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Speaker 1 (00:04):
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Unit twenty one dot ai Emiline Dozinski and this is
(00:55):
course of capital on the illicit edge network. Foreign adversaries
weaponization of information is nothing new. Still, the means and
modes by which rogue nations use disinformation, propaganda, and cyber
attacks to influence the American public opinion are increasingly worrisome,
weakening democracy, weaponizing free speech, and polarizing citizens in ways
(01:16):
they may not recognize, like in Russia, Iran, and China,
where their governments have built a global apparatus sowing discord
and a growing anti West narrative. I recently spoke with
renowned security expert and my colleague at the Foundation for
Defensive Democracies, doctor Vona Stradner, about this information warfare, what
she describes as the covert war for American minds. Doctor
(01:39):
Stradner is a research fellow with FDD's Bears Center for
Media Integrity. Her work examines both the psychological and technical
aspects of Russian information warfare. She also serves as a
special correspondent for the Key Post and Lectures on International
Law and Security. Ivana, you are one of the experts
that I go to to really understand the issue of
(02:02):
information warfare. What are the key elements and tools of
information warfare? How would you describe it?
Speaker 2 (02:10):
So, information warfare, as we have just mentioned, it contains
the word information, which is basically fight wars with other
means that are outside of heart power. So it's really
part of self power. But it is powerful enough that
can accomplish strategic objectives just like weapons. And that's something
(02:32):
that we have seen in the West. That's something that
we have seen with Russia's aggression in Ukraine, what China
is doing also globally, but also Iran. So it's a
very powerful tool that we are facing right now, and.
Speaker 1 (02:51):
A lot of your research and analysis over the last
few years has focused on Russian in particular and how
they use information warfare as an element of engagement with
many countries. And we're going to talk about that further
later on this conversation. But is the concept of information
(03:15):
warfare a relatively new phenomenon.
Speaker 2 (03:19):
Absolutely not. It's been around for decades, if I may
say even more like centuries. The only thing that is
really new is new technologies, especially related to social media platforms,
that can allow information slash disinformation or mal information to
actually go from one place to another in a very
(03:41):
very fast pace. And when you just mentioned Russia, Russia
has been using this tool kit for literally decades against
the West in particular. Just think about a Cold War
and Russia's active measures but also mus ktov uh in
the West, basically a lot of overt but also covert
(04:06):
actions that help Russia achieve its strategic objectives. Russia didn't
have to use tanks and jets back during the Cold
War against the United States. And I know that we're
living in a very very past, fast paced world, so
people do not have time and energy to go back
(04:28):
and to read all those documents from the Cold war.
But I always love to refer to them because we
tend to think sometimes very deeply about certain subjects without
thinking clearly, without understanding Russia's strategic approach to information warfare.
We love to talk about their operational and the tactical
(04:52):
level how Russia has been using that. I always, you know,
Ela loved to emphasize that Russia completely understands information in
a different way than we understand. They openly claim that
information is a weapon. They openly claim that who has
information superiority is going to win this war, and it's
(05:15):
truly about managing someone's perception. There is not to sound
like a typical academic, but I have to go back
to this strategic concept of reflexive control that the Kremlin
has been using truly for decades. So what does it mean.
It means that I feed you with information the two
(05:36):
things that can benefit you, but it actually benefits me.
So I'm going to set a goal for you. I'm
going to set certain strategies that you are going to follow,
and you will think that it will benefit you, but
actually it benefits your opponent. And when you think about,
for example, the most powerful Russia's influence operations in my
(05:58):
view for the past few years has been the one
related to the use of nuclear weapons, because put In,
as a KGB trained guy, he understands perfectly how to
manipulate his opponents, and he understands that a lot of
people in the West, but also here in Washington, DC,
remember the Cold War and have fears about nuclear escalations.
(06:21):
So he has pushed that agenda that if the West,
especially United States, help Ukraine, that is going to escalate
all the way to the nuclear war. So that's one
of the most powerful reflexive control strategies that Russia has
been using recently. And my last point to that. We
(06:44):
also like to sometimes think arrogantly that the world revolves
around Washington, DC or Brussels. So, for example, in Russian language,
they do not even use the word cybersecurity. They only
use that when they're referred to to Western news of cybersecurity.
They use another word, which is called information security. And
(07:06):
that tells you really all you need to know how
Russia is thinking about this subject, because they actually integrated
both the technical part, which is let's say attacks and
critical infrastructure, but also the psychological part of what we
call here information operations, and they also value for one,
(07:27):
they value four to one non kinetic to kinetic forces,
and it absolutely you know, it makes sense because put
In as a KGB trained person, he understands very well
how to manipulate his opponent. And Russia also doesn't play,
doesn't have to play by the rules that we have
(07:47):
to play. So that's why Russia has been quite successful
in this field.
Speaker 1 (07:53):
So a lot to unpact there. I want to go
back to twenty sixteen, which is when I feel like
the issue of information warfare and Russia's meddling in the
US elections really came into a public conversation, something that
people were paying attention to. How has Russian influence evolved
(08:14):
since twenty sixteen. I know there was some tracking of
Russian influence in the twenty twenty elections and in the
twenty twenty four elections, But would you say that the
information warfare campaign of Russia in the US is getting
worse or more sophisticated, or are we getting a handle
on that challenge?
Speaker 2 (08:35):
So I'm so glad that you ask me this question
because many people love to focus on Russia's influence operations
around the election times, when in fact Russia is doing
that three hundred and sixty five days twenty four to
seven around different cycles and different themes. So interfering in
(08:56):
American elections has always been one of Russia's favorite things
to basically not to particularly push for a certain candidate,
but rather to saw chaos and discord in the country
and to completely for people to lose their faith in institutions.
(09:18):
And all Russia really had to do was to polarize
on both sides of the spectrum, which is exactly what
we saw in twenty sixteen. But as you have mentioned,
Russia has evolved drastically. Back then, it was truly all
about trolls and bots, you know how authentic and authentic
(09:40):
accounts were pushing for certain narratives making people angry. And nowadays,
because we.
Speaker 3 (09:47):
Have a lot of software and a lot of technical
tools to basically detect their influence operations, Russia has moved
towards something else, towards more to put in quotation mark
grassroots movements.
Speaker 2 (10:06):
Basically using social media influencers to push for certain narratives
and traditional media that would put you certain information slash
this information in the information space, so everything looks just natural,
just that people have their own views when in fact,
the latest DOJ sanctions related to tenant media and how
(10:35):
they exposed, how they exposed and tell us actually how
Russia has evolved its strategies. I'm also tracking Russia's influence
operations in Central and Eastern Europe, and I know they
will talk later, but for example, there I can absolutely
see how Russia is taking social media influencers, fly them
to Russia, give them a training what they call it
(10:57):
a media training, and then fly them back. As I mentioned,
I really really hope one thing that we should eventually
stop talking about Russia's influence operations every four years, because
they are working twenty four to seven right now. In
the United States, we will see. Actually, we're already seeing
new efforts about California to secede, and Russia is already
(11:23):
on it pushing that narrative that was a very similar
thing where they were pushing for Texas to secede. And
while you and I like we can laugh about those
influenced operations, actually there are numerous evidence where we can
show really causality that it worked. It's also related to bioweapons.
(11:43):
It's also another field that Russia understands very well that
makes Americans very uncomfortable, So I'm happy to speak with
you more about that and exactly how Russia is operating
in this space. Of course, you know, pushing the narratives
are related to culture wars on both sides of the
spectrum and polluting the information space. Of course, there is
(12:06):
the issue related to Ukraine. If the United States supports Ukraine,
that for example, that we're pushing narratives that Americans are
starving and we suffer economically, so why would we ever
support Ukraine. But also it's the issue of if for example,
we support Ukraine, then Russian will go with China and
(12:28):
basically use that as a blackmail. I can go on
and on and give you multiple examples, but my conclusion
to that is not to use this for three days
and giving you a million examples is truly to explain
how Russia has adopted its influence operations.
Speaker 1 (12:45):
I think that helps us understand why the Russians are
so good at the information warfare game and the kinds
of methods that they use, and this global footprint that
has developed around these disinformation networks. One question that comes
to mind is how would a citizen, an average citizen,
(13:08):
understand what they're looking at for example, on a social
media environment, how would they be able to detect whether
they're looking at something that may have been influenced by
a foreign adversary. Is there a way to do that?
Speaker 2 (13:23):
So there are two parts of the issue there. Number
one is education, and I think some for example, Baltic States,
have done a very good job by teaching kids is
their early childhood on how to read news online. And
this is actually the paradox that exists here. If you
(13:44):
start teaching kids how to read the news, immediately they
will run another operation basically claiming that this is an
inductri nation of American youth, and they would, for example,
claim that this is a violation of free speech, which
is exactly how they have been violating free speech. And
we can discuss that more in details later. But the
(14:06):
second thing that I would love to add to, and
you know this point on a positive note, is that
I think more and more people are aware of how
this information campaigns operate. But as I said, they're evolving,
and they're also becoming more difficult to detect because it's
(14:27):
any more about some random bots that has like three
letters and seven numbers in the name, whether on the
platform X or Facebook or Instagram, feeling the blank. Actually,
I'll just give you a very concrete example. So Russia
can for example, create like a fake fake websites that
(14:51):
can mirror traditional media, whether all three journal New York
Times feeling the blank can just change like, for example,
one letter in the title, and you may not even
notice that when you click on that link, whether that
link is an accurate link or not, because people don't
(15:13):
pay attention to all those tiny details. There are a
lot of things right now, buzzwords such as, for example,
use of artificial intelligence that Russia has employed when it
comes to influence operations. Well, it is important. It's just
another technology, but the methods are the same. And the
(15:33):
third problem why it is very difficult to detect, it's
actually because we live in a free society. We do
not ban foreign media. Russian information space is completely closed. Actually,
now if you use the word war instead of special
military operation, you can end up in a war. Putt
(15:55):
In has banned foreign media, foreign social media. Here simply
announced that he will even ban for in video games
out of fear of using video games for influenced operations.
I can go on and on. They put in jail
different social media influencers just because they existed and stated
(16:17):
certain things that we're not in alignment with putt in rhetorics.
But this is really nothing new because that's exactly what
Stalin was using back then and today putting has just
continued with the same approach.
Speaker 1 (16:34):
So I want to come back to Russia, but I'd
love to get your thoughts on how China and Iran
are operating in this space and is there an evolving
capacity around information warfare that is in any way coordinated
among countries that are increasingly defined as part of the
(16:54):
access of aggressors.
Speaker 2 (16:57):
So it's not anymore Russia that is operating nefarious in
an nefarious way in the information space. Actually, our intelligence
has warned multiple times about China's and irans influenced operations,
also around the election times. In my view, Russia is
(17:19):
more sophisticated in sense that Russia understands very well the
narratives and how to use influenced operations to polarize societies,
and Russia and China they have very different objectives. China's
influence operations are mostly to discredit the United States and
(17:41):
to push the narrative that China is a friend of
the United States and just wants like a peaceful engagement
and economy. When it comes to a cooperation with the
United States. And Iran is junior partner of Russia, they
(18:04):
have specific narratives related to the Middle East. But also
to this credit, they try to discredit also President Trump,
how they were using influenced operations. And they're also learning
whether there is a pure coordination. Actually, China and Russia
they signed some agreements related to information security. Iran and
(18:31):
Russia are working together, for example on bricks TV and
working together. But I do not I haven't seen anything
in particular that can tell me that three of them
are on the same horizon using the same narratives. I
think they're in a competition. But for them the United
(18:53):
thing is that they have a mutual enemy.
Speaker 1 (18:56):
Yeah. So I want to quote something from your Foreign
Affairs article published in October of twenty twenty four. Together
with co author David shed He wrote, the United States
has reacted only trapidly to adversarious attempts to shape the
hearts and minds of American voters. It cannot afford to
be so timid, you go on to say, to safeguard
(19:17):
US national security, Washington should again launch influence operations of
its own. So I wanted to use that as a
framing for what is the US response to information warfare.
Speaker 2 (19:27):
As we mentioned in our article, we are not happy
with American response because we don't believe that it's powerful
enough to deter our enemies. And there are numerous reasons
actually why is that? But to make you know things
crystal clear, I think it's very important again to go
(19:48):
back to the Cold War era and remember that United
States was the beacon of hope for a lot of
people in Eastern Europe, precisely because of influence operations. For example,
the United States used Radio for Europe or the Voice
of America to push for certain narratives and give people
(20:12):
hope about democracy and freedom. There are numerous non reports
actually how the United States used jazz music or for example,
modern art to influence hearts and minds of people in
Eastern Europe. So no wonder why the majority of US
(20:34):
who grew up there love American modern art. But on
a serious note, something like that would not resonate nowadays
in the information space. Why because even people in Russia
they can have access to modern music, and that's something
that will not actually resonate with them. The second problem
(20:55):
is that as a democracy, we have to follow certain rules.
There are certain rules that we have to follow when
it comes to offensive influence operations covert or overt, or
whether we can or not push for certain narratives, especially
when it comes to let's say, disinformation campaigns. So it's
(21:20):
not easy for us to play the game the Russia
is playing, and we should not because the truth is
on our side. So just give you a very concrete
example how we are missing numerous opportunities. So equivalent to nature,
Russia has established something that is called CSTO, and CSTO
something like what I put in a quotation mark is
(21:42):
a military alliance with Russia's allies is actually falling apart
because just look certain countries that announce that they plan
to leave the cst What a great opportunity really for
the United States to launch influence operations and tell the
truth about Russia's lives, the right that put In is
actually losing, losing his allies. So I think in a
(22:06):
large part it's also because Washington is very much risk averse,
and to launch a fence and influence operations you have
to have a mindset to take certain risks and that's
not something that unfortunately is rewarded in Washington, DC. And
as I mentioned, we also have to follow certain rules.
So if you decide to lounge such influenced operations, you
(22:30):
will have ten lawyers knocking on your doors telling you
what you can or you cannot do, and going through
all those processes. It can take time, and you need
right now like to react in a rapidly Putting doesn't
have to follow any of those rules. He can just
with one phone call decide what to do. He is
(22:50):
not bound by rules. He does not have to worry
whether he can or not push this information related to
American bio weapons or cobbed or monkey pox, just feeling
the blank. So it's a very unfair bottle field and
very difficult battlefield that we are that we are facing. Finally,
(23:13):
the Global Engagement Center was just recently shut down. And
yes they did some things that were not welcomed by
by the Republican Party, but also it was an agency
that helped to expose Russian propaganda, but not only Russian.
They done a great work also on China. So that's
(23:36):
the second the second part that we need another place
where we are going to use UH an agency that
can expose UH influence operations. And the last point is
that we as a democracy, we have the right of
free speech the First Amendment, and the moment when we
(23:57):
started going after their influence came pains. They immediately launch
a counter influence operations here in the United States, telling
the Americans that the government is trying to shut down
their free speech. And this is a violation of the
First Amendment, which is exactly the weaponization of free speech
(24:17):
because lane as a citizen, I can say what regular say.
They can say whatever I want in social media, but
if someone is paid to do that by a foreign government,
that should be illegal. And that's something that we need
to actually teach Americans how to distinguish our right to
(24:38):
free speech versus how foreign adversaries that are abusing that.
Speaker 1 (24:44):
Today's podcast is supported by Unit twenty one. In the
fast paced world of fraud detection and compliance, speed and
accuracy equals efficiency. That's where Unit twenty one comes in.
Unit twenty one is cutting edge platform empowers financial institutions
and techs to detect, investigate, and respond to suspicious activity
throughout the life cycle of a customer. Account and in
(25:07):
real time. Their no code solution allows risk and compliance
teams to combine data signals for robust monitoring, payment fraud prevention,
and case management automation, all without engineering support. To learn more,
visit Unit twenty one dot ai. Do you feel like
there is a country in the world that has a
(25:27):
good response mechanism to this kind of information warfare? For example,
if we look at how the Europeans are responding to
Russia's information warfare, which is also happening in Western Europe
we'll talk about Eastern Europe in just a minute. And
there are also targeted campaigns towards NATO. Is there any
(25:50):
playbook for response mechanisms that should be held up as
some sort of a global standard or are we all
struggling with how to respond?
Speaker 2 (26:00):
I think all democracies are truly struggling, because, as I mentioned,
the rules of their games are different. However, I think
there is so much that we can learn from Ukraine,
so much that we can learn from the Baltic States
and their approach towards Russia's influence operations, not only when
(26:21):
it comes to, for example, exposing them, but also sanctioning them,
but also mocking their influenced operations, because the most powerful
weapon against put In slies is actually humor, and that's
something that I think Ukraine and the Baltic States are
very very good at. But on a serious note, I
(26:45):
think it's really past time for the West to have
a strategy when it comes to influenced operations, because, make
no mistake, influenced operations are here to stay, because who
has information superiority is going to win this war. And
I use very carefully the World War. And I will
(27:05):
explain why I'm emphasizing this because so many people in
the West may laugh about Puttings incentives, actually putting statements
about the creation of a multipolar world, and while it
is still far from the truth, how do you create
new ideology or a new world in perception? And the
(27:28):
world does not revolve around Washington, London or Brussels. And
that's precisely how Putting is operating in the global South,
using influence operations to accomplish his objectives. So not only
that we have to defend ourselves when it comes to
Russia's influence operations and to help our elies, I think
(27:52):
it's also very important to protect our objectives elsewhere in
the world and to keep Putting a taste of his
own medicine and to go back to the Cold War
era and to launch offensive influenced operations that would definitely
give put In headache.
Speaker 1 (28:10):
So I want to pick up on something you mentioned earlier,
which is the Bricks Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
announcing the creation of Bricks TV. So what is this about?
Who owns it? Is this a new mechanism of information
warfare that we need to be considering.
Speaker 2 (28:31):
So Russia has been operating for a long time through
RT and Sputnik as media channels. They were basically pushing
narratives that are aligned with the Kremlin. But Putting understands
also something really really well that he had to adopt
(28:52):
his influence operations. And that's why the Bricks actually TV
and media step team and started making all those agreements
between different countries in the Global South, including just recently.
I saw how they made certain agreements even with Iran,
(29:15):
to push for certain narratives and everything is around the
creation of a new multipolar world of a better world
order that is more just what they claim the end
of American hegemony, what I like to call but also
to focus on economy and investments, which is far from
(29:35):
what actually breaks TV is about. So it's just a
new it's just a new media that tends to actually
replace our teams Putnik and to bring new narratives in
the global South.
Speaker 1 (29:51):
So Russia's information warfare influence in Eastern Europe is also
something we should talk about places like Serbia, Moldova, Georgia,
Hungary other former satellite states where there's a certain amount
of political instability. There's a push and pull between the
(30:13):
influence of Russia and the influence of the EU. Do
you see this as a particular threat and how does
information warfare manifest in these environments.
Speaker 2 (30:26):
Well, a lot of people actually focus on Russia's war
in Ukraine just as one side story. I actually perceived
this in a more holistic way, because for putting this word,
it's not only about Ukraine. It's truly about destroying the
(30:46):
Western unity, making a new global order. And what a
better way to do it than to rally his allies.
He has allies as just mentioned in Latin America or
for example, in Africa, but he also has certain allies
in Europe, and he wants to make sure that Europe
is on the brink and that Europe is not going
(31:06):
to react. So just look what's happening right now in
Georgia with Georgian dream that has very very uh anti
Western agenda, and Putting has been working on destabilizing Georgia
for a very long time. Uh So this really doesn't
come as a surprise. And Putting is also pushing an
(31:28):
agenda like if we support the position that basically that
is going to create just a new war over there.
Uh So it's better to support the current government there
because that's going to escalate, which is just another influenced operations.
Because Putting would never benefit from a war in Caucuses
(31:51):
because that will absolutely destabilize, uh destabilize him as well.
There are also efforts in Moldova that Russia has been
pushing the agenday related to Transnistria, but also how the
West is not going to help Moldova, how Moldova is
going to freeze without Russian gas. There were numerous attempts
(32:15):
to stabilize the government to active measures, for example, to
overthrow the government, protests, et cetera, et cetera. In Serbia
as well, Russia has been playing a very important role
when it comes to influence operations. The even just recently
open our a TV shaping the narrative about Serbia being
(32:38):
Russia's friend and pushing Serbia for a war with Kosovo.
They also were pushing the agenda around what they called
traditional more in spiritual values, and I would love to
actually in a moment tell you that important part. So
making sure that also the Balkans is on the brain
(33:00):
war because don't forget that there are two Nature member states.
And also recently Serbian clashes in Kosto, I actually injured
nineteen to eight a piece keepers. So all Russia really
had to do is to destabilize those regions and to
make sure that the West does not respond in euro
(33:20):
absolutely right also about the European Union and enlargement. Russia
doesn't want any of those countries to be closer to
the European Union. So that's precisely why they are making
sure that they remain there is a status quo and
trying also to use any of vulnerable spots where they
(33:40):
can always escalate and then d escalate. And the putting
game position himself is a pillar of stability negotiations with
the West. So I just also mentioned something that I
think is tremendously important to emphasize Russia's role of put
in a quotation mark, protecting traditional more and spiritual values.
If you're read Russia's national security documents, you will actually
(34:03):
find in early paragraphs how Russia is a protector of
traditional more in spiritual values. A lot of my colleagues
in the West laugh about that, thinking who cares, But
actually it's extremely important because Putting needs a new ideology
to put it in a quotation mark, as an ideology is
(34:25):
an idea that can rally his allies around certain idea
to push for certain areas. That's exactly what put In
has been doing with the Farai groups across Europe but
also in the United States, basically stalking those cultural wars
and to claim that Russia is a pillar of traditional
(34:47):
more in spiritual values and that's why Russia is a
friend of those parties slash individuals. But it's really odd
to say that because Russian Orthodox Church has always been
a pillar of Russia's intelligence for destabilizing the region. Put
don't care less about religion. There are numerous reports that
(35:12):
even Patriarch Kirol served in Russia's intelligence. I always like
to emphasize how he loves to wear thirty thousand dollars,
watch and enjoy his luxury. Russia has one of the
highest abortion and divorce rates, so I'm actually not quite
(35:33):
certain that Russia is a pillar of protecting traditional, more
inspiritual values. Is just another information campaign for the West
that Putting wants them to fall for.
Speaker 1 (35:49):
Yeah, yeah, it strikes me that information warfare is an
excellent component of a colectocratic system. We have to think
about it in those terms, you know, both in terms
of who's involved in effectuating these sorts of strategies, how
they use these social themes and vulnerabilities really to drive
(36:16):
an agenda that is perhaps very different than what people imagine.
So are there opportunities to help fragile democracies and even
to help ourselves deal with information warfare? How should we
be thinking about this? And you mentioned the Global Engagement Center,
which is housed within State Department. They were not reauthorized,
(36:39):
so we no longer have that as a tool within
the US government. But are there opportunities to think more
broadly about engaging with allies and partners multilateral responses or
are we all just dealing with this as countries on
our own.
Speaker 2 (36:57):
I think that Global Engagement Center had that idea to
rally American analysts around the same important, important issue, which
is to defend ourselves from foreign influence, but unfortunately it's
not there anymore. So I think we do need a
(37:17):
similar bipartisan organization or institution that can achieve those objectives
in the meantime. You just mentioned also sanctions, and I
think what we did with Tenant Media and with other
Russian outlets is a step in the right direction because
that also prevents social media influencers to use that as
(37:41):
a platform to spread certain narratives, because, as you said,
one thing is to do it. As an individual, you
can say whatever you want. And I firmly, firmly support
First Amendment. But what I do not support if people
are paid by foreign governments to spread certain narratives. So
(38:02):
I think sanctioning social media, social media platforms that allow
our media platforms coming from Russia that are behind these
information campaigns, but also individuals, including Russian operatives in the West,
(38:23):
is a step in the right direction, so it's not
truly a violation of free speech. I would really not
love to see the United States sanctioning Slash banning social
media Western social media platforms from operating. We do need that,
We do need that as a platform to also express
(38:44):
our views, et cetera, et cetera. But as I said,
Russian media that is designed for the West should not
have a place in our information system if it's part
of Russia's intelligence strategy. And my last point to that is,
we also need to provide technical support to all those
(39:08):
fragile democracies, like different software centers, to give them, to
give them trainings when it comes to defending themselves from
influenced operations. And I think there are numerous initiatives coming
from the United States about that, and I truly hope
they will continue.
Speaker 1 (39:25):
Ivan It seems to me that the private sector could
play a very important role in terms of countering information warfare.
This is certainly something that's been on the agenda of
social media platforms and companies here in the US and elsewhere.
But what do you think should be happening with respect
(39:47):
to private sector engagement and where's the opportunity to have
a stronger public private response to all of this.
Speaker 2 (39:57):
I think when it comes to fighting influenced operations, private
sector can play a tremendously important role. We already saw
numerous Microsoft assessments as well as the reports where they
exposed foreign influence operations, so that's certainly been very helpful.
(40:17):
There are numerous organizations that are growing in number, not
only in the United States but also elsewhere in Europe
with researchers and investigative efforts to actually expose foreign influenced operations.
So this is one of the pillars that is tremendously important. However,
(40:42):
there are certainly no limits how they can go on
the offensive and what they can do. I don't know
what is happening in that field, but I truly also
hope that that part can be conducted by US government
unapologetically and to stop being risk conversed when it comes
(41:05):
to influence operations, because, as I mentioned, who has information
superiority is going to win this war.
Speaker 1 (41:14):
Adversarial influence comes in many forms, and the rise in
the use of social media has been a boon to
rogue regime seeking to destabilize free and open societies. As
doctor Stradner urges, free nations must move from disjointed and
insufficient to comprehensive and coordinated in their response. My thanks
to ev Honor for her insights and compelling research. Thanks
(41:36):
for joining me on this episode of Coersive Capital on
the Illicit Edge Network.