June 24, 2025 • 53 mins
In Episode 13 of Coercive Capital, host Elaine Dezenski is joined by Behnam Ben Taleblu, Senior Director of FDD’s Iran Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an expert on Iranian security and sanctions. They explore the cost and consequences of confronting the Islamic Republic—from the legacy of the U.S. “maximum pressure” campaign to the internal economic crises gripping Iran’s ruling regime. As nuclear diplomacy falters and regional tensions rise, financial institutions and compliance teams must adapt. What tools and insights are needed to understand Iran’s future trajectory? And how can policymakers and global markets stay ahead of the next flashpoint?
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Coercive Capital’s Proud Sponsors: This episode of Coercive Capital is brought to you by Hummingbird. Hummingbird is hosting a live, virtual webinar on Everyday AI for Compliance & Registration. In this session, experts will walk you through the best practices for leveraging artificial intelligence to streamline compliance processes and registration requirements, helping businesses save time and stay ahead of regulatory changes. To join the conversation and learn more about the webinar, visit Hummingbird’s website.
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Illicit Edge: Breaking News for Financial Crime Coercive Capital explores the intersection of U.S. economic and national security and global financial reform. Global adversaries are weaponizing our trade and financial systems, while Illicit financial flows, kleptocracy, and organized crime continue to erode democratic systems and destabilize economies. Elaine Dezenski brings together experts who understand these emerging threats and provide insights into the risks and emerging opportunities to strengthen our collective response.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:04):
Just a quick note to everyone out there. There's a
free webinar coming up and I think you should check
it out. It's called Everyday AI for Compliance Teams and
it's being hosted by our sponsor, Hummingbird on June twenty fifth.
It's a practical look at how investigators are using Hummingbird's
AI tools to work more efficiently, things like reducing repetitive tasks,
speeding up casework, and writing clearer, more consistent narratives. Why
(00:28):
because the goal of compliance AI isn't to replace judgment,
it's to give you more time to use it. That's
all happening Wednesday, June twenty fifth at eleven am Pacific
two pm Eastern, and you can register at a hummingbird
dot co slash Illicit Edge. Again, that's hummingbird dot Co
slash Illicit Edge. Hey, viewers and listeners, glad to have
(00:51):
you here. Back with Coercive Capital. Today's episode is focused
on Iran, and since we've recorded this on June eighteenth
and today's June twenty third, things have progressed. The US
is now involved in the war and it's unclear what
will be happening next. We may see some sort of
(01:12):
a deal if President Trump's tweets foretell something that may
be coming soon. I wanted to just make sure that
you knew about this delay and recording so that you
can take the discussion in context. Much of what we
talk about is even more relevant than it was last week,
(01:32):
but it's always good to put things in context. So
thanks for listening. Welcome back Course of Capital viewers and listeners.
After a brief hiatus, it's great to be back bringing
you podcast content on the Illicit Edge Network. And today
(01:57):
we're going to talk about Iran, joined by one of
the smartest people analyzing Iran today, Benam ben Talaglu. Benham
is senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation
for Defensive Democracies, where he's also a senior fellow colleague
of mine wonderful guy. He's also a member of the
Anti Defamation League's Task Force on the Middle East Minorities
(02:19):
and a contributing editor to the National Security Journal. Venom
examines Iran from just about every geopolitical angle you can imagine,
from nuclear non proliferation, ballistic missiles and drones, sanctions, the
illicit or the excuse me, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Cord
its proxies, foreign insecurity policy of the Islamic Republic and
(02:41):
more so, I can't imagine a more relevant person to
speak with during this current moment and to discuss the
evolving situation in the Middle East. So thank you Venam
for joining the podcast.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
Welcome, thanks for having me Lane, great to be with you,
and thanks for the very kind intro.
Speaker 1 (02:57):
Oh thanks, Well, things are changing as we speak, so
I thought what we should do is walk through some
of the latest developments on the Israeli Iran conflict and
you know, kind of get the lay of the land
as of today, and I just wanted to kind of
throw out there that it's nothing short of incredible that
(03:20):
as of a few days ago, Israel effectively controls the
Iranian airspace, which is pretty shocking even for folks who
I follow. Who are you know, like you really focused
on Iran? So what do you see unfolding at the moment,
and how would you summarize what's happened over the last
(03:40):
five to six days since Israel attacked Iran's nuclear weaponsites
and focused on eliminating some of the key leadership within
their nuclear program.
Speaker 2 (03:56):
Well, I think the word historic is absolutely right. I'm
going to butcher this lenin quotes of old people, where
I think you said there's decades where nothing happens, and
there's weeks where decades happen. We are less than a week,
as you mentioned, about six days into this overt Israeli
Ron shooting war.
Speaker 3 (04:12):
And make no.
Speaker 2 (04:13):
Mistake, it is a war. There's missiles flying, there's cyber stuff,
there's misinformation, there's control of cyberspace as well as the airspace.
This is the shadow war that we've seen between the
Islamic republica roon and Israel briefly come out of the
shadows in twenty twenty four and now stay there out
(04:34):
conventional outright over in twenty twenty five. And what you've
seen the Israelis do, based on reporting, based on video,
based on social media, based on official statements, is basically
deracinate the military brain trust of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
as well as a whole host of.
Speaker 3 (04:51):
Iranian nuclear scientists. They're going after the.
Speaker 2 (04:54):
Intellectual capital, the political capital that has actually made a
regime like the Islamic Republic be able to let asked
for so long. The reason I say this is because
while all the Israeli strikes on Iranian military basis in
the west as well as now in the center, and
then even last weekend that one site all the way
in the northeast of Iran, showing how much range and
control they could have over Iranian airspace. While all of
(05:18):
that matters from a military perspective, politically, these Raelies already
knew they were fighting an adversary who was conventionally weaker
than them, but to benefit maximally from that delta, they
were also striking.
Speaker 3 (05:32):
With the element of surprise.
Speaker 2 (05:33):
And while it's not a surprise because Israel and America
have been saying for many years, I think really since
the post nine to eleven years that all options were
on the table, and really twenty twenty four was a
historic year showed the regime's weaknesses limping into twenty twenty
five economically, environmentally, politically, militarily. It was not a shock
that Israel would be able to see that the regime
(05:55):
was at its lowest point, perhaps its lowest point ever
since the end of the.
Speaker 3 (05:59):
Iran Iraq War.
Speaker 2 (06:00):
But to really have the gumption to capitalize on that,
and capitalize on that with something that was not as
much reported, but which was a something that led to
their post October successes in the wars closer to home
for these Raelies, which was the intelligence fights and the
intelligence networks that they helped create, I mean inside of Iran.
These Raleies today have a drone base. They're firing on
(06:23):
Iran from Iranian territory. So merging this inside and outside game,
merging this defense against Iranian missiles, plus this offensive ground
game on the ground with thrones against these production sides
and against these launch sides, has really led to the
restricted room for maneuver of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and even forcing the Iranians into doing things that they
(06:45):
may not necessarily do and may not want to do,
and into predicaments you know, between use or lose. For example,
the Irunians are now finding realistic missiles from deeper within
Iranian territory, which means they have to rely on us
series of potentially older ballistic missiles, which advidually have heavier warheads,
so if they land in Israel, the impact is bigger,
(07:07):
but the interception likelihood is also much greater. Also, they're
just forcing the Iranians into this you know, use or
lose mentality because the Iranians for many years had a
quantitative missile advantage against the Israelies, but with the interceptions
as well as the left of launch strikes, the capability
for the Iranians to act on this quantitative advantage continues
(07:29):
to diminish. So you're seeing not just attacks on missiles
but also attacks on launchers. So you could have the
biggest arsenal in the world, and not just the Middle East.
But if you don't have a launcher, you can't really
get from point A to point B.
Speaker 3 (07:43):
So you know, these.
Speaker 2 (07:43):
Rallies have attacked the logistics and the command and control network,
and then they're also doing some politically symbolic targeting of
critical infrastructure that says that they could really scale this
up to be a major energy war as well as
also to be able to go after the regime's nuclear sites,
because less we forget, the big backdrop for this was
to stop the Islamic Republic of Iran from developing a
(08:05):
nuclear weapon, and actually there if one, is going to
be more critical beyond obviously the fact that any war
unfortunately does indeed have civilian casualties, and imposing civilian casualties
on any population is lamentable and is very sad and lamentable.
It is especially tragic in this case because you actually
have in the Iranian population the most pro American, the
(08:26):
most even pro Israeli population, And how to fight the
war against the regime kinetically now without losing that will
be a challenge for the Israelis while also defining success
as tactically and technically as possible by trying to go
after all of their nuclear program. And there's some sites
where they still may need more help. And that's why
all eyes really right now are on America. What will
(08:47):
America do? Will America more formally enter this conflict, Will
it go against the regime leadership, which the President has
been intonating on social media that he might, or will
they go for a more limited counter nuclear movie. Can
the US do it have to do that in conjunction
with the US and the Israelis. So there's a lot
more questions than answers here. That's really a tour to
(09:07):
force what.
Speaker 3 (09:09):
Is going on.
Speaker 1 (09:10):
Excellent, Well, there's a lot to dig into here, So
thank you for that framing that up so beautifully. One
thing that really struck me about what happened over the
weekend and the surprise of the Israeli attack, the fusion
of technology and intelligence networks, the ability to pinpoint locations
(09:35):
and people of interest within Iran to do so, you know,
very strategically, very cleanly. It's a completely different game than
thinking back to the attacks of October seventh and how
much of a surprise that was for the Israelis. And
(09:57):
that got me thinking about the issue of arounds proxies.
And you know, it's been kind of quiet from Hamas Hezbola.
What's that about? And what should we be expecting from
around proxies in the region who you know, maybe are
trying to reassess what their role is going forward. But
(10:21):
it is interesting that it's just been really quiet.
Speaker 2 (10:24):
It's been really quiet, and again that is by design.
It may be a question of when Hesbela may enter,
but if you had to be betting at this point
in time, Hesbela won't or is thus far trying to
delay its entry as much as possible. I mean this,
this constellation of terror proxies and partners you mentioned these
(10:44):
Lamica public calls this the axis of resistance, and the
post October sevent midd least was not an easy place
to be for the Axis of resistance. Even though these
Lamara public thought that by incrementally turning on a multi
front war against these rallies, it could attry these rallies
and bleed them into longer conflicts that they're not well
suited to fight. Try to, you know, force these relies
(11:06):
to divide their resources, expend forces, deal with political issues
at home and abroad while fighting you know, these more
asymmetric hybrid kinds of military operations. But ultimately, when it
comes to Hesbele in the south, Hesble in the north,
in Lebanon and Hamas in the south and Gaza, these
relies were immensely successful, both from a military perspective as
(11:27):
well as from an intelligence perspective, and that neutering and
gutting of Iran's transnational terrorist apparatus left to other elements,
the Houthis which for two months who saw the US
battle and tried to render to the sidelines, as well
as the Shia militias in Iraq, which have thus far
largely been quiet. Even in the post October seven Middle East.
(11:48):
They have been firing at Israel, but nowhere at the
volume that they had been firing at the Americans, and
even at the Americans that the volume ebbed and flowed
compared to you know, twenty nineteen levels of max pressure
counter post Soley money highs for this Iran backed for
these Iran backed terror groups. So one reason the Israelis
may have seen that now was an opportune time to
(12:10):
strike was the weakness of some of these groups. And
when you look at Iranian strategy more broadly, the regime
is a regime obsessed with deterrence. It's really overlearned the
lessons of deterrence from the Iran Iraq War. And this
is a small tangent, but every threat we face from
the regime in the military world, whether that's again transnational
terrorism and militias and proxies, or ballistic missiles or drones
(12:35):
or for example, you know, maritime aggression, these were things
that we saw and even you know the nuclear program,
by the way, these were things that we saw during
the Iran Iraq War raised their head. That was the
incubation period for these threats, and then post Ierono Rock War,
they were scaled up over time and integrated and you've
seen these Raelies understand that the deterrent functions of these
(12:58):
things maritime aggression, the US had been dealing with ballistic missiles.
These rallies and the Americans had been intercepting most but
not all, of those missile strikes in twenty twenty four,
and then transnational terrorism was down, so it really it
opened the way for these rallies to have the cleanest
possible shot against the heart of the regime itself, because
(13:19):
this deterrent architecture had really collapsed the only area that
it had not collapsed, and in fact, all the eggs
had been doubled down in that basket. And that's why
you saw, particularly post October seven, a whole host of
Iranian statements designed to take into account the evolving missile capability,
but cognizant of the adversaries evolving ballistic missile defenses, as
(13:42):
well as cognizance of the weakness of that transnational terror force.
You know, the fact that Hamas leaders are gone, HESBLA
leaders are gone, much of the HESBLA arsenal is gutted.
The fact that even with the ceasefire in place in
twenty twenty five, these rallies are able to still push
back against Hesbola, and still there's no HESBELA rocket volleys
or drones or anti tank weapons coming back at them,
(14:03):
and it isn't causing some kind of you know, major
political issue. Even with central authorities in Beirut, some of
them are happy to see these strikes continue. So these
reelis realized that they had a really clean shot and
that the proxy issue could be much more easily managed
if you disconnected the dots of it from its patron
and I think explains why the regime's acts as a
(14:26):
resistance isn't really resisting today.
Speaker 1 (14:30):
So these regional dynamics are complicated. But one other question
that came to my mind is how the fall of
the Asad regime in Syria impacted how all of this unfolded.
Speaker 2 (14:43):
Well, the Asad regime in Syria, we have to always remember,
was the sole state ally of the Islamic Republic in
the region. You know, the Islamic Republic really does have
a transnational vision, but it doesn't really have a whole
host of international partners. Yes, the regime is part of
this axis of aggressors, but again, even there there are
(15:03):
issues bilaterally between each country and there's different equities, there's
historical enmity, the real overlap there is political, not necessarily
a military and economic and when it comes to the
Assad regime, the Assaidn regime occupied a really critical piece
of geography in the Middle East that allowed the regime
to erect and sustain the land bridge from Iran through
(15:26):
Iraq into Syria and then to the Eastern Mediterranean through Lebanon.
And this basically was a highway that men, money and
munitions flew that supplemented the air bridge that allowed Iran
to basically use civilian airliners to ferry also men money
and munitions to conflict zones. And it was a permissive
environment and a launch pad and a measure of the
regime's forward defense strategy that allowed them to really have
(15:50):
a whole host of fights, have a whole host of
wars far away from their territory. It doesn't mean that
the Assaud regime over the years, they didn't try to hedge.
Every ten years, they went in one direction or another direction,
but broadly strategically politically they were always aligned with the
Iranian kin And it was really through the Asad regime
that Iran got to be able to create and control
(16:12):
Lebanese Hezbola in neighboring Lebanon.
Speaker 3 (16:14):
And when you.
Speaker 2 (16:15):
Remove as the Israelis have done slowly gutting the Iranian
basing infrastructure with strike since twenty thirteen and stepping up
in twenty fifteen against Iranian positions in Syria, and then
much more importantly, when you remove Hesbola from the equation
which had entered the Syrian Civil War in twenty thirteen
to bail out the Assad regime, you actually had the
(16:37):
political space in the military space for the collapse of
Turkey backed and al Qaeda linked militias and terror bops
to come in as rapidly as they did in the
winter of twenty twenty four. So the Iranians have been
losing on a whole host of fronts here and again.
If you're an Israeli decision maker and you realize your
(16:57):
advantage is a conventional military advantage that can be bolstered
by a series of short, sharp strikes married with a
great intel capability, when you see this again, this entire
architecture dissipating that your adversary had created, you press and
push the advantage. And I think that explains is really
decision making today as well as the predicament Iranian decision
(17:19):
makers find themselves in.
Speaker 1 (17:20):
Yeah, fascinating, Well, that's a good segue to a discussion
on what might be on the negotiating table. So the
Trump administration is called for. Trump himself has called for
unconditional surrender of the Iranian regime. It appears unlikely that
the regime will take him up on that. But if
(17:41):
you could kind of put your your your crystal ball
out in front of us here, what do you think
a negotiation might look like in light of, you know,
around dwindling number of cards to play? Is there even
a need for a negotiation? What should all of this
(18:02):
look like in terms of the diplomatic conversation, particularly over
the next few weeks.
Speaker 2 (18:08):
You know, you mentioned the word diplomatic, and the problem
is that there hasn't really been a diplomatic ground game,
and with respect, there hasn't even really been political thought
for the day after. That doesn't even necessarily mean regime change.
That means about how you can politically maximize your cards
to take advantage of this crumbling infrastructure in a way
(18:28):
that is not just military or that does not always
just have to be military. I mean again, these Raelis
have paved the pathway to make the case now in
the Middle East that you can finally begin to deal
with Iranian military threats in a military manner. But Iran's
strongest cards right now, if you're thinking about regime survival,
if you're thinking about buying space and creating time to
(18:49):
reconstitute what's left of the nuclear program, about putting up
barriers to entry for American involvement, those cards are not military.
Those cards are political, And being able to understand the
running political game requires understanding how the run is negotiate. Now,
this is an ideological regime that for forty plus years,
for forty six years, has consistently preferenced when put to
(19:11):
the choice macroeconomically or militarily, guns over butter. So if
that is going to be the case, it's all about
restricting the revenue and restricting the political space for them
to continue to pursue, said Gun. So, if you have
an adversary in this world, it's about and their intent
on fighting you, no matter how weak they are. Then
it's all about making sure that you know they are
(19:32):
fighting but with one.
Speaker 3 (19:33):
Hand tied behind their back.
Speaker 2 (19:35):
And negotiations here I think are consistent with the way
the Trump administration has made sense of the threats that
he believes Iran present presents to US interests in US security,
at the top of those as a potential nuclear weapon.
And you know, the President has been remarkably consistent when
he said, you know, he doesn't want to run to
get a nuclear weapon. And you know, even before he
(19:55):
entered office in term one, when he was campaigning, he said,
I think I buy bad deals, make them good deals.
Speaker 3 (20:01):
In this world.
Speaker 2 (20:02):
What the President may see is that Israeli military power
could be the means for an American diplomatic end. And
that's why I think the steady stream of commentary, some helpful,
some unhelpful on social media like x and whatever the
other applications are the names.
Speaker 3 (20:20):
Escape me.
Speaker 2 (20:22):
Is all about creating confusion for the Iranians about what
American potential aims are, if they will enter the conflict,
if they're not, if this will be military, if this
will be political. But I think they're designed to broadly
signal to comminate dismantle the program aka through negotiations, or
die or dismantle the program, or watch it and potentially
(20:43):
your regime be dismantled before your very eyes. These are
the choices Trump is trying to present to the Iranians.
I think in terms of how he's negotiating without already
negotiating and again cognizant of how weak the regime is.
This is actually when the regime actually excels, because if
we face these threats by virtue of the regime being empowered,
(21:03):
being an ideological regime, this is how they actually stay
in power despite being weaker.
Speaker 3 (21:09):
This is how the.
Speaker 2 (21:09):
Iroanioq War ended when they realized that there was no
way out, but through the predecessor of Isola Romani, the
founding father of the Islamic Republic, Isola Sorry, the predecessor
of Iola Kamene, who was Isola Homane. The name sound
very familiar and similar. When he ended the Ironuoq War,
he likened accepting a un cease fire that he had
rejected for a while to being akin to drinking from
(21:33):
a poison chalice. So the real strategy question is how
can you get Kamine to take the knee to drink
from the poison chalice? And it is by continuing the
military squeeze, by dangling the threat of American involvement and
making sure the Isolda is no way out. But through
what I would push back on that is is are
you sure you want to offer this regime an off ramp,
(21:54):
because while the debate in DC really since the end
of the push to administration has been what kind of
forced posture doing need in the region when Americans want
to consistently be doing less not more.
Speaker 3 (22:05):
In the region.
Speaker 2 (22:06):
The only long term way to address that, instead of
promising one thing and then having to get sucked back
in like Obama and Bush and Biden had to be
when it came to a whole host of other threats
in the Middle East while balancing great power competition and
pivoting and rebalancing to Asia, is by flipping the script
on the Iatolas. And that actually could be where a
potential regime change option actually is the thing that allows
(22:28):
you to push away from the Middle East. If you
flip the script on the Ietolas, you have turned off
the fire on You've done away with the arsonist behind
many of the fires of the Middle East. If by
solving that one thing, you open the management toolbox to
deal with all of the other things that have long
existed in the Middle East. So I don't believe the
(22:48):
Trump administration sees it that way yet, but I think
talking about decapitating military leadership, talking about not talking, but
basically hinting that there will be a gigantic failed state
in the heart of the Middle East with eighty six
million people, many of them are pro American pro is
Really that to me seems to be the height of
irresponsibility to do that while thinking you can pivot and
not have to deal with this region anymore and not
(23:10):
deal with environmental and economic and political and military, let
alone real human issues. And that's why the attempt to
avoid the regime change conversation actually is handicapping the necessary
political work to see how Iran is trying to buy time,
to see where their diplomatic strategy is at, and to
see what you will need to balance with when it
(23:30):
comes to Middle Eastern threats that are military, economic, and political,
with much more, bigger, costlier and challenging Eurasian and East
Asian threats.
Speaker 1 (23:40):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely, So who's advising Tehran? Who's I mean,
we you know, as you've laid it out, they're in
a bit of a corner here. Every day their leverage
is in some way decreasing, and I want to talk
about the economic side of that as well a bit later.
But who's whispering in the ear of the Ayatola outside
(24:03):
of Iran, anyone Russia, China who might be looking to
play a role in terms of how this all plays
out with the Israelis and the Americans.
Speaker 2 (24:14):
I honestly think not many people. You know, Again, there
is this acts of aggressors. There is Russia and China,
but they see Iran as a pawn in their strategic
competition with the West. You know, Iran has been auditioning
for great power support under the auspices of the Islamic
Republic for many years now, since the mid nineteen nineties.
You know, you can find from that time, you know,
Iranian talking points that sound like Putin talking points about
(24:36):
NATO expansion. They have been auditioning for this cover because
they want exactly that, the advice, the military stuff. And
while no doubt they've gotten it, they've gotten it in
dribs and drabs. And really it was only the post
JCPOA post Syrian Civil War relationships that created the political
space for the Iranians and the Russians to scale up
to go to the strategic relationship they had with Ukraine.
(24:58):
But we used to have a Russian colleague min many
years ago here at FDD.
Speaker 3 (25:01):
He was actually born in.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
The Soviet Union, and he used to always tell me
this phrase about Iran and Russia. And there is no
honor among thieves. Just because you bail your friend out
doesn't mean your friend will come bail you out. And
this is really the way a lot of partnerships work
in the world. I mean NATO and like real treaty allies.
They are the aberrations to the norm in human history.
(25:23):
So the Islamic Republic is alone. It's done a lot
to put itself in that position to be alone. But
those who it has coveted great power support and strategic
support from will always have to balance with the other conditions.
I mean, the Obama administration very cleverly got to the
Chinese to act on their own mercantilist impulses and in
(25:45):
so doing magnify the effect of US secondary sanctions. The
real art will be how to keep these two actors
at bay to not empower Iran, rather than how do
you further drive you know, how do you deal with
this issue in a way that you know magnifies the
existing Russo Iranian and Russo and Signo Iranian ties. So
(26:06):
Kamine is alone, and not only is he alone. He
is meeting people that he has not met with before.
I mean the military and political the military brain trusts
of the Islamic Republic is no longer there. People that
he's been having meetings with for fifteen years on a
perhaps two to three times a week basis are not
familiar faces in the room anymore. You know, there was
(26:28):
a joke made about the spokesperson for the Iranian military operation,
exceptionally young guy that the joke was that this is
a guy who has to still show his ID when
he's trying to buy an illegal beer.
Speaker 1 (26:41):
Yeah, so interesting, It's it's so it's strategic on so
many levels, how this is all playing out. But you know,
taking a step away from what's happening within the power
structures within Tehran and elsewhere, we should talk about the
(27:01):
Iranian people. And you know, you you referenced, you know,
some of the dynamics around a population that is not
necessarily antipe American, not necessarily anti Israeli or at least
uh you know, to the levels that uh, you know,
(27:22):
media might have us believe. But we're in a tricky moment,
right we have an administration that is less interested in uh,
pro democracy type activities are foreign assistance. Restructuring is in
its early stages, and I was thinking through this, you know,
(27:42):
this question about you know, if the regime falls, uh,
what does happen next in terms of how the US
might support population that are uh naturally aligned and want
to see some thing different while recognizing that we're really
(28:04):
bad at long wars, We're bad at nation building. We've
proven that out in Afghanistan and Rock. Maybe we've learned
some lessons, maybe we haven't. But is this a real
opportunity or a false opportunity? You know, for the Iranian people?
What are you thinking about in this in this regard
and what are you hearing? You know?
Speaker 2 (28:26):
The first thing I'm hearing, also just by virtue of
being a first generation American of Iranian origin, of born
and raised in the States, but both parents are immigrants
by way of Iran, is a question of authenticity. Nobody
wants to see, you know, wherever you are on the
pro anti regime obviously best sums of people both inside
(28:46):
and outside of Iran. On the anti regime side, wherever
you are though on that on that spectrum, the main
prism if you are inside Iran and you desire a
better future, fundamentally different government. The main prism that you
see this conflict through first and foremost is your own survival.
With Tehran, for example, being a city that is you know,
ten million plus potentially if you sprawl it out, Iranians
(29:10):
have not been able to leave districts, even when these
Raelis have been saying, you know, this district this time,
you know, please leave, or when Trump is tweeted about
the entire city, please leave. There's just been a video
after video of traffic jams and logs and people being
unable to escape to much more rural parts of the country,
be it the north near the Caspian Sea, or a
(29:31):
whole host of you know, resort areas on the outskirts
of Tehran proper. And that, coupled with the fact that
there are no shelters, this is not something that the
regime ever thought of, what was and was willing to
invest in when it came to the home front, leads
you to the to the position that you see today,
which is sadly, so many Iranians are just hunkered down
(29:52):
in their buildings, or at best they'll go into mosques
and tunnels and you know, metro stations that if they
hear something or if they're told to run out. But
you have a very tragic situation inside where you can't
even get to have those conversations about what comes next,
because the conversation is do I get it tomorrow? And
(30:12):
that is, you know, just the human element of this
conflict can never be forgotten. And you know while some
you know, very crassly are trying to link this to
some kind of foreign imposed war, and you know, Israel
just trying to delay domestic politics by widening the front consistently.
That's a gross and moral mistake. This is Ali Commade's war.
These are consistent wars of choice that Ali Kamene has
(30:35):
picked and eerily enough been winning in the past two
decades of the post nine to eleven Middle East. And
that was the case up until the post October seven
Middle East, when Israel began to slowly reverse the tide,
disconnect the dots, deal with the proxies, and is now
dealing with the patron I mean, you just have to
see the hubris in the Runian leadership here. No one
is advising them. But I found a video from twenty eighteen.
(30:57):
I posted it yesterday. The Iranian Supreme leader Gleiely saying
there will not be a war and we will not negotiate. Well, yet,
what in twenty twenty five on a Trump term two
you were negotiating and there is a war. Like the
Iranians have put themselves in this spot, and by Iranians
I mean the regime elite, the Islamic Republics governing, political, military,
and security elite. And now for them to try to
(31:19):
use an a for an eighty eight year old man,
the supreme leader of Iran, who try to use a
nation of eighty six million as a human shield. This
is one of the most atrocious things to watch, you know,
from far away to my heart goes out first and
foremost of this Iranians who desire a better life but
are stuck quite literally stuck in this predicament and see
no path to be able to even begin to answer
(31:41):
the questions you have. But that's why what is happening
on the ground matters. You know, the conversation about Iranians
applauding strikes initially is going to be moving to, you know,
how to deal with the casualty issue, and is going
to be moving to will can the Israelis potentially drive
you in a direction and to form some kind of
domestic pressure vector, all of which when you've seen in
(32:05):
the history of boom and bust, Iranian protests have been organic.
But in a world where these rallies are quite literally
striking the apparatus of repression of the regime, that I
think could be enough to give you know, wind beneath
the wings to some Iranians to get out there. But
no Iranian will get out there. Wile it's a war zone.
No Iranian will get out there, while the regime has
a monopoly of violence even at the neighborhood level, with
(32:27):
cameras and street thugs. And that's something these rallies and
the Americans need to know as they think about, you know,
potentially driving this to the next step. I certainly think
the longer DC keeps saying that there's a hangover from
Iraq and then doesn't deal with the reality of if
ever there was a place to have a regime change policy,
it would have been Iran, not anywhere else where the
(32:50):
US has tried it. That is really one of the
tragedies of a US foreign policy in this region since
since really again that the twenty first century, since really
nine elevee. I know, did an answer your question about
the assistance and the logistical things that need to come.
But this is the time when the Americans need to be,
at least from a sanctions perspective, you know, designating everybody
(33:11):
who's anybody on a human rights side. Again, you need
to look for ways to put wind beneath the wings.
This is when those US government media outlets VOA Radio
Heart or whatever need to be at their A game,
and frankly they're not. The US government has restored part
of VOA Persian, but has not bracked backed the consultants
Radio FABUS surrogate reporting has been good in some places,
(33:32):
deplorable in some other places. Okay in some other places.
This is when everyone needs to be at their A game.
This was an eventuality because of the way Ali Khamane
has been playing to the edge for two decades and
the fact that no one is ready for it. Being
from some elements in the running opposition to some you know,
well wishers in cyberspace, to even some foreign governments is
(33:56):
a massive indictment of everybody. But you can't keep finger
wagging while there is a war going on. Kind of
emotively footstomp that because I do believe, like Efudy says,
that you have to do things, not just think about them.
And one thing the US could be doing is now
trying to break some of the Internet censorship holds that
(34:16):
the regime is trying to put out there. What they
could do is actually highlight the things that are struck
and translate why these things that are struck are of
import for those who seek a better life in Iran.
I mean going after the National TV station, which has
been airing tortured confessions of Iranians and even foreign nationals
for many years. I think that is low hanging fruit.
(34:38):
To describe why going after the Tehran police headquarters that
is low hanging fruit for Iranians. These things need to
be consistently kind of put out there, and they're not,
whether it should be from the Israelies or the Americans.
And conversely, to think cleverly from a sanctions perspective, how
to put wing beneath the wings of Iranians and from
a cyber perspective, how to dismantle the apparatu of repression
(35:00):
that exists the street cameras, the MVPN filtering. There is
a real electronic element to this conflict that would do
a heck of a lot to those forces who are
seeking change in Iran, but.
Speaker 3 (35:12):
Again are not going to be able to act on
it like in the middle of a shooting war.
Speaker 1 (35:16):
This question of max pressure on Iran and what that
should look like now that we're in this kinetic moment,
and you know, we might be thinking about secondary sanctions
and tariffs, more sanctions on Chinese oil refineries for example,
or the recipients of a lot of sanctioned Iranian oil
(35:40):
efforts economically to sever Irani and Russian supply chains, particularly
critical defense supply chains. So what you're thinking on what
a max pressure strategy should look like? Is there a
role for it? Number one? And then number two, how
do we need to pivot? You mentioned you know we
should be sanctioning on a much broader scale. I agree
(36:03):
with that.
Speaker 3 (36:04):
What else?
Speaker 1 (36:04):
What else should we be doing?
Speaker 2 (36:07):
For too long, I think US policy has seen this
as an or question. It's diplomacy or or max pressure
or or strikes or Now we really have to see
it as a cocktail approach. There is a military element
these realies are doing. Obviously the Lieon's share of that.
There is a communications element that I think treasure that
(36:27):
the US government, particularly through those media outlets, does indeed
need to step up on the max pressure side. Just
because there is something of a kinetic conflict going on
doesn't mean that you should be taking your foot off
of the gas there. If you want to magnify the
impact of the strike, you should still be going after
those major sources of revenue as well as those industries
(36:47):
as well as those persons, banks, and businesses that have
long formed the sanctions busting campaign of these LAMBKA public
Particularly if you are one hundred percent certain that you're
not going after regime change, what you want to do
on the back end of it limited military strike or
potentially more expensive military strike that these relis have is
to be able to limit and contain the ability of
the regime to reconstitute. And by putting the regime in
(37:11):
this tough spot, you could then help shape events on
the ground or drive events on the ground by finding
foreign pressure and domestic pressure, or macroeconomically bringing the walls
in closer and closer on what's left of the regime
elite post conflict. So absolutely there is a need to
focus on all of the vectors of National Security Presidential
Memorandum to when it comes to the MAX Pressure campaign,
(37:35):
and then also to be able to scale that up
with some things that again would put win beneath the
wings of protesting Iranians. There's a whole host of Magnitsky
esque designations, human rights, Glomax style corruption things that now
when the regime is, when the population is saying, those
which the regime invested in the defense apparatus, the military apparatus,
the nuclear infrastructure is going up in smoke and didn't
(37:57):
really do that well anyway, and that was money that
should have been spent elsewhere. Now is the time to
put the spotlight on those persons, those entities who really
were instrumental in funneling cash away. There is a big
room there, both on the political messaging side as well
as the medium term to long term macroeconomic impact side,
(38:17):
and especially.
Speaker 3 (38:18):
If you marry that with the walls.
Speaker 2 (38:20):
Of MAX Pressure still going in by nesting that into
a larger series of sanctions and designations.
Speaker 3 (38:26):
Issues that we have with the Chinese. You know, you
guys at fud.
Speaker 2 (38:30):
At CEFP have been talking about the same things, which
are you know, ports, refiners, the refinery management leadership structure,
the Chinese and other financial institutions that are processing payments
or helping launder payments related to Irun oil. All of
these things need to be kind of humming along like
an engine in the background to amplify the success of
(38:54):
these strikes and then to again limit and contain the
ability of the regime to rebuild on the back end,
especially if you have no political ground game or no
idea for what could come next politically, or if you
want to shape the events that could come next politically.
So I think this stuff is absolutely imperative. Obviously it
gets ignored at any time there's a shooting war, the
(39:16):
other stuff gets ignored. Again, we have this or not
end problem in Washington, and now is really the time
for end?
Speaker 1 (39:23):
Yeah, absolutely, So I just want to go one step
further on max pressure sanctions and how banks need to
be thinking about this risk and how it may be shifting.
So one thing that has come up which is kind
of interesting is that Run's illicit networks includes those that
(39:43):
have been set up to support proxy groups, including militia
forces in Iraq, and the Central Bank of Iraq has
prohibited US dollar transactions with several Iraqi banks to to
these illicit finance concerns. It's something that Congress has been
talking about. Should we be thinking about a more aggressive
approach to banks in a rack that are linked to Iran?
Speaker 2 (40:07):
Exactly, Countries that engage in what we call the regional trade,
whether that's Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, UAE, certainly Pakistan, maybe Oman
that have functioned to a certain degree at different points
in time, obviously when it was not a shooting war
going on, as more of an artery or a straw
with which to breathe through and sustain and limp along
(40:30):
different peak periods of American sanctions do need to be
at the forefront of that sanctions menu. I mean Iraq
matters a lot because we're moving into the summer. One
of the waivers was already cut. It I forget if
it was for the electricity or for the gas.
Speaker 3 (40:43):
One was cut.
Speaker 2 (40:44):
I think one still remains that this should be high
on the docket for USG to try to address. You're
moving into the summer period, which is also the period
where you already have electric and other energy issues anyway,
so there's a real room, real desire for the US
to stand by its work when it says, if it's
going to be cutting waivers, it'll help you find an
alternative that can actually help keep some goodwill with the
(41:05):
Iraqi people. And then to realize that, you know, these
things will have short term to medium term effects inside
of Iraq, because if the Islamic Republic really does feel
like it's going down, that potentially might be when some
of these militias will step up because of how fragile
Iraq is, because of this mixed relationship Bagdad and central
authority in that country has with the US, and of
(41:25):
course because there will be elections I think in the
late fall of this year in Iraq as well, so
it's time to see these arteries that the regime has
within Iraq and be able to crush them and restrict
them as well. And again the same thing applies. This
is especially the case if you are not intent on
trying to build a different political order, or if you
do want to drive to create in the medium to
(41:47):
long term a different political order to go after the
host of bad actors that have helped sustain the current
bad order. So everything that you're saying, I think you
know also needs to be happening at kind of the
hum level, the low intensity, steady stream level out of
the USG the challenges of course limited time, limited human power,
(42:10):
and limited resources, which ones get prioritized. I think in
the macro world, when it comes to oil and major
ways that the oil money is laundered, you want to
look at Hong Kong and Uae, Malaysia and China.
Speaker 3 (42:25):
In the regional trade, you want to look at Iraq.
Speaker 1 (42:28):
So I want to switch to the broader economic equities,
the economic strategy. So there are people writing deep I
would say in the substack about the notion that what's
happening right now in the Middle East is much more
(42:49):
about a fight for the future economic order for the
region than it is about the threat of nuclear annihilation.
I'm not sure I agree with that, but I'd love
to get your view on how Iranian elites see these
strikes from an economic perspective. With it all and post
(43:13):
the question, do Iranian elites see the strikes as part
of a larger regional order being shaped against them? For example,
normalization with Arab states through the Abraham Accords. And one
more question, which could be kind of a crazy idea,
but I'm going to throw it out anyway. Do you
(43:34):
think that Iran and America could ever become economic allies.
Speaker 3 (43:39):
The latter one. Let me dress first.
Speaker 2 (43:40):
If you have a fundamentally different kind of government in Iran,
I think you will have a fundamentally different kind of
political relationship with that entity in Tehran and with the
US g The question obviously is what kind of order
Because you know, as much as I would like to
be an optimist as an Iranian American, also as an
analyst and a midd least watcher. More broadly, the rule
(44:04):
of the Middle East is things get worse, not better,
and it takes a heck of a lot of human
agency and planning and capital to be able to overcome
the barriers that are traditionally impeded these things which are
much more structural, especially in a place like the Middle East.
So yes, absolutely, if you flip the script and you
(44:24):
get even a more representative government or a government that
puts the national interest first. Notice I did not even
use the word democracy as we are, even as we
are both colleagues and the foundation for defensive democracy. But
even if you begin to facilitate the creep to get
to democracy, even in that period, you will have significant
room for the US. I mean flipping the script on
(44:45):
the eye toll is actually is opening, creating the script,
creating the political space to open for a different US
Iran economic relationship that actually could do what the eye
Tolas have been tempting Trump to do, which is to
see Iran as really one of the last not still
globally integrated economies in the world, and that I think
(45:08):
should go to the forces of freedom rather than to
the acts of aggressors who will continuously pick at the
carcass of Iran and cannot tolerate like a strong, sovereign,
independent Iran that has indeed great potential, But that potential
can only really come if you really are coming out
of this conflict successfully and with a political vision that
(45:29):
you can align resources towards and help drive. So that
is the potential alliance question. And on the other one
about how the Iranians see the region. You know, you
don't need to go into deep substack world to see that,
although there are very interesting things in deep substack world.
It's kind of like a intellectual deep Wikipedia world, what
(45:52):
kind of a rabbit hole you can go down. But
the Iranian political, economic, military elites have always seen the
region a rat against them.
Speaker 3 (46:01):
That is not new.
Speaker 2 (46:03):
They've always seen whether you're a state or a nonstate act,
or a bank or a business, they've always seen that
someone is out to get them. I mean, even look
at the way a place that they had invested significantly
militarily but were unable to economically get something out of it,
and that was Syria. You know, really from twenty eighteen
twenty nineteen, you saw a lot in the Iranian press
(46:24):
from Iranian political officials who have visited Syria and were
lamenting that even though they had done the lion's share
to try to keep us out in place and stabilize
to quote unquote stabilize, even though they created massive refugee issues,
terrorism issues, depopulation, all of that, as much as they
did that, they wanted to reap the economic dividends. They
wanted something predatory so that they could extract on the
(46:45):
back end, and they failed to extract. So there is
this you know, someone is always out to get us
kind of conspiratorial thinking. But it's also conditioned by them having.
Speaker 3 (46:55):
Been beaten in the official game.
Speaker 2 (46:57):
Because in a place like Syria, for example, they complaining
about the efficacy of the Turkic that the Turkey's foreign
economic policy towards that, you know, post towards that Assad regime,
post twenty fifteen, sixteen seventeen order that was back in
Damascus again, so this is the more kind of revisionist
(47:20):
revolutionary and then into conspiratorial thinking that exists.
Speaker 3 (47:23):
I don't think you.
Speaker 2 (47:25):
Know the fact that the dollar really does have all
of this strength and the dollar has been a weapon
of war against them for so long that also has
kind of led into this conspiratorial thinking.
Speaker 3 (47:35):
But again, the dollar has.
Speaker 2 (47:36):
Been been able to be weaponized against them for as
long because they have been the one again when I
say this is Ali Khamene's war, they have been the
one opting into these conflicts when they know economically and
even militarily they are outgunned. So you can't really cry
over spilt milk if you kept filling the milk glass
all the way and trying to pull over, push the
push the glass over because you wanted to look tough.
Speaker 1 (47:58):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely, So I want to end on one
final question, and it goes.
Speaker 2 (48:03):
Back to.
Speaker 1 (48:05):
Where the Israelis are positioned from an economic perspective. You know,
a lot of the geopolitical risk that has weighed down
the Israeli economy, its ratings, the ability to attract potentially
more foreign direct investment is linked to the Iran threat
(48:26):
and systematically those geopolitical risks are really being dealt with
mostly in the last week, which is but of course
a lot of build up to that. But how do
you see the opportunity going forward as you know, hopefully
(48:46):
we're going to get to some well, we don't know
where we're going. If it's more war negotiation, some combination,
we don't know. But Israel is a healthy economy. Me
They've had very strong growth that has actually continued through
the war of Their credit ratings are actually pretty strong.
Speaker 3 (49:08):
Uh.
Speaker 1 (49:09):
And I think you know, if they're successful in terms
of dealing with the nuclear threat in particular, it will
really be a boost for Israel and potentially the region.
But what do you think that should look like in
terms of Israel's role in a broader economic framework for
the region. Is it picking up again on the Abraham Accords?
(49:33):
Is it something different? Is it uh, some combination of
thinking around the iMac Israel, Middle East Europe supply chain
corridor and regional integration with Europe and India. What does
it look like from your perspective.
Speaker 2 (49:52):
All of that is where ISRAELI. You know, I want
to use this word that I used about Turkey. I
think Turkey fortunately or unfortunately depending on where you see
and there's it in life, does this really well? But
Israel has the opportunity, if it comes out of these
different cycles of violence, to really reshape its foreign economic
policy as being one that also is engaging deeper with
(50:17):
the East as it is with the West. Again, talk
about Abraham Accord expansion, talk about doubling down. If you
really do get some kind of ceasefire or truce or
peace or different kind of order in Gaza, whatever you
want to name it, there is really the potential for
a scaling up of the deep social, political, and economic
ties that they were able to build with some of
(50:38):
the GCC countries during the Abraham Accords.
Speaker 3 (50:40):
Expand that out.
Speaker 2 (50:42):
I mech I think so long as there's a major
missile war and shooting war, you have to really see
that as a pipe dream. But if these Raelies are
partners with the Americans on really flipping the script and
being able to drive a different political order or perhaps
better yet shape shape, help shape those forces on the
ground who want into different kind of political order, then
they too, just like the Americans, can be just like
(51:04):
the d nationalist and memmore present at creation for just
when that largest state in the region is flipped and
becomes a much more positive builder of things in the
region rather than a destructive power. Up until then, I
think these reallys will be for the short term, in
at least for another week or so. I think in
a shooting war with the Iranians, much will depend on
(51:25):
how they get the how America will come in. Will
they enter, will the Americans enter as more of a deconflictor,
will they enter as really someone who will deliver the
fou de grass if you will, or will they enter
as really part of a larger Israeli counter proliferation campaign,
which could mean the conflict will go on, which means
that the top of that we're having now about the
economic integration will be on pause, because I think even
(51:48):
though the regime understands that I think widens the war,
the Americans can deliver the death blow. They can move
from counter proliferation to counter regime. But nonetheless there will
be significant blows landed against GCC infrastructure basis, what have
you which will have negative economic effects, which will put
more distance and more time between what the GCC wanted
(52:10):
and what the Israelies wanted, meaning this more integrated, cohesive
regional economic order will for the foreseeable future be something
aspirational and will be something that these realies will try
to build vis a vis Salami tactics with each country
with a different friendly order in each capital, but will
always be on a shakeier foundation so long as there
(52:33):
is again this shooting work.
Speaker 3 (52:35):
I know that is very cautious.
Speaker 2 (52:37):
It's neither cautious optimism nor cautious pessimism, but it really
is designed to stress we're not out of this yet.
Speaker 1 (52:45):
Yeah, yeah, great, Venam, thank you so much. We've covered
a lot in the last fifty or so minutes and
I just want to thank you for all your good work,
and I hope you'll come back and join us again
on course of capital. Thank you so much, it.
Speaker 3 (52:57):
Would be a pleasure.
Speaker 2 (52:58):
Thank you so much, and it's a great to have
you and the whole CFP team as a colleague here.
Speaker 3 (53:02):
Thanks a lot.
Speaker 1 (53:05):
H
Just a quick note to everyone out there. There's a
free webinar coming up and I think you should check
it out. It's called Everyday AI for Compliance Teams and
it's being hosted by our sponsor, Hummingbird on June twenty fifth.
It's a practical look at how investigators are using Hummingbird's
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because the goal of compliance AI isn't to replace judgment,
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two pm Eastern, and you can register at a hummingbird
dot co slash Illicit Edge. Again, that's hummingbird dot Co
slash Illicit Edge. Hey, viewers and listeners, glad to have
(00:51):
you here. Back with Coercive Capital. Today's episode is focused
on Iran, and since we've recorded this on June eighteenth
and today's June twenty third, things have progressed. The US
is now involved in the war and it's unclear what
will be happening next. We may see some sort of
(01:12):
a deal if President Trump's tweets foretell something that may
be coming soon. I wanted to just make sure that
you knew about this delay and recording so that you
can take the discussion in context. Much of what we
talk about is even more relevant than it was last week,
(01:32):
but it's always good to put things in context. So
thanks for listening. Welcome back Course of Capital viewers and listeners.
After a brief hiatus, it's great to be back bringing
you podcast content on the Illicit Edge Network. And today
(01:57):
we're going to talk about Iran, joined by one of
the smartest people analyzing Iran today, Benam ben Talaglu. Benham
is senior director of the Iran Program at the Foundation
for Defensive Democracies, where he's also a senior fellow colleague
of mine wonderful guy. He's also a member of the
Anti Defamation League's Task Force on the Middle East Minorities
(02:19):
and a contributing editor to the National Security Journal. Venom
examines Iran from just about every geopolitical angle you can imagine,
from nuclear non proliferation, ballistic missiles and drones, sanctions, the
illicit or the excuse me, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Cord
its proxies, foreign insecurity policy of the Islamic Republic and
(02:41):
more so, I can't imagine a more relevant person to
speak with during this current moment and to discuss the
evolving situation in the Middle East. So thank you Venam
for joining the podcast.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
Welcome, thanks for having me Lane, great to be with you,
and thanks for the very kind intro.
Speaker 1 (02:57):
Oh thanks, Well, things are changing as we speak, so
I thought what we should do is walk through some
of the latest developments on the Israeli Iran conflict and
you know, kind of get the lay of the land
as of today, and I just wanted to kind of
throw out there that it's nothing short of incredible that
(03:20):
as of a few days ago, Israel effectively controls the
Iranian airspace, which is pretty shocking even for folks who
I follow. Who are you know, like you really focused
on Iran? So what do you see unfolding at the moment,
and how would you summarize what's happened over the last
(03:40):
five to six days since Israel attacked Iran's nuclear weaponsites
and focused on eliminating some of the key leadership within
their nuclear program.
Speaker 2 (03:56):
Well, I think the word historic is absolutely right. I'm
going to butcher this lenin quotes of old people, where
I think you said there's decades where nothing happens, and
there's weeks where decades happen. We are less than a week,
as you mentioned, about six days into this overt Israeli
Ron shooting war.
Speaker 3 (04:12):
And make no.
Speaker 2 (04:13):
Mistake, it is a war. There's missiles flying, there's cyber stuff,
there's misinformation, there's control of cyberspace as well as the airspace.
This is the shadow war that we've seen between the
Islamic republica roon and Israel briefly come out of the
shadows in twenty twenty four and now stay there out
(04:34):
conventional outright over in twenty twenty five. And what you've
seen the Israelis do, based on reporting, based on video,
based on social media, based on official statements, is basically
deracinate the military brain trust of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
as well as a whole host of.
Speaker 3 (04:51):
Iranian nuclear scientists. They're going after the.
Speaker 2 (04:54):
Intellectual capital, the political capital that has actually made a
regime like the Islamic Republic be able to let asked
for so long. The reason I say this is because
while all the Israeli strikes on Iranian military basis in
the west as well as now in the center, and
then even last weekend that one site all the way
in the northeast of Iran, showing how much range and
control they could have over Iranian airspace. While all of
(05:18):
that matters from a military perspective, politically, these Raelies already
knew they were fighting an adversary who was conventionally weaker
than them, but to benefit maximally from that delta, they
were also striking.
Speaker 3 (05:32):
With the element of surprise.
Speaker 2 (05:33):
And while it's not a surprise because Israel and America
have been saying for many years, I think really since
the post nine to eleven years that all options were
on the table, and really twenty twenty four was a
historic year showed the regime's weaknesses limping into twenty twenty
five economically, environmentally, politically, militarily. It was not a shock
that Israel would be able to see that the regime
(05:55):
was at its lowest point, perhaps its lowest point ever
since the end of the.
Speaker 3 (05:59):
Iran Iraq War.
Speaker 2 (06:00):
But to really have the gumption to capitalize on that,
and capitalize on that with something that was not as
much reported, but which was a something that led to
their post October successes in the wars closer to home
for these Raelies, which was the intelligence fights and the
intelligence networks that they helped create, I mean inside of Iran.
These Raleies today have a drone base. They're firing on
(06:23):
Iran from Iranian territory. So merging this inside and outside game,
merging this defense against Iranian missiles, plus this offensive ground
game on the ground with thrones against these production sides
and against these launch sides, has really led to the
restricted room for maneuver of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and even forcing the Iranians into doing things that they
(06:45):
may not necessarily do and may not want to do,
and into predicaments you know, between use or lose. For example,
the Irunians are now finding realistic missiles from deeper within
Iranian territory, which means they have to rely on us
series of potentially older ballistic missiles, which advidually have heavier warheads,
so if they land in Israel, the impact is bigger,
(07:07):
but the interception likelihood is also much greater. Also, they're
just forcing the Iranians into this you know, use or
lose mentality because the Iranians for many years had a
quantitative missile advantage against the Israelies, but with the interceptions
as well as the left of launch strikes, the capability
for the Iranians to act on this quantitative advantage continues
(07:29):
to diminish. So you're seeing not just attacks on missiles
but also attacks on launchers. So you could have the
biggest arsenal in the world, and not just the Middle East.
But if you don't have a launcher, you can't really
get from point A to point B.
Speaker 3 (07:43):
So you know, these.
Speaker 2 (07:43):
Rallies have attacked the logistics and the command and control network,
and then they're also doing some politically symbolic targeting of
critical infrastructure that says that they could really scale this
up to be a major energy war as well as
also to be able to go after the regime's nuclear sites,
because less we forget, the big backdrop for this was
to stop the Islamic Republic of Iran from developing a
(08:05):
nuclear weapon, and actually there if one, is going to
be more critical beyond obviously the fact that any war
unfortunately does indeed have civilian casualties, and imposing civilian casualties
on any population is lamentable and is very sad and lamentable.
It is especially tragic in this case because you actually
have in the Iranian population the most pro American, the
(08:26):
most even pro Israeli population, And how to fight the
war against the regime kinetically now without losing that will
be a challenge for the Israelis while also defining success
as tactically and technically as possible by trying to go
after all of their nuclear program. And there's some sites
where they still may need more help. And that's why
all eyes really right now are on America. What will
(08:47):
America do? Will America more formally enter this conflict, Will
it go against the regime leadership, which the President has
been intonating on social media that he might, or will
they go for a more limited counter nuclear movie. Can
the US do it have to do that in conjunction
with the US and the Israelis. So there's a lot
more questions than answers here. That's really a tour to
(09:07):
force what.
Speaker 3 (09:09):
Is going on.
Speaker 1 (09:10):
Excellent, Well, there's a lot to dig into here, So
thank you for that framing that up so beautifully. One
thing that really struck me about what happened over the
weekend and the surprise of the Israeli attack, the fusion
of technology and intelligence networks, the ability to pinpoint locations
(09:35):
and people of interest within Iran to do so, you know,
very strategically, very cleanly. It's a completely different game than
thinking back to the attacks of October seventh and how
much of a surprise that was for the Israelis. And
(09:57):
that got me thinking about the issue of arounds proxies.
And you know, it's been kind of quiet from Hamas Hezbola.
What's that about? And what should we be expecting from
around proxies in the region who you know, maybe are
trying to reassess what their role is going forward. But
(10:21):
it is interesting that it's just been really quiet.
Speaker 2 (10:24):
It's been really quiet, and again that is by design.
It may be a question of when Hesbela may enter,
but if you had to be betting at this point
in time, Hesbela won't or is thus far trying to
delay its entry as much as possible. I mean this,
this constellation of terror proxies and partners you mentioned these
(10:44):
Lamica public calls this the axis of resistance, and the
post October sevent midd least was not an easy place
to be for the Axis of resistance. Even though these
Lamara public thought that by incrementally turning on a multi
front war against these rallies, it could attry these rallies
and bleed them into longer conflicts that they're not well
suited to fight. Try to, you know, force these relies
(11:06):
to divide their resources, expend forces, deal with political issues
at home and abroad while fighting you know, these more
asymmetric hybrid kinds of military operations. But ultimately, when it
comes to Hesbele in the south, Hesble in the north,
in Lebanon and Hamas in the south and Gaza, these
relies were immensely successful, both from a military perspective as
(11:27):
well as from an intelligence perspective, and that neutering and
gutting of Iran's transnational terrorist apparatus left to other elements,
the Houthis which for two months who saw the US
battle and tried to render to the sidelines, as well
as the Shia militias in Iraq, which have thus far
largely been quiet. Even in the post October seven Middle East.
(11:48):
They have been firing at Israel, but nowhere at the
volume that they had been firing at the Americans, and
even at the Americans that the volume ebbed and flowed
compared to you know, twenty nineteen levels of max pressure
counter post Soley money highs for this Iran backed for
these Iran backed terror groups. So one reason the Israelis
may have seen that now was an opportune time to
(12:10):
strike was the weakness of some of these groups. And
when you look at Iranian strategy more broadly, the regime
is a regime obsessed with deterrence. It's really overlearned the
lessons of deterrence from the Iran Iraq War. And this
is a small tangent, but every threat we face from
the regime in the military world, whether that's again transnational
terrorism and militias and proxies, or ballistic missiles or drones
(12:35):
or for example, you know, maritime aggression, these were things
that we saw and even you know the nuclear program,
by the way, these were things that we saw during
the Iran Iraq War raised their head. That was the
incubation period for these threats, and then post Ierono Rock War,
they were scaled up over time and integrated and you've
seen these Raelies understand that the deterrent functions of these
(12:58):
things maritime aggression, the US had been dealing with ballistic missiles.
These rallies and the Americans had been intercepting most but
not all, of those missile strikes in twenty twenty four,
and then transnational terrorism was down, so it really it
opened the way for these rallies to have the cleanest
possible shot against the heart of the regime itself, because
(13:19):
this deterrent architecture had really collapsed the only area that
it had not collapsed, and in fact, all the eggs
had been doubled down in that basket. And that's why
you saw, particularly post October seven, a whole host of
Iranian statements designed to take into account the evolving missile capability,
but cognizant of the adversaries evolving ballistic missile defenses, as
(13:42):
well as cognizance of the weakness of that transnational terror force.
You know, the fact that Hamas leaders are gone, HESBLA
leaders are gone, much of the HESBLA arsenal is gutted.
The fact that even with the ceasefire in place in
twenty twenty five, these rallies are able to still push
back against Hesbola, and still there's no HESBELA rocket volleys
or drones or anti tank weapons coming back at them,
(14:03):
and it isn't causing some kind of you know, major
political issue. Even with central authorities in Beirut, some of
them are happy to see these strikes continue. So these
reelis realized that they had a really clean shot and
that the proxy issue could be much more easily managed
if you disconnected the dots of it from its patron
and I think explains why the regime's acts as a
(14:26):
resistance isn't really resisting today.
Speaker 1 (14:30):
So these regional dynamics are complicated. But one other question
that came to my mind is how the fall of
the Asad regime in Syria impacted how all of this unfolded.
Speaker 2 (14:43):
Well, the Asad regime in Syria, we have to always remember,
was the sole state ally of the Islamic Republic in
the region. You know, the Islamic Republic really does have
a transnational vision, but it doesn't really have a whole
host of international partners. Yes, the regime is part of
this axis of aggressors, but again, even there there are
(15:03):
issues bilaterally between each country and there's different equities, there's
historical enmity, the real overlap there is political, not necessarily
a military and economic and when it comes to the
Assad regime, the Assaidn regime occupied a really critical piece
of geography in the Middle East that allowed the regime
to erect and sustain the land bridge from Iran through
(15:26):
Iraq into Syria and then to the Eastern Mediterranean through Lebanon.
And this basically was a highway that men, money and
munitions flew that supplemented the air bridge that allowed Iran
to basically use civilian airliners to ferry also men money
and munitions to conflict zones. And it was a permissive
environment and a launch pad and a measure of the
regime's forward defense strategy that allowed them to really have
(15:50):
a whole host of fights, have a whole host of
wars far away from their territory. It doesn't mean that
the Assaud regime over the years, they didn't try to hedge.
Every ten years, they went in one direction or another direction,
but broadly strategically politically they were always aligned with the
Iranian kin And it was really through the Asad regime
that Iran got to be able to create and control
(16:12):
Lebanese Hezbola in neighboring Lebanon.
Speaker 3 (16:14):
And when you.
Speaker 2 (16:15):
Remove as the Israelis have done slowly gutting the Iranian
basing infrastructure with strike since twenty thirteen and stepping up
in twenty fifteen against Iranian positions in Syria, and then
much more importantly, when you remove Hesbola from the equation
which had entered the Syrian Civil War in twenty thirteen
to bail out the Assad regime, you actually had the
(16:37):
political space in the military space for the collapse of
Turkey backed and al Qaeda linked militias and terror bops
to come in as rapidly as they did in the
winter of twenty twenty four. So the Iranians have been
losing on a whole host of fronts here and again.
If you're an Israeli decision maker and you realize your
(16:57):
advantage is a conventional military advantage that can be bolstered
by a series of short, sharp strikes married with a
great intel capability, when you see this again, this entire
architecture dissipating that your adversary had created, you press and
push the advantage. And I think that explains is really
decision making today as well as the predicament Iranian decision
(17:19):
makers find themselves in.
Speaker 1 (17:20):
Yeah, fascinating, Well, that's a good segue to a discussion
on what might be on the negotiating table. So the
Trump administration is called for. Trump himself has called for
unconditional surrender of the Iranian regime. It appears unlikely that
the regime will take him up on that. But if
(17:41):
you could kind of put your your your crystal ball
out in front of us here, what do you think
a negotiation might look like in light of, you know,
around dwindling number of cards to play? Is there even
a need for a negotiation? What should all of this
(18:02):
look like in terms of the diplomatic conversation, particularly over
the next few weeks.
Speaker 2 (18:08):
You know, you mentioned the word diplomatic, and the problem
is that there hasn't really been a diplomatic ground game,
and with respect, there hasn't even really been political thought
for the day after. That doesn't even necessarily mean regime change.
That means about how you can politically maximize your cards
to take advantage of this crumbling infrastructure in a way
(18:28):
that is not just military or that does not always
just have to be military. I mean again, these Raelis
have paved the pathway to make the case now in
the Middle East that you can finally begin to deal
with Iranian military threats in a military manner. But Iran's
strongest cards right now, if you're thinking about regime survival,
if you're thinking about buying space and creating time to
(18:49):
reconstitute what's left of the nuclear program, about putting up
barriers to entry for American involvement, those cards are not military.
Those cards are political, And being able to understand the
running political game requires understanding how the run is negotiate. Now,
this is an ideological regime that for forty plus years,
for forty six years, has consistently preferenced when put to
(19:11):
the choice macroeconomically or militarily, guns over butter. So if
that is going to be the case, it's all about
restricting the revenue and restricting the political space for them
to continue to pursue, said Gun. So, if you have
an adversary in this world, it's about and their intent
on fighting you, no matter how weak they are. Then
it's all about making sure that you know they are
(19:32):
fighting but with one.
Speaker 3 (19:33):
Hand tied behind their back.
Speaker 2 (19:35):
And negotiations here I think are consistent with the way
the Trump administration has made sense of the threats that
he believes Iran present presents to US interests in US security,
at the top of those as a potential nuclear weapon.
And you know, the President has been remarkably consistent when
he said, you know, he doesn't want to run to
get a nuclear weapon. And you know, even before he
(19:55):
entered office in term one, when he was campaigning, he said,
I think I buy bad deals, make them good deals.
Speaker 3 (20:01):
In this world.
Speaker 2 (20:02):
What the President may see is that Israeli military power
could be the means for an American diplomatic end. And
that's why I think the steady stream of commentary, some helpful,
some unhelpful on social media like x and whatever the
other applications are the names.
Speaker 3 (20:20):
Escape me.
Speaker 2 (20:22):
Is all about creating confusion for the Iranians about what
American potential aims are, if they will enter the conflict,
if they're not, if this will be military, if this
will be political. But I think they're designed to broadly
signal to comminate dismantle the program aka through negotiations, or
die or dismantle the program, or watch it and potentially
(20:43):
your regime be dismantled before your very eyes. These are
the choices Trump is trying to present to the Iranians.
I think in terms of how he's negotiating without already
negotiating and again cognizant of how weak the regime is.
This is actually when the regime actually excels, because if
we face these threats by virtue of the regime being empowered,
(21:03):
being an ideological regime, this is how they actually stay
in power despite being weaker.
Speaker 3 (21:09):
This is how the.
Speaker 2 (21:09):
Iroanioq War ended when they realized that there was no
way out, but through the predecessor of Isola Romani, the
founding father of the Islamic Republic, Isola Sorry, the predecessor
of Iola Kamene, who was Isola Homane. The name sound
very familiar and similar. When he ended the Ironuoq War,
he likened accepting a un cease fire that he had
rejected for a while to being akin to drinking from
(21:33):
a poison chalice. So the real strategy question is how
can you get Kamine to take the knee to drink
from the poison chalice? And it is by continuing the
military squeeze, by dangling the threat of American involvement and
making sure the Isolda is no way out. But through
what I would push back on that is is are
you sure you want to offer this regime an off ramp,
(21:54):
because while the debate in DC really since the end
of the push to administration has been what kind of
forced posture doing need in the region when Americans want
to consistently be doing less not more.
Speaker 3 (22:05):
In the region.
Speaker 2 (22:06):
The only long term way to address that, instead of
promising one thing and then having to get sucked back
in like Obama and Bush and Biden had to be
when it came to a whole host of other threats
in the Middle East while balancing great power competition and
pivoting and rebalancing to Asia, is by flipping the script
on the Iatolas. And that actually could be where a
potential regime change option actually is the thing that allows
(22:28):
you to push away from the Middle East. If you
flip the script on the Ietolas, you have turned off
the fire on You've done away with the arsonist behind
many of the fires of the Middle East. If by
solving that one thing, you open the management toolbox to
deal with all of the other things that have long
existed in the Middle East. So I don't believe the
(22:48):
Trump administration sees it that way yet, but I think
talking about decapitating military leadership, talking about not talking, but
basically hinting that there will be a gigantic failed state
in the heart of the Middle East with eighty six
million people, many of them are pro American pro is
Really that to me seems to be the height of
irresponsibility to do that while thinking you can pivot and
not have to deal with this region anymore and not
(23:10):
deal with environmental and economic and political and military, let
alone real human issues. And that's why the attempt to
avoid the regime change conversation actually is handicapping the necessary
political work to see how Iran is trying to buy time,
to see where their diplomatic strategy is at, and to
see what you will need to balance with when it
(23:30):
comes to Middle Eastern threats that are military, economic, and political,
with much more, bigger, costlier and challenging Eurasian and East
Asian threats.
Speaker 1 (23:40):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely, So who's advising Tehran? Who's I mean,
we you know, as you've laid it out, they're in
a bit of a corner here. Every day their leverage
is in some way decreasing, and I want to talk
about the economic side of that as well a bit later.
But who's whispering in the ear of the Ayatola outside
(24:03):
of Iran, anyone Russia, China who might be looking to
play a role in terms of how this all plays
out with the Israelis and the Americans.
Speaker 2 (24:14):
I honestly think not many people. You know, Again, there
is this acts of aggressors. There is Russia and China,
but they see Iran as a pawn in their strategic
competition with the West. You know, Iran has been auditioning
for great power support under the auspices of the Islamic
Republic for many years now, since the mid nineteen nineties.
You know, you can find from that time, you know,
Iranian talking points that sound like Putin talking points about
(24:36):
NATO expansion. They have been auditioning for this cover because
they want exactly that, the advice, the military stuff. And
while no doubt they've gotten it, they've gotten it in
dribs and drabs. And really it was only the post
JCPOA post Syrian Civil War relationships that created the political
space for the Iranians and the Russians to scale up
to go to the strategic relationship they had with Ukraine.
(24:58):
But we used to have a Russian colleague min many
years ago here at FDD.
Speaker 3 (25:01):
He was actually born in.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
The Soviet Union, and he used to always tell me
this phrase about Iran and Russia. And there is no
honor among thieves. Just because you bail your friend out
doesn't mean your friend will come bail you out. And
this is really the way a lot of partnerships work
in the world. I mean NATO and like real treaty allies.
They are the aberrations to the norm in human history.
(25:23):
So the Islamic Republic is alone. It's done a lot
to put itself in that position to be alone. But
those who it has coveted great power support and strategic
support from will always have to balance with the other conditions.
I mean, the Obama administration very cleverly got to the
Chinese to act on their own mercantilist impulses and in
(25:45):
so doing magnify the effect of US secondary sanctions. The
real art will be how to keep these two actors
at bay to not empower Iran, rather than how do
you further drive you know, how do you deal with
this issue in a way that you know magnifies the
existing Russo Iranian and Russo and Signo Iranian ties. So
(26:06):
Kamine is alone, and not only is he alone. He
is meeting people that he has not met with before.
I mean the military and political the military brain trusts
of the Islamic Republic is no longer there. People that
he's been having meetings with for fifteen years on a
perhaps two to three times a week basis are not
familiar faces in the room anymore. You know, there was
(26:28):
a joke made about the spokesperson for the Iranian military operation,
exceptionally young guy that the joke was that this is
a guy who has to still show his ID when
he's trying to buy an illegal beer.
Speaker 1 (26:41):
Yeah, so interesting, It's it's so it's strategic on so
many levels, how this is all playing out. But you know,
taking a step away from what's happening within the power
structures within Tehran and elsewhere, we should talk about the
(27:01):
Iranian people. And you know, you you referenced, you know,
some of the dynamics around a population that is not
necessarily antipe American, not necessarily anti Israeli or at least
uh you know, to the levels that uh, you know,
(27:22):
media might have us believe. But we're in a tricky moment,
right we have an administration that is less interested in uh,
pro democracy type activities are foreign assistance. Restructuring is in
its early stages, and I was thinking through this, you know,
(27:42):
this question about you know, if the regime falls, uh,
what does happen next in terms of how the US
might support population that are uh naturally aligned and want
to see some thing different while recognizing that we're really
(28:04):
bad at long wars, We're bad at nation building. We've
proven that out in Afghanistan and Rock. Maybe we've learned
some lessons, maybe we haven't. But is this a real
opportunity or a false opportunity? You know, for the Iranian people?
What are you thinking about in this in this regard
and what are you hearing? You know?
Speaker 2 (28:26):
The first thing I'm hearing, also just by virtue of
being a first generation American of Iranian origin, of born
and raised in the States, but both parents are immigrants
by way of Iran, is a question of authenticity. Nobody
wants to see, you know, wherever you are on the
pro anti regime obviously best sums of people both inside
(28:46):
and outside of Iran. On the anti regime side, wherever
you are though on that on that spectrum, the main
prism if you are inside Iran and you desire a
better future, fundamentally different government. The main prism that you
see this conflict through first and foremost is your own survival.
With Tehran, for example, being a city that is you know,
ten million plus potentially if you sprawl it out, Iranians
(29:10):
have not been able to leave districts, even when these
Raelis have been saying, you know, this district this time,
you know, please leave, or when Trump is tweeted about
the entire city, please leave. There's just been a video
after video of traffic jams and logs and people being
unable to escape to much more rural parts of the country,
be it the north near the Caspian Sea, or a
(29:31):
whole host of you know, resort areas on the outskirts
of Tehran proper. And that, coupled with the fact that
there are no shelters, this is not something that the
regime ever thought of, what was and was willing to
invest in when it came to the home front, leads
you to the to the position that you see today,
which is sadly, so many Iranians are just hunkered down
(29:52):
in their buildings, or at best they'll go into mosques
and tunnels and you know, metro stations that if they
hear something or if they're told to run out. But
you have a very tragic situation inside where you can't
even get to have those conversations about what comes next,
because the conversation is do I get it tomorrow? And
(30:12):
that is, you know, just the human element of this
conflict can never be forgotten. And you know while some
you know, very crassly are trying to link this to
some kind of foreign imposed war, and you know, Israel
just trying to delay domestic politics by widening the front consistently.
That's a gross and moral mistake. This is Ali Commade's war.
These are consistent wars of choice that Ali Kamene has
(30:35):
picked and eerily enough been winning in the past two
decades of the post nine to eleven Middle East. And
that was the case up until the post October seven
Middle East, when Israel began to slowly reverse the tide,
disconnect the dots, deal with the proxies, and is now
dealing with the patron I mean, you just have to
see the hubris in the Runian leadership here. No one
is advising them. But I found a video from twenty eighteen.
(30:57):
I posted it yesterday. The Iranian Supreme leader Gleiely saying
there will not be a war and we will not negotiate. Well, yet,
what in twenty twenty five on a Trump term two
you were negotiating and there is a war. Like the
Iranians have put themselves in this spot, and by Iranians
I mean the regime elite, the Islamic Republics governing, political, military,
and security elite. And now for them to try to
(31:19):
use an a for an eighty eight year old man,
the supreme leader of Iran, who try to use a
nation of eighty six million as a human shield. This
is one of the most atrocious things to watch, you know,
from far away to my heart goes out first and
foremost of this Iranians who desire a better life but
are stuck quite literally stuck in this predicament and see
no path to be able to even begin to answer
(31:41):
the questions you have. But that's why what is happening
on the ground matters. You know, the conversation about Iranians
applauding strikes initially is going to be moving to, you know,
how to deal with the casualty issue, and is going
to be moving to will can the Israelis potentially drive
you in a direction and to form some kind of
domestic pressure vector, all of which when you've seen in
(32:05):
the history of boom and bust, Iranian protests have been organic.
But in a world where these rallies are quite literally
striking the apparatus of repression of the regime, that I
think could be enough to give you know, wind beneath
the wings to some Iranians to get out there. But
no Iranian will get out there. Wile it's a war zone.
No Iranian will get out there, while the regime has
a monopoly of violence even at the neighborhood level, with
(32:27):
cameras and street thugs. And that's something these rallies and
the Americans need to know as they think about, you know,
potentially driving this to the next step. I certainly think
the longer DC keeps saying that there's a hangover from
Iraq and then doesn't deal with the reality of if
ever there was a place to have a regime change policy,
it would have been Iran, not anywhere else where the
(32:50):
US has tried it. That is really one of the
tragedies of a US foreign policy in this region since
since really again that the twenty first century, since really
nine elevee. I know, did an answer your question about
the assistance and the logistical things that need to come.
But this is the time when the Americans need to be,
at least from a sanctions perspective, you know, designating everybody
(33:11):
who's anybody on a human rights side. Again, you need
to look for ways to put wind beneath the wings.
This is when those US government media outlets VOA Radio
Heart or whatever need to be at their A game,
and frankly they're not. The US government has restored part
of VOA Persian, but has not bracked backed the consultants
Radio FABUS surrogate reporting has been good in some places,
(33:32):
deplorable in some other places. Okay in some other places.
This is when everyone needs to be at their A game.
This was an eventuality because of the way Ali Khamane
has been playing to the edge for two decades and
the fact that no one is ready for it. Being
from some elements in the running opposition to some you know,
well wishers in cyberspace, to even some foreign governments is
(33:56):
a massive indictment of everybody. But you can't keep finger
wagging while there is a war going on. Kind of
emotively footstomp that because I do believe, like Efudy says,
that you have to do things, not just think about them.
And one thing the US could be doing is now
trying to break some of the Internet censorship holds that
(34:16):
the regime is trying to put out there. What they
could do is actually highlight the things that are struck
and translate why these things that are struck are of
import for those who seek a better life in Iran.
I mean going after the National TV station, which has
been airing tortured confessions of Iranians and even foreign nationals
for many years. I think that is low hanging fruit.
(34:38):
To describe why going after the Tehran police headquarters that
is low hanging fruit for Iranians. These things need to
be consistently kind of put out there, and they're not,
whether it should be from the Israelies or the Americans.
And conversely, to think cleverly from a sanctions perspective, how
to put wing beneath the wings of Iranians and from
a cyber perspective, how to dismantle the apparatu of repression
(35:00):
that exists the street cameras, the MVPN filtering. There is
a real electronic element to this conflict that would do
a heck of a lot to those forces who are
seeking change in Iran, but.
Speaker 3 (35:12):
Again are not going to be able to act on
it like in the middle of a shooting war.
Speaker 1 (35:16):
This question of max pressure on Iran and what that
should look like now that we're in this kinetic moment,
and you know, we might be thinking about secondary sanctions
and tariffs, more sanctions on Chinese oil refineries for example,
or the recipients of a lot of sanctioned Iranian oil
(35:40):
efforts economically to sever Irani and Russian supply chains, particularly
critical defense supply chains. So what you're thinking on what
a max pressure strategy should look like? Is there a
role for it? Number one? And then number two, how
do we need to pivot? You mentioned you know we
should be sanctioning on a much broader scale. I agree
(36:03):
with that.
Speaker 3 (36:04):
What else?
Speaker 1 (36:04):
What else should we be doing?
Speaker 2 (36:07):
For too long, I think US policy has seen this
as an or question. It's diplomacy or or max pressure
or or strikes or Now we really have to see
it as a cocktail approach. There is a military element
these realies are doing. Obviously the Lieon's share of that.
There is a communications element that I think treasure that
(36:27):
the US government, particularly through those media outlets, does indeed
need to step up on the max pressure side. Just
because there is something of a kinetic conflict going on
doesn't mean that you should be taking your foot off
of the gas there. If you want to magnify the
impact of the strike, you should still be going after
those major sources of revenue as well as those industries
(36:47):
as well as those persons, banks, and businesses that have
long formed the sanctions busting campaign of these LAMBKA public
Particularly if you are one hundred percent certain that you're
not going after regime change, what you want to do
on the back end of it limited military strike or
potentially more expensive military strike that these relis have is
to be able to limit and contain the ability of
the regime to reconstitute. And by putting the regime in
(37:11):
this tough spot, you could then help shape events on
the ground or drive events on the ground by finding
foreign pressure and domestic pressure, or macroeconomically bringing the walls
in closer and closer on what's left of the regime
elite post conflict. So absolutely there is a need to
focus on all of the vectors of National Security Presidential
Memorandum to when it comes to the MAX Pressure campaign,
(37:35):
and then also to be able to scale that up
with some things that again would put win beneath the
wings of protesting Iranians. There's a whole host of Magnitsky
esque designations, human rights, Glomax style corruption things that now
when the regime is, when the population is saying, those
which the regime invested in the defense apparatus, the military apparatus,
the nuclear infrastructure is going up in smoke and didn't
(37:57):
really do that well anyway, and that was money that
should have been spent elsewhere. Now is the time to
put the spotlight on those persons, those entities who really
were instrumental in funneling cash away. There is a big
room there, both on the political messaging side as well
as the medium term to long term macroeconomic impact side,
(38:17):
and especially.
Speaker 3 (38:18):
If you marry that with the walls.
Speaker 2 (38:20):
Of MAX Pressure still going in by nesting that into
a larger series of sanctions and designations.
Speaker 3 (38:26):
Issues that we have with the Chinese. You know, you
guys at fud.
Speaker 2 (38:30):
At CEFP have been talking about the same things, which
are you know, ports, refiners, the refinery management leadership structure,
the Chinese and other financial institutions that are processing payments
or helping launder payments related to Irun oil. All of
these things need to be kind of humming along like
an engine in the background to amplify the success of
(38:54):
these strikes and then to again limit and contain the
ability of the regime to rebuild on the back end,
especially if you have no political ground game or no
idea for what could come next politically, or if you
want to shape the events that could come next politically.
So I think this stuff is absolutely imperative. Obviously it
gets ignored at any time there's a shooting war, the
(39:16):
other stuff gets ignored. Again, we have this or not
end problem in Washington, and now is really the time
for end?
Speaker 1 (39:23):
Yeah, absolutely, So I just want to go one step
further on max pressure sanctions and how banks need to
be thinking about this risk and how it may be shifting.
So one thing that has come up which is kind
of interesting is that Run's illicit networks includes those that
(39:43):
have been set up to support proxy groups, including militia
forces in Iraq, and the Central Bank of Iraq has
prohibited US dollar transactions with several Iraqi banks to to
these illicit finance concerns. It's something that Congress has been
talking about. Should we be thinking about a more aggressive
approach to banks in a rack that are linked to Iran?
Speaker 2 (40:07):
Exactly, Countries that engage in what we call the regional trade,
whether that's Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, UAE, certainly Pakistan, maybe Oman
that have functioned to a certain degree at different points
in time, obviously when it was not a shooting war
going on, as more of an artery or a straw
with which to breathe through and sustain and limp along
(40:30):
different peak periods of American sanctions do need to be
at the forefront of that sanctions menu. I mean Iraq
matters a lot because we're moving into the summer. One
of the waivers was already cut. It I forget if
it was for the electricity or for the gas.
Speaker 3 (40:43):
One was cut.
Speaker 2 (40:44):
I think one still remains that this should be high
on the docket for USG to try to address. You're
moving into the summer period, which is also the period
where you already have electric and other energy issues anyway,
so there's a real room, real desire for the US
to stand by its work when it says, if it's
going to be cutting waivers, it'll help you find an
alternative that can actually help keep some goodwill with the
(41:05):
Iraqi people. And then to realize that, you know, these
things will have short term to medium term effects inside
of Iraq, because if the Islamic Republic really does feel
like it's going down, that potentially might be when some
of these militias will step up because of how fragile
Iraq is, because of this mixed relationship Bagdad and central
authority in that country has with the US, and of
(41:25):
course because there will be elections I think in the
late fall of this year in Iraq as well, so
it's time to see these arteries that the regime has
within Iraq and be able to crush them and restrict
them as well. And again the same thing applies. This
is especially the case if you are not intent on
trying to build a different political order, or if you
do want to drive to create in the medium to
(41:47):
long term a different political order to go after the
host of bad actors that have helped sustain the current
bad order. So everything that you're saying, I think you
know also needs to be happening at kind of the
hum level, the low intensity, steady stream level out of
the USG the challenges of course limited time, limited human power,
(42:10):
and limited resources, which ones get prioritized. I think in
the macro world, when it comes to oil and major
ways that the oil money is laundered, you want to
look at Hong Kong and Uae, Malaysia and China.
Speaker 3 (42:25):
In the regional trade, you want to look at Iraq.
Speaker 1 (42:28):
So I want to switch to the broader economic equities,
the economic strategy. So there are people writing deep I
would say in the substack about the notion that what's
happening right now in the Middle East is much more
(42:49):
about a fight for the future economic order for the
region than it is about the threat of nuclear annihilation.
I'm not sure I agree with that, but I'd love
to get your view on how Iranian elites see these
strikes from an economic perspective. With it all and post
(43:13):
the question, do Iranian elites see the strikes as part
of a larger regional order being shaped against them? For example,
normalization with Arab states through the Abraham Accords. And one
more question, which could be kind of a crazy idea,
but I'm going to throw it out anyway. Do you
(43:34):
think that Iran and America could ever become economic allies.
Speaker 3 (43:39):
The latter one. Let me dress first.
Speaker 2 (43:40):
If you have a fundamentally different kind of government in Iran,
I think you will have a fundamentally different kind of
political relationship with that entity in Tehran and with the
US g The question obviously is what kind of order
Because you know, as much as I would like to
be an optimist as an Iranian American, also as an
analyst and a midd least watcher. More broadly, the rule
(44:04):
of the Middle East is things get worse, not better,
and it takes a heck of a lot of human
agency and planning and capital to be able to overcome
the barriers that are traditionally impeded these things which are
much more structural, especially in a place like the Middle East.
So yes, absolutely, if you flip the script and you
(44:24):
get even a more representative government or a government that
puts the national interest first. Notice I did not even
use the word democracy as we are, even as we
are both colleagues and the foundation for defensive democracy. But
even if you begin to facilitate the creep to get
to democracy, even in that period, you will have significant
room for the US. I mean flipping the script on
(44:45):
the eye toll is actually is opening, creating the script,
creating the political space to open for a different US
Iran economic relationship that actually could do what the eye
Tolas have been tempting Trump to do, which is to
see Iran as really one of the last not still
globally integrated economies in the world, and that I think
(45:08):
should go to the forces of freedom rather than to
the acts of aggressors who will continuously pick at the
carcass of Iran and cannot tolerate like a strong, sovereign,
independent Iran that has indeed great potential, But that potential
can only really come if you really are coming out
of this conflict successfully and with a political vision that
(45:29):
you can align resources towards and help drive. So that
is the potential alliance question. And on the other one
about how the Iranians see the region. You know, you
don't need to go into deep substack world to see that,
although there are very interesting things in deep substack world.
It's kind of like a intellectual deep Wikipedia world, what
(45:52):
kind of a rabbit hole you can go down. But
the Iranian political, economic, military elites have always seen the
region a rat against them.
Speaker 3 (46:01):
That is not new.
Speaker 2 (46:03):
They've always seen whether you're a state or a nonstate act,
or a bank or a business, they've always seen that
someone is out to get them. I mean, even look
at the way a place that they had invested significantly
militarily but were unable to economically get something out of it,
and that was Syria. You know, really from twenty eighteen
twenty nineteen, you saw a lot in the Iranian press
(46:24):
from Iranian political officials who have visited Syria and were
lamenting that even though they had done the lion's share
to try to keep us out in place and stabilize
to quote unquote stabilize, even though they created massive refugee issues,
terrorism issues, depopulation, all of that, as much as they
did that, they wanted to reap the economic dividends. They
wanted something predatory so that they could extract on the
(46:45):
back end, and they failed to extract. So there is
this you know, someone is always out to get us
kind of conspiratorial thinking. But it's also conditioned by them having.
Speaker 3 (46:55):
Been beaten in the official game.
Speaker 2 (46:57):
Because in a place like Syria, for example, they complaining
about the efficacy of the Turkic that the Turkey's foreign
economic policy towards that, you know, post towards that Assad regime,
post twenty fifteen, sixteen seventeen order that was back in
Damascus again, so this is the more kind of revisionist
(47:20):
revolutionary and then into conspiratorial thinking that exists.
Speaker 3 (47:23):
I don't think you.
Speaker 2 (47:25):
Know the fact that the dollar really does have all
of this strength and the dollar has been a weapon
of war against them for so long that also has
kind of led into this conspiratorial thinking.
Speaker 3 (47:35):
But again, the dollar has.
Speaker 2 (47:36):
Been been able to be weaponized against them for as
long because they have been the one again when I
say this is Ali Khamene's war, they have been the
one opting into these conflicts when they know economically and
even militarily they are outgunned. So you can't really cry
over spilt milk if you kept filling the milk glass
all the way and trying to pull over, push the
push the glass over because you wanted to look tough.
Speaker 1 (47:58):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely, So I want to end on one
final question, and it goes.
Speaker 2 (48:03):
Back to.
Speaker 1 (48:05):
Where the Israelis are positioned from an economic perspective. You know,
a lot of the geopolitical risk that has weighed down
the Israeli economy, its ratings, the ability to attract potentially
more foreign direct investment is linked to the Iran threat
(48:26):
and systematically those geopolitical risks are really being dealt with
mostly in the last week, which is but of course
a lot of build up to that. But how do
you see the opportunity going forward as you know, hopefully
(48:46):
we're going to get to some well, we don't know
where we're going. If it's more war negotiation, some combination,
we don't know. But Israel is a healthy economy. Me
They've had very strong growth that has actually continued through
the war of Their credit ratings are actually pretty strong.
Speaker 3 (49:08):
Uh.
Speaker 1 (49:09):
And I think you know, if they're successful in terms
of dealing with the nuclear threat in particular, it will
really be a boost for Israel and potentially the region.
But what do you think that should look like in
terms of Israel's role in a broader economic framework for
the region. Is it picking up again on the Abraham Accords?
(49:33):
Is it something different? Is it uh, some combination of
thinking around the iMac Israel, Middle East Europe supply chain
corridor and regional integration with Europe and India. What does
it look like from your perspective.
Speaker 2 (49:52):
All of that is where ISRAELI. You know, I want
to use this word that I used about Turkey. I
think Turkey fortunately or unfortunately depending on where you see
and there's it in life, does this really well? But
Israel has the opportunity, if it comes out of these
different cycles of violence, to really reshape its foreign economic
policy as being one that also is engaging deeper with
(50:17):
the East as it is with the West. Again, talk
about Abraham Accord expansion, talk about doubling down. If you
really do get some kind of ceasefire or truce or
peace or different kind of order in Gaza, whatever you
want to name it, there is really the potential for
a scaling up of the deep social, political, and economic
ties that they were able to build with some of
(50:38):
the GCC countries during the Abraham Accords.
Speaker 3 (50:40):
Expand that out.
Speaker 2 (50:42):
I mech I think so long as there's a major
missile war and shooting war, you have to really see
that as a pipe dream. But if these Raelies are
partners with the Americans on really flipping the script and
being able to drive a different political order or perhaps
better yet shape shape, help shape those forces on the
ground who want into different kind of political order, then
they too, just like the Americans, can be just like
(51:04):
the d nationalist and memmore present at creation for just
when that largest state in the region is flipped and
becomes a much more positive builder of things in the
region rather than a destructive power. Up until then, I
think these reallys will be for the short term, in
at least for another week or so. I think in
a shooting war with the Iranians, much will depend on
(51:25):
how they get the how America will come in. Will
they enter, will the Americans enter as more of a deconflictor,
will they enter as really someone who will deliver the
fou de grass if you will, or will they enter
as really part of a larger Israeli counter proliferation campaign,
which could mean the conflict will go on, which means
that the top of that we're having now about the
economic integration will be on pause, because I think even
(51:48):
though the regime understands that I think widens the war,
the Americans can deliver the death blow. They can move
from counter proliferation to counter regime. But nonetheless there will
be significant blows landed against GCC infrastructure basis, what have
you which will have negative economic effects, which will put
more distance and more time between what the GCC wanted
(52:10):
and what the Israelies wanted, meaning this more integrated, cohesive
regional economic order will for the foreseeable future be something
aspirational and will be something that these realies will try
to build vis a vis Salami tactics with each country
with a different friendly order in each capital, but will
always be on a shakeier foundation so long as there
(52:33):
is again this shooting work.
Speaker 3 (52:35):
I know that is very cautious.
Speaker 2 (52:37):
It's neither cautious optimism nor cautious pessimism, but it really
is designed to stress we're not out of this yet.
Speaker 1 (52:45):
Yeah, yeah, great, Venam, thank you so much. We've covered
a lot in the last fifty or so minutes and
I just want to thank you for all your good work,
and I hope you'll come back and join us again
on course of capital. Thank you so much, it.
Speaker 3 (52:57):
Would be a pleasure.
Speaker 2 (52:58):
Thank you so much, and it's a great to have
you and the whole CFP team as a colleague here.
Speaker 3 (53:02):
Thanks a lot.
Speaker 1 (53:05):
H
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