August 5, 2025 • 55 mins
Andrew King, Executive Director of Future Union, joins Coercive Capital to expose how authoritarian financial flows are quietly reshaping democratic institutions—from pensions and universities to policy circles.
In this 50-minute interview, King breaks down:
– The origins of Future Union and why clean capital is essential
– The real-world risk of foreign influence in American finance
– The Clean Capital Pledge and how reform is starting to take hold
– Concrete examples of capture—and what we can do about it
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:04):
Coercive Capital is proudly supported by Hummingbird. Hummingbird is a
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(00:35):
Coercive Capital, where we expose how authoritarian influence, illicit finance,
and dark networks reshape power in the twenty first century.
I'm your host, Elaine Dezinski. Today's guest is Andrew King,
executive director of Future Union, a nonpartisan organization redefining what
democratic capitalism looks like in an era of foreign interference
(00:57):
and shadow financing. And his team are behind the Clean
Capital Pledge and are building a cross sector solution to
protect American institutions and capital markets from adversarial influence. This
conversation is a wake of call not just for policymakers,
but for every investor, boardroom, and civic leader who thinks
the system is still safe by default. So let's get
(01:20):
into it. I want to start with a quote. This
is from a piece that Andrew recently published. Quote, China
has relied on Western capital to turbo charge its rise,
exploiting investments to gain access to cutting edge technologies critical
to its geopolitical ambitions. The minimally regulated private equity and
(01:41):
venture capital transactions provide China with the networks, expertise and
funding it needs to dominate fields like artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
and biotech. So let's get into it why clean capital
matters and how Andrew is building Future Union. Andrew, welcome
to the show. It's great to have you, pleasure.
Speaker 2 (02:01):
To be here. Thank you very much for having me on.
Really excited to do this.
Speaker 1 (02:04):
Well. I've been wanting to do this conversation for a
while and I've been following your work at Future Union
for about two years now, so it's it's great to
have you here. And I think the timing couldn't be better.
As I know there's there's a lot going on with
Future Union, and I think this question about adversarial capital
as well as how the deep US capital markets are
(02:28):
leveraged for purposes that may not completely jive with national
security concerns. You know that issue is really coming to
the floor. So I want to start with how you
catalyze the creation of Future Union. What is it, how
did you get there and maybe talk about some of
the major initiatives that are underway.
Speaker 2 (02:49):
Yeah, thank you, first and foremost love that you're broadcasting
all all of the various areas that capital plays a
role in, sort of the the US side of of
sort of the short sword and then the shield to
of off strategic capital and a lot of the other
entities that the US government has set up recently. So
(03:11):
Future Union was set up, I think in a different
era where government was still slower to come to the
problem of capital in the competition against China, call it
the COVID days. And so looking around with some friends
as I was a venture capitalist in d C, sort
of realized that the capital markets and private capital in
(03:36):
particular that's less highly heavily regulated in more opaque, is
a primary source of accessing influence by China, and they've
been leveraging that for years. And so unfortunately a lot
of the US investors before this became as as a parent,
(03:57):
were you know, complicit in this, whether knowingly or not,
because they were taking capital from investors from China and
other places, or sort of working on behalf and providing
information that came back through those sources, and so I
think we've gotten a lot smarter in the last couple
of years. Thankfully, these sorts of programming and knowledge and
(04:21):
mainstream awareness has gotten out there through a lot of
the mainstream presses as well as the alternative options. But anyway,
the idea was to try to get the private sector
to take a larger role in standing out to China
and other adversario countries that were undermining the role of
law and the open and free markets that we all
(04:42):
rely on. And so what we did was we looked
at it from a bipartisan perspective and encouraged catalyzed the
private sector to do more. And so that that flows
into a lot of different areas.
Speaker 1 (04:56):
And how are you structured? Are you a five to
one C three or what? What is your kind of legal
structure for the work?
Speaker 2 (05:03):
Yeah, so we're structured as a an LFC organization. We
have both a nonprofit and a for profit aspect to it,
and then we work through both entities based on sort
of the goals at hand. So all private, privately funded,
no intermittingling that comes from from any of the various sides,
(05:27):
and basically set up to achieve goals that that maybe
other interested parties like the for profit ends and some
that we'll talk about on the programming may not have
the same ability to take stances that are that are
(05:47):
either unpopular or or not profit producing.
Speaker 1 (05:51):
Do you think you could kind of describe it as
a collective action effort then of primarily the private investment community,
and that you're just to be clear, you're sourcing most
of your funding from the financial institution's financial community of interest.
Speaker 2 (06:08):
Actually it's all personal, so we don't have any funding
from any corporates or anything on those lines. So everybody
is in arms length, and frankly, nobody has there's no
intermingling or discussion about anything that we sort of put
out there beforehand, and so yeah, I mean, I think
(06:31):
that's probably the best way to put it. The idea
was setting up something that leveraged the private sector because frankly,
we weren't hopeful at that point in time that the
government was going to get to the point that it
was making and taking the steps that were needed to
basically blunt China and a lot of the central decision
(06:52):
making of adversarial countries in a way that that sort
of reduced the risks in our in our free and
fare markets.
Speaker 1 (07:02):
How you know, how do you how do you define
this concept of clean capital. It's something that you've talked
about quite a bit. I think there's some momentum around
this idea. I think it's core to what you're what
you're defining within future Union.
Speaker 2 (07:18):
Yeah, and clean capital first and foremost definitions are difficult,
especially in this area, as you know, because you've talked
enough about this and excellent programming. But the idea is
tracing back capital to the the the impetus of the
source and ascertaining and sort of identifying interest that would
(07:42):
be against just for pure profit making type diverse. And
so the clean capital idea was was sort of an
underpin of we say the right things about where capital
is coming from. But but frankly, when you purport to
be for profit and andital capital producing maximizing profits, but
(08:04):
then in reality, China and a lot of other adversarial states,
but mostly China has been responsible for posturing one way
and actually really looking for insights and access through their means.
And so the idea was to trace this back to
the actual underlying entities where the capital is coming from.
(08:26):
And oftentimes there's shell corporations and entdes and wellcs and
trusts and all sorts of other stuff that money passes through,
and frankly, it's very difficult. Even in the day of AI,
figuring this out is probably one of the biggest challenges
the government phases and I have yet to see a
solution that actually works. And so one of the things
(08:46):
that we're doing is we started with a self attestation,
which the companies that most of which and the funds
that you would know, have sort of self identified, and
you know, the next phase of that is actually going
to a legal perspective of UH, legal requirements in legal
liability for knowing your customer and obviously the know your
(09:14):
customer type endeavors have been in banking for a long time.
But that being said, we're taking it a step further
and going back to the you know, the the underlying
source that that you know, the banking industry frankly is
a little reluctant to to try to take steps to
look into Yeah.
Speaker 1 (09:33):
Yeah, so this idea that you've put forward and UH
have been pursuing around a public investor pledge instead of
just focus focusing on policy, it seems to me like
you want investors to have real uh skin in the game, right,
is that the idea that you can have more traceability
but also that there's some level of accountability within this
(09:56):
kind of this frame of clean capital.
Speaker 2 (09:58):
Yeah, and I mean a think I think you identified it.
It's not just you know, accountability. I mean it's self
identifying right now. But the point is is that when
this clean capital initiative, the what's going to be readily apparent,
we hope is the is more funds adopted, as more
private investors step up and we have more traceability than
(10:21):
we have or we've had in the past, that's going
to unleash a greater amount of knowledge and awareness that
hopefully we have a decisional structure where investors can choose
between clean capital that is certified and capital that is uncertified,
(10:43):
so that when you're looking and making decisions in a
certified manner, you're going to trust that or maybe there's
less risk for the investors as well.
Speaker 1 (10:54):
And what have you found in terms of sector exposure
to authoritarian linked funds? Are you finding that certain sectors
are much higher risk or that certain institutions are maybe
unknowingly vulnerable.
Speaker 2 (11:09):
Yeah, there's a couple of different ways to unpack that.
From the standpoint of sectors, I think if you look
at what are the riskiest sectors from using capital as
a means to leverage an access, there's undoubtedly some sectors
that are more at risk because there are higher value
(11:30):
targets advers by China and other adversarial countries. And that
in particular means that obviously AI with everything that we're seeing,
is the top of mind for every everyone. And I
think Mantis and Benchmark, the Benchmark conversation with investing in Mantis,
which was a Chinese AI company, has kind of sparked
(11:55):
some of the backlash against that through the mainstream. That
wasn't just investors that knew a lot about clean capital.
But that being said, outside of you know, direct investments
from US venture funds like Benchmarks that have invested in
Chinese AI leaders, the reverse is also true because you
(12:16):
have the Chinese LPs that have gotten information and access
through the quarterly distributions by venture funds back to them
of information and even if that information is is not
as detailed, you get that quarterly and it adds up,
especially with the siphoning of information that China has done
across basically all aspects and all verticals. You know, their
(12:41):
ability to assess data combined with you know, some of
the companies like TikTok, and information that they have received
from from basically a lot of the open source type areas.
All of that combined gives them best practices, insights and
knowledge on how to build you know, better startups or
(13:01):
in faster than the US, which is problematic for obviously
a number of different reasons.
Speaker 1 (13:07):
One thing that I have really liked about the evolution
of your work is this link that you've made between democracy,
free markets, and national security. How is that playing out today?
You talked about, you know, the fact that you launched
Future Union during the COVID era, and we're really in
(13:30):
a different conversation now, particularly as we look at the
reorientation of global trade, the way that, for example, the
tear of conversation is now entwined with national and economic
security objectives, but in an environment that I think is
more transactional than it is driven by democracy or democratic ideals.
(13:53):
But how do you see those links between democracy, markets
and national security. Are you getting tracked action around that?
Speaker 2 (14:02):
Undoubtedly we are, I think the world is changing, and
obviously the conversation around tariffs and what it means to
be in the US and an allied country versus Europe
and an allied country, or NATO and an allied country
is adjusting that the definition of democracy we see at
the front lines with Ukraine right now. But you also
(14:25):
could say, you know, from a lot of the cyber
attacks that sort of fly into the radar, there's a
lot of countries that are that are you know, at
the at the precipice of of sort of capital and
in the conversation with economics Estonia, uh, cyber attacks there
and a lot of you know, countries that you would
never think of that have been victims of of China
(14:48):
or Russia, intermenttling type stuff would be would be the
ones that that sort of come to mind. I think
the mainstream this is going a much's becoming my more
apparent the average viewer and the average person in the street,
which was unheard of call it three years ago, five
years ago during COVID times. Now the conversation is changing
(15:11):
into how do we use capital and how do we
use our free markets to win the competition rather than
to be Achilles heel in in a competition that we
didn't even know we were competing in And I think
that's that's the biggest thing. And we'll have a couple
more things that are coming out in light of that,
(15:33):
catalyzing capital to make a difference in sort of the
global competition.
Speaker 1 (15:39):
And do you feel like you're getting good bipartisan traction.
Speaker 2 (15:43):
For your work? Yeah, and I don't. I don't think
it's just our work. There's a lot of people doing
exceptional work out there on these issues. That's the really
good part. And I want to credit the China Select
Committee because they've been right there with us for a
lot of this. And you know, we were We went
out with the enterre capital funds identifying and they had
subpoena power, so obviously maybe we took a broader approach
(16:06):
and they took more in depth approach, even if it
was voluntarily getting information from some of the worst offending
venture funds five which they identified last year and so
have worked closely with them. But I mean, I think
when you have a congressional committee that has been renewed
now once with an extremely a much higher budget, that
(16:29):
goes to show that bipartisan interest in this cuts across
party lines and really is throughout Congress.
Speaker 1 (16:37):
And you know, what about the potential for a more
international focused effort. I know most of your work has
been US based, but if we look at what's happening
in Europe, the potential to align some of these policies,
particularly with European allies and partners. They also have relatively
deep capital markets. Are you finding that there's an intro
(17:00):
st in other parts of the world.
Speaker 2 (17:03):
I would say there is, undoubtedly. I think the difference
is is they're still later to the game than we were,
from both a mainstream perspective as well as a defense perspective,
and so a lot of the conversations that have come
with the new administration have required a rethinking of what
defense means and who we're going to rely on. In
(17:25):
Europe where I am right now, we're actually having those
conversations real time with some of the major governments around
this because the sentiment has changed dramatically, and I've had
a lot of conversations around specifically the reliance on the
US and the ability to rely in the US as
(17:46):
well as you know, what does the future hold for US?
And so I know President Trump and NATO and the
five percent GDP pledge to defense budgets, a lot of
that being infrastructure. You know, it is making a difference,
but much more has to happen, And specifically, I would
(18:08):
point out Germany in large part because I sit in
Frankfurt right now and in the Frankfurt talking with a
lot of the financiers. The six hundred and fifty one
billion dollars that they've pledged to defense over the next
five years, he's unheard of. It's something they've never done,
(18:31):
and frankly, I don't know that they know how to
handle it yet, so there's still baby steps in that.
And what it could turn into is, in my mind,
it goes one of two ways. It becomes an infrastructure
project to improve Germany, it becomes truly innovative and is
as intended. Portion goes to improving some of the infrastructure
(18:54):
in Germany, and then a large portion goes to both
offense and defensive security for Europe. At Anto.
Speaker 1 (19:02):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely, that pivot in Germany around defense investment
is I think transformational, and you know has the potential
not only to build out that base in the different
ways as you've alluded to, but you know, their economy
(19:23):
is so dependent on China, and I mean they have
the dual challenge. And we've talked about this and other
segments on this show, but you know, the legacy reliance
on Russia for oil and the legacy reliance on China
as a primary export market is a double whammy when
it comes to authoritarian challenges. And I think this is
(19:46):
you know, widely understood at this point that this is
a particularly problematic period for Germany. But you know, I
almost think that this NATO imperative is the push right
to move them into a completely different space. And you know,
(20:06):
I spend a lot of time in the czar Land
over the years and other parts of Germany, and you
know that industrial base has shrunk, right. We always think
of Germany as as a serious powerhouse, and it is
around manufacturing. But there's also I think a real imperative
to to think about what's going to be next and
(20:27):
where they go with that capital. So I think it's
a really interesting time actually to be bullish on Germany
in particular. But as you said, I mean, it's it's
not going to be easy. There's a lot of capital
at play and some big decisions that have to be made,
so it's going to be interesting to see how that
works out well.
Speaker 2 (20:46):
Following off that on that briefly, I think I think
spot on, I agree with everything you said, except for
the fact that one thing is I don't think it's
self fulfilling that they will make the right choices just yet.
And that's one of the reasons that I'm out here
sort of having conversations. I am, and I think there's
(21:07):
a much more thoughtful process that's going into it. But
some of the unforced errors that have occurred in Germany
over the last decades are self inflicted and those don't
change very quickly, and frankly, the mainstream perspective of what
they face is still allowing them to sit on a fence.
(21:28):
And it's a fence that you know very well and
you've covered. But that being said, it is a fence
that they've elected not to take a dramatic move in
either one direction. And so if I walk out the
door here and go to the galleria that's next door,
I find a Dji store for drones right there, blocked
(21:49):
the other way, I find a Wawe store. And so
that in and of itself, in the dead center of Frankfurt,
is you know, perfect example of them not having had
or been forced to make difficult decisions that America has
to make now, and what they do next will decide.
(22:13):
It'll decide a lot more than just what happens in Germany.
Speaker 1 (22:16):
Yeah, I think that's exactly right, and there's such an
opportunity for harmonization of policy between the US and Europe.
I think it would be incredibly powerful. I was thinking
about the America First Investment Policy. We made a segment
on that several months ago, and I know you've written
on it, but I wonder if you see any inkling
(22:38):
of you know, conversation in Germany about adopting some of
the basic tenants of the America First Investment policy, limitations
on the you know, opaque investment into Germany that ends up,
you know, reinforcing exactly what you've said, their telecoms and
(23:00):
you know drone manufacturing base, which is already dominant.
Speaker 2 (23:05):
I mean, there is some of that, but I actually
I think, like I said before, we're so early in
that discussion here compared to the US, we're five years behind.
I mean, everything that I've seen, nothing has changed my
perspective to think that Germany sits where America did during
the covid era and what they decide next will have
dramatic implications, and frankly, isn't the best interest of everybody
(23:27):
for them to side with the Allies on this. But
I think until they feel that there is a reason
to do that, that funding that they've allocated may languish
and there's a very easy decision or I think recognition that, frankly,
not making any decisions is a decision in and of itself.
(23:49):
And so if you look at the history, and I
would say the same for the US, but we punted
a lot of those decisions for years in Congress and elsewhere.
We still pun on in the financial markets, as you
cover all the time in Germany, until they're forced not
to kick the can down the road, in my mind,
probably continue that path. And so I think I think
(24:12):
strong leadership is needed, and I frankly think the complacency
that persists everywhere that I've seen, and there's a lot
of cultural reasons for that, well dramatically have to change.
And that might only come with with challenges that are
that they're reacting to rather than proactively and you know, embracing.
Speaker 1 (24:38):
Yeah, I think that's a really accurate summary. I would
share much of you know what, what you've laid out.
Hopefully we'll be able to, you know, look back in
ten years, fifteen years and see that, you know, the
catalyst around NATO funding was the starting point for a
(24:58):
shift that that will be beneficial for Western democracies and
US engagement with Europe and reframing and reshaping the manufacturing
and productive base of the future. I think that's really
what's at stake here, But as you say, there's a
ways to go on the conversation. Hummingbird is a compliance
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at Hummingbird dot Co. That's Hummingbird dot Co. I'd like
to move into a different aspect of the conversation. Can
talk a little bit more about some of the real
world examples of how capital exposure is problematic. And I
(26:25):
thought maybe we could start with the recent Cattle IPO.
You've done some writing on that and have talked a
lot about it, and I was wondering if you could
just kind of walk us through that particular case. Cattle
a major supplier of battery technology, lots of vertical integration
across that company. They're they're really a global leader. It
(26:49):
was part of what we looked at in the Supply
Chain Battery Supply Chain Report that we launched just a
couple of weeks ago at FDD. So can you walk
us through that particular case.
Speaker 2 (27:01):
Yeah, it's it's a frankly, it's it's one of the
best examples of why we're not out of the woods,
I think, in the sense of even America. And so
while it's easy to you know, throw stones in different
places and in different entities for not making difficult decisions,
we have a look in the mirror in America too,
because a lot of our corporations and specifically in the
(27:23):
financial area are still getting a pass. And so cattle
is the prime example. Maybe technology uh TikTok could be
the one that we talked about there and continuously just
push that that ban or or I guess the separation
(27:46):
between the U s nity and the not U s
n n down the road. But I think with cattle.
Cattle is the largest battery maker by far supplies Tesla, Levelswagen,
a lot of the major car companies with their batteries,
not the most advanced technologies. But that being said, when
you we've we've looked at the intellectual property and and
(28:09):
gone pretty deep into this and frankly, the market share,
the leading market show that they have give them a
huge benefit to be a market maker. And then combined
with a lot of the subsidies that they've gotten from
the state and in China's interest in various ways to
(28:30):
help facilitate their rise, has has sort of been transformative.
So the cattle story he is, he is long dated.
They they've had, as I said, relationships with all the
carmakers at different points in time for batteries and supplying
that they look to raise more capital after listing on
(28:52):
the Chinese Stock Exchange five years ago, and so they
looked at you and doing a US list, and in
this climate it's not as palatable, and as an ancillary opportunity,
they looked at the Hong Kong Exchange. And so when
they started looking at raising call it five or six
(29:12):
billion dollars in capital in Hong Kong Exchange, they looked
at book runners and some banks to do that. The
two investment banks that came out of the beauty contest,
which banks tend to do for any sort of a
public market listing and they're very lucrative, were JP Morgan
(29:33):
and Bank of America, and the two of those led
a deal that included a number of other banks too,
but you know, they were the ones that were at
the very top. And do call it what two months ago,
UH they were able to use the the placement agents
of Bank of America, JP Morgan and others Goldman Morgan, Stanley,
(29:58):
a number of others to UH get listed on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange with a number of waivers that
came directly from the Chinese government to be able to
facilitate that and also keep intellectual property and patents opaque
and frankly from investors, increase the liability risk if anything
(30:21):
does go wrong with the company or there's a separation issue,
because as you know, the Chinese government has a right
of basic first refusal and overarching right on the technologies
of any Chinese companies and the data and that persistence.
And in the US markets, the SEC would not have
allowed that, or at least there would have been more strains.
(30:41):
In the Hong Kong Exchange was willing and able to
give them very quick waivers to get around them.
Speaker 1 (30:50):
Yeah, that's a big problem. And do you think we're
going to be seeing a lot more of that sort
of arbitrage, if you will, kind of moving into these
reisdictions to promote certain kinds of technologies, advance the interests
of the CCP through these entities that are extensively private
(31:11):
but really operate with a high degree of influence from Beijing.
Speaker 2 (31:17):
Yeah. I mean, you know, the one thing that we
both have to call out on this is the Golden Share.
So China has been you know, the operative entity for
creating a Golden Share, which basically gives Chinese authorities or
CCP Chinese Communist Party members a seat on the board
for a negligible amount of money, but basically gives them
(31:40):
almost a blocking right on a lot of the major
corporate decisions, plus an interest in capital or profit that
may come out of those large listings. So again with
a despite China being you know, a centralized government, a
lot of those part members make a significant amount of
(32:02):
money in the success of these Chinese or US stocks
that have Chinese investments. Down the road, and you know,
in other places we would call that, I guess that's
way to put it is. Trading on insider information is
one of the things that's going through Congress right now,
(32:22):
and everybody's looking at the Senate and House and what
we do with our own insider trading. Insider trading in
China is much more prolific and it doesn't even have
to be hidden. So I think, going down the you know,
the road on arbitrage, it's not so much an arbitrage
issue because it's a new pathway for China to list
(32:46):
it's private companies publicly. This happens to be an instance
where cattle was already listed on the Chinese Stock is Chuge,
so it's not an IPO. It's a secondary listing, but
it happens to raise you know, five billion dollars and
there's a lot of nuances in how that deal came about.
That The China Select Committee has issued subpoenas to Jamie
(33:09):
Diamond and Brian morny haantage at JP Morgan and Bank
of America last week to try to figure out and
discern really what went on behind the scenes. But a
lot of our writing has been on that. But the
simple fact is there was sixty a week after that listing,
there were sixty Chinese tech companies that were looking the
list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Now it's got
(33:30):
to be upwards of double or triple that amount, and
it's a new pathway on the backs of the banks
and their reputation and the signaling value to be able to,
you know, a new pathway to unlock money, which frankly,
with our M and A markets and IPO markets, they're
unfreezing now but largely have been stuck for the last
(33:51):
couple of years. It's an unfair advantage for the Chinese
companies that otherwise are getting liquidity and investors that are
getting liquidity to do the next step or grow faster,
which US companies aren't really.
Speaker 1 (34:04):
Eligible for, right, right, Yeah, I mean this is this
is another example of weaponization of free market practices. That's
what I think this is. Maybe that's the way we
need to start really talking about it. These components of
global finance and global trade have been weaponized to a
point where we've lost we've lost our ability to control
(34:28):
it in a way that supports the free market principles,
and this separation of public and private, the lines are
becoming so so blurry. I mean, in a way, it's
the same challenge that I think we're about to face
with the Hutchinson Ports deal, right, I mean we're coming
(34:51):
in from a different entry point there in terms of
you know, US investor coming in and you know, with
a with a European partner, which is actually a very
good thing. But now push back from the CCP and
their insistence that the deal can only go forward if
there's the inclusion of COSTC right, a major Chinese port
(35:14):
terminal operator. Why it's for the exact same reasons that
you've identified, right, This is uh, this is going to
be a real issue. How do we go forward? Can
we even allow something like that? From a national security perspective.
Speaker 2 (35:30):
Yeah, I mean your guests, I mean, I think we
know where we both stand on this. But you know,
this is sort of a question for the business community too,
and when are they going to start taking you know,
a principal stance on this, because frankly, this is not
going to age well as I look at this down
the road, and do you want to be a Jamie
Diamond Brian moynihan outside of the pay packages in looking
(35:53):
at where you stood on some of these issues when
they were important rather than hindsight, know, you know what
they led to, you know, a year or two or
more down the road, and you know when when those
companies are receiving subpoenas by you know, purportedly, you know,
bipartisan condissions that are focused, you know, on what the
(36:16):
American people care about, and frankly, have been getting a
lot of attention. You know. Again, a lot of CEOs
can weather that, but that's still not the right stance,
I don't think for for for the.
Speaker 1 (36:28):
Future, I'd like to pivot back now to the US
and talk a little bit about university endowments and pensions,
where there's been a growing discussion around exposure of endowments
and pensions in particular to what's going on in China
and investment strategies that might put them at risk. Uh, Andrew,
(36:51):
Id know, that's an area where you've done a lot
of research and writing. So give me your take on that.
Speaker 2 (36:58):
Yeah, I mean we've outlined this in a paper starting
last year and I think pretty good handle on the
industry or exactly what's known and what's what can be identified.
And you know, as we've alluded to in some of
our writing, I mean, you know, over the last couple
of years, the last five you know, sixty eight billion
dollars has gone to Chinese venture funds or funds investing
(37:23):
US funds that are investing in China in some way
in the innovation ecosystem. And that's the way that we
defined it is, you know, the public markets are a
lot less contentious because frankly, that's more mature technologies, and
even if that's a public listing on a Chinese stag
exchange Hong Kong, aside and the waivers that came about that,
(37:46):
it's usually much more mature technology. But investing in the
early stage startups or the innovation ecosystem that basically propel
a lot of these technologies, be a quantum an AI biotech,
even you know drone technology that we've seen and that
basically has a dual use or dji has proven that
you can do military and consumer at the same time.
(38:08):
You know, I think this capital has been the biggest
achilles heel that we've had over the last couple of
years because basically it's not just the capital, and if
it was just the money, it would be a lot
less of an issue. But it's the know how of
the venture funds that are the tops ones oftentimes in
Silicon Valley and in the US that provide access but
(38:32):
also provide the informal networks of advising the startups in
China and others on how to beat how to outcompete
the US startups that are in similar verticals. And the
way as a venture capitalist, the way that we work
is you don't invest in competing technologies in your portfolio.
You put all your weight in your mic behind one winner,
(38:54):
and that's the critical part. And if that winner, if
you're backing, goes into let's say Mantis at benchmark in China,
you do everything you possibly can to make sure that
that startup wins the whole competition against all the rest,
because that's how you exit, that's how you make money.
And it just so happens that what you're doing is
(39:15):
it's not just an investment. It's basically, you know, at
least at benchmark, decades upon decades of the brightest investors
in the US ecosystem that are the most connected, putting
their rolodex or or I guess LinkedIn accounts these days
(39:36):
behind those companies to ensure that they win. US companies don't.
Speaker 1 (39:40):
So let's go a little bit deeper on exposures of
endowments and pensions where specifically have you found the most
risk what you know, what what kind of exposure are
we talking about? Can you get into some of the
details on that, sure?
Speaker 2 (39:59):
I mean, the are some pensions and endowments that are
more noteworthy, oftentimes the larger ones. So you know, the
at least let's you know, back to basics or taking
a step back here, US pensions or state pensions. We
don't the US, at least until a couple of months ago,
had never had a sovereign wealth fund. So let's say
Norway and Sweden and Saudi Arabia and China obviously have
(40:25):
large sovereign wealth funds where the government takes money and
decides how to allocate that for economic outperformance or reinvesting
on behalf of citizens. What we have in the US
are US pensions at a state level that take government
workers oftentimes police, unions, nurses, teachers, others, and that goes
(40:49):
into a state pension fund that then reinvests because they
have to keep up with the payouts that come as
people retire later in their career. Obviously, so there's always
this catchup type endeavor for pensions to try to outperform
the market or at least recap and so oftentimes what
(41:10):
the venture capital private equity community, the private markets have
been the best ad is actually taking on greater risk
but also greater rewards, and so that's always sort of
the impetus for doing a lot of the investing in
private markets that are more opaque and less liquid. There
is a greater risk of loss, but there's also a
(41:32):
greater risk of significant returns, and that market has shown
over the years it can return a lot of money.
In the Chinese market, when the government basically puts their
thumb on the scales of who wins and who loses,
because that's what happens in China. They basically allocate siphoned
resources from intellectual property theft, cybersecurity theft, others to individual
(41:56):
national champions be it an ali baba, be it a TikTok,
you name it, and oftentimes those outcomes are much more dramatic.
So the question of investing in China is not so
much of picking the winners and losers. Oftentimes that's predecided
and predetermined. It's getting access. And that's why the venture
(42:16):
capital and private equity community, especially the most connected one,
has fought significantly to get access to that market in
whatever way possible. And so the pensions have sought the
greater returns certainty in the past of investing in basically
a rigs system of China to reap greater returns. And
(42:38):
so what's happened is the largest or oftentimes the largest
investors like Sequoia, we saw a benchmark with Mantus. Historically
benchmark has not been one of the worst, but the
US and the Select Committee for the CCP identified a
number of the major players that had gotten much of
(43:00):
the pension money to go invest in China, and so
the pensions have provided upwards of tens of billions of
dollars that have gone into the Chinese markets and thus
gotten good returns if they could exit. But that being said,
it's become much more challenging without an IPO market and Sue.
(43:21):
What we found is some of the largest pensions, like
the New York State pensions, the California State pensions, frankly,
Texas and Michigan have been some of the worst offenders,
have funneled billions of dollars into funds in China that
have basically supported and built the innovation ecosystems and sue.
(43:48):
The other side, in the flip side of that is
also the endowments, and those are the universities that we
know that they get their money from a combination of
wealthy individuals that are donors that provide money either at
death or prior to death to facilitate funding. And Harvard
obviously is one of the leading ones that's gotten a
lot of recognition for about a fifty billion dollar endowment,
(44:12):
but oftentimes they've been some of the worst offenders, and
they don't have the transparency requirements that a state pension
would have. And so from our investigation, we found tens
of billions of dollars, also going from the largest University
of California System, University of Michigan System, University of Texas System,
(44:33):
and then Yale Princeton a lot of the other major universities,
despite being very opaque and difficult information defined, are some
of the worst offenders investing in you know, call it
dozens to upwards of one hundred startups in China.
Speaker 1 (44:50):
Do you also see it in terms of exposure to
China's sovereign bonds?
Speaker 2 (44:56):
So we really haven't looked at the bonds nearly as much.
It's an interesting area to look at. I think the
challenge for us is the bond market is a very
different market than the private equity and metric capital. And
I started out actually a city group. In the bond market,
(45:16):
I think, in my mind I'm still very problematic, but
a very different analysis and also different types of players
than what we're seeing in the venture capital and private
equity space.
Speaker 1 (45:30):
I do think there's something there. I wrote a piece
on that a while back, and you know, there was
a pretty fundamental decision made back in it with twenty
sixteen or twenty seventeen to allow Chinese sovereign bonds into
the benchmark, the MSc benchmark, and you know that really
(45:50):
opened the door for this exposure in a different way.
The only person that really called that out was Marco Rubio.
To his credit, Yeah yeah, I mean really big kudos
to to Rubio for taking a pretty principled stand on that.
I do think it's something we need to take a deeper,
(46:11):
deeper look at. It's just, you know, when we think
about where we're going on the trade conversation and the exposures, right,
it's not just exposure to Chinese exports. It's exposure to
these tangled webs right of investment that are really challenging
and you know, going into essentially a trade war right
(46:35):
without maybe having thought through all the implications of these
areas of exposure. But also big shout out to the
Select Committee and the CCP for being you know, I
think a constant source of you know, raising raising the
alarm bells and looking at the right aspects of this problem.
(46:56):
Maybe that's a good segue into the resistance what we
do about this. You've touched on some of the potential
approaches and tools, but the first thing I wanted to
ask you is what kind of traction are you getting
around the Clean Capital Pledge and what would you define
as successful? What are you looking for there? How how
(47:16):
much you know, what percentage of engagement do you want
to see from from the investor community around around the
Clean Capital Pledge?
Speaker 2 (47:26):
Yeah, a great question, and frankly following up on sort
of like the the the previous one on the m
c I and and some of that type of stuff.
The politicians, frankly on that issue have been very good
in bipartisan and basically calling out some of that exposure.
And frankly your piece was excellent on that, and I
think especially for the federal employees, that was one of
(47:49):
the sticking points of allowing basically our our federal pension
fund significant for all all UH public employees to be
able to allow to be allowed to invest in Chinese bonds, equities,
things like that, and that's something that voluntarily, I give
them credit, they've stepped away from, or at least proverbally
(48:09):
stepped away from. But getting back to the Clean Capital Pledge,
what we're looking for now is more international investors, so
a lot of the private funds. So as as we
talked about before, not only are we seeing with not
only are we seeing with the Europe being farther behind
(48:34):
in a lot of different areas, we're also seeing a
resurgence of new interest in this area, and that means
more funds are taking a second look at it. So
I think, you know, we had the COVID era of ESG,
and that is still here in Europe and pervasive, and
a lot of the restrictions on offensive weaponry and national
(48:57):
security investing are still prolific. So a lot of the
institutions are still prohibited from investing in things that would
necessarily improve the future predisposition defense of a lot of
the European countries. That's slowly eroding, but it's still not
fast enough. And so as that erodes and there's more
(49:18):
money they can go into some of those private capital funds,
the venture funds, private refunds and things like that, I
think you'll see greater ability to invest. And frankly, what
will come with that is where you're taking money from.
If it's a European entity or something that conforms to
the clean Capital certification, you'll see funds that are more eligible.
Right now, I will say from a non scientific perspective, most,
(49:44):
if not the vast majority of funding here in Europe
has ties to China or has Chinese ties running through
it and would be ineligible for the Clean Capital Pledge.
And I think with subsequent funds, as they raise new
fund and there's more institutional capital to come in that
Frankly is getting outside of the ESG parameters, and Frankly
(50:07):
has the opportunity to invest more holistically in national security
to support there will be greater sources of capital which
will provide them an ability both to clean their their
capital base and then take part in the Clean Capital certification.
Speaker 1 (50:25):
Do you think the movement around clean capital can scale
without some specific legislation or more policy support from the US.
Speaker 2 (50:35):
So I look at the model that I You know,
I'm still very much of a free market capitalist believer.
I believe that government intervention should be the last resort
or relying on that should be the last resort for
most things. I really do think that the idea of
(50:55):
capital that is both that is both certified as clean
and championed as such is desirable from both the investment
le partner perspective as well as the investor perspective. And
I think that scales on its own based on having
source capital that is clean, and then also investors that
want that. And so you have basically a bifurcation of
(51:17):
a market where you have, you know, the good capital
on one side and providers that either choose or cannot
find cleaning capital for a number of different reasons on
another side. And both of those winno or I should say,
the good capital widens and the the deleterious capital narrows
(51:40):
in winnows over time, so that you have a base
of good capital instead of a collective intermingling of both.
Speaker 1 (51:52):
And would you have any specific advice for investment committees
on how they're vetting sources of capital.
Speaker 2 (52:00):
I think you know this is sort of like the
Supreme Court's pornography challenge from years ago, where you sort
of know when you see it, and you don't need
necessarily parameters for a lot of this stuff. You just
have to basically be You need to be vigilant in
(52:20):
what you're looking for. And so when you have a
limited partner, which frankly every private capital investor wants more
limited partners, you have to get out of the idea
that you'll take capital from anywhere because it's capital, and
start looking at like proverbally why are they giving us
capital and where's it coming from? And what do they
want out of us? And I for too long, I
(52:43):
think we've neglected what is I should say, those investment
committees have neglected what has been obvious because they did
not want to acknowledge what was obvious in where the
capital was coming from. And I think there's a greater,
if not principled, stand knowledge that other investment committees will
(53:07):
be looking at that and to keep up with the
Jones is we have to consider this more vociferously than
we have in the past.
Speaker 1 (53:16):
Great final question for you, what do you think success
should look like in five years time with a clean
capital pledge and the engagement of the investor community in
your work?
Speaker 2 (53:29):
Well, I mean, we'll find out, because I think that's
you know, we're trending towards this. But to be honest,
I think one of the challenges that remains in something
that we're I mean I'm working on daily is greater tools.
So frankly, if we if this clean capital pledge that
starts as voluntary this year will go to something legal
(53:51):
liability because it will go through a law firm and
there will be consequences for bad actors, and I don't
think we have any of those right now, but there
are ways to gain the system. I think the tools
that the government is not prepared to provide yet, and frankly,
even Ai and leading technologists have not been able to
(54:13):
crack will give us greater confidence in a couple of
years that, frankly, China is not intermingling. If there is
Chinese money, it's going after pure profit motives instead of
deleterious access information advantages, which we've seen for years, and
that in and of itself, I think is a huge win.
Speaker 1 (54:35):
Excellent Andrew, Thanks for sharing your time with us, and
I wish you all the best with all of your
work and the Clean Capital Pledge. It's really important, and
thanks for taking a principled stand. I appreciate that.
Speaker 2 (54:48):
Thank you for the time. I really enjoyed this.
Speaker 1 (54:50):
Thanks that was Andrew King helping us navigate the line
between capital and control a course of capital. We're not
just following the money, We're decoding the new battleground. This
show is part of the Elicit Edge network of platform
connecting experts, investigators, and producers tackling the hidden architecture of
modern influence. If you want to learn more, support our work,
(55:12):
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Every listen helps shine a light into dark money. Thanks
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(00:35):
Coercive Capital, where we expose how authoritarian influence, illicit finance,
and dark networks reshape power in the twenty first century.
I'm your host, Elaine Dezinski. Today's guest is Andrew King,
executive director of Future Union, a nonpartisan organization redefining what
democratic capitalism looks like in an era of foreign interference
(00:57):
and shadow financing. And his team are behind the Clean
Capital Pledge and are building a cross sector solution to
protect American institutions and capital markets from adversarial influence. This
conversation is a wake of call not just for policymakers,
but for every investor, boardroom, and civic leader who thinks
the system is still safe by default. So let's get
(01:20):
into it. I want to start with a quote. This
is from a piece that Andrew recently published. Quote, China
has relied on Western capital to turbo charge its rise,
exploiting investments to gain access to cutting edge technologies critical
to its geopolitical ambitions. The minimally regulated private equity and
(01:41):
venture capital transactions provide China with the networks, expertise and
funding it needs to dominate fields like artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
and biotech. So let's get into it why clean capital
matters and how Andrew is building Future Union. Andrew, welcome
to the show. It's great to have you, pleasure.
Speaker 2 (02:01):
To be here. Thank you very much for having me on.
Really excited to do this.
Speaker 1 (02:04):
Well. I've been wanting to do this conversation for a
while and I've been following your work at Future Union
for about two years now, so it's it's great to
have you here. And I think the timing couldn't be better.
As I know there's there's a lot going on with
Future Union, and I think this question about adversarial capital
as well as how the deep US capital markets are
(02:28):
leveraged for purposes that may not completely jive with national
security concerns. You know that issue is really coming to
the floor. So I want to start with how you
catalyze the creation of Future Union. What is it, how
did you get there and maybe talk about some of
the major initiatives that are underway.
Speaker 2 (02:49):
Yeah, thank you, first and foremost love that you're broadcasting
all all of the various areas that capital plays a
role in, sort of the the US side of of
sort of the short sword and then the shield to
of off strategic capital and a lot of the other
entities that the US government has set up recently. So
(03:11):
Future Union was set up, I think in a different
era where government was still slower to come to the
problem of capital in the competition against China, call it
the COVID days. And so looking around with some friends
as I was a venture capitalist in d C, sort
of realized that the capital markets and private capital in
(03:36):
particular that's less highly heavily regulated in more opaque, is
a primary source of accessing influence by China, and they've
been leveraging that for years. And so unfortunately a lot
of the US investors before this became as as a parent,
(03:57):
were you know, complicit in this, whether knowingly or not,
because they were taking capital from investors from China and
other places, or sort of working on behalf and providing
information that came back through those sources, and so I
think we've gotten a lot smarter in the last couple
of years. Thankfully, these sorts of programming and knowledge and
(04:21):
mainstream awareness has gotten out there through a lot of
the mainstream presses as well as the alternative options. But anyway,
the idea was to try to get the private sector
to take a larger role in standing out to China
and other adversario countries that were undermining the role of
law and the open and free markets that we all
(04:42):
rely on. And so what we did was we looked
at it from a bipartisan perspective and encouraged catalyzed the
private sector to do more. And so that that flows
into a lot of different areas.
Speaker 1 (04:56):
And how are you structured? Are you a five to
one C three or what? What is your kind of legal
structure for the work?
Speaker 2 (05:03):
Yeah, so we're structured as a an LFC organization. We
have both a nonprofit and a for profit aspect to it,
and then we work through both entities based on sort
of the goals at hand. So all private, privately funded,
no intermittingling that comes from from any of the various sides,
(05:27):
and basically set up to achieve goals that that maybe
other interested parties like the for profit ends and some
that we'll talk about on the programming may not have
the same ability to take stances that are that are
(05:47):
either unpopular or or not profit producing.
Speaker 1 (05:51):
Do you think you could kind of describe it as
a collective action effort then of primarily the private investment community,
and that you're just to be clear, you're sourcing most
of your funding from the financial institution's financial community of interest.
Speaker 2 (06:08):
Actually it's all personal, so we don't have any funding
from any corporates or anything on those lines. So everybody
is in arms length, and frankly, nobody has there's no
intermingling or discussion about anything that we sort of put
out there beforehand, and so yeah, I mean, I think
(06:31):
that's probably the best way to put it. The idea
was setting up something that leveraged the private sector because frankly,
we weren't hopeful at that point in time that the
government was going to get to the point that it
was making and taking the steps that were needed to
basically blunt China and a lot of the central decision
(06:52):
making of adversarial countries in a way that that sort
of reduced the risks in our in our free and
fare markets.
Speaker 1 (07:02):
How you know, how do you how do you define
this concept of clean capital. It's something that you've talked
about quite a bit. I think there's some momentum around
this idea. I think it's core to what you're what
you're defining within future Union.
Speaker 2 (07:18):
Yeah, and clean capital first and foremost definitions are difficult,
especially in this area, as you know, because you've talked
enough about this and excellent programming. But the idea is
tracing back capital to the the the impetus of the
source and ascertaining and sort of identifying interest that would
(07:42):
be against just for pure profit making type diverse. And
so the clean capital idea was was sort of an
underpin of we say the right things about where capital
is coming from. But but frankly, when you purport to
be for profit and andital capital producing maximizing profits, but
(08:04):
then in reality, China and a lot of other adversarial states,
but mostly China has been responsible for posturing one way
and actually really looking for insights and access through their means.
And so the idea was to trace this back to
the actual underlying entities where the capital is coming from.
(08:26):
And oftentimes there's shell corporations and entdes and wellcs and
trusts and all sorts of other stuff that money passes through,
and frankly, it's very difficult. Even in the day of AI,
figuring this out is probably one of the biggest challenges
the government phases and I have yet to see a
solution that actually works. And so one of the things
(08:46):
that we're doing is we started with a self attestation,
which the companies that most of which and the funds
that you would know, have sort of self identified, and
you know, the next phase of that is actually going
to a legal perspective of UH, legal requirements in legal
liability for knowing your customer and obviously the know your
(09:14):
customer type endeavors have been in banking for a long time.
But that being said, we're taking it a step further
and going back to the you know, the the underlying
source that that you know, the banking industry frankly is
a little reluctant to to try to take steps to
look into Yeah.
Speaker 1 (09:33):
Yeah, so this idea that you've put forward and UH
have been pursuing around a public investor pledge instead of
just focus focusing on policy, it seems to me like
you want investors to have real uh skin in the game, right,
is that the idea that you can have more traceability
but also that there's some level of accountability within this
(09:56):
kind of this frame of clean capital.
Speaker 2 (09:58):
Yeah, and I mean a think I think you identified it.
It's not just you know, accountability. I mean it's self
identifying right now. But the point is is that when
this clean capital initiative, the what's going to be readily apparent,
we hope is the is more funds adopted, as more
private investors step up and we have more traceability than
(10:21):
we have or we've had in the past, that's going
to unleash a greater amount of knowledge and awareness that
hopefully we have a decisional structure where investors can choose
between clean capital that is certified and capital that is uncertified,
(10:43):
so that when you're looking and making decisions in a
certified manner, you're going to trust that or maybe there's
less risk for the investors as well.
Speaker 1 (10:54):
And what have you found in terms of sector exposure
to authoritarian linked funds? Are you finding that certain sectors
are much higher risk or that certain institutions are maybe
unknowingly vulnerable.
Speaker 2 (11:09):
Yeah, there's a couple of different ways to unpack that.
From the standpoint of sectors, I think if you look
at what are the riskiest sectors from using capital as
a means to leverage an access, there's undoubtedly some sectors
that are more at risk because there are higher value
(11:30):
targets advers by China and other adversarial countries. And that
in particular means that obviously AI with everything that we're seeing,
is the top of mind for every everyone. And I
think Mantis and Benchmark, the Benchmark conversation with investing in Mantis,
which was a Chinese AI company, has kind of sparked
(11:55):
some of the backlash against that through the mainstream. That
wasn't just investors that knew a lot about clean capital.
But that being said, outside of you know, direct investments
from US venture funds like Benchmarks that have invested in
Chinese AI leaders, the reverse is also true because you
(12:16):
have the Chinese LPs that have gotten information and access
through the quarterly distributions by venture funds back to them
of information and even if that information is is not
as detailed, you get that quarterly and it adds up,
especially with the siphoning of information that China has done
across basically all aspects and all verticals. You know, their
(12:41):
ability to assess data combined with you know, some of
the companies like TikTok, and information that they have received
from from basically a lot of the open source type areas.
All of that combined gives them best practices, insights and
knowledge on how to build you know, better startups or
(13:01):
in faster than the US, which is problematic for obviously
a number of different reasons.
Speaker 1 (13:07):
One thing that I have really liked about the evolution
of your work is this link that you've made between democracy,
free markets, and national security. How is that playing out today?
You talked about, you know, the fact that you launched
Future Union during the COVID era, and we're really in
(13:30):
a different conversation now, particularly as we look at the
reorientation of global trade, the way that, for example, the
tear of conversation is now entwined with national and economic
security objectives, but in an environment that I think is
more transactional than it is driven by democracy or democratic ideals.
(13:53):
But how do you see those links between democracy, markets
and national security. Are you getting tracked action around that?
Speaker 2 (14:02):
Undoubtedly we are, I think the world is changing, and
obviously the conversation around tariffs and what it means to
be in the US and an allied country versus Europe
and an allied country, or NATO and an allied country
is adjusting that the definition of democracy we see at
the front lines with Ukraine right now. But you also
(14:25):
could say, you know, from a lot of the cyber
attacks that sort of fly into the radar, there's a
lot of countries that are that are you know, at
the at the precipice of of sort of capital and
in the conversation with economics Estonia, uh, cyber attacks there
and a lot of you know, countries that you would
never think of that have been victims of of China
(14:48):
or Russia, intermenttling type stuff would be would be the
ones that that sort of come to mind. I think
the mainstream this is going a much's becoming my more
apparent the average viewer and the average person in the street,
which was unheard of call it three years ago, five
years ago during COVID times. Now the conversation is changing
(15:11):
into how do we use capital and how do we
use our free markets to win the competition rather than
to be Achilles heel in in a competition that we
didn't even know we were competing in And I think
that's that's the biggest thing. And we'll have a couple
more things that are coming out in light of that,
(15:33):
catalyzing capital to make a difference in sort of the
global competition.
Speaker 1 (15:39):
And do you feel like you're getting good bipartisan traction.
Speaker 2 (15:43):
For your work? Yeah, and I don't. I don't think
it's just our work. There's a lot of people doing
exceptional work out there on these issues. That's the really
good part. And I want to credit the China Select
Committee because they've been right there with us for a
lot of this. And you know, we were We went
out with the enterre capital funds identifying and they had
subpoena power, so obviously maybe we took a broader approach
(16:06):
and they took more in depth approach, even if it
was voluntarily getting information from some of the worst offending
venture funds five which they identified last year and so
have worked closely with them. But I mean, I think
when you have a congressional committee that has been renewed
now once with an extremely a much higher budget, that
(16:29):
goes to show that bipartisan interest in this cuts across
party lines and really is throughout Congress.
Speaker 1 (16:37):
And you know, what about the potential for a more
international focused effort. I know most of your work has
been US based, but if we look at what's happening
in Europe, the potential to align some of these policies,
particularly with European allies and partners. They also have relatively
deep capital markets. Are you finding that there's an intro
(17:00):
st in other parts of the world.
Speaker 2 (17:03):
I would say there is, undoubtedly. I think the difference
is is they're still later to the game than we were,
from both a mainstream perspective as well as a defense perspective,
and so a lot of the conversations that have come
with the new administration have required a rethinking of what
defense means and who we're going to rely on. In
(17:25):
Europe where I am right now, we're actually having those
conversations real time with some of the major governments around
this because the sentiment has changed dramatically, and I've had
a lot of conversations around specifically the reliance on the
US and the ability to rely in the US as
(17:46):
well as you know, what does the future hold for US?
And so I know President Trump and NATO and the
five percent GDP pledge to defense budgets, a lot of
that being infrastructure. You know, it is making a difference,
but much more has to happen, And specifically, I would
(18:08):
point out Germany in large part because I sit in
Frankfurt right now and in the Frankfurt talking with a
lot of the financiers. The six hundred and fifty one
billion dollars that they've pledged to defense over the next
five years, he's unheard of. It's something they've never done,
(18:31):
and frankly, I don't know that they know how to
handle it yet, so there's still baby steps in that.
And what it could turn into is, in my mind,
it goes one of two ways. It becomes an infrastructure
project to improve Germany, it becomes truly innovative and is
as intended. Portion goes to improving some of the infrastructure
(18:54):
in Germany, and then a large portion goes to both
offense and defensive security for Europe. At Anto.
Speaker 1 (19:02):
Yeah, yeah, absolutely, that pivot in Germany around defense investment
is I think transformational, and you know has the potential
not only to build out that base in the different
ways as you've alluded to, but you know, their economy
(19:23):
is so dependent on China, and I mean they have
the dual challenge. And we've talked about this and other
segments on this show, but you know, the legacy reliance
on Russia for oil and the legacy reliance on China
as a primary export market is a double whammy when
it comes to authoritarian challenges. And I think this is
(19:46):
you know, widely understood at this point that this is
a particularly problematic period for Germany. But you know, I
almost think that this NATO imperative is the push right
to move them into a completely different space. And you know,
(20:06):
I spend a lot of time in the czar Land
over the years and other parts of Germany, and you
know that industrial base has shrunk, right. We always think
of Germany as as a serious powerhouse, and it is
around manufacturing. But there's also I think a real imperative
to to think about what's going to be next and
(20:27):
where they go with that capital. So I think it's
a really interesting time actually to be bullish on Germany
in particular. But as you said, I mean, it's it's
not going to be easy. There's a lot of capital
at play and some big decisions that have to be made,
so it's going to be interesting to see how that
works out well.
Speaker 2 (20:46):
Following off that on that briefly, I think I think
spot on, I agree with everything you said, except for
the fact that one thing is I don't think it's
self fulfilling that they will make the right choices just yet.
And that's one of the reasons that I'm out here
sort of having conversations. I am, and I think there's
(21:07):
a much more thoughtful process that's going into it. But
some of the unforced errors that have occurred in Germany
over the last decades are self inflicted and those don't
change very quickly, and frankly, the mainstream perspective of what
they face is still allowing them to sit on a fence.
(21:28):
And it's a fence that you know very well and
you've covered. But that being said, it is a fence
that they've elected not to take a dramatic move in
either one direction. And so if I walk out the
door here and go to the galleria that's next door,
I find a Dji store for drones right there, blocked
(21:49):
the other way, I find a Wawe store. And so
that in and of itself, in the dead center of Frankfurt,
is you know, perfect example of them not having had
or been forced to make difficult decisions that America has
to make now, and what they do next will decide.
(22:13):
It'll decide a lot more than just what happens in Germany.
Speaker 1 (22:16):
Yeah, I think that's exactly right, and there's such an
opportunity for harmonization of policy between the US and Europe.
I think it would be incredibly powerful. I was thinking
about the America First Investment Policy. We made a segment
on that several months ago, and I know you've written
on it, but I wonder if you see any inkling
(22:38):
of you know, conversation in Germany about adopting some of
the basic tenants of the America First Investment policy, limitations
on the you know, opaque investment into Germany that ends up,
you know, reinforcing exactly what you've said, their telecoms and
(23:00):
you know drone manufacturing base, which is already dominant.
Speaker 2 (23:05):
I mean, there is some of that, but I actually
I think, like I said before, we're so early in
that discussion here compared to the US, we're five years behind.
I mean, everything that I've seen, nothing has changed my
perspective to think that Germany sits where America did during
the covid era and what they decide next will have
dramatic implications, and frankly, isn't the best interest of everybody
(23:27):
for them to side with the Allies on this. But
I think until they feel that there is a reason
to do that, that funding that they've allocated may languish
and there's a very easy decision or I think recognition that, frankly,
not making any decisions is a decision in and of itself.
(23:49):
And so if you look at the history, and I
would say the same for the US, but we punted
a lot of those decisions for years in Congress and elsewhere.
We still pun on in the financial markets, as you
cover all the time in Germany, until they're forced not
to kick the can down the road, in my mind,
probably continue that path. And so I think I think
(24:12):
strong leadership is needed, and I frankly think the complacency
that persists everywhere that I've seen, and there's a lot
of cultural reasons for that, well dramatically have to change.
And that might only come with with challenges that are
that they're reacting to rather than proactively and you know, embracing.
Speaker 1 (24:38):
Yeah, I think that's a really accurate summary. I would
share much of you know what, what you've laid out.
Hopefully we'll be able to, you know, look back in
ten years, fifteen years and see that, you know, the
catalyst around NATO funding was the starting point for a
(24:58):
shift that that will be beneficial for Western democracies and
US engagement with Europe and reframing and reshaping the manufacturing
and productive base of the future. I think that's really
what's at stake here, But as you say, there's a
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at Hummingbird dot Co. That's Hummingbird dot Co. I'd like
to move into a different aspect of the conversation. Can
talk a little bit more about some of the real
world examples of how capital exposure is problematic. And I
(26:25):
thought maybe we could start with the recent Cattle IPO.
You've done some writing on that and have talked a
lot about it, and I was wondering if you could
just kind of walk us through that particular case. Cattle
a major supplier of battery technology, lots of vertical integration
across that company. They're they're really a global leader. It
(26:49):
was part of what we looked at in the Supply
Chain Battery Supply Chain Report that we launched just a
couple of weeks ago at FDD. So can you walk
us through that particular case.
Speaker 2 (27:01):
Yeah, it's it's a frankly, it's it's one of the
best examples of why we're not out of the woods,
I think, in the sense of even America. And so
while it's easy to you know, throw stones in different
places and in different entities for not making difficult decisions,
we have a look in the mirror in America too,
because a lot of our corporations and specifically in the
(27:23):
financial area are still getting a pass. And so cattle
is the prime example. Maybe technology uh TikTok could be
the one that we talked about there and continuously just
push that that ban or or I guess the separation
(27:46):
between the U s nity and the not U s
n n down the road. But I think with cattle.
Cattle is the largest battery maker by far supplies Tesla, Levelswagen,
a lot of the major car companies with their batteries,
not the most advanced technologies. But that being said, when
you we've we've looked at the intellectual property and and
(28:09):
gone pretty deep into this and frankly, the market share,
the leading market show that they have give them a
huge benefit to be a market maker. And then combined
with a lot of the subsidies that they've gotten from
the state and in China's interest in various ways to
(28:30):
help facilitate their rise, has has sort of been transformative.
So the cattle story he is, he is long dated.
They they've had, as I said, relationships with all the
carmakers at different points in time for batteries and supplying
that they look to raise more capital after listing on
(28:52):
the Chinese Stock Exchange five years ago, and so they
looked at you and doing a US list, and in
this climate it's not as palatable, and as an ancillary opportunity,
they looked at the Hong Kong Exchange. And so when
they started looking at raising call it five or six
(29:12):
billion dollars in capital in Hong Kong Exchange, they looked
at book runners and some banks to do that. The
two investment banks that came out of the beauty contest,
which banks tend to do for any sort of a
public market listing and they're very lucrative, were JP Morgan
(29:33):
and Bank of America, and the two of those led
a deal that included a number of other banks too,
but you know, they were the ones that were at
the very top. And do call it what two months ago,
UH they were able to use the the placement agents
of Bank of America, JP Morgan and others Goldman Morgan, Stanley,
(29:58):
a number of others to UH get listed on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange with a number of waivers that
came directly from the Chinese government to be able to
facilitate that and also keep intellectual property and patents opaque
and frankly from investors, increase the liability risk if anything
(30:21):
does go wrong with the company or there's a separation issue,
because as you know, the Chinese government has a right
of basic first refusal and overarching right on the technologies
of any Chinese companies and the data and that persistence.
And in the US markets, the SEC would not have
allowed that, or at least there would have been more strains.
(30:41):
In the Hong Kong Exchange was willing and able to
give them very quick waivers to get around them.
Speaker 1 (30:50):
Yeah, that's a big problem. And do you think we're
going to be seeing a lot more of that sort
of arbitrage, if you will, kind of moving into these
reisdictions to promote certain kinds of technologies, advance the interests
of the CCP through these entities that are extensively private
(31:11):
but really operate with a high degree of influence from Beijing.
Speaker 2 (31:17):
Yeah. I mean, you know, the one thing that we
both have to call out on this is the Golden Share.
So China has been you know, the operative entity for
creating a Golden Share, which basically gives Chinese authorities or
CCP Chinese Communist Party members a seat on the board
for a negligible amount of money, but basically gives them
(31:40):
almost a blocking right on a lot of the major
corporate decisions, plus an interest in capital or profit that
may come out of those large listings. So again with
a despite China being you know, a centralized government, a
lot of those part members make a significant amount of
(32:02):
money in the success of these Chinese or US stocks
that have Chinese investments. Down the road, and you know,
in other places we would call that, I guess that's
way to put it is. Trading on insider information is
one of the things that's going through Congress right now,
(32:22):
and everybody's looking at the Senate and House and what
we do with our own insider trading. Insider trading in
China is much more prolific and it doesn't even have
to be hidden. So I think, going down the you know,
the road on arbitrage, it's not so much an arbitrage
issue because it's a new pathway for China to list
(32:46):
it's private companies publicly. This happens to be an instance
where cattle was already listed on the Chinese Stock is Chuge,
so it's not an IPO. It's a secondary listing, but
it happens to raise you know, five billion dollars and
there's a lot of nuances in how that deal came about.
That The China Select Committee has issued subpoenas to Jamie
(33:09):
Diamond and Brian morny haantage at JP Morgan and Bank
of America last week to try to figure out and
discern really what went on behind the scenes. But a
lot of our writing has been on that. But the
simple fact is there was sixty a week after that listing,
there were sixty Chinese tech companies that were looking the
list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Now it's got
(33:30):
to be upwards of double or triple that amount, and
it's a new pathway on the backs of the banks
and their reputation and the signaling value to be able to,
you know, a new pathway to unlock money, which frankly,
with our M and A markets and IPO markets, they're
unfreezing now but largely have been stuck for the last
(33:51):
couple of years. It's an unfair advantage for the Chinese
companies that otherwise are getting liquidity and investors that are
getting liquidity to do the next step or grow faster,
which US companies aren't really.
Speaker 1 (34:04):
Eligible for, right, right, Yeah, I mean this is this
is another example of weaponization of free market practices. That's
what I think this is. Maybe that's the way we
need to start really talking about it. These components of
global finance and global trade have been weaponized to a
point where we've lost we've lost our ability to control
(34:28):
it in a way that supports the free market principles,
and this separation of public and private, the lines are
becoming so so blurry. I mean, in a way, it's
the same challenge that I think we're about to face
with the Hutchinson Ports deal, right, I mean we're coming
(34:51):
in from a different entry point there in terms of
you know, US investor coming in and you know, with
a with a European partner, which is actually a very
good thing. But now push back from the CCP and
their insistence that the deal can only go forward if
there's the inclusion of COSTC right, a major Chinese port
(35:14):
terminal operator. Why it's for the exact same reasons that
you've identified, right, This is uh, this is going to
be a real issue. How do we go forward? Can
we even allow something like that? From a national security perspective.
Speaker 2 (35:30):
Yeah, I mean your guests, I mean, I think we
know where we both stand on this. But you know,
this is sort of a question for the business community too,
and when are they going to start taking you know,
a principal stance on this, because frankly, this is not
going to age well as I look at this down
the road, and do you want to be a Jamie
Diamond Brian moynihan outside of the pay packages in looking
(35:53):
at where you stood on some of these issues when
they were important rather than hindsight, know, you know what
they led to, you know, a year or two or
more down the road, and you know when when those
companies are receiving subpoenas by you know, purportedly, you know,
bipartisan condissions that are focused, you know, on what the
(36:16):
American people care about, and frankly, have been getting a
lot of attention. You know. Again, a lot of CEOs
can weather that, but that's still not the right stance,
I don't think for for for the.
Speaker 1 (36:28):
Future, I'd like to pivot back now to the US
and talk a little bit about university endowments and pensions,
where there's been a growing discussion around exposure of endowments
and pensions in particular to what's going on in China
and investment strategies that might put them at risk. Uh, Andrew,
(36:51):
Id know, that's an area where you've done a lot
of research and writing. So give me your take on that.
Speaker 2 (36:58):
Yeah, I mean we've outlined this in a paper starting
last year and I think pretty good handle on the
industry or exactly what's known and what's what can be identified.
And you know, as we've alluded to in some of
our writing, I mean, you know, over the last couple
of years, the last five you know, sixty eight billion
dollars has gone to Chinese venture funds or funds investing
(37:23):
US funds that are investing in China in some way
in the innovation ecosystem. And that's the way that we
defined it is, you know, the public markets are a
lot less contentious because frankly, that's more mature technologies, and
even if that's a public listing on a Chinese stag
exchange Hong Kong, aside and the waivers that came about that,
(37:46):
it's usually much more mature technology. But investing in the
early stage startups or the innovation ecosystem that basically propel
a lot of these technologies, be a quantum an AI biotech,
even you know drone technology that we've seen and that
basically has a dual use or dji has proven that
you can do military and consumer at the same time.
(38:08):
You know, I think this capital has been the biggest
achilles heel that we've had over the last couple of
years because basically it's not just the capital, and if
it was just the money, it would be a lot
less of an issue. But it's the know how of
the venture funds that are the tops ones oftentimes in
Silicon Valley and in the US that provide access but
(38:32):
also provide the informal networks of advising the startups in
China and others on how to beat how to outcompete
the US startups that are in similar verticals. And the
way as a venture capitalist, the way that we work
is you don't invest in competing technologies in your portfolio.
You put all your weight in your mic behind one winner,
(38:54):
and that's the critical part. And if that winner, if
you're backing, goes into let's say Mantis at benchmark in China,
you do everything you possibly can to make sure that
that startup wins the whole competition against all the rest,
because that's how you exit, that's how you make money.
And it just so happens that what you're doing is
(39:15):
it's not just an investment. It's basically, you know, at
least at benchmark, decades upon decades of the brightest investors
in the US ecosystem that are the most connected, putting
their rolodex or or I guess LinkedIn accounts these days
(39:36):
behind those companies to ensure that they win. US companies don't.
Speaker 1 (39:40):
So let's go a little bit deeper on exposures of
endowments and pensions where specifically have you found the most
risk what you know, what what kind of exposure are
we talking about? Can you get into some of the
details on that, sure?
Speaker 2 (39:59):
I mean, the are some pensions and endowments that are
more noteworthy, oftentimes the larger ones. So you know, the
at least let's you know, back to basics or taking
a step back here, US pensions or state pensions. We
don't the US, at least until a couple of months ago,
had never had a sovereign wealth fund. So let's say
Norway and Sweden and Saudi Arabia and China obviously have
(40:25):
large sovereign wealth funds where the government takes money and
decides how to allocate that for economic outperformance or reinvesting
on behalf of citizens. What we have in the US
are US pensions at a state level that take government
workers oftentimes police, unions, nurses, teachers, others, and that goes
(40:49):
into a state pension fund that then reinvests because they
have to keep up with the payouts that come as
people retire later in their career. Obviously, so there's always
this catchup type endeavor for pensions to try to outperform
the market or at least recap and so oftentimes what
(41:10):
the venture capital private equity community, the private markets have
been the best ad is actually taking on greater risk
but also greater rewards, and so that's always sort of
the impetus for doing a lot of the investing in
private markets that are more opaque and less liquid. There
is a greater risk of loss, but there's also a
(41:32):
greater risk of significant returns, and that market has shown
over the years it can return a lot of money.
In the Chinese market, when the government basically puts their
thumb on the scales of who wins and who loses,
because that's what happens in China. They basically allocate siphoned
resources from intellectual property theft, cybersecurity theft, others to individual
(41:56):
national champions be it an ali baba, be it a TikTok,
you name it, and oftentimes those outcomes are much more dramatic.
So the question of investing in China is not so
much of picking the winners and losers. Oftentimes that's predecided
and predetermined. It's getting access. And that's why the venture
(42:16):
capital and private equity community, especially the most connected one,
has fought significantly to get access to that market in
whatever way possible. And so the pensions have sought the
greater returns certainty in the past of investing in basically
a rigs system of China to reap greater returns. And
(42:38):
so what's happened is the largest or oftentimes the largest
investors like Sequoia, we saw a benchmark with Mantus. Historically
benchmark has not been one of the worst, but the
US and the Select Committee for the CCP identified a
number of the major players that had gotten much of
(43:00):
the pension money to go invest in China, and so
the pensions have provided upwards of tens of billions of
dollars that have gone into the Chinese markets and thus
gotten good returns if they could exit. But that being said,
it's become much more challenging without an IPO market and Sue.
(43:21):
What we found is some of the largest pensions, like
the New York State pensions, the California State pensions, frankly,
Texas and Michigan have been some of the worst offenders,
have funneled billions of dollars into funds in China that
have basically supported and built the innovation ecosystems and sue.
(43:48):
The other side, in the flip side of that is
also the endowments, and those are the universities that we
know that they get their money from a combination of
wealthy individuals that are donors that provide money either at
death or prior to death to facilitate funding. And Harvard
obviously is one of the leading ones that's gotten a
lot of recognition for about a fifty billion dollar endowment,
(44:12):
but oftentimes they've been some of the worst offenders, and
they don't have the transparency requirements that a state pension
would have. And so from our investigation, we found tens
of billions of dollars, also going from the largest University
of California System, University of Michigan System, University of Texas System,
(44:33):
and then Yale Princeton a lot of the other major universities,
despite being very opaque and difficult information defined, are some
of the worst offenders investing in you know, call it
dozens to upwards of one hundred startups in China.
Speaker 1 (44:50):
Do you also see it in terms of exposure to
China's sovereign bonds?
Speaker 2 (44:56):
So we really haven't looked at the bonds nearly as much.
It's an interesting area to look at. I think the
challenge for us is the bond market is a very
different market than the private equity and metric capital. And
I started out actually a city group. In the bond market,
(45:16):
I think, in my mind I'm still very problematic, but
a very different analysis and also different types of players
than what we're seeing in the venture capital and private
equity space.
Speaker 1 (45:30):
I do think there's something there. I wrote a piece
on that a while back, and you know, there was
a pretty fundamental decision made back in it with twenty
sixteen or twenty seventeen to allow Chinese sovereign bonds into
the benchmark, the MSc benchmark, and you know that really
(45:50):
opened the door for this exposure in a different way.
The only person that really called that out was Marco Rubio.
To his credit, Yeah yeah, I mean really big kudos
to to Rubio for taking a pretty principled stand on that.
I do think it's something we need to take a deeper,
(46:11):
deeper look at. It's just, you know, when we think
about where we're going on the trade conversation and the exposures, right,
it's not just exposure to Chinese exports. It's exposure to
these tangled webs right of investment that are really challenging
and you know, going into essentially a trade war right
(46:35):
without maybe having thought through all the implications of these
areas of exposure. But also big shout out to the
Select Committee and the CCP for being you know, I
think a constant source of you know, raising raising the
alarm bells and looking at the right aspects of this problem.
(46:56):
Maybe that's a good segue into the resistance what we
do about this. You've touched on some of the potential
approaches and tools, but the first thing I wanted to
ask you is what kind of traction are you getting
around the Clean Capital Pledge and what would you define
as successful? What are you looking for there? How how
(47:16):
much you know, what percentage of engagement do you want
to see from from the investor community around around the
Clean Capital Pledge?
Speaker 2 (47:26):
Yeah, a great question, and frankly following up on sort
of like the the the previous one on the m
c I and and some of that type of stuff.
The politicians, frankly on that issue have been very good
in bipartisan and basically calling out some of that exposure.
And frankly your piece was excellent on that, and I
think especially for the federal employees, that was one of
(47:49):
the sticking points of allowing basically our our federal pension
fund significant for all all UH public employees to be
able to allow to be allowed to invest in Chinese bonds, equities,
things like that, and that's something that voluntarily, I give
them credit, they've stepped away from, or at least proverbally
(48:09):
stepped away from. But getting back to the Clean Capital Pledge,
what we're looking for now is more international investors, so
a lot of the private funds. So as as we
talked about before, not only are we seeing with not
only are we seeing with the Europe being farther behind
(48:34):
in a lot of different areas, we're also seeing a
resurgence of new interest in this area, and that means
more funds are taking a second look at it. So
I think, you know, we had the COVID era of ESG,
and that is still here in Europe and pervasive, and
a lot of the restrictions on offensive weaponry and national
(48:57):
security investing are still prolific. So a lot of the
institutions are still prohibited from investing in things that would
necessarily improve the future predisposition defense of a lot of
the European countries. That's slowly eroding, but it's still not
fast enough. And so as that erodes and there's more
(49:18):
money they can go into some of those private capital funds,
the venture funds, private refunds and things like that, I
think you'll see greater ability to invest. And frankly, what
will come with that is where you're taking money from.
If it's a European entity or something that conforms to
the clean Capital certification, you'll see funds that are more eligible.
Right now, I will say from a non scientific perspective, most,
(49:44):
if not the vast majority of funding here in Europe
has ties to China or has Chinese ties running through
it and would be ineligible for the Clean Capital Pledge.
And I think with subsequent funds, as they raise new
fund and there's more institutional capital to come in that
Frankly is getting outside of the ESG parameters, and Frankly
(50:07):
has the opportunity to invest more holistically in national security
to support there will be greater sources of capital which
will provide them an ability both to clean their their
capital base and then take part in the Clean Capital certification.
Speaker 1 (50:25):
Do you think the movement around clean capital can scale
without some specific legislation or more policy support from the US.
Speaker 2 (50:35):
So I look at the model that I You know,
I'm still very much of a free market capitalist believer.
I believe that government intervention should be the last resort
or relying on that should be the last resort for
most things. I really do think that the idea of
(50:55):
capital that is both that is both certified as clean
and championed as such is desirable from both the investment
le partner perspective as well as the investor perspective. And
I think that scales on its own based on having
source capital that is clean, and then also investors that
want that. And so you have basically a bifurcation of
(51:17):
a market where you have, you know, the good capital
on one side and providers that either choose or cannot
find cleaning capital for a number of different reasons on
another side. And both of those winno or I should say,
the good capital widens and the the deleterious capital narrows
(51:40):
in winnows over time, so that you have a base
of good capital instead of a collective intermingling of both.
Speaker 1 (51:52):
And would you have any specific advice for investment committees
on how they're vetting sources of capital.
Speaker 2 (52:00):
I think you know this is sort of like the
Supreme Court's pornography challenge from years ago, where you sort
of know when you see it, and you don't need
necessarily parameters for a lot of this stuff. You just
have to basically be You need to be vigilant in
(52:20):
what you're looking for. And so when you have a
limited partner, which frankly every private capital investor wants more
limited partners, you have to get out of the idea
that you'll take capital from anywhere because it's capital, and
start looking at like proverbally why are they giving us
capital and where's it coming from? And what do they
want out of us? And I for too long, I
(52:43):
think we've neglected what is I should say, those investment
committees have neglected what has been obvious because they did
not want to acknowledge what was obvious in where the
capital was coming from. And I think there's a greater,
if not principled, stand knowledge that other investment committees will
(53:07):
be looking at that and to keep up with the
Jones is we have to consider this more vociferously than
we have in the past.
Speaker 1 (53:16):
Great final question for you, what do you think success
should look like in five years time with a clean
capital pledge and the engagement of the investor community in
your work?
Speaker 2 (53:29):
Well, I mean, we'll find out, because I think that's
you know, we're trending towards this. But to be honest,
I think one of the challenges that remains in something
that we're I mean I'm working on daily is greater tools.
So frankly, if we if this clean capital pledge that
starts as voluntary this year will go to something legal
(53:51):
liability because it will go through a law firm and
there will be consequences for bad actors, and I don't
think we have any of those right now, but there
are ways to gain the system. I think the tools
that the government is not prepared to provide yet, and frankly,
even Ai and leading technologists have not been able to
(54:13):
crack will give us greater confidence in a couple of
years that, frankly, China is not intermingling. If there is
Chinese money, it's going after pure profit motives instead of
deleterious access information advantages, which we've seen for years, and
that in and of itself, I think is a huge win.
Speaker 1 (54:35):
Excellent Andrew, Thanks for sharing your time with us, and
I wish you all the best with all of your
work and the Clean Capital Pledge. It's really important, and
thanks for taking a principled stand. I appreciate that.
Speaker 2 (54:48):
Thank you for the time. I really enjoyed this.
Speaker 1 (54:50):
Thanks that was Andrew King helping us navigate the line
between capital and control a course of capital. We're not
just following the money, We're decoding the new battleground. This
show is part of the Elicit Edge network of platform
connecting experts, investigators, and producers tackling the hidden architecture of
modern influence. If you want to learn more, support our work,
(55:12):
or ask a question for a future guest. Visit us
at elicitedge dot com or email us directly at Elaine
at elicitedge dot com. Subscribe, share, and leave us a review.
Every listen helps shine a light into dark money. Thanks
for joining us.
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