May 26, 2025 • 42 mins
What happens when police officers make split-second decisions under immense pressure? How do we fairly evaluate these actions after the fact? These questions lie at the heart of our riveting conversation with Sergeant Jamie Borden, one of law enforcement's most respected use-of-force experts.
Jamie takes us on his remarkable journey from witnessing his brother's scrutinized police shooting in 1992 to becoming a sought-after expert who has consulted on over 400 high-profile cases. His passion for ensuring that officers receive fair and objective reviews of their actions shines throughout our discussion as he reveals how he created a groundbreaking Use of Force Training and Analysis Unit that has become a model for departments nationwide.
Jamie's book, "The Anatomy of a Critical Incident," represents the culmination of his decades of experience and offers what many consider the definitive resource on use of force analysis.
Whether you're in law enforcement, interested in criminal justice, or seeking a deeper understanding of police actions beyond the headlines, this conversation offers profound insights that will transform your perspective on critical incidents. Connect with Jamie's work through Critical Incident Review to learn more about his approach to fair and thorough analysis of police use of force.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:02):
Welcome to Courageous Leadership with Travis Yates,
where leaders find the insights,advice and encouragement they
need to lead courageously.
Travis Yates (00:12):
Welcome back to the show.
I'm so honored that you decidedto spend a few minutes with us
here today and today's guest.
We have been trying to makethis happen for some time.
I'm really excited.
You're going to be excited.
This is something you're goingto want to tune into, maybe more
than once, and send to yourfriends.
On today's episode we haveSergeant Jamie Borden.
Jamie spent well over twodecades in law enforcement.
(00:36):
He's one of the most respectedand esteemed experts in the
field, particularly with use offorce.
His book, the Anatomy of aCritical Incident, is by far the
best resource you have today onuse of force analysis and use
of force investigations.
I can't recommend him histraining, his classes, his book
(00:56):
enough.
Sergeant Jamie Borden, how areyou?
Jamie Borden (00:58):
doing.
Sir man, I'm good brother.
Thank you, it's nice to be onyour show.
Travis Yates (01:03):
Well, jamie, we've had Danny King on.
I know you do a lot of workwith Danny King and I guess,
before we get started, I meanthis journey you've had in law
enforcement is so interesting,so just sort of give us the
quick preview of your career andhow you landed here today,
being really one of the foremostexperts in use of force
investigations.
Jamie Borden (01:21):
That's a great.
That's a great question.
Investigations that's a greatquestion.
And the crazy thing is, travis,is that my journey to where I?
First of all, I've given uptrying to figure out how I ended
up being who I am.
And this is just me followingmy passions, answering the call,
if you will.
And in 1992, my brother, steveBorden, was involved in a
(01:42):
shooting in Las Vegas that wentall the way to the Supreme Court
LVMPD versus Warren and I wasby his side.
I wasn't a cop yet.
I had always had an interest inbeing a cop, but I was by his
side through that entire process.
He was internally scrutinized.
This was the onset of videoevidence.
News camera cop captured thewhole thing.
(02:02):
It was completely distorted inhow it presented to the news.
So the allegations were thatthe officers were too close,
they weren't in fear for theirlife and it was all based on
what the video showed.
So I found that veryinteresting.
But I remember telling him atthe time and my brother did the
right thing for the right reasonat the right time, like 99% of
our officers who were involvedin these critical incidents.
(02:24):
And I remember telling him atthe time this is pre-academy for
me, the first time if I've evergot anything to do with this
officers that are in yourposition that have been
wrongfully alleged to have donesomething wrong and they didn't
do something wrong I'm going tohave play in that.
And then you know, fast forwardnow almost 30 years and here I
(02:47):
am involved in, you know, 400plus cases at everywhere, from
the highest profile civil casesto the highest profile criminal
cases, to state level civilcases, arbitration, state level
decertification cases.
I mean everything that can findthe courtroom in any fashion.
I'm involved in it and I'm sothankful that I am.
(03:09):
And it's one of those thingsthat be careful what you wish
for A right, follow your passion, be good at what you do.
Me and Danny King just did awhole series on officer wellness
following your passions,bringing outside passion into
police work so that police workthrives and you become a better
public servant.
And I've done that my wholecareer.
(03:31):
And, lo and behold, I took thejob.
I was a patrol officer, fto.
I became an officer in chargebelow a sergeant.
I then took a break and wentout on tour.
As you know, I have a musiccareer that paralleled police
work, came back to work andpromoted into I was a narcotics
(03:53):
officer.
I then promoted into thetraining bureau where I just
really found my niche in that,and I created the unit, the use
of force training and analysisunit, which was responsible for
investigating, reviewing andanalyzing and then regurgitating
information good, bad orindifferent back into the
department.
So our goal was myself andDanny King and the creation of
this unit was to uncover and Icame up with an acronym called
(04:19):
replicate, change and avoid RCA.
We didn't only look at what wewanted to change or avoid, but
we looked very heavily at whatwe wanted to replicate in law
enforcement, because most ofthese critical incidents we
immediately overlook whatofficers have done well in these
cases because it's expected,and then we have an outcome that
might be undesirable orunexpected and the focus becomes
(04:41):
that and then we look backwardson that event with a blame
oriented perspective and we lookto blame for the outcome.
And you know so that that unitreally quantified, looking at
every incident as a trainingmoment for the department.
So we broke down silos and wewere training, we were putting
out directives and briefingtrainings on that department as
(05:03):
many times as two to three timesa week and then we would siphon
those trainings into oursymposiums.
That would happen twice a year,so we had a very good grip on
it, and it was that unit thatdid it.
That unit became nationallyrecognized.
Many departments across thecountry are adopting similar
units at this point, which iswhere my career started, with
(05:23):
lecturing.
I've lectured across thecountry.
I've got close to 500 classesunder my belt and since 2019,
they've all been under theumbrella of Critical Incident
Review, the company that Ifounded, and Danny King works
with me for Critical IncidentReview.
He's my COO.
He keeps me in line and keepsmy schedule in front of me, so I
(05:46):
know where to be on every givenday.
But that's kind of a breakdownof how I ended up here today.
Travis Yates (05:51):
Well, we're very thankful that you do it and
obviously, as you mentioned,what your department did at the
time was cutting edge.
Most departments weren't doingthat and you guys were at the
forefront of that.
How much did politics come intoplay?
Because that unit I don't thinkthat unit lasted forever, right
, like you guys were doing sucha great job and the police
chiefs and the policeadministration.
(06:11):
You've got to sort of give upyour ego when you do that,
because, yeah, you're going tohear from the experts instead of
.
I've always thought it wasamazing, jamie, that we have
these commanders or chiefs orwhoever that review these use of
force.
I have no external training onthat review, right, and so it
was certainly very, very smartand cutting edge for them to
implement that unit, to thenrecommend to them what they
(06:34):
should be looking at.
But politics sometimes get inthe way, right, and I wish there
wasn't a need for you, right,wish there wasn't a need for
Danny King, but certainlypolitics has has interjected in
a way that we may have neverforeseen.
What's your thoughts on that?
Jamie Borden (06:49):
Well, you're 100% accurate.
And the chief that allowed thatunit to exist came to me.
My very first task when I tookthe training bureau spot was to
revamp our use of force trainingpolicy.
And I didn't just go throughand rewrite the policy.
I took our neighboringdepartment, Las Vegas Metro.
(07:12):
They had involvement through asettlement agreement with the
DOJ, so they had redone theirwhole policy and then they'd
submitted it to the ACLU.
The ACLU gave theirrecommendations on the policy.
Well, I took the finishedpolicy and the document from the
ACLU.
The ACLU gave theirrecommendations on the policy.
Well, I took the finishedpolicy and the document from the
ACLU and I went through andrevamped our entire policy.
I then did an 85-page documentthat stated why I adopted and
(07:34):
why I did not adopt certaincomponents of the ACLU's
recommendations, and I submittedthat document to the ACLU.
I got a response from them thatthey were proud to have been a
part of it.
They approved the policy.
They love the policy and wemoved forward with that policy,
including the unit and the workthat myself and Danny King did.
(07:56):
So here's where the politicskick in.
That chief did exactly what yousaid.
He stepped aside from all ofhis ego and looked for the
people that were invested inthat particular component of law
enforcement and he put all ofthe onus on the unit that I
created.
And they listened.
We weren't makingrecommendations.
We simply would present thefacts to them, but we would
(08:18):
teach them about what the factsmeant and what this did.
Was it helped them avoid aknee-jerk reaction to these
otherwise critical incidentsthat may look bad on video, and
we would break it down andexplain exactly why these things
were happening, right down tothe distortions in video and
body-worn camera.
And so all of that made a unitthat created a culture on the
(08:41):
department where officers knewthat if they made a decision in
the field, that they were goingto be fairly and objectively
viewed in that incident.
It didn't matter who liked them, who didn't like them, what
their reputation on thedepartment was.
That case is what mattered, andit created a culture where
officers were self-investing andmaking better decisions overall
(09:05):
.
Well, now let's talk aboutpolitics.
That chief was forced out, asmost chiefs are with the city of
Henderson, by the citygovernment.
Scandalous allegations thechief ended up leaving under
those allegations, ended upsuing the department.
Blah, blah, blah.
We get a chief in fromArlington, Texas, who was a
captain on Arlington, came innot a change maker, but a change
(09:28):
agent.
Right, there's a difference andyou know the difference.
Right, these are people thatcome in and fix shit that
doesn't need to be fixed, simplybecause it's their name on it,
and now they're owning it.
So I did a 45-minutepresentation to the chief and
the deputy chief, who had bothcome from Arlington.
At the end of that 45-minutepresentation and Travis, I had
(09:49):
flow charts and I hadexplanations for everything we
were doing.
I explained the culturalchanges.
I explained the use of force,the decrease in use of force,
the increase of hands-on,decrease of taste.
I mean all the things that wewere able to tabulate and follow
, analyze, process and then useas evidence-based information to
create better training Wentthrough this whole thing.
(10:10):
The only question I got asked atthe end of that was where did
you learn how to do this?
Hold on, Chief.
I don't understand the question.
Where did you learn this?
We didn't learn it, we createdit.
This is cutting edge.
Other departments are.
Well, I need a breakdown ofwhere you learned this
information and I want to knowmore about it because to me it
(10:30):
seems corrupt.
You're here to protect badbehavior and Travis, that
meeting was 45 minutes.
I went in.
My lieutenant said, well, Ithink that went pretty well.
And I said, well, I thinkyou're on crack.
That didn't go well at all andI'll tell you I'm on the edge of
making a decision.
It was two days later.
I came in with my papers and Iretired.
(10:52):
They were going to dissolve theunit and everybody was saying
stay, we'll fight for it.
I don't want the fight to beabout me.
I want the fight to be aboutthe resolve for the department.
Right, Don't make it about me.
I don't care about the position.
So I had you know, choices atthe department were to stay,
take a sergeant's position overa unit, which is the best job in
the world, or I could go outand have an impact nationally on
(11:16):
on the United States in lawenforcement, and that's what I
chose to do.
I walked out the door.
I'll never forget no-transcriptwhen we look at these cases
(11:54):
through the lens of riskaversity.
I've got a whole chapter in mybook about risk aversity.
Identify what it is you'retrying to protect.
Right, and tell people whatthey need to know, not what you
think they want to know, topreserve the position.
This position was given to youin transition and it's an
evolving point, right.
But if we're not making theworld a better place, if we're
(12:16):
just preserving a position,which is bad leadership in my
opinion, if you're moreconcerned about your position
than you are, the integrity of apolice department, through cops
that are doing what they'vebeen trained with the training,
the expectation and the right bylaw to do these things that
they're doing in the field, andwe're turning our back on them
in the 11th hour and using thatpolicy instead of a parameter
(12:38):
like it's.
You know, we train that.
It's a parameter, a decisionmaking model, if you will train
that.
It's a parameter, adecision-making model, if you
will.
And then we turn it into ahardline black letter law to
shatter their career because onepoint in that policy was
deviated from.
In the case which you're nevergoing to be involved in a use of
force, case where you're notstepping outside of policy,
black line letter because policydoesn't cover everything.
(13:00):
I've heard you talk about thisbefore Me and you have talked
about it before, so the politicscertainly dance in this stuff.
I left and here we are todayBest decision I ever made, but
I'll set of balls, right, You'vegot to say what needs to be
(13:27):
said, not what you think peoplewant you to hear.
Travis Yates (13:30):
To preserve your position, yeah, there's far too
many chiefs like this.
In fact, I wrote a whole bookabout chiefs like this, called
the Courageous Police Leader.
It seems to be so rare that wehave actual leaders who do the
right thing, and your storyreminds me of something similar
of mine.
I won't give the background onit, but I was treated in a
similar fashion over a unit, andthat's why below 100 was
developed.
(13:50):
Most people listening to thislaw enforcement are familiar
with below 100.
Just know this.
It was only developed becausemy department took me out of a
role where I was doing the samething and then I decided well,
let's do this nationally.
So I'm very thankful you didthat, jamie, and you're busier,
and busier, and busier,unfortunately, because so
oftentimes it shouldn't be thecase.
What kind of tricks of thetrade are you seeing used
(14:11):
against law enforcement?
I know you'll get a little bitof hindsight bias, but if you
were to say anything that you'reseeing routinely because just
like we meet, we talk about bestpractices the enemies against
the profession, the enemiesagainst use of force.
When I say enemies, what I meanis they want to take justified
legal use of force and twist itand turn it into illegal use of
force.
What?
What's the practice you'reseeing from them right now?
Jamie Borden (14:33):
Well.
So the narrative is based on apassionate belief of wrongdoing
prosecution and plaintiff'sattorneys will take that
narrative because we, as a lawenforcement, in the profession
of law enforcement, leaveinformation on the table.
We see something in a case,right, let's just take the
(14:54):
Lunsford case, for example.
The officer did everything bythe book.
His decisions were to apply adeadly force tactic to save his
partner's life, right Under whathe reasonably believed was a
deadly threat.
Subject had the taser wasmanipulating, the safety was 12
inches from his face and thedecision to use deadly force
(15:16):
tactics in that moment was doneand it was accepted.
Well, in that narrative.
Even the experts on the otherside and these are experts that
have a CV that's deafening,right, they've got all these
credentials and they get up andthey say, well, the officer
could have stepped back, madespace, gotten a perfect spread.
(15:36):
The subject didn't have a shirton and used a taser to achieve
NMI.
First of all, there's noguarantee that a subject is
going to is going to respond tothe use of a taser, even if it's
a direct skin dart to skincontact, right, we know that it
just uh, drugs on board willprevent NMI from happening.
Another expert said he couldhave stepped off and slapped him
(15:58):
.
That's actual words from thetrial, right, and why this
argument came up is becauseevery officer involved in the
investigation and they did anoutstanding investigation and
this is not a failure.
This is just something thatneeds to be known.
That's not necessarily known Inthat investigation.
Every officer involved in theinvestigation understood exactly
(16:19):
why Brad Lunsford used thattaser.
So they never broached thequestion why did you not use
other resources, otherimplementations?
And had we had that explanationon the record for the trial,
then it wouldn't have come up inthe trial, because at that
point, because the informationis not on the table now, it's
(16:40):
information that's coming out totry to justify your bad
behavior.
And that's exactly how theypose that argument.
And it is not the case.
And, and it's again, it's not afailure on the part of the
investigators with with uh, withLunsford, it's it's not knowing
what we don't know.
We've got to exhaust thisinformation.
We have to develop thatnarrative from the core of this
(17:01):
incident.
It doesn't matter why weunderstand it or why we don't
understand it.
What matters is we get all theinformation about why the
officer did what they did, whyit made sense to them in that
moment.
Well, that includes why did itnot make sense to you to use
your taser?
And once we got that longnarrative about why the taser
was an inappropriate weapon, aninappropriate choice at that
(17:23):
point, that narrative nowbelongs to us.
No one else can ask thatquestion, even though the
question asked two years lateron the stand is going to be
exactly the same.
It doesn't exist in thepre-existing information, so now
it's an excuse.
If it happens before, it's anexplanation.
If it happens during or after,it's an excuse.
And I need officers andinvestigators to understand that
(17:46):
.
That's what my whole course isabout.
Efi Enhanced ForceInvestigations course is getting
that information on the table.
It's not about accuracy, it'sabout completeness.
If we've got completeness, wecan develop the accurate points
within it, with an understandingthat there's going to be some
inaccuracies and inconsistencies.
You're talking about theoriginal report, correct,
(18:07):
correct, yeah, from the pointthat it happens, the original
statements, you know.
And that's why the cognitiveinterview is so important.
I've got a whole section of myEFI course that's focused on how
to elicit this information.
Dr Ed Geiselman gave me thekeys to the castle on the CI the
cognitive interview and Iproduced a whole model of the
(18:27):
cognitive interview that'sspecifically for interviewing
police officers involved incritical incidents, and there's
very important differences righton how we get to that
information and how we ask thosequestions, and that we ask all
of the questions, even the stuffthat makes sense to us already
right, even though we know itand understand it.
That doesn't matter, becausewe're the last ones to look at
(18:48):
that report with policebackground.
The next person that looks atthat statement is going to be a
plaintiff's attorney, aprosecuting attorney, and if
that information is not on thetable, we're lost in the mix.
Brother, we now have to make upthat time and it becomes an
explanation or becomes an excuse, not an explanation.
Travis Yates (19:05):
Now part of that report, jamie, would you
recommend including training andpast experiences?
And, with that answer, whattype of training should officers
be seeking now, before they getinvolved in one of these
incidents?
Jamie Borden (19:17):
Well and that self-investment component,
Travis, is huge.
I think that officers andlisten, officers are tasked for
time.
Our training budgets are slim.
Some departments they're none.
You know myself and Danny, ifwe were denied a training with
Henderson, we'd purchase thetraining and go to the training
ourselves on our own vacationtime because the job was just
(19:39):
that important to us.
You know officers, they andI've done this whole series on
officer wellness and investmentand applying your passions
outside of police work to helpyour discipline as a police
officer.
I think it's very important tounderstand that this requires
discipline, right, this requiresan understanding.
As an officer involved in acritical incident, you can't put
(20:00):
the weight on the investigatorsto know everything.
Put the weight on theinvestigators to know everything
.
And if you know more aboutcertain components of the
incident that you're involved inand it's not getting on the
record, you have to know thatit's got to get on the record
and you have to put it on therecord.
You know and and that's not.
There's no harm and no foul indoing that, but our training is
so important.
After the fact, when I get acase at the civil level, the
(20:23):
very first thing I ask for istraining.
I look for training, I look forlesson plans, I make sure and I
can't say that the officerlistened during the class.
I can't say that theyassimilated any of that
information, but I can say thatthey were exposed to it and that
the actions I see in theevidence are consistent with
what I know the training to be.
So now I've bridged the gapbetween what they assimilated in
(20:46):
training and what we see as aconsistent behavior in that
evidence, primarily video.
Travis Yates (20:52):
If you're just now joining us, we're talking to
Sergeant Jamie Borden, retiredHenderson police.
Sergeant ran a unit there.
It was pretty phenomenal anduseful force.
But his book and it's one ofthe reasons I want to bring him
on called the anatomy of the.
The anatomy of a criticalincident is the best book on the
topic and there's so much totalk about in this book, Jamie,
I'm not going to make you giveit all up, but the one thing
(21:12):
that I found interesting wasyour delineation and difference
between truth and fact.
I kind of explained to ouraudience, because that was such
an important feature, that Ifound in the book something that
I, quite frankly, hadn'tthought too much of before.
Jamie Borden (21:28):
So give us your thoughts on that.
So you know, and this isn'ttruth and fact in social justice
, right, it's not.
It's not a look at truth andfact through that lens.
This is literally an officer'sfocus of attention and their
limited resources in a criticalincident, under the constraints
of time and and I want everybodythat's listening to really
think about this An officer thatis involved in a critical
incident where all of theinformation isn't known, because
they only know what they'velearned pre-incident coming into
(21:52):
the call, what they seebehaviorally from the suspect
and then what they respond to inthat context, Well, there's a
very thin slice of pie availableto the officer regarding their
focus of attention, whether it'saudible or visual, stimulus,
smell, feel, whatever it mightbe.
So, in those instances whereit's captured globally on a
(22:12):
video camera, we see all of thisinformation and we've got all
the information in hindsight,Well, the officer's belief of
the facts at that time, whattheir truth is, their truth is
simply a belief of what thefacts are in the moment that we
may find inconsistencies with inthe hindsight review of that
(22:32):
case.
That doesn't make it because itwasn't true, doesn't make it a
lie.
So the truth, the differencebetween truth and fact is.
The truth is what issubjectively believed in the
moment to be fact by the officer.
Now, in hindsight, through theobjective, dispassionate review,
we find that those facts may beinconsistent.
(22:53):
But could the officer haveknown that?
That's what Graham v Conner isall about.
Right, 20-20 vision of hindsightand I also have following that
chapter Travis is themanipulation of the totality of
facts and circumstances known tothe officer when the event
occurred Pre-existinginformation, knowledge learned
in real time during the, duringthe contact, and the information
(23:16):
at the final moment.
That totality of the facts andcircumstances isn't the same as
the totality of facts andcircumstances that I get after
the fact isn't the same as thetotality of facts and
circumstances that I get afterthe fact.
Right, Well, you'll get.
People say no, I'm consideringthe totality of the facts and
circumstances, just likeoutlined in Graham versus Connor
.
No, you're not.
That's known to the officer atthe time.
It's a reasonable belief basedon the context, the perceptions,
(23:39):
the expectations, the decisionsand actions that lead to a
performance and behavior.
That's what I call the commonthread in my class and I live in
that common thread.
So that's kind of the truth.
In fact is the facts known tothe officer at the time are
truthfully and reasonablybelieved to be the facts.
The facts in hindsight areobjective, irrefutable facts
(24:02):
that will be inconsistent withthe officer's truth in that
moment.
Travis Yates (24:06):
Yeah, graham v Connor, it's been around since
1989.
It's not going anywhere.
The makeup of the court andrecent decisions it's I mean, as
I think the closest they'vegotten is a 7-2 decision to
reverse that.
So it's not going anywhere inthe next generation, or
potentially two, but you'llnever hear that case on MSNBC or
CNN or any of these so-calledpolice experts talking
negatively about law enforcement.
(24:27):
Unfortunately, you don't reallyhear that case too often about
people trying to defend lawenforcement.
It's an important case but thatcase is twisted a lot.
Jamie, I know you talked aboutsome of that, but how are they
twisting Granby-Connor even atthe department level and policy
level?
That actually hurts officers.
Jamie Borden (24:43):
Well, that's a great question.
On a very recent high profiletrial, they redacted the
objective, reasonable standardfrom policy and disallowed it to
be included in the juryinstructions.
That's what they're doing Holdup back up.
What was that again?
Yeah, they redacted any placethat referred to the objective
standard in policy in the trial,because this was a criminal
(25:06):
case.
This is an officer that istrained how and why and when to
use force based on the objectivestandard, has a policy to
support it.
The policy is now in place andit's been completely redacted in
court for a jury instructionbecause it's a civil case, not a
criminal case instructionbecause it's a civil case, not a
(25:28):
criminal case.
Now this is where and the nextpoint in my book that this comes
up is the deadly forcenarrative, the intent to kill
and the application of a deadlyforce tactic.
Right, An application of adeadly force tactic is a tactic
that's applied to changebehavior where deadly force is
prominently or probable in thatenvironment, right?
So when you look at theconstruct of this whole thing,
(25:53):
the application of a deadlyforce tactic is to save a life.
The application of a deliberateintention to kill is simply to
kill someone, right?
So this narrative getsmisconstrued.
Anytime the news says anofficer is under investigation
for homicide, homicide is viewedas a terminology that's got a
(26:14):
criminal element to it.
Homicide is a method of death.
It has nothing to do withcriminal behavior.
Murder is what they're thinking.
Homicide and murder aresynonymous with those lay people
that just don't have anyunderstanding of the terminology
, right?
So these are the things thatget misconstrued.
And the prosecutors in thiscase were saying you made the
(26:38):
decision to kill him because andthat's not accurate there's not
a decision to kill, it's adeadly force tactic to change
behavior, to save a life, eitheryour own or someone else's.
The stinging effect is that,tragically, someone loses their
life because the application ofa deadly force tactic comes with
the expectation of substantialbodily harm or death.
(26:58):
And that's known right.
That is the viable andappropriate application of the
tactic to save a life, and thatnarrative gets squelched.
In these cases, the objectivestandard gets removed, even
though civilly, everything wouldhave been objectively
reasonable in this case.
All of these things stand thetest of time until they're
(27:21):
redacted and disallowed to beused in a criminal case.
Until they're redacted anddisallowed to be used in a
criminal case.
Well, that's chilling.
Sit in a courtroom and watch aman get walked out in handcuffs
because this is the case that's.
One of the single mostprominent days in my life is
watching Brad Lunsford getwalked out of that courtroom in
(27:42):
handcuffs, full well knowingthat he had the full support of
his department, his chief, thepolicy, the training, everything
was in place, but somehow itbecame criminal so I'm sure they
weren't lining up the chief andand the policymakers to arrest
him because he's followingpolicy.
Travis Yates (28:02):
They weren't doing that, were they?
Jamie Borden (28:03):
absolutely not, and I'll tell you, you know, my
hat's off to jeremy story, thechief over there over las cruces
.
Uh, absolute stallion.
And I I'd go to work for himtoday if I didn't think, uh,
that, uh, that I'd get sued inthe first 12 minutes I was on
the job.
Travis Yates (28:21):
One of the things that you talk about, I think, so
eloquently in your book.
I remember anatomy of acritical incident.
Go get it, just go get it.
Every cop in America needs it.
Obviously, every investigatorneeds it.
But you break downde-escalation in a way that very
few do, because this is one ofthe most butchered terms that's
been used against lawenforcement in so many ways and
(28:42):
most law enforcement doesn'tunderstand it.
I watch these videos every daywhere I see where this has
gotten us as a profession to,where we think that
de-escalation is some magictrick to just solve things and
what often it does is it gets usin worse trouble Kind of break
down, and I know de-escalationis being used as a tool against
us as well.
Jane, we just kind of breakdown your thoughts on that Well
(29:04):
and another great subject matter, and that's another one of
those terms.
Jamie Borden (29:07):
Right that it's misappropriated.
It's a training term and we'renever going to change training
De-escalation.
When I say the termde-escalation, the first thing
that pops into your mind isverbal tactics, verbal skills,
the attempt to talk somebody offof the ledge.
Well, and I simplified this inthe book.
In fact, Greg Meyer quoted theentire section out of the book
(29:30):
that I defined de-escalation asa goal, not a tactic, and it's
an honor to be recognized byguys like that who were mentors
of mine for years and still are.
When you simplify it, if youlook up definition for
de-escalation, you'll seedefinitions that are half a page
long and they go into all ofthis different stuff, including
(29:51):
social justice and all theseconvoluted things.
The bottom line is this tode-escalate a scenario is to
bring under control a situationthat is otherwise out of control
, and it requires a composite oftactics that officers have been
trained, that they've developedas heuristics, and we always
want to come in lukewarm.
We always want to try to reachthe goal of de-escalation
(30:13):
through the lowest form of forceor tactical application that we
can form of force or tacticalapplication that we can.
Here's the disconnect.
When an officer is failing intheir mind in de-escalation
because we're not getting aresponse from the suspect right,
the suspect isn't playing wellwith us.
In our attempts to de-escalate,Officers are failing to
escalate to a level of force toeffectively bring that situation
(30:37):
into control and it's becausethey're stuck on the term
de-escalation and the disciplinethat goes along with failing to
de-escalate.
Remember, most times an officerfails in a de-escalation
attempt is because the suspectisn't playing along right.
The suspect has a role in thiscommunication process.
Communication is and we allknow this is a two-way street.
(31:00):
If you're talking at someoneand not to someone, or you're
talking to someone and notgetting a response, then verbal
tactics aren't going to beeffective.
And if we fail and continue totry to stay at these lower
levels of force and I'm notsaying shoot first, ask
questions later, Please don'ttake this out of context, but
officers have to realize.
So the way I applyde-escalation in the hindsight
(31:24):
and analysis of these cases isto look at the point where the
officers are failing or thesuspect is failing to comply
with officers and at which pointare they escalating their level
of force to reach the goal ofde-escalation.
And that really simplifies it.
Look at de-escalation as a goal, not a tactic, where you still
(31:46):
have the opportunity to move upand down the continuum at
whatever point you need to be,to gain control based on the
perceptions, context,expectation that drive your
decisions and actions and end upin a performance and behavior,
the common thread.
Right, it's a goal, it's not atactic, and that's the simplest
way I can explain it.
Travis Yates (32:06):
Yeah, and you even say this in your book and I've
been talking about this foryears is sometimes you may have
to escalate force to deescalatethe situation A hundred percent.
Phoenix Police Department's aprime example.
That's how they train.
It's appropriate, and theDepartment of Justice just lost
their mind on them right bydoing this.
Because of this, fail tounderstand what de-escalation is
, and let me just prove that tothe people listening.
(32:27):
If you watch any amount ofthese police videos, you'll see
a lot of deadly force thathappens after de-escalation
fails.
If we're using de-escalation asa sole tactic say verbal, but
when verbal doesn't fail, theofficers have nothing else to
use it escalates pretty quicklyto deadly force.
But what if the officers couldgo hands-on much earlier, use a
taser much earlier?
That's part of de-escalation,because you're trying to
(32:49):
mitigate that force and you do abrilliant job explaining that.
Jamie Borden (32:52):
Yeah, and it's a very important subject for
officers to understand,especially when they prepare for
a statement or they're writinga witness report.
It's important to explain whyde-escalation went the way it
did.
It's important to explain thatthey're trying to reach the goal
of de-escalation.
It's important to explain thedifference between what they
were trained and how theyapplied it in the field right.
(33:15):
These are things.
This is information that couldget left on the table Travis,
and this is the information weneed when it goes to trial.
I need it as an expert to referto it so I can verify that the
officers knew exactly what theprocess was.
And look, we've beendeescalating these critical
incidents for 150 years, sinceSir Robert Peel ratified common
(33:35):
and modern policing.
This is the way police work hasbeen done.
It was done differently 25years ago, right, and you know
that was a different climate.
Not that it was excessive orunnecessary.
It was just a little bit moredefined, if you will, and so our
officers need to reallyunderstand that.
And, moreover, our supervisors,midline management and upper
(33:57):
management command staff need tounderstand the difference
between these things, becausethey'll send officers through
de-escalation training and thensay that they fail to respond to
training when a situation isn'tcontrolled by words and it's
outside of the control ofofficers.
In many cases and look Traviswe've had cases where an officer
comes in hot water right, hecomes in hot and fails to try
(34:20):
anything else, go straight intoa situation with hands on and we
can't ratify it through any ofthe evidence.
It happens, right.
I'm not here to advocate badbehavior.
I'm here to define goodbehavior.
Right, let's define thesethings and make sure it's on the
record.
These instances are the mostimportant part of everyone's
(34:40):
life involved, including thesuspect.
Right?
We as investigators, reviewers,analyzers, decision makers.
It had better be the mostimportant incident in our life
at the time we're doing thatreview.
It's not something we push tothe side.
We get into it, we dig, we findwhat we need to find.
We look deeper for things thatwe might not even know we need.
(35:02):
Right, it's important.
It's a very important process.
Travis Yates (35:05):
And I know you've addressed this you addressed it
in your book, Jamie.
You've addressed it multipletimes.
You probably have to address itevery time you testify is
people will say, oh, Jamie orTravis is trying to permit bad
cops or bad behavior.
It's actually the exactopposite.
Sort of give a quickexplanation on that.
Jamie Borden (35:20):
Well, first of all, and I'll tell you for all
your listeners, nobody wants abad cop out of the mix worse
than a good cop.
Right?
It's too hard to go out and doa great job as a cop, invest
yourself, do everything the wayit should be done, and then be
put in a position where someoneelse's fail to invest in
themselves, bad decisions, badhistory, all these things
immaturity end up making thewhole department look bad, and
(35:42):
then undue pressure is on thosecops.
I want bad cops gone.
I fired a lot of cops as asergeant.
I've taken cases against cops asan expert and I don't like
doing it, but I do it because Ihave to call balls and strikes.
I need people to know that I'mhere to better law enforcement,
not protect cops.
Cops need to protect themselves.
(36:03):
I'll protect law enforcementwith your good decisions, but I
will also protect lawenforcement by calling out bad
decisions when I see them.
And that's an important pointthat needs to be made, and every
expert that's listening to this, make sure that that's the
foundation that you're workingfrom.
I'm not afraid to tell peoplewhat they need to know.
Right, and we've had thisconversation.
(36:24):
I'm not the expert that willtell you what you want to hear
for the purpose of your case.
I'll tell you what you need tohear for the purpose of your
case and I might not be suitablefor it right After doing a full
review.
My opinions might not align withwhoever prosecution or defense
plaintiff, whatever it might be,and and I'm, I don't need the
(36:45):
work.
Right, I want the work and Iwant to do the job I'm doing,
but I'm not.
I'm not.
This is not a money grab.
All right, I take cases on bothsides of the table simply
because we have to make lawenforcement better and, in my
opinion, those of us that areout here doing the job that
you're doing, that I'm doingwith your report about Phoenix
and the improprieties of the DOJand all of the things that
(37:07):
we're saying, listen, it's veryeasy for us to overestimate our
popularity, brother, when we'resaying what needs to be said,
and that's just a punch I'mwilling to take.
You know what I mean.
Travis Yates (37:17):
Right Now, Matt.
I can't thank you enough, Jamie, the punch I'm willing to take,
you know what I mean Right Now,man.
I can't thank you enough, Jamie, for being here Once again, if
you're just joining us, JamieBorden.
He's the founder and owner ofCritical Incident Review.
He's written an incredible bookcalled the Anatomy of a
Critical Incident.
You can get that book at allmajor booksellers.
But, Jamie, I've written a fewbooks so I understand, when I
got this book, what this bookentailed.
I can't imagine the effort andthe lift that went into this.
(37:38):
Explain that process to me,because I got to tell you I was
impressed.
You even had to reduce the fontsize much, to the chagrin of
Chip DeBloch because he's halfblind.
He didn't want a thousand pagebook, but it's.
I mean every page.
You could spend an hourdissecting it.
So I cannot even fathom in mysmall brain and all the stuff
that I write how this was done.
(37:59):
Explain to us why you decidedto do it and the process that
went into doing it.
Jamie Borden (38:05):
So it started in 2018 when I retired.
I'd been doing cases at thatpoint for about six years or so
Well, about five years and I wascompiling information for the
class that I was puttingtogether.
At the time, I was a contractinstructor for science.
I was teaching and lecturingall over the country for them as
(38:26):
their senior lead instructor,and this was important
information, because I wasteaching the science, but I was
compiling information thatinvestigators needed to know,
because, in my opinion, wearen't going to make scientists
out of investigators.
We're going to make goodinvestigators out of them
through the application ofscience.
Right, and that's really whereI live.
I don't have scientificauthority.
I've got a deep understandingand a good grasp on scientific
(38:49):
principles that inform me as aninvestigator.
So this all began in 2018.
2019, I separated and moved onwith my own company from Force
Science, and it was amicable andI just needed to get out to
answer the questions I wasgetting.
As an instructor across theboard, I developed this class.
As I developed the class, I wastaking notes.
(39:09):
So for five years, as thisclass evolved four and a half
years I would continually updatethese notes with full intention
that I was going to write abook.
Well, at the time I'd made thedecision to commit to the book,
I had a stack of unorganizednotes that big enough to choke
an elephant and I started theprocess of trying to organize.
(39:31):
I then, you know, once I goteverything on paper and I got
into Word documents and I titledevery document what the chapter
was going to be and I just bledout on the page, got into word
documents and I titled everydocument what the chapter was
going to be and I just bled outon the page.
I would just sit and write downevery thought that I had.
I'd go through my course ofinstruction, I'd write down
every subject matter from everyslide and then I would sit down
(39:53):
and commit and I would commit 10hours a day for about four and
a half months, and on days thatI was working in between cases,
I would commit 10 hours a dayfor about four and a half months
, and on days that I was workingin between cases, I would
commit four hours a day.
I was literally up at a minimumfor 20 hours a day during the
final four months when this bookcame together.
And you're right, it was aheavy lift and the problem was
is when I was done at 12 fontwhere everybody can read it.
(40:16):
I had a thousand page book andI wasn't willing to put that out
.
But I started going through itand looking at what I was going
to cut out and I was alsounwilling to cut anything out of
the book.
It was all importantinformation.
So I reduced the font and gotit down to 452 pages.
So when you get it, don't readit on the toilet because you
will go paralyzed.
Travis Yates (40:37):
Well, it's pretty incredible, man.
You've done a service that willoutlast our lives for sure.
Jamie, that's what legacy isabout.
It's what we talk about all thetime here.
I can't thank you enough forwhat you've done, and I have to
tell people this is not just aproduct or a training for use of
force investigators or patrolofficers.
This is the epitome of lawenforcement leadership.
If you don't understand theseconcepts, you have no business
(40:59):
in a leadership position, makingthese types of decisions that
affect so many lives.
So everybody needs to get tothis.
I went, I became a forceinvestigator late in my career
and I just shake my head of howmany decisions I made before I
had that knowledge that wereprobably wrong or come to with
the wrong conclusion.
So thank you so much for doingit.
Thank you for being here.
I can't thank you enough.
Jamie Borden (41:19):
Yeah, Travis, the feelings are mutual.
Man, I follow the things thatyou do very closely and you know
we get the opportunity to be onthese radio shows together with
Chip DeBlock, Law EnforcementRoundtable, and it's always a
pleasure.
I'm so glad we got theopportunity to get this thing
off the ground and hopefully wecan do some work together here
(41:40):
soon, in the near future.
Travis Yates (41:41):
Yes, sir Jamie Borden, thank you, and if you've
been watching, you've beenlistening.
Thank you for doing that.
And just remember lead on andstay courageous.
Speaker 1 (41:51):
Thank you for listening to Courageous
Leadership with Travis Yates.
We invite you to join othercourageous leaders at
travisyatesorg.
Welcome to Courageous Leadership with Travis Yates,
where leaders find the insights,advice and encouragement they
need to lead courageously.
Travis Yates (00:12):
Welcome back to the show.
I'm so honored that you decidedto spend a few minutes with us
here today and today's guest.
We have been trying to makethis happen for some time.
I'm really excited.
You're going to be excited.
This is something you're goingto want to tune into, maybe more
than once, and send to yourfriends.
On today's episode we haveSergeant Jamie Borden.
Jamie spent well over twodecades in law enforcement.
(00:36):
He's one of the most respectedand esteemed experts in the
field, particularly with use offorce.
His book, the Anatomy of aCritical Incident, is by far the
best resource you have today onuse of force analysis and use
of force investigations.
I can't recommend him histraining, his classes, his book
(00:56):
enough.
Sergeant Jamie Borden, how areyou?
Jamie Borden (00:58):
doing.
Sir man, I'm good brother.
Thank you, it's nice to be onyour show.
Travis Yates (01:03):
Well, jamie, we've had Danny King on.
I know you do a lot of workwith Danny King and I guess,
before we get started, I meanthis journey you've had in law
enforcement is so interesting,so just sort of give us the
quick preview of your career andhow you landed here today,
being really one of the foremostexperts in use of force
investigations.
Jamie Borden (01:21):
That's a great.
That's a great question.
Investigations that's a greatquestion.
And the crazy thing is, travis,is that my journey to where I?
First of all, I've given uptrying to figure out how I ended
up being who I am.
And this is just me followingmy passions, answering the call,
if you will.
And in 1992, my brother, steveBorden, was involved in a
(01:42):
shooting in Las Vegas that wentall the way to the Supreme Court
LVMPD versus Warren and I wasby his side.
I wasn't a cop yet.
I had always had an interest inbeing a cop, but I was by his
side through that entire process.
He was internally scrutinized.
This was the onset of videoevidence.
News camera cop captured thewhole thing.
(02:02):
It was completely distorted inhow it presented to the news.
So the allegations were thatthe officers were too close,
they weren't in fear for theirlife and it was all based on
what the video showed.
So I found that veryinteresting.
But I remember telling him atthe time and my brother did the
right thing for the right reasonat the right time, like 99% of
our officers who were involvedin these critical incidents.
(02:24):
And I remember telling him atthe time this is pre-academy for
me, the first time if I've evergot anything to do with this
officers that are in yourposition that have been
wrongfully alleged to have donesomething wrong and they didn't
do something wrong I'm going tohave play in that.
And then you know, fast forwardnow almost 30 years and here I
(02:47):
am involved in, you know, 400plus cases at everywhere, from
the highest profile civil casesto the highest profile criminal
cases, to state level civilcases, arbitration, state level
decertification cases.
I mean everything that can findthe courtroom in any fashion.
I'm involved in it and I'm sothankful that I am.
(03:09):
And it's one of those thingsthat be careful what you wish
for A right, follow your passion, be good at what you do.
Me and Danny King just did awhole series on officer wellness
following your passions,bringing outside passion into
police work so that police workthrives and you become a better
public servant.
And I've done that my wholecareer.
(03:31):
And, lo and behold, I took thejob.
I was a patrol officer, fto.
I became an officer in chargebelow a sergeant.
I then took a break and wentout on tour.
As you know, I have a musiccareer that paralleled police
work, came back to work andpromoted into I was a narcotics
(03:53):
officer.
I then promoted into thetraining bureau where I just
really found my niche in that,and I created the unit, the use
of force training and analysisunit, which was responsible for
investigating, reviewing andanalyzing and then regurgitating
information good, bad orindifferent back into the
department.
So our goal was myself andDanny King and the creation of
this unit was to uncover and Icame up with an acronym called
(04:19):
replicate, change and avoid RCA.
We didn't only look at what wewanted to change or avoid, but
we looked very heavily at whatwe wanted to replicate in law
enforcement, because most ofthese critical incidents we
immediately overlook whatofficers have done well in these
cases because it's expected,and then we have an outcome that
might be undesirable orunexpected and the focus becomes
(04:41):
that and then we look backwardson that event with a blame
oriented perspective and we lookto blame for the outcome.
And you know so that that unitreally quantified, looking at
every incident as a trainingmoment for the department.
So we broke down silos and wewere training, we were putting
out directives and briefingtrainings on that department as
(05:03):
many times as two to three timesa week and then we would siphon
those trainings into oursymposiums.
That would happen twice a year,so we had a very good grip on
it, and it was that unit thatdid it.
That unit became nationallyrecognized.
Many departments across thecountry are adopting similar
units at this point, which iswhere my career started, with
(05:23):
lecturing.
I've lectured across thecountry.
I've got close to 500 classesunder my belt and since 2019,
they've all been under theumbrella of Critical Incident
Review, the company that Ifounded, and Danny King works
with me for Critical IncidentReview.
He's my COO.
He keeps me in line and keepsmy schedule in front of me, so I
(05:46):
know where to be on every givenday.
But that's kind of a breakdownof how I ended up here today.
Travis Yates (05:51):
Well, we're very thankful that you do it and
obviously, as you mentioned,what your department did at the
time was cutting edge.
Most departments weren't doingthat and you guys were at the
forefront of that.
How much did politics come intoplay?
Because that unit I don't thinkthat unit lasted forever, right
, like you guys were doing sucha great job and the police
chiefs and the policeadministration.
(06:11):
You've got to sort of give upyour ego when you do that,
because, yeah, you're going tohear from the experts instead of
.
I've always thought it wasamazing, jamie, that we have
these commanders or chiefs orwhoever that review these use of
force.
I have no external training onthat review, right, and so it
was certainly very, very smartand cutting edge for them to
implement that unit, to thenrecommend to them what they
(06:34):
should be looking at.
But politics sometimes get inthe way, right, and I wish there
wasn't a need for you, right,wish there wasn't a need for
Danny King, but certainlypolitics has has interjected in
a way that we may have neverforeseen.
What's your thoughts on that?
Jamie Borden (06:49):
Well, you're 100% accurate.
And the chief that allowed thatunit to exist came to me.
My very first task when I tookthe training bureau spot was to
revamp our use of force trainingpolicy.
And I didn't just go throughand rewrite the policy.
I took our neighboringdepartment, Las Vegas Metro.
(07:12):
They had involvement through asettlement agreement with the
DOJ, so they had redone theirwhole policy and then they'd
submitted it to the ACLU.
The ACLU gave theirrecommendations on the policy.
Well, I took the finishedpolicy and the document from the
ACLU.
The ACLU gave theirrecommendations on the policy.
Well, I took the finishedpolicy and the document from the
ACLU and I went through andrevamped our entire policy.
I then did an 85-page documentthat stated why I adopted and
(07:34):
why I did not adopt certaincomponents of the ACLU's
recommendations, and I submittedthat document to the ACLU.
I got a response from them thatthey were proud to have been a
part of it.
They approved the policy.
They love the policy and wemoved forward with that policy,
including the unit and the workthat myself and Danny King did.
(07:56):
So here's where the politicskick in.
That chief did exactly what yousaid.
He stepped aside from all ofhis ego and looked for the
people that were invested inthat particular component of law
enforcement and he put all ofthe onus on the unit that I
created.
And they listened.
We weren't makingrecommendations.
We simply would present thefacts to them, but we would
(08:18):
teach them about what the factsmeant and what this did.
Was it helped them avoid aknee-jerk reaction to these
otherwise critical incidentsthat may look bad on video, and
we would break it down andexplain exactly why these things
were happening, right down tothe distortions in video and
body-worn camera.
And so all of that made a unitthat created a culture on the
(08:41):
department where officers knewthat if they made a decision in
the field, that they were goingto be fairly and objectively
viewed in that incident.
It didn't matter who liked them, who didn't like them, what
their reputation on thedepartment was.
That case is what mattered, andit created a culture where
officers were self-investing andmaking better decisions overall
(09:05):
.
Well, now let's talk aboutpolitics.
That chief was forced out, asmost chiefs are with the city of
Henderson, by the citygovernment.
Scandalous allegations thechief ended up leaving under
those allegations, ended upsuing the department.
Blah, blah, blah.
We get a chief in fromArlington, Texas, who was a
captain on Arlington, came innot a change maker, but a change
(09:28):
agent.
Right, there's a difference andyou know the difference.
Right, these are people thatcome in and fix shit that
doesn't need to be fixed, simplybecause it's their name on it,
and now they're owning it.
So I did a 45-minutepresentation to the chief and
the deputy chief, who had bothcome from Arlington.
At the end of that 45-minutepresentation and Travis, I had
(09:49):
flow charts and I hadexplanations for everything we
were doing.
I explained the culturalchanges.
I explained the use of force,the decrease in use of force,
the increase of hands-on,decrease of taste.
I mean all the things that wewere able to tabulate and follow
, analyze, process and then useas evidence-based information to
create better training Wentthrough this whole thing.
(10:10):
The only question I got asked atthe end of that was where did
you learn how to do this?
Hold on, Chief.
I don't understand the question.
Where did you learn this?
We didn't learn it, we createdit.
This is cutting edge.
Other departments are.
Well, I need a breakdown ofwhere you learned this
information and I want to knowmore about it because to me it
(10:30):
seems corrupt.
You're here to protect badbehavior and Travis, that
meeting was 45 minutes.
I went in.
My lieutenant said, well, Ithink that went pretty well.
And I said, well, I thinkyou're on crack.
That didn't go well at all andI'll tell you I'm on the edge of
making a decision.
It was two days later.
I came in with my papers and Iretired.
(10:52):
They were going to dissolve theunit and everybody was saying
stay, we'll fight for it.
I don't want the fight to beabout me.
I want the fight to be aboutthe resolve for the department.
Right, Don't make it about me.
I don't care about the position.
So I had you know, choices atthe department were to stay,
take a sergeant's position overa unit, which is the best job in
the world, or I could go outand have an impact nationally on
(11:16):
on the United States in lawenforcement, and that's what I
chose to do.
I walked out the door.
I'll never forget no-transcriptwhen we look at these cases
(11:54):
through the lens of riskaversity.
I've got a whole chapter in mybook about risk aversity.
Identify what it is you'retrying to protect.
Right, and tell people whatthey need to know, not what you
think they want to know, topreserve the position.
This position was given to youin transition and it's an
evolving point, right.
But if we're not making theworld a better place, if we're
(12:16):
just preserving a position,which is bad leadership in my
opinion, if you're moreconcerned about your position
than you are, the integrity of apolice department, through cops
that are doing what they'vebeen trained with the training,
the expectation and the right bylaw to do these things that
they're doing in the field, andwe're turning our back on them
in the 11th hour and using thatpolicy instead of a parameter
(12:38):
like it's.
You know, we train that.
It's a parameter, a decisionmaking model, if you will train
that.
It's a parameter, adecision-making model, if you
will.
And then we turn it into ahardline black letter law to
shatter their career because onepoint in that policy was
deviated from.
In the case which you're nevergoing to be involved in a use of
force, case where you're notstepping outside of policy,
black line letter because policydoesn't cover everything.
(13:00):
I've heard you talk about thisbefore Me and you have talked
about it before, so the politicscertainly dance in this stuff.
I left and here we are todayBest decision I ever made, but
I'll set of balls, right, You'vegot to say what needs to be
(13:27):
said, not what you think peoplewant you to hear.
Travis Yates (13:30):
To preserve your position, yeah, there's far too
many chiefs like this.
In fact, I wrote a whole bookabout chiefs like this, called
the Courageous Police Leader.
It seems to be so rare that wehave actual leaders who do the
right thing, and your storyreminds me of something similar
of mine.
I won't give the background onit, but I was treated in a
similar fashion over a unit, andthat's why below 100 was
developed.
(13:50):
Most people listening to thislaw enforcement are familiar
with below 100.
Just know this.
It was only developed becausemy department took me out of a
role where I was doing the samething and then I decided well,
let's do this nationally.
So I'm very thankful you didthat, jamie, and you're busier,
and busier, and busier,unfortunately, because so
oftentimes it shouldn't be thecase.
What kind of tricks of thetrade are you seeing used
(14:11):
against law enforcement?
I know you'll get a little bitof hindsight bias, but if you
were to say anything that you'reseeing routinely because just
like we meet, we talk about bestpractices the enemies against
the profession, the enemiesagainst use of force.
When I say enemies, what I meanis they want to take justified
legal use of force and twist itand turn it into illegal use of
force.
What?
What's the practice you'reseeing from them right now?
Jamie Borden (14:33):
Well.
So the narrative is based on apassionate belief of wrongdoing
prosecution and plaintiff'sattorneys will take that
narrative because we, as a lawenforcement, in the profession
of law enforcement, leaveinformation on the table.
We see something in a case,right, let's just take the
(14:54):
Lunsford case, for example.
The officer did everything bythe book.
His decisions were to apply adeadly force tactic to save his
partner's life, right Under whathe reasonably believed was a
deadly threat.
Subject had the taser wasmanipulating, the safety was 12
inches from his face and thedecision to use deadly force
(15:16):
tactics in that moment was doneand it was accepted.
Well, in that narrative.
Even the experts on the otherside and these are experts that
have a CV that's deafening,right, they've got all these
credentials and they get up andthey say, well, the officer
could have stepped back, madespace, gotten a perfect spread.
(15:36):
The subject didn't have a shirton and used a taser to achieve
NMI.
First of all, there's noguarantee that a subject is
going to is going to respond tothe use of a taser, even if it's
a direct skin dart to skincontact, right, we know that it
just uh, drugs on board willprevent NMI from happening.
Another expert said he couldhave stepped off and slapped him
(15:58):
.
That's actual words from thetrial, right, and why this
argument came up is becauseevery officer involved in the
investigation and they did anoutstanding investigation and
this is not a failure.
This is just something thatneeds to be known.
That's not necessarily known Inthat investigation.
Every officer involved in theinvestigation understood exactly
(16:19):
why Brad Lunsford used thattaser.
So they never broached thequestion why did you not use
other resources, otherimplementations?
And had we had that explanationon the record for the trial,
then it wouldn't have come up inthe trial, because at that
point, because the informationis not on the table now, it's
(16:40):
information that's coming out totry to justify your bad
behavior.
And that's exactly how theypose that argument.
And it is not the case.
And, and it's again, it's not afailure on the part of the
investigators with with uh, withLunsford, it's it's not knowing
what we don't know.
We've got to exhaust thisinformation.
We have to develop thatnarrative from the core of this
(17:01):
incident.
It doesn't matter why weunderstand it or why we don't
understand it.
What matters is we get all theinformation about why the
officer did what they did, whyit made sense to them in that
moment.
Well, that includes why did itnot make sense to you to use
your taser?
And once we got that longnarrative about why the taser
was an inappropriate weapon, aninappropriate choice at that
(17:23):
point, that narrative nowbelongs to us.
No one else can ask thatquestion, even though the
question asked two years lateron the stand is going to be
exactly the same.
It doesn't exist in thepre-existing information, so now
it's an excuse.
If it happens before, it's anexplanation.
If it happens during or after,it's an excuse.
And I need officers andinvestigators to understand that
(17:46):
.
That's what my whole course isabout.
Efi Enhanced ForceInvestigations course is getting
that information on the table.
It's not about accuracy, it'sabout completeness.
If we've got completeness, wecan develop the accurate points
within it, with an understandingthat there's going to be some
inaccuracies and inconsistencies.
You're talking about theoriginal report, correct,
(18:07):
correct, yeah, from the pointthat it happens, the original
statements, you know.
And that's why the cognitiveinterview is so important.
I've got a whole section of myEFI course that's focused on how
to elicit this information.
Dr Ed Geiselman gave me thekeys to the castle on the CI the
cognitive interview and Iproduced a whole model of the
(18:27):
cognitive interview that'sspecifically for interviewing
police officers involved incritical incidents, and there's
very important differences righton how we get to that
information and how we ask thosequestions, and that we ask all
of the questions, even the stuffthat makes sense to us already
right, even though we know itand understand it.
That doesn't matter, becausewe're the last ones to look at
(18:48):
that report with policebackground.
The next person that looks atthat statement is going to be a
plaintiff's attorney, aprosecuting attorney, and if
that information is not on thetable, we're lost in the mix.
Brother, we now have to make upthat time and it becomes an
explanation or becomes an excuse, not an explanation.
Travis Yates (19:05):
Now part of that report, jamie, would you
recommend including training andpast experiences?
And, with that answer, whattype of training should officers
be seeking now, before they getinvolved in one of these
incidents?
Jamie Borden (19:17):
Well and that self-investment component,
Travis, is huge.
I think that officers andlisten, officers are tasked for
time.
Our training budgets are slim.
Some departments they're none.
You know myself and Danny, ifwe were denied a training with
Henderson, we'd purchase thetraining and go to the training
ourselves on our own vacationtime because the job was just
(19:39):
that important to us.
You know officers, they andI've done this whole series on
officer wellness and investmentand applying your passions
outside of police work to helpyour discipline as a police
officer.
I think it's very important tounderstand that this requires
discipline, right, this requiresan understanding.
As an officer involved in acritical incident, you can't put
(20:00):
the weight on the investigatorsto know everything.
Put the weight on theinvestigators to know everything
.
And if you know more aboutcertain components of the
incident that you're involved inand it's not getting on the
record, you have to know thatit's got to get on the record
and you have to put it on therecord.
You know and and that's not.
There's no harm and no foul indoing that, but our training is
so important.
After the fact, when I get acase at the civil level, the
(20:23):
very first thing I ask for istraining.
I look for training, I look forlesson plans, I make sure and I
can't say that the officerlistened during the class.
I can't say that theyassimilated any of that
information, but I can say thatthey were exposed to it and that
the actions I see in theevidence are consistent with
what I know the training to be.
So now I've bridged the gapbetween what they assimilated in
(20:46):
training and what we see as aconsistent behavior in that
evidence, primarily video.
Travis Yates (20:52):
If you're just now joining us, we're talking to
Sergeant Jamie Borden, retiredHenderson police.
Sergeant ran a unit there.
It was pretty phenomenal anduseful force.
But his book and it's one ofthe reasons I want to bring him
on called the anatomy of the.
The anatomy of a criticalincident is the best book on the
topic and there's so much totalk about in this book, Jamie,
I'm not going to make you giveit all up, but the one thing
(21:12):
that I found interesting wasyour delineation and difference
between truth and fact.
I kind of explained to ouraudience, because that was such
an important feature, that Ifound in the book something that
I, quite frankly, hadn'tthought too much of before.
Jamie Borden (21:28):
So give us your thoughts on that.
So you know, and this isn'ttruth and fact in social justice
, right, it's not.
It's not a look at truth andfact through that lens.
This is literally an officer'sfocus of attention and their
limited resources in a criticalincident, under the constraints
of time and and I want everybodythat's listening to really
think about this An officer thatis involved in a critical
incident where all of theinformation isn't known, because
they only know what they'velearned pre-incident coming into
(21:52):
the call, what they seebehaviorally from the suspect
and then what they respond to inthat context, Well, there's a
very thin slice of pie availableto the officer regarding their
focus of attention, whether it'saudible or visual, stimulus,
smell, feel, whatever it mightbe.
So, in those instances whereit's captured globally on a
(22:12):
video camera, we see all of thisinformation and we've got all
the information in hindsight,Well, the officer's belief of
the facts at that time, whattheir truth is, their truth is
simply a belief of what thefacts are in the moment that we
may find inconsistencies with inthe hindsight review of that
(22:32):
case.
That doesn't make it because itwasn't true, doesn't make it a
lie.
So the truth, the differencebetween truth and fact is.
The truth is what issubjectively believed in the
moment to be fact by the officer.
Now, in hindsight, through theobjective, dispassionate review,
we find that those facts may beinconsistent.
(22:53):
But could the officer haveknown that?
That's what Graham v Conner isall about.
Right, 20-20 vision of hindsightand I also have following that
chapter Travis is themanipulation of the totality of
facts and circumstances known tothe officer when the event
occurred Pre-existinginformation, knowledge learned
in real time during the, duringthe contact, and the information
(23:16):
at the final moment.
That totality of the facts andcircumstances isn't the same as
the totality of facts andcircumstances that I get after
the fact isn't the same as thetotality of facts and
circumstances that I get afterthe fact.
Right, Well, you'll get.
People say no, I'm consideringthe totality of the facts and
circumstances, just likeoutlined in Graham versus Connor
.
No, you're not.
That's known to the officer atthe time.
It's a reasonable belief basedon the context, the perceptions,
(23:39):
the expectations, the decisionsand actions that lead to a
performance and behavior.
That's what I call the commonthread in my class and I live in
that common thread.
So that's kind of the truth.
In fact is the facts known tothe officer at the time are
truthfully and reasonablybelieved to be the facts.
The facts in hindsight areobjective, irrefutable facts
(24:02):
that will be inconsistent withthe officer's truth in that
moment.
Travis Yates (24:06):
Yeah, graham v Connor, it's been around since
1989.
It's not going anywhere.
The makeup of the court andrecent decisions it's I mean, as
I think the closest they'vegotten is a 7-2 decision to
reverse that.
So it's not going anywhere inthe next generation, or
potentially two, but you'llnever hear that case on MSNBC or
CNN or any of these so-calledpolice experts talking
negatively about law enforcement.
(24:27):
Unfortunately, you don't reallyhear that case too often about
people trying to defend lawenforcement.
It's an important case but thatcase is twisted a lot.
Jamie, I know you talked aboutsome of that, but how are they
twisting Granby-Connor even atthe department level and policy
level?
That actually hurts officers.
Jamie Borden (24:43):
Well, that's a great question.
On a very recent high profiletrial, they redacted the
objective, reasonable standardfrom policy and disallowed it to
be included in the juryinstructions.
That's what they're doing Holdup back up.
What was that again?
Yeah, they redacted any placethat referred to the objective
standard in policy in the trial,because this was a criminal
(25:06):
case.
This is an officer that istrained how and why and when to
use force based on the objectivestandard, has a policy to
support it.
The policy is now in place andit's been completely redacted in
court for a jury instructionbecause it's a civil case, not a
criminal case instructionbecause it's a civil case, not a
(25:28):
criminal case.
Now this is where and the nextpoint in my book that this comes
up is the deadly forcenarrative, the intent to kill
and the application of a deadlyforce tactic.
Right, An application of adeadly force tactic is a tactic
that's applied to changebehavior where deadly force is
prominently or probable in thatenvironment, right?
So when you look at theconstruct of this whole thing,
(25:53):
the application of a deadlyforce tactic is to save a life.
The application of a deliberateintention to kill is simply to
kill someone, right?
So this narrative getsmisconstrued.
Anytime the news says anofficer is under investigation
for homicide, homicide is viewedas a terminology that's got a
(26:14):
criminal element to it.
Homicide is a method of death.
It has nothing to do withcriminal behavior.
Murder is what they're thinking.
Homicide and murder aresynonymous with those lay people
that just don't have anyunderstanding of the terminology
, right?
So these are the things thatget misconstrued.
And the prosecutors in thiscase were saying you made the
(26:38):
decision to kill him because andthat's not accurate there's not
a decision to kill, it's adeadly force tactic to change
behavior, to save a life, eitheryour own or someone else's.
The stinging effect is that,tragically, someone loses their
life because the application ofa deadly force tactic comes with
the expectation of substantialbodily harm or death.
(26:58):
And that's known right.
That is the viable andappropriate application of the
tactic to save a life, and thatnarrative gets squelched.
In these cases, the objectivestandard gets removed, even
though civilly, everything wouldhave been objectively
reasonable in this case.
All of these things stand thetest of time until they're
(27:21):
redacted and disallowed to beused in a criminal case.
Until they're redacted anddisallowed to be used in a
criminal case.
Well, that's chilling.
Sit in a courtroom and watch aman get walked out in handcuffs
because this is the case that's.
One of the single mostprominent days in my life is
watching Brad Lunsford getwalked out of that courtroom in
(27:42):
handcuffs, full well knowingthat he had the full support of
his department, his chief, thepolicy, the training, everything
was in place, but somehow itbecame criminal so I'm sure they
weren't lining up the chief andand the policymakers to arrest
him because he's followingpolicy.
Travis Yates (28:02):
They weren't doing that, were they?
Jamie Borden (28:03):
absolutely not, and I'll tell you, you know, my
hat's off to jeremy story, thechief over there over las cruces
.
Uh, absolute stallion.
And I I'd go to work for himtoday if I didn't think, uh,
that, uh, that I'd get sued inthe first 12 minutes I was on
the job.
Travis Yates (28:21):
One of the things that you talk about, I think, so
eloquently in your book.
I remember anatomy of acritical incident.
Go get it, just go get it.
Every cop in America needs it.
Obviously, every investigatorneeds it.
But you break downde-escalation in a way that very
few do, because this is one ofthe most butchered terms that's
been used against lawenforcement in so many ways and
(28:42):
most law enforcement doesn'tunderstand it.
I watch these videos every daywhere I see where this has
gotten us as a profession to,where we think that
de-escalation is some magictrick to just solve things and
what often it does is it gets usin worse trouble Kind of break
down, and I know de-escalationis being used as a tool against
us as well.
Jane, we just kind of breakdown your thoughts on that Well
(29:04):
and another great subject matter, and that's another one of
those terms.
Jamie Borden (29:07):
Right that it's misappropriated.
It's a training term and we'renever going to change training
De-escalation.
When I say the termde-escalation, the first thing
that pops into your mind isverbal tactics, verbal skills,
the attempt to talk somebody offof the ledge.
Well, and I simplified this inthe book.
In fact, Greg Meyer quoted theentire section out of the book
(29:30):
that I defined de-escalation asa goal, not a tactic, and it's
an honor to be recognized byguys like that who were mentors
of mine for years and still are.
When you simplify it, if youlook up definition for
de-escalation, you'll seedefinitions that are half a page
long and they go into all ofthis different stuff, including
(29:51):
social justice and all theseconvoluted things.
The bottom line is this tode-escalate a scenario is to
bring under control a situationthat is otherwise out of control
, and it requires a composite oftactics that officers have been
trained, that they've developedas heuristics, and we always
want to come in lukewarm.
We always want to try to reachthe goal of de-escalation
(30:13):
through the lowest form of forceor tactical application that we
can form of force or tacticalapplication that we can.
Here's the disconnect.
When an officer is failing intheir mind in de-escalation
because we're not getting aresponse from the suspect right,
the suspect isn't playing wellwith us.
In our attempts to de-escalate,Officers are failing to
escalate to a level of force toeffectively bring that situation
(30:37):
into control and it's becausethey're stuck on the term
de-escalation and the disciplinethat goes along with failing to
de-escalate.
Remember, most times an officerfails in a de-escalation
attempt is because the suspectisn't playing along right.
The suspect has a role in thiscommunication process.
Communication is and we allknow this is a two-way street.
(31:00):
If you're talking at someoneand not to someone, or you're
talking to someone and notgetting a response, then verbal
tactics aren't going to beeffective.
And if we fail and continue totry to stay at these lower
levels of force and I'm notsaying shoot first, ask
questions later, Please don'ttake this out of context, but
officers have to realize.
So the way I applyde-escalation in the hindsight
(31:24):
and analysis of these cases isto look at the point where the
officers are failing or thesuspect is failing to comply
with officers and at which pointare they escalating their level
of force to reach the goal ofde-escalation.
And that really simplifies it.
Look at de-escalation as a goal, not a tactic, where you still
(31:46):
have the opportunity to move upand down the continuum at
whatever point you need to be,to gain control based on the
perceptions, context,expectation that drive your
decisions and actions and end upin a performance and behavior,
the common thread.
Right, it's a goal, it's not atactic, and that's the simplest
way I can explain it.
Travis Yates (32:06):
Yeah, and you even say this in your book and I've
been talking about this foryears is sometimes you may have
to escalate force to deescalatethe situation A hundred percent.
Phoenix Police Department's aprime example.
That's how they train.
It's appropriate, and theDepartment of Justice just lost
their mind on them right bydoing this.
Because of this, fail tounderstand what de-escalation is
, and let me just prove that tothe people listening.
(32:27):
If you watch any amount ofthese police videos, you'll see
a lot of deadly force thathappens after de-escalation
fails.
If we're using de-escalation asa sole tactic say verbal, but
when verbal doesn't fail, theofficers have nothing else to
use it escalates pretty quicklyto deadly force.
But what if the officers couldgo hands-on much earlier, use a
taser much earlier?
That's part of de-escalation,because you're trying to
(32:49):
mitigate that force and you do abrilliant job explaining that.
Jamie Borden (32:52):
Yeah, and it's a very important subject for
officers to understand,especially when they prepare for
a statement or they're writinga witness report.
It's important to explain whyde-escalation went the way it
did.
It's important to explain thatthey're trying to reach the goal
of de-escalation.
It's important to explain thedifference between what they
were trained and how theyapplied it in the field right.
(33:15):
These are things.
This is information that couldget left on the table Travis,
and this is the information weneed when it goes to trial.
I need it as an expert to referto it so I can verify that the
officers knew exactly what theprocess was.
And look, we've beendeescalating these critical
incidents for 150 years, sinceSir Robert Peel ratified common
(33:35):
and modern policing.
This is the way police work hasbeen done.
It was done differently 25years ago, right, and you know
that was a different climate.
Not that it was excessive orunnecessary.
It was just a little bit moredefined, if you will, and so our
officers need to reallyunderstand that.
And, moreover, our supervisors,midline management and upper
(33:57):
management command staff need tounderstand the difference
between these things, becausethey'll send officers through
de-escalation training and thensay that they fail to respond to
training when a situation isn'tcontrolled by words and it's
outside of the control ofofficers.
In many cases and look Traviswe've had cases where an officer
comes in hot water right, hecomes in hot and fails to try
(34:20):
anything else, go straight intoa situation with hands on and we
can't ratify it through any ofthe evidence.
It happens, right.
I'm not here to advocate badbehavior.
I'm here to define goodbehavior.
Right, let's define thesethings and make sure it's on the
record.
These instances are the mostimportant part of everyone's
(34:40):
life involved, including thesuspect.
Right?
We as investigators, reviewers,analyzers, decision makers.
It had better be the mostimportant incident in our life
at the time we're doing thatreview.
It's not something we push tothe side.
We get into it, we dig, we findwhat we need to find.
We look deeper for things thatwe might not even know we need.
(35:02):
Right, it's important.
It's a very important process.
Travis Yates (35:05):
And I know you've addressed this you addressed it
in your book, Jamie.
You've addressed it multipletimes.
You probably have to address itevery time you testify is
people will say, oh, Jamie orTravis is trying to permit bad
cops or bad behavior.
It's actually the exactopposite.
Sort of give a quickexplanation on that.
Jamie Borden (35:20):
Well, first of all, and I'll tell you for all
your listeners, nobody wants abad cop out of the mix worse
than a good cop.
Right?
It's too hard to go out and doa great job as a cop, invest
yourself, do everything the wayit should be done, and then be
put in a position where someoneelse's fail to invest in
themselves, bad decisions, badhistory, all these things
immaturity end up making thewhole department look bad, and
(35:42):
then undue pressure is on thosecops.
I want bad cops gone.
I fired a lot of cops as asergeant.
I've taken cases against cops asan expert and I don't like
doing it, but I do it because Ihave to call balls and strikes.
I need people to know that I'mhere to better law enforcement,
not protect cops.
Cops need to protect themselves.
(36:03):
I'll protect law enforcementwith your good decisions, but I
will also protect lawenforcement by calling out bad
decisions when I see them.
And that's an important pointthat needs to be made, and every
expert that's listening to this, make sure that that's the
foundation that you're workingfrom.
I'm not afraid to tell peoplewhat they need to know.
Right, and we've had thisconversation.
(36:24):
I'm not the expert that willtell you what you want to hear
for the purpose of your case.
I'll tell you what you need tohear for the purpose of your
case and I might not be suitablefor it right After doing a full
review.
My opinions might not align withwhoever prosecution or defense
plaintiff, whatever it might be,and and I'm, I don't need the
(36:45):
work.
Right, I want the work and Iwant to do the job I'm doing,
but I'm not.
I'm not.
This is not a money grab.
All right, I take cases on bothsides of the table simply
because we have to make lawenforcement better and, in my
opinion, those of us that areout here doing the job that
you're doing, that I'm doingwith your report about Phoenix
and the improprieties of the DOJand all of the things that
(37:07):
we're saying, listen, it's veryeasy for us to overestimate our
popularity, brother, when we'resaying what needs to be said,
and that's just a punch I'mwilling to take.
You know what I mean.
Travis Yates (37:17):
Right Now, Matt.
I can't thank you enough, Jamie, the punch I'm willing to take,
you know what I mean Right Now,man.
I can't thank you enough, Jamie, for being here Once again, if
you're just joining us, JamieBorden.
He's the founder and owner ofCritical Incident Review.
He's written an incredible bookcalled the Anatomy of a
Critical Incident.
You can get that book at allmajor booksellers.
But, Jamie, I've written a fewbooks so I understand, when I
got this book, what this bookentailed.
I can't imagine the effort andthe lift that went into this.
(37:38):
Explain that process to me,because I got to tell you I was
impressed.
You even had to reduce the fontsize much, to the chagrin of
Chip DeBloch because he's halfblind.
He didn't want a thousand pagebook, but it's.
I mean every page.
You could spend an hourdissecting it.
So I cannot even fathom in mysmall brain and all the stuff
that I write how this was done.
(37:59):
Explain to us why you decidedto do it and the process that
went into doing it.
Jamie Borden (38:05):
So it started in 2018 when I retired.
I'd been doing cases at thatpoint for about six years or so
Well, about five years and I wascompiling information for the
class that I was puttingtogether.
At the time, I was a contractinstructor for science.
I was teaching and lecturingall over the country for them as
(38:26):
their senior lead instructor,and this was important
information, because I wasteaching the science, but I was
compiling information thatinvestigators needed to know,
because, in my opinion, wearen't going to make scientists
out of investigators.
We're going to make goodinvestigators out of them
through the application ofscience.
Right, and that's really whereI live.
I don't have scientificauthority.
I've got a deep understandingand a good grasp on scientific
(38:49):
principles that inform me as aninvestigator.
So this all began in 2018.
2019, I separated and moved onwith my own company from Force
Science, and it was amicable andI just needed to get out to
answer the questions I wasgetting.
As an instructor across theboard, I developed this class.
As I developed the class, I wastaking notes.
(39:09):
So for five years, as thisclass evolved four and a half
years I would continually updatethese notes with full intention
that I was going to write abook.
Well, at the time I'd made thedecision to commit to the book,
I had a stack of unorganizednotes that big enough to choke
an elephant and I started theprocess of trying to organize.
(39:31):
I then, you know, once I goteverything on paper and I got
into Word documents and I titledevery document what the chapter
was going to be and I just bledout on the page, got into word
documents and I titled everydocument what the chapter was
going to be and I just bled outon the page.
I would just sit and write downevery thought that I had.
I'd go through my course ofinstruction, I'd write down
every subject matter from everyslide and then I would sit down
(39:53):
and commit and I would commit 10hours a day for about four and
a half months, and on days thatI was working in between cases,
I would commit 10 hours a dayfor about four and a half months
, and on days that I was workingin between cases, I would
commit four hours a day.
I was literally up at a minimumfor 20 hours a day during the
final four months when this bookcame together.
And you're right, it was aheavy lift and the problem was
is when I was done at 12 fontwhere everybody can read it.
(40:16):
I had a thousand page book andI wasn't willing to put that out
.
But I started going through itand looking at what I was going
to cut out and I was alsounwilling to cut anything out of
the book.
It was all importantinformation.
So I reduced the font and gotit down to 452 pages.
So when you get it, don't readit on the toilet because you
will go paralyzed.
Travis Yates (40:37):
Well, it's pretty incredible, man.
You've done a service that willoutlast our lives for sure.
Jamie, that's what legacy isabout.
It's what we talk about all thetime here.
I can't thank you enough forwhat you've done, and I have to
tell people this is not just aproduct or a training for use of
force investigators or patrolofficers.
This is the epitome of lawenforcement leadership.
If you don't understand theseconcepts, you have no business
(40:59):
in a leadership position, makingthese types of decisions that
affect so many lives.
So everybody needs to get tothis.
I went, I became a forceinvestigator late in my career
and I just shake my head of howmany decisions I made before I
had that knowledge that wereprobably wrong or come to with
the wrong conclusion.
So thank you so much for doingit.
Thank you for being here.
I can't thank you enough.
Jamie Borden (41:19):
Yeah, Travis, the feelings are mutual.
Man, I follow the things thatyou do very closely and you know
we get the opportunity to be onthese radio shows together with
Chip DeBlock, Law EnforcementRoundtable, and it's always a
pleasure.
I'm so glad we got theopportunity to get this thing
off the ground and hopefully wecan do some work together here
(41:40):
soon, in the near future.
Travis Yates (41:41):
Yes, sir Jamie Borden, thank you, and if you've
been watching, you've beenlistening.
Thank you for doing that.
And just remember lead on andstay courageous.
Speaker 1 (41:51):
Thank you for listening to Courageous
Leadership with Travis Yates.
We invite you to join othercourageous leaders at
travisyatesorg.
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