After America E3: The Rise of Nazi Germany, the Fall of Rome, and America's Future

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If American democracy were to collapse, what historical parallels could help us understand what we might be in for? Nazi Germany? Learn how the Nazis swiftly exploited the Reichstag Fire in 1933 to enact the Reichstag Fire Decree, leading to a brutal suppression of political opponents and securing their dominance in the March 5th elections. We explore economic and social turmoil in Weimar Germany that laid the groundwork for Hitler's ascent, drawing poignant comparisons to the fragility of today’s democratic system in the United States, and reveal the strategic maneuvers the Nazis employed to position themselves as the true representatives of Germany, transcending traditional political labels and focusing on national unity and modernization. We discuss the cultural anxieties exacerbated by rapid modernization and urbanization, and how Hitler's propaganda machine capitalized on these fears to foster a return to traditional values, further deepening societal and political divides. And, we explore the unique political skills and empathetic understanding Hitler used to galvanize support, setting a dangerous precedent for charismatic leadership in times of crisis.

But, when we consider the similarities between conditions in Weimar Germany immediately prior to the collapse of democracy to the conditions in the United States, does past mean prelude? Maybe the gradual democratic collapse of the Roman Republic is a better corollary. So, we look into how systems designed to prevent tyranny can inadvertently lead to gridlock and public disenchantment. By examining historical events like Augustus' rise to power and modern phenomena such as gerrymandering and judicial appointments, we emphasize the subtle dangers of gradual democratic backsliding. This episode helps us understand what might lie ahead for American democracy and underscores the urgent need to recognize and address threats to democratic institutions today to prevent repeating the errors of history.

Guests: Dr. Benjamin Hett, Dr. Peter Fritzsche, and Dr. Edward Watts

Music:
Infados - Kevin MacLeod
Dark Tales: Music by Rahul Bhardwaj from Pixabay

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Episode Transcript

Shawn (00:05):
On the cold and ultimately fateful night of
February 27th 1933, the heart ofGermany's democracy, the
Reichstag, the country'sparliament, was engulfed in
flames.
In many ways, the firesymbolized the impending doom of
the current German government,the Weimar Republic.
Amid the chaos of that night, ayoung Dutch communist, marinus

(00:30):
van der Lubbe, was arrested,allegedly caught in the act of
starting the fire.
The Nazis, quick to seize themoment, proclaimed it a
communist plot to overthrow thegovernment.
Adolf Hitler, newly appointedchancellor, and his close ally,
hermann Goering, wasted no timein exploiting the government.
Adolf Hitler, newly appointedchancellor, and his close ally,
hermann Goering, wasted no timein exploiting the crisis.
They convinced President Paulvon Hindenburg to sign the

(00:52):
Reichstag Fire Decree the verynext day.
This decree altered the courseof democracy in Germany,
ultimately dealing it a fatalblow.
Wielding the powers within thedecree, the Nazi party remade
German politics and social life.
The decree's impact wasimmediate and it was devastating
, and it marked the beginning ofa ruthless crackdown on

(01:15):
communists, socialists and anydissenting voices, as they
arrested and detained politicalopponents without trial.
Thousands of people wererounded up.
Silenced by the swift andbrutal efficiency of the Nazi
apparatus, the Communists, whohad been a significant force in
German politics were effectivelyobliterated.
The upcoming elections on March5th 1933 were conducted in an

(01:40):
atmosphere of terror andintimidation, securing the Nazis
a decisive victory.
The Reichstag fire became thepretext for the Nazis to
dismantle the fragile democraticstructures of the Weimar
Republic and, with the EnablingAct passed later in March,
hitler gained dictatorial powers, rendering the Reichstag

(02:01):
impotent.
The fire signaled not just thedestruction of a building, but
the incineration of Germandemocracy, ushering in an era of
totalitarian rule andunimaginable horror.
Could something like thishappen here?
Welcome to After America.
I'm your host, s C Fettig.

(02:22):
Find, follow and like.
Deep Dive with Shawn C Fettigon your favorite podcast
platform and on YouTube, andcheck back every Sunday through
September for new episodes ofAfter America as we examine the
precarious state of Americandemocracy, how we got here and
where we might be headed.

(02:42):
We got here and where we mightbe headed.
The clock is ticking.
Democracy is at a crossroadsand the time to act is now.
When we consider democraticcollapse and the rise of

(03:06):
authoritarianism, our mindsoften turn to Germany in 1933.
This was the year Adolf Hitlercame to power, made himself
dictator and ushered in the Naziregime, a dark chapter in
history that led to theHolocaust, World War II and the
overall deaths of about 85million people, approximately
2.3% of the global population atthe time, the thought that we

(03:27):
might be staring into a similarabyss today seems both entirely
possible and utterly impossible.
Yet there are strikingparallels between current events
in the United States and theconditions that led to the
destruction of democracy inWeimar Germany.
If the prelude looks familiar,then the aftermath is certainly
worth considering as a potentialfuture for America.

(03:49):
So what were those conditions?
The Weimar Republic emerged fromGermany's defeat in World War I
, and the new government, led bythe Social Democratic Party,
faced the daunting task ofnegotiating peace with the
Allied powers.
The resulting Treaty ofVersailles, signed in June of
1919, imposed harsh penalties onGermany, including substantial

(04:13):
territorial losses, militaryrestrictions and crippling
reparations payments.
This treaty was widely resentedby the German people, fueling
nationalist sentiments andundermining the legitimacy of
the Weimar government from itsvery inception.
One of the most significantchallenges facing the Weimar
Republic was economicinstability.

(04:34):
The reparations demanded by theTreaty of Versailles placed an
enormous burden on the Germaneconomy and, in a desperate
attempt to meet theseobligations, the government
resorted to printing more money,leading to hyperinflation.
By 1923, the value of theGerman mark had plummeted to
absurd levels, resulting inwidespread economic hardship.

(04:55):
Savings were wiped out,pensions became worthless and
ordinary Germans faced direpoverty and unemployment.
Germans faced dire poverty andunemployment.
Dr Benjamin Hett, professor ofhistory at the City University
of New York and author of theDeath of Democracy, hitler's
Rise to Power and the Downfallof the Weimar Republic, explains
this period.

Dr. Hett (05:16):
Really, when you think about the Weimar Republic and
especially the later years ofthe Republic from the late 1920s
into the early 30s, germanswere dealing with so many crises
at once that it's notsurprising that there was
political crisis resulting outof all the other crises.
But just to give you a bit of asense, you know we need to keep
in mind that in 1918, germanylost what was then the biggest

(05:41):
war in history.
And they hadn't Germans, hadn'texpected to lose it.
Until the very end, theirpropaganda told them they were
winning.
Their soldiers were on foreignground, everywhere.
It wasn't like the end of WorldWar II, and so it was a shock
that they lost, and in thecourse of losing they had lost
about 1.7 million young menkilled in action in combat.
I always like to tell mystudents, if you sort of to get

(06:04):
a sense of that imagine that theUnited States now had a war and
lost about 8 million soldierskilled in action.
Proportionally that would bewhat you're talking about and
think what 8 million deadAmerican soldiers would do to
our country.
I mean that's a really stunningloss.
So there's that.
Then there's all the crisisthat comes with the end of the
war.
They have regime change whichis unpopular in many sections of

(06:26):
the country not universallyunpopular, but with some
sections of the country and theregime change is accompanied by
civil war basically.
And the civil war basicallydrags on for about five years.
It comes in flares.
It's not war all the time, butthere are various kinds of
flare-ups of what are basicallycivil war until 1923.
Then things finally kind ofcalmed down a little bit and the

(06:49):
Republic has about four or fiveyears where things seem to be
on the up.
And then comes the GreatDepression, of course, in 1929.
And the Great Depression hitsGermany harder really than any
other country in the world.
The only comparable place interms of the economic statistics
is the United States, but inmost respects Germany gets hit
worse in terms of drop inindustrial production,

(07:09):
unemployment numbers and so on.
So this has been by the time weget to the early 1930s.
There's been a dozen or soyears here of just unmitigated
crisis.
Oh, and I forgot to mention thehyperinflation, of course of
1923, at the end of which, or atthe last stage of which, the
German mark was trading to theUS dollar at 4.3 trillion marks

(07:29):
to the dollar, meaning of coursethe currency had become utterly
worthless and Germany had kindof reverted to a barter economy
and many people, if you had anykind of bank savings, you lost
it.
That was gone forever.
So again part of this wholesort of pattern of disasters.
So those are some of thefactors that are contributing to
an atmosphere in which somebodylike Hitler can flourish.

(07:51):
And in a way, what I've said inmy book, the Death of Democracy
in particular, is that peopledidn't use the word
globalization back then, but thephenomenon was happening and
that was also something that alot of Germans were reacting to.
A lot of Germans felt and theyweren't crazy to think this that
Germany was kind of you know,the world's football, that in

(08:11):
many ways in terms of tradeflows, in terms of you know the
whole complex subject of thereparations that Germany was
supposed to pay to some of theWestern allies coming out of
World War I, and then all thefinancial arrangements that
ultimately were kind of graftedonto the reparations.
It was very complicated andbasically resulted in, you know,
literally Germany's centralbank being largely under foreign

(08:32):
control and its currencylargely being regulated by
foreign countries and all kindsof stuff like this, a situation
which, at one point, germany'scentral banker called an
invisible occupation, and hewasn't wrong to call it that.
The financial control ofGermany was a kind of invisible
occupation.
So all of this is feeding into,you know, the sort of other
elements of crises that Imentioned and, you know,

(08:53):
creating a real feeling amongGermans that their country is
just completely, you know,unmoored and completely a wreck,
and they are dealing with somany different crises at once
and they are dealing with somany different crises at once.

Shawn (09:08):
This economic chaos eroded public confidence in the
Weimar government and createdfertile ground for extremist
political movements.
The political landscape of theWeimar Republic became highly
fragmented.
Germany's proportionalrepresentation system meant that
no single party could achieve amajority in the Reichstag,
leading to a series of unstablecoalition governments.
This political instabilityhindered effective governance

(09:31):
and made it difficult to addressthe very real issues that the
people of Germany were bucklingunder.
Layered on top of that was thefact that the political spectrum
was increasingly polarized,with radical left-wing and
radical right-wing partiesgaining significant support.
The left-wing extremists,primarily represented by the
Communist Party of Germany,sought to emulate the Bolshevik

(09:54):
revolution in Russia.
They organized strikes anduprisings which were violently
suppressed by the governmentwith the help of right-wing
paramilitary groups.
On the right, nationalist andanti-Semitic sentiments
flourished.
Right-wing paramilitary groupsand factions led by Adolf Hitler
capitalized on the public'sdiscontent.

(10:14):
They blamed the Weimarpoliticians, jews and communists
for Germany's misfortunes,promoting the stab-in-the-back
myth which falsely claimed thatGermany had been betrayed from
within during World War I,leading to its ultimate
surrender, and currentconditions.
Dr Peter Fritsche, professor ofhistory at the University of

(10:34):
Illinois and author of the bookHitler's First 100 Days offers
some insight here into the riseof the Nazi party the rise of
the Nazi party.

Dr. Fritzsche (10:50):
The best way to think about the rise of and the
Nazis had many antecedents.
There were all sorts ofproto-fascist movements coming
in and out of German politics inthe mid and the late 1920s.
So if you take the bar graphand see that the Nazis had 2.6
in 1928 and then 18 in 1930 andthen doubled that again in 1932,

(11:11):
you miss the fact that there'sa fertile ground that is
measurable in many, many waysfor a more radical nationalist
movement.
But the Nazis were the mosteffective stewards really of
that larger anti-left but alsoanti-imperial, anti-monarchical

(11:34):
environment.
The best way to describe thesuccess of the Nazis is to look
at the acronym of the party,nsdap, which is National
Socialist German Workers Party.
With this acronym they wereable to say that they were
German but also different.
It was time for some sort ofrevolution, a real revolution, a

(11:58):
genuine revolution, a Germanrevolution in which the
community and larger socialinterests would have priority
over individual interests.
But it would be German, wouldbe within the nation and it
would not flirt in any way,ideologically or otherwise, with

(12:19):
other international movementsor the international order.
After Versailles it waschauvinistically German, with
the addition of the word workers.
They're signaling that it'stime to bring everybody into the
nation.
And workers had not beenintegrated before the revolution

(12:41):
.
And the Nazis even understoodwhy the Social Democrats had
done well.
Initially because theyrepresented the workers who had
no place and no voice.
But the Nazis now offered agenuine integration into the
community, not a worker statebut a German state.
But nonetheless theyunderscored that they were very

(13:04):
anxious to include workers andall Germans, all common Germans,
into their national party.
So they had, you know, invarious degrees, support from

(13:27):
across the board sociologically.
So they were the largestCatholic party outside of the
German Catholic party.
They were the largest workingclass party outside of the
institutional socialist parties.
They had rural and urban andrich and modest incomes.

(13:48):
Now, of course, this was invarious proportions, but they
succeeded where the otherparties did not, in creating a
national front.
That in itself became anadvertisement for what the Nazis
would do.

Shawn (14:04):
While Germany's economy did improve somewhat by the
mid-1920s, this recovery waslargely due to American loans
and investments that came to anabrupt end with the onset of the
Great Depression in 1929.
The global economic downturnled to a severe crisis in
Germany.
Unemployment soared, reachingnearly 6 million by 1932.

(14:26):
And the government's inabilityto address the economic collapse
and the resulting socialdistress further undermined its
credibility.
As economic conditions worsened, the appeal of extremist
parties grew.
The Nazi Party in particulargained traction by promising to
provide jobs and combat theperceived threats of communism

(14:46):
and Jewish influence.
Here's Dr Fritsch again.

Dr. Fritzsche (14:50):
The Nazis also used rhetoric and violence to
suggest that a new era was goingto dawn, and that's the key
term there is the Third Reichthat they were going to turn a
page, not just that, start a newchapter in German history, but
one to come.

(15:11):
They were not looking back andthere's very little in their
appeal that really harks back toa pre-1914 Germany.
So neither their voters nor theprotagonists of the movement
themselves were nostalgic forsome older Germany which was

(15:33):
similarly, which was flawed,basically flawed in its own ways
as well.
But they were going to captureand genuinely realize the
revolution that had never thentaken place, and they would not
allow alien elements or fifthcolumns, or dangerous elements

(15:53):
or those who had criminally andhere are some of the
contradictions, but criminallyfomented revolution in war
caused Germany's defeat.
These elements socialistleaders, democrats, jews would
be punished and segregated fromthe nation.

(16:15):
But otherwise Germany as suchwould come to life as it had
never come to life before,glimpse perhaps during the war
time.
Unity then would beinstitutionalized in a new
chapter of German history andGermany would move forward.
And they were not technophobes,they embraced technology in many

(16:35):
aspects of modern society.
So they're not a backwardmovement and that is basically,
in a nutshell, their appeal.
They did not like being seatedin the far right of the
parliament because they believedthat they were not a far
right-wing party.
They thought that theyrepresented Germany as such.

(16:56):
In fact, they didn't think interms of left and right, they
thought in terms of surface anddepth and for them, the Weimar
Republic was a surface thing andhad been imposed from the
outside and stabilized by theoutside and really didn't
represent Germany, whereas theNazis represented Germans and

(17:18):
would represent them as they hadnever been represented before,
not through kings or anythinglike that, but through the
people and the people's chosenleaders.

Shawn (17:31):
The party's propaganda, skillfully orchestrated by
Joseph Goebbels, exploited thefears and frustrations of the
German populace.
The Nazi party leader, adolfHitler, proved to be a dynamic,
engaging personality thatprovided hope for a better
German future, a return to gloryand pride in a nation that had
been hollowed out.
Dr Hett explains Hitler'sappeal.

Dr. Hett (17:54):
Hitler had some real skills and talents as a
political operator, dr Hett, avoracious reader.
He had a highly retentivememory on certain issues you

(18:16):
know, like military history andmilitary strategy and military
technology.
He read and rememberedeverything and he could sort of
talk on an even keel with hisgenerals about this kind of
thing and his generals wereoften, almost in spite of
themselves, quite impressed byhis grasp of military things he
had.
Hitler had an ability to readpeople, which was quite amazing

(18:39):
and I actually think, quitemysterious in a man who in most
respects was quite cut off fromclose personal contact with
people.
And yet people who knew himwould say this, and you can kind
of see the effects in any casein the historical record that
both on a kind of one-on-onelevel and in the sense of
dealing with a crowd, hitler wasincredibly empathetic to what
people were thinking and feelingand this was a powerful weapon.

(19:01):
Certainly it's a great thingfor negotiations if you can read
the other person really well,and then the other thing Hitler
could deploy is very good actingskills.
So if you were to meet him andhe cared that you came away with
a good impression.
He might not care, dependingwho you were and depending on
the day, but if he wanted tomake a good impression on you,

(19:23):
no matter who you were, he coulddo it, because he would read
you and then he would act to thepart of what he sussed out that
you wanted him to be.
And again we see this.
So many people who really shouldhave known better came away
from a meeting with Hitlerprofoundly impressed, including
seasoned Western democraticstatesmen.
I think to me maybe the mosteye-catching example is the

(19:46):
World War I British PrimeMinister, david Lloyd George,
who was himself an incrediblysavvy, sophisticated, brilliant
political operator, operator whoalso had incredible kind of
radar for people.
Lloyd George went to meetHitler in I think it was 1936,
and came away absolutelyimpressed and he said he is the
George Washington of Germany.
And he was.
Lloyd George was so impressedwith this guy.

Shawn (20:09):
Beyond the political and economic turmoil, social and
cultural factors also played arole in the rise of Nazi Germany
.
The rapid modernization andurbanization of Germany in the
early 20th century created asense of dislocation and
cultural anxiety.
Traditional values and socialnorms were challenged by the
emergence of a more liberal andcosmopolitan society,

(20:31):
exemplified by the culturaldynamism of cities like Berlin.
The Nazis adeptly exploitedthese cultural tensions,
presenting themselves asdefenders of traditional German
values against the perceiveddecadence of the Weimar era.
Their propaganda promoted areturn to a mythical and
homogenous German community,free from the influences of

(20:51):
modernity and foreign elements.
This created deep divides incommunities, as Dr Fritsche
explains.

Dr. Fritzsche (21:00):
The second thing that weakens the republic is the
divide reproduced in everycommunity, in every Protestant
community so that's two-thirdsof Germany, right there between
left and right, betweennationalists, more middle-class
folks and more social democratic, usually working-class folks.
That divide was expressedgeographically in town, in where

(21:24):
people lived and worked, and itwas expressed in social life,
so that there were, so to speak,two singing clubs, two bowling
clubs, two soccer clubs, twochess clubs right down the
divide, and two newspapers intown and some towns two
voluntary fire companies.
So that division meant almostno cooperation between left and

(21:51):
right, even at the communallevel, at the local level, all
the way up to the Reichstag, tothe parliament.

Shawn (22:01):
All of this instability in the Weimar Republic economic,
political, social and culturalculminated in a series of
backroom deals and politicalmaneuvers.
It was amidst this chaos,capitalizing on widespread
discontent and nationalisticfervor, that Adolf Hitler and
the Nazi party came to power.
In the July 1932 elections, theNazis emerged as the largest

(22:25):
party in the Reichstag, securing37.4% of the vote, although
they did not achieve an outrightmajority.
And it's important at thispoint to note that in these 1932
elections, the people ofGermany were not voting for the
Germany they would ultimatelyget.
Dr Fritsch explains.

Dr. Fritzsche (22:44):
This is 1932 or 1933 is the point of comparison.
We're not talking about 1941,with the deportations from the
train stations, and we're nottalking about an invasion of the
Soviet.
Union people in 1932 would nothave voted for those things and
did not believe that no one wastalking in those terms.

Shawn (23:07):
The Reichstag was in a state of chaos after the July
1932 election.
While the election resulted inthe Nazi party securing 230
seats, a plurality, they didn'thave an outright majority and
the political landscape remainedhighly fragmented.
The Social Democrats and theCommunists together held a
significant number of seats, butthey were deeply opposed to

(23:29):
each other, meaning theycouldn't and they wouldn't form
a coalition in opposition to theNazis.
This inability of the variouspolitical factions to cooperate
led to a deadlock.
The Reichstag was unable topass significant legislation or
form a stable government, andthis paralysis further
contributed to the perceptionthat parliamentary democracy was

(23:51):
ineffective and incapable ofaddressing the urgent economic
and social issues facing Germany.
Amidst this turmoil, presidentPaul von Hindenburg and his
advisors tried to stabilize thegovernment by appointing a
series of chancellors, none ofwhom, it would turn out, could
command a majority in theReichstag.
So finally, in January of 1933,underestimating Hitler's

(24:15):
ambitions and believing that hecould be controlled with a
conservative-minded cabinet,hindenburg appointed Hitler as
chancellor.

Dr. Hett (24:23):
Famously.
Hitler tried to carry out acoup d'etat against the
government in 1923, the eventknown as the Beer Hall Putsch
Putsch just being the Germanword for coup d'etat and that
failed.
And it failed because thepolice and the army shut it down
.
And so Hitler took the lessonfrom this and I think it was an
abundantly correct lesson thathe couldn't overthrow the state

(24:46):
from outside.
That he couldn't.
A coup d'etat wouldn't work ina modern state against the army
and the police.
So he decided we do have to gofrom within, and this means we
have to run in elections and wehave to go till we've got a
majority and then can, in asense, do our coup d'etat from
inside once we have a positionin the government.
So then that was the strategythe Nazi party followed,

(25:06):
starting from 1925, early 1925,when Hitler got out of prison,
and for several years it wentnowhere.
Through the 20s they werepolling very badly in national
elections 2.6% in 1928.
They were a real fringe party.
But then came the GreatDepression and that contributed
to the crisis atmosphere andcontributed to their fortunes.

(25:27):
And in 1930, in September 1930,in Reichstag elections they
jumped up to just over 18%, andthen two years later they jumped
up to a little over 37%, whichwas their best showing in a
fully free election, and by thattime they're the largest party
in the Reichstag.
And by that time, because theyare the largest party, they are
becoming interesting to powerfulpeople on the right who are

(25:50):
worried about the communists,who are also gaining vote
strength.
And there are people on theright and here I really mean
some top industrialists and alot of senior military
commanders feel the democracy ofWeimar is really not serving
their interests.
It's much too kind of regulatoryfor business, it's making wages

(26:12):
too expensive and, as far asthe armed forces are concerned,
the democratic parliament justwon't vote enough military
appropriations, and so they wantto really overturn the whole
democratic system and create aright-wing government.
But some of these eliteestablishment conservative
people, while many of themthey're not stupid, they're

(26:33):
quite sophisticated modern menand they know that even a
dictatorship under modernconditions has to have a
substantial popular base.
You can't be a dictator againsta substantial majority of the
population.
It just won't work.
So they want a political anchor, they want a real right-wing
political base, and it lookslike the Nazis might be able to

(26:54):
provide this, and so in a way,the narrative of German politics
.
The whole narrative betweenfall of 1930, let's say, and
early 1933, is the narrative ofa kind of awkward dance between
a conservative establishmentthat wants to co-opt Hitler and
the Nazis and Hitler and theNazis who want to get into power
.
But they need the conservativeestablishment to really open the

(27:17):
door to power for them to makeHitler chancellor, to create
Nazi cabinet ministers, thatkind of thing.

Shawn (27:24):
And once in power, hitler moved quickly to consolidate
his position.
As we touched on at the top ofthis episode, a pivotal moment
came on February 27th 1933.
Dr Head explains thesignificance of the Reichstag
fire and its aftermath.

Dr. Hett (27:41):
Some things about the Reichstag fire are very
controversial.
Some things are notcontroversial.
The things that are notcontroversial are basically that
the fire happened literallyfour weeks to the day after
Hitler had taken office aschancellor and in the context of
an election campaign.
The election was going to besix days later.
The fire is on the Mondayevening, february 27th.

(28:03):
The election is supposed totake place on the following
Sunday.
So this election campaign hasalready been heated and, to some
degree, quite violent, hasalready been heated and to some
degree quite violent.
And then comes the fire andHitler takes the opportunity of
the fire to go to PresidentHindenburg and get something
that Hindenburg can give him,which is basically what we call

(28:24):
in America an executive order.
And the Weimar Constitutiongave the president authority to
use executive orders for almostanything.
If he felt there was anemergency, the president could
do just about anything byexecutive order.
And so Hindenburg issues suchan order, known to history as
the Reichstag Fire Decree, whichreally just kills the whole

(28:47):
democratic constitution ofWeimar.
In one stroke it cuts out allof the key individual rights
which were in that constitution.
You know the basic things likefreedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, freedom of the press,freedom from arrest without
charge, and it also this issometimes overlooked but
critically important it alsogave the national government

(29:08):
Germany was a federal state thenand is now like the United
States.
It gave the national governmentthe authority to take over
state governments if thenational government felt that
state governments weren'tgoverning properly.
So you know, imagine if anAmerican president could just
walk in and take over thegovernment of New York State or
California.
That's in a sense what theReichstag Fire, that's one of

(29:28):
the key powers that theReichstag Fire decree gave
Hitler.
So many scholars think that thisis sort of the transitional
moment where Hitler reallybecomes a dictator.
He was in a fairly weakpolitical position up until that
point.
He was in a cabinet of 11 men,of whom only three were Nazis,
and most observers felt Hitlerwas kind of hemmed in by the

(29:50):
non-Nazi people in the cabinet,by President von Hindenburg,
ultimately by the army, whicheverybody figured would be loyal
to Hindenburg if the chips weredown and there was a clash
between Hindenburg and Hitler.
So he's seen as a weak andprobably transitory figure, and
then the fire and the decreereally make him effectively a
dictator.
That part's uncontroversial.

(30:10):
Who set the fire iscontroversial, and it's much
like the John F Kennedyassassination in the sense that
there's one slightly crazyperson, in this case Marinus
Vandaluba, who was arrested inthe building, kind of like Lee
Harvey Oswald, and Vandalubaclearly had something to do with
the fire.
But whether he was doing it byhimself or was a stooge in

(30:31):
someone else's conspiracy, thatremains controversial.
I've gone on the record withthe—I think it's still a
minority position amonghistorians, but I think it's
gaining solidly—I've gone on therecord with the view that in
fact the Nazis themselves didset the fire as what we might
call a false flag operation togive themselves the pretext to

(30:52):
do the Reichstag fire decree.
There was actually a part twoPeople sometimes sort of mix
these things up but there was apart two in his consolidation of
power, which was an act throughthe Reichstag called the
Enabling Act, which was aseparate thing.
It came in late March and theEnabling Act was a
constitutional amendmentactually which needed a two
thirds vote in the Reichstag andgot it, under which the

(31:13):
Reichstag gave Hitler'sadministration all of the
Reichstag's lawmaking powers forfour years, and so that really
completed the process of himbeing a dictator.

Shawn (31:22):
The Reichstag fire decree suspended civil liberties and
granted the government sweepingpowers.
Its impact was immediate anddevastating.
The fire became the pretext forthe Nazis to dismantle the
fragile democratic structures ofthe Weimar Republic.
With the Enabling Act passedlater in March and the death of
President Hindenburg in 1934,hitler gained absolute

(31:45):
dictatorial powers.
The democratic institutions ofthe Weimar Republic were
systematically dismantled andGermany was transformed into a
totalitarian state.
The entire world would beengulfed in a world war within
seven years and the Holocaustwould commence.
And entire world would beengulfed in a world war within
seven years and the Holocaustwould commence, and the world
would never be the same.
The collapse of the WeimarRepublic and the rise of Nazi

(32:06):
Germany were the result of acomplex interplay of political,
economic, social and culturalfactors.
The harsh conditions imposed bythe Treaty of Versailles,
economic instability andhyperinflation, political
fragmentation and extremism.
The impact of Versailles,economic instability and
hyperinflation, politicalfragmentation and extremism, the
impact of the Great Depressionand the political maneuvering
that brought Hitler to power allcontributed to the demise of

(32:27):
German democracy.
And so, as we look back on thefall of the Weimar Republic and
the rise of Nazi Germany, wehave to ask ourselves could
something like this happen herein the United States, germany.
We have to ask ourselves couldsomething like this happen here
in the United States?
While the context and specificcircumstances differ
significantly, several parallelscan be drawn between the

(32:48):
gradual erosion of Germandemocracy and potential threats
to democratic institutions inthe US today.
In many ways, a Trumppresidency is not the beginning
of democratic backsliding inAmerica.
It's just the next phase and,as I argued on last week's
episode of After America, we'vebeen experiencing such erosion
since at least 2000, when theSupreme Court stopped the

(33:09):
counting of presidentialelection ballots in Florida,
handing the presidency to GeorgeW Bush.
Donald Trump has been explicitabout his authoritarian agenda.
He has said that he would be adictator for day one.
He plans to do mass roundups ofundocumented immigrants and
place them in camps pendingremoval.
He wants to end birthrightcitizenship.

(33:30):
He plans to deploy federaltroops into cities.
He wants to withdraw from NATO.
He plans to repeal anyremaining COVID mandates and
withhold funding from publicagencies, including schools that
ever mandate.
He wants to withdraw from NATO.
He plans to repeal anyremaining COVID mandates and
withhold funding from publicagencies, including schools that
ever mandate mask wearing, andhe wants to weaponize the
federal government, especiallylaw enforcement to target his
rivals.
The conservative think tankHeritage Foundation has also

(33:52):
produced a policy program calledProject 2025 that outlines
initiatives that the nextRepublican administration should
take, primarily throughunilateral executive action.
These include eliminatingfederal agencies, altering
education to be a propagandawing of the Republican Party,
replacing federal civil serviceworkers with loyalists, further

(34:14):
restricting abortion access,codifying Christian principles
in American government and otherradical initiatives to
undermine democracy.
There are striking similaritiesbetween these plans right now
by Trump and the RepublicanParty and the tactics used by
Hitler and the Nazi Party toconsolidate power, fomenting and
creating crises to sow chaosand justify the use of

(34:36):
unilateral power.
Using propaganda and media tospread false narratives and
demonize opponents, manipulatingelections and maneuvering to
entrench minoritarian rulethrough quirks built into the
democratic system.
But do all of thesesimilarities add up to Nazi
Germany?
Is that our future?
Dr Hett provides a perspectiveon the differences between Trump

(34:58):
and Hitler.

Dr. Hett (35:01):
Differences, I think, come under two quite large
categories and you know, onedifference is and we can talk
about this maybe but onedifference would be the
extremely different social andcultural context of 21st century
America as opposed to earlieror mid-20th century Germany.
But just on the two individualpersons and this is actually for
us kind of good news Trump isless alarming than Hitler.

(35:23):
I don't think Donald Trump andI will take a backseat to no one
in my contempt and disgust forthe man, but I would not even
begin to say that he ispossessed by or driven by the
absolutely operatic scale ofevil that Hitler was.
I think there are twooutstanding facts about Trump
that explain almost everythingabout him.
One is that he is absolutelyjaw-droppingly stupid.

(35:45):
He is mind-blowingly stupid.
He has zero ability to absorbinformation and he has no
information in his head like zip.
The other thing is his enormousTexas sized inferiority complex
, which means that he isincredibly vulnerable to either
flattery or praise, flattery orcriticism, and he reacts to

(36:06):
people solely with that as abarometer.
If you say nice things abouthim, he loves you.
If you criticize him, he hatesyou, no matter who you are.
And those two things hisincredible stupidity and his
incredible inferiority complex,I think, literally explain
almost everything the man doesand, in a sense, that makes him
much less threatening thanHitler, because he's so stupid,
he's so weak, he's so vulnerable, he's so incompetent.

(36:26):
I mean, he tried to coup d'etatand he's too incompetent to
make it work.
So you know, were he to becomepresident again, this would be
bad news for American democracy,to be sure.
But I think the bad news wouldbe.
Bad news for American democracy, to be sure, but I think the
bad news would be somewhatmitigated by his extraordinary
incompetence.
The reality is that the optionsfor democratic collapse in the

(36:46):
United States are not limited toeither total democracy or Nazi
Germany, so perhaps we can learnfrom an historical example that
is somewhere between these twoextremes.
Dr Edward Watts, professor ofhistory at the University of
California, San Diego, andauthor of the book Mortal
Republic how Rome Fell intoTyranny, offers some insight
into viewing democracy on aspectrum.

(37:09):
Democracy isn't a binary in theway that we see it when we talk
about Weimar, germany and itstransition to Nazism.
Democracy is instead somethingthat exists on a spectrum, and
so I think a good way toconsider that and understand
that is to look at somethinglike the Economist Democracy
Index, where they have a rankingof all of the world's
governments on a scale of one to10, based on how democratic

(37:33):
they are, and so on one end islike North Korea and on the
other end is somewhere likeNorway, and societies and
countries fall within thatspectrum and, based on
developments in the country,they move in that spectrum
between full democracy, flaweddemocracy, hybrid regime with
some democratic characteristicsand some autocratic

(37:54):
characteristics, all the waydown to something that is a pure
autocracy like North Koreacharacteristics, all the way
down to something that is a pureautocracy like North Korea.
And the Weimar example suggeststhat you can go from 10 to 1
very quickly, and you can, butmost of the time, historically,
democracies don't move like that.
They move slowly and they movekind of across the spectrum, but

(38:20):
not all the way across thespectrum.
And this is where I think Romeis a great example for us to
think with, because the RomanRepublic was never Norway.
It never was a pure and fullyfunctional and fully
representative democracy.
It never was a pure autocracyeither, and so I think what Rome
gives us is a way to betterunderstand what might be
happening in the United States.
It gives us a pattern to showthe progression across that

(38:44):
spectrum, from more free to lessfree, without imagining that
you have to tip all the way toautocracy when a democracy fails
.

Shawn (38:53):
The fall of the Roman Republic and the transition to
the Roman Empire is one of themost significant transformations
in ancient history.
This shift from a democraticrepublic to an autocratic empire
didn't happen overnight, but itwas the result of a combination
of internal weaknesses, socialand economic turmoil and the
ambition of powerful individualsof powerful individuals.

(39:15):
Democratic backsliding in theUnited States, if it continues
to occur, may bear closerresemblance to the fall of the
Roman Republic than to the riseof Nazi Germany.
While the context and specificcircumstances differ
significantly, several parallelscan be drawn between the
gradual erosion of Romandemocracy and potential threats
to democratic institutions inthe United States today.

(39:38):
One key similarity is the issueof economic inequality In Rome.
The expansion of the empirebrought immense wealth, but it
also created significant socialand economic challenges.
The influx of slaves fromconquered territories disrupted
the labor market, leading tohigh unemployment among Roman
citizens.
Small farmers, unable tocompete with the large estates

(40:00):
that used slave labor, wereoften forced to sell their land
and migrate to the cities,particularly Rome, where they
lived in poverty.
The Gracchi brothers, tiberiusand Gaius, were notable
reformers who sought to addressthese issues through land
redistribution and othermeasures.
Dr Watts explains thesignificance.

Dr. Watts (40:22):
Gaius Gracchus does something a little more radical.
He introduces a grain dole,where public money is being used
to provide food support to poorpeople in Rome.
But these are ways ofredirecting resources that are,
in the view of some regularRomans, being overly generously

(40:44):
given to rich people.
There's another angle, too, andthis is, I think, what is quite
interesting.
Poor people could not bythemselves win Roman elections.
There were more poor peoplethan rich people, but the Roman
voting system was structured insuch a way that most of the poor
people's votes didn't count asmuch as those of rich people,

(41:06):
and there are a couple ofreasons for that, but this was
very much by design, and so ifyou actually wanted to win a
Roman election, you couldn't doit by just appealing to poor
people.
You just wouldn't be able towin in that particular electoral
system.
And so what reformers like Gaiusand Tiberius Gracchus are also
able to do is channel thefrustration of wealthy people

(41:31):
who were not super wealthy.
These are the people who, inparticular, feel like the system
is rigged, because they seethat their prospects are not
increasing as dramatically andas quickly as the people who are
very wealthy.
And so what the reformers ofthe 130s and 120s are able to do
is build a coalition of poorpeople who really feel like the

(41:54):
government could do more forthem, and upper middle class to
lower upper class people whofeel like the system is rigged
against their ability toactually compete with the people
who are extremely wealthy.
And so the reformers build acoalition of more or less poor
people who want one thing fromthis reform and relatively rich

(42:16):
people who want a differentthing.
One of them wants benefits, theother more or less just wants
to control the unfettered accessto capital and resources.
That's fueling this wealthinequality.
But that's a very potentcombination because it means
that significant portions of theRoman populace, for different

(42:37):
reasons, no longer believe thatthe republic is working.

Shawn (42:42):
In the US.
Growing income inequality, theerosion of the middle class and
the increasing influence ofmoney in politics are also
pressing concerns.
The wealth gap is beinghighlighted by movements like
Occupy Wall Street and theincreased attention to the 1%
versus the 99%.
These economic disparitiesexacerbate social divisions,

(43:03):
foster populist movements andlead to a sense of
disenfranchisement among largesegments of the population.
Another critical factor in thefall of Roman democracy was the
transformation of the Romanmilitary.
Originally composed of citizensoldiers who served for short
campaigns, the military evolvedinto a professional standing

(43:23):
army.
This change was largely drivenby Gaius Marius, who reformed
the military by recruitinglandless citizens and promising
them land and pensions uponretirement.
These reforms had far-reachingconsequences.
Soldiers became more loyal totheir generals, who could
provide for their future, thanto the state itself.
This shift in loyalty enabledambitious generals to wield

(43:48):
significant political power.
Figures like Julius Caesar usedtheir military successes and
populist appeal to concentratepower populist appeal to
concentrate power.
In the US, the potential forcontinued democratic backsliding
can similarly be fueled bycharismatic leaders who
challenge institutional normsand seek to centralize authority
.
Donald Trump's repeatedchallenges to the legitimacy of

(44:12):
electoral outcomes, particularlyhis refusal to concede the 2020
election, and the subsequentCapitol riot on January 6, 2021,
illustrate how leaders canerode democratic norms and
checks and balances here in theUnited States.
The Roman Republic, as in theUnited States, was characterized
by a complex system of checksand balances designed to prevent

(44:34):
the concentration of power.
However, these very mechanismsbecame sources of political
gridlock and inefficiency.
Dr Watts expounds on this.

Dr. Watts (44:44):
So I think the system of checks and balances in Rome
is more informal than in theUnited States, because Rome
doesn't have a writtenconstitution, so they don't say
specifically yeah, this assemblydoes this to prevent, you know,
this person from oversteppingtheir bounds, but the system is
in some ways, much more robust.
So the basic principle of therepublic is that there is nobody

(45:05):
, unless it's an absoluteemergency, there's nobody who
has power without a colleaguehaving equal power.
So the Supreme Office in theRoman Republic is the consulship
.
There were always two.
They always had equal power,and so what that meant was, you
know, each one could veto theactions of the other.
But it also meant that, if pushcame to shove, one consul had

(45:29):
equal ability to marshal an armyand equal ability to marshal
the resources of the state, andtherefore it would prevent
somebody from trying to seizepower by themselves, because
there was nobody who's going tobe more powerful than somebody
else.
And so this principle of pairedmagistracies was an essential
function of the Republic,because it meant that you had to

(45:51):
compromise, you know, you hadto build consensus, consensus.
And because they served inoffice for such a short period
of time, there was also a sensewhen the Republic was really
functional, that if you had anidea for how to do something,
maybe you could execute it,maybe you could institute a
reform and it would happen.
But if the society wasn't readyfor it, well, your term of

(46:13):
office was up and if youcouldn't build a consensus for
it, then you would step backinto the citizen population and
if it was a good idea, peoplewould keep working on it, and if
it wasn't a necessary ideaanymore, it would go away.
But your contributions, in asense, were things that you did

(46:33):
on behalf of everybody else, andso the system was designed
really to prevent anybody fromdoing anything individually, and
there was a very strongreaction to people who tried to
do too much or who tried to dothings without the support of
their colleagues and without thesupport of a broad segment of

(46:54):
the population.
What happens in the secondcentury is this frustration with
a system that felt like it wasrigged, boils over because it
was so difficult to reachconsensus about what to do.
So people you know begin sayingin the 140s, even this system
doesn't work, like there's areal problem here.
You know, we don't like what'shappening.

(47:15):
We don't like how wealth isbeing divided.
There are people who aresuffering because of this.
We need to do something aboutit, and they begin proposing
reforms.
The first set of reforms areabout voting rights.
They then begin proposing someeconomic reforms, but because of
this process of having to getcolleagues with equal power to

(47:38):
agree with one another, thosereforms don't really go quickly
enough and people becomefrustrated with a system that
just doesn't seem responsive.
It seems gridlocked, and that'swhy they become more open to
entertaining the ideas ofradical people who are claiming
they're going to shake thesystem up and overthrow the
system.
If they can use threats andintimidation to push something

(48:01):
through, they're actually goingto get extremely popular because
they are the ones who were seento do something, and so, in a
way, the Roman system of checksand balances empowers people to
try to challenge that system ofchecks and balances once people
begin to feel like that systemis rigged against them.

Shawn (48:17):
Much like in Rome, the US political system, with its
separation of powers and federalstructure, is designed to
prevent tyranny, but can alsolead to partisan deadlock and
legislative paralysis.
Recent examples includeprolonged government shutdowns
over budget disputes anddifficulties in passing
significant legislation onissues like comprehensive

(48:38):
immigration reform andinfrastructure.
These instances highlight howpolitical gridlock can erode
public confidence in theeffectiveness of democratic
institutions.
The concentration of wealthamong the Roman elite also
created economic disparity,which fueled social unrest and
led to increasing demands forreform.
Julius Caesar used legalavenues to reform and

(49:01):
concentrate power, diminishingthe role of representative
institutions such as the Senate.
Caesar's accumulation of power,his appointment as dictator for
life and his various reformsthat concentrated power in his
hands alarmed many senators.
Caesar's assassination intendedto restore the Republic, but
instead plunged Rome intoanother series of civil wars.

(49:22):
Octavian, caesar's adopted heir, skillfully navigated the
chaotic aftermath of Caesar'sdeath by presenting himself as a
restorer of the public, whilesimultaneously consolidating
power.
Octavian managed to establish anew political order.
Consolidating power, octavianmanaged to establish a new
political order and in 27 BC, hewas granted the title Augustus.

(49:43):
Dr Watts describes Augustus'rise to power.

Dr. Watts (49:46):
So what Augustus did was construct a set of powers
that evolved over time, andthere were tweaks to the
structure, but he assumed a setof powers that were governed by
the institutional prerogativesand the institutional powers of
magistrates that existed in theRoman Republic.

(50:07):
And so, for Augustus, what hesays is you know what?
The Republic is back, we'rehaving elections again, the
Senate meets and debatesimportant events, the Senate
conducts trials.
All of the things that happenedin the Republic are happening
again.
It's just I'm here with thepowers of multiple Republican
magistrates to make sureeverything works well.

(50:29):
Most people, including mostRomans, didn't really buy that,
because it isn't really true.
I mean, augustus did have quitea bit of more power than any
Republican person ever had, butthere were moments during the
Republic when people wereentrusted with this kind of
authority over the state.
So in the 50s BC, the Republicwas suffering from such profound

(50:54):
political violence that theycouldn't conduct elections for
magistrates, and so there wasbasically a lapse in the elected
magistrates and they had tobring in the general, pompey the
Great, to serve more or less asa strongman to bring peace to
the state.
And Pompey did that, and thenPompey held elections.
And so you know, if you want tolook at Augustus and say what

(51:16):
Augustus did ended the Republic,I think you're right.
But Augustus actually has a caseto make where he says what I
did was done before.
I'm just doing it for longer.
But you struggle to find aparticular date that really
purely works for the fall of theRoman Republic.
You know, because what Augustustried to do was not set up

(51:38):
North Korea.
What he tried to do was set upsomething like, say, hungary,
where it is a hybrid regime,where you have elements of
autocracy but you also havecontinued elements of democracy
existing in certain structuresand in certain controlled ways,
so that people are able tocontinue to exercise their

(51:59):
voices in a sort of meaningfulcontext, in a political
environment.

Shawn (52:03):
In the United States, similar legal avenues and
reforms can be used to underminedemocracy and consolidate
authoritarian power.
Examples include the strategicuse of gerrymandering to create
electoral advantages, theimplementation of restrictive
voting laws thatdisproportionately affect
minority communities, and thepoliticization of judicial

(52:23):
appointments.
The refusal to considerPresident Obama's Supreme Court
nominee, merrick Garland, in2016, followed by the rapid
confirmation of Amy ConeyBarrett in 2020, highlights how
judicial appointments can beweaponized for partisan gain.
All of these factors in Romecumulatively and gradually
eroded and undermined democracyuntil it eventually collapsed.

(52:45):
Dr Watts explains the finalstages of this process.

Dr. Watts (52:49):
When the republic stops working, it's largely
because magistrates beginbuilding power in ways that
cannot be constrained by thosestructures within the republic,
and people within the republicstart acquiring more resources
and more property in a fashionthat doesn't look like it is

(53:11):
lawful and just, and so peoplebegin to suspect that the
republic isn't functioningaccording to their wishes and
instead it seems like it'sbroken.
And this is what ultimatelyleads to the very long,
century-long process throughwhich Romans become frustrated
with their republic and startbeing willing to entertain ideas

(53:35):
of leaders who try to assertpower outside of the structures
of that republic.
And when they do that, whatthey're doing in essence is
breaking that compact.
You know, the power thatthey're exercising is not power
entrusted to them by the entirecollective of citizens.
It's instead power that theyhave taken based on the backing

(53:58):
of some citizens.
And so, ultimately, I think thedecline of the Republican
system is a sort of complicateddynamic between the structures
of the state, the desires ofindividuals and the frustrations
of segments of the citizenpopulation that feel like the
basic compact that's governingthe republic is no longer

(54:21):
holding.

Shawn (54:26):
Gradual democratic backsliding is more insidious
than a rapid coup.
Its incremental nature allowsit to evade immediate detection
and resistance.
As democratic norms andinstitutions erode slowly,
citizens often fail to recognizethe extent of the deterioration
until it's too late.
This slow degradation cannormalize undemocratic practices

(54:50):
, making them harder to reverse.
People become accustomed tosmall losses of freedom and
democratic norms, making itdifficult to mobilize against
the cumulative effect.
Gradual backsliding alsomaintains a veneer of legitimacy
.
Autocrats often keep theappearance of democratic
processes like elections andjudicial proceedings, while

(55:11):
subverting their integrity.
This facade confuses citizens,making it harder to recognize
the authoritarian shift.
A rapid coup, in contrast, isblatant and typically triggers
immediate condemnation andresistance.
Moreover, gradual backslidingexploits and deepens existing
societal divisions.
By undermining democratic norms, leaders can manipulate the

(55:34):
media, the judiciary andelectoral systems to consolidate
power.
This often involves subtlechanges like restricting press
freedom, limiting judicialindependence and
disenfranchising voter groups,collectively weakening the
democratic fabric and creating apolarized society less capable
of unified resistance.
In essence, gradual democraticbacksliding is stealthy.

(55:57):
It maintains a guise oflegitimacy, deepens societal
divisions and erodes public willto resist, leading to a more
entrenched form ofauthoritarianism, more so than
the shock overthrow ofdemocratic governance in Nazi
Germany, the fall of the RomanRepublic.
The gradual collapse ofdemocracy may more closely
resemble what democratic erosioncould look like in the United

(56:19):
States, driven by structuralweaknesses, economic and social
inequalities, powerfulindividuals and the erosion of
civic norms.
These factors are all presentin American politics today, with
growing income disparity,increasing political
polarization, the outsizedinfluence of money in politics
and a decline in public trusttoward democratic institutions.

(56:42):
Donald Trump, a populist andcharismatic leader with
authoritarian tendencies,mirrors some of these historical
precedents.
However, history doesn't repeatitself exactly.
It can offer context, a roadmapand lessons, sure, but the
future is not predetermined.
Unexpected events can changeoutlooks and prospects.

(57:02):
Historical precedents can,however, help us identify
warning signs, and right nowthey're going off everywhere.
Check back next Sunday forepisode four of After America.