April 13, 2025 • 53 mins
American democracy is crumbling. The Republican Party, once defined by traditional conservatism, has transformed into a vehicle for Trumpism, while Democrats struggle to maintain their coalition after unexpected losses. Dr. Hans Noel, Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University, and co-author of the book Political Parties, joins the pod to explain the complex forces reshaping our political landscape.
According to Dr. Noel, while we're not experiencing a complete political realignment, significant shifts are occurring beneath the surface. The Republican Party hasn't abandoned conservative principles but has dramatically changed its emphasis - elevating immigration concerns and national identity while making loyalty to Trump personally a defining characteristic. Meanwhile, Democrats face their own identity crisis as working-class voters, once their reliable base, become increasingly divided.
Gender matters here - and is critical dimension in this political transformation. Trump's aggressive masculinity appeals strongly to male voters across demographic groups, while Democrats attempt to counter with an alternative vision centered on care and inclusivity. This represents not merely an electoral calculation but a genuine values difference between the parties.
The consequences for democracy are profound. When citizens become so frustrated with politics that they're willing to abandon basic democratic principles, the entire system becomes vulnerable. Dr. Noel maintains cautious optimism about democracy's long-term resilience but acknowledges the medium-term outlook appears concerning: "Long-term, Germany is a thriving democracy that went through a very tough period. In the medium term, including the rest of my lifetime, things could be really ugly."
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Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
long-term.
Germany today is a thrivingdemocracy and has a lot of
success and it went through verytough period, right.
So you know it's it's likelong-term it could, could still
be in.
In the medium term, includinglike the rest of my lifetime
things could be really, reallyugly.
I think that there are a lot ofpeople who are so frustrated
(00:20):
with politics that they'rewilling to give up basic
democratic principles like youknow, congressional
representation and they don'trespect the role that those
things play.
They don't understand the rolethat that plays and we don't do
a very good job of defendingthat.
So things I mean right nowthings look pretty, pretty grim
(00:56):
pretty grim.
Speaker 2 (00:56):
Welcome to Deep Dive with me, sean C Fettig.
American politics is clearly atsome type of crossroads.
The Republican Party, oncesynonymous with traditional
conservatism, has been reshapedinto a vehicle for Trumpism,
blending populism, nationalismand an unrelenting loyalty to
its figurehead, donald Trumphimself.
At the same time, theDemocratic Party finds itself
(01:17):
adrift, grappling with internaldivisions about how to approach
the Trump presidency andstruggling to define a cohesive
vision.
What the Democratic Party isafter losses in the 2024
election.
All of this matters because, aswe're living through and
experiencing right now, theweaker the parties are, the less
(01:38):
able they are to act as abulwark against the rise of
authoritarianism under DonaldTrump.
Today's guest is Dr Hans Knoll,associate Professor of
Government at GeorgetownUniversity, leading expert on
political parties in Americandemocracy and co-author of the
book Political Parties.
He's here to help answer somequestions like how did Trump
(02:00):
consolidate his grip on the GOPand transform it into an
extension of his MAGA movement?
Why are Democrats unable torally around a clear strategy or
leader, and what does this meanfor the country?
Could this political alignmentoffer an opportunity for renewal
, or are we truly witnessing theunraveling of democratic norms
and democracy itself?
(02:21):
All right, if you like thisepisode or any episode, please
give it a like, share and followon your favorite podcast
platform and or subscribe to thepodcast on YouTube.
And, as always, if you have anythoughts, questions or comments
, please feel free to email meat deepdivewithshawn at gmailcom
.
Let's do a deep dive dot com.
Let's do a deep dive, dr Noel,thanks for being here.
(02:51):
How are you?
Speaker 1 (02:52):
I'm doing great.
Speaker 2 (02:59):
Thanks for having me Absolutely so.
A lot of focus on party ID andpartisanship over the past
decade has really been on theevolution of the Republican
Party into one that is whollyTrumpist, largely MAGA.
But there does seem to be ashift in the Democratic Party as
well, and I think we sawglimmers of that in the
2015-2016 race that BernieSanders was really exposing a
rift in the Democratic Partythat was probably, in retrospect
, more enduring than perhaps weall realized at the time, and
(03:22):
this past election shows justhow real shifting alliances and
identification seem to be in ourpolitics, and I guess it
remains to be seen how permanentthis realignment is.
But the reality is that it'snot limited to the Republican
Party and it is impacting ourentire country, and I want to
work our way through, you know,the impact or the form that this
is taking within each of theparties, but perhaps before we
(03:43):
even get there impact or theform that this is taking within
each of the parties, but perhapsbefore we even get there we
should just, you know, establishwhether or not you think that
there actually is some type of arealignment that we're living
through and, if so, what theimpact is that it might be
having on our politics.
Speaker 1 (03:58):
Yeah, sure, that's a really good place to start.
I mean, the concept of arealignment in political science
is, you know, sometimes prettyprecise and we talk about, you
know, that there's this majorchange of groups that are in the
parties, moving from one partyinto the other, or what the
parties stand for is changing.
Realignment of the RepublicanParty from the, you know,
(04:27):
lincoln era, when the party wasmainly about ending slavery and
then other things, to today whenthe party is principally the
party that is most embracing of,say, the Confederate flag or
symbols of the old South, thatkind of realignment, no, I don't
think we're seeing somethingquite that big.
But I also think politicalscience like saw some really big
moments in the past and said,oh, like, these are really big
shifts and so we have thisreally high bar for what it
(04:47):
amounts to as a realignment.
What I think we're seeing nowis there are some, you know,
more gradual shifts.
The two parties remain the twoparties.
Much of what they stand forremains very similar.
There's more of a shift infocus than in you know, any
actual, you know things thatthey care about or switching
sides on policies.
Some, but not mostly, and sobroadly.
(05:09):
The coalitions are similar, butvoters are, you know, new
generation of voters areresponding to those coalitions a
little bit differently, andthere's some other changes, and
so there are some very gradualchanges and of course it's hard
to know where those are going.
And so I do think there'ssomething happening under the
surface, but it's not the kindof realignment where we're going
to say in 20 or 30 years wehave completely new parties.
Speaker 2 (05:32):
So one of the narratives about what's happened
with the Republican Party, ifwe start with them, is that
they've been completely reshapedand reformed into being
essentially sycophantic Trumpist, and that it is divorced from
and I guess this cuts a littlebit against what you've just
said, so maybe we need to diginto the nuance here but it's
divorced from the traditionalkind of conservative
(05:56):
identification that sitscomfortably within the
Republican Party, that hasbecome much more populist and
nationalist that it's, that it'smoved away from being elite
driven which in and of itselfthis last point isn't
necessarily a bad thing but thatit's become something that is
not at all characteristic ofwhat it used to be.
So I guess I'm wondering how wewould characterize the current
(06:17):
identity of the Republican Party, and if you say that it is
largely built of the samecomponents, then how does that
comport with this narrative?
Speaker 1 (06:26):
Yeah, well, I mean, I think that the narrative is
true that there is a generalshift in the last you know
decade or so towards Trumpismand whatever Trump stands for,
but the underlying, you know,material that Trump is working
with is still Republican,conservative policies, and so
(06:48):
one way to think about that is,like you know, conservatives
tended to be very, you know, profree trade and Trump is not
right.
So there's a reversal there.
But it is still the case thatthe kinds of policies Trump is
advancing are fiscalconservative let's not spend too
much money, let's, you know,give not, have, not have tax
policies that are especiallypunitive on the rich, these
(07:10):
kinds of things that were, youknow, republican principles
before.
And some of his argument abouttariffs even is not so much
about I'm going to want toimplement tariffs to change, you
know, and bring back, you know,lots of support for working
class jobs although that is partof what he says but also
building American industry ingeneral, top to odds with the
(07:34):
past Republican coalition.
But it doesn't seem likethere's this, like you know,
completely new group of people.
It is the case that mostactivists look at Trump and say
that's where the RepublicanParty is and that's what
(07:55):
conservatism is.
And so if you ask them like, whois more conservative, they'll
say that Trump favoringpoliticians are more
conservative, even if they aremore or not more conservative on
sort of more traditional thingslike, say, free trade, but that
that shift is more about inputemphasis.
It used to be thatconservatives some conservatives
(08:15):
were really concerned aboutimmigration and national
identity, and Trump has takenthat as one of the elements of
the Republican Party and put itright at the top.
The other big thing that Trumphas shifted the Republican Party
about is about himself, hispersonal policy questions like
you know his own legalchallenges and his, you know his
, how much power he should haveand those kinds of things.
(08:37):
And that's not really that wildto have a party backing their
own president on those kind ofpersonal things.
It's just Trump has a lot ofthem and he really does push
them hard.
And there are very fewpoliticians who are defecting in
the way that, say, manyDemocrats defected from Clinton
during the Lewinsky scandal.
Speaker 2 (08:57):
Mm.
Hmm, you know, often the theconstruction or the structure of
a party is the reflection ofsome strike of a balance between
elites within the party andtheir representation of what
they believe the RepublicanParty or conservatism should be
balanced against what theRepublican or conservative
(09:19):
electorate is hoping that theparty is.
And we're living through a timewhere it feels as if Trump
embodies the entirety ofRepublican identity.
And I think one argument isthat some evidence of this is
the fact that Republicans inCongress are ceding a lot of
control to Trump as opposed toexerting some of their own.
(09:42):
And I think the argument hereis that if they felt like they
had their finger on the pulse ofthe Republican Party at the
electorate level, that theywould feel a bit more empowered
to flex some of that muscle inCongress, but that they're
instead being a bit reflexive.
And I wonder if that is asignifier that the Republican
Party at the elite level inCongress isn't quite sure who or
(10:03):
what the Republican Party atthe electorate level is and is
just taking their cues fromTrump.
Speaker 1 (10:09):
Yeah, I mean, I think that's that's right, and maybe
not just taking them from Trump,but using what they've learned
from Trump's success to tellsomething about what what
Republican voters want.
And so it used to be, forinstance, that the argument was
that, you know, republicans usedsocial issues and populist
(10:29):
appeals to try to bring aroundvoters and then turn around and
they would vote for, you know,economic policies that benefit
the wealthy and business owners.
I mean, to some degree that'sstill happening, because Trump
is OK with policies in somecases that help big businesses.
Trump is okay with policies insome cases that help big
businesses, but exactly whatkind and how far that's going to
go and whether or not youreally want to fully embrace it
(10:50):
is something that a lot ofRepublican leaders are now
saying.
Well, you know, maybe we don'tneed to or we shouldn't go
towards some of these moretraditional conservative
economic policies, because we dowant to get this growing
working class element in ourparty, and that means you know
policies that are orientedtowards helping the working
(11:12):
class, but you'll notice thatthe way they talk about it still
is.
You know, unions are still theproblem right, and we want to
embrace working class votersthat are not in unionized jobs
and we want to have lessgovernment and saying that it's
government policies that aremaking problems for the working
class.
So there's a lot of continuityin the kinds of issues and it's
(11:35):
more you know the places wherethere is a shift.
Trump is showing that that'smore electorally successful
that's more electorallysuccessful.
Speaker 2 (11:46):
So if we look at this through the lens of history, I
guess I want to take head on, ordiscuss head on, this argument
that the Republican Party in itscurrent configuration is an
existential threat to democracyin the United States, and I
think there are probablyelements of our politics
generally that could lay to thatargument.
But I do wonder, if we look atthis through, like I said, the
(12:07):
lens of history and theevolution of parties and party
ID and shifts in alignments andrealignments if this is
something that we could expectto see at any given time you
know, the politics that we'reliving through are something
that we could expect to see atperiods of time in which there
are alignments, or if there areelements here that are truly
concerning.
Speaker 1 (12:28):
I think there's a mix of things and then maybe
there's like four levels ofthings that we want to think
about when we talk about likethreats to democracy and that
often get lumped together,especially for Democrats who see
this threat.
I mean, first there's just alot of policies that Democrats
don't like and they think, youknow, make us a different
country than they want to have,and those are not.
(12:48):
I mean, that's differentdisagreements and maybe the
Democrats are right about howimportant those policies are,
but that's not about lack ofdemocratic representation.
That's just a policy difference.
There's also some policydifferences that are more
fundamental about citizenshipand what it means to be an
American.
That I'd sort of call, you know, illiberal policies that some
(13:10):
of the Republicans are advancingand those I think people have a
reasonable connection to.
If you start saying certainkinds of people don't belong
here, that used to belong here,then that can be sort of eroding
of the notion of Americanidentity and therefore erodes,
you know, the republic and ourlogic of democracy.
But it's still not exactly athreat directly to democracy.
(13:30):
It's a threat to something likewhat kind of democracy we're
going to be.
And then there's, you know,things that are like, I think
threats to sort ofconstitutional order and the
rule of law, where you know theConstitution says that Congress
gets to decide how we spendmoney and what agencies are
going to exist, and yet Trumpseems to be saying, no, he gets
(13:52):
to decide what those things aregoing to be and he's signing and
issuing executive orders thatyou know sort of invade on
Congress's territory and thelike, and so that starts to get
to be like well, you know that's, you know it's not strictly
undemocratic in that you know hewas democratically elected, so
that's the case.
(14:12):
But our, you know, democracyisn't just or is there voting
going on, but you know we have asystem that is based on, you
know, checks and balances andconstitutional order of who gets
to make these kinds ofdecisions.
And there's a threat there andI think that's pretty, pretty
legitimately a concern.
And then there are, finally,there are some things that seem
(14:34):
to like actually undermine theability of the country to have
democratic elections, and that's.
There are a lot of elements inthe Republican coalition's views
about democracy that democracyscholars worry about.
So there's a really excellentbook by Jacob Grumbach, which I
just happened to be reading withmy students, called
(14:57):
Laboratories Against Democracy,and his argument is that because
politics at the national levelhas gotten so polarized,
national parties now are shapingstate party policy on in many
different ways, includingespecially in how democracy is
run.
So things like you know whetheror not you have early voting or
who's allowed to vote, or youknow absentee, how absentee
(15:20):
ballots are handled, or whetheryou have mail in ballots, and
all those kinds of things, andhe builds a scale out of that
that talks about like howdemocratic or you know how good
for democracy are each state'spolicies, and he shows that in
states that have Republicans incontrol there's less democratic,
less of what he calls democracy.
(15:40):
Now it's worth noting that hisscale is a scale that gives you
points for having you know earlyvoting and mail-in voting and
would take away from howdemocratic it is if you have you
know voter ID laws and otherrestrictions, which Republicans
would say no, those areempowering our democracy.
But I think a lot of you knowsort of scholars of democracy
(16:02):
would say that the Republicanview on what is empowering
democracy and what is not is isincorrect.
And so then that does like OK,that does look like it's a
threat, but it's a threat that'sgot an ideological component to
it of Republicans thinking thatthese things that other people
think are democracy actuallyaren't.
Speaker 2 (16:20):
So let's switch and talk a little bit about the
Democratic Party and before wedig into the party today and
what it might be struggling with, I prefaced in the preamble
this idea that maybe BernieSanders was a warning sign to
the structure of the DemocraticParty in 2015, 2016 in a way
(16:41):
that the party didn't takeseriously, 2016 in a way that
the party didn't take seriously,but I don't want to posit that
as a fact.
So I guess I'm wondering if youthink that was a moment that
suggests the party was losingtouch with a certain segment of
its base, or if there'ssomething else that we could
point to.
Speaker 1 (16:55):
So I think I mean there's a lot of different
cleavages within both parties.
American parties are coalDemocrat and then the sort of
more, you know, educated, youknow like sort of more white
(17:24):
collar type Democrat, is not new, but the degree to which
Democratic policy had moved,democrat policy priorities,
democratic Party priorities, thedegree to which Democratic
Party priorities had sort ofshifted to more cultural issues,
things that are not the sort ofbread and butter for union
(17:45):
members of working class, thathad been happening, it is real.
Some of it's because it's hardto make changes in the economic
policy and it might be easier tomake changes on the civil
rights front.
Some of it's because of thedecline in union membership,
which means that the power ofunions within politics in
general and also within theDemocratic Party is weakening.
(18:06):
And so I don't think it's truethat the Democratic Party was
just ignoring that this washappening, but it had been
happening and there was a trendin that direction and Sanders
caught onto it and emphasized it.
There's a certain aspect of whenyou start to make an issue out
of a cleavage like this andhighlight it in this way and use
the kind of rhetoric that youknow politicians who are would
(18:28):
have been like, yeah, thatDemocratic Party is probably the
better party for us and they'renot doing as much as we'd like,
but that's our party.
And then Sanders says, oh well,the Democrats don't care about
you.
And then afterwards they'relike, oh, maybe the Democrats
(18:49):
don't care about me.
And then they start thinking,oh well, what else does?
And they see Trump there.
I don't want to blame Sandersper se, but like that this comes
up and then it starts to likeshape people's views of what the
party stands for and adifferent reaction of the
Democratic Party that moreembraced some of the elements of
Sanders policies although it'sworth noting that not all of his
(19:10):
things, you know both, makesense or necessarily better for
the working class but embracesome of that like appeal might
have forestalled some of thoseshifts in working class voters
towards the Republican Party.
It's also worth noting that,while there is a shift on this,
this cleavage is real and thereare a lot of working class
voters who are now thinking oflooking elsewhere.
(19:32):
It's not the case that, like,working class voters are now a
solid Republican bloc.
It's that they're more divided,which they didn't used to be.
Speaker 2 (19:43):
So if we look at the Democratic Party today, you know
the story is that the party isadrift, it's in the wilderness,
it's vulnerable and it's weak.
And I think there was a moment,after the you know Supreme Court
struck down Roe v Wade, thatthe Democratic response in that
election year was to runessentially against, at least in
(20:04):
part against that SCOTUSdecision, and there was a
concern in the back of my mindthat this wasn't a proactive
agenda, this was more of areactive agenda and that that
wasn't sustainable.
And I think in this lastelection it felt much the same
to me that the Democrats wererunning on a reactive agenda and
not a proactive agenda.
(20:24):
And I wonder if that helpsexplain where they are now in
that, between 2015, whathappened in that election, and
now that the Democratic Partyhasn't really figured out how to
develop a proactive agenda.
But I also wonder if that mightbe ignoring some of the work
that doesn't get enoughattention that came out of the
Biden administration.
And so the question here reallyis like what do you think is
(20:47):
happening with the DemocraticParty right now?
Speaker 1 (20:51):
Yeah, I think some of that like broadly speaking,
that narrative probably has sometruth to it, but I do think
that it overstates a lot ofthings, which is, I mean, that's
the conventional wisdom, but itoverstates a lot of things.
Um, I think the first thing isthat we tend to look at things
like oh, now the Democrats areadrift and they're in disarray
and this is where we are today,but, um, you know, they just
lost an election.
Uh, meanwhile, everyone wassaying something very similar
(21:13):
about the Republican party twoyears ago when, after SCOTUS
decision on abortion,Republicans did much, much less
well than you would haveotherwise expected in that
condition, and people thoughtRepublicans were also doing, had
taken a blow in 2020, but nowit was like, oh, it's really a
(21:35):
blow.
But of course, you go back to2016 and then we're back in the
same place where, like, how didthey possibly lose this election
?
And Democrats are unsure how tomanage this new shift in what
the party stands for, what the,what the working class wants and
all these things.
And in fact, if you go backpretty much in the like year or
so after every election, youknow the losing party is, you
(21:56):
know, sort of panic, trying toto figure out what to do and how
to how to regain their position.
Sometimes the good strategiescome out of that, Sometimes they
don't, and so some of that'sjust normal right behavior.
Right, we're just had anelection, and so the democratic
party is, in fact, trying tofigure out how to react to the
2024 loss and how to buildsomething going forward, and so
(22:18):
that's just like that happens.
I also think it's true that in2022, the Roe v Wade issue did
help Democrats.
I don't think it was the onlything that helped Democrats, but
I think it was.
It did help them and I think,on balance, it was probably also
a good issue for 2024.
It's just that, you know, itwas now into the past a little
(22:39):
bit and it wasn't, you know, itwasn't very proactive, as you
say.
It was like reacting tosomething that was now several
years into the past, and I thinkthe Democratic Party does need
to figure out a way toreestablish its brand and it's
working to do that.
But that's like sort of likethe natural thing.
It's what the Republicans feltlike they needed to do after
2012.
(22:59):
They needed to reestablishtheir brand.
They said they were going to doit by backing off of some of
the immigration issues.
Instead, they know that's notwhat ended up happening and it
turns out embracing immigrationeven more forcefully turned out
to be politically effective.
But of course, a lot of thevariation in what happens in the
elections is beyond the party'sdirect control anyway.
Happens in the elections isbeyond the party's direct
(23:23):
control anyway.
You know, the COVID event shookup incumbents and it shook
incumbents across the world.
And so I'm not I don't want tosay this, you know absolves
Biden or the Bidenadministration for any
responsibility for what they did.
I think there were a lot ofpolicy moves that they could
have done.
Maybe that would have beenbetter, but they've got to do
this in sort of the.
You know, in the context ofthese bigger shifts that
(23:43):
sometimes there's nothing thatcan be done about them.
But then afterwards we drawstories based on what happened.
That may or may not be true,and then of course they become
self-reinforcing if we decidethat this is what happened and
therefore the party has tochange and therefore it tries to
change and it struggles and etc.
Speaker 2 (24:02):
This might be more of an observation than a question,
but I have been somewhatfascinated in the Democratic
response this election, thispast election, particularly
because it's not like it was ablowout.
This election was won for theRepublican Party by a one and a
half point margin and Democratsdid pick up in the House.
(24:24):
They lost in the Senate, butagain, that wasn't a blowout.
So I'm a little surprised athow existential the Democratic
Party seems to be taking thispast election.
So maybe this is a bit removedfrom your research per se, but
it's surprising to me that theDemocratic Party is reacting
this way, where and I think theydo have an actual they do have
(24:44):
some footing to fight back.
And I wonder if this is more asa result of what seems like
momentum on the Republican Partyside or if they might be seeing
something in the tea leavesthat I'm just missing.
Speaker 1 (24:59):
Well, I think you're right that it means it's
definitely an incredibly closeelection and yet the you know
sort of the way we talk about itis that oh, it was this huge
change, and I think in the backof a lot of people's minds as
well.
But okay, in two years or infour years there'll be another
election and maybe then, youknow, that'll be the chance to
have some change.
And it's just, you know, itfeels existential, because two
(25:20):
years is a long time, especiallywith an administration that is
doing so much, so quickly thatyou know, seems threatening.
It'd be something else if theadministration was just sort of
like you know, puttering alongthe way that oftentimes they do
in a you know sort of polarizedgridlock kind of policy setting.
(25:41):
But I think part of it is thatthis sort of story of that
there's chaos feeds on itself.
I mean, the first half of ourconversation was all about
there's this chaos, and sothat's what we're saying, and
everybody else is saying thatI'm sure that there are some
Democratic Party leaders in factthis may explain why it seems
like Democrats are not doingvery much who are like we'll, we
(26:02):
have to tough it out, but ourbrand will bounce back,
especially after a year of Trumpand Doge and all the chaos
that's happening.
But there's not an electionright now.
So what we just have to do is,you know, start to build and
plan ahead and maybe keep ourpowder dry, and then we'll jump
out in a year with this tacticand then that looks like
(26:24):
paralysis and lack of direction.
But it is also true that thereis a lot of different direction
that different Democrats want tohave, and when you're in this
moment of I don't know whichdirection to go, then that
empowers people to say let'spush it in my direction.
So that's why you're hearingthese like here's the abundance
agenda, let's make that be ourthing.
No, we need to embrace a more,you know, progressive, bolder,
(26:50):
bernie Sanders style directionof the party or whatever.
And those are fights that arealways going to be in the
background, but they're nowforeground because there's not
much else for the party to do tobe in the background, but
they're now foreground becausethere's not much else for the
party to do.
Speaker 2 (27:06):
One of the arguments that Democrats in the Democratic
Party often give when they'reon the losing side in an
election is that they're a bigtent party.
They have a lot of people toplease, a lot of groups to
please a lot of constituenciesin a way that the Republican
Party doesn't.
But in this past election, whilewe might not be seeing a
wholesale realignment amongstthe electorate or within the
electorate, it is true that theRepublican Party does seem to be
(27:26):
benefiting from a shift in votefrom some percentage of working
class voters and voters ofcolor away from the Democrats,
and it remains to be seen ifthat's enduring, if that's
personality based, if that is,you know, ideologically based,
so that you know that's all tocome.
But if that's true, it suggeststhat the Republican Party might
(27:47):
also be inheriting the sameproblem that the Democratic
Party had, if we buy thisargument that the big tent is a
difficult tent to make happy,and so that there are
vulnerabilities in thiscoalition for the Republican
Party, and so that there arevulnerabilities in this
coalition for the RepublicanParty, and so that's one thing I
think we could talk about.
But I think the thing furtherdown the road is that if the
(28:08):
Democratic Party remains to somedegree a big tent party and the
Republican Party is alsobuilding a coalition, that makes
it a big tent party.
If that also suggests that weare in for a tumultuous period
of time, as both parties arereally struggling to keep their
constituencies happy in a waythat at least the Republican
Party maybe didn't have to soextensively in the past.
Speaker 1 (28:32):
Yeah.
So I think generally that weshould, we should think of both
parties as big tent parties andthat they always have been, they
have to be, because, uh, wehave only two and they're both
trying to get majorities.
So, like in the in the sort ofpeak pre-trump period, when
we're talking about sort of likeyou know, um, george w bush and
mccain and romney, like therepublican party was, you know,
(28:55):
they talked about the republicanparty as this three-legged
stool and it had the socialconservatives and the economic
and fiscal conservatives and ithad the you know foreign policy
hawks.
And these three differentgroups, you know, oftentimes
didn't have very much at all todo with each other.
They were a big tent and, infact, as one of the things that
Trump had discovered was thatthis tent, you know, didn't have
(29:16):
people who were embracing allof those, those legs of the
stool that the socialconservative folks who were had
sort of like this America first,let's protect our interests.
Less immigration, we want tohave a more.
It's a particular picture ofwhat it means to be American,
which for some people is white,but also for some people,
(29:39):
whether it's whatever the raceis, it still has a particular
set of values and views what itmeans to be American, and that
that was what matters.
And fiscal conservatism andfree trade and some of the
foreign policy hawkishness noneof that.
That stuff didn't matter asmuch to those people, and maybe
they didn't even like it, and soTrump managed to appeal to this
(29:59):
um by dropping some of thepieces of the republican big
tent, but meanwhile those piecesare still there, um, and
without them, you're not, he'snot going to win, he's just he's
managed to amplify this otherpart of the story.
So I do think that, though, ifthere's more working class
voters is becoming major, morepart of the republican coalition
, then yeah, there's moreworking class voters is becoming
a major, more part of theRepublican coalition, then yeah,
(30:20):
there's going to need to besome delivery on that.
There's going to need to bepolicies that actually it's one
thing to say.
Well, the Republic Democratsare not doing a good enough job
and they're letting inflationhappen and wages aren't growing.
So see, look they're.
They say they're your friend,but they're not.
It's something else to then goa term without actually
delivering anything to thatgroup, and so some of them won't
go in that direction.
(30:41):
I think the other thing to noteis you know, when it comes to
voters of color, there's a shiftthere and I think some of it's
just that you know many, manyvoters who are, especially as we
make, you know, sort ofprogress on racial issues.
You know they're the issues are.
You know, other issues matterto them more.
A lot of Black voters aresocially conservative and
conservative in other ways.
They voted the Democratic Partybecause it's been a part of
(31:04):
sort of what it means to be aBlack American.
But that is breaking down,perhaps, especially for younger
voters and non-white voters, forwhom their racial identity is
really important.
That is continues to be howthey vote.
(31:26):
The other elements in theworking class is more
complicated in that, you know,it depends a little bit on how
you define the working class.
We used to sort of think aboutit as just sort of like an
income level thing, butobviously that's not quite right
and you know, there's a lot ofyou know working class voters
who you know make quite a lot ofmoney and maybe run small
businesses but didn't go tocollege and don't think of
(31:47):
themselves as elite or, you know, well-to-do or in the elite
part of the country.
And so there's this like notionof a you know, lap clock, laptop
class versus the you know realworking class.
And some of that isn't aboutincome at all, and I think it's
actually not, you know, withanalyses that focus on that and
say see, look, you know, theseare the haves and have nots are
(32:09):
wrong, but it is a real culturaland social difference.
And so there's a kind ofworking class appeal that
Republicans have and theDemocrats seem to have lost in
embracing academic ideas and youknow all the things that get
labeled woke.
And so Democrats are now havingto hold that coalition together
(32:29):
, and I think Republicans willnow also have to try to hold
that coalition together, and itmay be that the working class
voters become increasingly aswing group in the way that they
hadn't been.
And then, of course, thatpresumably means both parties
are going to try to compete forthem, and that might actually
work out to their advantage.
Speaker 2 (32:47):
Who knows?
I suppose there's anothercleavage here that might be
explaining this a bit more butalso might suggest that this is
maybe more of an enduring issue,and that is the male-female
cleavage.
The Democratic Party has alwaysbeen cast as being weaker kind
of across the board and theRepublican Party has always been
(33:09):
.
I mean, this is obviously anoversimplification, but the
Republican Party is cast asbeing stronger kind of across
the board and as long as that'sbeing cast or molded and shaped
along the male-female divide, Ido wonder if this last election,
if it reflects that, suggeststhat it will be more difficult,
(33:32):
if this image holds or thischaracterization holds, for
Democrats to attract the malevote back from the Republican
Party.
Speaker 1 (33:40):
Yeah, I'm really glad this came up because I think it
is a huge part of what thecleavage is about.
I mean, it's been for a longtime now that women voters,
especially women voters who carea lot about the issues that we
think of as mattering a lot towomen so you know women's access
to health care, women'semployment, and you know equal
(34:01):
opportunities and equal pay,abortion, all those kinds of
issues Women who care a lotabout those issues have tended
to be, have increasingly been,democratic voters.
You know, back when you'retalking about this, you know
expansion of the franchise andthe, you know, women's suffrage
movement.
It was, if anything,republicans who were more, you
know, supportive, but that's adifferent coalition than we have
(34:22):
now.
And the new coalition that bothparties have had really since
you know the seventies andeighties and definitely in you
know everything since 2000, hasbeen that, this turning in this
direction and then, but, that,but, but even then it hasn't
been had that level of, like youknow, sort of masculinity and
(34:43):
masculine identity that thecurrent Republican image is
really built around, especiallythe Trumpism is built around,
and you know it's a, it's a youknow strange kind of masculinity
that you know someone likeTrump, who you know, I think
objectively just sort of doesn'tlook like he's that masculine
and tough, but then he changesand with the way his language
(35:05):
works and the way he's portrayedis a different thing than the
way he was if it was sittingacross the table from you, and
that kind of like masculinitytoughness is a difficult thing
to resist in for a lot of voters.
I think what Democrats tried todo in 2024 and make may find
some successful path later is tosort of re describe a you know
(35:28):
different kind of masculinity, amore, you know, inclusive
fathers caring for theirfamilies, taking care, not being
, you know, dominant, and allthis sort of thing, which is why
I think what like Tim wallaceis trying to to represent, and
whether that was successful ornot, uh is is a is a question,
but I see the democrat partytrying to do that to try to win
(35:49):
back, um, these uh male voters,um, and this like sense of a
responsibility and and not, um,just masculine toughness,
whether or not that'spolitically the right path.
I think Democrats are stuck with.
That's the direction, ifanything, because Democrats and
liberals believe that that isthe right way to think about
(36:11):
being masculine, right, and soyou know it's not like these
things are all just aboutelectoral appeals.
There's also, you know,ideological and you know,
principled difference on theroles that the roles of gender
and the ways in which gender andrace and sex and all of these
(36:32):
identities should play in dailylife, and the Democrats
represent a particular vision onthat.
That may cost them some youngmale voters in particular who
don't embrace that.
Speaker 2 (36:47):
So full disclosure.
I think I am a bit of apessimist, maybe even a fatalist
, so take that, as it were, inthis, in this next question,
which is so I think, parties, usparties anyway, historically
some have, you know, blinked inand out of existence.
Some have been more enduringthan others, and you know, when
there are shifts amongst theelectorate, it can be
(37:09):
existential for parties suchthat they do actually collapse
or they do fail and then otherparties fill that void or they
do evolve.
And so there have been momentsin the last decade or so in
which I've wondered.
This started with the RepublicanParty.
I wondered if the RepublicanParty was on the verge of
collapse and then wouldreformulate itself in some other
(37:30):
type of constitution.
But now I'm wondering the sameof the Democratic Party, if
that's the position they're in.
And this is going to sound likea stupid question, but I guess
I'm wondering if there areexamples of existential party
threats in which the partyactually can evolve successfully
and and rebuild itself, or ifthere are more examples of
(37:54):
parties just collapsing and thenan experience of different
parties rising up and takingtheir place.
Speaker 1 (38:01):
Yeah, this is a good question.
I mean, in the United States wehave, because of both the
two-party system and because ofsome you know, a number of other
institutions that are sort ofin place.
It's very hard for new partiesto emerge, and so you know, it's
worth noting that we have hadthe same political parties in
the United States since theCivil War, right, so we're
talking about, you know, acentury and a half of the same
(38:23):
parties.
You look at other democracies,even other, like major
democracies, which there areparties that have lasted a long
time, right, you know, sort ofstab long established.
Tomorrow there's still shiftsand changes and new parties and
and adjustments and so forth.
The United States we had thesame two parties and instead
they have, as you were saying,they evolve, they change, and so
the party of Lincoln is not theparty of even the sort of late
(38:47):
1800s, not the Republican Partyof the early 40th century, not
the Republican Party today, andsimilarly the Republican
Democratic Party has evolved andshifted in different ways.
Those evolutions and shiftsinclude, like moments where one
party is just like clearly down.
In the big part of middle partof the 20th century, you know,
(39:09):
we essentially had what we'dcall sort of a three party
system, with northern Democratsand southern Democrats both
uniting in the Democratic Partyfor a lot of procedural purposes
and electing presidents andlike and the Republican Party
was this like, you know, smaller, you know element, and of
course, now it's come back.
So I think there's like shiftsand changes but like, in a lot
(39:32):
of real ways, like the labelDemocrat and Republican, those
entities aren't the things thatwe really care about.
It's really about the abilityof a coalition to organize and
to compete and to bring forwardthe issues that matter and
everything else.
And I think that there's a goodchance that both you know, the
important constituencies in theUnited States are going to
(39:54):
struggle to get attention fromeither party going forward.
On the other hand, you know whoknows, like there's a mixing and
combining and so forth.
It really does sort of callthis kind of crisis moment, if
you think that's what'shappening now.
So it really calls attention tothe fact that we do have a
two-party system and thatthere's things that could happen
in a multi-party system that wejust don't see here.
(40:17):
And we don't have a multi-partysystem for a whole host of
reasons, like every possibleexplanation that you could have
for why we don't get moreparties, the United States has
that explanation.
So, like every possibleexplanation that you could have
for why we don't get moreparties, the United States has
that explanation.
So, like you know all of thethings.
So everything from ourelectoral institutions to the
fact that we have primaries, tothe kinds of cleavages that we
have, to everything.
But there's a good case to bemade that if we found a way to
(40:39):
allow third and fourth partiesto emerge, then the cleavages
within the parties could beexpressed in a way that didn't
bring down the whole party inits electoral efforts.
Speaker 2 (40:52):
We've lived through different eras in the United
States, the eras in whichgovernment and politics are
shaped by different coalitions,different issues.
I guess I'm wondering how youwould characterize the forces
that are shaping Americanpolitics today and maybe into
the near future.
Speaker 1 (41:10):
Well, I think that, like, if you want to sort of sum
it all up into some place,there's some, there's a populist
movement and it's around theworld that the parties are
having a hard time reacting to,and part of it's because the
populist movement, like allpopulist movements, you know,
has elements that areproblematic, and so you don't
(41:32):
want to just say, okay, we'rejust going to appeal to your you
know cultural identity asAmericans and we're going to
trash experts and give you acommanding figure that you can
get excited about and that kindof thing, which is, you know,
one way in which you can kind oftap into the this populism.
But people are frustrated, andpart of it's that you know the
(41:55):
state where you're in with thecurrent um, you know global
economy and people arestruggling to to succeed and
trouble that, struggling to uh,um, have the kind of life that
they thought they were going tohave, things that they thought
were um, were, you know,guarantees or not so much
guaranteed and all the rest ofit, um, and I don't know what.
We know how to deal with that,and so different parties are
(42:18):
offering, uh, solutions thatthey're struggling with.
But I do think that, like thereare solutions.
There are answers to this andthere are things that we can do
to be to do better, helpingworking people and voters and
make them, you know, give themthe kinds of things that they're
asking for.
But the party system isstruggling.
(42:38):
I think Republicans, as anelectoral speaking, electorally
speaking, the Republicans havedone a better job because
they've got a leader, an appealthat taps into things that
frustrated populists want, butthat comes at perhaps the cost
of some of the principles ofdemocracy that we think are
important and certainly comes ata cost of appeals to racial
(43:03):
identity and American identitythat might be corrosive.
Democrats are having a hardertime appealing to this and
trying to hold their coalitiontogether, but that, I think, is
the ultimate thing, and I domaybe I'm more of an optimist.
I do feel like there is asolution that can be found for
(43:23):
this and that you know will comeout the back end of it with
something that isn't a, you know, return to a totalitarian
period or something Not thatthat's not on the menu, so to
speak.
Speaker 2 (43:37):
Well, to that point, and recognizing that you're an
optimist and that you may haveto some degree answered the
question, but to put a finepoint on it, through the lens of
this conversation and yourresearch, how concerned are you
about liberal democracy in theUnited States?
Speaker 1 (43:54):
I mean I am pretty concerned, right.
I mean I say like long term,things will get, you know, find
some place, but long term,germany today is a thriving
democracy and has a lot ofsuccess and it went through a
very tough period, right.
So, you know, it's like longterm, it could still be.
In the medium term, including,like the rest of my lifetime
(44:15):
things could be really, reallyugly.
I think that there are a lot ofpeople who are so frustrated
with politics that they'rewilling to give up basic
democratic principles, like, youknow, congressional
representation and they don'trespect the role that those
things play.
They don't understand the rolethat that plays and we don't do
(44:36):
a very good job of defendingthat.
So things I mean right now,things look pretty grim.
The source of optimism I haveis that there are a lot of
people who I see noticing thisand are hoping to do something
about it.
You know my students, and thisis part of part of what keeps me
optimistic is I talk tostudents who are, you know, they
see problems and they'refrustrated and they're, you know
(44:56):
, don't have a have all theanswers, but they want to do
things about things, they wantto respond, they want to push
things into a new and betterdirection.
And they don't always win justlike every other generation
doesn't always win but they are,they're sort of ready for the
fight, but I think a fight iscoming.
Speaker 2 (45:14):
OK, final question You're ready for it?
Sure, what's somethinginteresting you've been reading,
watching, listening to or doinglately, and it doesn't have to
be related to this topic, but itcan be Sure.
Speaker 1 (45:26):
I love this kind of question and I also never have a
good answer for it.
But since we've just beentalking a lot about you know
sort of people struggling andclass and everything else, I'll
just say that I, you know, wejust I'm a pop culture guy and
I'm watching you know shows andmovies and everything else, and
we just finished watchingSeverance, which I think is,
(45:47):
first of all, it's just great.
If you haven't seen it,somebody go check it out.
It is really interesting.
It's a really great story.
The basic premise of it is isthat you could imagine
separating your memories intothe past sorry, what you do at
work and what you do outside ofwork, and you basically have two
identities that evolve forward.
But you do outside of work andbasically have two identities
that evolve forward.
(46:08):
But the show is really ametaphor then for how our
relationship is to work and whatwe do and our relationship to
our bosses and our employers andwhat our employers do to us.
And so it's got a very sort ofboth populist element to it and
an almost Marxist element to itin a lot of ways, and yet
(46:28):
Marxist element to it in a lotof ways, and yet it's a white
collar work environment that itdepicts, and I'm pretty sure
that the people who are watchingit are mostly, you know, more
educated, not what we think ofas sort of working class
consumers, and I think that'stelling that that appeal of
these kinds of clashes and theneed to resist the man and the
(46:51):
corporations and religions thatare shaping our world is
something that you know, whitecollar middle class and upper
middle class consumers findappealing, and I think that's
because these same dynamics aresort of present and the same
concerns are present acrosseverything, and that may be one
(47:12):
of the reasons.
One of the difficulties that theDemocratic Party has is that
it's sort of made up of peoplewho watch severance but not
people who actually live throughthe really difficult things
that some people are livingthrough, at least the leadership
of the party, and so while theyhave empathy for the sort of
fight that working class votersare having, they also see it on
(47:35):
their own context and they'rehaving, you know, they're having
a hard time figuring out how toaddress all those questions,
and so maybe it's, you know,everything I watch kind of ties
back into the things that I'mthinking about, but I see a lot
of that in Severance, which isalso just a great show and I'd
recommend people see it.
Speaker 2 (47:54):
I think you're making an interesting point here,
because I've often wonderedabout shows that are carrying a
much deeper kind of social andcultural point, that I think
have political components orthat would fit nicely in
political arena for some type ofattention.
You're talking about severance,but I also think about shows
(48:14):
like Billions and evenSuccession that are really
touching on, I think, issues youknow kind of across the
electorate that are important topeople, the electorate, that
are important to people, and Ialways find it fascinating when
these are very popular shows butthey don't really generate some
type of a movement around theissue that you'd think it might.
Like it does have its finger ona pulse, but it's not really
moving beyond that.
I wonder if maybe you'rehitting on the reason, and that
(48:38):
is who the consumer is.
Speaker 1 (48:41):
Yeah, that may be part of it.
I think you know it's a pieceof it, but it's also, you know
it is.
It's a piece of it, but it'salso, you know it is just.
It's also true that, like youknow, people who have more
(49:01):
leisure time, more free time todo other things, you know
they're often the workhorses inpolitical movements, at least in
organizing right, and theyorganize other people who then
go on to do other stuff, butpeople you know, cultural things
that tap into frustrations, andof course, you just you watch
the show and then it's like, ok,well, I had some expression of
my, my concerns, and maybethat's all that I have time for.
And we don't have, meanwhile,institutions that are designed
to sort of organize and bringthat energy into politics, to
(49:26):
sort of organize and bring thatenergy into politics.
And here's where I think youknow the importance of political
parties as institutions isoften overlooked, where you need
organizations to then bringpeople together and say, ok, we
are the Democratic Party andthis is what we care about.
And, by the way, you know yousaw this fight on severance the
other day and this will, youknow, this should inspire you in
this direction.
We're the Republican Party, wecare about these things.
(49:47):
We saw this fight on severancethe other day and this should
inspire you in this direction.
We're the Republican Party andwe care about these things, and
you saw this fight on.
Whatever show that you'retapping into, that is energizing
you maybe the same show and itenergizes you in this way.
But the sort ofgrassroots-level party
organizations are not as centralto people's politics as they
once were.
I don't know how we build thatback or whether it needs to be
(50:10):
the parties per se, but thatkind of institutional
organization is, you know, isthe next step, and we do see it
occasionally.
I know that there's like thereare movements, you know, in
response to the Trumpadministration right now that
are, you know, building outinstitutions, but we don't have
the kind of institutionalcapacity to do politics that the
(50:30):
moment it calls for.
Speaker 2 (50:32):
Dr Noel, thanks for being here.
I truly appreciate the time.
Speaker 1 (50:36):
Oh, thank you.
This was a great conversation.
I had a lot of fun.
Speaker 2 (50:46):
If this conversation should make anything clear, it's
this the American party systemis at a pivotal moment.
The Republican Party'stransformation into a Trumpist
movement and the DemocraticParty's struggle to find its
footing signal deep shifts inour political landscape.
Americans, we hold power toshape this realignment by
(51:08):
mobilizing within local partystructures, by demanding
accountability from leaders andby supporting grassroots
movements that prioritizedemocracy and inclusive
governance over oligarchic andcorrupting influence.
Whether this moment leads torenewal influence Whether this
moment leads to renewal and itreally could or further
polarization, which it alsoreally could depends on
(51:35):
collective action to bridgeexisting divisions and sweep
this Trump era into the dustbinof history.
All right, check back next weekfor another episode of Deep
Dive Chat.
Soon, folks.
Thank you, thank you.
long-term.
Germany today is a thrivingdemocracy and has a lot of
success and it went through verytough period, right.
So you know it's it's likelong-term it could, could still
be in.
In the medium term, includinglike the rest of my lifetime
things could be really, reallyugly.
I think that there are a lot ofpeople who are so frustrated
(00:20):
with politics that they'rewilling to give up basic
democratic principles like youknow, congressional
representation and they don'trespect the role that those
things play.
They don't understand the rolethat that plays and we don't do
a very good job of defendingthat.
So things I mean right nowthings look pretty, pretty grim
(00:56):
pretty grim.
Speaker 2 (00:56):
Welcome to Deep Dive with me, sean C Fettig.
American politics is clearly atsome type of crossroads.
The Republican Party, oncesynonymous with traditional
conservatism, has been reshapedinto a vehicle for Trumpism,
blending populism, nationalismand an unrelenting loyalty to
its figurehead, donald Trumphimself.
At the same time, theDemocratic Party finds itself
(01:17):
adrift, grappling with internaldivisions about how to approach
the Trump presidency andstruggling to define a cohesive
vision.
What the Democratic Party isafter losses in the 2024
election.
All of this matters because, aswe're living through and
experiencing right now, theweaker the parties are, the less
(01:38):
able they are to act as abulwark against the rise of
authoritarianism under DonaldTrump.
Today's guest is Dr Hans Knoll,associate Professor of
Government at GeorgetownUniversity, leading expert on
political parties in Americandemocracy and co-author of the
book Political Parties.
He's here to help answer somequestions like how did Trump
(02:00):
consolidate his grip on the GOPand transform it into an
extension of his MAGA movement?
Why are Democrats unable torally around a clear strategy or
leader, and what does this meanfor the country?
Could this political alignmentoffer an opportunity for renewal
, or are we truly witnessing theunraveling of democratic norms
and democracy itself?
(02:21):
All right, if you like thisepisode or any episode, please
give it a like, share and followon your favorite podcast
platform and or subscribe to thepodcast on YouTube.
And, as always, if you have anythoughts, questions or comments
, please feel free to email meat deepdivewithshawn at gmailcom
.
Let's do a deep dive dot com.
Let's do a deep dive, dr Noel,thanks for being here.
(02:51):
How are you?
Speaker 1 (02:52):
I'm doing great.
Speaker 2 (02:59):
Thanks for having me Absolutely so.
A lot of focus on party ID andpartisanship over the past
decade has really been on theevolution of the Republican
Party into one that is whollyTrumpist, largely MAGA.
But there does seem to be ashift in the Democratic Party as
well, and I think we sawglimmers of that in the
2015-2016 race that BernieSanders was really exposing a
rift in the Democratic Partythat was probably, in retrospect
, more enduring than perhaps weall realized at the time, and
(03:22):
this past election shows justhow real shifting alliances and
identification seem to be in ourpolitics, and I guess it
remains to be seen how permanentthis realignment is.
But the reality is that it'snot limited to the Republican
Party and it is impacting ourentire country, and I want to
work our way through, you know,the impact or the form that this
is taking within each of theparties, but perhaps before we
(03:43):
even get there impact or theform that this is taking within
each of the parties, but perhapsbefore we even get there we
should just, you know, establishwhether or not you think that
there actually is some type of arealignment that we're living
through and, if so, what theimpact is that it might be
having on our politics.
Speaker 1 (03:58):
Yeah, sure, that's a really good place to start.
I mean, the concept of arealignment in political science
is, you know, sometimes prettyprecise and we talk about, you
know, that there's this majorchange of groups that are in the
parties, moving from one partyinto the other, or what the
parties stand for is changing.
Realignment of the RepublicanParty from the, you know,
(04:27):
lincoln era, when the party wasmainly about ending slavery and
then other things, to today whenthe party is principally the
party that is most embracing of,say, the Confederate flag or
symbols of the old South, thatkind of realignment, no, I don't
think we're seeing somethingquite that big.
But I also think politicalscience like saw some really big
moments in the past and said,oh, like, these are really big
shifts and so we have thisreally high bar for what it
(04:47):
amounts to as a realignment.
What I think we're seeing nowis there are some, you know,
more gradual shifts.
The two parties remain the twoparties.
Much of what they stand forremains very similar.
There's more of a shift infocus than in you know, any
actual, you know things thatthey care about or switching
sides on policies.
Some, but not mostly, and sobroadly.
(05:09):
The coalitions are similar, butvoters are, you know, new
generation of voters areresponding to those coalitions a
little bit differently, andthere's some other changes, and
so there are some very gradualchanges and of course it's hard
to know where those are going.
And so I do think there'ssomething happening under the
surface, but it's not the kindof realignment where we're going
to say in 20 or 30 years wehave completely new parties.
Speaker 2 (05:32):
So one of the narratives about what's happened
with the Republican Party, ifwe start with them, is that
they've been completely reshapedand reformed into being
essentially sycophantic Trumpist, and that it is divorced from
and I guess this cuts a littlebit against what you've just
said, so maybe we need to diginto the nuance here but it's
divorced from the traditionalkind of conservative
(05:56):
identification that sitscomfortably within the
Republican Party, that hasbecome much more populist and
nationalist that it's, that it'smoved away from being elite
driven which in and of itselfthis last point isn't
necessarily a bad thing but thatit's become something that is
not at all characteristic ofwhat it used to be.
So I guess I'm wondering how wewould characterize the current
(06:17):
identity of the Republican Party, and if you say that it is
largely built of the samecomponents, then how does that
comport with this narrative?
Speaker 1 (06:26):
Yeah, well, I mean, I think that the narrative is
true that there is a generalshift in the last you know
decade or so towards Trumpismand whatever Trump stands for,
but the underlying, you know,material that Trump is working
with is still Republican,conservative policies, and so
(06:48):
one way to think about that is,like you know, conservatives
tended to be very, you know, profree trade and Trump is not
right.
So there's a reversal there.
But it is still the case thatthe kinds of policies Trump is
advancing are fiscalconservative let's not spend too
much money, let's, you know,give not, have, not have tax
policies that are especiallypunitive on the rich, these
(07:10):
kinds of things that were, youknow, republican principles
before.
And some of his argument abouttariffs even is not so much
about I'm going to want toimplement tariffs to change, you
know, and bring back, you know,lots of support for working
class jobs although that is partof what he says but also
building American industry ingeneral, top to odds with the
(07:34):
past Republican coalition.
But it doesn't seem likethere's this, like you know,
completely new group of people.
It is the case that mostactivists look at Trump and say
that's where the RepublicanParty is and that's what
(07:55):
conservatism is.
And so if you ask them like, whois more conservative, they'll
say that Trump favoringpoliticians are more
conservative, even if they aremore or not more conservative on
sort of more traditional thingslike, say, free trade, but that
that shift is more about inputemphasis.
It used to be thatconservatives some conservatives
(08:15):
were really concerned aboutimmigration and national
identity, and Trump has takenthat as one of the elements of
the Republican Party and put itright at the top.
The other big thing that Trumphas shifted the Republican Party
about is about himself, hispersonal policy questions like
you know his own legalchallenges and his, you know his
, how much power he should haveand those kinds of things.
(08:37):
And that's not really that wildto have a party backing their
own president on those kind ofpersonal things.
It's just Trump has a lot ofthem and he really does push
them hard.
And there are very fewpoliticians who are defecting in
the way that, say, manyDemocrats defected from Clinton
during the Lewinsky scandal.
Speaker 2 (08:57):
Mm.
Hmm, you know, often the theconstruction or the structure of
a party is the reflection ofsome strike of a balance between
elites within the party andtheir representation of what
they believe the RepublicanParty or conservatism should be
balanced against what theRepublican or conservative
(09:19):
electorate is hoping that theparty is.
And we're living through a timewhere it feels as if Trump
embodies the entirety ofRepublican identity.
And I think one argument isthat some evidence of this is
the fact that Republicans inCongress are ceding a lot of
control to Trump as opposed toexerting some of their own.
(09:42):
And I think the argument hereis that if they felt like they
had their finger on the pulse ofthe Republican Party at the
electorate level, that theywould feel a bit more empowered
to flex some of that muscle inCongress, but that they're
instead being a bit reflexive.
And I wonder if that is asignifier that the Republican
Party at the elite level inCongress isn't quite sure who or
(10:03):
what the Republican Party atthe electorate level is and is
just taking their cues fromTrump.
Speaker 1 (10:09):
Yeah, I mean, I think that's that's right, and maybe
not just taking them from Trump,but using what they've learned
from Trump's success to tellsomething about what what
Republican voters want.
And so it used to be, forinstance, that the argument was
that, you know, republicans usedsocial issues and populist
(10:29):
appeals to try to bring aroundvoters and then turn around and
they would vote for, you know,economic policies that benefit
the wealthy and business owners.
I mean, to some degree that'sstill happening, because Trump
is OK with policies in somecases that help big businesses.
Trump is okay with policies insome cases that help big
businesses, but exactly whatkind and how far that's going to
go and whether or not youreally want to fully embrace it
(10:50):
is something that a lot ofRepublican leaders are now
saying.
Well, you know, maybe we don'tneed to or we shouldn't go
towards some of these moretraditional conservative
economic policies, because we dowant to get this growing
working class element in ourparty, and that means you know
policies that are orientedtowards helping the working
(11:12):
class, but you'll notice thatthe way they talk about it still
is.
You know, unions are still theproblem right, and we want to
embrace working class votersthat are not in unionized jobs
and we want to have lessgovernment and saying that it's
government policies that aremaking problems for the working
class.
So there's a lot of continuityin the kinds of issues and it's
(11:35):
more you know the places wherethere is a shift.
Trump is showing that that'smore electorally successful
that's more electorallysuccessful.
Speaker 2 (11:46):
So if we look at this through the lens of history, I
guess I want to take head on, ordiscuss head on, this argument
that the Republican Party in itscurrent configuration is an
existential threat to democracyin the United States, and I
think there are probablyelements of our politics
generally that could lay to thatargument.
But I do wonder, if we look atthis through, like I said, the
(12:07):
lens of history and theevolution of parties and party
ID and shifts in alignments andrealignments if this is
something that we could expectto see at any given time you
know, the politics that we'reliving through are something
that we could expect to see atperiods of time in which there
are alignments, or if there areelements here that are truly
concerning.
Speaker 1 (12:28):
I think there's a mix of things and then maybe
there's like four levels ofthings that we want to think
about when we talk about likethreats to democracy and that
often get lumped together,especially for Democrats who see
this threat.
I mean, first there's just alot of policies that Democrats
don't like and they think, youknow, make us a different
country than they want to have,and those are not.
(12:48):
I mean, that's differentdisagreements and maybe the
Democrats are right about howimportant those policies are,
but that's not about lack ofdemocratic representation.
That's just a policy difference.
There's also some policydifferences that are more
fundamental about citizenshipand what it means to be an
American.
That I'd sort of call, you know, illiberal policies that some
(13:10):
of the Republicans are advancingand those I think people have a
reasonable connection to.
If you start saying certainkinds of people don't belong
here, that used to belong here,then that can be sort of eroding
of the notion of Americanidentity and therefore erodes,
you know, the republic and ourlogic of democracy.
But it's still not exactly athreat directly to democracy.
(13:30):
It's a threat to something likewhat kind of democracy we're
going to be.
And then there's, you know,things that are like, I think
threats to sort ofconstitutional order and the
rule of law, where you know theConstitution says that Congress
gets to decide how we spendmoney and what agencies are
going to exist, and yet Trumpseems to be saying, no, he gets
(13:52):
to decide what those things aregoing to be and he's signing and
issuing executive orders thatyou know sort of invade on
Congress's territory and thelike, and so that starts to get
to be like well, you know that's, you know it's not strictly
undemocratic in that you know hewas democratically elected, so
that's the case.
(14:12):
But our, you know, democracyisn't just or is there voting
going on, but you know we have asystem that is based on, you
know, checks and balances andconstitutional order of who gets
to make these kinds ofdecisions.
And there's a threat there andI think that's pretty, pretty
legitimately a concern.
And then there are, finally,there are some things that seem
(14:34):
to like actually undermine theability of the country to have
democratic elections, and that's.
There are a lot of elements inthe Republican coalition's views
about democracy that democracyscholars worry about.
So there's a really excellentbook by Jacob Grumbach, which I
just happened to be reading withmy students, called
(14:57):
Laboratories Against Democracy,and his argument is that because
politics at the national levelhas gotten so polarized,
national parties now are shapingstate party policy on in many
different ways, includingespecially in how democracy is
run.
So things like you know whetheror not you have early voting or
who's allowed to vote, or youknow absentee, how absentee
(15:20):
ballots are handled, or whetheryou have mail in ballots, and
all those kinds of things, andhe builds a scale out of that
that talks about like howdemocratic or you know how good
for democracy are each state'spolicies, and he shows that in
states that have Republicans incontrol there's less democratic,
less of what he calls democracy.
(15:40):
Now it's worth noting that hisscale is a scale that gives you
points for having you know earlyvoting and mail-in voting and
would take away from howdemocratic it is if you have you
know voter ID laws and otherrestrictions, which Republicans
would say no, those areempowering our democracy.
But I think a lot of you knowsort of scholars of democracy
(16:02):
would say that the Republicanview on what is empowering
democracy and what is not is isincorrect.
And so then that does like OK,that does look like it's a
threat, but it's a threat that'sgot an ideological component to
it of Republicans thinking thatthese things that other people
think are democracy actuallyaren't.
Speaker 2 (16:20):
So let's switch and talk a little bit about the
Democratic Party and before wedig into the party today and
what it might be struggling with, I prefaced in the preamble
this idea that maybe BernieSanders was a warning sign to
the structure of the DemocraticParty in 2015, 2016 in a way
(16:41):
that the party didn't takeseriously, 2016 in a way that
the party didn't take seriously,but I don't want to posit that
as a fact.
So I guess I'm wondering if youthink that was a moment that
suggests the party was losingtouch with a certain segment of
its base, or if there'ssomething else that we could
point to.
Speaker 1 (16:55):
So I think I mean there's a lot of different
cleavages within both parties.
American parties are coalDemocrat and then the sort of
more, you know, educated, youknow like sort of more white
(17:24):
collar type Democrat, is not new, but the degree to which
Democratic policy had moved,democrat policy priorities,
democratic Party priorities, thedegree to which Democratic
Party priorities had sort ofshifted to more cultural issues,
things that are not the sort ofbread and butter for union
(17:45):
members of working class, thathad been happening, it is real.
Some of it's because it's hardto make changes in the economic
policy and it might be easier tomake changes on the civil
rights front.
Some of it's because of thedecline in union membership,
which means that the power ofunions within politics in
general and also within theDemocratic Party is weakening.
(18:06):
And so I don't think it's truethat the Democratic Party was
just ignoring that this washappening, but it had been
happening and there was a trendin that direction and Sanders
caught onto it and emphasized it.
There's a certain aspect of whenyou start to make an issue out
of a cleavage like this andhighlight it in this way and use
the kind of rhetoric that youknow politicians who are would
(18:28):
have been like, yeah, thatDemocratic Party is probably the
better party for us and they'renot doing as much as we'd like,
but that's our party.
And then Sanders says, oh well,the Democrats don't care about
you.
And then afterwards they'relike, oh, maybe the Democrats
(18:49):
don't care about me.
And then they start thinking,oh well, what else does?
And they see Trump there.
I don't want to blame Sandersper se, but like that this comes
up and then it starts to likeshape people's views of what the
party stands for and adifferent reaction of the
Democratic Party that moreembraced some of the elements of
Sanders policies although it'sworth noting that not all of his
(19:10):
things, you know both, makesense or necessarily better for
the working class but embracesome of that like appeal might
have forestalled some of thoseshifts in working class voters
towards the Republican Party.
It's also worth noting that,while there is a shift on this,
this cleavage is real and thereare a lot of working class
voters who are now thinking oflooking elsewhere.
(19:32):
It's not the case that, like,working class voters are now a
solid Republican bloc.
It's that they're more divided,which they didn't used to be.
Speaker 2 (19:43):
So if we look at the Democratic Party today, you know
the story is that the party isadrift, it's in the wilderness,
it's vulnerable and it's weak.
And I think there was a moment,after the you know Supreme Court
struck down Roe v Wade, thatthe Democratic response in that
election year was to runessentially against, at least in
(20:04):
part against that SCOTUSdecision, and there was a
concern in the back of my mindthat this wasn't a proactive
agenda, this was more of areactive agenda and that that
wasn't sustainable.
And I think in this lastelection it felt much the same
to me that the Democrats wererunning on a reactive agenda and
not a proactive agenda.
(20:24):
And I wonder if that helpsexplain where they are now in
that, between 2015, whathappened in that election, and
now that the Democratic Partyhasn't really figured out how to
develop a proactive agenda.
But I also wonder if that mightbe ignoring some of the work
that doesn't get enoughattention that came out of the
Biden administration.
And so the question here reallyis like what do you think is
(20:47):
happening with the DemocraticParty right now?
Speaker 1 (20:51):
Yeah, I think some of that like broadly speaking,
that narrative probably has sometruth to it, but I do think
that it overstates a lot ofthings, which is, I mean, that's
the conventional wisdom, but itoverstates a lot of things.
Um, I think the first thing isthat we tend to look at things
like oh, now the Democrats areadrift and they're in disarray
and this is where we are today,but, um, you know, they just
lost an election.
Uh, meanwhile, everyone wassaying something very similar
(21:13):
about the Republican party twoyears ago when, after SCOTUS
decision on abortion,Republicans did much, much less
well than you would haveotherwise expected in that
condition, and people thoughtRepublicans were also doing, had
taken a blow in 2020, but nowit was like, oh, it's really a
(21:35):
blow.
But of course, you go back to2016 and then we're back in the
same place where, like, how didthey possibly lose this election
?
And Democrats are unsure how tomanage this new shift in what
the party stands for, what the,what the working class wants and
all these things.
And in fact, if you go backpretty much in the like year or
so after every election, youknow the losing party is, you
(21:56):
know, sort of panic, trying toto figure out what to do and how
to how to regain their position.
Sometimes the good strategiescome out of that, Sometimes they
don't, and so some of that'sjust normal right behavior.
Right, we're just had anelection, and so the democratic
party is, in fact, trying tofigure out how to react to the
2024 loss and how to buildsomething going forward, and so
(22:18):
that's just like that happens.
I also think it's true that in2022, the Roe v Wade issue did
help Democrats.
I don't think it was the onlything that helped Democrats, but
I think it was.
It did help them and I think,on balance, it was probably also
a good issue for 2024.
It's just that, you know, itwas now into the past a little
(22:39):
bit and it wasn't, you know, itwasn't very proactive, as you
say.
It was like reacting tosomething that was now several
years into the past, and I thinkthe Democratic Party does need
to figure out a way toreestablish its brand and it's
working to do that.
But that's like sort of likethe natural thing.
It's what the Republicans feltlike they needed to do after
2012.
(22:59):
They needed to reestablishtheir brand.
They said they were going to doit by backing off of some of
the immigration issues.
Instead, they know that's notwhat ended up happening and it
turns out embracing immigrationeven more forcefully turned out
to be politically effective.
But of course, a lot of thevariation in what happens in the
elections is beyond the party'sdirect control anyway.
Happens in the elections isbeyond the party's direct
(23:23):
control anyway.
You know, the COVID event shookup incumbents and it shook
incumbents across the world.
And so I'm not I don't want tosay this, you know absolves
Biden or the Bidenadministration for any
responsibility for what they did.
I think there were a lot ofpolicy moves that they could
have done.
Maybe that would have beenbetter, but they've got to do
this in sort of the.
You know, in the context ofthese bigger shifts that
(23:43):
sometimes there's nothing thatcan be done about them.
But then afterwards we drawstories based on what happened.
That may or may not be true,and then of course they become
self-reinforcing if we decidethat this is what happened and
therefore the party has tochange and therefore it tries to
change and it struggles and etc.
Speaker 2 (24:02):
This might be more of an observation than a question,
but I have been somewhatfascinated in the Democratic
response this election, thispast election, particularly
because it's not like it was ablowout.
This election was won for theRepublican Party by a one and a
half point margin and Democratsdid pick up in the House.
(24:24):
They lost in the Senate, butagain, that wasn't a blowout.
So I'm a little surprised athow existential the Democratic
Party seems to be taking thispast election.
So maybe this is a bit removedfrom your research per se, but
it's surprising to me that theDemocratic Party is reacting
this way, where and I think theydo have an actual they do have
(24:44):
some footing to fight back.
And I wonder if this is more asa result of what seems like
momentum on the Republican Partyside or if they might be seeing
something in the tea leavesthat I'm just missing.
Speaker 1 (24:59):
Well, I think you're right that it means it's
definitely an incredibly closeelection and yet the you know
sort of the way we talk about itis that oh, it was this huge
change, and I think in the backof a lot of people's minds as
well.
But okay, in two years or infour years there'll be another
election and maybe then, youknow, that'll be the chance to
have some change.
And it's just, you know, itfeels existential, because two
(25:20):
years is a long time, especiallywith an administration that is
doing so much, so quickly thatyou know, seems threatening.
It'd be something else if theadministration was just sort of
like you know, puttering alongthe way that oftentimes they do
in a you know sort of polarizedgridlock kind of policy setting.
(25:41):
But I think part of it is thatthis sort of story of that
there's chaos feeds on itself.
I mean, the first half of ourconversation was all about
there's this chaos, and sothat's what we're saying, and
everybody else is saying thatI'm sure that there are some
Democratic Party leaders in factthis may explain why it seems
like Democrats are not doingvery much who are like we'll, we
(26:02):
have to tough it out, but ourbrand will bounce back,
especially after a year of Trumpand Doge and all the chaos
that's happening.
But there's not an electionright now.
So what we just have to do is,you know, start to build and
plan ahead and maybe keep ourpowder dry, and then we'll jump
out in a year with this tacticand then that looks like
(26:24):
paralysis and lack of direction.
But it is also true that thereis a lot of different direction
that different Democrats want tohave, and when you're in this
moment of I don't know whichdirection to go, then that
empowers people to say let'spush it in my direction.
So that's why you're hearingthese like here's the abundance
agenda, let's make that be ourthing.
No, we need to embrace a more,you know, progressive, bolder,
(26:50):
bernie Sanders style directionof the party or whatever.
And those are fights that arealways going to be in the
background, but they're nowforeground because there's not
much else for the party to do tobe in the background, but
they're now foreground becausethere's not much else for the
party to do.
Speaker 2 (27:06):
One of the arguments that Democrats in the Democratic
Party often give when they'reon the losing side in an
election is that they're a bigtent party.
They have a lot of people toplease, a lot of groups to
please a lot of constituenciesin a way that the Republican
Party doesn't.
But in this past election, whilewe might not be seeing a
wholesale realignment amongstthe electorate or within the
electorate, it is true that theRepublican Party does seem to be
(27:26):
benefiting from a shift in votefrom some percentage of working
class voters and voters ofcolor away from the Democrats,
and it remains to be seen ifthat's enduring, if that's
personality based, if that is,you know, ideologically based,
so that you know that's all tocome.
But if that's true, it suggeststhat the Republican Party might
(27:47):
also be inheriting the sameproblem that the Democratic
Party had, if we buy thisargument that the big tent is a
difficult tent to make happy,and so that there are
vulnerabilities in thiscoalition for the Republican
Party, and so that there arevulnerabilities in this
coalition for the RepublicanParty, and so that's one thing I
think we could talk about.
But I think the thing furtherdown the road is that if the
(28:08):
Democratic Party remains to somedegree a big tent party and the
Republican Party is alsobuilding a coalition, that makes
it a big tent party.
If that also suggests that weare in for a tumultuous period
of time, as both parties arereally struggling to keep their
constituencies happy in a waythat at least the Republican
Party maybe didn't have to soextensively in the past.
Speaker 1 (28:32):
Yeah.
So I think generally that weshould, we should think of both
parties as big tent parties andthat they always have been, they
have to be, because, uh, wehave only two and they're both
trying to get majorities.
So, like in the in the sort ofpeak pre-trump period, when
we're talking about sort of likeyou know, um, george w bush and
mccain and romney, like therepublican party was, you know,
(28:55):
they talked about the republicanparty as this three-legged
stool and it had the socialconservatives and the economic
and fiscal conservatives and ithad the you know foreign policy
hawks.
And these three differentgroups, you know, oftentimes
didn't have very much at all todo with each other.
They were a big tent and, infact, as one of the things that
Trump had discovered was thatthis tent, you know, didn't have
(29:16):
people who were embracing allof those, those legs of the
stool that the socialconservative folks who were had
sort of like this America first,let's protect our interests.
Less immigration, we want tohave a more.
It's a particular picture ofwhat it means to be American,
which for some people is white,but also for some people,
(29:39):
whether it's whatever the raceis, it still has a particular
set of values and views what itmeans to be American, and that
that was what matters.
And fiscal conservatism andfree trade and some of the
foreign policy hawkishness noneof that.
That stuff didn't matter asmuch to those people, and maybe
they didn't even like it, and soTrump managed to appeal to this
(29:59):
um by dropping some of thepieces of the republican big
tent, but meanwhile those piecesare still there, um, and
without them, you're not, he'snot going to win, he's just he's
managed to amplify this otherpart of the story.
So I do think that, though, ifthere's more working class
voters is becoming major, morepart of the republican coalition
, then yeah, there's moreworking class voters is becoming
a major, more part of theRepublican coalition, then yeah,
(30:20):
there's going to need to besome delivery on that.
There's going to need to bepolicies that actually it's one
thing to say.
Well, the Republic Democratsare not doing a good enough job
and they're letting inflationhappen and wages aren't growing.
So see, look they're.
They say they're your friend,but they're not.
It's something else to then goa term without actually
delivering anything to thatgroup, and so some of them won't
go in that direction.
(30:41):
I think the other thing to noteis you know, when it comes to
voters of color, there's a shiftthere and I think some of it's
just that you know many, manyvoters who are, especially as we
make, you know, sort ofprogress on racial issues.
You know they're the issues are.
You know, other issues matterto them more.
A lot of Black voters aresocially conservative and
conservative in other ways.
They voted the Democratic Partybecause it's been a part of
(31:04):
sort of what it means to be aBlack American.
But that is breaking down,perhaps, especially for younger
voters and non-white voters, forwhom their racial identity is
really important.
That is continues to be howthey vote.
(31:26):
The other elements in theworking class is more
complicated in that, you know,it depends a little bit on how
you define the working class.
We used to sort of think aboutit as just sort of like an
income level thing, butobviously that's not quite right
and you know, there's a lot ofyou know working class voters
who you know make quite a lot ofmoney and maybe run small
businesses but didn't go tocollege and don't think of
(31:47):
themselves as elite or, you know, well-to-do or in the elite
part of the country.
And so there's this like notionof a you know, lap clock, laptop
class versus the you know realworking class.
And some of that isn't aboutincome at all, and I think it's
actually not, you know, withanalyses that focus on that and
say see, look, you know, theseare the haves and have nots are
(32:09):
wrong, but it is a real culturaland social difference.
And so there's a kind ofworking class appeal that
Republicans have and theDemocrats seem to have lost in
embracing academic ideas and youknow all the things that get
labeled woke.
And so Democrats are now havingto hold that coalition together
(32:29):
, and I think Republicans willnow also have to try to hold
that coalition together, and itmay be that the working class
voters become increasingly aswing group in the way that they
hadn't been.
And then, of course, thatpresumably means both parties
are going to try to compete forthem, and that might actually
work out to their advantage.
Speaker 2 (32:47):
Who knows?
I suppose there's anothercleavage here that might be
explaining this a bit more butalso might suggest that this is
maybe more of an enduring issue,and that is the male-female
cleavage.
The Democratic Party has alwaysbeen cast as being weaker kind
of across the board and theRepublican Party has always been
(33:09):
.
I mean, this is obviously anoversimplification, but the
Republican Party is cast asbeing stronger kind of across
the board and as long as that'sbeing cast or molded and shaped
along the male-female divide, Ido wonder if this last election,
if it reflects that, suggeststhat it will be more difficult,
(33:32):
if this image holds or thischaracterization holds, for
Democrats to attract the malevote back from the Republican
Party.
Speaker 1 (33:40):
Yeah, I'm really glad this came up because I think it
is a huge part of what thecleavage is about.
I mean, it's been for a longtime now that women voters,
especially women voters who carea lot about the issues that we
think of as mattering a lot towomen so you know women's access
to health care, women'semployment, and you know equal
(34:01):
opportunities and equal pay,abortion, all those kinds of
issues Women who care a lotabout those issues have tended
to be, have increasingly been,democratic voters.
You know, back when you'retalking about this, you know
expansion of the franchise andthe, you know, women's suffrage
movement.
It was, if anything,republicans who were more, you
know, supportive, but that's adifferent coalition than we have
(34:22):
now.
And the new coalition that bothparties have had really since
you know the seventies andeighties and definitely in you
know everything since 2000, hasbeen that, this turning in this
direction and then, but, that,but, but even then it hasn't
been had that level of, like youknow, sort of masculinity and
(34:43):
masculine identity that thecurrent Republican image is
really built around, especiallythe Trumpism is built around,
and you know it's a, it's a youknow strange kind of masculinity
that you know someone likeTrump, who you know, I think
objectively just sort of doesn'tlook like he's that masculine
and tough, but then he changesand with the way his language
(35:05):
works and the way he's portrayedis a different thing than the
way he was if it was sittingacross the table from you, and
that kind of like masculinitytoughness is a difficult thing
to resist in for a lot of voters.
I think what Democrats tried todo in 2024 and make may find
some successful path later is tosort of re describe a you know
(35:28):
different kind of masculinity, amore, you know, inclusive
fathers caring for theirfamilies, taking care, not being
, you know, dominant, and allthis sort of thing, which is why
I think what like Tim wallaceis trying to to represent, and
whether that was successful ornot, uh is is a is a question,
but I see the democrat partytrying to do that to try to win
(35:49):
back, um, these uh male voters,um, and this like sense of a
responsibility and and not, um,just masculine toughness,
whether or not that'spolitically the right path.
I think Democrats are stuck with.
That's the direction, ifanything, because Democrats and
liberals believe that that isthe right way to think about
(36:11):
being masculine, right, and soyou know it's not like these
things are all just aboutelectoral appeals.
There's also, you know,ideological and you know,
principled difference on theroles that the roles of gender
and the ways in which gender andrace and sex and all of these
(36:32):
identities should play in dailylife, and the Democrats
represent a particular vision onthat.
That may cost them some youngmale voters in particular who
don't embrace that.
Speaker 2 (36:47):
So full disclosure.
I think I am a bit of apessimist, maybe even a fatalist
, so take that, as it were, inthis, in this next question,
which is so I think, parties, usparties anyway, historically
some have, you know, blinked inand out of existence.
Some have been more enduringthan others, and you know, when
there are shifts amongst theelectorate, it can be
(37:09):
existential for parties suchthat they do actually collapse
or they do fail and then otherparties fill that void or they
do evolve.
And so there have been momentsin the last decade or so in
which I've wondered.
This started with the RepublicanParty.
I wondered if the RepublicanParty was on the verge of
collapse and then wouldreformulate itself in some other
(37:30):
type of constitution.
But now I'm wondering the sameof the Democratic Party, if
that's the position they're in.
And this is going to sound likea stupid question, but I guess
I'm wondering if there areexamples of existential party
threats in which the partyactually can evolve successfully
and and rebuild itself, or ifthere are more examples of
(37:54):
parties just collapsing and thenan experience of different
parties rising up and takingtheir place.
Speaker 1 (38:01):
Yeah, this is a good question.
I mean, in the United States wehave, because of both the
two-party system and because ofsome you know, a number of other
institutions that are sort ofin place.
It's very hard for new partiesto emerge, and so you know, it's
worth noting that we have hadthe same political parties in
the United States since theCivil War, right, so we're
talking about, you know, acentury and a half of the same
(38:23):
parties.
You look at other democracies,even other, like major
democracies, which there areparties that have lasted a long
time, right, you know, sort ofstab long established.
Tomorrow there's still shiftsand changes and new parties and
and adjustments and so forth.
The United States we had thesame two parties and instead
they have, as you were saying,they evolve, they change, and so
the party of Lincoln is not theparty of even the sort of late
(38:47):
1800s, not the Republican Partyof the early 40th century, not
the Republican Party today, andsimilarly the Republican
Democratic Party has evolved andshifted in different ways.
Those evolutions and shiftsinclude, like moments where one
party is just like clearly down.
In the big part of middle partof the 20th century, you know,
(39:09):
we essentially had what we'dcall sort of a three party
system, with northern Democratsand southern Democrats both
uniting in the Democratic Partyfor a lot of procedural purposes
and electing presidents andlike and the Republican Party
was this like, you know, smaller, you know element, and of
course, now it's come back.
So I think there's like shiftsand changes but like, in a lot
(39:32):
of real ways, like the labelDemocrat and Republican, those
entities aren't the things thatwe really care about.
It's really about the abilityof a coalition to organize and
to compete and to bring forwardthe issues that matter and
everything else.
And I think that there's a goodchance that both you know, the
important constituencies in theUnited States are going to
(39:54):
struggle to get attention fromeither party going forward.
On the other hand, you know whoknows, like there's a mixing and
combining and so forth.
It really does sort of callthis kind of crisis moment, if
you think that's what'shappening now.
So it really calls attention tothe fact that we do have a
two-party system and thatthere's things that could happen
in a multi-party system that wejust don't see here.
(40:17):
And we don't have a multi-partysystem for a whole host of
reasons, like every possibleexplanation that you could have
for why we don't get moreparties, the United States has
that explanation.
So, like every possibleexplanation that you could have
for why we don't get moreparties, the United States has
that explanation.
So, like you know all of thethings.
So everything from ourelectoral institutions to the
fact that we have primaries, tothe kinds of cleavages that we
have, to everything.
But there's a good case to bemade that if we found a way to
(40:39):
allow third and fourth partiesto emerge, then the cleavages
within the parties could beexpressed in a way that didn't
bring down the whole party inits electoral efforts.
Speaker 2 (40:52):
We've lived through different eras in the United
States, the eras in whichgovernment and politics are
shaped by different coalitions,different issues.
I guess I'm wondering how youwould characterize the forces
that are shaping Americanpolitics today and maybe into
the near future.
Speaker 1 (41:10):
Well, I think that, like, if you want to sort of sum
it all up into some place,there's some, there's a populist
movement and it's around theworld that the parties are
having a hard time reacting to,and part of it's because the
populist movement, like allpopulist movements, you know,
has elements that areproblematic, and so you don't
(41:32):
want to just say, okay, we'rejust going to appeal to your you
know cultural identity asAmericans and we're going to
trash experts and give you acommanding figure that you can
get excited about and that kindof thing, which is, you know,
one way in which you can kind oftap into the this populism.
But people are frustrated, andpart of it's that you know the
(41:55):
state where you're in with thecurrent um, you know global
economy and people arestruggling to to succeed and
trouble that, struggling to uh,um, have the kind of life that
they thought they were going tohave, things that they thought
were um, were, you know,guarantees or not so much
guaranteed and all the rest ofit, um, and I don't know what.
We know how to deal with that,and so different parties are
(42:18):
offering, uh, solutions thatthey're struggling with.
But I do think that, like thereare solutions.
There are answers to this andthere are things that we can do
to be to do better, helpingworking people and voters and
make them, you know, give themthe kinds of things that they're
asking for.
But the party system isstruggling.
(42:38):
I think Republicans, as anelectoral speaking, electorally
speaking, the Republicans havedone a better job because
they've got a leader, an appealthat taps into things that
frustrated populists want, butthat comes at perhaps the cost
of some of the principles ofdemocracy that we think are
important and certainly comes ata cost of appeals to racial
(43:03):
identity and American identitythat might be corrosive.
Democrats are having a hardertime appealing to this and
trying to hold their coalitiontogether, but that, I think, is
the ultimate thing, and I domaybe I'm more of an optimist.
I do feel like there is asolution that can be found for
(43:23):
this and that you know will comeout the back end of it with
something that isn't a, you know, return to a totalitarian
period or something Not thatthat's not on the menu, so to
speak.
Speaker 2 (43:37):
Well, to that point, and recognizing that you're an
optimist and that you may haveto some degree answered the
question, but to put a finepoint on it, through the lens of
this conversation and yourresearch, how concerned are you
about liberal democracy in theUnited States?
Speaker 1 (43:54):
I mean I am pretty concerned, right.
I mean I say like long term,things will get, you know, find
some place, but long term,germany today is a thriving
democracy and has a lot ofsuccess and it went through a
very tough period, right.
So, you know, it's like longterm, it could still be.
In the medium term, including,like the rest of my lifetime
(44:15):
things could be really, reallyugly.
I think that there are a lot ofpeople who are so frustrated
with politics that they'rewilling to give up basic
democratic principles, like, youknow, congressional
representation and they don'trespect the role that those
things play.
They don't understand the rolethat that plays and we don't do
(44:36):
a very good job of defendingthat.
So things I mean right now,things look pretty grim.
The source of optimism I haveis that there are a lot of
people who I see noticing thisand are hoping to do something
about it.
You know my students, and thisis part of part of what keeps me
optimistic is I talk tostudents who are, you know, they
see problems and they'refrustrated and they're, you know
(44:56):
, don't have a have all theanswers, but they want to do
things about things, they wantto respond, they want to push
things into a new and betterdirection.
And they don't always win justlike every other generation
doesn't always win but they are,they're sort of ready for the
fight, but I think a fight iscoming.
Speaker 2 (45:14):
OK, final question You're ready for it?
Sure, what's somethinginteresting you've been reading,
watching, listening to or doinglately, and it doesn't have to
be related to this topic, but itcan be Sure.
Speaker 1 (45:26):
I love this kind of question and I also never have a
good answer for it.
But since we've just beentalking a lot about you know
sort of people struggling andclass and everything else, I'll
just say that I, you know, wejust I'm a pop culture guy and
I'm watching you know shows andmovies and everything else, and
we just finished watchingSeverance, which I think is,
(45:47):
first of all, it's just great.
If you haven't seen it,somebody go check it out.
It is really interesting.
It's a really great story.
The basic premise of it is isthat you could imagine
separating your memories intothe past sorry, what you do at
work and what you do outside ofwork, and you basically have two
identities that evolve forward.
But you do outside of work andbasically have two identities
that evolve forward.
(46:08):
But the show is really ametaphor then for how our
relationship is to work and whatwe do and our relationship to
our bosses and our employers andwhat our employers do to us.
And so it's got a very sort ofboth populist element to it and
an almost Marxist element to itin a lot of ways, and yet
(46:28):
Marxist element to it in a lotof ways, and yet it's a white
collar work environment that itdepicts, and I'm pretty sure
that the people who are watchingit are mostly, you know, more
educated, not what we think ofas sort of working class
consumers, and I think that'stelling that that appeal of
these kinds of clashes and theneed to resist the man and the
(46:51):
corporations and religions thatare shaping our world is
something that you know, whitecollar middle class and upper
middle class consumers findappealing, and I think that's
because these same dynamics aresort of present and the same
concerns are present acrosseverything, and that may be one
(47:12):
of the reasons.
One of the difficulties that theDemocratic Party has is that
it's sort of made up of peoplewho watch severance but not
people who actually live throughthe really difficult things
that some people are livingthrough, at least the leadership
of the party, and so while theyhave empathy for the sort of
fight that working class votersare having, they also see it on
(47:35):
their own context and they'rehaving, you know, they're having
a hard time figuring out how toaddress all those questions,
and so maybe it's, you know,everything I watch kind of ties
back into the things that I'mthinking about, but I see a lot
of that in Severance, which isalso just a great show and I'd
recommend people see it.
Speaker 2 (47:54):
I think you're making an interesting point here,
because I've often wonderedabout shows that are carrying a
much deeper kind of social andcultural point, that I think
have political components orthat would fit nicely in
political arena for some type ofattention.
You're talking about severance,but I also think about shows
(48:14):
like Billions and evenSuccession that are really
touching on, I think, issues youknow kind of across the
electorate that are important topeople, the electorate, that
are important to people, and Ialways find it fascinating when
these are very popular shows butthey don't really generate some
type of a movement around theissue that you'd think it might.
Like it does have its finger ona pulse, but it's not really
moving beyond that.
I wonder if maybe you'rehitting on the reason, and that
(48:38):
is who the consumer is.
Speaker 1 (48:41):
Yeah, that may be part of it.
I think you know it's a pieceof it, but it's also, you know
it is.
It's a piece of it, but it'salso, you know it is just.
It's also true that, like youknow, people who have more
(49:01):
leisure time, more free time todo other things, you know
they're often the workhorses inpolitical movements, at least in
organizing right, and theyorganize other people who then
go on to do other stuff, butpeople you know, cultural things
that tap into frustrations, andof course, you just you watch
the show and then it's like, ok,well, I had some expression of
my, my concerns, and maybethat's all that I have time for.
And we don't have, meanwhile,institutions that are designed
to sort of organize and bringthat energy into politics, to
(49:26):
sort of organize and bring thatenergy into politics.
And here's where I think youknow the importance of political
parties as institutions isoften overlooked, where you need
organizations to then bringpeople together and say, ok, we
are the Democratic Party andthis is what we care about.
And, by the way, you know yousaw this fight on severance the
other day and this will, youknow, this should inspire you in
this direction.
We're the Republican Party, wecare about these things.
(49:47):
We saw this fight on severancethe other day and this should
inspire you in this direction.
We're the Republican Party andwe care about these things, and
you saw this fight on.
Whatever show that you'retapping into, that is energizing
you maybe the same show and itenergizes you in this way.
But the sort ofgrassroots-level party
organizations are not as centralto people's politics as they
once were.
I don't know how we build thatback or whether it needs to be
(50:10):
the parties per se, but thatkind of institutional
organization is, you know, isthe next step, and we do see it
occasionally.
I know that there's like thereare movements, you know, in
response to the Trumpadministration right now that
are, you know, building outinstitutions, but we don't have
the kind of institutionalcapacity to do politics that the
(50:30):
moment it calls for.
Speaker 2 (50:32):
Dr Noel, thanks for being here.
I truly appreciate the time.
Speaker 1 (50:36):
Oh, thank you.
This was a great conversation.
I had a lot of fun.
Speaker 2 (50:46):
If this conversation should make anything clear, it's
this the American party systemis at a pivotal moment.
The Republican Party'stransformation into a Trumpist
movement and the DemocraticParty's struggle to find its
footing signal deep shifts inour political landscape.
Americans, we hold power toshape this realignment by
(51:08):
mobilizing within local partystructures, by demanding
accountability from leaders andby supporting grassroots
movements that prioritizedemocracy and inclusive
governance over oligarchic andcorrupting influence.
Whether this moment leads torenewal influence Whether this
moment leads to renewal and itreally could or further
polarization, which it alsoreally could depends on
(51:35):
collective action to bridgeexisting divisions and sweep
this Trump era into the dustbinof history.
All right, check back next weekfor another episode of Deep
Dive Chat.
Soon, folks.
Thank you, thank you.
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