Is Bill Clinton responsible for this Trump Era? In this episode, Dr. Nelson Lichtenstein, professor of History at UC Santa Barbara, and co-author of the book A Fabulous Failure: The Clinton Presidency and the Transformation of American Capitalism joins the pod to examine the complexities of Bill Clinton's presidency and its enduring effects on American democracy today. We discuss how Clinton’s embrace of neoliberalism, exemplified through policies like welfare reform and NAFTA, caused rifts within the Democratic Party and set the stage for right-wing populism. As we dig into the consequences of prioritizing political pragmatism and bipartisanship over progressive ideals, we ask: did Clinton's era create an environment ripe for the rise of figures like Donald Trump?
Dr. Lichtenstein highlights political dynamics during the 1990s, the importance of maintaining a strong, progressive base, and lessons that contemporary Democrats can apply as they navigate today's political landscape, while encouraging reflection on labor's role, coalition-building among progressives, and strategies for re-engaging disillusioned voters.
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Dr. Lichtenstein (00:00):
Bill Clinton.
And here's a mistake, a tragedy.
Bill Clinton could havecaptured that constituency had
he chosen, you know, just a fewthings certainly not NAFTA and a
few other trade issues.
But he didn't.
He didn't and that Perotconstituency, which had a kind
(00:21):
of rough character to it, by theway, as strong in the north as
it was in the south, clintonfailed to capture that, which
meant that by the time he got tothe year 2000, the country was
divided, you know.
Equally, I think you see, inplaces like northern Maine and
certain areas of the rural,industrial, rural Midwest, where
(00:43):
Trump Trump, where Perot wasvery strong, and those areas
have gone over to theRepublicans.
Shawn (00:57):
Welcome to Deep Dive with me, s C Fettig.
The presidency of Bill Clintonis often remembered for economic
prosperity, political centrismand an ability to bridge the gap
between left and right and well, the whole cigar thing.
But as time passes, I thinkit's fair to say that the maybe
(01:20):
devastating ramifications of theClinton presidency are becoming
clearer Beneath the surface.
Clinton's embrace ofneoliberalism,
corporate-friendly policies anda calculated retreat from
progressive ideals may have hadfar-reaching consequences, ones
that we're reckoning with today,maybe even explain today this
(01:41):
Trump era.
By sidelining labor, guttingsocial safety nets and
championing policies likewelfare reform and financial
deregulation, clinton reshapedthe Democratic Party into a
technocratic, market-driveninstitution, one that abandoned
its New Deal roots in favor oftriangulation and political
(02:03):
survival.
As we are experiencing an eraof democratic backsliding in the
United States, it's crucial toask did Clinton's failures in
progressive governance createthe conditions that led to the
rise of Donald Trump?
Did the disillusionment ofworking class voters, the
erosion of economic security andthe retreat from bold leftist
(02:25):
policies opened the door forright-wing populism?
In this episode, I'm joined byDr Nelson Lichtenstein,
professor of history atUniversity of California, santa
Barbara, and co-author of thebook A Fabulous Failure the
Clinton Presidency and theTransformation of American
Capitalism.
We discuss how the Clintonpresidency weakened progressive
(02:52):
governance, the long-term damageit inflicted on the Democratic
Party, maybe American democracyitself, and how it helped lay
the foundation for the politicalcrisis, this grievance-driven,
score-settling Trump era, we'reliving through today.
Alright, if you liked thisepisode, or any episode, please
give it a like, share and followon your favorite podcast
platform and or subscribe to thepodcast on YouTube.
(03:13):
And, as always, if you have anythoughts, questions or comments
, please feel free to email meat deepdivewithshawn at gmailcom
.
Let's do a deep dive.
Dr Lichtenstein, thanks forbeing here.
How are you Delighted to behere?
(03:34):
I'm fine, I'm fine.
Okay, I'm glad to hear it.
So, over the past few years,I've been thinking about how we
got to the present moment we'rein in our politics, which to me
seems like it's short circuitedsomewhere between Bill Clinton
and Donald Trump.
It really seemed like we wereon some type of a trajectory
that wasn't overwhelminglyprogressive, but it did seem
like that was the generaldirection we were kind of
(03:56):
stumbling into.
It didn't feel well directed,but it felt like it was
happening.
So you know where we are now.
10 years ago would have seemedI don't think it's unreasonable
to say utterly impossible.
Know where we are now 10 yearsago would have seemed.
I don't think it's unreasonableto say utterly impossible.
Yet here we are, and I think aknee-jerk reaction would be to
blame figures like George W Bushor Mitch McConnell or Donald
Trump, etc.
And I think that's probablyfair.
(04:17):
But I've also been thinkingmore and more about the failures
if that's the right word ofquote-unquote liberal figures
like Barack Obama and BillClinton and you've written
extensively about thisespecially Clinton.
So I'm excited to get your takeon this.
Dr. Lichtenstein (04:31):
Yes, well, yeah, I mean, there's the
immediate events involving thereturn of Trump and Trumpism in
general.
I think we'll be labeling thisthese last 12 years assuming he
completes his presidency is theage of Trump, although Biden,
you know, is there, but anyway,I think.
(04:53):
So there's the immediateaspects of that.
You know, and you can look at,you know, as you mentioned,
various politicians anddecisions that have been made,
but, in general, I think punditsand historians and just
everyone in general thinks, yeah, there's something, something
went wrong, something definitelywent wrong within the world of,
(05:14):
well, within America and withinthe body of liberalism, and
that's stretching back.
Actually, you can go back toCarter, but Clinton, you're
right, bill Clinton and Obama,despite what I do think were
some genuinely liberal,progressive, actually not
(05:36):
anti-capitalist, but efforts tomanage capitalism which both of
those individuals and somepeople around them had.
Nevertheless, we do label them,and I think probably correctly,
as you know, a part of a, whatwe'd call a, a neoliberal, um,
uh, sort of statecraft from the90s and including, uh, barack
(05:59):
obama's response to the bigeconomic crisis of the 19 of
2008.
Now, I mean this wordneoliberal, by the way, of
course, is such a has become akind of cliche and it kind of
encompasses too much, butnevertheless, when we think
about it, let's crudely just saya kind of belief in
international trade, the market,above that of managing
(06:23):
capitalism domestically and akind of somewhat austere social
programs.
Now, the main point I would make, and I've tried to make in this
book that I wrote on thepresidency of Bill Clinton, is
that it would be a mistake tothink of this strand of
statecraft, of neoliberalstatecraft, as a kind of pure
(06:46):
ideology that individuals likeBill Clinton, you know, walk
into the White House with, orBarack Obama, for that matter,
or any other politician.
That was not the case at alland in fact I think what's the
creative tension and what we canlearn from the experience of,
say, a Clinton or an Obama, isthat their commitment during the
(07:13):
campaign and their whole lifereally to a sort of more
progressive, liberal,pro-working class kind of
democratic politics that theyhad.
That's one reason they wereelected.
Certainly, clinton, hiscampaign in 1992 was one which
(07:34):
was the economy stupid.
What that meant was let's getback to fundamentals, let's end
the stagnation of livingstandards.
But the tension there is that,despite all of these intentions
and people he brought in whoagreed with him.
Nevertheless, social forces,ideological forces, political
(07:59):
upheavals, a whole variety ofcircumstances, some
self-inflicted, some fromwithout, pushed Clinton to where
he ended up in the end of hispresidency as what we think of
today, as kind of thisneoliberal presidency which, in
(08:19):
effect, as Bernie Sanders put itin a very recent post, you know
, the Democrats abandoned theworking class.
So.
But the point of it is that Ithink we have to look at why it
is that sort of good intentions,progressive intentions, were
thwarted and sort of turnedinside out.
I think that's the point thatwe can learn from these
(08:42):
presidencies.
Ok.
Shawn (08:43):
I don't want to put too fine a point on it because I
think you touched on this, but Ithink it's worth digging a
little bit into.
If we're looking at whereClinton and Obama specifically
landed as it relates to kind oftheir approach to globalization
and free trade and, you know,maybe we encapsulate that in
some type of neoliberal ideologyI think you know it's worth
(09:04):
maybe, I guess, putting a finerpoint on this idea that I think
we look back and think thatpresidents come into office and
have a very specific ideology,that then they layer over global
events and they layer overdomestic events and they layer
over, you know, the politics ofthe day.
But in reading some of your workand just kind of reflecting on
both Clinton and Obama, it feelsmore to me that's giving them
(09:27):
maybe a little bit too muchcredit and that instead these
might just have been two figuresthat obviously had influential
figures behind them but thatthey were kind of iterating in
the moment, you know, the end ofthe Cold War, the end of
history, the rise ofglobalization, the internal
(09:48):
politics at home were veryconflictual and that they were
maybe in the moment evolving andadjusting to that and that
ended up creating an ideology inretrospect.
Dr. Lichtenstein (10:03):
Well, right, I mean, I think, yeah, there's a
level of opportunism or just akind of a political happenstance
that takes place Obviously.
I think they made, I thinkthere were some elements that
were wrong.
And while they thought, Ibelieve and I emphasize in my to
the Clinton's health carereform, which he saw not just as
(10:27):
a good thing for expanding thewelfare state but also as
industrial policy, because oneof the reasons that American
industry having difficultycompeting in those days with
Germany and Japan was because ofthe burden of health care costs
.
It costs more money for healthcare than steel, said the
president of the Ford MotorCompany.
(10:48):
This is something that comesout of the economics.
It was essentially benign andthat it could not have the kind
of devastating impact it had onspecific communities,
particularly in the Rust Belt,and I think they underplayed
that.
And then, of course, trade wasnot just about trade.
It was also about immigration,and this was clearly the case
with NAFTA.
(11:08):
I mean, clinton himself didn'twalk into the White House as a
NAFTA warrior.
We have to pass that.
That was not an important partof his campaign or of his
outlook.
It was actually NAFTA the tradeagreement with Mexico was
(11:28):
pushed forward both by theMexican government and by the HW
Bush administration.
But Clinton, I think I call ita blunder in pushing that
forward and it had very, verydeleterious consequences in
terms of his electoral base andwhat we think of as his trade
(11:48):
regime.
Of course, the opening to Chinawas actually far more
devastating, when it came to theindustrial base of the country,
than Mexico.
But your point is right thatthere's always a mixture of kind
of preexisting ideas which arethere, and then the events and
(12:10):
rapid Japan as both differentmodels of capitalism, more
successful models of capitalism,and then of course also trading
(12:47):
threats to the United States.
The end of the Cold War, youknow, took all of that sort of
foreign policy-oriented you know, conversation, discourse which
had dominated American politicsfor decades, was sort of over
and you know we moved on to anew set of problems.
(13:09):
As Senator Tsongas, who was arival of Kennedy, of Obama for
the presidential nomination in1992, put it, he said the Cold
War is over, germany and Japanhave won, and that was something
, a sentiment, that Clinton wasalso concerned with, and so
(13:30):
that's why, both in terms of hisdomestic policies initially,
and even, to some degree, tradepolicies, everyone's forgotten
the very determined effort thatthe Clinton people made to
manage trade with Japan, toforce the Japanese to buy
American products and restrictthe kind of dumping of goods in
(13:55):
the United States.
This was a big effort and itfailed, but it but it indicates
that Clinton again didn't walkinto the White House as a
neoliberal.
He ended up that way, I think,and is probably criticized, but
that was not where he came from.
Again, I repeat, it's importantfor liberals, progressives, to
(14:19):
understand that it's not just aquestion of sheer ideology, that
it's not just a question ofsheer ideology.
It's a question of what yourpolicies are, what coalitions
you create, you know, and howyou conduct your statecraft, to
understand whether you're goingto succeed or fail and move in a
liberal or conservativedirection.
Shawn (14:38):
You make this point and I think we're thinking more about
this just generally in at leastthe political arena the
evolution of, or the impact of,policies under Clinton and, I
suppose, obama and how they havecontributed to what some might
consider to be the morass we'rein right now and I think we tend
to look at if we can just lookat the moment we're in now,
(15:01):
there's a narrative around Trumpand his policies that it's
chaos and that it'sunintelligent or unintelligible
and that it's potentiallydangerous.
But if we take a longer view andI'm not trying to justify this,
but I think if we take thelonger view and maybe you would
disagree but a lot of thegrievance that Trump tapped into
(15:23):
comes directly out of some ofthe policies under Clinton and I
suppose under Obama as well,and you know Trump's policies as
it relates to globalization andthen free trade and trade deals
in a way would almost seem likevery strategically targeted and
outside of the politics of it.
I do wonder if there is acertain amount of intelligence
(15:48):
to it that I don't want toascribe to Trump.
Maybe it's a knee jerk, justinstinctual in him, but I wonder
if you think this is Trumptapping into something a bit
more political, a grievance thatcame out of you know these
policies, or if he's actuallytapping into something that is a
necessity as it relates toAmerican policy in these areas.
Dr. Lichtenstein (16:11):
You know I don't disagree at all.
I mean, clearly that's the caseTrump's tariff sort of fixation
.
He does it very crudely andprobably, you know, have a kind
of certain kinds of backlash,but nevertheless it does reflect
the opposition to certain ofthese free trade ideals.
Let me just make a point aboutfree trade for a second.
(16:33):
Then I want to say somethingelse about Trump as well.
The reason that all economists,actually even today almost, are
in favor of free trade and thisextends over to the left as well
is that it is true that a freetrade regime does have the
(16:55):
effect of kind of in autilitarian way, lowering the
price of goods that you knowthat millions, tens of millions,
hundreds of millions ofconsumers purchase in various
ways, from cars to what you buyat Walmart.
It does lower it.
They're more efficientproducing it in China or Mexico.
However, to the degree thathundreds of millions of people
may save a dollar here or adollar there on their t-shirt or
(17:17):
even their imported car, morethan a few dollars, trade has.
A trade has a very, verypointed and devastating impact
on particular industries,particular communities, and
those have a very largepolitical resonance, and that's
something that that the left hasto deal with and liberals have
(17:38):
to deal with, and something thatTrump, of course, has pointed
out.
Now I want to make one thingthat we do have to, just with
Trump, say this yes, he's pickedup on these economic grievances
, and they are not just againwith the white working class,
but with black and brown andothers as well.
(17:59):
But clearly with Trump there'salso this sort of white,
christian nationalist strand.
It's related, of course, to theeconomic difficulties, but it's
not sort of a one-to-onerelationship.
It can't be quite, you know,mechanically connected, but he
clearly has picked up on thatand I think that really is the
(18:20):
core of his appeal, and I don'tthink we need to, we should just
to be a sort of economicfundamentalist on this question.
That's there, you know.
Shawn (18:30):
Well and I'm glad you bring this up, because I think
we always look for easy answersor easy explanations for things
that have happened or where weare, what's happening and I
think an easy answer would be tolook at Clinton and say there
was some sharp, sharp pivotunder Clinton and a failure on
Clinton's part that contributedto the moment that we're in
today, which may be true, but Ithink the the mistake made in
(18:52):
that is to assume that all ofthe voters that made up the
Democratic coalition in the 80sand 90s then somehow have
pivoted to become the you knowhard right, far right
conservative Trump voters now.
Dr. Lichtenstein (19:05):
Yeah, of course, yeah, of course not
Right, obviously.
And and by the way, you knowthe, the, the Democratic
coalition you know, kind of heldtogether to a degree all
through the through the Obamayears, and you know you can, you
can trace that out in polling.
I would say this the one thingthat a very good economic
(19:26):
historian, gavin Wright, made,the point that NAFTA was this
very.
We remember it now Again.
It's not as important as China,but we remember it very well
because of its politically toxiccharacter.
And what would happen withNAFTA was that its impact
(19:46):
actually, politically wasgreater in the South than in the
industrial North.
It was in the South that therewere lots and lots of sort of
rural apparel factories andparts factories, things that
could be easily moved to Mexico,and they were.
And so the Democrats who hadbeen winning, still winning
(20:06):
congressional elections in theSouth up through the early 90s,
it was in the 1994 election thatthey're wiped out in the South
and that's when the RepublicanParty really comes to dominate
the South in a definitive way,and all those who are called
(20:31):
blue dog Democrats, you know,moderate Democrats, they're
wiped out by, and NAFTA is oneof the major, major reasons that
that happens in 1994.
And from from that point on wewe have a somewhat at least the
conservative coalition gets amajor bulwark.
I would make one other point, bythe way, a figure.
Another figure that we have notmentioned today is Ross Perot
figure.
Another figure that we have notmentioned today is Ross Perot,
and Perot won 19% of thepresidential vote in 1992.
(20:54):
And I think about 9% in 1996.
And Perot was not a right wingculture warrior.
I mean, he had some right wingbackground, you know, when it
came to Vietnam and things ofthat sort.
But he was also emphasizing akind of a hostility to trade, to
NAFTA in particular, and also akind of industrial policy, a
(21:16):
kind of here's a mistake, atragedy.
Bill Clinton could have capturedthat constituency had he chosen
just a few things, certainlynot NAFTA and a few other trade
(21:39):
issues.
But he didn't, he didn't, hedidn't, and that Perot
constituency, which had a kindof rough character to it, by the
way, as strong in the north asit was in the south, clinton
failed to capture that, whichmeant that by the time he got to
the year 2000, the country wasdivided, you know.
(22:01):
Equally, I think, you see, inplaces like northern Maine and
certain areas of the rural,industrial, rural Midwest, where
Trump was, where Perot was verystrong, and those areas have
gone over to the Republicans.
So that was a kind of I wouldjust make this point about
Clinton.
Clinton was a terrible leader ofthe Democratic Party.
(22:22):
He was not.
He was terrible leader of theDemocratic Party.
He was not.
He was terrible.
He and Obama was in his own way, but, but, but certainly on
trade, on many trade deals, andon welfare issues.
He was winning those issueswith Republican votes, not
Democratic votes, in theCongress.
And so he, he really he gothimself reelected, true, but the
(22:43):
Democrats, but the Democratswere harmed by Clinton's
presidency.
Shawn (22:48):
I want to swing back and talk about this last point in a
few minutes the coalitions thatClinton built and how that
potentially underminedprogressive causes.
But before we get there, I'mglad you bring up Ross Perot
because I think history islooking at him a little bit
differently, or the impact thathe has.
And I actually think if we casta wider net and look even
further back, I think we doourselves a disservice, as at
(23:09):
least in the political andgoverning realms, to dismiss
third party candidates and thesupport or the type of support
that they're tapping into.
And I think Perot was acharacter and a figure that
captured such a significantslice of the electorate and, as
you mentioned, Clinton did aterrible job of reaching out to
(23:29):
that electorate and, byextension, I suppose the
Democrats did.
But I wonder if, within theirown house, the Democrats then
made the same mistake in 2016with Bernie Sanders dismissing
whatever it is that he wastapping into.
Dr. Lichtenstein (23:43):
That kind of played out there were different
factors that played into the2020 election but might have the
impact of that ignorance on thepart of Democrats in 2016 may
have played out in this lastelection uh, yeah, right, yes, I
mean yeah, the, the clearly, ifyou get down to the sort of
inside, uh, the you know thewhole way politics, I mean uh,
(24:06):
uh, hillary clinton, and youknow it was very hostile to, to
bernie.
There was no effort to create akind of coalition, that kind of
you know she, just he dismissedhim and that was clearly a
mistake, a mistake and and andand there were, you know, we've
political scientists have shownlots of Sanders supporters ended
up voting for Trump.
There was a kind of that.
(24:26):
There was that kind of oh, Idon't know, pitchfork hostility
to the, to the reigningestablishment and Hillary
Clinton, who, who'd been inpolitics for about 30 years, you
know, represented that Biden,of course, was was smart in the
spring of the year 2020.
He reached out to Bernie andhis supporters and there was a
(24:47):
kind of, you know, a coalitionthat ran and won in 2020.
I also think, by the way, justthat the Black Lives Matter
phenomena was very helpful toBiden, even though he didn't
identify with it, but itenergized millions of people who
got them interested in politicsand I think that had a big
(25:10):
impact later on.
And then, of course, we couldlook at 2024, and I think you
can see that again, sandersdoesn't run, his base, is not
energized and and for whateverher clearly Harris was, was, was
, I mean she wasn't overtlyhostile to it, but that wasn't
something she emphasized.
And and it's kind ofinteresting that that that the,
(25:32):
the Sanders people and AOC etcetera, they were the last ones
to abandon Biden.
They were, they were for Bidenbecause there was this sort of
coalition that Biden had builtwith them and they were
reluctant to abandon it.
But yeah, I mean Hillary wasidentified with the sins of her,
(25:54):
of her husband, and especiallythat there were, there were two
other events, two other policythings in the Clinton period
that made poor middle class,upper middle class liberals
particularly hostile or pissedoff Clinton, and that was the
crime bill of 1994 and thewelfare reform of 1996.
(26:17):
And I mean those two.
They have a it's interestinghistory of them and what's
happened subsequently.
But they were issues that wereparticularly seemed to indicate
Clinton's betrayal of post-civilrights, progressive values, and
(26:38):
he was, you know, too clever byhalf in seeking to, you know,
win reelection and really hemade tremendous enemies among a
certain strata of, I would say,middle class kind of talking
class kind of people and they'dnever forgiven Clinton for that,
(27:00):
bill Clinton for that, andHillary was tarred with it.
Shawn (27:04):
I want to actually talk a bit more about this.
You mentioned this in your lastresponse and one prior about
this coalition of the coalitionsthat Clinton built to.
At the time when he left office, he was considered to have been
a very successful president, orit was a very successful
presidency, at leasteconomically, I suppose.
But really what was happeningunderneath and you've touched on
this is that Clinton wasbuilding coalitions primarily
(27:27):
across the aisle, so he wasworking primarily with
conservatives because he justcouldn't get the ball across the
line with just the Democraticcoalition.
Dr. Lichtenstein (27:35):
And.
Shawn (27:35):
I think what happened there is that he actually ended
up in retrospect cracking thecoalition.
So you end up with and this isjust a broad brush, but you end
up with true progressives thatare pissed off, as you said
right, and then they're kind ofcleaved away from what might be
considered blue dogs and moremoderate Democrats.
That I think what.
(27:56):
This is how I see it, and youcan tell me if this is a bad
characterization.
He made those both parties inthat coalition essentially
politically homeless andweakened.
So the blue dogs or themoderates then became, I think,
to some degree over time, easypickings for the Republican
Party and it's difficult, it wasdifficult, to cobble together
(28:18):
that coalition in 2016 in thesame way, especially with
Hillary Clinton and the baggagethat she was bringing from the
Bill Clinton presidency.
Dr. Lichtenstein (28:26):
Yeah, yes, I mean, you know one thing,
actually, one thing that maybewe learned from Trump is it's
really important to cultivateyour base, that's.
That is that's more importantthan even reaching out.
And Clinton did not cultivatehis base, even reaching out, and
Clinton did not cultivate hisbase.
You know, I mean, I guess aconventional view of colleagues,
oh, you know, let's reach out,you know, fight for the middle
(28:47):
ground, et cetera, but I'm notsure that's entirely true and
the mobilization of your base ismore important and Clinton does
not do that.
I mean, the 1996 election, forexample, the turnout was one of
the worst in American history.
1992 was much better, I wouldsay.
Let me say about his, yes,there's the coalition building
(29:34):
that would support his economicpolicies, especially his
initially stimulus policies andhealthcare policies, and
policies that would again makethe American version economic
conference in Little Rock, andit was full of CEOs, and they
were there not because Clintonwas promising to cut taxes or
deregulate, quite the opposite,it was because Clinton was
promising to policies that would, that would sustain and revive
(29:58):
American industry.
Sustain and revive Americanindustry.
The other wing of capital thatClinton is linked to is
symbolized by Robert Rubin, whois, you know from Goldman Sachs
and Rubin.
And there was an element ofthis true of Wall Street, it's
still true.
Actually, he was a welfarestate liberal.
(30:18):
That is Rubin was you know.
He came out of a family thathad been democratic, left
democratic, for generations.
His mother was a civil rightsactivist and voted for Henry
Wallace in 1948.
And Rubin was, you know, hadsupported McGovern and raised
money for him.
But Rubin, and so Rubin was infavor of, you know, various
(30:40):
kinds of moderate welfare statepolicies and made him sort of
popular in that period.
But what Rubin was also in favorabsolutely of was the absolute
mobility of capital.
That means free trade, but italso means mergers and
acquisitions and the capacity ofWall Street to roam the world
(31:01):
and invest and disinvest whereit chose to do.
So that, he thought, was theessence of kind of a liberal
world.
And he thought I thinkideologically, I think that here
the Wall Streeters weremistaken and the liberals who
went along with them that thiswould ultimately produce a kind
(31:21):
of worldwide civil society.
If you're going to have a stockmarket in China or Russia, well
then you're going to have afinancial press that has to be
free to report on what's goingon, and from there you just move
step by step into kind of atleast, if not liberal democracy,
at least a kind of civilsociety.
Well, they were wrong aboutthat, but that was something
(31:42):
that Rubin thought you know verystrongly.
And he also thought that youknow that low interest rates,
and you know, were a key torevival.
He was not enamored of theindustrial policy ideas which
mean sort of targetedinvestments that Clinton liked
(32:03):
initially.
And so a big fight in the earlyClinton moment, the first year
really is.
You know, are we going to movetoward a balanced budget, the
point of which was not balancingthe budget per se, but it was
getting interest rates downamong the bond traders of
Frankfurt and London and NewYork and Tokyo.
(32:24):
And Rubin was determined to dothat.
He thought that was the key toeconomic revival.
And I mean, I think that wasmistaken, but that was.
But he was a very I always Isay in the book that Rubin is
unquestionably the second mostimportant figure in the Clinton
administration and in someablythe second most important figure
in the Clinton administrationand in some cases the most
important.
Shawn (32:44):
So if we talk about Rubin and then I suppose if we bundle
him with Summers and Reich andtheir approach to global economy
as well as, I suppose, domesticeconomy and the I hate to use
this phrase but the trickle-downimpacts that that's supposed to
have on kind of working-classvoters, which made up at the
time a significant chunk of theDemocratic Party's base, but
(33:06):
we've seen that they have thatpart of the base has shifted and
you know this is notwithstanding the, as you
mentioned, the Christiannationalism that is also making
up part of that base.
But how much do you ascribe toRubin and Summers and Reich
their approach to that shift ofthose voters away from the
(33:28):
Democratic Party and thesituation that we're in today?
Dr. Lichtenstein (33:32):
Well, of course, insofar as they were
quite willing to allow thehollowing out of American
industry and the communitiesdependent upon it, I mean that
creates a sort of socialdynamite or tinder that can be
taken advantage of by the right,and that is the usual today
(33:53):
liberal view of this, and Ithink it's true.
I mean, I think that's whyBiden was so determined to, with
his infrastructure plans andchips plans, to reindustrialize
the Midwest and the Middle South.
I think that's absolutely thecase, and they I mean Summers is
even more of a kind ofcheerleader for international
(34:16):
capital than even Rubin was.
Reich is a little bit different.
International capital than evenRubin was.
Reich is a little bit different.
While Reich was a free traderand he had fights with others on
the liberal side of theadministration on that question,
Reich is a free trader.
He was also very much in favorof domestic stimulus plans,
about regulating industry, andhe clashed with Robert Rubin and
(34:39):
Summers on this question.
So did Joseph Stiglitz, who'salso a figure in the Clinton
administration, head of theCouncil of Economic Advisers,
who also clashes repeatedly withRubin and Summers.
I mean they become absolutelyenemies of the most intense sort
.
Reich, of course, has moved tothe left considerably since then
(35:02):
.
But but at the, at that momentin the early 1990s, he's, he's a
kind of.
He he has this series of essaysyou know well, sort of if you
build it, they will come.
If you educate the Americanworker, make them more skilled,
provide some infrastructure andsort of, you know kind of some,
(35:25):
you know R&D et cetera, Wellthen you know, it doesn't matter
whether the company is owned bythe Japanese or the Germans or
whoever it is, They'll buildfactories in America anyway.
And we get sort of if you buildit, they will come.
I mean, I think that'sfundamentally wrong in terms of
of industrial economics.
But that was, that was the viewthat that Reich had, which
(35:45):
which led him to support NAFTA,while at the same time being
very much in favor of all sortsof domestic initiatives, the
more progressive that Clintonhad.
Shawn (35:58):
This is a bit of an aside , but as long as we're talking
about Reich, he's kind of allover the place right now and,
like you said, he's writing aseries of essays and you know
people have the ability toreinvent themselves.
But I have to tell you withthis lens that we see the
Clinton presidency, clintonpolicies and how they've played
out over the past handful ofdecades and the potential
contribution that that has beento our current politics.
(36:19):
It's really hard to look atReich now and take anything that
he says seriously or at leastwithout a caveat of.
Well, dude, you might be partof the reason.
Dr. Lichtenstein (36:29):
Yeah, that's a good point.
Yeah, no, I, although I dothink.
I mean I think he's, he'sproven his bona fides over the
last 20 years.
He has been for 20 years he,he's been more than that
Actually.
Actually he has been on theleft, at least, you know, in his
public presentation.
I mean he actually wrote thisbook, locked in the Cabinet,
which he published in 1997 or 8.
(36:50):
That is a pretty bitter bookactually, critical of Clinton, I
think.
To make this point, which Ithink does reflect the
progressive politics in this era, the period from the 70s and
80s and early 90s was the worstperiod for the American labor
movement in the 20th century.
(37:12):
It's certainly in terms of itsappeal to other sectors of
society.
It was losing.
Of course it was losing membersand losing clout.
But even more it was the worstperiod Ideologically and in
terms of its sort of generalsort of social outlook and its
(37:33):
attractiveness.
You know, in the 20th centuryit was, you know it was, you
know, had been a staunt, thelast support of the Cold War.
It really ignored the newsocial formations arising in the
working class and people likeReich and Bill Clinton were, you
(37:53):
know, reciprocated with kind ofdisdain.
And you know this is not aplayer.
So I think that's, as I said,that's sort of a hand that
didn't clap a dog, that didn'tbark, an absence from the body
politic which I mean.
Today the labor movement isactually still very weak in
terms of numbers butideologically, you know,
(38:14):
culturally it has.
It has more more kind ofsalience.
I have to say I was part of amovement in the mid-'90s when
Sweeney came in and took overthe, to sort of link up sort of
left-wing academics and radicalactivists with the labor
movement.
Again, I think that has happenedto some degree.
Reich's and people like Reichwho were sort of they really
(38:41):
were trying to construct aliberalism without, you know, a
full hand.
You know you can't construct aliberalism without the labor
movement, or at least the ideaof a labor movement, and they
were trying to do that.
And that was something thatthat was beyond Bill Clinton's
can.
He couldn't snap his fingersand create a labor movement, but
it wasn't there.
(39:02):
It was in numbers stronger thanit is today, but ideologically
and culturally it was at itsmost retrobate and unattractive
to liberals anyway, during thewhole 20th century, the whole
20th century.
And I think that's somethingthat it wasn't Clinton's fault,
(39:30):
but it was one reason that hecould drift to the right so
easily and a labor movement thatexists and that is vocal and
has the potential for growing.
I think that helps disciplinethe Democratic Party, at least
to a degree, and we may beseeing that a little bit today.
Shawn (39:44):
So I want to talk a little bit about 1994 election,
because it was kind of a seismicshock to the system that we had
come to know, right, that itreally broke to some degree the
Democrats' dominance in DC.
And so not only that, you know,did the House go Republican,
but the leadership was underGingrich, who was a whole new
(40:05):
style of politics.
Right, he was a real bombthrower.
Politics is warfare, really.
And I wonder if I don't knowthat we can really do this, but
in retrospect, if Clinton wasreally boxed in in such a way
that he probably could we makean argument that he could not
have advanced progressive causesafter 1994 and that what he was
doing instead was just tryingto find a way to be somewhat
(40:28):
successful.
Dr. Lichtenstein (40:29):
Oh, yes, well, unquestionably, after the
election of 94, I mean, clintonfamously triangulates and tries
to reach various kinds ofaccommodations with the Gingrich
Republicans.
I mean, he's actually as a kindof clever politician, he
actually does that in someclever ways.
(40:51):
He does do that, he does cuthis losses, as it were, but
unquestionably he's on thedefensive, his ambitions are
curbed dramatically and ofcourse he does move to the, to
the right.
He, he pushes the welfarereform bill which which was
adamantly opposed by many, manyin his cabinet and in the
(41:13):
Democratic Party I mean reallyhis closest people, some of them
were opposed to it.
He pushes that in the mostcynical way, thinking that this
is the only way he can getreelected in 1996.
That probably wasn't true, buthe does that.
In any event.
I want to just say one thingabout Newt Gingrich.
(41:34):
Yes, he's called a bomb throwerand he's rhetorically a kind of
ultra kind of figure.
But one thing he does, and BillKristol again.
Bill Kristol today is a bit ofa whatever Trumper and and it's
sort of, I guess, rifted a bitto the left.
But in those days there's a bigfight inside the Republican
(41:57):
Party.
The Dole wing, the Robert Dolewing, dole will run for
president as Republican in 1996.
Dole thinks we can make somecompromises with Clinton,
especially on health care.
We can, you know, and we'llcome up with some system, some
program which is, you know,amenable to the insurance
companies, and you know, butit'll be better.
Gingrich and Bill Kristol sayabsolutely not.
(42:21):
And you have this remarkablesituation in 1993 and 4 in which
the right wing of theRepublican Party is lobbying
business, not the other wayaround.
The Republicans are lobbyingbusiness and business
associations to not cooperatewith Clinton and Ira Magaziner,
(42:43):
who is the head of the healthcare task force, not to
cooperate with them inconstructing some sort of a
health care plan, and they justsay no, nothing, we don't want
anything.
No, compromise nothing.
And they actually win on that.
The health care which was themajor initiative, domestic
(43:03):
initiative of the Clinton people.
It goes down to defeat andalong with NAFTA that I think
sets the stage for the 1994Republican victories in Congress
.
That point on.
Shawn (43:22):
You know, again Clinton is dickering around with
Gingrich on various questionsthat you know move him to the
right in general, in general,this also is an aside, but as
long as you bring him up, thismight be more of an observation
than a question, but I thinkit's fascinating that figures
like Bill Kristol and maybeCharlie Sykes as well they were
not just conservative figures.
They were really in theRepublican trenches in the 90s
(43:44):
and early 2000s up until theybecame Never Trumpers, and what
I find fascinating about that isthat when they became Never
Trumpers both of them along witha handful of other pretty
right-wing figures they alsobecame a bit leftist in their
policies, and I'm not sure whathappened there.
Dr. Lichtenstein (44:00):
No, that's an observation I made too, and I'm
not entirely understanding whatthat represents.
Clearly, one thing itrepresents is that I think that
they were neoconservatives ingeneral and foreign policy
questions.
They've been big champions ofthe Iraq war and Trump clearly
is not part of that.
But you're right, and we don'tentirely understand it.
(44:22):
The other thing I would say itindicates that they were chiefs
without Indians.
I thought, well, if all thesesort of famous Republicans are
against Trump, surely theyrepresent one or two or five
percent of the Republican base,but apparently not at all at.
You know, one or two or fivepercent of the Republican base,
but apparently not at all.
(44:43):
So so they, they seem,seemingly had no influence
either in 19, in 2016 or 2024.
But you're right, they have.
They have moved a bit to theleft, and that's.
That's a phenomenon I don'tthink we entirely understand,
because you know, I guess LizCheney, if you actually would
probe her, she would say, yeah,I'm still a right wing
Republican on all sorts ofquestions, but I mean, that
(45:05):
seems to be a much lessimportance than her, than her
opposition to to to Trump onconstitutional grounds.
Yeah, so, adam Kinzinger too.
Yeah, yeah, all of them, I meanall of them.
I mean I mean actually LizCheney.
I think she made a point whenshe was fighting the Republicans
.
She was so in Congress ofvoting down the line for the
(45:27):
most conservative position.
She wanted to make it clearthat I'm still a conservative
Republican, even though I thinkTrump is illegitimate.
But that didn't.
That had no impact.
Shawn (45:35):
That had no one cared cared your most recent book A
Fabulous Failure about theClinton presidency.
We could chalk it up to youknow a title right, but clearly
you do see the Clintonpresidency through this lens.
And so I guess I wonder, inretrospect and knowing what we
know now and if we take thetitle at face value, how should
(45:56):
we be evaluating the Clintonpresidency overall?
Dr. Lichtenstein (45:59):
Yeah, well, I mean, I say fabulous is sort of
it.
Well, the reason the wordfabulous is there is because
Janet Yellen and anotherprominent economist, alan
Blinder, wrote a book, a smallbook, in the year 2000, in which
they said they said it was afabulous decade, and you know,
(46:19):
and there are lots of indexes ofeconomic performance say that's
right, low unemployment, abooming stock market, a rising
GNP, a balanced budget, abalanced budget.
So, yes, there was the OK, but,but all of this was kind of
built on sand.
I mean, all of this didn't havereally firm grounding and it
(46:44):
would be either, you know,evaporate or be destroyed, you
know, in subsequent years.
And the fact that Al Gore, hewins the popular vote but loses
in the year 2000,.
He should have, look, peace andprosperity.
He should have won in a, youknow, in a landslide.
And I mean there are reasonsfor that.
I think that Clinton set thestage for that.
(47:07):
It wasn't just Monica Lewinsky,by the way.
It was that Al Gore could notput forward a bold program
because the balanced budget thatClinton did create at the end
of his administration was a kindof albatross.
He was so afraid that theRepublicans would just create a
(47:33):
series of tax breaks, whichGeorge W Bush would do when he
gets in.
But Clinton was so afraid ofthat George W Bush would do when
he gets in, but Clinton was soafraid of that.
They said, well, we're going toput this balanced budget, we're
going to devote it entirely tosustaining Social Security, and
Al Gore would say we're puttingthe budget surplus in a lockbox.
Well, what the hell is that?
Who cares about that?
(47:55):
I mean, gore could not make anybold plans, any attractive
plans in running for presidentin the year 2000.
And so you know, it was muchcloser than it should have been
and he lost.
So I mean Clinton kind ofcreates a prison of his own
design by the end of the 1990s,which kind of stymies him in any
(48:20):
effort to use that remarkablebalanced budget for any, to help
his constituents, to help hisbase, to help his.
You know the people who votedfor him.
Shawn (48:31):
One of the narratives about this past election is that
Democrats are lost in thewilderness and have completely
lost touch with their base, andthere's probably a nugget of
truth to that, but that'snotwithstanding the fact that
the popular vote was very close.
The Democrats lost or gained aseat in the House and, you know,
the Senate was really probablybecause of malapportionment.
(48:53):
You know it wasn't like awipeout right, but it is true
that the labor vote and theworking class vote has
definitely shifted towards theRepublican Party and away from
the Democratic Party and in thatsense the Democratic Party does
have some soul searching to doRight.
And they do have toreconstitute themselves and try
to put together some type of acoalition and if they want to be
(49:14):
, want that coalition to beprogressive.
I guess my question for you isif they were to just examine the
trajectory of the vote awayfrom them since the Clinton era,
what could they learn fromClinton's presidency in
reconstituting themselves now?
Dr. Lichtenstein (49:31):
Well, as I said, yeah, one has to provide
benefits and ideological andmaterial for one's base, for the
base.
I think Biden tried to do that,but imperfectly.
By the way, I would just makethis point that the yes, the
working class vote in general,the 90 percent of the working
(49:51):
class who are not in unions, andthis includes brown and black
people as well did well, it didmore.
Mainly it stayed home.
Mainly it voted for the couchmore than for Trump, and that's
the demobilization of the base.
The actual number in unions,the people, the 10% of the
(50:11):
electorate in unions, actuallymaintain their support for the
Democrats pretty much, andpartly that was just the get out
the vote efforts of the unions.
But that that was, of course.
That wasn't enough to to, to,to be decisive.
But I think, I think the lessonwe learned from Clinton for
contemporary Democrats is thatyou that the key to winning
(50:35):
elections is the mobilization ofone's base.
That is the key.
Don't try to reach out to somemythical or a center, because
actually, in fact, most peopleare polarized.
Harris made a big mistake inbutting around with Cheney, not
because Cheney was a bad person,but because she didn't
(50:57):
represent anybody.
Liz Cheney didn't reallyrepresent.
There was no substance to herconstituency, but anyway.
But to mobilize the base.
I think Bernie Sandersunderstood that, I think Biden
understood it but was unable todo it, and I think that's the
lesson we should learn.
And Clinton didn't do that.
That's why he was a terribleparty manager, and I think
(51:17):
that's the lesson we shouldlearn.
And Clinton didn't do that.
That's why he was a terribleparty manager and he demobilized
, you know, people who shouldhave been in favor of him.
So that would be the lesson Iwould learn.
Shawn (51:24):
Do you see in the Democratic Party right now any
potential leaders that could, Isuppose, move the Democratic
Party out of the wilderness andback into some fighting position
that is specific to aprogressive movement, not just
winning?
Dr. Lichtenstein (51:41):
Yeah, that's a very good question.
I mean, you know who's to say.
Who will, you know, emerge?
I don't want to play thispersonality game.
I mean there's a whole bunch ofpeople.
I do think that a, a, a.
I think that the basis of aprogressive movement would be
opposition to, to Trump, toTrumpism.
(52:01):
I mean, just don't make theseaccommodations.
And you can sort of see thishappening, don't this.
We're an opposition party andhere's what we think.
Make that clear continuously.
The Republicans certainly dothat, democrats do that as well.
And secondly, I do think thatthe alliance with the labor
movement, the one thing thatwhat the labor movement can do,
(52:25):
whether it wins higher wages ornot, it creates a kind of world,
cultural and organizational andpolitical, in which ordinary
people feel that they have acertain agency, a certain power,
a certain collective strength.
And I think that's aprophylactic against the.
(52:47):
Sean Fain has emerged as kindof a national figure.
I mean the you know and youknow and because he sort of he
represents that.
It's not to say that all UAWmembers are are voting for
(53:07):
Democrats or anti-Trump.
They aren't actually in theDeep South.
I did some reportage andthey're split half and half, but
nevertheless there's a kind ofthe origins of a dynamic
movement there and I think thatthe, I think the Democrats have
and will align themselves withthat.
That's, that's one, one part ofthe ingredient, but it's but
(53:28):
it's a big fight because thewhole sort of American political
terrain, cultural terrain, hasbeen tilted to the right and
Trump is trying to consolidatethat right now.
And well, you know, and that'sa that's a big fight, during the
(53:51):
Monica Lewinsky, well, justbefore the Monica Lewinsky
scandal, which really tookClinton sort of out of operation
during the year 1998, clintonwas dickering around with
Gingrich about privatizingSocial Security.
Now, he wasn't going to do thewhole thing, but they were
beginning to, you know, nibblearound doing that, and you know
(54:15):
this was again part of thismovement to the right.
Well, the Lewinsky scandalerupts.
And so who are the staunchsupporters of Bill Clinton in
the midst of this scandal?
Well, it's not the moderateDemocrats, you know, and of
course not the Republicans.
It's the left wing of theDemocratic Party, it's Barney
Frank, you know, who knewsomething about sex and knew
(54:36):
something about finance, youknow.
And people like that.
And so Clinton, right in themiddle of the scandal, says,
well, I guess I better stopdickering around with with Newt
Gingrich on privatizing SocialSecurity, because my staunch if
I want to stay president andavoid impeachment, I have to
(54:57):
sustain Social Security alongwith these left-wingers.
So the meme that came out isthat Monica Lewinsky saved
Social Security.
I mean, I think there's anelement of truth to that.
So that indicates theimportance of cultivating one's
base.
I think that is something thatthe Democrats have to do.
Shawn (55:15):
All right, final question you ready for it?
Yeah, what's somethinginteresting you've been reading,
watching, listening to or doinglately?
And it doesn't have to berelated to this topic, but it
can be.
Dr. Lichtenstein (55:25):
Yeah, I've been reading this wonderful book
by Zachary Carter.
It came out four years ago,three or four years ago, on John
Maynard Keynes, and it's a very, very good book.
And what's interesting about it, he shows the radicalism of
Keynesianism.
See, Keynes, when, by the timeClinton comes along, Keynesians
in America were sort of tepid.
You know, oh, let's give a tinylittle.
(55:46):
You know, we'll give a taxreduction for business.
Well, you know, we'll do it.
They were very tepid.
But this book by Zachary Cartershows that Keynes was a real
radical who really, bothculturally and and economically,
and you know, he wanted, youknow he, both in Britain and
(56:07):
America, he wanted to, you knowto, you know, to basically
manage capitalism in the mostvigorous way possible, so as to
he talked about the euthanasiaof the rentiers, you know, which
meant, the euthanasia of theRobert Rubens, really of this
world.
He didn't mean thatstatistically, he meant that,
you know, economically, and Ithink that I think that kind of
(56:30):
a left Keynesianism and I thinkBiden began to approach that
Keynesianism and I think Bidenbegan to approach that A link to
a kind of industrial policy isthe economic program that any
new liberal formation shouldadvance.
Shawn (56:45):
Hey, what are you working on right now?
Dr. Lichtenstein (56:47):
Ah, I'm writing a book entitled why
Unions Matter, a short bookdesigned for the under 35 age
group, in which I look at bothactually interesting I look at,
like the world of academia andwhy that has, why you've had
this tremendous surge in a prounion direction among the grad
(57:10):
students, and not just in thehumanities but also the sciences
.
I look at some kind of oddlittle union places and try to
see what's significant about whythey exist, from baristas to
taxi drivers in New York to allsorts of people.
And I'm trying to show whyunions are essential and should
(57:34):
be central to the revival of anyliberal movement.
And the last chapter is goingto be looking throughout the
entire 20th century at whentrade unions have saved
democracy, whether it's inefforts to do so, whether it's
Spain or Spain, but actuallybefore Franco, and then after
(57:55):
Franco, or South Africa, orvarious parts of Latin America,
et cetera.
Shawn (57:59):
So I'm going to that's what I'm writing right now- Dr
Lichtenstein, thanks for takingthe time and for the
conversation.
You're welcome, thank you.
Bill Clinton's presidencyreshaped the Democratic Party,
but at what cost?
By prioritizing politicalpragmatism over progressive
(58:23):
ideals, his administrationweakened the social contract,
disillusioned working-classvoters and helped pave the way
for right-wing populism.
The failures of that era stillhaunt us today as we grapple
with democratic backsliding andthe resurgence of authoritarian
politics.
But understanding and acceptingthese failures can maybe also
(58:45):
help us chart a path forward.
Progressives can and shouldreclaim the fight for economic
justice, push for bold policiesthat restore faith in government
and mobilize at the grassrootslevel to rebuild a democracy
that truly serves the people.
Organizing voting, reform andholding leaders accountable are
(59:06):
key steps, critical steps inthis moment, toward reversing
the damage and creating a changethat works for everybody, while
also embracing progressivevalues.
All right, check back next weekfor another episode of Deep
Dive Chat.
Soon, folks, thank you, thankyou.
Bill Clinton.
And here's a mistake, a tragedy.
Bill Clinton could havecaptured that constituency had
he chosen, you know, just a fewthings certainly not NAFTA and a
few other trade issues.
But he didn't.
He didn't and that Perotconstituency, which had a kind
(00:21):
of rough character to it, by theway, as strong in the north as
it was in the south, clintonfailed to capture that, which
meant that by the time he got tothe year 2000, the country was
divided, you know.
Equally, I think you see, inplaces like northern Maine and
certain areas of the rural,industrial, rural Midwest, where
(00:43):
Trump Trump, where Perot wasvery strong, and those areas
have gone over to theRepublicans.
Shawn (00:57):
Welcome to Deep Dive with me, s C Fettig.
The presidency of Bill Clintonis often remembered for economic
prosperity, political centrismand an ability to bridge the gap
between left and right and well, the whole cigar thing.
But as time passes, I thinkit's fair to say that the maybe
(01:20):
devastating ramifications of theClinton presidency are becoming
clearer Beneath the surface.
Clinton's embrace ofneoliberalism,
corporate-friendly policies anda calculated retreat from
progressive ideals may have hadfar-reaching consequences, ones
that we're reckoning with today,maybe even explain today this
(01:41):
Trump era.
By sidelining labor, guttingsocial safety nets and
championing policies likewelfare reform and financial
deregulation, clinton reshapedthe Democratic Party into a
technocratic, market-driveninstitution, one that abandoned
its New Deal roots in favor oftriangulation and political
(02:03):
survival.
As we are experiencing an eraof democratic backsliding in the
United States, it's crucial toask did Clinton's failures in
progressive governance createthe conditions that led to the
rise of Donald Trump?
Did the disillusionment ofworking class voters, the
erosion of economic security andthe retreat from bold leftist
(02:25):
policies opened the door forright-wing populism?
In this episode, I'm joined byDr Nelson Lichtenstein,
professor of history atUniversity of California, santa
Barbara, and co-author of thebook A Fabulous Failure the
Clinton Presidency and theTransformation of American
Capitalism.
We discuss how the Clintonpresidency weakened progressive
(02:52):
governance, the long-term damageit inflicted on the Democratic
Party, maybe American democracyitself, and how it helped lay
the foundation for the politicalcrisis, this grievance-driven,
score-settling Trump era, we'reliving through today.
Alright, if you liked thisepisode, or any episode, please
give it a like, share and followon your favorite podcast
platform and or subscribe to thepodcast on YouTube.
(03:13):
And, as always, if you have anythoughts, questions or comments
, please feel free to email meat deepdivewithshawn at gmailcom
.
Let's do a deep dive.
Dr Lichtenstein, thanks forbeing here.
How are you Delighted to behere?
(03:34):
I'm fine, I'm fine.
Okay, I'm glad to hear it.
So, over the past few years,I've been thinking about how we
got to the present moment we'rein in our politics, which to me
seems like it's short circuitedsomewhere between Bill Clinton
and Donald Trump.
It really seemed like we wereon some type of a trajectory
that wasn't overwhelminglyprogressive, but it did seem
like that was the generaldirection we were kind of
(03:56):
stumbling into.
It didn't feel well directed,but it felt like it was
happening.
So you know where we are now.
10 years ago would have seemedI don't think it's unreasonable
to say utterly impossible.
Know where we are now 10 yearsago would have seemed.
I don't think it's unreasonableto say utterly impossible.
Yet here we are, and I think aknee-jerk reaction would be to
blame figures like George W Bushor Mitch McConnell or Donald
Trump, etc.
And I think that's probablyfair.
(04:17):
But I've also been thinkingmore and more about the failures
if that's the right word ofquote-unquote liberal figures
like Barack Obama and BillClinton and you've written
extensively about thisespecially Clinton.
So I'm excited to get your takeon this.
Dr. Lichtenstein (04:31):
Yes, well, yeah, I mean, there's the
immediate events involving thereturn of Trump and Trumpism in
general.
I think we'll be labeling thisthese last 12 years assuming he
completes his presidency is theage of Trump, although Biden,
you know, is there, but anyway,I think.
(04:53):
So there's the immediateaspects of that.
You know, and you can look at,you know, as you mentioned,
various politicians anddecisions that have been made,
but, in general, I think punditsand historians and just
everyone in general thinks, yeah, there's something, something
went wrong, something definitelywent wrong within the world of,
(05:14):
well, within America and withinthe body of liberalism, and
that's stretching back.
Actually, you can go back toCarter, but Clinton, you're
right, bill Clinton and Obama,despite what I do think were
some genuinely liberal,progressive, actually not
(05:36):
anti-capitalist, but efforts tomanage capitalism which both of
those individuals and somepeople around them had.
Nevertheless, we do label them,and I think probably correctly,
as you know, a part of a, whatwe'd call a, a neoliberal, um,
uh, sort of statecraft from the90s and including, uh, barack
(05:59):
obama's response to the bigeconomic crisis of the 19 of
2008.
Now, I mean this wordneoliberal, by the way, of
course, is such a has become akind of cliche and it kind of
encompasses too much, butnevertheless, when we think
about it, let's crudely just saya kind of belief in
international trade, the market,above that of managing
(06:23):
capitalism domestically and akind of somewhat austere social
programs.
Now, the main point I would make, and I've tried to make in this
book that I wrote on thepresidency of Bill Clinton, is
that it would be a mistake tothink of this strand of
statecraft, of neoliberalstatecraft, as a kind of pure
(06:46):
ideology that individuals likeBill Clinton, you know, walk
into the White House with, orBarack Obama, for that matter,
or any other politician.
That was not the case at alland in fact I think what's the
creative tension and what we canlearn from the experience of,
say, a Clinton or an Obama, isthat their commitment during the
(07:13):
campaign and their whole lifereally to a sort of more
progressive, liberal,pro-working class kind of
democratic politics that theyhad.
That's one reason they wereelected.
Certainly, clinton, hiscampaign in 1992 was one which
(07:34):
was the economy stupid.
What that meant was let's getback to fundamentals, let's end
the stagnation of livingstandards.
But the tension there is that,despite all of these intentions
and people he brought in whoagreed with him.
Nevertheless, social forces,ideological forces, political
(07:59):
upheavals, a whole variety ofcircumstances, some
self-inflicted, some fromwithout, pushed Clinton to where
he ended up in the end of hispresidency as what we think of
today, as kind of thisneoliberal presidency which, in
(08:19):
effect, as Bernie Sanders put itin a very recent post, you know
, the Democrats abandoned theworking class.
So.
But the point of it is that Ithink we have to look at why it
is that sort of good intentions,progressive intentions, were
thwarted and sort of turnedinside out.
I think that's the point thatwe can learn from these
(08:42):
presidencies.
Ok.
Shawn (08:43):
I don't want to put too fine a point on it because I
think you touched on this, but Ithink it's worth digging a
little bit into.
If we're looking at whereClinton and Obama specifically
landed as it relates to kind oftheir approach to globalization
and free trade and, you know,maybe we encapsulate that in
some type of neoliberal ideologyI think you know it's worth
(09:04):
maybe, I guess, putting a finerpoint on this idea that I think
we look back and think thatpresidents come into office and
have a very specific ideology,that then they layer over global
events and they layer overdomestic events and they layer
over, you know, the politics ofthe day.
But in reading some of your workand just kind of reflecting on
both Clinton and Obama, it feelsmore to me that's giving them
(09:27):
maybe a little bit too muchcredit and that instead these
might just have been two figuresthat obviously had influential
figures behind them but thatthey were kind of iterating in
the moment, you know, the end ofthe Cold War, the end of
history, the rise ofglobalization, the internal
(09:48):
politics at home were veryconflictual and that they were
maybe in the moment evolving andadjusting to that and that
ended up creating an ideology inretrospect.
Dr. Lichtenstein (10:03):
Well, right, I mean, I think, yeah, there's a
level of opportunism or just akind of a political happenstance
that takes place Obviously.
I think they made, I thinkthere were some elements that
were wrong.
And while they thought, Ibelieve and I emphasize in my to
the Clinton's health carereform, which he saw not just as
(10:27):
a good thing for expanding thewelfare state but also as
industrial policy, because oneof the reasons that American
industry having difficultycompeting in those days with
Germany and Japan was because ofthe burden of health care costs
.
It costs more money for healthcare than steel, said the
president of the Ford MotorCompany.
(10:48):
This is something that comesout of the economics.
It was essentially benign andthat it could not have the kind
of devastating impact it had onspecific communities,
particularly in the Rust Belt,and I think they underplayed
that.
And then, of course, trade wasnot just about trade.
It was also about immigration,and this was clearly the case
with NAFTA.
(11:08):
I mean, clinton himself didn'twalk into the White House as a
NAFTA warrior.
We have to pass that.
That was not an important partof his campaign or of his
outlook.
It was actually NAFTA the tradeagreement with Mexico was
(11:28):
pushed forward both by theMexican government and by the HW
Bush administration.
But Clinton, I think I call ita blunder in pushing that
forward and it had very, verydeleterious consequences in
terms of his electoral base andwhat we think of as his trade
(11:48):
regime.
Of course, the opening to Chinawas actually far more
devastating, when it came to theindustrial base of the country,
than Mexico.
But your point is right thatthere's always a mixture of kind
of preexisting ideas which arethere, and then the events and
(12:10):
rapid Japan as both differentmodels of capitalism, more
successful models of capitalism,and then of course also trading
(12:47):
threats to the United States.
The end of the Cold War, youknow, took all of that sort of
foreign policy-oriented you know, conversation, discourse which
had dominated American politicsfor decades, was sort of over
and you know we moved on to anew set of problems.
(13:09):
As Senator Tsongas, who was arival of Kennedy, of Obama for
the presidential nomination in1992, put it, he said the Cold
War is over, germany and Japanhave won, and that was something
, a sentiment, that Clinton wasalso concerned with, and so
(13:30):
that's why, both in terms of hisdomestic policies initially,
and even, to some degree, tradepolicies, everyone's forgotten
the very determined effort thatthe Clinton people made to
manage trade with Japan, toforce the Japanese to buy
American products and restrictthe kind of dumping of goods in
(13:55):
the United States.
This was a big effort and itfailed, but it but it indicates
that Clinton again didn't walkinto the White House as a
neoliberal.
He ended up that way, I think,and is probably criticized, but
that was not where he came from.
Again, I repeat, it's importantfor liberals, progressives, to
(14:19):
understand that it's not just aquestion of sheer ideology, that
it's not just a question ofsheer ideology.
It's a question of what yourpolicies are, what coalitions
you create, you know, and howyou conduct your statecraft, to
understand whether you're goingto succeed or fail and move in a
liberal or conservativedirection.
Shawn (14:38):
You make this point and I think we're thinking more about
this just generally in at leastthe political arena the
evolution of, or the impact of,policies under Clinton and, I
suppose, obama and how they havecontributed to what some might
consider to be the morass we'rein right now and I think we tend
to look at if we can just lookat the moment we're in now,
(15:01):
there's a narrative around Trumpand his policies that it's
chaos and that it'sunintelligent or unintelligible
and that it's potentiallydangerous.
But if we take a longer view andI'm not trying to justify this,
but I think if we take thelonger view and maybe you would
disagree but a lot of thegrievance that Trump tapped into
(15:23):
comes directly out of some ofthe policies under Clinton and I
suppose under Obama as well,and you know Trump's policies as
it relates to globalization andthen free trade and trade deals
in a way would almost seem likevery strategically targeted and
outside of the politics of it.
I do wonder if there is acertain amount of intelligence
(15:48):
to it that I don't want toascribe to Trump.
Maybe it's a knee jerk, justinstinctual in him, but I wonder
if you think this is Trumptapping into something a bit
more political, a grievance thatcame out of you know these
policies, or if he's actuallytapping into something that is a
necessity as it relates toAmerican policy in these areas.
Dr. Lichtenstein (16:11):
You know I don't disagree at all.
I mean, clearly that's the caseTrump's tariff sort of fixation
.
He does it very crudely andprobably, you know, have a kind
of certain kinds of backlash,but nevertheless it does reflect
the opposition to certain ofthese free trade ideals.
Let me just make a point aboutfree trade for a second.
(16:33):
Then I want to say somethingelse about Trump as well.
The reason that all economists,actually even today almost, are
in favor of free trade and thisextends over to the left as well
is that it is true that a freetrade regime does have the
(16:55):
effect of kind of in autilitarian way, lowering the
price of goods that you knowthat millions, tens of millions,
hundreds of millions ofconsumers purchase in various
ways, from cars to what you buyat Walmart.
It does lower it.
They're more efficientproducing it in China or Mexico.
However, to the degree thathundreds of millions of people
may save a dollar here or adollar there on their t-shirt or
(17:17):
even their imported car, morethan a few dollars, trade has.
A trade has a very, verypointed and devastating impact
on particular industries,particular communities, and
those have a very largepolitical resonance, and that's
something that that the left hasto deal with and liberals have
(17:38):
to deal with, and something thatTrump, of course, has pointed
out.
Now I want to make one thingthat we do have to, just with
Trump, say this yes, he's pickedup on these economic grievances
, and they are not just againwith the white working class,
but with black and brown andothers as well.
(17:59):
But clearly with Trump there'salso this sort of white,
christian nationalist strand.
It's related, of course, to theeconomic difficulties, but it's
not sort of a one-to-onerelationship.
It can't be quite, you know,mechanically connected, but he
clearly has picked up on thatand I think that really is the
(18:20):
core of his appeal, and I don'tthink we need to, we should just
to be a sort of economicfundamentalist on this question.
That's there, you know.
Shawn (18:30):
Well and I'm glad you bring this up, because I think
we always look for easy answersor easy explanations for things
that have happened or where weare, what's happening and I
think an easy answer would be tolook at Clinton and say there
was some sharp, sharp pivotunder Clinton and a failure on
Clinton's part that contributedto the moment that we're in
today, which may be true, but Ithink the the mistake made in
(18:52):
that is to assume that all ofthe voters that made up the
Democratic coalition in the 80sand 90s then somehow have
pivoted to become the you knowhard right, far right
conservative Trump voters now.
Dr. Lichtenstein (19:05):
Yeah, of course, yeah, of course not
Right, obviously.
And and by the way, you knowthe, the, the Democratic
coalition you know, kind of heldtogether to a degree all
through the through the Obamayears, and you know you can, you
can trace that out in polling.
I would say this the one thingthat a very good economic
(19:26):
historian, gavin Wright, made,the point that NAFTA was this
very.
We remember it now Again.
It's not as important as China,but we remember it very well
because of its politically toxiccharacter.
And what would happen withNAFTA was that its impact
(19:46):
actually, politically wasgreater in the South than in the
industrial North.
It was in the South that therewere lots and lots of sort of
rural apparel factories andparts factories, things that
could be easily moved to Mexico,and they were.
And so the Democrats who hadbeen winning, still winning
(20:06):
congressional elections in theSouth up through the early 90s,
it was in the 1994 election thatthey're wiped out in the South
and that's when the RepublicanParty really comes to dominate
the South in a definitive way,and all those who are called
(20:31):
blue dog Democrats, you know,moderate Democrats, they're
wiped out by, and NAFTA is oneof the major, major reasons that
that happens in 1994.
And from from that point on wewe have a somewhat at least the
conservative coalition gets amajor bulwark.
I would make one other point, bythe way, a figure.
Another figure that we have notmentioned today is Ross Perot
figure.
Another figure that we have notmentioned today is Ross Perot,
and Perot won 19% of thepresidential vote in 1992.
(20:54):
And I think about 9% in 1996.
And Perot was not a right wingculture warrior.
I mean, he had some right wingbackground, you know, when it
came to Vietnam and things ofthat sort.
But he was also emphasizing akind of a hostility to trade, to
NAFTA in particular, and also akind of industrial policy, a
(21:16):
kind of here's a mistake, atragedy.
Bill Clinton could have capturedthat constituency had he chosen
just a few things, certainlynot NAFTA and a few other trade
(21:39):
issues.
But he didn't, he didn't, hedidn't, and that Perot
constituency, which had a kindof rough character to it, by the
way, as strong in the north asit was in the south, clinton
failed to capture that, whichmeant that by the time he got to
the year 2000, the country wasdivided, you know.
(22:01):
Equally, I think, you see, inplaces like northern Maine and
certain areas of the rural,industrial, rural Midwest, where
Trump was, where Perot was verystrong, and those areas have
gone over to the Republicans.
So that was a kind of I wouldjust make this point about
Clinton.
Clinton was a terrible leader ofthe Democratic Party.
(22:22):
He was not.
He was terrible leader of theDemocratic Party.
He was not.
He was terrible.
He and Obama was in his own way, but, but, but certainly on
trade, on many trade deals, andon welfare issues.
He was winning those issueswith Republican votes, not
Democratic votes, in theCongress.
And so he, he really he gothimself reelected, true, but the
(22:43):
Democrats, but the Democratswere harmed by Clinton's
presidency.
Shawn (22:48):
I want to swing back and talk about this last point in a
few minutes the coalitions thatClinton built and how that
potentially underminedprogressive causes.
But before we get there, I'mglad you bring up Ross Perot
because I think history islooking at him a little bit
differently, or the impact thathe has.
And I actually think if we casta wider net and look even
further back, I think we doourselves a disservice, as at
(23:09):
least in the political andgoverning realms, to dismiss
third party candidates and thesupport or the type of support
that they're tapping into.
And I think Perot was acharacter and a figure that
captured such a significantslice of the electorate and, as
you mentioned, Clinton did aterrible job of reaching out to
(23:29):
that electorate and, byextension, I suppose the
Democrats did.
But I wonder if, within theirown house, the Democrats then
made the same mistake in 2016with Bernie Sanders dismissing
whatever it is that he wastapping into.
Dr. Lichtenstein (23:43):
That kind of played out there were different
factors that played into the2020 election but might have the
impact of that ignorance on thepart of Democrats in 2016 may
have played out in this lastelection uh, yeah, right, yes, I
mean yeah, the, the clearly, ifyou get down to the sort of
inside, uh, the you know thewhole way politics, I mean uh,
(24:06):
uh, hillary clinton, and youknow it was very hostile to, to
bernie.
There was no effort to create akind of coalition, that kind of
you know she, just he dismissedhim and that was clearly a
mistake, a mistake and and andand there were, you know, we've
political scientists have shownlots of Sanders supporters ended
up voting for Trump.
There was a kind of that.
(24:26):
There was that kind of oh, Idon't know, pitchfork hostility
to the, to the reigningestablishment and Hillary
Clinton, who, who'd been inpolitics for about 30 years, you
know, represented that Biden,of course, was was smart in the
spring of the year 2020.
He reached out to Bernie andhis supporters and there was a
(24:47):
kind of, you know, a coalitionthat ran and won in 2020.
I also think, by the way, justthat the Black Lives Matter
phenomena was very helpful toBiden, even though he didn't
identify with it, but itenergized millions of people who
got them interested in politicsand I think that had a big
(25:10):
impact later on.
And then, of course, we couldlook at 2024, and I think you
can see that again, sandersdoesn't run, his base, is not
energized and and for whateverher clearly Harris was, was, was
, I mean she wasn't overtlyhostile to it, but that wasn't
something she emphasized.
And and it's kind ofinteresting that that that the,
(25:32):
the Sanders people and AOC etcetera, they were the last ones
to abandon Biden.
They were, they were for Bidenbecause there was this sort of
coalition that Biden had builtwith them and they were
reluctant to abandon it.
But yeah, I mean Hillary wasidentified with the sins of her,
(25:54):
of her husband, and especiallythat there were, there were two
other events, two other policythings in the Clinton period
that made poor middle class,upper middle class liberals
particularly hostile or pissedoff Clinton, and that was the
crime bill of 1994 and thewelfare reform of 1996.
(26:17):
And I mean those two.
They have a it's interestinghistory of them and what's
happened subsequently.
But they were issues that wereparticularly seemed to indicate
Clinton's betrayal of post-civilrights, progressive values, and
(26:38):
he was, you know, too clever byhalf in seeking to, you know,
win reelection and really hemade tremendous enemies among a
certain strata of, I would say,middle class kind of talking
class kind of people and they'dnever forgiven Clinton for that,
(27:00):
bill Clinton for that, andHillary was tarred with it.
Shawn (27:04):
I want to actually talk a bit more about this.
You mentioned this in your lastresponse and one prior about
this coalition of the coalitionsthat Clinton built to.
At the time when he left office, he was considered to have been
a very successful president, orit was a very successful
presidency, at leasteconomically, I suppose.
But really what was happeningunderneath and you've touched on
this is that Clinton wasbuilding coalitions primarily
(27:27):
across the aisle, so he wasworking primarily with
conservatives because he justcouldn't get the ball across the
line with just the Democraticcoalition.
Dr. Lichtenstein (27:35):
And.
Shawn (27:35):
I think what happened there is that he actually ended
up in retrospect cracking thecoalition.
So you end up with and this isjust a broad brush, but you end
up with true progressives thatare pissed off, as you said
right, and then they're kind ofcleaved away from what might be
considered blue dogs and moremoderate Democrats.
That I think what.
(27:56):
This is how I see it, and youcan tell me if this is a bad
characterization.
He made those both parties inthat coalition essentially
politically homeless andweakened.
So the blue dogs or themoderates then became, I think,
to some degree over time, easypickings for the Republican
Party and it's difficult, it wasdifficult, to cobble together
(28:18):
that coalition in 2016 in thesame way, especially with
Hillary Clinton and the baggagethat she was bringing from the
Bill Clinton presidency.
Dr. Lichtenstein (28:26):
Yeah, yes, I mean, you know one thing,
actually, one thing that maybewe learned from Trump is it's
really important to cultivateyour base, that's.
That is that's more importantthan even reaching out.
And Clinton did not cultivatehis base, even reaching out, and
Clinton did not cultivate hisbase.
You know, I mean, I guess aconventional view of colleagues,
oh, you know, let's reach out,you know, fight for the middle
(28:47):
ground, et cetera, but I'm notsure that's entirely true and
the mobilization of your base ismore important and Clinton does
not do that.
I mean, the 1996 election, forexample, the turnout was one of
the worst in American history.
1992 was much better, I wouldsay.
Let me say about his, yes,there's the coalition building
(29:34):
that would support his economicpolicies, especially his
initially stimulus policies andhealthcare policies, and
policies that would again makethe American version economic
conference in Little Rock, andit was full of CEOs, and they
were there not because Clintonwas promising to cut taxes or
deregulate, quite the opposite,it was because Clinton was
promising to policies that would, that would sustain and revive
(29:58):
American industry.
Sustain and revive Americanindustry.
The other wing of capital thatClinton is linked to is
symbolized by Robert Rubin, whois, you know from Goldman Sachs
and Rubin.
And there was an element ofthis true of Wall Street, it's
still true.
Actually, he was a welfarestate liberal.
(30:18):
That is Rubin was you know.
He came out of a family thathad been democratic, left
democratic, for generations.
His mother was a civil rightsactivist and voted for Henry
Wallace in 1948.
And Rubin was, you know, hadsupported McGovern and raised
money for him.
But Rubin, and so Rubin was infavor of, you know, various
(30:40):
kinds of moderate welfare statepolicies and made him sort of
popular in that period.
But what Rubin was also in favorabsolutely of was the absolute
mobility of capital.
That means free trade, but italso means mergers and
acquisitions and the capacity ofWall Street to roam the world
(31:01):
and invest and disinvest whereit chose to do.
So that, he thought, was theessence of kind of a liberal
world.
And he thought I thinkideologically, I think that here
the Wall Streeters weremistaken and the liberals who
went along with them that thiswould ultimately produce a kind
(31:21):
of worldwide civil society.
If you're going to have a stockmarket in China or Russia, well
then you're going to have afinancial press that has to be
free to report on what's goingon, and from there you just move
step by step into kind of atleast, if not liberal democracy,
at least a kind of civilsociety.
Well, they were wrong aboutthat, but that was something
(31:42):
that Rubin thought you know verystrongly.
And he also thought that youknow that low interest rates,
and you know, were a key torevival.
He was not enamored of theindustrial policy ideas which
mean sort of targetedinvestments that Clinton liked
(32:03):
initially.
And so a big fight in the earlyClinton moment, the first year
really is.
You know, are we going to movetoward a balanced budget, the
point of which was not balancingthe budget per se, but it was
getting interest rates downamong the bond traders of
Frankfurt and London and NewYork and Tokyo.
(32:24):
And Rubin was determined to dothat.
He thought that was the key toeconomic revival.
And I mean, I think that wasmistaken, but that was.
But he was a very I always Isay in the book that Rubin is
unquestionably the second mostimportant figure in the Clinton
administration and in someablythe second most important figure
in the Clinton administrationand in some cases the most
important.
Shawn (32:44):
So if we talk about Rubin and then I suppose if we bundle
him with Summers and Reich andtheir approach to global economy
as well as, I suppose, domesticeconomy and the I hate to use
this phrase but the trickle-downimpacts that that's supposed to
have on kind of working-classvoters, which made up at the
time a significant chunk of theDemocratic Party's base, but
(33:06):
we've seen that they have thatpart of the base has shifted and
you know this is notwithstanding the, as you
mentioned, the Christiannationalism that is also making
up part of that base.
But how much do you ascribe toRubin and Summers and Reich
their approach to that shift ofthose voters away from the
(33:28):
Democratic Party and thesituation that we're in today?
Dr. Lichtenstein (33:32):
Well, of course, insofar as they were
quite willing to allow thehollowing out of American
industry and the communitiesdependent upon it, I mean that
creates a sort of socialdynamite or tinder that can be
taken advantage of by the right,and that is the usual today
(33:53):
liberal view of this, and Ithink it's true.
I mean, I think that's whyBiden was so determined to, with
his infrastructure plans andchips plans, to reindustrialize
the Midwest and the Middle South.
I think that's absolutely thecase, and they I mean Summers is
even more of a kind ofcheerleader for international
(34:16):
capital than even Rubin was.
Reich is a little bit different.
International capital than evenRubin was.
Reich is a little bit different.
While Reich was a free traderand he had fights with others on
the liberal side of theadministration on that question,
Reich is a free trader.
He was also very much in favorof domestic stimulus plans,
about regulating industry, andhe clashed with Robert Rubin and
(34:39):
Summers on this question.
So did Joseph Stiglitz, who'salso a figure in the Clinton
administration, head of theCouncil of Economic Advisers,
who also clashes repeatedly withRubin and Summers.
I mean they become absolutelyenemies of the most intense sort
.
Reich, of course, has moved tothe left considerably since then
(35:02):
.
But but at the, at that momentin the early 1990s, he's, he's a
kind of.
He he has this series of essaysyou know well, sort of if you
build it, they will come.
If you educate the Americanworker, make them more skilled,
provide some infrastructure andsort of, you know kind of some,
(35:25):
you know R&D et cetera, Wellthen you know, it doesn't matter
whether the company is owned bythe Japanese or the Germans or
whoever it is, They'll buildfactories in America anyway.
And we get sort of if you buildit, they will come.
I mean, I think that'sfundamentally wrong in terms of
of industrial economics.
But that was, that was the viewthat that Reich had, which
(35:45):
which led him to support NAFTA,while at the same time being
very much in favor of all sortsof domestic initiatives, the
more progressive that Clintonhad.
Shawn (35:58):
This is a bit of an aside , but as long as we're talking
about Reich, he's kind of allover the place right now and,
like you said, he's writing aseries of essays and you know
people have the ability toreinvent themselves.
But I have to tell you withthis lens that we see the
Clinton presidency, clintonpolicies and how they've played
out over the past handful ofdecades and the potential
contribution that that has beento our current politics.
(36:19):
It's really hard to look atReich now and take anything that
he says seriously or at leastwithout a caveat of.
Well, dude, you might be partof the reason.
Dr. Lichtenstein (36:29):
Yeah, that's a good point.
Yeah, no, I, although I dothink.
I mean I think he's, he'sproven his bona fides over the
last 20 years.
He has been for 20 years he,he's been more than that
Actually.
Actually he has been on theleft, at least, you know, in his
public presentation.
I mean he actually wrote thisbook, locked in the Cabinet,
which he published in 1997 or 8.
(36:50):
That is a pretty bitter bookactually, critical of Clinton, I
think.
To make this point, which Ithink does reflect the
progressive politics in this era, the period from the 70s and
80s and early 90s was the worstperiod for the American labor
movement in the 20th century.
(37:12):
It's certainly in terms of itsappeal to other sectors of
society.
It was losing.
Of course it was losing membersand losing clout.
But even more it was the worstperiod Ideologically and in
terms of its sort of generalsort of social outlook and its
(37:33):
attractiveness.
You know, in the 20th centuryit was, you know it was, you
know, had been a staunt, thelast support of the Cold War.
It really ignored the newsocial formations arising in the
working class and people likeReich and Bill Clinton were, you
(37:53):
know, reciprocated with kind ofdisdain.
And you know this is not aplayer.
So I think that's, as I said,that's sort of a hand that
didn't clap a dog, that didn'tbark, an absence from the body
politic which I mean.
Today the labor movement isactually still very weak in
terms of numbers butideologically, you know,
(38:14):
culturally it has.
It has more more kind ofsalience.
I have to say I was part of amovement in the mid-'90s when
Sweeney came in and took overthe, to sort of link up sort of
left-wing academics and radicalactivists with the labor
movement.
Again, I think that has happenedto some degree.
Reich's and people like Reichwho were sort of they really
(38:41):
were trying to construct aliberalism without, you know, a
full hand.
You know you can't construct aliberalism without the labor
movement, or at least the ideaof a labor movement, and they
were trying to do that.
And that was something thatthat was beyond Bill Clinton's
can.
He couldn't snap his fingersand create a labor movement, but
it wasn't there.
(39:02):
It was in numbers stronger thanit is today, but ideologically
and culturally it was at itsmost retrobate and unattractive
to liberals anyway, during thewhole 20th century, the whole
20th century.
And I think that's somethingthat it wasn't Clinton's fault,
(39:30):
but it was one reason that hecould drift to the right so
easily and a labor movement thatexists and that is vocal and
has the potential for growing.
I think that helps disciplinethe Democratic Party, at least
to a degree, and we may beseeing that a little bit today.
Shawn (39:44):
So I want to talk a little bit about 1994 election,
because it was kind of a seismicshock to the system that we had
come to know, right, that itreally broke to some degree the
Democrats' dominance in DC.
And so not only that, you know,did the House go Republican,
but the leadership was underGingrich, who was a whole new
(40:05):
style of politics.
Right, he was a real bombthrower.
Politics is warfare, really.
And I wonder if I don't knowthat we can really do this, but
in retrospect, if Clinton wasreally boxed in in such a way
that he probably could we makean argument that he could not
have advanced progressive causesafter 1994 and that what he was
doing instead was just tryingto find a way to be somewhat
(40:28):
successful.
Dr. Lichtenstein (40:29):
Oh, yes, well, unquestionably, after the
election of 94, I mean, clintonfamously triangulates and tries
to reach various kinds ofaccommodations with the Gingrich
Republicans.
I mean, he's actually as a kindof clever politician, he
actually does that in someclever ways.
(40:51):
He does do that, he does cuthis losses, as it were, but
unquestionably he's on thedefensive, his ambitions are
curbed dramatically and ofcourse he does move to the, to
the right.
He, he pushes the welfarereform bill which which was
adamantly opposed by many, manyin his cabinet and in the
(41:13):
Democratic Party I mean reallyhis closest people, some of them
were opposed to it.
He pushes that in the mostcynical way, thinking that this
is the only way he can getreelected in 1996.
That probably wasn't true, buthe does that.
In any event.
I want to just say one thingabout Newt Gingrich.
(41:34):
Yes, he's called a bomb throwerand he's rhetorically a kind of
ultra kind of figure.
But one thing he does, and BillKristol again.
Bill Kristol today is a bit ofa whatever Trumper and and it's
sort of, I guess, rifted a bitto the left.
But in those days there's a bigfight inside the Republican
(41:57):
Party.
The Dole wing, the Robert Dolewing, dole will run for
president as Republican in 1996.
Dole thinks we can make somecompromises with Clinton,
especially on health care.
We can, you know, and we'llcome up with some system, some
program which is, you know,amenable to the insurance
companies, and you know, butit'll be better.
Gingrich and Bill Kristol sayabsolutely not.
(42:21):
And you have this remarkablesituation in 1993 and 4 in which
the right wing of theRepublican Party is lobbying
business, not the other wayaround.
The Republicans are lobbyingbusiness and business
associations to not cooperatewith Clinton and Ira Magaziner,
(42:43):
who is the head of the healthcare task force, not to
cooperate with them inconstructing some sort of a
health care plan, and they justsay no, nothing, we don't want
anything.
No, compromise nothing.
And they actually win on that.
The health care which was themajor initiative, domestic
(43:03):
initiative of the Clinton people.
It goes down to defeat andalong with NAFTA that I think
sets the stage for the 1994Republican victories in Congress
.
That point on.
Shawn (43:22):
You know, again Clinton is dickering around with
Gingrich on various questionsthat you know move him to the
right in general, in general,this also is an aside, but as
long as you bring him up, thismight be more of an observation
than a question, but I thinkit's fascinating that figures
like Bill Kristol and maybeCharlie Sykes as well they were
not just conservative figures.
They were really in theRepublican trenches in the 90s
(43:44):
and early 2000s up until theybecame Never Trumpers, and what
I find fascinating about that isthat when they became Never
Trumpers both of them along witha handful of other pretty
right-wing figures they alsobecame a bit leftist in their
policies, and I'm not sure whathappened there.
Dr. Lichtenstein (44:00):
No, that's an observation I made too, and I'm
not entirely understanding whatthat represents.
Clearly, one thing itrepresents is that I think that
they were neoconservatives ingeneral and foreign policy
questions.
They've been big champions ofthe Iraq war and Trump clearly
is not part of that.
But you're right, and we don'tentirely understand it.
(44:22):
The other thing I would say itindicates that they were chiefs
without Indians.
I thought, well, if all thesesort of famous Republicans are
against Trump, surely theyrepresent one or two or five
percent of the Republican base,but apparently not at all at.
You know, one or two or fivepercent of the Republican base,
but apparently not at all.
(44:43):
So so they, they seem,seemingly had no influence
either in 19, in 2016 or 2024.
But you're right, they have.
They have moved a bit to theleft, and that's.
That's a phenomenon I don'tthink we entirely understand,
because you know, I guess LizCheney, if you actually would
probe her, she would say, yeah,I'm still a right wing
Republican on all sorts ofquestions, but I mean, that
(45:05):
seems to be a much lessimportance than her, than her
opposition to to to Trump onconstitutional grounds.
Yeah, so, adam Kinzinger too.
Yeah, yeah, all of them, I meanall of them.
I mean I mean actually LizCheney.
I think she made a point whenshe was fighting the Republicans
.
She was so in Congress ofvoting down the line for the
(45:27):
most conservative position.
She wanted to make it clearthat I'm still a conservative
Republican, even though I thinkTrump is illegitimate.
But that didn't.
That had no impact.
Shawn (45:35):
That had no one cared cared your most recent book A
Fabulous Failure about theClinton presidency.
We could chalk it up to youknow a title right, but clearly
you do see the Clintonpresidency through this lens.
And so I guess I wonder, inretrospect and knowing what we
know now and if we take thetitle at face value, how should
(45:56):
we be evaluating the Clintonpresidency overall?
Dr. Lichtenstein (45:59):
Yeah, well, I mean, I say fabulous is sort of
it.
Well, the reason the wordfabulous is there is because
Janet Yellen and anotherprominent economist, alan
Blinder, wrote a book, a smallbook, in the year 2000, in which
they said they said it was afabulous decade, and you know,
(46:19):
and there are lots of indexes ofeconomic performance say that's
right, low unemployment, abooming stock market, a rising
GNP, a balanced budget, abalanced budget.
So, yes, there was the OK, but,but all of this was kind of
built on sand.
I mean, all of this didn't havereally firm grounding and it
(46:44):
would be either, you know,evaporate or be destroyed, you
know, in subsequent years.
And the fact that Al Gore, hewins the popular vote but loses
in the year 2000,.
He should have, look, peace andprosperity.
He should have won in a, youknow, in a landslide.
And I mean there are reasonsfor that.
I think that Clinton set thestage for that.
(47:07):
It wasn't just Monica Lewinsky,by the way.
It was that Al Gore could notput forward a bold program
because the balanced budget thatClinton did create at the end
of his administration was a kindof albatross.
He was so afraid that theRepublicans would just create a
(47:33):
series of tax breaks, whichGeorge W Bush would do when he
gets in.
But Clinton was so afraid ofthat George W Bush would do when
he gets in, but Clinton was soafraid of that.
They said, well, we're going toput this balanced budget, we're
going to devote it entirely tosustaining Social Security, and
Al Gore would say we're puttingthe budget surplus in a lockbox.
Well, what the hell is that?
Who cares about that?
(47:55):
I mean, gore could not make anybold plans, any attractive
plans in running for presidentin the year 2000.
And so you know, it was muchcloser than it should have been
and he lost.
So I mean Clinton kind ofcreates a prison of his own
design by the end of the 1990s,which kind of stymies him in any
(48:20):
effort to use that remarkablebalanced budget for any, to help
his constituents, to help hisbase, to help his.
You know the people who votedfor him.
Shawn (48:31):
One of the narratives about this past election is that
Democrats are lost in thewilderness and have completely
lost touch with their base, andthere's probably a nugget of
truth to that, but that'snotwithstanding the fact that
the popular vote was very close.
The Democrats lost or gained aseat in the House and, you know,
the Senate was really probablybecause of malapportionment.
(48:53):
You know it wasn't like awipeout right, but it is true
that the labor vote and theworking class vote has
definitely shifted towards theRepublican Party and away from
the Democratic Party and in thatsense the Democratic Party does
have some soul searching to doRight.
And they do have toreconstitute themselves and try
to put together some type of acoalition and if they want to be
(49:14):
, want that coalition to beprogressive.
I guess my question for you isif they were to just examine the
trajectory of the vote awayfrom them since the Clinton era,
what could they learn fromClinton's presidency in
reconstituting themselves now?
Dr. Lichtenstein (49:31):
Well, as I said, yeah, one has to provide
benefits and ideological andmaterial for one's base, for the
base.
I think Biden tried to do that,but imperfectly.
By the way, I would just makethis point that the yes, the
working class vote in general,the 90 percent of the working
(49:51):
class who are not in unions, andthis includes brown and black
people as well did well, it didmore.
Mainly it stayed home.
Mainly it voted for the couchmore than for Trump, and that's
the demobilization of the base.
The actual number in unions,the people, the 10% of the
(50:11):
electorate in unions, actuallymaintain their support for the
Democrats pretty much, andpartly that was just the get out
the vote efforts of the unions.
But that that was, of course.
That wasn't enough to to, to,to be decisive.
But I think, I think the lessonwe learned from Clinton for
contemporary Democrats is thatyou that the key to winning
(50:35):
elections is the mobilization ofone's base.
That is the key.
Don't try to reach out to somemythical or a center, because
actually, in fact, most peopleare polarized.
Harris made a big mistake inbutting around with Cheney, not
because Cheney was a bad person,but because she didn't
(50:57):
represent anybody.
Liz Cheney didn't reallyrepresent.
There was no substance to herconstituency, but anyway.
But to mobilize the base.
I think Bernie Sandersunderstood that, I think Biden
understood it but was unable todo it, and I think that's the
lesson we should learn.
And Clinton didn't do that.
That's why he was a terribleparty manager, and I think
(51:17):
that's the lesson we shouldlearn.
And Clinton didn't do that.
That's why he was a terribleparty manager and he demobilized
, you know, people who shouldhave been in favor of him.
So that would be the lesson Iwould learn.
Shawn (51:24):
Do you see in the Democratic Party right now any
potential leaders that could, Isuppose, move the Democratic
Party out of the wilderness andback into some fighting position
that is specific to aprogressive movement, not just
winning?
Dr. Lichtenstein (51:41):
Yeah, that's a very good question.
I mean, you know who's to say.
Who will, you know, emerge?
I don't want to play thispersonality game.
I mean there's a whole bunch ofpeople.
I do think that a, a, a.
I think that the basis of aprogressive movement would be
opposition to, to Trump, toTrumpism.
(52:01):
I mean, just don't make theseaccommodations.
And you can sort of see thishappening, don't this.
We're an opposition party andhere's what we think.
Make that clear continuously.
The Republicans certainly dothat, democrats do that as well.
And secondly, I do think thatthe alliance with the labor
movement, the one thing thatwhat the labor movement can do,
(52:25):
whether it wins higher wages ornot, it creates a kind of world,
cultural and organizational andpolitical, in which ordinary
people feel that they have acertain agency, a certain power,
a certain collective strength.
And I think that's aprophylactic against the.
(52:47):
Sean Fain has emerged as kindof a national figure.
I mean the you know and youknow and because he sort of he
represents that.
It's not to say that all UAWmembers are are voting for
(53:07):
Democrats or anti-Trump.
They aren't actually in theDeep South.
I did some reportage andthey're split half and half, but
nevertheless there's a kind ofthe origins of a dynamic
movement there and I think thatthe, I think the Democrats have
and will align themselves withthat.
That's, that's one, one part ofthe ingredient, but it's but
(53:28):
it's a big fight because thewhole sort of American political
terrain, cultural terrain, hasbeen tilted to the right and
Trump is trying to consolidatethat right now.
And well, you know, and that'sa that's a big fight, during the
(53:51):
Monica Lewinsky, well, justbefore the Monica Lewinsky
scandal, which really tookClinton sort of out of operation
during the year 1998, clintonwas dickering around with
Gingrich about privatizingSocial Security.
Now, he wasn't going to do thewhole thing, but they were
beginning to, you know, nibblearound doing that, and you know
(54:15):
this was again part of thismovement to the right.
Well, the Lewinsky scandalerupts.
And so who are the staunchsupporters of Bill Clinton in
the midst of this scandal?
Well, it's not the moderateDemocrats, you know, and of
course not the Republicans.
It's the left wing of theDemocratic Party, it's Barney
Frank, you know, who knewsomething about sex and knew
(54:36):
something about finance, youknow.
And people like that.
And so Clinton, right in themiddle of the scandal, says,
well, I guess I better stopdickering around with with Newt
Gingrich on privatizing SocialSecurity, because my staunch if
I want to stay president andavoid impeachment, I have to
(54:57):
sustain Social Security alongwith these left-wingers.
So the meme that came out isthat Monica Lewinsky saved
Social Security.
I mean, I think there's anelement of truth to that.
So that indicates theimportance of cultivating one's
base.
I think that is something thatthe Democrats have to do.
Shawn (55:15):
All right, final question you ready for it?
Yeah, what's somethinginteresting you've been reading,
watching, listening to or doinglately?
And it doesn't have to berelated to this topic, but it
can be.
Dr. Lichtenstein (55:25):
Yeah, I've been reading this wonderful book
by Zachary Carter.
It came out four years ago,three or four years ago, on John
Maynard Keynes, and it's a very, very good book.
And what's interesting about it, he shows the radicalism of
Keynesianism.
See, Keynes, when, by the timeClinton comes along, Keynesians
in America were sort of tepid.
You know, oh, let's give a tinylittle.
(55:46):
You know, we'll give a taxreduction for business.
Well, you know, we'll do it.
They were very tepid.
But this book by Zachary Cartershows that Keynes was a real
radical who really, bothculturally and and economically,
and you know, he wanted, youknow he, both in Britain and
(56:07):
America, he wanted to, you knowto, you know, to basically
manage capitalism in the mostvigorous way possible, so as to
he talked about the euthanasiaof the rentiers, you know, which
meant, the euthanasia of theRobert Rubens, really of this
world.
He didn't mean thatstatistically, he meant that,
you know, economically, and Ithink that I think that kind of
(56:30):
a left Keynesianism and I thinkBiden began to approach that
Keynesianism and I think Bidenbegan to approach that A link to
a kind of industrial policy isthe economic program that any
new liberal formation shouldadvance.
Shawn (56:45):
Hey, what are you working on right now?
Dr. Lichtenstein (56:47):
Ah, I'm writing a book entitled why
Unions Matter, a short bookdesigned for the under 35 age
group, in which I look at bothactually interesting I look at,
like the world of academia andwhy that has, why you've had
this tremendous surge in a prounion direction among the grad
(57:10):
students, and not just in thehumanities but also the sciences
.
I look at some kind of oddlittle union places and try to
see what's significant about whythey exist, from baristas to
taxi drivers in New York to allsorts of people.
And I'm trying to show whyunions are essential and should
(57:34):
be central to the revival of anyliberal movement.
And the last chapter is goingto be looking throughout the
entire 20th century at whentrade unions have saved
democracy, whether it's inefforts to do so, whether it's
Spain or Spain, but actuallybefore Franco, and then after
(57:55):
Franco, or South Africa, orvarious parts of Latin America,
et cetera.
Shawn (57:59):
So I'm going to that's what I'm writing right now- Dr
Lichtenstein, thanks for takingthe time and for the
conversation.
You're welcome, thank you.
Bill Clinton's presidencyreshaped the Democratic Party,
but at what cost?
By prioritizing politicalpragmatism over progressive
(58:23):
ideals, his administrationweakened the social contract,
disillusioned working-classvoters and helped pave the way
for right-wing populism.
The failures of that era stillhaunt us today as we grapple
with democratic backsliding andthe resurgence of authoritarian
politics.
But understanding and acceptingthese failures can maybe also
(58:45):
help us chart a path forward.
Progressives can and shouldreclaim the fight for economic
justice, push for bold policiesthat restore faith in government
and mobilize at the grassrootslevel to rebuild a democracy
that truly serves the people.
Organizing voting, reform andholding leaders accountable are
(59:06):
key steps, critical steps inthis moment, toward reversing
the damage and creating a changethat works for everybody, while
also embracing progressivevalues.
All right, check back next weekfor another episode of Deep
Dive Chat.
Soon, folks, thank you, thankyou.
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