August 27, 2025 • 31 mins
In Part 1, we explored the three terrorist incidents that shaped TSA policy. Now, we examine whether the agency actually works. Join Alice and Zach as they dive into the TSA's shocking 95% failure rate in security tests, the human cost of security theater, and the recent policy changes that have everyone asking: if we can keep our shoes on now, why couldn't we before? After 23 years and over $200 billion, has the TSA made us safer, or just made us feel safer? This episode asks the tough questions about one of America's most controversial federal agencies.
Sources:
- "Transportation Security Administration" - Wikipedia
- "It Was Shoes On, No Boarding Pass Or ID. But Airport Security Forever Changed On 9/11" - David Schaper, NPR, September 10, 2021
- "A Look at How Airport Security Has Evolved Post 9-11" - Diane Gerace, Philadelphia International Airport, June 11, 2021
- "DHS to End 'Shoes-Off' Travel Policy" - Department of Homeland Security Press Release, July 8, 2025
- "TSA's new airport security: What travelers need to know in 2025" - Doc Louallen, ABC News, July 17, 2025
- "Is TSA PreCheck still worth it after security changes?" - Steph Whiteside, NewsNation, July 18, 2025
Find FINAL BOARDING CALL online:
- Website: finalboardingcallpodcast.com
- Instagram: @FinalBoardingCallPod
- Facebook: Final Boarding Call
Credits: Final Boarding Call is hosted by Alice Stern and Zach Stemas, researched and written by Alice Stern, produced and edited by Alice Stern and Zach Stemas.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:01):
Picture that it's part two folks.
In our last episode, we exploredthe three terrorist incidents that
shaped modern airport security.
In every case, passengers and crew,actually prevented the catastrophe.
But those incidents did lead tothe security measures that we
(00:24):
all know, shoe removal, the 3 1 1liquid rule and full body scanners.
Today we are asking the fundamentalquestion, has it worked?
And is TSA worth the very expensivetab that they have built up?
(00:46):
So still your tray tables fastenyour seat belts and prepare for
some uncomfortable truths becausethis is final boarding call.
Rero Music beep.
Hello and welcome backto Final Boarding Call.
(01:07):
I am your disaster obsessedhost, Alice, and I'm still Zach.
I don't really wanna roll withthe reluctant thing anymore.
That was something that you made up andit doesn't really, I don't know, feel fun.
And I'm a fun guy.
I'm just Ken.
(01:27):
I never watched that movie,so it does nothing for me.
Alright, well, oh boy.
Am I not so reluctant?
Would you still say you're a homebody?
I'll stop calling you reluctant.
That's easy enough for me to edit.
But would you classifyyourself as a homebody?
Well, yeah, but is that the onlything That's gonna be my identifier?
(01:50):
No.
Okay.
I'll find something.
Got it.
Okay.
Uh, if anybody has any ideas forfun taglines for Zach and I know
that much of our listener base.
Know Zach quite well, so go ahead andslide in our dms or leave a comment.
We're about to get some unhingedsuggestions in the comments.
(02:13):
Most of 'em will probably be my Facebook.
Oh, it'll be okay.
Okay.
Before we dive in, quickreminder to all of our listeners.
Please, please, folks, rate, review,subscribe, and tell a friend.
Honestly, I feel like word ofmouth has been huge for us.
We did just have a really amazingmonth in July for listenership,
(02:35):
so we are really grateful.
We got the best friends, wereally do have the best friends.
So thank you all.
We love you.
Okay.
Before we fully dive into this episode,Zach, I wanna acknowledge something.
The elephant in the room, the elephantin the room, and that is that this el,
(02:58):
this elephant, this episode is probablygoing to make people uncomfortable.
It might piss some people off.
I love that.
Yes.
And that's because.
You know, I feel like anytime you bringup a law enforcement, anything, there's
a little bit of controversy behindit by the very nature of what it is.
(03:20):
Honestly, I think people thatare even like thin, blue line,
all that stuff all day long.
I don't think anybody likes TSA.
I think it's okay.
Okay.
Well, whether this pisses you offor not, we're gonna keep going so.
I wanna acknowledge it, but we're alsogonna do the thing, trigger warning.
Trigger your warning.
You might be triggered, um, butyou're gonna learn something.
(03:43):
So here we go.
How well does the TSA actually work?
Zach, that's the question based onour last three, I'm gonna guess not
very well since TSA catches nothingand it happens in the plane anyway,
and all of a sudden they're like, oh,we should have a rule against that.
(04:03):
Oh my gosh.
Okay.
And I am also going to giveyou a crazy statistic here.
So in the intro I mentioned that.
The TSA has accumulated quite a bar tab.
Mm-hmm.
It's been 23 years of TSA existing.
(04:25):
The grand total is over 200billion with a B dollars.
So that's, that's much, in my opinion.
Um, they might call that a buku buck.
They might call that a KU buck.
And here's the thing, if the TSA waslike really doing some work, we could,
(04:48):
maybe justify something like that.
But whew, we're gonna dive intoit and it's gonna get pretty,
pretty uncomfortable here.
Okay.
I'm already uncomfortable, Zachary.
All right.
We have data that we're gonna talk about.
So this is all facts.
No printer.
(05:09):
Just so everybody's aware.
All facts, no printers.
I hate our printers still.
The agency, the TSA has its own undercoveroperations that they call red team.
So this is where TSA investigatorspose as passengers and they attempt
(05:33):
to smuggle weapons and explosivesthrough security to literally test.
Whether they're going to getflagged, I want that job.
It sounds pretty badass, right?
Alright, Zach, the resultsare catastrophically bad.
(05:54):
86% of the time they get through.
I wish it was that.
Number's it higher than that number.
Let's talk about hilarious.
Let's talk about it.
Okay.
2015 was the year that shouldhave changed everything.
The Department of Homeland SecurityInspector General conducted comprehensive
(06:15):
undercover tests at airports nationwide,sending these investigators with their
fake weapons and their fake explosives.
I don't know, maybe they were realthrough TSA checkpoints to see if
the screeners would catch them.
TSA officers failed to detect weapons,explosives, and other prohibited items
(06:38):
in 95% of the test attempts, meaningthat these items were only detected 5%.
Of the time.
We may be really bad at ourjobs, but we have jobs that's
(06:58):
that's, uh, really, really bad.
The failure was so spectacular thatit actually led to the immediate
reassignment of then acting TSAadministrator, Melvin Caraway.
But when you look at the patternof test results over the TSA entire
existence, the 95% failure rate.
(07:20):
Was not an anomaly.
It was consistent with the very, very badperformance of TSA since its creation.
So let's rewind.
It's 2004.
What was happening in 2004?
Oh my gosh.
Brittany Bitch.
The TSA.
(07:41):
The TSA officials at San Franciscowere caught alerting screeners when
undercover tests were happening.
Cheaters, Hmm, they'recheaters and they still failed.
In 2006, Newark screenersfailed 20 of 22 undercover tests
(08:02):
missing both guns and bombs.
In 2010, A, B, C News found agentsbrought weapons through security
70% of the time at major airports.
In 2011, Honolulu fired 36 screenersfor regularly allowing bags through
(08:25):
without even looking at them.
Oh, wow.
Just like, don't care,just send it on through.
Now to give a wee bit of credit,because this sounds very harsh and
mean, they do catch some real threats.
In 2022, they intercepted a record6,301 firearms at checkpoints.
(08:50):
88% of those were already loaded.
Oh, so pay, that's many.
Yeah.
And that's great.
They also regularly find concealedweapons like knives hidden in cane
handles, stun guns disguised ascell phones, which is like, oh, and
(09:13):
blades embedded in belt buckles.
And I just gotta say, peopleare getting very crafty.
Yeah.
Honestly, I'm gonna guess that thisis still padded statistics, kind of
like the COVID stuff, in my opinion.
What did this did come, this part thatI'm pulling did come from the TSA website
directly, those numbers, which makes itsound like it more so would be padded, but
(09:37):
there's lots of people with belt bucklesthat have a little knife in them, like
some people like to just be tactical andbe prepared for some weird situations.
And it's easy to forgethaving something like that.
Like the belt that you wearevery day has a knife in it.
You're still wearing that beltevery day and you go to the airport.
So they're getting some inflatedwinds, I would say by catching these
(10:00):
people that just didn't think about it.
Have you ever wanted a beltbuckle with a knife in it?
No.
Okay.
I was about to add thatto your Christmas list.
I think they're stupid,but people buy 'em.
Okay.
Would you rather have a beltbuckle with a knife in it?
Or a stun gun disguised as a cell phone.
(10:21):
I think the stun gun disguisedas a cell phone is super sweet.
I would totally get one of those.
All right, noted.
If anybody's wondering what Zach wantsfor Chris, put it on the wishlist.
I'm gonna be like an OnlyFansgirl and like have an Amazon
wishlist on our link to website.
Thing.
Zach wants a stun gun cell phone.
(10:43):
Okay.
Like extra, extra, extra large lingerie.
Why would this be on here?
Oh my God.
Here's the irony, Zach.
Well, failing to detect weapons 95%of the time and controlled tests.
TSA scanners are incredibly sensitiveto something completely harmless.
(11:05):
Human sweat.
I did have to get real patted downand they talked about a strip search
when, uh, I went through on theway back from Chicago without you.
Yes, it is.
It's literally called SwampCrotch, this phenomenon.
So they blamed it on my pantsbeing too low, and I'm like, well,
(11:27):
you made me take off my belt.
You fucking buell.
The pants too low or swampy crotch.
Their millimeter wave scanners respondto moisture leading to invasive pet
down pat downs for sweaty travelers.
Why are you so wet down here?
(11:49):
Come on.
So we have a system in place rightnow that is great at detecting
whether you are nervous, but terribleat finding like actual threats.
I am.
Ugh.
Bogey Beyond effectiveness.
The TSA has generated an extensivecatalog of abuse that would be
(12:10):
shocking for any government agency.
Are you ready for one that happened?
You think the NYP D's bad?
Wait till you say TSA.
Oh my gosh.
You ready for one?
That happened at DIA Denver.
Tell me.
Okay.
In 20 15, 2 TSA employees atDenver International Airport.
(12:30):
Coordinated to falsely flag attractivemale passengers for invasive pat downs.
When an attractive man went throughthe scanner, one employee would signal
his colleague to falsely trigger analarm requiring an enhanced pat down,
involving extensive groin touching.
(12:51):
Were these attractive female TSA workers.
Uh, by chance, not that it makesit better, I'm just curious.
At least one of 'em was a male.
Oh.
Um, the TSA fired both employees, butprotected their identities to shield
them from prosecution, which is wild.
Uh, time Magazine leader intervieweda former TSA employee who called
(13:14):
groping passengers businessas usual within the agency.
Have you ever had like a really invasive.
Twice.
Twice.
Okay.
I, I'm real, I'm real good at the randoms.
Oh my gosh.
Well, I had, this isactually a funny story, guys.
Speaking of things that it detectsthat are complete nonsense I was
(13:34):
bringing a girlfriend, a package ofbath salts that we had made in Ang
on a trip, and I flew home with them.
She was outta room in her bag,and then I was flying to Dallas
and bringing them to her, and.
They got flagged as, yes, this is a bomb.
(13:54):
Like you know how sometimes they pullstuff outta your bag and then they like
swipe it with that sheet and they put itinto the machine and it's like negative.
Only on the way to Texas, though theywere fine with it when you left Anguilla.
That's so true.
So true.
Not flagged, uh, in any way,shape or form in Anguilla.
But yeah, the Colorado SpringsAirport, they pulled it out and I was
(14:15):
like, literally like, okay, this isnot a big deal that happens when I
fly with candles or when I fly with,anything kind of organic material.
Well, it came back as a fucking bomb,Zach, and I think I told you this, but
they brought out like the bomb squad guythat works at the airport, and I got, this
(14:37):
was not just like a casual like, oh, we'regonna rub between your legs real quick.
I got frisked in a way.
That was wild.
Needless to say, folks,it wasn't a bomb surprise.
Stop being such a sketchy individual.
Tell you what, God, it was wild.
(14:57):
Let's talk about theft.
How much TSA steals from people.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
This is actually aquestion that I have had.
Well, from 2010 to 2014,passengers reported 25,016
incidents of theft from luggage.
(15:17):
Yes.
This is from the luggage.
This is when you get those little slips,except I doubt they're putting a slip
in the ones that they're stealing from.
But do you ever get those?
Oh, I bet they do.
It's that would cover them even more.
It's like your bag was randomlysearched, so we had to open it.
I'm sure like if they're stealingstuff in there, I would absolutely
(15:38):
put that slip in there and belike, oh, maybe it just fell out.
We'll see if we can find it.
No way.
I wouldn't want them knowingthat I'd open their bag.
Because then they haveproof that TSA handled it.
I don't know.
But in any case, however, it's happening,people are reporting that things are
going missing from their luggage.
And by 2011, 500 TSAH agentshad been fired for stealing.
(16:04):
So that's, I mean, that's wild.
Despite over 400 theft reportsin Pittsburgh alone, not
a single arrest was made.
Sounds right.
The TSA does not sharetheft reports with police.
As a matter of policy, man,somebody at that Pittsburgh
airport had some sticky fingers.
(16:26):
Former TSA agent.
Umhis Brown admitted to stealingover $800,000 worth of items saying
that it was very convenient tosteal due to poor agency morale.
Oh, that's funny to me.
(16:51):
I was just so bored and everybody was somean that I just stole everybody's stuff.
I hate my job, so I juststole a bunch of jewelry.
Okay.
And Zach, obviously, one ofthe biggest issues with TSA is
gonna be discrimination, right?
The TSA behavioral detection programsdisproportionately target, I guess.
(17:17):
Guess who?
I don't want to guess.
Okay.
Well, it's exactly whoyou imagined it would be.
It's Arabs, Muslims, and Latinos.
Boom.
Actually, so I'm gonna soundstupid for saying this.
They didn't pop into my head at all.
Immediately.
I was like, ohoh, everybody'smean to the blacks.
(17:40):
Like,
and that's how not racist I am isthat I don't even think about the
standard practice of racism for flying.
When you say it, it makes sense.
I'm like, oh, right,because of these things.
Yes.
Yeah.
My bad.
Yes.
The Jason Scientific Advisorygroup concluded that there is no
(18:04):
scientific evidence that existsto support the detection of
future behavior, including intent.
So literally them just randomlydiscriminating and like selecting people
to go through further testing that.
Is not work.
It can't work scientifically.
(18:25):
Mm-hmm.
Doesn't work.
We are spending hundreds of millionsannually on a program that doesn't
work and enables discrimination andtheft, and doesn't stop the thing
that it's actually supposed to stop.
On July 8th, 2025, department of HomelandSecurity Secretary Christie Nome announced
(18:49):
that passengers no longer need to removeshoes at security checkpoints citing
cutting edge technological advancement.
Cutting edge.
Zach, tell me, what did they do?
There's actually no cuttingedge technological advancements.
She was just, she was justusing words that sounded cool.
(19:13):
This raises the obvious question,if the technology exists now to
screen shoes while wearing them.
How long has it existed?
Prob probably since thefirst full body scanner.
And I fly folks a lot and I can tell youright now that at least at the Colorado's
(19:35):
Springs Airport, there has not beenany changes to the technology that.
Is being used at security.
It looks, it's just a program update guy.
Maybe it doesn't have to look different.
That's so true.
Zach, who am I to, uh,make assumptions, okay.
Why were we forced to remove ourshoes for 24 years if technology could
(19:59):
have eliminated this requirement?
Consider the waste.
If just 10% of 800 million annualpassengers spent an extra 30 seconds
on shoe removals, that's 2000 personyears of wasted time annually.
(20:20):
And it's not just 30 secondsto take off your shoes correct.
And put 'em through the conveyorbelt and do all this stuff.
Absolutely.
And Secretary Nome has also hinted thatthe 3 1 1 liquid rule might be next.
If liquid restrictions arelifted after 19 years, it's gonna
raise similar questions like.
(20:42):
Why
the timing is telling these changes arehappening under an administration that
campaigned on reducing bureaucracy.
So this suggests that maintaining thesemeasures for so long was really about kind
of bureaucratic inertia and not security.
(21:03):
Not necessarily.
Once a security measure is implemented,removing it becomes really hard.
Even is, is nightmare.
It's brutal.
Even when evidence shows that it isineffective, no politician really
wants to be responsible for weakeningsecurity, even if the measures
(21:25):
don't actually provide protection.
Yeah.
And as soon as one thing happens,they're like, well, this guy lifted it.
Mm-hmm.
Huh.
So Zach, we've come fullcircle to the question.
After 23 years and over $200 billion,has the TSA actually made aviation safer?
(21:50):
No.
I think that they should file bankruptcyand just give that money to me.
Oh, fair.
We are going to do a, like, pro conlist with our listeners right now.
So the evidence against TSA isthat it has a 95% failure rate
in detecting actual threats.
(22:11):
All major post nine 11 aviationterrorist attempts were stopped by
factors other than TSA screening.
Okay.
Although that one I will give a caveatbecause you can't prove a negative.
So to be fair, one of thoseto be found to be foul.
(22:31):
One of those loaded guns, for example,that they stopped, that could have been.
Some sort of mm-hmm.
Incident.
So we will give them awee bit of credit there.
Um, or it could have been some guythat has a concealed carry and forgot
to leave it at home or that and youknow, I think when they're talking
about major terrorist attempts,they're, they may be talking about.
(22:54):
Like explosives.
Yeah.
Cornell researchers suggestTSA measures may have increased
overall transportation deaths byencouraging more dangerous driving.
That's wild.
Dunno if I agree with that, but, uh, itis a fascinating thing to think about.
(23:16):
And then finally, recent policychanges suggest that many measures.
Were never necessary in the first place.
Okay, let's see the evidence.
Four, no successful terroristattacks against the US commercial
aviation since nine 11.
So there you go.
I mean, boom.
It works both ways.
(23:36):
A and I will factor in.
This is not necessarily a fact,but the way that I see things, just
like a locked a door on a house.
If somebody wants to come in, theycan absolutely get in, but it's kind
of keeping the honest people honest.
You have to be dedicated to your causeto really try to smuggle bombs through.
(24:00):
I completely agree.
I totally agree with you.
A hundred percent.
And that is actually my next bullet point.
A possible deterrent.
I win a possible deterrenton potential attackers.
Man, Zach, you're reading my mind.
And then reinforced publicconfidence in flying.
(24:21):
It did do that.
It did do that.
Yeah.
I mean, after nine 11.
Wow.
Nobody wanted to fly for a while.
No.
Fuck no.
And then all of a sudden there's allthese rules and screens and things.
Yes.
Like your general good personis gonna see TSA inspect.
How would I get anything through?
They're so good.
Totally.
But do you wanna know what themost effective post nine 11
(24:42):
security improvements were?
Background checks.
Oh, that's a really good guess, actually.
But they are reinforced cockpit doors.
Oh yeah.
Because if people can't, if you can'tjust pick, open the plastic door,
if you can't infiltrate the cockpit.
(25:02):
You're gonna have a much hardertime taking over an airplane.
And then also the cultural change endingpassenger compliance with hijackers.
Mm-hmm.
So as we heard actually in someof the stories that we told
last week, it was passengerswho stopped shit from happening.
(25:24):
On the airplanes, guys likeme with a hero complex.
So true.
They just wanna stand upand take someone down.
You do, I do feel saferwhen I'm flying with you.
Um, I'll say that.
I can tell the way that you just like skygaze, you just staring up at the world
and be like, wow, it's a beautiful place.
And I'm like, there's three peopleon my left, one right behind me.
(25:46):
You got three people over there.
This one looks a little sketchy.
I see you're doing that, but I'mexamining the outside of a plane for
fatigue cracking as we're boarding.
So we, we both have our weirdanxiety OCDs as we get on.
Okay.
Alright.
Here is the uncomfortable truth.
(26:09):
When they test themselves under controlledconditions, they fail 95% of the time.
The three major post nine 11 aviationterrorist attempts were all stopped
by factors other than TSA screeningand the most effective security
improvements have nothing to do withT SSA's, $200 billion price tag.
(26:36):
It's a tough pill to swallow.
So, and we wonder whythey're raising taxes.
Oh, I totally agree though withwhat you said, Zach, which is
that the honest assessment mightbe the psychology behind TSA.
Mm-hmm.
More than the actualphysical checkpoint of TSA.
(26:59):
People feel safer believingthat TSA is keeping them.
From being in a dangerous situation.
Sorry everybody to ruinthat now, you know.
Now you know.
Okay.
So ideally TSA will continue movingtowards evidence-based policies and,
(27:25):
maybe we'll be able to bring full sizedliquids on, which would be really cool.
You know, maybe we'll be able to,I don't know, keep our belts on.
I don't know what's up next.
I have TSA pre and I have for a while,so I don't even know what they make you
do in a normal security, but I'm prettysure you have to take your belt off.
You have to take it off at ts.
(27:46):
A pre Yes, most of the time.
Woof.
I think it's belt, shoes, hats.
Pretty much it's not anything that's nota standard clothing item has to come off.
Wow.
Okay.
Well, hopefully we can do better.
And Zach, that is our story for today.
(28:09):
That is the conclusion of my examinationof TSA, well, I gotta say 95% failure is.
Pretty embarrassing.
Especially when it costs 200 and billion,$200 billion to build your program.
Yeah.
(28:29):
Eh, so, I don't know.
I don't think it's gonna hurtanybody's feelings unless we have
like a TSA worker in our listeners.
Sorry, not sorry.
Well, that's the thing isthat it, you know, it does
provide jobs and that's, yeah.
I always have a hard time whensomething comes along and it's
(28:50):
like, oh, you shouldn't have a job.
Your job doesn't matter.
It's like, it's nice to employpeople and it's, in the same way that
people say one bad cop ruins likeeverybody's reputation, whatever.
If you're having one airport with 5,000thefts or whatever, chances are, it
was probably one or two people thatwere really in on those thefts Out
(29:12):
of totally the couple hundred peoplethat work there, it's not all of them.
It's a couple that arejust getting away with it.
Oh gosh.
Yeah.
Anyway, that one guy who stole$800,000 worth of stuff, I hope he
gets diarrhea 'cause that's crazy.
And steps on Allego.
And steps on Allego.
(29:33):
Shame on you, sir.
Good Lord.
If you enjoy this two part series,please rate, review, and subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts.
Uh, we're on the socials, but I'mgonna be honest, I'm not, I haven't
been doing much with them lately.
I just, we're bad socials.
I don't have time.
(29:53):
So we've got lots of socials.
We've got our business socials,our personal socials, and we
don't post on any of them.
No, I have no time.
I got no time folks.
Um, if you have ample time and you likework in the socials, shoot us an email.
Oh my God.
Please take over our socials.
Uh, I would love that.
Until then, oh, I forgot tosay the sentence before that.
(30:18):
Join us next time.
I swear.
What are we on episode like 25 and Istill don't have my lines memorized.
I'm not off book.
Join us next time when we'llbe back to exploring another
transportation disaster story.
Until then, remember tostow your tray tables.
(30:39):
Fasten your seat belts and preparefor the unexpected because not every
trip reaches its final destination.
And keep those shoes on.
And keep your shoes on.
I don't wanna see yourstinky feet in the airport.
You can't see that they're stinky.
They just are.
Well, they know when you gothrough the body scanner.
Yeah, that's true.
(30:59):
They know sweaty.
Picture that it's part two folks.
In our last episode, we exploredthe three terrorist incidents that
shaped modern airport security.
In every case, passengers and crew,actually prevented the catastrophe.
But those incidents did lead tothe security measures that we
(00:24):
all know, shoe removal, the 3 1 1liquid rule and full body scanners.
Today we are asking the fundamentalquestion, has it worked?
And is TSA worth the very expensivetab that they have built up?
(00:46):
So still your tray tables fastenyour seat belts and prepare for
some uncomfortable truths becausethis is final boarding call.
Rero Music beep.
Hello and welcome backto Final Boarding Call.
(01:07):
I am your disaster obsessedhost, Alice, and I'm still Zach.
I don't really wanna roll withthe reluctant thing anymore.
That was something that you made up andit doesn't really, I don't know, feel fun.
And I'm a fun guy.
I'm just Ken.
(01:27):
I never watched that movie,so it does nothing for me.
Alright, well, oh boy.
Am I not so reluctant?
Would you still say you're a homebody?
I'll stop calling you reluctant.
That's easy enough for me to edit.
But would you classifyyourself as a homebody?
Well, yeah, but is that the onlything That's gonna be my identifier?
(01:50):
No.
Okay.
I'll find something.
Got it.
Okay.
Uh, if anybody has any ideas forfun taglines for Zach and I know
that much of our listener base.
Know Zach quite well, so go ahead andslide in our dms or leave a comment.
We're about to get some unhingedsuggestions in the comments.
(02:13):
Most of 'em will probably be my Facebook.
Oh, it'll be okay.
Okay.
Before we dive in, quickreminder to all of our listeners.
Please, please, folks, rate, review,subscribe, and tell a friend.
Honestly, I feel like word ofmouth has been huge for us.
We did just have a really amazingmonth in July for listenership,
(02:35):
so we are really grateful.
We got the best friends, wereally do have the best friends.
So thank you all.
We love you.
Okay.
Before we fully dive into this episode,Zach, I wanna acknowledge something.
The elephant in the room, the elephantin the room, and that is that this el,
(02:58):
this elephant, this episode is probablygoing to make people uncomfortable.
It might piss some people off.
I love that.
Yes.
And that's because.
You know, I feel like anytime you bringup a law enforcement, anything, there's
a little bit of controversy behindit by the very nature of what it is.
(03:20):
Honestly, I think people thatare even like thin, blue line,
all that stuff all day long.
I don't think anybody likes TSA.
I think it's okay.
Okay.
Well, whether this pisses you offor not, we're gonna keep going so.
I wanna acknowledge it, but we're alsogonna do the thing, trigger warning.
Trigger your warning.
You might be triggered, um, butyou're gonna learn something.
(03:43):
So here we go.
How well does the TSA actually work?
Zach, that's the question based onour last three, I'm gonna guess not
very well since TSA catches nothingand it happens in the plane anyway,
and all of a sudden they're like, oh,we should have a rule against that.
(04:03):
Oh my gosh.
Okay.
And I am also going to giveyou a crazy statistic here.
So in the intro I mentioned that.
The TSA has accumulated quite a bar tab.
Mm-hmm.
It's been 23 years of TSA existing.
(04:25):
The grand total is over 200billion with a B dollars.
So that's, that's much, in my opinion.
Um, they might call that a buku buck.
They might call that a KU buck.
And here's the thing, if the TSA waslike really doing some work, we could,
(04:48):
maybe justify something like that.
But whew, we're gonna dive intoit and it's gonna get pretty,
pretty uncomfortable here.
Okay.
I'm already uncomfortable, Zachary.
All right.
We have data that we're gonna talk about.
So this is all facts.
No printer.
(05:09):
Just so everybody's aware.
All facts, no printers.
I hate our printers still.
The agency, the TSA has its own undercoveroperations that they call red team.
So this is where TSA investigatorspose as passengers and they attempt
(05:33):
to smuggle weapons and explosivesthrough security to literally test.
Whether they're going to getflagged, I want that job.
It sounds pretty badass, right?
Alright, Zach, the resultsare catastrophically bad.
(05:54):
86% of the time they get through.
I wish it was that.
Number's it higher than that number.
Let's talk about hilarious.
Let's talk about it.
Okay.
2015 was the year that shouldhave changed everything.
The Department of Homeland SecurityInspector General conducted comprehensive
(06:15):
undercover tests at airports nationwide,sending these investigators with their
fake weapons and their fake explosives.
I don't know, maybe they were realthrough TSA checkpoints to see if
the screeners would catch them.
TSA officers failed to detect weapons,explosives, and other prohibited items
(06:38):
in 95% of the test attempts, meaningthat these items were only detected 5%.
Of the time.
We may be really bad at ourjobs, but we have jobs that's
(06:58):
that's, uh, really, really bad.
The failure was so spectacular thatit actually led to the immediate
reassignment of then acting TSAadministrator, Melvin Caraway.
But when you look at the patternof test results over the TSA entire
existence, the 95% failure rate.
(07:20):
Was not an anomaly.
It was consistent with the very, very badperformance of TSA since its creation.
So let's rewind.
It's 2004.
What was happening in 2004?
Oh my gosh.
Brittany Bitch.
The TSA.
(07:41):
The TSA officials at San Franciscowere caught alerting screeners when
undercover tests were happening.
Cheaters, Hmm, they'recheaters and they still failed.
In 2006, Newark screenersfailed 20 of 22 undercover tests
(08:02):
missing both guns and bombs.
In 2010, A, B, C News found agentsbrought weapons through security
70% of the time at major airports.
In 2011, Honolulu fired 36 screenersfor regularly allowing bags through
(08:25):
without even looking at them.
Oh, wow.
Just like, don't care,just send it on through.
Now to give a wee bit of credit,because this sounds very harsh and
mean, they do catch some real threats.
In 2022, they intercepted a record6,301 firearms at checkpoints.
(08:50):
88% of those were already loaded.
Oh, so pay, that's many.
Yeah.
And that's great.
They also regularly find concealedweapons like knives hidden in cane
handles, stun guns disguised ascell phones, which is like, oh, and
(09:13):
blades embedded in belt buckles.
And I just gotta say, peopleare getting very crafty.
Yeah.
Honestly, I'm gonna guess that thisis still padded statistics, kind of
like the COVID stuff, in my opinion.
What did this did come, this part thatI'm pulling did come from the TSA website
directly, those numbers, which makes itsound like it more so would be padded, but
(09:37):
there's lots of people with belt bucklesthat have a little knife in them, like
some people like to just be tactical andbe prepared for some weird situations.
And it's easy to forgethaving something like that.
Like the belt that you wearevery day has a knife in it.
You're still wearing that beltevery day and you go to the airport.
So they're getting some inflatedwinds, I would say by catching these
(10:00):
people that just didn't think about it.
Have you ever wanted a beltbuckle with a knife in it?
No.
Okay.
I was about to add thatto your Christmas list.
I think they're stupid,but people buy 'em.
Okay.
Would you rather have a beltbuckle with a knife in it?
Or a stun gun disguised as a cell phone.
(10:21):
I think the stun gun disguisedas a cell phone is super sweet.
I would totally get one of those.
All right, noted.
If anybody's wondering what Zach wantsfor Chris, put it on the wishlist.
I'm gonna be like an OnlyFansgirl and like have an Amazon
wishlist on our link to website.
Thing.
Zach wants a stun gun cell phone.
(10:43):
Okay.
Like extra, extra, extra large lingerie.
Why would this be on here?
Oh my God.
Here's the irony, Zach.
Well, failing to detect weapons 95%of the time and controlled tests.
TSA scanners are incredibly sensitiveto something completely harmless.
(11:05):
Human sweat.
I did have to get real patted downand they talked about a strip search
when, uh, I went through on theway back from Chicago without you.
Yes, it is.
It's literally called SwampCrotch, this phenomenon.
So they blamed it on my pantsbeing too low, and I'm like, well,
(11:27):
you made me take off my belt.
You fucking buell.
The pants too low or swampy crotch.
Their millimeter wave scanners respondto moisture leading to invasive pet
down pat downs for sweaty travelers.
Why are you so wet down here?
(11:49):
Come on.
So we have a system in place rightnow that is great at detecting
whether you are nervous, but terribleat finding like actual threats.
I am.
Ugh.
Bogey Beyond effectiveness.
The TSA has generated an extensivecatalog of abuse that would be
(12:10):
shocking for any government agency.
Are you ready for one that happened?
You think the NYP D's bad?
Wait till you say TSA.
Oh my gosh.
You ready for one?
That happened at DIA Denver.
Tell me.
Okay.
In 20 15, 2 TSA employees atDenver International Airport.
(12:30):
Coordinated to falsely flag attractivemale passengers for invasive pat downs.
When an attractive man went throughthe scanner, one employee would signal
his colleague to falsely trigger analarm requiring an enhanced pat down,
involving extensive groin touching.
(12:51):
Were these attractive female TSA workers.
Uh, by chance, not that it makesit better, I'm just curious.
At least one of 'em was a male.
Oh.
Um, the TSA fired both employees, butprotected their identities to shield
them from prosecution, which is wild.
Uh, time Magazine leader intervieweda former TSA employee who called
(13:14):
groping passengers businessas usual within the agency.
Have you ever had like a really invasive.
Twice.
Twice.
Okay.
I, I'm real, I'm real good at the randoms.
Oh my gosh.
Well, I had, this isactually a funny story, guys.
Speaking of things that it detectsthat are complete nonsense I was
(13:34):
bringing a girlfriend, a package ofbath salts that we had made in Ang
on a trip, and I flew home with them.
She was outta room in her bag,and then I was flying to Dallas
and bringing them to her, and.
They got flagged as, yes, this is a bomb.
(13:54):
Like you know how sometimes they pullstuff outta your bag and then they like
swipe it with that sheet and they put itinto the machine and it's like negative.
Only on the way to Texas, though theywere fine with it when you left Anguilla.
That's so true.
So true.
Not flagged, uh, in any way,shape or form in Anguilla.
But yeah, the Colorado SpringsAirport, they pulled it out and I was
(14:15):
like, literally like, okay, this isnot a big deal that happens when I
fly with candles or when I fly with,anything kind of organic material.
Well, it came back as a fucking bomb,Zach, and I think I told you this, but
they brought out like the bomb squad guythat works at the airport, and I got, this
(14:37):
was not just like a casual like, oh, we'regonna rub between your legs real quick.
I got frisked in a way.
That was wild.
Needless to say, folks,it wasn't a bomb surprise.
Stop being such a sketchy individual.
Tell you what, God, it was wild.
(14:57):
Let's talk about theft.
How much TSA steals from people.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
This is actually aquestion that I have had.
Well, from 2010 to 2014,passengers reported 25,016
incidents of theft from luggage.
(15:17):
Yes.
This is from the luggage.
This is when you get those little slips,except I doubt they're putting a slip
in the ones that they're stealing from.
But do you ever get those?
Oh, I bet they do.
It's that would cover them even more.
It's like your bag was randomlysearched, so we had to open it.
I'm sure like if they're stealingstuff in there, I would absolutely
(15:38):
put that slip in there and belike, oh, maybe it just fell out.
We'll see if we can find it.
No way.
I wouldn't want them knowingthat I'd open their bag.
Because then they haveproof that TSA handled it.
I don't know.
But in any case, however, it's happening,people are reporting that things are
going missing from their luggage.
And by 2011, 500 TSAH agentshad been fired for stealing.
(16:04):
So that's, I mean, that's wild.
Despite over 400 theft reportsin Pittsburgh alone, not
a single arrest was made.
Sounds right.
The TSA does not sharetheft reports with police.
As a matter of policy, man,somebody at that Pittsburgh
airport had some sticky fingers.
(16:26):
Former TSA agent.
Umhis Brown admitted to stealingover $800,000 worth of items saying
that it was very convenient tosteal due to poor agency morale.
Oh, that's funny to me.
(16:51):
I was just so bored and everybody was somean that I just stole everybody's stuff.
I hate my job, so I juststole a bunch of jewelry.
Okay.
And Zach, obviously, one ofthe biggest issues with TSA is
gonna be discrimination, right?
The TSA behavioral detection programsdisproportionately target, I guess.
(17:17):
Guess who?
I don't want to guess.
Okay.
Well, it's exactly whoyou imagined it would be.
It's Arabs, Muslims, and Latinos.
Boom.
Actually, so I'm gonna soundstupid for saying this.
They didn't pop into my head at all.
Immediately.
I was like, ohoh, everybody'smean to the blacks.
(17:40):
Like,
and that's how not racist I am isthat I don't even think about the
standard practice of racism for flying.
When you say it, it makes sense.
I'm like, oh, right,because of these things.
Yes.
Yeah.
My bad.
Yes.
The Jason Scientific Advisorygroup concluded that there is no
(18:04):
scientific evidence that existsto support the detection of
future behavior, including intent.
So literally them just randomlydiscriminating and like selecting people
to go through further testing that.
Is not work.
It can't work scientifically.
(18:25):
Mm-hmm.
Doesn't work.
We are spending hundreds of millionsannually on a program that doesn't
work and enables discrimination andtheft, and doesn't stop the thing
that it's actually supposed to stop.
On July 8th, 2025, department of HomelandSecurity Secretary Christie Nome announced
(18:49):
that passengers no longer need to removeshoes at security checkpoints citing
cutting edge technological advancement.
Cutting edge.
Zach, tell me, what did they do?
There's actually no cuttingedge technological advancements.
She was just, she was justusing words that sounded cool.
(19:13):
This raises the obvious question,if the technology exists now to
screen shoes while wearing them.
How long has it existed?
Prob probably since thefirst full body scanner.
And I fly folks a lot and I can tell youright now that at least at the Colorado's
(19:35):
Springs Airport, there has not beenany changes to the technology that.
Is being used at security.
It looks, it's just a program update guy.
Maybe it doesn't have to look different.
That's so true.
Zach, who am I to, uh,make assumptions, okay.
Why were we forced to remove ourshoes for 24 years if technology could
(19:59):
have eliminated this requirement?
Consider the waste.
If just 10% of 800 million annualpassengers spent an extra 30 seconds
on shoe removals, that's 2000 personyears of wasted time annually.
(20:20):
And it's not just 30 secondsto take off your shoes correct.
And put 'em through the conveyorbelt and do all this stuff.
Absolutely.
And Secretary Nome has also hinted thatthe 3 1 1 liquid rule might be next.
If liquid restrictions arelifted after 19 years, it's gonna
raise similar questions like.
(20:42):
Why
the timing is telling these changes arehappening under an administration that
campaigned on reducing bureaucracy.
So this suggests that maintaining thesemeasures for so long was really about kind
of bureaucratic inertia and not security.
(21:03):
Not necessarily.
Once a security measure is implemented,removing it becomes really hard.
Even is, is nightmare.
It's brutal.
Even when evidence shows that it isineffective, no politician really
wants to be responsible for weakeningsecurity, even if the measures
(21:25):
don't actually provide protection.
Yeah.
And as soon as one thing happens,they're like, well, this guy lifted it.
Mm-hmm.
Huh.
So Zach, we've come fullcircle to the question.
After 23 years and over $200 billion,has the TSA actually made aviation safer?
(21:50):
No.
I think that they should file bankruptcyand just give that money to me.
Oh, fair.
We are going to do a, like, pro conlist with our listeners right now.
So the evidence against TSA isthat it has a 95% failure rate
in detecting actual threats.
(22:11):
All major post nine 11 aviationterrorist attempts were stopped by
factors other than TSA screening.
Okay.
Although that one I will give a caveatbecause you can't prove a negative.
So to be fair, one of thoseto be found to be foul.
(22:31):
One of those loaded guns, for example,that they stopped, that could have been.
Some sort of mm-hmm.
Incident.
So we will give them awee bit of credit there.
Um, or it could have been some guythat has a concealed carry and forgot
to leave it at home or that and youknow, I think when they're talking
about major terrorist attempts,they're, they may be talking about.
(22:54):
Like explosives.
Yeah.
Cornell researchers suggestTSA measures may have increased
overall transportation deaths byencouraging more dangerous driving.
That's wild.
Dunno if I agree with that, but, uh, itis a fascinating thing to think about.
(23:16):
And then finally, recent policychanges suggest that many measures.
Were never necessary in the first place.
Okay, let's see the evidence.
Four, no successful terroristattacks against the US commercial
aviation since nine 11.
So there you go.
I mean, boom.
It works both ways.
(23:36):
A and I will factor in.
This is not necessarily a fact,but the way that I see things, just
like a locked a door on a house.
If somebody wants to come in, theycan absolutely get in, but it's kind
of keeping the honest people honest.
You have to be dedicated to your causeto really try to smuggle bombs through.
(24:00):
I completely agree.
I totally agree with you.
A hundred percent.
And that is actually my next bullet point.
A possible deterrent.
I win a possible deterrenton potential attackers.
Man, Zach, you're reading my mind.
And then reinforced publicconfidence in flying.
(24:21):
It did do that.
It did do that.
Yeah.
I mean, after nine 11.
Wow.
Nobody wanted to fly for a while.
No.
Fuck no.
And then all of a sudden there's allthese rules and screens and things.
Yes.
Like your general good personis gonna see TSA inspect.
How would I get anything through?
They're so good.
Totally.
But do you wanna know what themost effective post nine 11
(24:42):
security improvements were?
Background checks.
Oh, that's a really good guess, actually.
But they are reinforced cockpit doors.
Oh yeah.
Because if people can't, if you can'tjust pick, open the plastic door,
if you can't infiltrate the cockpit.
(25:02):
You're gonna have a much hardertime taking over an airplane.
And then also the cultural change endingpassenger compliance with hijackers.
Mm-hmm.
So as we heard actually in someof the stories that we told
last week, it was passengerswho stopped shit from happening.
(25:24):
On the airplanes, guys likeme with a hero complex.
So true.
They just wanna stand upand take someone down.
You do, I do feel saferwhen I'm flying with you.
Um, I'll say that.
I can tell the way that you just like skygaze, you just staring up at the world
and be like, wow, it's a beautiful place.
And I'm like, there's three peopleon my left, one right behind me.
(25:46):
You got three people over there.
This one looks a little sketchy.
I see you're doing that, but I'mexamining the outside of a plane for
fatigue cracking as we're boarding.
So we, we both have our weirdanxiety OCDs as we get on.
Okay.
Alright.
Here is the uncomfortable truth.
(26:09):
When they test themselves under controlledconditions, they fail 95% of the time.
The three major post nine 11 aviationterrorist attempts were all stopped
by factors other than TSA screeningand the most effective security
improvements have nothing to do withT SSA's, $200 billion price tag.
(26:36):
It's a tough pill to swallow.
So, and we wonder whythey're raising taxes.
Oh, I totally agree though withwhat you said, Zach, which is
that the honest assessment mightbe the psychology behind TSA.
Mm-hmm.
More than the actualphysical checkpoint of TSA.
(26:59):
People feel safer believingthat TSA is keeping them.
From being in a dangerous situation.
Sorry everybody to ruinthat now, you know.
Now you know.
Okay.
So ideally TSA will continue movingtowards evidence-based policies and,
(27:25):
maybe we'll be able to bring full sizedliquids on, which would be really cool.
You know, maybe we'll be able to,I don't know, keep our belts on.
I don't know what's up next.
I have TSA pre and I have for a while,so I don't even know what they make you
do in a normal security, but I'm prettysure you have to take your belt off.
You have to take it off at ts.
(27:46):
A pre Yes, most of the time.
Woof.
I think it's belt, shoes, hats.
Pretty much it's not anything that's nota standard clothing item has to come off.
Wow.
Okay.
Well, hopefully we can do better.
And Zach, that is our story for today.
(28:09):
That is the conclusion of my examinationof TSA, well, I gotta say 95% failure is.
Pretty embarrassing.
Especially when it costs 200 and billion,$200 billion to build your program.
Yeah.
(28:29):
Eh, so, I don't know.
I don't think it's gonna hurtanybody's feelings unless we have
like a TSA worker in our listeners.
Sorry, not sorry.
Well, that's the thing isthat it, you know, it does
provide jobs and that's, yeah.
I always have a hard time whensomething comes along and it's
(28:50):
like, oh, you shouldn't have a job.
Your job doesn't matter.
It's like, it's nice to employpeople and it's, in the same way that
people say one bad cop ruins likeeverybody's reputation, whatever.
If you're having one airport with 5,000thefts or whatever, chances are, it
was probably one or two people thatwere really in on those thefts Out
(29:12):
of totally the couple hundred peoplethat work there, it's not all of them.
It's a couple that arejust getting away with it.
Oh gosh.
Yeah.
Anyway, that one guy who stole$800,000 worth of stuff, I hope he
gets diarrhea 'cause that's crazy.
And steps on Allego.
And steps on Allego.
(29:33):
Shame on you, sir.
Good Lord.
If you enjoy this two part series,please rate, review, and subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts.
Uh, we're on the socials, but I'mgonna be honest, I'm not, I haven't
been doing much with them lately.
I just, we're bad socials.
I don't have time.
(29:53):
So we've got lots of socials.
We've got our business socials,our personal socials, and we
don't post on any of them.
No, I have no time.
I got no time folks.
Um, if you have ample time and you likework in the socials, shoot us an email.
Oh my God.
Please take over our socials.
Uh, I would love that.
Until then, oh, I forgot tosay the sentence before that.
(30:18):
Join us next time.
I swear.
What are we on episode like 25 and Istill don't have my lines memorized.
I'm not off book.
Join us next time when we'llbe back to exploring another
transportation disaster story.
Until then, remember tostow your tray tables.
(30:39):
Fasten your seat belts and preparefor the unexpected because not every
trip reaches its final destination.
And keep those shoes on.
And keep your shoes on.
I don't wanna see yourstinky feet in the airport.
You can't see that they're stinky.
They just are.
Well, they know when you gothrough the body scanner.
Yeah, that's true.
(30:59):
They know sweaty.
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