August 13, 2025 • 47 mins
On February 12, 2009, a routine commuter flight from Newark to Buffalo became a catastrophic lesson in pilot training and aviation safety. When stick shaker stall warnings activated during Colgan Air Flight 3407's approach, the captain's response turned a recoverable situation into an unrecoverable tragedy. Join Alice and Zach as they explore how fatigue, inadequate training, and a fundamental misunderstanding of stall recovery led to the deaths of 50 people—and sparked the most comprehensive aviation safety reforms in decades. This is the story of how one crash changed everything about how we train pilots and regulate regional airlines.
Sources:
- NTSB Aircraft Accident Report AAR-10/01, "Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air Flight 3407"
- "Colgan Air Flight 3407: How a Single Crash Sparked Unprecedented Reform" - Aviation International News
- "Crew Errors Led to Fatal Colgan Air Crash" - Defense Daily
- Code7700.com Case Study: Colgan Air 3407
- Wikipedia article on Colgan Air Flight 3407
- Mayday: Air Disasters Season 10, Episode 4 "Dead Tired"
Find FINAL BOARDING CALL online:
- Website: finalboardingcallpodcast.com
- Instagram: @FinalBoardingCallPod
- Facebook: Final Boarding Call
Credits: Final Boarding Call is hosted by Alice Stern and Zach Stemas, researched and written by Alice Stern, produced and edited by Alice Stern and Zach Stemas.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
picture this.
It's a cold February evening in 2009,bur a small commuter plane is on
final approach to Buffalo, New York,carrying 49 people through light,
snow and icing conditions In thecockpit, two exhausted pilots are
(00:22):
chatting casually unaware that theirairspeed is dropping dangerously low.
Suddenly a violent shaking of repsthrough the controls, the stick
shaker warning of an impending stall.
The captain has mere secondsto respond correctly, pushed
forward, add power, recover.
(00:45):
Instead, he pulls back hard.
So stow your trade tables,fasten your seat belts.
And prepare for the unexpectedbecause this is final boarding call.
Intro music.
(01:06):
Intro music.
Hello and welcome to Final Boarding Call.
I'm your disaster obsessed host Alice.
And I am Zach.
Not so reluctant.
I don't know.
Feeling good today.
And a reminder for all of our listeners,please like rate, review, and subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts.
(01:27):
I like this like radio broadcaster voiceyou're bringing to the table today.
It's kind of fun.
I'm congested.
What can I say?
That's, that's the secret.
That's the whole thing.
It's been real hot here and alittle windy, and I work with.
The shop door open all day every day.
That's fair.
It, it has been really hot.
You've been, not to mention suffering.
Not, I've been welding again, which isextra heat and also, smells and things
(01:51):
that will give you cancer eventually.
Oh yeah.
Your daughter's been doingdemon voices at me in bed.
That's not fun.
I hate that so much.
Yuck.
Oh, I hate that.
Yuck.
And it's always prefaced with somethinglike, he says, you gotta do that.
And I'm like, Nope.
Nope.
Hate that.
And on that super positive note, I'mgonna transition into our sources.
(02:14):
So we have a few, obviouslythe NTSB accident report.
We have an article fromAviation International News.
Uh, we have an article from Defense Daily,Wikipedia, and then of course, Zach,
we have a Mayday Air Disaster Season10, episode four called Dead Tired.
(02:36):
Um, been there.
You're ready to jump into the story.
Enough chitchat.
I would prefer to just stepinto it, but if you really want
me to jump Okay, I'll do it.
February 12th, 2009.
While most of America was dealing withthe early months of the great recession.
The aviation industry wasfacing its own challenges.
(03:00):
Regional airlines, which are thesmaller carriers that operate
commuter flights for major airlines.
We're under intense pressure to cutcosts while maintaining schedules.
Isn't that the way that therich people always want it?
It's like, I need you to domore while working less one
(03:21):
of these regional carriers.
Was Colgan Air Operating Flights underthe Continental Connection brand.
Do you remember Continental?
No.
Oh man.
I'm pretty sure Continentalwas purchased by United.
Oh, okay.
But before it was its own white andblue, and they had kind of like a
checkered livery on their airplanes.
(03:43):
You didn't fly as a kid anyway.
I didn't have my firstflight until like 2013.
For me, continental is such anineties kid memory, um, because
they were still around back then.
All right.
Colgan had built its business on thefee for departure model, essentially
getting paid by Continental Airlines foreach flight completed, regardless of how
(04:05):
many passengers were actually on board.
I thought you were about to say,regardless of how many passengers
made it, I mean, based on thetheme of this podcast, like no.
On this particular evening, Colgan AirFlight 3 4 0 7 was scheduled to fly from
Newark Liberty International Airportto Buffalo which is a routine 53 minute
(04:27):
flight, Zach, super short, that's barelylonger than the springs to Denver.
Yeah it's really, really short and it,it does this dozens of times daily,
just like the springs to Denver flight.
There's no drink service.
There's no food service, there's nothing.
No.
Just strap in.
We'll be there.
So yeah, you're on like apretty small little plane.
Mm-hmm.
You feel the bumps and rums.
(04:48):
So easy.
The aircraft was a BombardierQ 400, a modern turboprop
designed for short haul routes.
So this is kind of the workhorseof regional air aviation.
It's got twin turboprop engines, 74 seats,and it has a reputation for reliability.
(05:09):
This specific aircraft was relativelynew, having been manufactured in April,
2008, and we are in February, 2009.
So it's a little baby.
Uh, and it had just over1800 flight hours total.
Wow.
So I mean, that's.
(05:31):
Not a lot of flight hours,not a very old plane.
How does it already have a reputationas being such a solid plane?
This particular plane is ababy, but the bombardier,
whether did I say this was two?
I thought they came out in two.
400?
No, this one was built.
Oh, okay.
In 2008.
Yeah, that makes more sense.
No, no.
(05:52):
I actually have a really funepisode coming up for you.
That's the history of Bombardierbecause it is a fascinating brand
that we will not dive into on thisepisode, but stay tuned for more.
Well, I've got some historyfor you, Bombardier.
Just makes me think of bomb voyage.
Do you know what that's fromthe, the phrase bon voyage.
(06:14):
No.
Bomb voyage.
He's a super villain in the Incredibles.
Can't believe you Didn't know that.
Well, if you had left that tothe audience than our listeners,
they could have guessed.
Yeah.
And gotten a sticker.
But I saw the look on your face.
And if you don't know,it's not as fun for me.
All right, Zach, this is the point.
Where our story gets concerningbecause the plane is new, it's safe.
(06:41):
So what are some of the other factorsthat go wrong in our stories Staff?
Let's talk about our flight crew.
Yep.
Okay.
Their backgrounds are gonnareveal some systemic issues and
ultimately they will prove fatal.
Captain Marvin Relow, age 47 was thepilot in command, and he had been hired
(07:07):
by Colgan in September, 2005, and he hadaccumulated 3,379 total flight hours.
One that's not a lot.
A ton of flight hours.
I mean, we hear aboutpilots that have 10, 13,000.
Well, we had one episode where one had 30.
(07:28):
Correct.
And then we chatted with ourman York Bauer in Oh my gosh.
Yes.
Yeah.
Like he is somewhere around 30.
Yep.
I race cars with a really, really nice.
Gentleman who's a pilot and I didtalk to him and he is going to be
a guest on the show at some point,but he has 30,000 flight hours.
So one, this isn't a ton, but two Zachand more concerning, he had only 1100
(07:55):
hours as a captain on the Q 400, sohe's like brand new to this plane.
More troubling investigators would laterdiscover that Relow had failed multiple
check rides throughout his career.
What's a check ride?
A check ride is imagine if you hadto like take your driver's test every
(08:20):
once in a while just to make sure thatyou were still still, oh, you've just
got like a teacher in there with you?
Yeah.
Yeah, I think it's, I really,it's just like checking up to make
sure that you're not a danger toyourself or the people around you.
Secret shopper, that bitch, well, hefailed and he failed on some things
that are fundamental aircraft control.
(08:41):
Uh, and tho, that shouldhave been red flags.
Let's talk about our first officer.
First Officer Rebecca LynnShaw was only 24 years old.
Mm-hmm.
She's our co-pilot.
She had been hired by Colgan in January,2008 and already had 2,244 flight hours.
(09:03):
Now here's where thestory gets very troubling.
Both pilots were based at Newark, butneither of them actually lived there.
So what that means.
Okay.
Is that when they check in for a day'swork, they have to fly to their base?
Yes.
The expectation is that they're gonnastart their day at Newark Airport,
(09:25):
except they don't live in Newark Airport.
So Captain Rens slow lives near Tampa,Florida, so he's got a two and a
half hour flight north to get there.
First, get this first.
Officer Shaw.
Lived near Seattle, Washington.
Oh, great.
(09:45):
So she's got a four hour flight.
This means that both of these pilots werecommuting across the fricking country.
Mm-hmm.
To get to work every day.
And it's a common practice inthe airline industry, but it
does create serious fatigue.
Yeah.
In my opinion, and this is just myopinion, if they are awake to get
(10:10):
to work that long, I know it's notthis way for a regular day job, but.
They are awake for those hours.
They should be almost documentedas flight hours, not as them
flying, but I hear what you mean.
Yeah.
Yeah.
It's, you know, when I was workingat UPS, if you went over shift, you
(10:32):
weren't allowed to start until 12.
Full hours had lapsed.
Mm-hmm.
So if you didn't get off until10:00 PM you couldn't start working
the next day until 10:00 AM.
Wow.
That's interesting.
Um, and that was not the case.
In our story, and let'stalk about what happened.
The night before the accident, Shawhad taken a red eye flight from Seattle
(10:57):
to Memphis, then connected to Newark,arriving at 6 23 on February 12th.
She had been traveling all nightand she was already exhausted
before her workday even began.
Mm-hmm.
Captain Rens Low's situationwas just as problematic.
So he had completed a two daytrip sequence, arriving in Newark
(11:23):
at 3:44 PM on February 11th.
Instead of getting a hotel room, he spentthe night in the Colgan's crew room at
the airport, which is the equivalentof spending the night on a couch.
In a break room.
So both pilots were observed inthe crew room before their 1:30
PM report time on February 12th.
(11:46):
They were already very fatiguedbefore they even started flying,
which is a recipe for disaster.
Indeed.
Do buckaroo really in any career,but especially in aviation.
You know?
Mm-hmm.
Pilots, surgeons, I feel like thereare a couple jobs where you kind
(12:10):
of need to like be up and at 'em.
I'm, this is one of those ones whereI'm like, oh, well, she probably,
in my opinion, should have been finebecause I picture myself in my twenties.
Staying up until one in the morning,being up at five, going to work, and then
doing it all over again the next day.
And it wasn't that weird.
(12:30):
That sounds horrible.
That's 'cause we're old now.
God, their original flights that day, tworound trips between Newark and Rochester
had been canceled due to high wind.
So their first and only flight of the daywould be the evening departure to Buffalo.
This meant that they had been sittingaround the airport all day further
(12:52):
disrupting their sleep cycles at 6:00 PMThe dispatch release was issued for flight
3 4 0 7, showing an estimated departuretime of 7:10 PM But weather delays at
Newark pushed their actual departure.
To 9:18 PM Jesus.
So they have been just straight at ittechnically for like 30 hours a long time.
(13:18):
Yeah.
And you know, there's something aboutthat antsy anticipation when you're
waiting at the airport and you're waitingand your flight keeps getting delayed.
Mm-hmm.
It always just kind of agitates me.
You know, I am curious, and it'sbecause we're not in the industry,
but in a situation like that, howdoes a captain or the first officer
(13:42):
even, how do they approach it?
If they did recognize, I'mtoo tired to make this flight.
Do they just cancel the flight?
Do they have people on standby?
Let's listen and find out, oh, mywife, she has all the information.
Oh, I might have some information.
As the crew prepared for departure,there were already warning
(14:06):
signs that something was wrong.
The cockpit voice recorder captured first.
Officer Shaw saying, I'mready to be in the hotel room.
And later, this is one of thosetimes that if I felt like this when
I was at home, there's no way Iwould've come all the way out here.
She was clearly feeling unwell andexhausted, but felt pressured to complete
(14:29):
the flight rather than call in sick.
Which is what pilots can doif they feel like they're not
well enough to fly a plane.
She even mentioned that if she calledin sick, she'd have to pay for her
own hotel room until she felt better.
A policy that penalized pilotsfor prioritizing safety over
(14:51):
completing flights, yay.
Um, less than ideal situation there.
That's nuts.
The flight itself started routinely.
They climbed to their cruisingaltitude of 16,000 feet.
They engaged the autopilot and theybegan the 53 minute journey to buffalo.
The weather conditions includedlight icing, so the crew activated
(15:15):
the aircraft's de-icing system.
A routine procedure for winterflying in the Northeast, especially,
I mean, my God, if you're gonnarun into ice, it's probably gonna
be in New York or roundabouts.
Don't put on the voice, I mean, allow.
During the cruise portion of theflight, the captain and first officer
(15:38):
engaged in casual conversation,which Zach is excellent at, and I.
Hate.
I'd rather yank off a toenail thanbe engaged in casual conversation.
This was technically allowedduring cruise flight, but it
established a pattern of distractionthat would prove crucial later.
(16:01):
Hmm.
Around 9:49 PM the first officerbriefed the approach speeds for
landing 118 knots, which is about136 miles per hour for the reference
landing speed, which is called V ref.
Cool.
And that's the target speed for touchdown.
(16:23):
And 114 knots, whichis 1 31 miles per hour.
1 31.
131 is what normal people would sayfor a go around speed, which is the
minimum speed needed if they have toabort the landing and do a go around.
Mm-hmm.
(16:43):
Okay.
Right.
Which we've had obviously episodeswhere they've had to go around.
Like, whoops.
Missed that one.
We're gonna go for it again.
Doing it again.
The captain acknowledged thisinformation and everything at this
point, according to the voice recorder,seemed normal, but as they began their
(17:03):
descent into buffalo, the seeds ofdisaster had already been planted.
The crew was tired.
They were behind on their briefings,and they were about to enter the
most dangerous phase of flight.
Approach and landing in icing conditions.
(17:26):
Oh, let's find out what happens.
Zach.
I have an inkling.
Can you imagine if I was just like,and then the plane landed safely,
and that's our episode today?
No.
As flight 3 4 0 7 began its descenttoward Buffalo, the crew was cleared
for an instrument approach to runway 23.
The weather actually wasn't terrible.
(17:48):
Light snow winds saying theweather outside was not frightful.
It was not.
No.
Zach weather outside was not frightful.
Wow.
It was actually a, uh, marshmallow world.
It was light snow winds from 250degrees at 15 knots gusting to 23 knots.
(18:09):
Um, so.
A little windy for sure.
Light snow, but nothing where,it's like, this is, yeah, terrible.
We can't land here.
It was winter flying conditions thatrequired attention and professionalism.
Right?
Yeah.
Two things that pilots probably shouldbring to the table during the landing.
(18:31):
You're coming up into a, you know, townfrom a highway in the middle of nowhere.
You gotta be paying attention.
Slow down there.
Speed limit drops.
Boom.
At 10:04 PM the captainbegan the approach briefing.
This is a crucial procedure wherepilots review the approach, they
discuss potential hazards and theyconfirm their game plan for landing.
(18:54):
But this briefing was interruptedby air traffic control instructions
and never properly completed.
Here is where we need to talk aboutsomething called the sterile cockpit Rule.
Mm-hmm.
Which I had never heard of before.
Below 10,000 feet.
(19:14):
Federal regulations requirepilots to focus exclusively.
On flying related task,that means no chitchat.
You're not friends right now.
No, you just fly.
You are doing somethingthat is very dangerous.
That is one of the mostdangerous times of flight.
No personal discussions and nothingthat could distract from the critical
(19:39):
task of getting the airplane safely.
On Ze Island
that you should be worriedabout in that moment.
The crew of flight 3 4 0 7 violatedthis rule almost immediately as
they descended below 10,000 feet.
They continued chatting about iceaccumulation on the windshield, the
(20:00):
first officer's lack of experiencewith icing conditions and other
non-essential, very comforting topics.
This might seem minor.
But it shows a lack ofprofessionalism that really, uh,
is not gonna be good for anybody.
Around 10, 10:00 PM the firstofficer made a comment that
(20:24):
should have been a red flag.
I've never seen icing conditions.
Never de-iced, neverexperienced any of that.
She was admitting to having minimalexperience with the exact conditions
that they were flying through.
This was exactly the kind ofinformation that should have prompted
extra caution and attention toprocedures, and instead the pilot
(20:47):
was like, ah, watch this we're fine.
Instead, the casualconversation continued.
The captain and first officerperformed their required checklist.
But they were clearly distracted andthey were really not giving their full
attention to the approach that was comingup quickly at 10:15 PM as they were
(21:09):
about three miles from the outer marker.
The outer marker is a navigationbeacon that marks the beginning
of the final approach path.
The captain began slowing theaircraft to configure for landing.
He reduced power to flight idle,which is the lowest power setting
(21:31):
where the engines are still runningand the aircraft began to slow.
So we've all been in an airplanethat you can feel this, right.
It's usually where it suddenly feelslike a float rather than flying.
Yeah.
And it's usually associated alsowith the, um, landing gear coming
down pretty quickly after that.
It.
(21:51):
It almost sounds like theengines are shutting off.
It's a little like, yeah.
Well, it feels like mid stall.
Mm-hmm.
Yep.
The landing gear was extended.
There you go.
And the first officer confirmed geardown when the air speeded was at 145
knots, which is 167 miles per hour.
So now they're in the right range.
(22:12):
So far.
So far Seems like we'redoing everything right.
Other than the idolchitchat, quit talking.
Go sit in the hall.
We're not friends.
The captain then called forflaps to be set to 15 degrees.
Perfect.
And requested the before landingchecklist, but here is where
(22:33):
things start to get confusing.
The flight data recorder shows theflaps were only extended to 10 degrees.
Mm-hmm.
Not the 15 degrees requested.
The Q 400 is equipped with asystem called the ref speed switch,
which can be set to either normalor increase, so those a year.
(22:57):
Those are your options for this switch.
When it's set to increase, which isused for icing conditions, it raises
all the speed references by 15 knots.
Its providing an extra marginof safety by essentially telling
the pilots to fly faster whenice might be affecting the wings.
Oh, like creating extra drag or something?
(23:18):
Exactly.
Yes.
So the crew had set this switch toincrease because of the icing conditions
that they're flying around in, whichmeant that their stall warning system
also known as the stick shaker, which.
Who doesn't love a good stick shakerreference would would activate at
a higher air speed than normal.
(23:41):
This should have given them extrawarning time if they got too slow.
But here's the problem.
The crew lost track of their airspeed asthey configured for landing the airplane.
Continued to slow.
The flight data recorder shows theairspeed decreasing from 145 knots
(24:05):
to 1 35 knots to one 30 knots.
On the primary flight displayin front of both pilots.
There were multiple cues tellingthem that they were getting too slow.
You guys are fucking upthe yes, the low speed cue.
Think of this as kind of avisual warning that shows how
(24:26):
close you are to a stall speed.
It was rising towardtheir current airspeed.
The airspeed tend vectorwas pointing downwards.
Which indicates a decrease inspeed and the airspeed numbers
were even changing color.
Oh, to warn them we're inthe dark yellow slash warm.
(24:49):
Like, that's bad you guys,guys, it's almost red now.
Not good.
Both pilots mist all of thesewarnings wide open net, and
they just weren't there.
They, they were distractedby their conversation.
Focused on other tasks and simply notmonitoring their airspeed properly.
(25:09):
This is what investigators calla monitoring failure when pilots
fail to observe and respondto critical flight parameters.
As one investigator would laternote, they were clear and conspicuous
cues of the deteriorating airspeedthat were not heated by the captain.
(25:31):
At 10:16 PM the inevitable happened.
The stick shaker activated a stickA I did that in the last episode.
I stick my shaker.
You shake?
I shake my sticker.
You a shake.
Must stick a ew.
Oh, right folks, we've talked aboutstick shakers before, but I'm gonna give
a very brief explanation of what theyare in case this is your first episode.
(25:53):
Hi, welcome.
The stick shaker is a stall warningsystem that literally violently
vibrates the control column, which isthe steering wheel of the aircraft.
When the aircraft approaches stallspeed, it's designed to get the
pilot's attention, um, through literalphysical vibration, and then also
(26:14):
a distinctive rapid thumping soundthat's very difficult to ignore.
It is the airplane's way ofscreaming, Hey, you're about to stall.
Hello?
Oh, then he says hi to everybody.
Well, I figured thatwas the stupid pebble.
Oh, that may have been the pebble.
He always, I mean, he isreally the star of the podcast.
(26:36):
Yeah.
If we ever made shirts, theywould just be like, Sev, sev
with holding a little suitcase.
Cute.
Okay.
The correct response to a stick shakeris ingrained in every pilot's training.
And if you are listening to thisand you are a pilot, you are
probably like, I know what to do.
(26:59):
You push forward on the controls to lowerthe nose, add power to increase speed,
and recover from the impending stall.
So that should make sense to anybody.
Especially people that drive manual cars.
I feel like that probablywould make sense.
But the reason that something stalls isbecause it doesn't have enough power to
(27:25):
keep doing the thing that you are tryingto make it do in the most basic sense.
So in order to prevent something fromstalling, you need to provide it with.
F more power in a car,typically that's downshifting.
In a plane, it is pushing thenose down, it's down diving, it's
(27:47):
down, diving, and it's speed.
So we know now what to do.
But Captain Rens low didn't do that.
Instead, he pulled backhard on the controls.
What happened, Zach?
It raised the nose and lowers the stall.
Speed it.
It's gonna raise, or I guessit raises the stall speed.
(28:08):
It's gonna raise the nose.
Woof.
So obviously Captain Relow shouldhave pushed the control column
forward and added full power.
As investigator Scott Warrendiscovered instead of pushing forward,
which is the normal response, thecrew was actually pulling back.
This had the effect of, as Zach accuratelydescribed, pulling the nose up, causing
(28:32):
the air speed to drop and tipping theaircraft into a full stall just like that.
Boop boop.
That's the sound the plane made.
Oh God.
The flight data recordercaptured the precise forces.
Relow applied a 37 pound pole forceinitially, then 41 pounds, then 90
(28:55):
pounds, and finally 160 pounds ashe fought against the aircraft's
Automated recovery systems.
By pulling back on the controlsand obviously with 160 pounds, he
is pulling back with everything.
Yeah.
He sure this is what he's supposed to do.
Yeah.
I mean, I feel like he'sprobably got a foot on the dash
(29:18):
pulling back with 160 pounds.
Captain Relow had done exactly theopposite of what he should have done.
So instead of preventinga stall, he created one.
He created one.
The airflow over the wings separated.
The aircraft lost lift, and it beganto roll uncontrollably to the left,
(29:38):
the autopilot, which had been flying.
The aircraft automaticallydisconnected when the stick shaker
activated, suddenly Captain Relow.
Was hand flying a stallingaircraft in icing conditions at
low altitude, and he was making thesituation worse with every input.
(29:59):
The aircraft rolled to 45 degreesleft wing down, despite the
captain's attempts to control it.
Then it rolled back to theright reaching 105 degrees,
which is a near inverted angle.
But that is, one wing all the way up.
One wing all the way down.
A little past.
I mean, yeah, I think the,oh, pilots correct me.
(30:23):
I think the idea of invertedis anytime that the is, oh,
so anytime greater than 90.
Yeah.
I feel like that's.
Yeah, I mean, I suppose so.
Well maybe, I don't know.
Tell us pilots because if you're here,that's 90, so that would be 1 0 5.
Technically, you areupside down a little bit.
Yeah, the stick pusher activated tryingto force the nose down to recover from
(30:45):
the stall, but the captain overwroteit by pulling back even harder.
Woof.
This poor plane is tryingso hard to save itself.
Flock twist.
He was doing this on purpose.
Whoa, no.
Um, the stick pusher is anautomated system designed to
compliment the stick shaker.
(31:07):
Nothing better than a pusher witha shaker in what I mean, flock.
Okay.
No, I don't.
Would you explain?
When the aircraft actually enters astall, the stick pusher physically
pushes the control column forward tolower the nose and break the stall.
It is essentially the airplane.
Trying desperately to save itselfwhen the pilots don't respond
(31:30):
correctly to the warning throughoutthis entire sequence, first Officer
Shaw was making the situation worse.
She retracted the flaps to zerodegrees, which eliminated what little
lift the wings were still generating.
She also suggested raising the landinggear, which the captain approved.
So I guess in the middle ofthis whole thing, the plane's
(31:50):
upside down and they're like, thelanding here, that's what it was.
What.
The aircraft was now in a deep stall.
It was rolling violently from side to sidewith both pilots making control inputs
that were deepening the crisis rather thanresolving it, the stick pusher activated
(32:10):
three times each time trying to pushthe nose down to recover, and each time
the captain overrode it with more force.
As the aircraft pitched and rolledviolently, the first officer
asked, should I put the gear up?
The captain responded, gear up, butby this point it was far too late
(32:32):
that's not your problem, honey.
They were already low altitude.
How much altitude?
'cause they have left.
Oh, we're gonna find out here, Zach.
The final moments were capturedon the cockpit voice recorder.
As the aircraft entered its final dive,captain Rens Low was heard saying and
expletive and making grunting sounds as hefought the controls in the last seconds as
(32:56):
the aircraft plummeted towards the ground.
He said simply that theywere going down at 10:17 PM.
Flight 34 0 7 slammed into a house.
Yeah.
Hopefully they were out to dinner.
Oh gosh.
Yeah.
It was in, uh, Clarence Center, NewYork, about five miles from the airport
(33:19):
that they were trying to land at.
The aircraft hit the ground in anearly vertical descent, traveling
at over 115 miles per hour.
The impact destroyed the houseand killed its owner, um, which
is like just insane to me.
(33:40):
Maybe what's more insane is thathis wife Karen and his daughter
Jill, barely escaped with theirlives, but they somehow survived.
A plane crashing into their house.
All 49 people aboardthe aircraft perished.
45 passengers, two pilotsand two flight attendants.
(34:00):
The post crash fire consumed mostof the wreckage, but the black
box survived to tell the storyof the final fatal 25 seconds.
Among the victims weresome notable individuals.
Beverly Eckert, a nine 11 widow,who had become a prominent
advocate for aviation safety.
(34:24):
Allison DeFores, a human rightsinvestigator and expert on the Rwanda
genocide and jazz musicians, GaryLeewood and Coleman Millette, who were
traveling to perform with the BuffaloPhil Harmonic Orchestra, but beyond the
individual tragedies, this crash wouldexpose, uh, some systematic problems
(34:50):
in the regional airline industrythat had been building for years.
The National Transportation SafetyBoard launched its investigation
immediately sending a team of 14investigators to this crash site.
First, let's talk aboutthe aircraft itself.
Investigators quickly determined thatthere was nothing wrong with the Q 400.
(35:14):
Engines, normal flight controls workinggreat aircraft good, and also the
minimal ice accumulation on the wings.
That was not the issue either.
So it was not mechanical,it was not the weather.
The flight data recorder and cockpitvoice recorder were recovered intact,
providing investigators with acomplete picture of what had happened.
(35:38):
But it was the analysis of this datathat revealed the most disturbing
act aspects of the accident.
Investigators faced avery unusual problem.
The wreckage was hopelesslyjumbled together with human
remains and debris from a housethat had burned all night long.
(36:01):
Everything had burned and settledinto the basement of this house.
Creating about 10 feet of debris that hadto be carefully excavated, extrapolated.
They received help from graduatestudents in forensic anthropology who
separated human remains from aircraftdebris, freeing up investigators
(36:23):
to focus on technical aspects ofthe investigation, the flight data
recorder and cockpit voice recorder.
We're recovered from the tailsection, and that is really
gonna be the key pieces here.
So as we said before, it was notmechanical, it was not the weather.
(36:45):
What could it be?
Our investigator, Scott Warren.
He found something very surprising whenhe looked at the flight data the aircraft
was flying, as if it had only a relativelysmall, very manageable amount of ice.
And why this matters is because thecrew had activated the reference
(37:08):
speed switch for icing conditions.
This unique feature of the Q 400raises all the stall warning speeds.
It does all the stuffthat we talked about.
It was in the increased position,meaning that the stick shaker activated
at 131 knots instead of 116, giving thecrew an extra 20 knot safety margin.
(37:32):
So why the hell did this thing go down?
Like they had basically safety floaties.
Yeah.
On.
The real question here is why did CaptainRens low pull back on the controls instead
of pushing forward because he had the eps?
The investigation revealed that RensLow had a history of struggling with
(37:53):
basic aircraft control and stallrecovery techniques specifically.
His training records showedmultiple failures on check rides,
including problems with instrumentflying and aircraft handling.
He had never experienced a full stallwith stick pusher activation in training.
(38:14):
Company training included approachto stall exercises designed to be
recovered without altitude lossto meet check ride standards.
So you know, that would be like yougetting your license without ever
having to practice parallel parking.
And then you go to New York andyou're like, oh shit, I can't
(38:37):
park anywhere because I haveno idea how to parallel park.
We got our licenses at a similar time.
I know that you didn't have toparallel park to pass your test.
I didn't, but I knew how to parallel park.
Let me tell you, you and me both.
Yeah.
I mean, my mom is the EastCoast lady, and let me tell you,
she can parallel park a bus.
(38:59):
I can parallel park a truck, a trailer.
That's fair.
Actually, your mom laughed at it one day.
Would you stop me do it?
Uh, well, because companytraining doesn't include.
The training to do this, it may haveconditioned pilots to avoid altitude
loss at all costs, even when altitudeloss was necessary for stall recovery.
(39:23):
Hmm.
Just like if you dunno how to parallelpark, you'll just keep driving around
because you're scared to park the car.
First, officer Shaw's decision toretract the flaps during the stall was
equally problematic, removing lift whenthe aircraft desperately needed it.
The investigation exposed systemicissues with within Colgan Air and the
(39:45):
regional airline industry in general.
The investigation revealed theextent of the fatigue problem
through NTSB InvestigatorEvan Burns investigation work.
Tracking the pilot's movements.
So he literally does like realdetective work, you know, he's
(40:05):
like, when did he get here?
That's exact, yeah.
Like old school.
Like we got a trace steps back 72 hours.
And they do, and it's really scary.
Shaw had commuted overnight from Seattleand Rens, so had slept on a couch in the
crew lounge against company rules becauseneither could afford housing near Newark.
(40:30):
Oh, mm-hmm.
As one investigator put it, herjob was to watch the air speeded.
Her job was to watch the instrumentpanel, and my view was she was fatigued
to the point where that's where shewas, and he just was not capable.
He should not have beenflying an airplane.
Oh no.
It's not funny, but it's really.
Don't even funny.
(40:50):
The business model createdperverse incentives.
The fee for departure system paidairlines per completed flight,
right pressuring crews to operateregardless of their fitness.
Previous employees weren't requiredto disclose training failures,
(41:10):
allowing pilots to hide performanceproblems by switching airlines.
Of the seven fatal passenger jetaccidents in the US over the previous
decade, five involved regional airlines.
When the NTSB revealed its finalreport on February 2nd, 2010, it
issued a rare call to action demandingimmediate industry-wide changes.
(41:35):
The problem cause was captaininappropriate response to the
activation of the stick shaker.
So that's what was writtendown in the report?
Mm-hmm.
The board made 46 safety recommendations.
They wrote a book essentially sayingthat the problems were too serious to
(41:57):
wait for normal regulatory processes.
The stage was set for comprehensive.
Aviation safety reformsand let's talk about 'em.
I just can't get over how much,this is like doctor death.
They're just like, oh, well, we didn'thave to talk about his failures.
He could just go somewhereelse and it didn't matter.
(42:19):
It's crazy, right?
Yeah.
Not our problem anymore.
Boop.
I think he's gone.
It's fine.
It's fine.
What's the worst that could happen?
He crashed a plane.
Into a house with peoplein it and in the plane.
It's crazy.
In the aftermath of the crash,the families of flight 3, 4 0 7
(42:39):
victims did something unprecedented.
They organized into one ofthe most effective safety
lobbying groups and aviation.
History.
Oh, mm-hmm.
Led by people like John Kasner, whosedaughter Ellie was killed in the crash.
They refused to let theirloved one's deaths become.
(43:01):
Just another statistic, as Kasner putit, it's a tragedy that should not
have happened, that was foreseeable,was preventable, and it's repeatable
if we do not do something about it.
I'm focused and determinedto change what exists and not
have another dad sitting here.
Well, God bless that man.
(43:22):
Being a girl dad will reallychange things about you.
Ugh.
I think being a dad in general, butyeah, I mean, you know, aria is your.
World.
I just can't even imagine whatthis stat's going through.
The families organized and theylobbied Congress relentlessly, and
they demanded specific regulatorychanges and their efforts paid off
(43:48):
when President Obama signed theAirline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010.
Which, woof, what a mouthful.
But it was the most sweepingaviation safety reform in decades.
The key changes included one,the 1500 hour rule requiring all
(44:13):
airline pilots to hold airlinetransport pilot certificates, right?
Yep.
Yep.
New science-based fatigue regulations.
Huh?
How does the body react with no sleep?
Badly.
Revolutionary stall training.
Emphasizing proper recovery techniques.
(44:36):
Like we always say, push forward,train the pilots to do the things.
The pilot records database preventingpilots from hiding training failures.
So no Doctor death enhancedtransparency requirements and
mandatory safety management systemscreating proactive safety programs.
(44:57):
So that's a lot of stuff, but basicallywhat it means is that all of the
conditions that were in place thatcaused this crash, they went through
one by one and they were like, fix fix.
However, the reform sparked controversy.
Some people were not happy.
The 1500 hour rule created pilotrecruitment challenges and reduced
(45:20):
service to smaller communities.
I mean, it's one of those thingswhere it's like if somebody
can't get an entry level job.
Without experience.
Without experience, howdoes one get experience?
The experience?
Yeah.
So that's basically whatthe pilots were arguing.
Industry groups lobby for modifications,citing European airlines operating
(45:44):
safely with lower requirements.
But flight.
34 0 7 families oppose anyweakening of the standards.
And Zach, that's our story for today.
I'm glad Dr.
Death is no longer flying planes.
It's pretty absurd.
I mean, having that manyfailed trainings that are just.
Common sense.
(46:04):
So you listener, friend, if you enjoyedthis episode, please rate, review and
subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.
Uh, you can follow us.
We're on Instagram, we're on Facebook.
But.
You know, tell us how you're feeling,what you're vibing with on Spotify.
Now you can leave comments on podcasts.
That's pretty cool.
Ooh.
(46:24):
Mm-hmm.
Just like, go ahead and do that.
I, I get notifications and I love it.
So write us a little, little message.
And finally join us next timewhen we will be exploring another
transportation disaster story.
Until then, remember tostow your tray tables.
(46:45):
Fasten your seat belts and preparefor the unexpected because not every
trip reaches its final destination.
Goodbye,
beautiful harmony.
picture this.
It's a cold February evening in 2009,bur a small commuter plane is on
final approach to Buffalo, New York,carrying 49 people through light,
snow and icing conditions In thecockpit, two exhausted pilots are
(00:22):
chatting casually unaware that theirairspeed is dropping dangerously low.
Suddenly a violent shaking of repsthrough the controls, the stick
shaker warning of an impending stall.
The captain has mere secondsto respond correctly, pushed
forward, add power, recover.
(00:45):
Instead, he pulls back hard.
So stow your trade tables,fasten your seat belts.
And prepare for the unexpectedbecause this is final boarding call.
Intro music.
(01:06):
Intro music.
Hello and welcome to Final Boarding Call.
I'm your disaster obsessed host Alice.
And I am Zach.
Not so reluctant.
I don't know.
Feeling good today.
And a reminder for all of our listeners,please like rate, review, and subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts.
(01:27):
I like this like radio broadcaster voiceyou're bringing to the table today.
It's kind of fun.
I'm congested.
What can I say?
That's, that's the secret.
That's the whole thing.
It's been real hot here and alittle windy, and I work with.
The shop door open all day every day.
That's fair.
It, it has been really hot.
You've been, not to mention suffering.
Not, I've been welding again, which isextra heat and also, smells and things
(01:51):
that will give you cancer eventually.
Oh yeah.
Your daughter's been doingdemon voices at me in bed.
That's not fun.
I hate that so much.
Yuck.
Oh, I hate that.
Yuck.
And it's always prefaced with somethinglike, he says, you gotta do that.
And I'm like, Nope.
Nope.
Hate that.
And on that super positive note, I'mgonna transition into our sources.
(02:14):
So we have a few, obviouslythe NTSB accident report.
We have an article fromAviation International News.
Uh, we have an article from Defense Daily,Wikipedia, and then of course, Zach,
we have a Mayday Air Disaster Season10, episode four called Dead Tired.
(02:36):
Um, been there.
You're ready to jump into the story.
Enough chitchat.
I would prefer to just stepinto it, but if you really want
me to jump Okay, I'll do it.
February 12th, 2009.
While most of America was dealing withthe early months of the great recession.
The aviation industry wasfacing its own challenges.
(03:00):
Regional airlines, which are thesmaller carriers that operate
commuter flights for major airlines.
We're under intense pressure to cutcosts while maintaining schedules.
Isn't that the way that therich people always want it?
It's like, I need you to domore while working less one
(03:21):
of these regional carriers.
Was Colgan Air Operating Flights underthe Continental Connection brand.
Do you remember Continental?
No.
Oh man.
I'm pretty sure Continentalwas purchased by United.
Oh, okay.
But before it was its own white andblue, and they had kind of like a
checkered livery on their airplanes.
(03:43):
You didn't fly as a kid anyway.
I didn't have my firstflight until like 2013.
For me, continental is such anineties kid memory, um, because
they were still around back then.
All right.
Colgan had built its business on thefee for departure model, essentially
getting paid by Continental Airlines foreach flight completed, regardless of how
(04:05):
many passengers were actually on board.
I thought you were about to say,regardless of how many passengers
made it, I mean, based on thetheme of this podcast, like no.
On this particular evening, Colgan AirFlight 3 4 0 7 was scheduled to fly from
Newark Liberty International Airportto Buffalo which is a routine 53 minute
(04:27):
flight, Zach, super short, that's barelylonger than the springs to Denver.
Yeah it's really, really short and it,it does this dozens of times daily,
just like the springs to Denver flight.
There's no drink service.
There's no food service, there's nothing.
No.
Just strap in.
We'll be there.
So yeah, you're on like apretty small little plane.
Mm-hmm.
You feel the bumps and rums.
(04:48):
So easy.
The aircraft was a BombardierQ 400, a modern turboprop
designed for short haul routes.
So this is kind of the workhorseof regional air aviation.
It's got twin turboprop engines, 74 seats,and it has a reputation for reliability.
(05:09):
This specific aircraft was relativelynew, having been manufactured in April,
2008, and we are in February, 2009.
So it's a little baby.
Uh, and it had just over1800 flight hours total.
Wow.
So I mean, that's.
(05:31):
Not a lot of flight hours,not a very old plane.
How does it already have a reputationas being such a solid plane?
This particular plane is ababy, but the bombardier,
whether did I say this was two?
I thought they came out in two.
400?
No, this one was built.
Oh, okay.
In 2008.
Yeah, that makes more sense.
No, no.
(05:52):
I actually have a really funepisode coming up for you.
That's the history of Bombardierbecause it is a fascinating brand
that we will not dive into on thisepisode, but stay tuned for more.
Well, I've got some historyfor you, Bombardier.
Just makes me think of bomb voyage.
Do you know what that's fromthe, the phrase bon voyage.
(06:14):
No.
Bomb voyage.
He's a super villain in the Incredibles.
Can't believe you Didn't know that.
Well, if you had left that tothe audience than our listeners,
they could have guessed.
Yeah.
And gotten a sticker.
But I saw the look on your face.
And if you don't know,it's not as fun for me.
All right, Zach, this is the point.
Where our story gets concerningbecause the plane is new, it's safe.
(06:41):
So what are some of the other factorsthat go wrong in our stories Staff?
Let's talk about our flight crew.
Yep.
Okay.
Their backgrounds are gonnareveal some systemic issues and
ultimately they will prove fatal.
Captain Marvin Relow, age 47 was thepilot in command, and he had been hired
(07:07):
by Colgan in September, 2005, and he hadaccumulated 3,379 total flight hours.
One that's not a lot.
A ton of flight hours.
I mean, we hear aboutpilots that have 10, 13,000.
Well, we had one episode where one had 30.
(07:28):
Correct.
And then we chatted with ourman York Bauer in Oh my gosh.
Yes.
Yeah.
Like he is somewhere around 30.
Yep.
I race cars with a really, really nice.
Gentleman who's a pilot and I didtalk to him and he is going to be
a guest on the show at some point,but he has 30,000 flight hours.
So one, this isn't a ton, but two Zachand more concerning, he had only 1100
(07:55):
hours as a captain on the Q 400, sohe's like brand new to this plane.
More troubling investigators would laterdiscover that Relow had failed multiple
check rides throughout his career.
What's a check ride?
A check ride is imagine if you hadto like take your driver's test every
(08:20):
once in a while just to make sure thatyou were still still, oh, you've just
got like a teacher in there with you?
Yeah.
Yeah, I think it's, I really,it's just like checking up to make
sure that you're not a danger toyourself or the people around you.
Secret shopper, that bitch, well, hefailed and he failed on some things
that are fundamental aircraft control.
(08:41):
Uh, and tho, that shouldhave been red flags.
Let's talk about our first officer.
First Officer Rebecca LynnShaw was only 24 years old.
Mm-hmm.
She's our co-pilot.
She had been hired by Colgan in January,2008 and already had 2,244 flight hours.
(09:03):
Now here's where thestory gets very troubling.
Both pilots were based at Newark, butneither of them actually lived there.
So what that means.
Okay.
Is that when they check in for a day'swork, they have to fly to their base?
Yes.
The expectation is that they're gonnastart their day at Newark Airport,
(09:25):
except they don't live in Newark Airport.
So Captain Rens slow lives near Tampa,Florida, so he's got a two and a
half hour flight north to get there.
First, get this first.
Officer Shaw.
Lived near Seattle, Washington.
Oh, great.
(09:45):
So she's got a four hour flight.
This means that both of these pilots werecommuting across the fricking country.
Mm-hmm.
To get to work every day.
And it's a common practice inthe airline industry, but it
does create serious fatigue.
Yeah.
In my opinion, and this is just myopinion, if they are awake to get
(10:10):
to work that long, I know it's notthis way for a regular day job, but.
They are awake for those hours.
They should be almost documentedas flight hours, not as them
flying, but I hear what you mean.
Yeah.
Yeah.
It's, you know, when I was workingat UPS, if you went over shift, you
(10:32):
weren't allowed to start until 12.
Full hours had lapsed.
Mm-hmm.
So if you didn't get off until10:00 PM you couldn't start working
the next day until 10:00 AM.
Wow.
That's interesting.
Um, and that was not the case.
In our story, and let'stalk about what happened.
The night before the accident, Shawhad taken a red eye flight from Seattle
(10:57):
to Memphis, then connected to Newark,arriving at 6 23 on February 12th.
She had been traveling all nightand she was already exhausted
before her workday even began.
Mm-hmm.
Captain Rens Low's situationwas just as problematic.
So he had completed a two daytrip sequence, arriving in Newark
(11:23):
at 3:44 PM on February 11th.
Instead of getting a hotel room, he spentthe night in the Colgan's crew room at
the airport, which is the equivalentof spending the night on a couch.
In a break room.
So both pilots were observed inthe crew room before their 1:30
PM report time on February 12th.
(11:46):
They were already very fatiguedbefore they even started flying,
which is a recipe for disaster.
Indeed.
Do buckaroo really in any career,but especially in aviation.
You know?
Mm-hmm.
Pilots, surgeons, I feel like thereare a couple jobs where you kind
(12:10):
of need to like be up and at 'em.
I'm, this is one of those ones whereI'm like, oh, well, she probably,
in my opinion, should have been finebecause I picture myself in my twenties.
Staying up until one in the morning,being up at five, going to work, and then
doing it all over again the next day.
And it wasn't that weird.
(12:30):
That sounds horrible.
That's 'cause we're old now.
God, their original flights that day, tworound trips between Newark and Rochester
had been canceled due to high wind.
So their first and only flight of the daywould be the evening departure to Buffalo.
This meant that they had been sittingaround the airport all day further
(12:52):
disrupting their sleep cycles at 6:00 PMThe dispatch release was issued for flight
3 4 0 7, showing an estimated departuretime of 7:10 PM But weather delays at
Newark pushed their actual departure.
To 9:18 PM Jesus.
So they have been just straight at ittechnically for like 30 hours a long time.
(13:18):
Yeah.
And you know, there's something aboutthat antsy anticipation when you're
waiting at the airport and you're waitingand your flight keeps getting delayed.
Mm-hmm.
It always just kind of agitates me.
You know, I am curious, and it'sbecause we're not in the industry,
but in a situation like that, howdoes a captain or the first officer
(13:42):
even, how do they approach it?
If they did recognize, I'mtoo tired to make this flight.
Do they just cancel the flight?
Do they have people on standby?
Let's listen and find out, oh, mywife, she has all the information.
Oh, I might have some information.
As the crew prepared for departure,there were already warning
(14:06):
signs that something was wrong.
The cockpit voice recorder captured first.
Officer Shaw saying, I'mready to be in the hotel room.
And later, this is one of thosetimes that if I felt like this when
I was at home, there's no way Iwould've come all the way out here.
She was clearly feeling unwell andexhausted, but felt pressured to complete
(14:29):
the flight rather than call in sick.
Which is what pilots can doif they feel like they're not
well enough to fly a plane.
She even mentioned that if she calledin sick, she'd have to pay for her
own hotel room until she felt better.
A policy that penalized pilotsfor prioritizing safety over
(14:51):
completing flights, yay.
Um, less than ideal situation there.
That's nuts.
The flight itself started routinely.
They climbed to their cruisingaltitude of 16,000 feet.
They engaged the autopilot and theybegan the 53 minute journey to buffalo.
The weather conditions includedlight icing, so the crew activated
(15:15):
the aircraft's de-icing system.
A routine procedure for winterflying in the Northeast, especially,
I mean, my God, if you're gonnarun into ice, it's probably gonna
be in New York or roundabouts.
Don't put on the voice, I mean, allow.
During the cruise portion of theflight, the captain and first officer
(15:38):
engaged in casual conversation,which Zach is excellent at, and I.
Hate.
I'd rather yank off a toenail thanbe engaged in casual conversation.
This was technically allowedduring cruise flight, but it
established a pattern of distractionthat would prove crucial later.
(16:01):
Hmm.
Around 9:49 PM the first officerbriefed the approach speeds for
landing 118 knots, which is about136 miles per hour for the reference
landing speed, which is called V ref.
Cool.
And that's the target speed for touchdown.
(16:23):
And 114 knots, whichis 1 31 miles per hour.
1 31.
131 is what normal people would sayfor a go around speed, which is the
minimum speed needed if they have toabort the landing and do a go around.
Mm-hmm.
(16:43):
Okay.
Right.
Which we've had obviously episodeswhere they've had to go around.
Like, whoops.
Missed that one.
We're gonna go for it again.
Doing it again.
The captain acknowledged thisinformation and everything at this
point, according to the voice recorder,seemed normal, but as they began their
(17:03):
descent into buffalo, the seeds ofdisaster had already been planted.
The crew was tired.
They were behind on their briefings,and they were about to enter the
most dangerous phase of flight.
Approach and landing in icing conditions.
(17:26):
Oh, let's find out what happens.
Zach.
I have an inkling.
Can you imagine if I was just like,and then the plane landed safely,
and that's our episode today?
No.
As flight 3 4 0 7 began its descenttoward Buffalo, the crew was cleared
for an instrument approach to runway 23.
The weather actually wasn't terrible.
(17:48):
Light snow winds saying theweather outside was not frightful.
It was not.
No.
Zach weather outside was not frightful.
Wow.
It was actually a, uh, marshmallow world.
It was light snow winds from 250degrees at 15 knots gusting to 23 knots.
(18:09):
Um, so.
A little windy for sure.
Light snow, but nothing where,it's like, this is, yeah, terrible.
We can't land here.
It was winter flying conditions thatrequired attention and professionalism.
Right?
Yeah.
Two things that pilots probably shouldbring to the table during the landing.
(18:31):
You're coming up into a, you know, townfrom a highway in the middle of nowhere.
You gotta be paying attention.
Slow down there.
Speed limit drops.
Boom.
At 10:04 PM the captainbegan the approach briefing.
This is a crucial procedure wherepilots review the approach, they
discuss potential hazards and theyconfirm their game plan for landing.
(18:54):
But this briefing was interruptedby air traffic control instructions
and never properly completed.
Here is where we need to talk aboutsomething called the sterile cockpit Rule.
Mm-hmm.
Which I had never heard of before.
Below 10,000 feet.
(19:14):
Federal regulations requirepilots to focus exclusively.
On flying related task,that means no chitchat.
You're not friends right now.
No, you just fly.
You are doing somethingthat is very dangerous.
That is one of the mostdangerous times of flight.
No personal discussions and nothingthat could distract from the critical
(19:39):
task of getting the airplane safely.
On Ze Island
that you should be worriedabout in that moment.
The crew of flight 3 4 0 7 violatedthis rule almost immediately as
they descended below 10,000 feet.
They continued chatting about iceaccumulation on the windshield, the
(20:00):
first officer's lack of experiencewith icing conditions and other
non-essential, very comforting topics.
This might seem minor.
But it shows a lack ofprofessionalism that really, uh,
is not gonna be good for anybody.
Around 10, 10:00 PM the firstofficer made a comment that
(20:24):
should have been a red flag.
I've never seen icing conditions.
Never de-iced, neverexperienced any of that.
She was admitting to having minimalexperience with the exact conditions
that they were flying through.
This was exactly the kind ofinformation that should have prompted
extra caution and attention toprocedures, and instead the pilot
(20:47):
was like, ah, watch this we're fine.
Instead, the casualconversation continued.
The captain and first officerperformed their required checklist.
But they were clearly distracted andthey were really not giving their full
attention to the approach that was comingup quickly at 10:15 PM as they were
(21:09):
about three miles from the outer marker.
The outer marker is a navigationbeacon that marks the beginning
of the final approach path.
The captain began slowing theaircraft to configure for landing.
He reduced power to flight idle,which is the lowest power setting
(21:31):
where the engines are still runningand the aircraft began to slow.
So we've all been in an airplanethat you can feel this, right.
It's usually where it suddenly feelslike a float rather than flying.
Yeah.
And it's usually associated alsowith the, um, landing gear coming
down pretty quickly after that.
It.
(21:51):
It almost sounds like theengines are shutting off.
It's a little like, yeah.
Well, it feels like mid stall.
Mm-hmm.
Yep.
The landing gear was extended.
There you go.
And the first officer confirmed geardown when the air speeded was at 145
knots, which is 167 miles per hour.
So now they're in the right range.
(22:12):
So far.
So far Seems like we'redoing everything right.
Other than the idolchitchat, quit talking.
Go sit in the hall.
We're not friends.
The captain then called forflaps to be set to 15 degrees.
Perfect.
And requested the before landingchecklist, but here is where
(22:33):
things start to get confusing.
The flight data recorder shows theflaps were only extended to 10 degrees.
Mm-hmm.
Not the 15 degrees requested.
The Q 400 is equipped with asystem called the ref speed switch,
which can be set to either normalor increase, so those a year.
(22:57):
Those are your options for this switch.
When it's set to increase, which isused for icing conditions, it raises
all the speed references by 15 knots.
Its providing an extra marginof safety by essentially telling
the pilots to fly faster whenice might be affecting the wings.
Oh, like creating extra drag or something?
(23:18):
Exactly.
Yes.
So the crew had set this switch toincrease because of the icing conditions
that they're flying around in, whichmeant that their stall warning system
also known as the stick shaker, which.
Who doesn't love a good stick shakerreference would would activate at
a higher air speed than normal.
(23:41):
This should have given them extrawarning time if they got too slow.
But here's the problem.
The crew lost track of their airspeed asthey configured for landing the airplane.
Continued to slow.
The flight data recorder shows theairspeed decreasing from 145 knots
(24:05):
to 1 35 knots to one 30 knots.
On the primary flight displayin front of both pilots.
There were multiple cues tellingthem that they were getting too slow.
You guys are fucking upthe yes, the low speed cue.
Think of this as kind of avisual warning that shows how
(24:26):
close you are to a stall speed.
It was rising towardtheir current airspeed.
The airspeed tend vectorwas pointing downwards.
Which indicates a decrease inspeed and the airspeed numbers
were even changing color.
Oh, to warn them we're inthe dark yellow slash warm.
(24:49):
Like, that's bad you guys,guys, it's almost red now.
Not good.
Both pilots mist all of thesewarnings wide open net, and
they just weren't there.
They, they were distractedby their conversation.
Focused on other tasks and simply notmonitoring their airspeed properly.
(25:09):
This is what investigators calla monitoring failure when pilots
fail to observe and respondto critical flight parameters.
As one investigator would laternote, they were clear and conspicuous
cues of the deteriorating airspeedthat were not heated by the captain.
(25:31):
At 10:16 PM the inevitable happened.
The stick shaker activated a stickA I did that in the last episode.
I stick my shaker.
You shake?
I shake my sticker.
You a shake.
Must stick a ew.
Oh, right folks, we've talked aboutstick shakers before, but I'm gonna give
a very brief explanation of what theyare in case this is your first episode.
(25:53):
Hi, welcome.
The stick shaker is a stall warningsystem that literally violently
vibrates the control column, which isthe steering wheel of the aircraft.
When the aircraft approaches stallspeed, it's designed to get the
pilot's attention, um, through literalphysical vibration, and then also
(26:14):
a distinctive rapid thumping soundthat's very difficult to ignore.
It is the airplane's way ofscreaming, Hey, you're about to stall.
Hello?
Oh, then he says hi to everybody.
Well, I figured thatwas the stupid pebble.
Oh, that may have been the pebble.
He always, I mean, he isreally the star of the podcast.
(26:36):
Yeah.
If we ever made shirts, theywould just be like, Sev, sev
with holding a little suitcase.
Cute.
Okay.
The correct response to a stick shakeris ingrained in every pilot's training.
And if you are listening to thisand you are a pilot, you are
probably like, I know what to do.
(26:59):
You push forward on the controls to lowerthe nose, add power to increase speed,
and recover from the impending stall.
So that should make sense to anybody.
Especially people that drive manual cars.
I feel like that probablywould make sense.
But the reason that something stalls isbecause it doesn't have enough power to
(27:25):
keep doing the thing that you are tryingto make it do in the most basic sense.
So in order to prevent something fromstalling, you need to provide it with.
F more power in a car,typically that's downshifting.
In a plane, it is pushing thenose down, it's down diving, it's
(27:47):
down, diving, and it's speed.
So we know now what to do.
But Captain Rens low didn't do that.
Instead, he pulled backhard on the controls.
What happened, Zach?
It raised the nose and lowers the stall.
Speed it.
It's gonna raise, or I guessit raises the stall speed.
(28:08):
It's gonna raise the nose.
Woof.
So obviously Captain Relow shouldhave pushed the control column
forward and added full power.
As investigator Scott Warrendiscovered instead of pushing forward,
which is the normal response, thecrew was actually pulling back.
This had the effect of, as Zach accuratelydescribed, pulling the nose up, causing
(28:32):
the air speed to drop and tipping theaircraft into a full stall just like that.
Boop boop.
That's the sound the plane made.
Oh God.
The flight data recordercaptured the precise forces.
Relow applied a 37 pound pole forceinitially, then 41 pounds, then 90
(28:55):
pounds, and finally 160 pounds ashe fought against the aircraft's
Automated recovery systems.
By pulling back on the controlsand obviously with 160 pounds, he
is pulling back with everything.
Yeah.
He sure this is what he's supposed to do.
Yeah.
I mean, I feel like he'sprobably got a foot on the dash
(29:18):
pulling back with 160 pounds.
Captain Relow had done exactly theopposite of what he should have done.
So instead of preventinga stall, he created one.
He created one.
The airflow over the wings separated.
The aircraft lost lift, and it beganto roll uncontrollably to the left,
(29:38):
the autopilot, which had been flying.
The aircraft automaticallydisconnected when the stick shaker
activated, suddenly Captain Relow.
Was hand flying a stallingaircraft in icing conditions at
low altitude, and he was making thesituation worse with every input.
(29:59):
The aircraft rolled to 45 degreesleft wing down, despite the
captain's attempts to control it.
Then it rolled back to theright reaching 105 degrees,
which is a near inverted angle.
But that is, one wing all the way up.
One wing all the way down.
A little past.
I mean, yeah, I think the,oh, pilots correct me.
(30:23):
I think the idea of invertedis anytime that the is, oh,
so anytime greater than 90.
Yeah.
I feel like that's.
Yeah, I mean, I suppose so.
Well maybe, I don't know.
Tell us pilots because if you're here,that's 90, so that would be 1 0 5.
Technically, you areupside down a little bit.
Yeah, the stick pusher activated tryingto force the nose down to recover from
(30:45):
the stall, but the captain overwroteit by pulling back even harder.
Woof.
This poor plane is tryingso hard to save itself.
Flock twist.
He was doing this on purpose.
Whoa, no.
Um, the stick pusher is anautomated system designed to
compliment the stick shaker.
(31:07):
Nothing better than a pusher witha shaker in what I mean, flock.
Okay.
No, I don't.
Would you explain?
When the aircraft actually enters astall, the stick pusher physically
pushes the control column forward tolower the nose and break the stall.
It is essentially the airplane.
Trying desperately to save itselfwhen the pilots don't respond
(31:30):
correctly to the warning throughoutthis entire sequence, first Officer
Shaw was making the situation worse.
She retracted the flaps to zerodegrees, which eliminated what little
lift the wings were still generating.
She also suggested raising the landinggear, which the captain approved.
So I guess in the middle ofthis whole thing, the plane's
(31:50):
upside down and they're like, thelanding here, that's what it was.
What.
The aircraft was now in a deep stall.
It was rolling violently from side to sidewith both pilots making control inputs
that were deepening the crisis rather thanresolving it, the stick pusher activated
(32:10):
three times each time trying to pushthe nose down to recover, and each time
the captain overrode it with more force.
As the aircraft pitched and rolledviolently, the first officer
asked, should I put the gear up?
The captain responded, gear up, butby this point it was far too late
(32:32):
that's not your problem, honey.
They were already low altitude.
How much altitude?
'cause they have left.
Oh, we're gonna find out here, Zach.
The final moments were capturedon the cockpit voice recorder.
As the aircraft entered its final dive,captain Rens Low was heard saying and
expletive and making grunting sounds as hefought the controls in the last seconds as
(32:56):
the aircraft plummeted towards the ground.
He said simply that theywere going down at 10:17 PM.
Flight 34 0 7 slammed into a house.
Yeah.
Hopefully they were out to dinner.
Oh gosh.
Yeah.
It was in, uh, Clarence Center, NewYork, about five miles from the airport
(33:19):
that they were trying to land at.
The aircraft hit the ground in anearly vertical descent, traveling
at over 115 miles per hour.
The impact destroyed the houseand killed its owner, um, which
is like just insane to me.
(33:40):
Maybe what's more insane is thathis wife Karen and his daughter
Jill, barely escaped with theirlives, but they somehow survived.
A plane crashing into their house.
All 49 people aboardthe aircraft perished.
45 passengers, two pilotsand two flight attendants.
(34:00):
The post crash fire consumed mostof the wreckage, but the black
box survived to tell the storyof the final fatal 25 seconds.
Among the victims weresome notable individuals.
Beverly Eckert, a nine 11 widow,who had become a prominent
advocate for aviation safety.
(34:24):
Allison DeFores, a human rightsinvestigator and expert on the Rwanda
genocide and jazz musicians, GaryLeewood and Coleman Millette, who were
traveling to perform with the BuffaloPhil Harmonic Orchestra, but beyond the
individual tragedies, this crash wouldexpose, uh, some systematic problems
(34:50):
in the regional airline industrythat had been building for years.
The National Transportation SafetyBoard launched its investigation
immediately sending a team of 14investigators to this crash site.
First, let's talk aboutthe aircraft itself.
Investigators quickly determined thatthere was nothing wrong with the Q 400.
(35:14):
Engines, normal flight controls workinggreat aircraft good, and also the
minimal ice accumulation on the wings.
That was not the issue either.
So it was not mechanical,it was not the weather.
The flight data recorder and cockpitvoice recorder were recovered intact,
providing investigators with acomplete picture of what had happened.
(35:38):
But it was the analysis of this datathat revealed the most disturbing
act aspects of the accident.
Investigators faced avery unusual problem.
The wreckage was hopelesslyjumbled together with human
remains and debris from a housethat had burned all night long.
(36:01):
Everything had burned and settledinto the basement of this house.
Creating about 10 feet of debris that hadto be carefully excavated, extrapolated.
They received help from graduatestudents in forensic anthropology who
separated human remains from aircraftdebris, freeing up investigators
(36:23):
to focus on technical aspects ofthe investigation, the flight data
recorder and cockpit voice recorder.
We're recovered from the tailsection, and that is really
gonna be the key pieces here.
So as we said before, it was notmechanical, it was not the weather.
(36:45):
What could it be?
Our investigator, Scott Warren.
He found something very surprising whenhe looked at the flight data the aircraft
was flying, as if it had only a relativelysmall, very manageable amount of ice.
And why this matters is because thecrew had activated the reference
(37:08):
speed switch for icing conditions.
This unique feature of the Q 400raises all the stall warning speeds.
It does all the stuffthat we talked about.
It was in the increased position,meaning that the stick shaker activated
at 131 knots instead of 116, giving thecrew an extra 20 knot safety margin.
(37:32):
So why the hell did this thing go down?
Like they had basically safety floaties.
Yeah.
On.
The real question here is why did CaptainRens low pull back on the controls instead
of pushing forward because he had the eps?
The investigation revealed that RensLow had a history of struggling with
(37:53):
basic aircraft control and stallrecovery techniques specifically.
His training records showedmultiple failures on check rides,
including problems with instrumentflying and aircraft handling.
He had never experienced a full stallwith stick pusher activation in training.
(38:14):
Company training included approachto stall exercises designed to be
recovered without altitude lossto meet check ride standards.
So you know, that would be like yougetting your license without ever
having to practice parallel parking.
And then you go to New York andyou're like, oh shit, I can't
(38:37):
park anywhere because I haveno idea how to parallel park.
We got our licenses at a similar time.
I know that you didn't have toparallel park to pass your test.
I didn't, but I knew how to parallel park.
Let me tell you, you and me both.
Yeah.
I mean, my mom is the EastCoast lady, and let me tell you,
she can parallel park a bus.
(38:59):
I can parallel park a truck, a trailer.
That's fair.
Actually, your mom laughed at it one day.
Would you stop me do it?
Uh, well, because companytraining doesn't include.
The training to do this, it may haveconditioned pilots to avoid altitude
loss at all costs, even when altitudeloss was necessary for stall recovery.
(39:23):
Hmm.
Just like if you dunno how to parallelpark, you'll just keep driving around
because you're scared to park the car.
First, officer Shaw's decision toretract the flaps during the stall was
equally problematic, removing lift whenthe aircraft desperately needed it.
The investigation exposed systemicissues with within Colgan Air and the
(39:45):
regional airline industry in general.
The investigation revealed theextent of the fatigue problem
through NTSB InvestigatorEvan Burns investigation work.
Tracking the pilot's movements.
So he literally does like realdetective work, you know, he's
(40:05):
like, when did he get here?
That's exact, yeah.
Like old school.
Like we got a trace steps back 72 hours.
And they do, and it's really scary.
Shaw had commuted overnight from Seattleand Rens, so had slept on a couch in the
crew lounge against company rules becauseneither could afford housing near Newark.
(40:30):
Oh, mm-hmm.
As one investigator put it, herjob was to watch the air speeded.
Her job was to watch the instrumentpanel, and my view was she was fatigued
to the point where that's where shewas, and he just was not capable.
He should not have beenflying an airplane.
Oh no.
It's not funny, but it's really.
Don't even funny.
(40:50):
The business model createdperverse incentives.
The fee for departure system paidairlines per completed flight,
right pressuring crews to operateregardless of their fitness.
Previous employees weren't requiredto disclose training failures,
(41:10):
allowing pilots to hide performanceproblems by switching airlines.
Of the seven fatal passenger jetaccidents in the US over the previous
decade, five involved regional airlines.
When the NTSB revealed its finalreport on February 2nd, 2010, it
issued a rare call to action demandingimmediate industry-wide changes.
(41:35):
The problem cause was captaininappropriate response to the
activation of the stick shaker.
So that's what was writtendown in the report?
Mm-hmm.
The board made 46 safety recommendations.
They wrote a book essentially sayingthat the problems were too serious to
(41:57):
wait for normal regulatory processes.
The stage was set for comprehensive.
Aviation safety reformsand let's talk about 'em.
I just can't get over how much,this is like doctor death.
They're just like, oh, well, we didn'thave to talk about his failures.
He could just go somewhereelse and it didn't matter.
(42:19):
It's crazy, right?
Yeah.
Not our problem anymore.
Boop.
I think he's gone.
It's fine.
It's fine.
What's the worst that could happen?
He crashed a plane.
Into a house with peoplein it and in the plane.
It's crazy.
In the aftermath of the crash,the families of flight 3, 4 0 7
(42:39):
victims did something unprecedented.
They organized into one ofthe most effective safety
lobbying groups and aviation.
History.
Oh, mm-hmm.
Led by people like John Kasner, whosedaughter Ellie was killed in the crash.
They refused to let theirloved one's deaths become.
(43:01):
Just another statistic, as Kasner putit, it's a tragedy that should not
have happened, that was foreseeable,was preventable, and it's repeatable
if we do not do something about it.
I'm focused and determinedto change what exists and not
have another dad sitting here.
Well, God bless that man.
(43:22):
Being a girl dad will reallychange things about you.
Ugh.
I think being a dad in general, butyeah, I mean, you know, aria is your.
World.
I just can't even imagine whatthis stat's going through.
The families organized and theylobbied Congress relentlessly, and
they demanded specific regulatorychanges and their efforts paid off
(43:48):
when President Obama signed theAirline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010.
Which, woof, what a mouthful.
But it was the most sweepingaviation safety reform in decades.
The key changes included one,the 1500 hour rule requiring all
(44:13):
airline pilots to hold airlinetransport pilot certificates, right?
Yep.
Yep.
New science-based fatigue regulations.
Huh?
How does the body react with no sleep?
Badly.
Revolutionary stall training.
Emphasizing proper recovery techniques.
(44:36):
Like we always say, push forward,train the pilots to do the things.
The pilot records database preventingpilots from hiding training failures.
So no Doctor death enhancedtransparency requirements and
mandatory safety management systemscreating proactive safety programs.
(44:57):
So that's a lot of stuff, but basicallywhat it means is that all of the
conditions that were in place thatcaused this crash, they went through
one by one and they were like, fix fix.
However, the reform sparked controversy.
Some people were not happy.
The 1500 hour rule created pilotrecruitment challenges and reduced
(45:20):
service to smaller communities.
I mean, it's one of those thingswhere it's like if somebody
can't get an entry level job.
Without experience.
Without experience, howdoes one get experience?
The experience?
Yeah.
So that's basically whatthe pilots were arguing.
Industry groups lobby for modifications,citing European airlines operating
(45:44):
safely with lower requirements.
But flight.
34 0 7 families oppose anyweakening of the standards.
And Zach, that's our story for today.
I'm glad Dr.
Death is no longer flying planes.
It's pretty absurd.
I mean, having that manyfailed trainings that are just.
Common sense.
(46:04):
So you listener, friend, if you enjoyedthis episode, please rate, review and
subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.
Uh, you can follow us.
We're on Instagram, we're on Facebook.
But.
You know, tell us how you're feeling,what you're vibing with on Spotify.
Now you can leave comments on podcasts.
That's pretty cool.
Ooh.
(46:24):
Mm-hmm.
Just like, go ahead and do that.
I, I get notifications and I love it.
So write us a little, little message.
And finally join us next timewhen we will be exploring another
transportation disaster story.
Until then, remember tostow your tray tables.
(46:45):
Fasten your seat belts and preparefor the unexpected because not every
trip reaches its final destination.
Goodbye,
beautiful harmony.
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