November 10, 2025 • 33 mins
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:07):
Welcome to Flight Global Focus, the essential podcast for
trusted aviation insights. We publish episodes twice
weekly. Join us every Friday for a
concise briefing on the week's news and again on Monday for in
depth analysis covering important developments in
airlines, defence and aerospace.I'm Ryan Finnerty, Flight
Global's America's Defence reporter, and today we're
(00:28):
discussing the prospect of an air war in the Western Pacific
between the United States and China.
A recent research paper from 2 American scholars finds there
are dangerous risks associated with the US Air Force's strategy
for conflict with China over Taiwan.
Not only will the US likely losehundreds of tactical aircraft,
(00:51):
there's a significant chance it would lose a battle with China
altogether. The main issue is China's deep
reserves of long range precisionmissiles, a key pillar of
Beijing's anti access area denial strategy.
Those missiles are expected to rain down on large American air
bases in Japan and Guam. the US Air Force has an answer to this
(01:12):
problem, Agile Combat Employment, more commonly known
as ACE. The idea calls for the dispersal
of fighters and support aircraftacross a number of smaller,
austere airstrips throughout theregion, effectively hiding them
from Chinese bombardment while vulnerable on the ground.
But the latest study published in the journal International
(01:33):
Security, raises serious doubts about the ability of ACE to
actually deliver on that promise.
Joining me today to discuss the new findings and what they mean
for regional security are FlightGlobal's Managing Editor for
Defence, Greg Waldron, based in Singapore and Craig Hoyle, our
European Defence editor based inLondon.
Hey guys and good to speak with you both again.
(01:54):
Hi, Ryan. Great to be here.
Hi everyone. OK guys, so this study was
authored by Nicholas Anderson atthe George Washington University
in Washington, DC and Daryl Press at Dartmouth College, both
both US universities. And it imagines either a full
military invasion of Taiwan by China or at the least an island
(02:16):
wide blockade with the Americansdeploying forces to assist
Taipei and either fend off the invasion or break the blockade.
And the analysis looks at expected US losses after 30 days
of fighting specifically for theUS Air Force ground based air
power. And we will have a link to this
research paper in the show notesfor anyone listening who wants
(02:38):
to give it a read themselves. And like several war games that
have been conducted in the last few years and research studies
on this topic, Anderson and Press, the two authors found
that the Americans will likely lose hundreds of combat
aircraft, with most of those losses being on the ground
rather than an aerial combat. So, Greg, you're based in the
(02:58):
Indo Pacific and you often writeabout developments of Chinese
military technology and strategyfor flight.
How are we likely to see a Chinese operation unfold if
there were to be an operation launched?
And what challenge would the Americans face in trying to
repel an invasion or break a blockade?
Yeah, it was an interesting paper and certainly a very
sobering read. The way we understand a Chinese
(03:21):
assault on Taiwan, it's going tobe key for them to achieve
aerial supremacy. I mean, you're, they're going to
have, you know, a massive numberof ships crossing the Taiwan
Strait. And these are going to need to
be protected as a very urgent priority, not only in the
initial invasion, but also as Chinese forces, should they make
a landing and establish A beachhead.
It's critical that this beachhead be resupplied, right?
(03:44):
That's a key part of amphibious warfare.
And so that Chinese airpower is going to be in the air kind of
protecting this landing from incursions from, you know,
allied aircraft. Now, the paper outlines the US
response and the way that would work the US, since the Chinese
would have a this air, you know,combat air patrol over the
(04:04):
Taiwan, the US would be able to pick and choose when it would
actually come in and engage Chinese forces, which would put
China at a disadvantage because the US would basically have the
option of when to attack. So the Chinese strategy would be
really to go and knockout American aircraft on the ground
(04:25):
before they can actually get into action.
And to do this, China's investedin a massive arsenal of
ballistic missiles, large numbers of cruise missiles, both
air launched and ground launched, all sorts of ship
launched weapons and a range of other systems as well.
It's going to be a lot of electronic warfare.
There could be special forces and so forth.
And this is the, you know, sort of the genesis of ACE.
(04:48):
OK, thanks for that overview Greg.
So the, the basic idea with ACE is that these main air bases,
there's six of them mostly in Japan and one in Guam, are
vulnerable. They're known fixed positions
and they're vulnerable to attackby Chinese fighters.
And so the Air Force has this idea of ACE to spread those
fighters out and protect them while on the ground.
(05:09):
So Craig, this idea that you candisperse fighters and help them
survive in their most vulnerableposition actually originated in
Europe, in a part of Europe thatyou often cover.
What can you tell us about it? Yeah, so, and I, I think
thinking about it, the the sort of dispersed operations thing
probably goes back to, you know,Second World War with putting
(05:30):
lots of bases all over the place.
But yeah, looking into the sort of more modern era, the
experience I'm I'm most familiarwith is what goes on in Sweden.
So they're a recent entrant to NATO, but before that their
whole posture was around nation defence.
They have, I mean, they've comparatively good sized Air
Force, but compared to Russia it's tiny.
(05:52):
What they do there is. So it's not, it's not an ace
concept, it's a dispersed operations concept.
And the idea is that the the forces and the aircraft kind of
disappear into the forest essentially.
So what they will do in practiseis you'll have a small Rd strip
in the middle of nowhere essentially, and a jet will go
and land there quickly, have support people waiting on the
(06:15):
ground to refuel it and rearm it, and then it's up again in
the air before the enemy can work out where they are and
attack them. So it's a good sounding policy
on paper. What of course has happened is
after the end of the Cold War, the infrastructure there has
been sort of let go a little bit.
So I don't know how many of these remote bases they used to
(06:37):
have, but they don't have as many these days.
So you're well prepared adversary will probably know
exactly where they are. So there's there's a bit of a,
there's been a lack of capability at the moment, but
essentially what you do is. So I went to a demonstration of
one of these last year during a visit to Sweden and it was done
(06:59):
by the F7 wing just near Sortanas air base at their their
home. And what they do is they come
in, they close a small section of local road and practise
landing the aircraft on it. So it is a small section of Rd.
It's it's one kilometre long, but essentially the box they
operate in is 800 metres by 17 metres.
(07:22):
So the Saab Grip and which they use these days, the wingspan is
about 8 1/2 metres. So you've basically got half a
wing of room on either side of the runway, the road runway and
then you've got a small section of land and then trees.
It's a pretty sporty activity todo and the Swedes will tell you
(07:43):
that the Grippen is the only aircraft that can do this.
So they are practising it more these days.
But what sort of what supports it really well is that you have
a very small support team, so you may only have four or five
people, some of which are conscripts, and now come along
and do the rearming of the aircraft.
There'll be 1 little fuel tankerthere that looks just like a
(08:05):
commercial truck. And the whole activity takes
place in about 15 minutes. I think a lot of a lot of other
air forces have been to see the Swedes and look at how they do
things. Because when we think of an ACE
construct, quite often you're talking about things like
landing F30 fives on a road in Finland.
Well, it's, it's a big highway, it's not a little section of
(08:27):
road. And then to support that, you've
maybe had to fly AC17 load of equipment in and then move that
equipment by truck or C130J to where the exercise is happening.
So the sort of agile and as agile and generally speaking
Europe's practising this more, but they're very out of
practise. Poland did a an exercise on one
(08:51):
of their highways in 2023 and that was the first time they've
done it for 20 years. I'm not aware of the UK having
done any sort of ACE type operations.
They've landed typhoons away from home at some other military
air bases. So it's a capability that's
there, but it needs more practise, needs more development
and more nations need to be doing it.
(09:13):
And in in the context of the Swedish Air Force, Craig, is
this distributed operations strategy, is that their main
focus if there were to be an invasion?
I guess maybe it's different nowthat they're a member of NATO,
but when this was being developed, was that their
immediate plan to go to dispersed operations or was it
(09:33):
viewed more as a backup or a supporting effort in the way
that the Americans are looking at it in the Pacific so.
Basically, they would assume they, you know, they would be
subject to a huge attack and theidea would be that they would
disperse as much equipment as they possibly can as quickly as
they can. They would move around the
country. It's a, it's a big country.
(09:53):
There's a lot of forests. So I guess there's lots of
places you could hide in theory,like I said today, there's not
that much infrastructure to do this.
But the idea they have is very much they would do this with,
when they have their globalised surveillance aircraft, they also
want that to be able to operate at lots of different airfields
and smaller airfields around thecountry to make it hard to
target those. This is what Ukraine's been
(10:16):
doing to good effect with its small number of aircraft.
They've managed to not have hugenumbers of losses of aircraft on
the ground by keeping them moving.
So it's a good strategy. I forgot to mention actually,
when I when I'd done the the Sweden visit to actually watch
this demonstration, I'd previously flown the grip and E
simulator and had a go at landing on one of these Rd
(10:37):
strips. And it certainly focuses your
mind when you're flying into this very, very small area.
I'll put my hand up and say I had a test pilot who was helping
me with throttle because it was quite complex to, to get the
aircraft all set up for the landing.
But you basically come in prettyfast.
You already got your feet on thetoe brakes and it stops really,
(11:01):
really quick. You turn it around in the width
of the road and you go back to where the the supporting people
are. So it's it's a very slick
operation to see it in action. Hair raising experience, I'm
sure, having attempted a few landings in simulators myself,
proper runways, I'm sure that was quite the challenge.
I think you raised a couple really interesting points there,
(11:23):
Craig, about about the ACE concept in, in the modern
context. You know that it's based off
this this strategy that was really designed for a 20th
century land war in Europe against the Soviet Union in a
country that has lots of forestsand mountains and roads
connecting all of these remote sites.
And the Americans are now attempting to adapt it for more
(11:46):
of a Naval Air war in the first island chain of the Western
Pacific against a modern Chinesemilitary.
And, you know, there's some debate as to whether or not it
can work. And I think the, the authors of
this paper, Anderson and Press, came down pretty firmly in the
know category on that question that ACE can help and, and can
reduce some losses, but is not the silver bullet that it's
(12:09):
sometimes presented as. And I think you, you raised a
few of the obvious setbacks to it.
You know, 1 you need to resupplyall of these these remote sites
with fuel and and munitions and food and water for the personnel
that are there and that they're likely to already be identified
by the adversary even when you start using them.
(12:31):
And I think that's why the paperconcludes that the the current
US Air Force strategy risks quote, significant header
carries quote or significant risk of catastrophic defeat, End
Quote. And with the a strategy unlikely
to guarantee a victory. And so Greg, you heard Craig
kind of give an overview of of how ACE works in Europe.
(12:54):
You've got some expertise in thePacific.
How well do you think the idea can be adapted for this?
More of an island war where you're having to project power
over large distances of of oceanto fight, kind of a standoff war
over Taiwan. It's certainly more challenging.
I mean, what Sweden's done is very useful and, you know, very
(13:15):
specific to that country. And of course, the landmass of
Sweden is vastly greater than the amount of landmass that
you'd have the US would have available to operate from in an
ACE type situation. So, you know, you have a major
tanking issue as well in Asia. So getting enough fuel to the
aircraft. Also you're operating dissimilar
types like in the Swedish example, you'd be operating the
(13:38):
grip. And so everything's kind of set
up for the grip and you have stashes of, you know, weapons
and gear. It's all kind of standardised,
I'd imagine throughout this kindof universe of small airfields
and Hwy, you know, landing strips.
I think in, you know, ace in Asia, it's going to be a lot
more complicated. You're going to have C one 30s,
C seventeens, you know, all sorts of tactical transports,
(14:00):
you know, flying supplies, flying personnel around so that
they can meet the fighters, rearm the fighters, refuel the
fighters. And, you know, if you really
look at the history of warfare, when you attempt these really
complicated operations where everybody kind of has to come
together at once and everybody'sthere and things just going to
happen, somebody's always going to be delayed.
There's always going to be a problem.
(14:20):
The plane breaks down, the aircraft with the necessary
weapons went to the wrong airfield, you know, all these
different issues. And of course, the enemy will
get a vote as well and all that.So that it's just a complicated
task even without the enemy, youknow, shooting at you.
It's, you know, over vast distances as well.
Some of the other aspects of thereport, they talk about the need
(14:42):
for hardened shelters in the US to develop hardened shelters for
its bases and at ACE locations. They really haven't done a lot
of that, even though this China threat has been growing and
growing and growing for years. I mean, I remember having a
discussion with another reporterin 2011 talking about the woeful
state of US hardened shelter building.
(15:02):
We said, yeah, they really need to do more of it then.
And that's 14 years ago, and very little has happened.
On the other hand, you know, I think the US has gotten quite
good at missile defence. If you look at the case of
Israel versus Iran, I mean, theywere really able to whack a lot
of those missiles out of the sky.
So I think they're quite good atintercepting missiles.
But of course, in the case, you know, China has, I guess, 24
(15:23):
airfields that they really need to focus on.
And they can build a lot of missiles and they can really
pummelled these things. They can put up a lot of decoys.
I mean, they can really force the US to exhaust its missile
defence stocks quite quickly. And on the other hand too, I'd
like to point out too, it's veryimportant to stress Chinese
forces. I mean, they're very impressive.
They've added a lot of aircraft over the years.
(15:45):
They have fifth generation typesin the form of the J20.
You know, you've seen some success with Chinese aircraft
such as the J10C shooting down Rafalls in the recent India
Pakistan skirmish, but the Chinese forces are still
relatively untested. So they've made big progress,
but it's not 100%. Clear how Well.
They're going to perform. But even that said, though,
(16:07):
like, you know, another point I'd like to make too, back to
the hardened shelters thing. China has invested in hardened
shelters for its air bases that would be engaged in any conflict
around Taiwan. So the aircraft have hardened
shelters that they can go back to.
And the other thing I'd add, too, is in a war over Taiwan, it
is very possible that the US president might be reluctant to
(16:30):
order direct strikes against theChinese mainland.
In the Korean War, MacArthur wasreally pushing for strikes
against Chinese logistics, Chinese cities, you know,
Chinese units across the border.And Truman refused to give him
that because he was concerned about a nuclear war kicking off
with the Soviet Union at the time.
(16:51):
So basically China had this, youknow, huge sanctuary from
American air power. Similarly, in the Vietnam War, I
think it was like a 20 mile buffer zone bleeding up to the
Chinese border that the US was not allowed to bomb so
gracically, creating like a sanctuary.
So I would suspect also not only, you know, will the US have
(17:11):
to deal with Chinese airport over Taiwan, but I have a strong
suspicion that they will not be able to actually strike Chinese
aircraft in China. And even if they do, they're
going to be facing a very serious surface to air missile
threat and also the hardened shelters at Chinese bases.
I think that's a great point, Greg.
And, and I guess we should, we should say too, there's, there's
kind of a, the opposite side of that coin, which is we don't
(17:34):
know if there were to be a war that China would strike US bases
in Japan and Guam and elsewhere,that would mark a significant
escalation on their side as well.
So there are a lot of unknowns here.
And and if the Chinese government opted not to launch
direct missile strikes on Japanese territory, for example,
(17:56):
that really changes the calculusthat's outlined in this paper.
Because as we've mentioned, thisstudy and several others find
that most of the US losses, thispaper was 94% of losses were
coming on the ground rather thanan air to air combat.
There are a lot of unknowns as you've identified there.
(18:18):
And I think one of the other things that is interesting that
Craig mentioned or that Craig made me think of was this whole
distributed operations concept that came from Sweden.
They built a fighter aircraft, the grip in that was really
designed to operate in these type of environments and and
built their strategy around that.
Whereas the US has not done thatin aircraft like the F35.
(18:40):
And the F16 are much more sensitive and have more
difficulty operating on some of these rugged and austere
airfields that aren't being constantly swept for debris and
and well maintained like that. And do you think that will play
a role as well in the in the kind of success of this
(19:00):
strategy, Greg? Yeah, the different types of
aircraft. I mean, the F35A was envisaged
as operating from, you know, bigrunways.
And again, a lot of the aircraftuses were kind of built on the
assumption that they'll be operating from a big, you know,
sanctuary style base, as they did in the first Gulf War.
Has it in the second Gulf War. I mean, basically, since the end
(19:21):
of the Second World War, the US air power has operated from a
sanctuary. And that's what, of course, will
be very different about any conflict with China because the
air bases themselves will come under threat.
And of course, you know, China is going to be using its ISR,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to really, you
know, keep an eye on what US aircraft are doing.
(19:43):
And one of the points that the paper makes, which I thought was
quite interesting, is that this will really kind of force the US
to knockout Chinese ISR very early in the conflict,
effectively blinding Chinese leadership.
And the paper sees this as highly escalatory.
So that's something, you know, that needs to be considered.
It even suggests that probably the best course of action you
(20:06):
know of all the bad choices the report outlines, it outlines the
best course of action is really consolidating on those big six
fixed bases have really good hardened shelters, have really
good ballistic missile defence. And have really good electronic
warfare protection as opposed tomaybe attempting ACE.
It also talks about the securityof these remote airfields in
(20:29):
places like the Philippines, Assuming the Philippines will
let you have access to the remote airfields.
These are highly populated areas.
And of course, there will be a very serious counterintelligence
challenge in the sense that you could have, you know, paid
informants around these locations who can basically
listen for more activity to and find out when the Americans are
(20:49):
coming and so forth. And that could go back to China
and again, set up a kill chain to attack the base while
American aircraft are on the ground.
So yeah, there's basically, you know, a lot of issues around
this. So these small airfields,
they're quite congested. Their force protection isn't as
good. The Chinese might know you're
there. Anyway.
There's also one line that really popped out at me from the
(21:12):
report. I'm going to read it right now,
quote. US allies accustomed to asking
tough questions about the UnitedStates willingness to defend
them now must also ask pressing questions about its capability
to do so. End Quote.
Yeah, that's quite chilling. I think that's that's never
really been in question in the recent past, the ability of the
(21:36):
US military to actually make good on its security guarantees
that there was, you know, perhaps as that quote indicates,
political questions about what decisions would be made in
Washington. But from a capability
standpoint, that was never, never in doubt.
And and now it maybe is. And yeah, I think you're right,
Greg, that the, it's sort of thewhole ace concept sort of is
(21:58):
relying on secrecy or lack of detection, preventing detection
to be effective. And there's a lot of maybe a
doubt as to whether or not that can actually be achieved.
And if that's the case, maybe itis better to just really
concentrate on well defended small number of large
installations. Definitely a lot of dilemmas, as
(22:19):
you said, which is the the same term that military leaders in
the Pentagon like to to use to say they want to create dilemmas
for their adversaries. And now that really seems to
have been turned backwards on them and and China's really
creating a lot of dilemmas for the US and its allies.
Yeah, China has done a very goodjob at building up its forces
(22:41):
and really kind of trying to address this specific mission
of, of invading Taiwan, whereas the US is, you know, very much
more involved in like Expeditionary operations around
the world has to deal with, you know, a broad range of missions.
China has really been laser focused on this Taiwan
contingency. And you can see, you know,
(23:02):
Chinese combat aircraft are constantly probing Taiwanese
airspace. They're navigating it.
They're doing air to air refuelling operations around it.
China's aircraft carrier has done, aircraft carriers have
done flight operations off the East Coast of Taiwan.
They see the Chinese carriers, as, you know, extending that
(23:22):
area access area denial strategyout beyond Taiwan to really
create a bubble of safe space around Taiwan that will allow
Chinese invasion forces to crossthe Strait, create a big
beachhead, and then resupply forces as they crush opposition
on the island of Taiwan. And of course, they are well
(23:42):
aware that the US would like to get aerial supremacy.
If the US is able to attain aerial supremacy during that
invasion, it'll be a military disaster for China.
They recognise that fact. And they're really working hard
to prevent that eventuality should it come to a shooting war
over Taiwan. You mentioned the Chinese
aircraft carriers, Greg, and that was 1 aspect of this report
(24:03):
that wasn't included in the analysis was naval aviation and
both the Chinese carriers and the US carriers.
There's been a lot of discussionin Washington and kind of the
think tank circles about whetheror not carriers, US carriers,
can be effective in this fight if they're too vulnerable to
(24:24):
missile attack, if they need to stay farther away from Taiwan to
be survivable. What's your sense as to what
role naval aviation might play in a conflict over Taiwan on
either side of the the Ledger? I think China, you know, the
traditional view was that China's kind of a immature naval
(24:45):
power and therefore they're liketo hold their Navy back in the
event of a conflict. But they've made such a massive
investment in there. You know, the aircraft carrier
fleet of course is growing. They have very powerful cruisers
and destroyers with massive blocks of surface to air
missiles. And it was one of the US
generals was speaking a few years ago and and he reckons
(25:07):
that they're going to put those guys, you know, well, to the
east of Taiwan to really push, you know, U.S. forces back.
And now that you've, you know, you'll have the Chinese carriers
are operating there. And that will create like a safe
space again for Chinese airborneearly warning and control
aircraft like the KJ 500. Aircraft like that to monitor
(25:28):
the airspace, gives protection for their anti submarine warfare
aircraft to really kind of, you know, work the area to keep
American submarines away from the Chinese battle fleet, but
also away from the Straits of Taiwan where they could
interfere with an invasion. And that would be kind of the
vision for Chinese naval aviation.
And of course, now the Chinese are testing the Fujian, which
(25:48):
will have a, you know, far bigger air wing and a integrated
airborne early warning and control aircraft in the form of
the KJ 600. Now, the US Navy would probably
operate at the margins in the beginning, I would assume, but
they do are developing ways, I think to actually keep the
carrier at a relatively safe distance but still do these long
(26:12):
range strikes against Chinese aircraft near and around Taiwan.
And, you know, you'll probably see missions, for example,
involving the Super Hornet. This has a new missile called
the AIM 174B, which is based on the, you know, a surface of the,
I think it's the standard missile sticks, the SM6.
That's big. Yeah.
Remember that missile came out. The anti ballistic missile
(26:36):
defence. Yeah.
And now they're using it as an air to air missile.
And the F18 Super Hornet will beable to fire this at a very long
range to pick off, you know, Chinese surveillance aircraft
and other aerial assets. And you'll also have a better
U.S. Navy refuelling capability when
they bring in the MQ 25. So they will be able to put the
(26:57):
air wing out a good distance from the carrier.
And that will be able to start like, you know, chewing away at
the edges of Chinese, you know, air power that's over Taiwan.
But again, you know, the the carriers will be subject to
attack. There'll be submarines out
there, and it will be a very difficult environment.
But that being said, I mean, thecarriers, you know, move very
(27:17):
fast. the US again, and Israel had very good success shooting
down Iranian missiles coming at fixed targets.
So I think when the Chinese are trying to shoot at a moving
target like a carrier, I think it will actually be quite
challenging for them to get a solution, especially if the
carrier is operating at a safer distance.
But you know, hopefully we neverhave to see any of this occur,
(27:38):
but certainly a lot of variablesto think about with this.
Yeah, I know that's sort of the opposing viewpoint of the
carrier debate, which is that carriers are still relevant
because the ocean is huge and they can hide in the vastness of
the Pacific Ocean and you can't shoot at a carrier if you can't
locate it. And then that's easier said than
(27:59):
done. So there's, yeah, definitely
still an open debate on that on that front.
I think what is known is that inthe event of a full amphibious
invasion of Taiwan by China, US air power is going to be
instrumental in knocking back the landing ships and the the
China's huge fleet of civilian ferries that will be converted
(28:22):
into troop carriers and to move all those troops ashore.
All of the studies that are unclassified and open source
indicate that air launched anti ship missiles are going to be
instrumental in attriting that landing force enough to beat
back an invasion. And if the US can't get aircraft
(28:45):
close enough to launch those anti ship missiles, it'll be a
much harder problem for Taiwan to defend against a large
amphibious landing like that. So as you pointed out, Greg, a
lot of dilemmas on both sides and a lot of unknowns.
And hopefully it's something that remains theoretical and we
never have to actually see if any of these predictions bear
(29:08):
out. Yeah.
And it's, it's important to notethat EU SS Air Force is not
relying entirely on a some. It's developed the Quick Sync
munition, which can be dropped from the B2 bomber, which is
like a low cost bomb designed toactually sink ships.
And it appears to be very focused on the possibility of
repelling an invasion in the Taiwan Strait.
(29:30):
Craig, any thoughts on that? Yeah, I think there's some
interesting discussions around things like hardened aircraft
shelters. I mean big precision guided
weapons, cruise missiles, they're going to take those out.
So I don't think spending lots on strengthening the hazards is
going to get you anywhere really.
And ultimately, you know, if youif you build up the protection
(29:52):
for your aircraft, well, if I'm a smart military, I can come
along and put half a dozen weapons down your runway and
then they they can't take off anyway.
I was just going to say on this sort of question of mass, we
always think of China having huge mass, but I think it's
worth bearing in mind that Chinadoesn't have over 500 tanker
aircraft like US and doesn't have, I don't know, 10 massive
(30:15):
aircraft carriers. So there is this sort of thing
that the US can throw a lot of weight behind it if it wants to.
I've just finished doing the edit on our annual World Air
Forces directory. And, and just as a sort of top
line on that, the US has got about 13,000 military aircraft.
China has about 3 1/2 thousand. So there's a big numerical gap
(30:38):
there. China's probably only got about
1/3 fewer combat aircraft significantly.
So I think it's just sort of, it's interesting to bear in mind
that we think the US is going tohave a lot of trouble here, but
it can do impressive things. We saw with the midnight hammer
strike on, on Iran a package of 125 aircraft, including 7B2
(31:00):
bombers, so they can get in and out without being seen.
Whether they can do that with China, yeah, questionable.
But yeah, I think it's just worth noting that I think ACE is
one element of a wider campaign.Yeah, that's a great point,
Craig. And, and we should note that
this report we've been discussing assumes as its sort
(31:21):
of sample size, if you will, that the United States would
deploy a fighter force of 450 aircraft, a mix of 4th and 5th
generation. And of that, the breakdown was
roughly 1/3 of available 4th generation fighters and 2/3 of
available 5th generation fighters would be committed to
(31:41):
this operation to defend Taiwan.So while the losses may be
significant on paper, there is still quite a bit held in
reserve. So it's not the entire US Air
Force being wiped out. And that of course also doesn't
count the US Navy and the US Marine Corps and allied forces
that might be involved as well. But I do think it's interesting
(32:04):
on the the kind of mass discussion that most of these
studies really only look at the 1st 30 days or so of a conflict
when you're not going to be increasing or replacing forces
that are destroyed. What you have is what you have.
If this was to drag on into a longer conflict like what we've
seen with Ukraine and Russia, then there becomes a much more
(32:27):
ambiguous issue of mass and who can ramp up production and
replace forces that are lost. For example, China has a huge
advantage in shipbuilding over the US, and the US would really
struggle to replace any lost ships like aircraft carriers
that are lost in an operation. And aircraft production rates
are much lower now than they were during the Second World
(32:49):
War, for example, Unfortunately.Guys, it's been a great
discussion as always, but we're about out of time, so we'll have
to leave it there. It's been great to talk with you
both, and we'll get together again soon.
Thanks for talking with me. Take care, Ryan.
Thanks. Yeah.
Thanks, Ryan. That's a good one.
If you'd like to read more aboutthis study on the US China air
(33:10):
war over Taiwan, we'll have a link to my story on it in
today's show notes, and we'll also have a link to the paper
itself if you'd like to read that.
It's really in depth with some great analysis.
You've been listening to our discussion on this topic on
Flight Global Focus, which is a production of Flight Global with
audio editing by Lucy Johnson. If you want to be in touch about
(33:30):
today's show or for commercial opportunities related to the
podcast, please e-mail podcast at flightglobal.com, listen,
rate, review and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.
I'm Ryan Finnerty, and we'll seeyou next time for Flight Global
Focus.
Welcome to Flight Global Focus, the essential podcast for
trusted aviation insights. We publish episodes twice
weekly. Join us every Friday for a
concise briefing on the week's news and again on Monday for in
depth analysis covering important developments in
airlines, defence and aerospace.I'm Ryan Finnerty, Flight
Global's America's Defence reporter, and today we're
(00:28):
discussing the prospect of an air war in the Western Pacific
between the United States and China.
A recent research paper from 2 American scholars finds there
are dangerous risks associated with the US Air Force's strategy
for conflict with China over Taiwan.
Not only will the US likely losehundreds of tactical aircraft,
(00:51):
there's a significant chance it would lose a battle with China
altogether. The main issue is China's deep
reserves of long range precisionmissiles, a key pillar of
Beijing's anti access area denial strategy.
Those missiles are expected to rain down on large American air
bases in Japan and Guam. the US Air Force has an answer to this
(01:12):
problem, Agile Combat Employment, more commonly known
as ACE. The idea calls for the dispersal
of fighters and support aircraftacross a number of smaller,
austere airstrips throughout theregion, effectively hiding them
from Chinese bombardment while vulnerable on the ground.
But the latest study published in the journal International
(01:33):
Security, raises serious doubts about the ability of ACE to
actually deliver on that promise.
Joining me today to discuss the new findings and what they mean
for regional security are FlightGlobal's Managing Editor for
Defence, Greg Waldron, based in Singapore and Craig Hoyle, our
European Defence editor based inLondon.
Hey guys and good to speak with you both again.
(01:54):
Hi, Ryan. Great to be here.
Hi everyone. OK guys, so this study was
authored by Nicholas Anderson atthe George Washington University
in Washington, DC and Daryl Press at Dartmouth College, both
both US universities. And it imagines either a full
military invasion of Taiwan by China or at the least an island
(02:16):
wide blockade with the Americansdeploying forces to assist
Taipei and either fend off the invasion or break the blockade.
And the analysis looks at expected US losses after 30 days
of fighting specifically for theUS Air Force ground based air
power. And we will have a link to this
research paper in the show notesfor anyone listening who wants
(02:38):
to give it a read themselves. And like several war games that
have been conducted in the last few years and research studies
on this topic, Anderson and Press, the two authors found
that the Americans will likely lose hundreds of combat
aircraft, with most of those losses being on the ground
rather than an aerial combat. So, Greg, you're based in the
(02:58):
Indo Pacific and you often writeabout developments of Chinese
military technology and strategyfor flight.
How are we likely to see a Chinese operation unfold if
there were to be an operation launched?
And what challenge would the Americans face in trying to
repel an invasion or break a blockade?
Yeah, it was an interesting paper and certainly a very
sobering read. The way we understand a Chinese
(03:21):
assault on Taiwan, it's going tobe key for them to achieve
aerial supremacy. I mean, you're, they're going to
have, you know, a massive numberof ships crossing the Taiwan
Strait. And these are going to need to
be protected as a very urgent priority, not only in the
initial invasion, but also as Chinese forces, should they make
a landing and establish A beachhead.
It's critical that this beachhead be resupplied, right?
(03:44):
That's a key part of amphibious warfare.
And so that Chinese airpower is going to be in the air kind of
protecting this landing from incursions from, you know,
allied aircraft. Now, the paper outlines the US
response and the way that would work the US, since the Chinese
would have a this air, you know,combat air patrol over the
(04:04):
Taiwan, the US would be able to pick and choose when it would
actually come in and engage Chinese forces, which would put
China at a disadvantage because the US would basically have the
option of when to attack. So the Chinese strategy would be
really to go and knockout American aircraft on the ground
(04:25):
before they can actually get into action.
And to do this, China's investedin a massive arsenal of
ballistic missiles, large numbers of cruise missiles, both
air launched and ground launched, all sorts of ship
launched weapons and a range of other systems as well.
It's going to be a lot of electronic warfare.
There could be special forces and so forth.
And this is the, you know, sort of the genesis of ACE.
(04:48):
OK, thanks for that overview Greg.
So the, the basic idea with ACE is that these main air bases,
there's six of them mostly in Japan and one in Guam, are
vulnerable. They're known fixed positions
and they're vulnerable to attackby Chinese fighters.
And so the Air Force has this idea of ACE to spread those
fighters out and protect them while on the ground.
(05:09):
So Craig, this idea that you candisperse fighters and help them
survive in their most vulnerableposition actually originated in
Europe, in a part of Europe thatyou often cover.
What can you tell us about it? Yeah, so, and I, I think
thinking about it, the the sort of dispersed operations thing
probably goes back to, you know,Second World War with putting
(05:30):
lots of bases all over the place.
But yeah, looking into the sort of more modern era, the
experience I'm I'm most familiarwith is what goes on in Sweden.
So they're a recent entrant to NATO, but before that their
whole posture was around nation defence.
They have, I mean, they've comparatively good sized Air
Force, but compared to Russia it's tiny.
(05:52):
What they do there is. So it's not, it's not an ace
concept, it's a dispersed operations concept.
And the idea is that the the forces and the aircraft kind of
disappear into the forest essentially.
So what they will do in practiseis you'll have a small Rd strip
in the middle of nowhere essentially, and a jet will go
and land there quickly, have support people waiting on the
(06:15):
ground to refuel it and rearm it, and then it's up again in
the air before the enemy can work out where they are and
attack them. So it's a good sounding policy
on paper. What of course has happened is
after the end of the Cold War, the infrastructure there has
been sort of let go a little bit.
So I don't know how many of these remote bases they used to
(06:37):
have, but they don't have as many these days.
So you're well prepared adversary will probably know
exactly where they are. So there's there's a bit of a,
there's been a lack of capability at the moment, but
essentially what you do is. So I went to a demonstration of
one of these last year during a visit to Sweden and it was done
(06:59):
by the F7 wing just near Sortanas air base at their their
home. And what they do is they come
in, they close a small section of local road and practise
landing the aircraft on it. So it is a small section of Rd.
It's it's one kilometre long, but essentially the box they
operate in is 800 metres by 17 metres.
(07:22):
So the Saab Grip and which they use these days, the wingspan is
about 8 1/2 metres. So you've basically got half a
wing of room on either side of the runway, the road runway and
then you've got a small section of land and then trees.
It's a pretty sporty activity todo and the Swedes will tell you
(07:43):
that the Grippen is the only aircraft that can do this.
So they are practising it more these days.
But what sort of what supports it really well is that you have
a very small support team, so you may only have four or five
people, some of which are conscripts, and now come along
and do the rearming of the aircraft.
There'll be 1 little fuel tankerthere that looks just like a
(08:05):
commercial truck. And the whole activity takes
place in about 15 minutes. I think a lot of a lot of other
air forces have been to see the Swedes and look at how they do
things. Because when we think of an ACE
construct, quite often you're talking about things like
landing F30 fives on a road in Finland.
Well, it's, it's a big highway, it's not a little section of
(08:27):
road. And then to support that, you've
maybe had to fly AC17 load of equipment in and then move that
equipment by truck or C130J to where the exercise is happening.
So the sort of agile and as agile and generally speaking
Europe's practising this more, but they're very out of
practise. Poland did a an exercise on one
(08:51):
of their highways in 2023 and that was the first time they've
done it for 20 years. I'm not aware of the UK having
done any sort of ACE type operations.
They've landed typhoons away from home at some other military
air bases. So it's a capability that's
there, but it needs more practise, needs more development
and more nations need to be doing it.
(09:13):
And in in the context of the Swedish Air Force, Craig, is
this distributed operations strategy, is that their main
focus if there were to be an invasion?
I guess maybe it's different nowthat they're a member of NATO,
but when this was being developed, was that their
immediate plan to go to dispersed operations or was it
(09:33):
viewed more as a backup or a supporting effort in the way
that the Americans are looking at it in the Pacific so.
Basically, they would assume they, you know, they would be
subject to a huge attack and theidea would be that they would
disperse as much equipment as they possibly can as quickly as
they can. They would move around the
country. It's a, it's a big country.
(09:53):
There's a lot of forests. So I guess there's lots of
places you could hide in theory,like I said today, there's not
that much infrastructure to do this.
But the idea they have is very much they would do this with,
when they have their globalised surveillance aircraft, they also
want that to be able to operate at lots of different airfields
and smaller airfields around thecountry to make it hard to
target those. This is what Ukraine's been
(10:16):
doing to good effect with its small number of aircraft.
They've managed to not have hugenumbers of losses of aircraft on
the ground by keeping them moving.
So it's a good strategy. I forgot to mention actually,
when I when I'd done the the Sweden visit to actually watch
this demonstration, I'd previously flown the grip and E
simulator and had a go at landing on one of these Rd
(10:37):
strips. And it certainly focuses your
mind when you're flying into this very, very small area.
I'll put my hand up and say I had a test pilot who was helping
me with throttle because it was quite complex to, to get the
aircraft all set up for the landing.
But you basically come in prettyfast.
You already got your feet on thetoe brakes and it stops really,
(11:01):
really quick. You turn it around in the width
of the road and you go back to where the the supporting people
are. So it's it's a very slick
operation to see it in action. Hair raising experience, I'm
sure, having attempted a few landings in simulators myself,
proper runways, I'm sure that was quite the challenge.
I think you raised a couple really interesting points there,
(11:23):
Craig, about about the ACE concept in, in the modern
context. You know that it's based off
this this strategy that was really designed for a 20th
century land war in Europe against the Soviet Union in a
country that has lots of forestsand mountains and roads
connecting all of these remote sites.
And the Americans are now attempting to adapt it for more
(11:46):
of a Naval Air war in the first island chain of the Western
Pacific against a modern Chinesemilitary.
And, you know, there's some debate as to whether or not it
can work. And I think the, the authors of
this paper, Anderson and Press, came down pretty firmly in the
know category on that question that ACE can help and, and can
reduce some losses, but is not the silver bullet that it's
(12:09):
sometimes presented as. And I think you, you raised a
few of the obvious setbacks to it.
You know, 1 you need to resupplyall of these these remote sites
with fuel and and munitions and food and water for the personnel
that are there and that they're likely to already be identified
by the adversary even when you start using them.
(12:31):
And I think that's why the paperconcludes that the the current
US Air Force strategy risks quote, significant header
carries quote or significant risk of catastrophic defeat, End
Quote. And with the a strategy unlikely
to guarantee a victory. And so Greg, you heard Craig
kind of give an overview of of how ACE works in Europe.
(12:54):
You've got some expertise in thePacific.
How well do you think the idea can be adapted for this?
More of an island war where you're having to project power
over large distances of of oceanto fight, kind of a standoff war
over Taiwan. It's certainly more challenging.
I mean, what Sweden's done is very useful and, you know, very
(13:15):
specific to that country. And of course, the landmass of
Sweden is vastly greater than the amount of landmass that
you'd have the US would have available to operate from in an
ACE type situation. So, you know, you have a major
tanking issue as well in Asia. So getting enough fuel to the
aircraft. Also you're operating dissimilar
types like in the Swedish example, you'd be operating the
(13:38):
grip. And so everything's kind of set
up for the grip and you have stashes of, you know, weapons
and gear. It's all kind of standardised,
I'd imagine throughout this kindof universe of small airfields
and Hwy, you know, landing strips.
I think in, you know, ace in Asia, it's going to be a lot
more complicated. You're going to have C one 30s,
C seventeens, you know, all sorts of tactical transports,
(14:00):
you know, flying supplies, flying personnel around so that
they can meet the fighters, rearm the fighters, refuel the
fighters. And, you know, if you really
look at the history of warfare, when you attempt these really
complicated operations where everybody kind of has to come
together at once and everybody'sthere and things just going to
happen, somebody's always going to be delayed.
There's always going to be a problem.
(14:20):
The plane breaks down, the aircraft with the necessary
weapons went to the wrong airfield, you know, all these
different issues. And of course, the enemy will
get a vote as well and all that.So that it's just a complicated
task even without the enemy, youknow, shooting at you.
It's, you know, over vast distances as well.
Some of the other aspects of thereport, they talk about the need
(14:42):
for hardened shelters in the US to develop hardened shelters for
its bases and at ACE locations. They really haven't done a lot
of that, even though this China threat has been growing and
growing and growing for years. I mean, I remember having a
discussion with another reporterin 2011 talking about the woeful
state of US hardened shelter building.
(15:02):
We said, yeah, they really need to do more of it then.
And that's 14 years ago, and very little has happened.
On the other hand, you know, I think the US has gotten quite
good at missile defence. If you look at the case of
Israel versus Iran, I mean, theywere really able to whack a lot
of those missiles out of the sky.
So I think they're quite good atintercepting missiles.
But of course, in the case, you know, China has, I guess, 24
(15:23):
airfields that they really need to focus on.
And they can build a lot of missiles and they can really
pummelled these things. They can put up a lot of decoys.
I mean, they can really force the US to exhaust its missile
defence stocks quite quickly. And on the other hand too, I'd
like to point out too, it's veryimportant to stress Chinese
forces. I mean, they're very impressive.
They've added a lot of aircraft over the years.
(15:45):
They have fifth generation typesin the form of the J20.
You know, you've seen some success with Chinese aircraft
such as the J10C shooting down Rafalls in the recent India
Pakistan skirmish, but the Chinese forces are still
relatively untested. So they've made big progress,
but it's not 100%. Clear how Well.
They're going to perform. But even that said, though,
(16:07):
like, you know, another point I'd like to make too, back to
the hardened shelters thing. China has invested in hardened
shelters for its air bases that would be engaged in any conflict
around Taiwan. So the aircraft have hardened
shelters that they can go back to.
And the other thing I'd add, too, is in a war over Taiwan, it
is very possible that the US president might be reluctant to
(16:30):
order direct strikes against theChinese mainland.
In the Korean War, MacArthur wasreally pushing for strikes
against Chinese logistics, Chinese cities, you know,
Chinese units across the border.And Truman refused to give him
that because he was concerned about a nuclear war kicking off
with the Soviet Union at the time.
(16:51):
So basically China had this, youknow, huge sanctuary from
American air power. Similarly, in the Vietnam War, I
think it was like a 20 mile buffer zone bleeding up to the
Chinese border that the US was not allowed to bomb so
gracically, creating like a sanctuary.
So I would suspect also not only, you know, will the US have
(17:11):
to deal with Chinese airport over Taiwan, but I have a strong
suspicion that they will not be able to actually strike Chinese
aircraft in China. And even if they do, they're
going to be facing a very serious surface to air missile
threat and also the hardened shelters at Chinese bases.
I think that's a great point, Greg.
And, and I guess we should, we should say too, there's, there's
kind of a, the opposite side of that coin, which is we don't
(17:34):
know if there were to be a war that China would strike US bases
in Japan and Guam and elsewhere,that would mark a significant
escalation on their side as well.
So there are a lot of unknowns here.
And and if the Chinese government opted not to launch
direct missile strikes on Japanese territory, for example,
(17:56):
that really changes the calculusthat's outlined in this paper.
Because as we've mentioned, thisstudy and several others find
that most of the US losses, thispaper was 94% of losses were
coming on the ground rather thanan air to air combat.
There are a lot of unknowns as you've identified there.
(18:18):
And I think one of the other things that is interesting that
Craig mentioned or that Craig made me think of was this whole
distributed operations concept that came from Sweden.
They built a fighter aircraft, the grip in that was really
designed to operate in these type of environments and and
built their strategy around that.
Whereas the US has not done thatin aircraft like the F35.
(18:40):
And the F16 are much more sensitive and have more
difficulty operating on some of these rugged and austere
airfields that aren't being constantly swept for debris and
and well maintained like that. And do you think that will play
a role as well in the in the kind of success of this
(19:00):
strategy, Greg? Yeah, the different types of
aircraft. I mean, the F35A was envisaged
as operating from, you know, bigrunways.
And again, a lot of the aircraftuses were kind of built on the
assumption that they'll be operating from a big, you know,
sanctuary style base, as they did in the first Gulf War.
Has it in the second Gulf War. I mean, basically, since the end
(19:21):
of the Second World War, the US air power has operated from a
sanctuary. And that's what, of course, will
be very different about any conflict with China because the
air bases themselves will come under threat.
And of course, you know, China is going to be using its ISR,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to really, you
know, keep an eye on what US aircraft are doing.
(19:43):
And one of the points that the paper makes, which I thought was
quite interesting, is that this will really kind of force the US
to knockout Chinese ISR very early in the conflict,
effectively blinding Chinese leadership.
And the paper sees this as highly escalatory.
So that's something, you know, that needs to be considered.
It even suggests that probably the best course of action you
(20:06):
know of all the bad choices the report outlines, it outlines the
best course of action is really consolidating on those big six
fixed bases have really good hardened shelters, have really
good ballistic missile defence. And have really good electronic
warfare protection as opposed tomaybe attempting ACE.
It also talks about the securityof these remote airfields in
(20:29):
places like the Philippines, Assuming the Philippines will
let you have access to the remote airfields.
These are highly populated areas.
And of course, there will be a very serious counterintelligence
challenge in the sense that you could have, you know, paid
informants around these locations who can basically
listen for more activity to and find out when the Americans are
(20:49):
coming and so forth. And that could go back to China
and again, set up a kill chain to attack the base while
American aircraft are on the ground.
So yeah, there's basically, you know, a lot of issues around
this. So these small airfields,
they're quite congested. Their force protection isn't as
good. The Chinese might know you're
there. Anyway.
There's also one line that really popped out at me from the
(21:12):
report. I'm going to read it right now,
quote. US allies accustomed to asking
tough questions about the UnitedStates willingness to defend
them now must also ask pressing questions about its capability
to do so. End Quote.
Yeah, that's quite chilling. I think that's that's never
really been in question in the recent past, the ability of the
(21:36):
US military to actually make good on its security guarantees
that there was, you know, perhaps as that quote indicates,
political questions about what decisions would be made in
Washington. But from a capability
standpoint, that was never, never in doubt.
And and now it maybe is. And yeah, I think you're right,
Greg, that the, it's sort of thewhole ace concept sort of is
(21:58):
relying on secrecy or lack of detection, preventing detection
to be effective. And there's a lot of maybe a
doubt as to whether or not that can actually be achieved.
And if that's the case, maybe itis better to just really
concentrate on well defended small number of large
installations. Definitely a lot of dilemmas, as
(22:19):
you said, which is the the same term that military leaders in
the Pentagon like to to use to say they want to create dilemmas
for their adversaries. And now that really seems to
have been turned backwards on them and and China's really
creating a lot of dilemmas for the US and its allies.
Yeah, China has done a very goodjob at building up its forces
(22:41):
and really kind of trying to address this specific mission
of, of invading Taiwan, whereas the US is, you know, very much
more involved in like Expeditionary operations around
the world has to deal with, you know, a broad range of missions.
China has really been laser focused on this Taiwan
contingency. And you can see, you know,
(23:02):
Chinese combat aircraft are constantly probing Taiwanese
airspace. They're navigating it.
They're doing air to air refuelling operations around it.
China's aircraft carrier has done, aircraft carriers have
done flight operations off the East Coast of Taiwan.
They see the Chinese carriers, as, you know, extending that
(23:22):
area access area denial strategyout beyond Taiwan to really
create a bubble of safe space around Taiwan that will allow
Chinese invasion forces to crossthe Strait, create a big
beachhead, and then resupply forces as they crush opposition
on the island of Taiwan. And of course, they are well
(23:42):
aware that the US would like to get aerial supremacy.
If the US is able to attain aerial supremacy during that
invasion, it'll be a military disaster for China.
They recognise that fact. And they're really working hard
to prevent that eventuality should it come to a shooting war
over Taiwan. You mentioned the Chinese
aircraft carriers, Greg, and that was 1 aspect of this report
(24:03):
that wasn't included in the analysis was naval aviation and
both the Chinese carriers and the US carriers.
There's been a lot of discussionin Washington and kind of the
think tank circles about whetheror not carriers, US carriers,
can be effective in this fight if they're too vulnerable to
(24:24):
missile attack, if they need to stay farther away from Taiwan to
be survivable. What's your sense as to what
role naval aviation might play in a conflict over Taiwan on
either side of the the Ledger? I think China, you know, the
traditional view was that China's kind of a immature naval
(24:45):
power and therefore they're liketo hold their Navy back in the
event of a conflict. But they've made such a massive
investment in there. You know, the aircraft carrier
fleet of course is growing. They have very powerful cruisers
and destroyers with massive blocks of surface to air
missiles. And it was one of the US
generals was speaking a few years ago and and he reckons
(25:07):
that they're going to put those guys, you know, well, to the
east of Taiwan to really push, you know, U.S. forces back.
And now that you've, you know, you'll have the Chinese carriers
are operating there. And that will create like a safe
space again for Chinese airborneearly warning and control
aircraft like the KJ 500. Aircraft like that to monitor
(25:28):
the airspace, gives protection for their anti submarine warfare
aircraft to really kind of, you know, work the area to keep
American submarines away from the Chinese battle fleet, but
also away from the Straits of Taiwan where they could
interfere with an invasion. And that would be kind of the
vision for Chinese naval aviation.
And of course, now the Chinese are testing the Fujian, which
(25:48):
will have a, you know, far bigger air wing and a integrated
airborne early warning and control aircraft in the form of
the KJ 600. Now, the US Navy would probably
operate at the margins in the beginning, I would assume, but
they do are developing ways, I think to actually keep the
carrier at a relatively safe distance but still do these long
(26:12):
range strikes against Chinese aircraft near and around Taiwan.
And, you know, you'll probably see missions, for example,
involving the Super Hornet. This has a new missile called
the AIM 174B, which is based on the, you know, a surface of the,
I think it's the standard missile sticks, the SM6.
That's big. Yeah.
Remember that missile came out. The anti ballistic missile
(26:36):
defence. Yeah.
And now they're using it as an air to air missile.
And the F18 Super Hornet will beable to fire this at a very long
range to pick off, you know, Chinese surveillance aircraft
and other aerial assets. And you'll also have a better
U.S. Navy refuelling capability when
they bring in the MQ 25. So they will be able to put the
(26:57):
air wing out a good distance from the carrier.
And that will be able to start like, you know, chewing away at
the edges of Chinese, you know, air power that's over Taiwan.
But again, you know, the the carriers will be subject to
attack. There'll be submarines out
there, and it will be a very difficult environment.
But that being said, I mean, thecarriers, you know, move very
(27:17):
fast. the US again, and Israel had very good success shooting
down Iranian missiles coming at fixed targets.
So I think when the Chinese are trying to shoot at a moving
target like a carrier, I think it will actually be quite
challenging for them to get a solution, especially if the
carrier is operating at a safer distance.
But you know, hopefully we neverhave to see any of this occur,
(27:38):
but certainly a lot of variablesto think about with this.
Yeah, I know that's sort of the opposing viewpoint of the
carrier debate, which is that carriers are still relevant
because the ocean is huge and they can hide in the vastness of
the Pacific Ocean and you can't shoot at a carrier if you can't
locate it. And then that's easier said than
(27:59):
done. So there's, yeah, definitely
still an open debate on that on that front.
I think what is known is that inthe event of a full amphibious
invasion of Taiwan by China, US air power is going to be
instrumental in knocking back the landing ships and the the
China's huge fleet of civilian ferries that will be converted
(28:22):
into troop carriers and to move all those troops ashore.
All of the studies that are unclassified and open source
indicate that air launched anti ship missiles are going to be
instrumental in attriting that landing force enough to beat
back an invasion. And if the US can't get aircraft
(28:45):
close enough to launch those anti ship missiles, it'll be a
much harder problem for Taiwan to defend against a large
amphibious landing like that. So as you pointed out, Greg, a
lot of dilemmas on both sides and a lot of unknowns.
And hopefully it's something that remains theoretical and we
never have to actually see if any of these predictions bear
(29:08):
out. Yeah.
And it's, it's important to notethat EU SS Air Force is not
relying entirely on a some. It's developed the Quick Sync
munition, which can be dropped from the B2 bomber, which is
like a low cost bomb designed toactually sink ships.
And it appears to be very focused on the possibility of
repelling an invasion in the Taiwan Strait.
(29:30):
Craig, any thoughts on that? Yeah, I think there's some
interesting discussions around things like hardened aircraft
shelters. I mean big precision guided
weapons, cruise missiles, they're going to take those out.
So I don't think spending lots on strengthening the hazards is
going to get you anywhere really.
And ultimately, you know, if youif you build up the protection
(29:52):
for your aircraft, well, if I'm a smart military, I can come
along and put half a dozen weapons down your runway and
then they they can't take off anyway.
I was just going to say on this sort of question of mass, we
always think of China having huge mass, but I think it's
worth bearing in mind that Chinadoesn't have over 500 tanker
aircraft like US and doesn't have, I don't know, 10 massive
(30:15):
aircraft carriers. So there is this sort of thing
that the US can throw a lot of weight behind it if it wants to.
I've just finished doing the edit on our annual World Air
Forces directory. And, and just as a sort of top
line on that, the US has got about 13,000 military aircraft.
China has about 3 1/2 thousand. So there's a big numerical gap
(30:38):
there. China's probably only got about
1/3 fewer combat aircraft significantly.
So I think it's just sort of, it's interesting to bear in mind
that we think the US is going tohave a lot of trouble here, but
it can do impressive things. We saw with the midnight hammer
strike on, on Iran a package of 125 aircraft, including 7B2
(31:00):
bombers, so they can get in and out without being seen.
Whether they can do that with China, yeah, questionable.
But yeah, I think it's just worth noting that I think ACE is
one element of a wider campaign.Yeah, that's a great point,
Craig. And, and we should note that
this report we've been discussing assumes as its sort
(31:21):
of sample size, if you will, that the United States would
deploy a fighter force of 450 aircraft, a mix of 4th and 5th
generation. And of that, the breakdown was
roughly 1/3 of available 4th generation fighters and 2/3 of
available 5th generation fighters would be committed to
(31:41):
this operation to defend Taiwan.So while the losses may be
significant on paper, there is still quite a bit held in
reserve. So it's not the entire US Air
Force being wiped out. And that of course also doesn't
count the US Navy and the US Marine Corps and allied forces
that might be involved as well. But I do think it's interesting
(32:04):
on the the kind of mass discussion that most of these
studies really only look at the 1st 30 days or so of a conflict
when you're not going to be increasing or replacing forces
that are destroyed. What you have is what you have.
If this was to drag on into a longer conflict like what we've
seen with Ukraine and Russia, then there becomes a much more
(32:27):
ambiguous issue of mass and who can ramp up production and
replace forces that are lost. For example, China has a huge
advantage in shipbuilding over the US, and the US would really
struggle to replace any lost ships like aircraft carriers
that are lost in an operation. And aircraft production rates
are much lower now than they were during the Second World
(32:49):
War, for example, Unfortunately.Guys, it's been a great
discussion as always, but we're about out of time, so we'll have
to leave it there. It's been great to talk with you
both, and we'll get together again soon.
Thanks for talking with me. Take care, Ryan.
Thanks. Yeah.
Thanks, Ryan. That's a good one.
If you'd like to read more aboutthis study on the US China air
(33:10):
war over Taiwan, we'll have a link to my story on it in
today's show notes, and we'll also have a link to the paper
itself if you'd like to read that.
It's really in depth with some great analysis.
You've been listening to our discussion on this topic on
Flight Global Focus, which is a production of Flight Global with
audio editing by Lucy Johnson. If you want to be in touch about
(33:30):
today's show or for commercial opportunities related to the
podcast, please e-mail podcast at flightglobal.com, listen,
rate, review and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts.
I'm Ryan Finnerty, and we'll seeyou next time for Flight Global
Focus.
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