Episode 131 - Battle of Lutzen, Napoleon's bounce-back victory, with special guest Jonas de Neef

In 1813, the Allies thought Napoleon and his army was a spent-force following the disastrous Russian invasion a year earlier. The Allied army found out the hard way that Napoleon could bounce back quickly. Special guest Jonas de Neef joins the show to discuss the brutal Battle of Lutzen.

X/Twitter: @andnapoleon

Episode Transcript

(00:00):
Welcome back to Generals and Napoleon.
We have the very esteemed guestsback once again, Mr. Jonas,
Denise joining us. Hello, Jonas.
Hey John, how are you doing? I'm good, I'm good.
So good to see you again. Those who don't know Jonas,
tremendous scholar, really good stuff.
He's always putting out on his website, which is a
napoleonchronicles.wordpress.comwhere does a lot of translation

(00:22):
work. He also has a LinkedIn.
You can check him out, Jonas Tanif and Instagram at JDM.
Napoleon is his handle. And yeah, we're thrilled to have
you on the show. That's great.
Yeah, I'm looking forward to this one as well.
Yeah, yeah. So today we're going to tackle a
very important battle. What battle are we talking about
today, Jonas? Battle of Lutz in May of 1813.

(00:42):
OK, this battle to me is intriguing for many reasons, but
I think the biggest one is that the Allies thought Napoleon and
his army were a spent force after the disastrous 1812
Russian invasion. It seems to me to be a classic
case of fool around and find out.
Were the Allies overconfident, or was Napoleon just that good?

(01:06):
I think we can make statements in in both ways as we were.
So, you know, that might have reigned the belief among the
allies that Napoleon would be able to rebound from the
catastrophe in Russia because, Imean, the amount of men that
Napoleon can have this disposal through conscription.
You know, the withdrawal from veteran, veteran forces in Spain

(01:28):
and the men available in the garrison's in Germany and in
Eastern Europe along allies likethe Poles, the rank Confederacy
and meant to reinforce the ground on May in its March to
Russia. I mean, he gave Napoleon
actually the means to regroup. And it actually proves, you
know, the organizational skills of not only the Emperor, but
also of Grand Marshall Deroc andthe French General Staff as a
whole, who, you know, in the initial absence of Bertie

(01:50):
Marshall. Bertie due to fatigue from
Russia. Yeah, they actually helped to
reconstitute the French army completely.
Actually, when you think about, you know, why would, you know,
it's our Alexander especially orFrederick William and burning
out not be eager to go on the offensive because a chance like
that didn't present itself very often in the previous wars.
And the Russians although like spent and about to March into

(02:12):
Europe once again. And then with the Prussians on
their side since the Tarragon Convention, they actually had
the momentum. But Kutuzov actually pleaded for
caution and and actually when hepassed away in the end of April,
his words actually would prove prophetic.
Yeah. And I think it's interesting,
just as you were talking, I was thinking about Napoleon was
usually at his most dangerous when you had like a small force
like in Italy in 1796 or even France in 1814, where people

(02:35):
thought, oh, this guy's done and.
Because you latch out. Yeah, exactly.
Well to give some battle on Lutsen, Napoleon's empire lost
almost 500,000 troops in the invasion of Russia and left many
of his allies questioning if they were on the right side.
How did this 6th coalition representing Britain, Prussia,

(02:55):
Sweden and Russia come together?Well, there's actually, there
were actually 2 main reasons forthis.
It's actually, you know, Napoleon and the French Empire's
continued expansion and that combined with, you know, the
imposed continental system, which actually harmed European
trade. And so for the individual
nations involved, you actually have Britain.
They were actually the main finance of the Coalition wars,

(03:18):
and they were actually bitter enemies of the French for many
centuries. So they were always advocating a
balance of power in on the continent, which was actually
disrupted since the revolution and through Napoleon's actions.
And then you have Prussia and Russia that actually saw the
feats of the hands of the Frenchalso since the revolutionary
period and especially 18 O 5 to the eighteen O 7 period.

(03:40):
There was actually, you know, dark times for SAR Alexander and
King Frederick William. You know, for in in the latter's
case, like Prussia's renowned army was humiliated and they
would look for a time actually to strike back as especially its
military minds. And French rule was like mostly
disliked in Germany. And they were actually forming
like the seeds of a war of liberation in in the region.

(04:03):
And Forza Alexander, you know, ever since the invasion of his
country, he actually became a moral force to be reckoned with
because he just started seeming himself as a Liberator of Europe
at the head of the Holy Alliance, basically also as a
sort of Messiah to drive back France to more conservative
accepted borders. And also the social reforms

(04:24):
because he wanted to counter liberalism in the secular state,
which he felt were causes of this grand conflict.
And then lastly, for for Sweden on the Bernardotte, you know, he
would be easily swayed, you know, to join in his flop with
the Coalition, given his personal grievances with
Napoleon in the past. The French are also encroached
into Swedish Bomerania. And, you know, the imposed trade

(04:45):
limitations of the Continental system, it basically hurt
Swedish trade. Yeah, all good points.
And notably, there have been 5 coalitions before this that
tried to topple France and the various governments.
I want to point out that Napoleon was only in command of
France during the 3rd, 4th, and 5th.
Now, he didn't have a hand in the 1st and 2nd coalitions, but
he wasn't running the governmentin those two.

(05:07):
Exactly. Why did these previous five
coalitions fail in your opinion?Well, I mean, there are a few
examples to to prove this point.When you look at the first
coalition, you know, which went from 1792 to 1797, oh, yeah, its
members Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, Spain, Kemal, Sardinia,
the Netherlands and so forth. You know, what were their

(05:29):
issues? I mean, there's kind of like a
lack of unity. You know, the coalition partners
always had divergent goals. So for instance, Austrians, in
this case, they wanted to restore the Borbon monarchy.
Prussia is seeking territorial gains in Poland.
And Britain was actually focuseda bit more on its maritime
supremacy at the time. Then you have political and
stable Spain, which had her her home turf to defend with a

(05:52):
crumbling overseas empire. So you know, it shows the lack
of unity basically in France's case, your nationalism and
conscription, Bolivian mass, youknow, mass conscription provided
actually France with vast manpower, which actually
overwhelmed the professional armies of the coalition.
It also was combined with military innovation.
The French introduced flexible Army Corps, aggressive offensive

(06:13):
tactics, and they also had like their citizen soldiers that
boasted high morale. Also, you know, you got to
imagine the vastness of the fields of of operations.
You know, how how do you coordinate all this in the age
of, you know, written messages, you know, 18th century
logistics, you know, think aboutit must be easy.
And then you also have battles like Valmi and Flourish,

(06:35):
basically turning the tide. And then you have actually
Napoleon emerging as a rising star during the Italian
campaigns, which actually forcedAustria to sue for peace
individually in the Treaty of Campo Formio.
When you look in the main empireyears, then you know when you
have Prussia in 1806 and Austriain 1809.
Actually in both cases they werebacked only by the British.

(06:56):
So in Prussia's example, the Russians joined in when matters
already went to worse, and for Austria and Prussia specifically
in those campaigns they actuallyhad the guts to tackle Napoleon
and with a home field army by themselves.
I mean, that's basically asking for trouble.
Yeah, and I really liked your point about lack of unity, even
if it's just Prussia. Like there's so many different

(07:18):
generals and Princess and kings you got to get orders from.
With Napoleon's army, there was one guy, you know, and and there
wasn't this miscommunication of orders or who's in charge of
what army. It was one guy running the whole
show. Yeah, it's really correct.
I mean, it's, it's, it's safe tosay like in those early
coalitions against France, you know, they basically failed to
several factors. You know, like kind of like you

(07:39):
mentioned, you know, the lack ofcoordination, there's disjointed
strategies, poor communications among the coalition members,
which actually led to ineffective campaign.
Napoleon actually in this initial stages had the technical
superiority of all they like. He had innovative strategies
based on timing, rapid movements, which basically
outmaneuvered by the Coalition all the time.

(08:00):
The allies also had to deal withpolitical and diplomatic
instability. You know, there's internal
divisions changing alliances within the Coalition's.
It actually weakens the resolve.And then there's also like the
the resource constraints, you know, the allies, they face
these large logistical challenges and resource
shortages, which basically hinders sustained military

(08:20):
efforts. Yeah, And for those wondering
how hard coalition warfare is, Imean, asked Dwight Eisenhower.
He had to like, you know, organize all these different
competing agendas and, and launch basically the largest
seaborne operation in history DDA and it's it's hard to do
coalition work. It's hard to tackle.
Yeah. Or even in this period, you
know, I think Schwartzenberg might have pulled out his hair

(08:41):
in many occasions. It must have been very tough to
deal with all the real, the intrigues, the the political
movements. I mean that some cases, you
know, allies were really close to, you know, to get at one
another because of differences. Yeah, I mean, at least Dwight
Eisenhower didn't have the President Winston Churchill and
Stalin in his tent with him likehe he was able to have a little
buffer there that. Could be troublesome.

(09:03):
That could have been troublesome.
Yeah, indeed. Well, getting back to this
battle. Pulling quickly cobbles together
an army of 200,000 to face the allies out Lutsen.
How does he do this? I mean, to rapidly create this,
this new force, Poland actually drew upon multiple sources
throughout France and its territories.
So you have the conscription levy of 1813, which actually

(09:24):
already been authorized in 1812,which called up 120,000 young
men, which was later increased to 137,000.
And additionally, France also mobilized the National Guard
through a system of cohorts which were actually meant for
homeland defense. But these cohorts were converted
into line regiments in early 1813, which added about another

(09:45):
78,000 men. You got to remember that many of
these men were actually pushed into service through coercion.
You know, they had to, you know,they were facing huge financial
constraints from from the government if, you know,
families couldn't provide their sons going to war.
So it was basically ready to just give them up and join the
army. Anyway.
Then you have like all this additional manpower came from

(10:06):
extraordinary levies and there was a supplementary call of
100,000 men from earlier conscription classes from
eighteen O 9 to 1812. Then there was another 150,000
men from the class of 1814, which is basically called up
earlier. And then then then it should be.
And then there's also like additional contributions of
around 20,000 men from departments and cities.

(10:29):
So many of them were mounted andthey were equipped at local
expense. And then you actually also had
the idle naval personnel, which were converted into over two
dozen battalions of marine slashnaval infantry.
I like to point out why were they idle?
Well, basically, yeah. They, they were, they were
basically stuck in all these ports, harbors all across the

(10:49):
Empire. And, you know, they were, they
were meant to actually just to convert them into infantry and
to make them worthwhile. You know, they, they couldn't
board any ships. They were all blocked inside
these harbors. So ready to get them surf in
that way. Yeah, I mean they you can go
anywhere because of the British blockade.
So you have all these trained basically artillery men on boats
and said let's let's get them inthe army.

(11:10):
Oh yeah, for sure. Then you also have like the
so-called the Guards of Honor about 10,000 to 15,000 young
quote, UN quote elite volunteers, but which also kind
of meant like Coors hostages, you know, they were actually
from wealthy families and they actually had to pay for their
own equipment and so forth. But it did actually add to the
cavalry support for halfway 1813Napoleon actually mobilized over

(11:35):
650,000 men, but the vast majority of them are young and
inexperienced. So only a portion of this, you
know, around 200 two, 110,000 infantry and 40,000 Calvary.
They would be actually availablein time for the spring campaign
in section. So actually despite the sheer
scale, the mobilization, the troop quality was mixed at best.

(11:56):
Most of the new soldiers had little to no military
experience, they had minimal training, and most of them
actually were of poor physical development because Marshall
Sensor criticized the conscriptsfrailty.
But then you actually have Marmol raising them for their
spirit and potential. The training was often rushed or
neglected. Many countries reaching the

(12:16):
front before even firing live ammunition.
But this is actually quite a, quite a problem.
And, you know, even if they didn't drop out somewhere along
the road due to fatigue and desertion, and this is, you
know, force marching. There's also equipment
shortages, particularly muskets.You know, it all complicated
matters. Napoleon even suggested the use
of captured foreign weaponry. And then you also have like the

(12:38):
the shortage in office, you know, many experienced cadres
were dead because of the Russiancampaign, which actually hurt
the ESP decor of certain units. And there were replacements
coming from military academies. There was retired personnel or
you just have like rapid promotion from the NCO rings.
So while high command was competent, you know, so you have

(12:58):
commanders like name armour Berton leading the corps,
basically the middle and the junior officer levels.
So we're basically overstretched.
And there's actually the study on the Battle of Flutson in the
earlier century written by a French Colonel called Laura Zak.
He actually noted that the officer to soldier ratio we're
still high early on, but there would be no reserves to replace

(13:21):
them when the battlefield losseswere, you know, would come into
play. Then like lastly, you also have
Napoleon reforming his cavalry, which also which suffered
actually way more than the infantry.
You know, think about losing on 150 thousand horses during the
Russian campaign. So actually starting from about
10,000 survivors, Napoleon actually created 3 cavalry corps

(13:43):
under Generals Batu, Mahbourg, Sebastiani and Arigi.
And he was basically sourcing mounts and then wherever
possible even, you know, like wementioned early earlier, like
including units from Spain. So actually on the whole, you
know, we can accept laws, acts, you know, estimate of the army
of 1813, because he actually quoted, like he said.
Certainly the new troops were not, you know, the equals in

(14:05):
value of the bans destroyed in Russia, and moreover, their
constitution exposed them to rebec the extortion.
But nevertheless they were good.The army with which Napoleon
opened the campaign was a good instrument of war.
However, it had in itself serious germs of weakness.
Yeah, End Quote. Yeah, I the interesting part
from all of that was the middle officers, so like your majors

(14:26):
and captains and, and even the NCO's, like the sergeants that
died in Russia. Yeah, You have the marshals, you
know, you have some of the division divisional generals,
but that middle echelon of frontline guys, it's hard to
replace that. Oh, for sure, yeah.
It's, it's basically experience,you know, dying along with the
men. You know, it's very hard to
replace. You know, it's really those, you

(14:47):
know, the, the men basically within the within the regiments,
they can lead this man forward. And then, you know, it also
compounds with all the inexperienced young men coming
into play, you know, how how to handle them.
Then having to do all these exercises, drills on the March.
It just just makes things way harder, you know, then back in
the day, you know, think about the belonging camp, you know,

(15:09):
leading up to the Oscillates campaign.
Yeah, I remember story, I think it was in 1814 during the
defense of France. Like Marshall Marmont had a
show, a new recruit had a load and fire his Musk.
He had no idea. Yeah, exactly.
Yeah, for sure. Or even accidents happening, you
know, like men firing their ramrods instead of putting them
back and these things were actually happened.

(15:30):
Well, we're still leading up to the battle here.
After with the Russian invasion 1812, the Allied army had some
initial success in pushing back the remnants army under Prince
Eugene. Napoleon steps on back towards
France. In addition, one of Napoleon's
famous marshals, Jean Baptiste Bessier, is killed right before
the battle. What happened to the Marshall?

(15:51):
Who is one of Napoleon's favorites?
Well, we actually, we have a fewaccounts on the event.
We have Colonel St. Shacla.
He actually wrote a letter describing what happened, and
I'll quote him. The Marshall, Prince of the
Moskva, AKA Nay, at the head of his Army Corps on the March, had
just passed the village of Ripach by his left, followed by

(16:14):
a staff of which I was a member,and had stopped at the height of
the last houses, presenting a large plane in front, and
covered with enemy cavalry, which pretended to want to
vigorously oppose the continuation of our progress.
Marshall Bessier, arriving closeto Marshall Nay, was told by the
letter. Ah, there you are.
What are you doing here alone? Look, if your cavalier was here,

(16:37):
they would do well. I've just sent for them, replied
Bessier. And they will arrive, and they
will arrive there at pointing tothe ground with his finger.
And at that very moment a volleyof artillery was fired at our
group, and as if it had made a long flight, 1 of the last shots
struck Marshall Bessier, threw him off his horse, hurled him to
the ground with his full weight,at the same time as his blood

(16:58):
and stretch of flesh, which I was partly covered, were flung
everywhere. The enemy, who were very close,
then moved to carry out a charge, and Marshall Nay, while
giving his orders to his troops to properly receive the attack,
he exclaimed, We must not leave him there.
So immediately. Understanding his reasoning, I
rushed down from my horse, whichI abandoned, and I quickly

(17:19):
seized the body of Marshall Bessia.
And in seeking some kind of refuge I saw a scorch towards
which I headed, and at the bottom with which I only reached
by dragging myself and moving with my burden which I could not
carry. They're unable to see anything,
but surrounded by hurrah, the cries of hurrah, and forward I
took my sword, and supporting the Marshall on my left arm, I

(17:40):
waited with the firm resolution to defend myself, to perish with
my dying companion, rather than see him wrestled from my arms
and thus become the trophy of the enemy.
And shortly afterwards soldiers came and helped me to carry him
to the nearest house I could find, which turned out to be
dead of a Weaver. There we laid him on the bed.
I took off his sword and found only a watch and a handkerchief

(18:01):
in his pockets, after which I covered the Marshall with the
blanket of. And as I was thinking of what to
do next, there appeared an officer who was crying, and I
asked him with reference to his uniform.
He was one of the marshals officers.
When he answered that he was indeed one of his ad camps, I
gave the officer the sword, the watch and the handkerchief.
And I then returned to my post alongside the Prince of the

(18:22):
Muskva, to whom I gave an account of what just happened.
And after a pause, with an emphasis of sorrow, he
pronounced these words. This is our fate.
It is a fine death. Yeah.
And I've often thought about what that means, but I think
Marshall name means he died quickly and he died on a
battlefield, which is a warrior's dream.
I guess if that's if you're going to die, that's the way to

(18:42):
do it. There, there was like a, there
was like a portion in the excerpt where, you know, St.
Charlotte is saying that Basia was basically like still hanging
on. But I think, you know, from
other accounts like the the shotbasically ripped straight
through his through his chest. So I think it must have been an
instant thing. Is that?
Yeah, I heard he died instantly,but yeah, sad loss for Napoleon.

(19:04):
Let's discuss the formations andsizes of each army before the
battle. I think Napoleon has about 80 to
90,000 men and 372 cannon. The allies have about the same
troop size but 552 cannons, so they outnumber them in cannons.
Yeah, so Napoleon is actually, when you would include all the
core in the area, they would actually total, you know, around

(19:26):
135,000 men with an additional 15,000 cavalry and like you said
372 guns. So despite some core being
distant or incomplete information, the French army was
positioned to use its numerical superiority effectively.
So when you have the ground armay, you have a few
components. So you have the Army of The
Maine which obeyed Napoleon. It had a third core on the

(19:50):
Marshall name 45,000 men across 5 divisions which included units
under Generals Suhan, Brenier, Jihad, Rika and Marchon.
So these troops were stationed east of Weisenfeld.
Then you have 4th core under General Bertrand, yet around
30,000 men which was composed ofWurtenberg troops led by General

(20:10):
Frank Moore. Italian divisions under
Generals, Bathing and Mohawk, and these forces were scattered
across key locations such as Berghao, Naumburg and Yana.
But then you have 6 core on the Marshall mammal.
He had 25,000 men with three divisions on the Generals
compound, Bonnet and Frederick's, which were mainly
deployed around Naumburg and Kerson.

(20:31):
And then you have 12 core under Marshall Ludino, he had 25,000
men including the Bavarian and Italian divisions, and that core
was actually stretched from Southfield to Coburg.
Then you have the Imperial Guardwhich is led by Marshall
Martier. He had General Dumosier's Young
Guard which consists of 11,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry and

(20:51):
General Rogese Old Guard and hiscavalry.
They were stationed in Weisenfeld and the Young Guard
was actually stood at Naumburg. And then thirdly for the French,
you have the army of the ALP which was led by Ujjain de
Boerne, you have 11 corps under it.
Under Marshall McDonald he had 22,000 men.
Divisions led by General JacquesFresini Charpentier, they were

(21:13):
positioned east of Mercerberg. 5th Corps under General Logging
Stone, he had 22,000 men spread across 4 divisions and they were
positioned behind Mercerberg. And then you have some other
units. Then when you look at the Allied
army, the Allies actually fielded a combined force of
about 95,000 men with approximately 6065 thousand

(21:36):
infantry, 22,000 cavalry, 8000 artillerymen.
So the key difference here between the two opposing armies
was that the Allies had an advantage in artillery and and
cavalry. So they actually had 40% more
cavalrymen than the French and they had around 530 to 552 guns

(21:56):
compared to Napoleon's 372. Under that army you actually
have Wittgenstein's force which was composed under was composed
of General Berg and York score 7500 men each and you have
Kleist's detachment, 6000 men. They were tasked with securing

(22:18):
the Leipzig area. Then you have Marshall Blucher
score at he had 27,000 men and he was located just north of
Borna. The Russian guard were eighteen
18,500 men and they were stationed between Froberg and
Kurdan, so they were actually offering a significant reserve
force for the Allies. Then two more units which were

(22:40):
Miloradovic core, 4000 men positioned slightly South of
Panic and then lastly with single to the score.
This core was actually composed of 5000 cavalry and 8505 hundred
infantry, and they were positioned just West of Zwinka
and they would actually play a key role in reconnaissance and
covering the western flank of the battlefield.

(23:01):
So Jonas, here's the map in question.
Can you kind of just talk us through what's going on here?
This is just showing the convergence of all the different
core, right? Yeah, so for, you know, for the
battlefield, just to indicate some some key positions, Lutz in
itself is actually way in the north.
Then you have the four villages which were hotly contested at

(23:25):
Kaya Kaya, Gershen, Rana, Gross,Gershen.
The Monarchan Huegel is actuallythe green M where all the red
units are, which are the allied forces.
That's where Wittgenstein actually started the battle off
other key positions, A star seedl center, center left where

(23:51):
Mormon would come in. Then the Grunerbach stream,
which is in the West of the battlefield and you know, full
Scrabon is, you know, is that canal running basically also
acting as like the eastern part of the battlefield.

(24:11):
OK, yeah, for those listeners, I'll put this episode on YouTube
as well so you can see it there.But if you're on Spotify, you
should be able to see the map through our video.
But yeah, the the Prussians start the attack in the morning
of May 2nd with Marshall Bluchersurprised to find a full
division of French troops in front of him.
What happens from there? I.

(24:32):
Mean we can establish the objectives of both sides quickly
to understand what the French and the Allies actually wanted
to achieve that day. So witch Kinstein, you know, he
was the main commander, he was under the impression through
engagements prior to the battle that that Napoleon was actually
posting a screen to cover a general movement in large
columns towards Leipzig, but to then thrust onwards to Berlin to

(24:56):
basically knockout the Prussianswith a Thunder clap.
You have actually the author anda historian, Michael Legia.
He actually, in his books on the1813 campaign, he actually makes
the argument that, you know, theFrench emperor had quite the
fixation on, you know, the Prussian capital as his main
objective. And so the allies, on the other
hand, they actually agreed to try and strike Napoleon's right

(25:17):
flank. And it wasn't too bad of an idea
given the all the open fields inthe area to actually make
optimal use of their numerical superiority to drive the fringe
into the marshes around Leipzig and Lutzen.
But this plan actually required action where Wittgenstein
actually didn't really excel him.
He was quite a methodical soldier.
His fellow commanders would actually blame him of putting a

(25:39):
lot of work and emphasis into details.
Lengthy orders is that, you know, once the action was
underway, it couldn't really provide much flexibility.
And actually some orders actually also reached his
colleagues hours later. And in such a time span, matters
can change very quickly and especially when you're facing
Napoleon. So as we will see, you know, it
kind of meant that the allies would get startled once they

(26:01):
would encounter French forces unexpectedly due to a lack of
follow up reconnaissance, and they would start acting piece
meal. So they would basically negate
their superiority in numbers that way.
So yeah, to the battle itself, when you know, when Wittgenstein
actually decided to attack the supposed French weer guard at 4
villages, you have Gross, Gershon, Klein, Gershon, Arana

(26:23):
and Kaya, which were located northwest of his position.
And the battlefield, the battlefield was, as it were,
enclosed in the South by villages named Tornau and
Redmond. You have a stream called the
Grunabach in the West, and in the east you have the the
Flosgraben Canal. So Blucher was actually ordered
to capture these villages in thenorth with one brigade, but

(26:45):
actually the determined Prussiangeneral, like he insisted on
leading the first wave himself. So around 11:45, Blucher rode up
to Wittgenstein and he actually requested permission to begin
the attack. He was blessed with the words of
with God's, with God's help. And then he fervently led his
first brigade into battle. And actually this surprised soul
actually caught the French underGeneral Suhan off guard because

(27:09):
they were still preparing lunch.You know, they didn't station
any forward posts. And actually Ney was blamed for
this. My Napoleon of.
Course. So after intense fighting,
Blucher actually secures gross Gershon, but the battle actually
was far from over. So despite, you know, his
initial success, Wittgenstein started to hesitate to commit

(27:31):
the rest of Blucher score for a simultaneous advance on Clan
Gershon and Anurana, you know, two other villages because they
was actually starting to fear the unknown forces beyond these
villages. So actually the defense that was
being put up by Napoleon's troops there, you know, they
didn't longer seem like only a rear guard.
So as a result, actually blue Curse Second Brigade was sent in

(27:53):
to attack line Gershon at around1 the Marshall.
They actually quickly rallied the French troops in that
sector. So they launched a counter
attack with three divisions, which basically overwhelmed blue
curse, you know, 2 brigades withmore than double the manpower.
So Blue her actually himself LEDa new assault on Kaya, but then
during that struggle hit one of his close allies, you know,
Prince Leopold of Hessen Homburg.

(28:14):
He was mortally wounded and thenblew her.
You know, you got to remember the guy is 70 years old.
He actually demonstrated extraordinary bravery despite
taking several hits. His his horse was shot under him
and then he was also wounded by a bullet that pierced aside.
And so when he was attempting torally his troops, Blue her
actually continued to fight alongside General Shawn Horst

(28:35):
until he could no longer ignore his injuries.
And basically these initial engagements, you know, they were
the onset of attacks after attacks of basically trying to
get a hold over these villages. Yeah, and Marshall Mamont hears
a cannon fire and moves his coreup to get involved.
Where is Napoleon during all this?
I've heard that he's famously giving a tour of the 1632

(28:58):
battlefield of Luton to his aides.
Yeah, well, Napoleon initially didn't really believe that an
attack was forthcoming before the 3rd of May.
So most of his orders that he issued earlier that day, they
were actually meant for that thrust into Leipzig.
So once Nase sector gets attacked, like he throws his
plan around as he noticed that the allied assault was growing

(29:19):
in size. So Napoleon thus ordered a
concentration of his core. So Marmol, he ends up
confronting the Allied left, where General Ziohar was also
basically caught by a surprise. You know, the men were still in
bivouac and the artillery teams,they were actually sent off to
gather forage and water. So there was this bull charged
by a great force of Allied cavalry, which probably would

(29:41):
have carried them away. But instead of that, they
actually the Allies would start to deploy their artillery, to
which there was actually little reply.
So we actually start to notice that the Allies are not acting
in immunism. So then covered by the village.
And Ogi was actually able to resist these partial attacks.
And he held on until he was relieved by the arrival of Mamo

(30:03):
and the Marshall. When he reached the village, you
know, he was marching in six large squares of a brigade each
to actually face the concentrated Allied cavalry in
that sector. And Mamo's arrival actually
enabled Jihag to leave the defense of Star Sedal to the
Marshall, and then he could thenMarch to the aid of General
Suhan in the four other villages.

(30:24):
And we actually have like a phenomenal French soldiers
perspective on the Battle of Flutzen and actually the entire
1813 campaign. And it was written by a man
called Nazis for sure. He was actually a 19 year old
serving in the 26th line blind infantry regiment, which was
actually part of Marshall Marmotscore.
And he recalls in his memoirs, and I quote, our regiment stood

(30:46):
in square with arms at the ready, receiving without
flinching the numerous cannonballs that the enemy
hurled at us, but on our side our artillery.
Our artillery was also wreaking havoc in the ranks of the mass
of cavalry which was opposing us, and which on several
occasions attempted charges on our squares, then never reached
our bayonets. Each time we were threatened

(31:07):
with a charge. The guns were placed at the
corners of the endangered front,and all the known commissioned
officers and skirmishers headed to the side that was due to be
engaged, and when the enemy cavalry was seen to be
sufficiently close it was repulsed with canister and
musket fire, and then withdrew. And shortly afterwards they
would pretend to try again, or other squadrons would replace

(31:29):
those that had been repulsed, and leaving General Vicar as a
reserve. Marshall Nade then actually put
himself at the head of General Brenier's division, and he led
it forward with those of Generals Jihar and Suham, and
the Persians were actually unable to stand against these
much greater numbers. They were driven again from Rana
and Klein. Gershon and Nate continued his

(31:50):
events on Gross. Gershon then met by a storm of
artillery fire. The Marshall was unable to
recapture the village. Yeah, Napoleon finally arrives
at 2:00 PM and begins to developa double envelopment plan.
Is this correct? Yeah, that's correct.
So he, Napoleon arrived at the battlefield near the village of
Kaya, where the situation appeared dire, but his presence

(32:10):
actually immediately lifted the morale of his troops, of course,
and with even the wounded, even some of them first facing
certain death, they were lootinghim with cries of Vive Lumpur.
But, you know, despite the reception, the Emperor actually
recognized the gravity of the situation.
So he encountered fleeing soldiers, and he actually
learned that three of Marshall Nae's five divisions had been

(32:31):
severely weakened. So when he reached Kaya, he also
received an urgent request from Marshall Mahmol to for
reinforcements at * Siedle. But actually, Napoleon dismissed
this request because he was a that the key to the battle lay
around the village of Kaya. And these forces were at risk of
being driven from these villagesonto the plain of Flutzen, which

(32:52):
is, you know, a situation that had to be prevented at all costs
until, you know, the Viceroy Eugene and General Berton could
actually close in on the enemy'sflanks and rear.
Then you have like the Imperial Guard, they also arrived at Kaya
at the same time as the Emperor,but he actually held them off at
deploying them because he was anticipating that the battle was
not like, you know, quote, UN quote, ripe yet for a decisive

(33:14):
stripe. Because he suspected that the
allies had reserves approaching and which was actually the case
because you have the Russian Grenadier and guard divisions.
But they were still not in position because these forces
actually had been delayed by Volkonsky because he actually
saw the initial Prussian successes earlier in the day.
And he actually advised the troops not to hurry because he

(33:34):
believed that the situation was under control.
And then by that time, actually the Tsar Alexander, he had taken
effective command from Wittgenstein because he was
struggling to resist the advancing French forces.
So by three in the afternoon, Napoleon actually ordered
General Mouton to push General Rica's division through Kaya
with support from Suham Jihad and Barenia's units.

(33:56):
And the French cleared the village of their enemy and
launched in the soldering Klein Gersh in Arana again, which were
fiercely defended by the Prussians.
Then French artillery between inKaia and Star Siedel, they were
supporting this attack and the villages and the surrounding
area were basically the left in ruins after hours of brutal
fighting. The Prussians fought with an
intense hatred before their French foes because they're, you

(34:19):
know, they were actually driven by years of oppression and they
were displaying like a level of bitterness not often seen in the
in the previous wars. And then by shortly after 5:00
PM, you have Marshall McDonald's11th Corps.
He arrived at Eisdorf on the Allied right and it's 60 guns
were actually in the vanguard. And then at the same time you
have Morons division, which Napoleon had finally ordered

(34:41):
into action. They've actually broke through
the Allied left. So the French basically at that
moment had the momentum on theirside.
Yeah. And my next point kind of speaks
to what just happened with Alexander and Wittgenstein.
The King of Prussia, Frederick William the Third, is also there
and leads a charge of the Prussian Guard, as you
mentioned. It's very bloody, hotly

(35:02):
contested battle. But I'm also not sure who's in
charge of this giant allied army.
The Russians are, is there. The Prussian king is there.
General Wittgenstein is there. Blucher is there?
Is this one of the issues that plagues the allied army's
chances? I have for sure, like the
situation is actually complicated by, you know, the
leadership dynamics within the Allied army.

(35:23):
And this fragment of command actually contributed
significantly to the difficulties that they would
face. While Wittgenstein was normally
in charge of the Allied forces, his authority was undermined by
the presence of both Alexander and Frederick William, who both
had a great influence over theirrespective troops.
And I'm not even mentioning likehot heads like Blucher and, and

(35:45):
General York. Then you have like Miloradovich.
And with Singeroda, you know, they actually weren't also
really at their best on the, youknow, that day.
So actually all this resulted like in a lack of coordinated
command, for instance, like the Russian reserve slowly advancing
and kept waiting when they couldactually could have been used to
actually turn the tide earlier in the battle.
So this issue of divided leadership, you know, with both

(36:07):
the Tsar and the Prussian king exercising their influence, you
know, it actually prevented the Allies from exploiting their
early successes and coordinatinglike a concentrated strategy,
strategy to defeat the French. This, this issue, you know,
became even more pronounced when, you know, Napoleon's clear
chain of command and his centralized decision making

(36:28):
proved to be very effective because Napoleon could
coordinate his forces more efficiently despite the
challenges of the battlefield and the poor reconnaissance that
he conducted prior to the battle.
But while the allies were, you know, suffering from delays and
confusion to, you know, basically to all these multiple
leaders pulling the strings. Yeah, and kind of.
Once the Allied thrust stalls, Napoleon strikes back with a

(36:50):
great mass of artillery, 100 guns under the famous General
Drool. This punch is a hole in the
Allied army lines, and the Imperial Guard finishes the
business around 6:00 PM and the Allies have to retreat.
Why was there no pursuit by Napoleon?
Well, because, you know, this battle actually required the
French to converge on positions as they were moving to locations

(37:11):
elsewhere. So it actually meant like sudden
changes of plans with force marching coming in, which was
very tiring for most of Napoleons unseasoned troops.
So Lutzen in Napoleons case was actually a battle of reacting to
developments as they were ongoing and there was actually
no vigorous pursuit with cavalrybecause actually there was
actually very little to work with in the first place.

(37:34):
And performing this as the night, you know, would settle
in, it actually would prove dangerous because, you know, you
have actually Marmol staff beingfired upon at one point by his
own troops and the confusion of the infantry fighting and the
darkness and the allies actually, you know, they counter
attacked them with the elite andheavy cavalry.
So it actually kept the fringe in the state of alarm throughout

(37:55):
the night, denying the soldiers much needed rest and
facilitating, you know, the withdrawal of the Allied army.
OK, So what were the casualties on both sides?
I know the Prussians lose one oftheir most able generals in
Charnhorse. Yeah, for sure.
French losses, they amounted to 18,000 men killed, wounded,
taken prisoner, which actually included 12,000 men from Third

(38:19):
Corps, you know, under Marshall May alone.
And although the allies claim tohave, you know, lost only half
that number, it actually kind ofseems in reality that both sides
actually suffered roughly the same numbers of casualties.
But you also, but you got to know, however, that, you know,
when the French army actually crossed the Alba River a few
days later, almost 35,000 men were missing because, you know,

(38:41):
you have disorders and stragglers doubling, you know,
the this number of quote, UN quote casualties.
It, it really shows the, the lack of experience with the with
the men, basically. And then, yeah, Shawn Horst.
So he actually received a wound in the foot, which in itself
wasn't very grave, but it was soon made mortal, you know, due
to the fatigues of the retreat. And he actually succumbed to his

(39:03):
injury on the 28th of June of 1813 at Prague, when he was
actually travelling to negotiatewith Schwartzenberg and Raddesky
for the armed intervention of Austria.
Very sad indeed. Yeah, he was very talented
general, and that's a big loss for the Persian army.
For sure. The aftermath of Lutsen and
Napoleon's later victory at Bounson was that of pirate

(39:26):
victories. Yes, Napoleon held the field and
made the Allies retreat, but they weren't resounding
clinching victories like Asterlitz and Friedland.
What did this mean to Napoleon and the Allies?
Well, yeah, neither side actually achieved, you know, its
objectives, although gaining A tactical victory of the French
actually paid dearly for a success, you know, that actually

(39:46):
brought no big gains. And while defeated, the
Coalition army was neither destroyed nor actually broken.
And, you know, there were distensions, but, you know,
followed the defeat, you know, for a moment seemed to lead to a
split between the Russians and the Prussians.
They were actually soon overcomeand then actually by failing
again at the Battle of Bouts. And actually the allies realized

(40:08):
that they they were actually in need of a plan to counter
Napoleon more effectively ratherthan just taking him on directly
in the field. And that would actually lead
them to develop the Tracenberg plan, which would actually yield
them. Victories as the campaign
continued. Yeah, that's the old plan where
they shouldn't confront Napoleonhead on, but only as Marshalls
and generals. And when Napoleon showed up,

(40:29):
they should retreat. I have for sure.
And it would prove effective, you know, with medals, as you
know, Cool, Denovitz and so forth, so.
Yeah, yeah. Last question about this Lutz.
And did this battle induce Austria to get off the fence and
cast their lot with the allies? I mean, nuts in itself, it
didn't really immediately bring the Austrians into the war, but

(40:50):
it was a key turning point in the broader context of the 1813
campaign, you know, because the battle actually made clear that
Napoleon was still dangerous, but, you know, his power was no
longer unassailable. And so actually following these
battles of the spring campaign, Austria, mostly in the form of,
you know, Meternic orchestratingall this, they actually became

(41:11):
actively involved in diplomatic discussions with the allies.
And actually by August of 1813, Austria would officially join
the 6th Coalition. This decision was actually also
largely motivated by the growingrealization that Napoleons power
was waning, and by aligning itself with the Coalition it
would offer Austria, you know, achance to influence the post war

(41:32):
order in Europe. Yeah, it's an interesting battle
to me, Lutsen. It's almost like a defensive
victory for Napoleon because he wasn't expecting it to happen
where it did. And and he he recovered nicely
and won the battle, but it was just not like the earlier
battles, like I mentioned, Austerlitz and Friedland, that
was a knockout victory. Yeah, I like the follow up

(41:53):
basically. And then then the lack of
cavalry and then like I said, especially the reconnaissance
would cost him a lot of battles.And then we also not mentioning
that, you know, the building up of all these partisan bands, the
Germans, you know, taking up arms and disrupting his lines of
communication, his logistic lines.
But it would prove it would costhim dearly as the campaign would

(42:14):
continue. Yeah, very interesting battle.
Thank you so much for that, Jonas.
That was wonderful. No problem.
Again, I really recommend you check out Jonas's WordPress.
It's napoleonchronicles.oryeahnapoleonchronicles.wordpress.com.
Yes, really good translations there.
A lot of first hand accounts, right?
Primary accounts of soldiers andall that kind of stuff.

(42:35):
For sure, thank you and thank you for having me on once again.
Yeah, yeah, no, we love having Jonas on.
Always a great guest. And yeah, we'll see you soon, my
friend.