June 29, 2025 • 22 mins
A semi-truck ignores flashing warning lights. An Amtrak train barrels forward at 79 miles per hour. Eleven lives are lost in the devastating collision that follows. The 1999 Bourbonnais Amtrak disaster stands as a sobering reminder of how quickly tragedy can unfold when safety protocols fail.
The catastrophe began with truck driver John Stokes, who after a long day hauling steel, approached a railroad crossing in Bourbonnais, Illinois. Despite active warning signals, he attempted to accelerate across the tracks rather than risk stopping. Meanwhile, Amtrak's City of New Orleans train #59 was approaching with 207 passengers and 21 crew members. The impact was devastating – destroying the semi-trailer, scattering a 37,000-pound load of steel rebar, and causing 11 of the train's 14 cars to derail.
What unfolded next was both horrific and heroic. As flames engulfed parts of the wreckage on a frigid March night, emergency responders from multiple agencies converged on the scene. Perhaps most remarkably, 35 employees from the nearby Birmingham Steel plant rushed to help before firefighters fully deployed, cutting through fences and risking their lives to pull passengers from the wreckage. Their selfless actions alongside the coordinated emergency response undoubtedly saved many lives, though tragically, eleven passengers perished.
The investigation revealed troubling factors that contributed to the disaster. Stokes had falsified his logbooks to conceal excessive driving hours and fatigue likely impaired his judgment. His employer, Melco Transfer, had previously been cited for safety violations. The disaster prompted changes – the dangerous crossing was permanently closed, and Stokes eventually served prison time for his violations.
Listen to this gripping account of the Bourbonnais Amtrak crash to understand the cascade of decisions and circumstances that led to disaster, and the heroic efforts that prevented an even greater tragedy. Share this episode with others who appreciate stories of real-world events that combine human error, emergency response, and the lasting impact of split-second decisions.
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Special thank you to Lunarfall Audio for producing and doing all the heavy lifting on audio editing since April 13, 2025, the Murder of Christopher Meyer episode https://lunarfallaudio.com/
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:01):
Train rides are fun, right.
Zooming down the track atroughly 80 miles per hour, you
get to see the sights you wouldnot normally see driving down
the highway, and maybe you cangrab a snack from the food car
or catch a nap in the sleeper.
Sounds like fun, right?
Well, that is until there's asemi stopped in the middle of
(00:23):
the tracks and it's way too latefor the train to come to a full
stop.
And that's exactly whathappened on the night of March
15th 1999.
A truck driver ignored therailroad crossing lights and
attempted to cross while therewas a train coming.
The Amtrak could not stop intime.
(00:44):
In the ensuing collision, 11 ofthe 14 cars derailed.
So what happened?
I'm Andrew and this is History'sA Disaster.
Tonight we are taking a trip toBourbonna, illinois, and
(01:06):
looking into a deadly Amtrakcollision, and this is a little
bit of a trip down memory lanefor me.
I lived not that far from wherethe crash happened.
I knew most or part of thestory of what happened, along
with some rumors and whatnotthat went with it, along with
some rumors and whatnot thatwent with it, and decided to dig
(01:31):
into it to find out some of thetruth about what misconceptions
I had you know shit like.
The truck driver was animmigrant and only got his
license from the George Ryanpay-to-play scandal, neither of
which was not true at all.
John Stokes was born inMichigan in 1940 and was 58 at
the time of the accident and hadbeen driving trucks for several
(01:51):
years.
Most recently he had beendriving for Melco Transfer out
of Piatone, illinois, which hadalso been cited multiple times
for safety violations.
So no surprises there.
And while he did have problemswith his license, it had nothing
to do with the George Ryanscandal.
At the time of the accident hewas driving on a 60-day
(02:15):
probationary license, since hisCDL had been suspended for three
violations within a year,despite what he wrote in his
logbook.
March 15th was a long day ofdriving for John Stokes.
He delivered a load of steelfrom Birmingham Steel in
Bourbonnet, illinois, to Dayton,ohio.
(02:36):
On his way back he picked up aload of lift trucks from
Princeton Products in CanalWinchester, ohio, for delivery
to Country Supply in Piatone,illinois.
Now Melco Transfer says theyknew nothing about this load
coming back, which sounds prettyconvenient for them and also a
(02:57):
little bit of bullshit.
Melco Transfer had previouslyowned Country Supply until 1997
and still maintained a businessrelationship with them.
Country Supply often used Melcofor loads from Princeton Supply
and surprise, surprise, allbilling information for this
extra load no longer exists.
(03:19):
Anyways, after dropping thisload off in Piatone, stokes
returned to Birmingham Steel inBourbonnais for his third trip
of the day.
There he picked up a load of60-foot long rebar weighing over
37,000 pounds.
After he was loaded up hesecured the load and left the
(03:40):
steel plant.
Turning right onto McKnightRoad, he was now a little over
600 feet away from the railroadgrade crossing.
That crossing had the flashinglights and the bells and the
gate arms, so it's pretty hardnot to see when they're going,
especially at night.
(04:02):
Separate from this, up inChicago, amtrak 59, the City of
New Orleans train was gettingready to roll.
The crew had all got there by7.15 that night.
The engineer went about hispre-trip inspections while the
rest of the crew made ready fortheir passengers and got the
(04:23):
train ready for departure.
During his checks the engineerreported the air brakes worked
properly and the headlight andditch lights were in working
order.
Now, those ditch lights, thoseare the two little lights at the
bottom of the train and they'rethere just to make the train
more visible.
And as was the case with Amtrak59, when coming up to a
(04:47):
crossing, these ditch lightswould flash in blink when they
honked the train horn, thereforeincreasing visibility.
On their way to the first stopin Homewood, no problems with
the brakes or lights wererecorded.
The train departed at nearly 930 at night.
It was on schedule and traveledsouth with a crew of 21 and 207
(05:11):
passengers on its way to NewOrleans in its doom.
According to Stokes, as heapproached the railroad crossing
, the crossing lights did notactivate until he was nearly on
top of the tracks and he wasunaware of the position of the
gate arms.
Amtrak 59 was getting closerand had activated the crossing
(05:33):
lights.
Stokes claimed there was a fearif he slammed on the brakes,
the load of rebar would shiftforward and strike the cab of
the truck and damage it.
And if he braked, normally he'djust end up stopping on the
tracks right in front of thepath of the Amtrak hurtling
towards him at 79 miles per hour.
(05:55):
So what else could he possiblydo but put pedal to the metal
and floor it?
He got the truck into 6th gearand up to 20 miles per hour.
As he crossed the tracks helooked left and right down the
track and believed the train wasfar enough down the track to
make it.
He was wrong.
(06:16):
Enough down the track to makeit.
He was wrong.
The engineer in Amtrak 59, whowas the only one in the cab at
the time, saw the truck on thetracks and sounded the horn.
Fearing the truck would notclear the tracks, he initiated
emergency braking.
Unfortunately, traveling at 79miles per hour, there was not
(06:39):
enough distance to stop thetrain in time.
At 9.47, the train smashed intothe left rear end of the
trailer.
The semi-trailer was destroyed,scattering its load of rebar
across the area.
The two locomotives, along with11 of the train's 14 cars,
(07:03):
derailed.
Two freight cars sitting on aneighboring line were struck and
destroyed.
The derailment happened justoutside of the Birmingham steel
plant.
The conductor was walkingthrough the coach car behind the
diner when he heard the train'sbrake supply and felt the bump.
He felt the train accelerateand then the car rolled over on
(07:25):
its side.
The conductor helped thepassenger remove a window and
climbed outside.
Once outside he called theassistant conductor and the
engineer by radio.
When the engineer said that hewas trapped in the locomotive,
the assistant conductorvolunteered to go help him.
The conductor remained at thecoach and helped passengers
(07:46):
evacuate.
Within a minute of the crash theKankakee County Sheriff's
Dispatch got the first calls forhelp from the Birmingham Steel
Security Office.
More calls would come in andBourbonnet firefighters were
sent out.
Within five minutes aBourbonnet and Bradley police
(08:10):
officer would arrive on scene,taking in the carnage and
growing fire.
They would immediately requestmore help and went straight into
rescuing passengers.
Soon more cops would show upand begin to help the evacuation
.
The Kankakee County disasterplan was put into effect.
As the first cops arrived onthe scene, the Bourbonnet Police
(08:33):
Department set up a stagingarea on an unpaved road on the
west side of the tracks next towhere the train derailed.
The passengers and train crewwere taken here to wait for
medical personnel While out onanother call.
The Bourbonnet Fire DepartmentChief received word of the wreck
On the way there.
(08:54):
He listened to the reportscoming in over the radio.
As incident commander he madethe call to summon emergency
equipment and personnel.
Once he got there he assessedthe situation and identified the
fire and the need to geteveryone the fuck out of there.
Shortly after 10 o'clock hecalled for additional mutual aid
(09:14):
emergency response support.
Afterwards he established afire department field command
post near the initial stagingarea.
Emergency responders' immediatefocus was getting the trapped
and injured passengers and traincrew out.
One of the first things theydid was call Amtrak's National
(09:34):
Operations Center to learn howmany passengers were on the
train At this time.
Amtrak responded that the traincould be carrying as many as
400 passengers.
When Amtrak management arrivedon scene, however, they
determined that the passengercount was 196, and they weren't
(09:55):
even sure if that was right.
It would take several days toget the passenger count of 198,
and another several days beforeAmtrak could produce a complete
list of passenger names, becauseobviously they have great
record keeping over at Amtrak,especially when it would be a
few more days before theyfinally got to the right count
(10:19):
of 207 passengers.
Anyways, by 10, the firstambulances arrived at the scene.
Bourbonnais Fire DepartmentSquad 62 also arrived.
The Squad 62 truck held 500gallons of water along with five
gallon fire suppression foamcontainers.
Firefighters began hitting theburning train with water and
(10:46):
foam, but they were unable toput out the fire before they ran
out of water.
Bourbonnet Fire DepartmentEngine 61, a pumper truck
carrying about 2,000 feet ofhose, arrived at a hydrant about
2,600 feet from the site.
Firefighters pulled out thefull length of the hose and
(11:07):
stretched it as close as theycould to the train wreck.
A second pumper truck wouldarrive with more hoses that
would be laid out along theunpaved road and charged up and
ready to supply water at thewest side of the site.
When the firefighters finallymade it to the fire, they saw
that 35 employees of BirminghamSteel had beat them to the scene
(11:30):
and had begun the rescue effort.
These steel plant guys had cuta hole in the chain link fence
separating the wreck from thesteel plant's property and had
brought a number of handheldfire extinguishers and ladders
from the plant to combat theflames.
While some of the steel plantguys applied the fire
extinguishers to the flames,others were going in and out of
(11:53):
the derailed cars, pullingpassengers from the wreck.
They kept it up for 45 minutesbefore being relieved by the
firefighters, who continued therescue effort and spraying down
the fire.
Since the McKnight Roadcrossing was blocked, they had
to set up three separate stagingareas.
The first was the one on theunpaid road near the wreckage
(12:15):
pileup.
A second fire departmentcommand post was set up at the
southeast corner of McKnightRoad and Route 50 at an empty
lumber yard and was called theEast Staging Area.
A police department commandpost was set up shortly after at
the northeast corner of thesame intersection.
At the northeast corner of thesame intersection, at 10.30,
(12:39):
incident Command issued a radiorequest to responding agencies
seeking fire suppression foam.
Several units responded, buteach only had a small number of
5-gallon containers of foam andsystems designed to mix the foam
with water for use on the fireDuring the rescue efforts.
Once pulled out, passengers andtrain crew were taken to one of
(13:04):
two triage areas set up nearby.
Because the temperature thatnight was in the low 20s,
however, the incident commanderbecame concerned about the
threat of hypothermia.
Since most of them lacked warmclothing, a nearby store stepped
up and offered its store as atemporary shelter.
First responders would use itboth as a shelter and as a
(13:26):
triage site for several of theinjured.
A call was also put out for amedical trauma team consisting
of physicians and medicalequipment from local hospitals
to rush to the scene.
Equipment from local hospitalsto rush to the scene.
Police officers were pullingpassengers through the emergency
exit windows of an overturnedcoach car.
A Manteno Fire Departmentpumper truck emptied its water
(13:50):
tank by supplying a stream ofwater to the top of this car in
an effort to cool it.
However, manteno firefighterswould have to make a radio
request to command that water beapplied to the top of the train
because they were out.
Unfortunately, command on thewestern side of the pileup
mistook the request, thinking itcame from personnel inside
(14:14):
sleeper car 32035, and theyresponded with a large stream of
water onto the west end of thatcar.
Continuing attempts were madeto set up a hydrant flow to
resupply the Mantino fire truckson the east side of the scene.
The Braidwood Fire Departmentheavy rescue truck, having
(14:34):
arrived at the east side stagingarea, was sent back over to the
west side.
The requested trauma team wouldfollow shortly behind them into
the west side staging area.
Mike Shorkey, who was both aBraidwood firefighter and an
emergency response coordinatorfor a chemical company in Elwood
(14:54):
, recognized that the firesuppression foam at the scene
was almost out.
He also realized that thefirefighting efforts had not
been working on the locomotivefire.
The fire was petroleum-basedand it remained trapped within
the upper confines of thelocomotive car body wreckage.
He believed the strategy beingused up to that point was having
(15:19):
only limited success becausethe fire would go out in one
location only to start back upin another location and then
bounce back to the original.
Shorky figured what they neededwas a shit ton of foam to lay
down on the fire and for that aheavy foam tanker truck from the
nearest available place shouldbe called in.
(15:41):
After getting approval fromcommand, shorkey immediately
placed a call asking that aheavy tanker truck and personnel
from the Stepan ChemicalCompany in Elwood be sent out to
the accident.
He would also make a similarcall to the Mobile Oil Refinery.
Both of these places are about35 miles away and would take
(16:05):
nearly 45 minutes to arrive.
At 10 45, a call went out overthe radio requesting that the
Chicago Combined Agency ResponseTeam immediately respond to the
east side of the wreck becausetwo people were trapped inside a
car and the fire was blockingrescue attempts.
This car team is a tacticalrescue squad composed of fire
(16:29):
and rescue departments acrossthe Chicagoland area.
When the Braidwood FireDepartment heavy rescue truck
arrived at the west side stagingarea, it was set up as another
field command post.
In desperate need for morewater, command issued a call to
all responding agencies for allavailable water tanker truck
(16:50):
support.
By 11 pm they had the east sidefire under control Not out.
But almost by 11 30, the heavyfoam tanker truck from Stepan
Chemical Company showed up andquickly got set up and working.
The west side fire.
Mike Shorkey organized theStepan response.
(17:10):
They sprayed down thelocomotive and the burning
sleeper car with water and foam.
It would not take them longbefore they had the fire
completely put down and toprevent the possibility of the
fire starting back up again,they kept on hosing down the hot
metal in the wreckage.
Just to be sure, by 12.05, anemergency shelter established at
(17:33):
a nearby school building beganto receive the uninjured
passengers who were transferredfrom the temporary shelter
established at the store.
This shelter, staffed by theAmerican Red Cross and the
Bourbonnet Police Department,would remain open until 2 30 am.
The firefighters on handcontinued to fight small fires
(17:56):
that kept popping up throughoutthe night before finally putting
it out for good by dawn on the16th.
Out of the 207 passengers 17on-duty Amtrak crew members and
four off-duty Amtrak andrailroad personnel 121 of them
(18:20):
were taken to local hospitalsfor medical treatment.
35 of them were examined andreleased without receiving
medical treatment.
One of the trained crew memberswould have to be airlifted from
Provena St Mary's Hospital tothe Loyola University Medical
Center in Chicago.
John Stokes, a firefighter anda sheriff's deputy, received
(18:42):
minor injuries and were quicklytreated and released from a
local hospital.
11 passengers all from sleepingcar 32035, died from their
injuries.
Shortly after the accident,safety board investigators
compiled the activities ofStokes for the 72-hour period
(19:03):
before the accident, using hisown statements, his logbook and
materials from the IllinoisState Police investigation.
The initial findings indicatedthat Stokes had been driving for
about 10 hours and had been onduty for another two hours in
the 24-hour period before theaccident.
However, during the accidentinvestigation, investigators
(19:27):
discovered a fuel receipt thatcontradicted his accounts of his
whereabouts on the day before,and when confronted with the
evidence, stokes changed hisstory real quick.
The truth was finally comingout In the few days prior to the
accident.
He had slept only a few hoursand was on the road.
(19:48):
More than anything, stokeswould not end up being charged
with a grade crossing violation.
Following the accident, however, the federal office of motor
carrier Safety conducted acompliance review of Melco
Transfer Inc.
That would result in fines forboth the company and for Stokes.
They would also decide not topursue the case further, but
(20:12):
instead turn the case over tothe DOT's Office of the
Inspector General who conducteda criminal investigation into
the circumstances surroundingthe accident.
In October of 2001, john Stokeswas indicted by a Kankakee
(20:34):
County grand jury on two countsOne count for falsifying his
logbook and the second one forviolating the hours of service
regulation, and both of thoseare felony charges.
Stokes would be sentenced onSeptember 21st 2004 to two years
in prison for logbook and hoursof service violations and hours
(21:04):
of service violations.
At sentencing, kankakee CountyJudge Clark Erickson stated that
it was not proven if a lack ofrest played a factor in the
wreck, but that he fullybelieved Stokes would have been
more able to make safe drivingdecisions if he had been fully
rested.
John Stokes would later die inFebruary 2007 from a cerebral
hemorrhage.
Bourbonet would end up puttinga memorial to the victims at the
(21:28):
intersection of 45 and 102,across the street from Olivet
University In January of 2006,.
They would end up permanentlyclosing the grade crossing where
the accident occurred, and thatwas the Bourbonnet Amtrak crash
(21:49):
of 1999.
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(22:12):
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disaster.
Thanks and goodbye.
Train rides are fun, right.
Zooming down the track atroughly 80 miles per hour, you
get to see the sights you wouldnot normally see driving down
the highway, and maybe you cangrab a snack from the food car
or catch a nap in the sleeper.
Sounds like fun, right?
Well, that is until there's asemi stopped in the middle of
(00:23):
the tracks and it's way too latefor the train to come to a full
stop.
And that's exactly whathappened on the night of March
15th 1999.
A truck driver ignored therailroad crossing lights and
attempted to cross while therewas a train coming.
The Amtrak could not stop intime.
(00:44):
In the ensuing collision, 11 ofthe 14 cars derailed.
So what happened?
I'm Andrew and this is History'sA Disaster.
Tonight we are taking a trip toBourbonna, illinois, and
(01:06):
looking into a deadly Amtrakcollision, and this is a little
bit of a trip down memory lanefor me.
I lived not that far from wherethe crash happened.
I knew most or part of thestory of what happened, along
with some rumors and whatnotthat went with it, along with
some rumors and whatnot thatwent with it, and decided to dig
(01:31):
into it to find out some of thetruth about what misconceptions
I had you know shit like.
The truck driver was animmigrant and only got his
license from the George Ryanpay-to-play scandal, neither of
which was not true at all.
John Stokes was born inMichigan in 1940 and was 58 at
the time of the accident and hadbeen driving trucks for several
(01:51):
years.
Most recently he had beendriving for Melco Transfer out
of Piatone, illinois, which hadalso been cited multiple times
for safety violations.
So no surprises there.
And while he did have problemswith his license, it had nothing
to do with the George Ryanscandal.
At the time of the accident hewas driving on a 60-day
(02:15):
probationary license, since hisCDL had been suspended for three
violations within a year,despite what he wrote in his
logbook.
March 15th was a long day ofdriving for John Stokes.
He delivered a load of steelfrom Birmingham Steel in
Bourbonnet, illinois, to Dayton,ohio.
(02:36):
On his way back he picked up aload of lift trucks from
Princeton Products in CanalWinchester, ohio, for delivery
to Country Supply in Piatone,illinois.
Now Melco Transfer says theyknew nothing about this load
coming back, which sounds prettyconvenient for them and also a
(02:57):
little bit of bullshit.
Melco Transfer had previouslyowned Country Supply until 1997
and still maintained a businessrelationship with them.
Country Supply often used Melcofor loads from Princeton Supply
and surprise, surprise, allbilling information for this
extra load no longer exists.
(03:19):
Anyways, after dropping thisload off in Piatone, stokes
returned to Birmingham Steel inBourbonnais for his third trip
of the day.
There he picked up a load of60-foot long rebar weighing over
37,000 pounds.
After he was loaded up hesecured the load and left the
(03:40):
steel plant.
Turning right onto McKnightRoad, he was now a little over
600 feet away from the railroadgrade crossing.
That crossing had the flashinglights and the bells and the
gate arms, so it's pretty hardnot to see when they're going,
especially at night.
(04:02):
Separate from this, up inChicago, amtrak 59, the City of
New Orleans train was gettingready to roll.
The crew had all got there by7.15 that night.
The engineer went about hispre-trip inspections while the
rest of the crew made ready fortheir passengers and got the
(04:23):
train ready for departure.
During his checks the engineerreported the air brakes worked
properly and the headlight andditch lights were in working
order.
Now, those ditch lights, thoseare the two little lights at the
bottom of the train and they'rethere just to make the train
more visible.
And as was the case with Amtrak59, when coming up to a
(04:47):
crossing, these ditch lightswould flash in blink when they
honked the train horn, thereforeincreasing visibility.
On their way to the first stopin Homewood, no problems with
the brakes or lights wererecorded.
The train departed at nearly 930 at night.
It was on schedule and traveledsouth with a crew of 21 and 207
(05:11):
passengers on its way to NewOrleans in its doom.
According to Stokes, as heapproached the railroad crossing
, the crossing lights did notactivate until he was nearly on
top of the tracks and he wasunaware of the position of the
gate arms.
Amtrak 59 was getting closerand had activated the crossing
(05:33):
lights.
Stokes claimed there was a fearif he slammed on the brakes,
the load of rebar would shiftforward and strike the cab of
the truck and damage it.
And if he braked, normally he'djust end up stopping on the
tracks right in front of thepath of the Amtrak hurtling
towards him at 79 miles per hour.
(05:55):
So what else could he possiblydo but put pedal to the metal
and floor it?
He got the truck into 6th gearand up to 20 miles per hour.
As he crossed the tracks helooked left and right down the
track and believed the train wasfar enough down the track to
make it.
He was wrong.
(06:16):
Enough down the track to makeit.
He was wrong.
The engineer in Amtrak 59, whowas the only one in the cab at
the time, saw the truck on thetracks and sounded the horn.
Fearing the truck would notclear the tracks, he initiated
emergency braking.
Unfortunately, traveling at 79miles per hour, there was not
(06:39):
enough distance to stop thetrain in time.
At 9.47, the train smashed intothe left rear end of the
trailer.
The semi-trailer was destroyed,scattering its load of rebar
across the area.
The two locomotives, along with11 of the train's 14 cars,
(07:03):
derailed.
Two freight cars sitting on aneighboring line were struck and
destroyed.
The derailment happened justoutside of the Birmingham steel
plant.
The conductor was walkingthrough the coach car behind the
diner when he heard the train'sbrake supply and felt the bump.
He felt the train accelerateand then the car rolled over on
(07:25):
its side.
The conductor helped thepassenger remove a window and
climbed outside.
Once outside he called theassistant conductor and the
engineer by radio.
When the engineer said that hewas trapped in the locomotive,
the assistant conductorvolunteered to go help him.
The conductor remained at thecoach and helped passengers
(07:46):
evacuate.
Within a minute of the crash theKankakee County Sheriff's
Dispatch got the first calls forhelp from the Birmingham Steel
Security Office.
More calls would come in andBourbonnet firefighters were
sent out.
Within five minutes aBourbonnet and Bradley police
(08:10):
officer would arrive on scene,taking in the carnage and
growing fire.
They would immediately requestmore help and went straight into
rescuing passengers.
Soon more cops would show upand begin to help the evacuation
.
The Kankakee County disasterplan was put into effect.
As the first cops arrived onthe scene, the Bourbonnet Police
(08:33):
Department set up a stagingarea on an unpaved road on the
west side of the tracks next towhere the train derailed.
The passengers and train crewwere taken here to wait for
medical personnel While out onanother call.
The Bourbonnet Fire DepartmentChief received word of the wreck
On the way there.
(08:54):
He listened to the reportscoming in over the radio.
As incident commander he madethe call to summon emergency
equipment and personnel.
Once he got there he assessedthe situation and identified the
fire and the need to geteveryone the fuck out of there.
Shortly after 10 o'clock hecalled for additional mutual aid
(09:14):
emergency response support.
Afterwards he established afire department field command
post near the initial stagingarea.
Emergency responders' immediatefocus was getting the trapped
and injured passengers and traincrew out.
One of the first things theydid was call Amtrak's National
(09:34):
Operations Center to learn howmany passengers were on the
train At this time.
Amtrak responded that the traincould be carrying as many as
400 passengers.
When Amtrak management arrivedon scene, however, they
determined that the passengercount was 196, and they weren't
(09:55):
even sure if that was right.
It would take several days toget the passenger count of 198,
and another several days beforeAmtrak could produce a complete
list of passenger names, becauseobviously they have great
record keeping over at Amtrak,especially when it would be a
few more days before theyfinally got to the right count
(10:19):
of 207 passengers.
Anyways, by 10, the firstambulances arrived at the scene.
Bourbonnais Fire DepartmentSquad 62 also arrived.
The Squad 62 truck held 500gallons of water along with five
gallon fire suppression foamcontainers.
Firefighters began hitting theburning train with water and
(10:46):
foam, but they were unable toput out the fire before they ran
out of water.
Bourbonnet Fire DepartmentEngine 61, a pumper truck
carrying about 2,000 feet ofhose, arrived at a hydrant about
2,600 feet from the site.
Firefighters pulled out thefull length of the hose and
(11:07):
stretched it as close as theycould to the train wreck.
A second pumper truck wouldarrive with more hoses that
would be laid out along theunpaved road and charged up and
ready to supply water at thewest side of the site.
When the firefighters finallymade it to the fire, they saw
that 35 employees of BirminghamSteel had beat them to the scene
(11:30):
and had begun the rescue effort.
These steel plant guys had cuta hole in the chain link fence
separating the wreck from thesteel plant's property and had
brought a number of handheldfire extinguishers and ladders
from the plant to combat theflames.
While some of the steel plantguys applied the fire
extinguishers to the flames,others were going in and out of
(11:53):
the derailed cars, pullingpassengers from the wreck.
They kept it up for 45 minutesbefore being relieved by the
firefighters, who continued therescue effort and spraying down
the fire.
Since the McKnight Roadcrossing was blocked, they had
to set up three separate stagingareas.
The first was the one on theunpaid road near the wreckage
(12:15):
pileup.
A second fire departmentcommand post was set up at the
southeast corner of McKnightRoad and Route 50 at an empty
lumber yard and was called theEast Staging Area.
A police department commandpost was set up shortly after at
the northeast corner of thesame intersection.
At the northeast corner of thesame intersection, at 10.30,
(12:39):
incident Command issued a radiorequest to responding agencies
seeking fire suppression foam.
Several units responded, buteach only had a small number of
5-gallon containers of foam andsystems designed to mix the foam
with water for use on the fireDuring the rescue efforts.
Once pulled out, passengers andtrain crew were taken to one of
(13:04):
two triage areas set up nearby.
Because the temperature thatnight was in the low 20s,
however, the incident commanderbecame concerned about the
threat of hypothermia.
Since most of them lacked warmclothing, a nearby store stepped
up and offered its store as atemporary shelter.
First responders would use itboth as a shelter and as a
(13:26):
triage site for several of theinjured.
A call was also put out for amedical trauma team consisting
of physicians and medicalequipment from local hospitals
to rush to the scene.
Equipment from local hospitalsto rush to the scene.
Police officers were pullingpassengers through the emergency
exit windows of an overturnedcoach car.
A Manteno Fire Departmentpumper truck emptied its water
(13:50):
tank by supplying a stream ofwater to the top of this car in
an effort to cool it.
However, manteno firefighterswould have to make a radio
request to command that water beapplied to the top of the train
because they were out.
Unfortunately, command on thewestern side of the pileup
mistook the request, thinking itcame from personnel inside
(14:14):
sleeper car 32035, and theyresponded with a large stream of
water onto the west end of thatcar.
Continuing attempts were madeto set up a hydrant flow to
resupply the Mantino fire truckson the east side of the scene.
The Braidwood Fire Departmentheavy rescue truck, having
(14:34):
arrived at the east side stagingarea, was sent back over to the
west side.
The requested trauma team wouldfollow shortly behind them into
the west side staging area.
Mike Shorkey, who was both aBraidwood firefighter and an
emergency response coordinatorfor a chemical company in Elwood
(14:54):
, recognized that the firesuppression foam at the scene
was almost out.
He also realized that thefirefighting efforts had not
been working on the locomotivefire.
The fire was petroleum-basedand it remained trapped within
the upper confines of thelocomotive car body wreckage.
He believed the strategy beingused up to that point was having
(15:19):
only limited success becausethe fire would go out in one
location only to start back upin another location and then
bounce back to the original.
Shorky figured what they neededwas a shit ton of foam to lay
down on the fire and for that aheavy foam tanker truck from the
nearest available place shouldbe called in.
(15:41):
After getting approval fromcommand, shorkey immediately
placed a call asking that aheavy tanker truck and personnel
from the Stepan ChemicalCompany in Elwood be sent out to
the accident.
He would also make a similarcall to the Mobile Oil Refinery.
Both of these places are about35 miles away and would take
(16:05):
nearly 45 minutes to arrive.
At 10 45, a call went out overthe radio requesting that the
Chicago Combined Agency ResponseTeam immediately respond to the
east side of the wreck becausetwo people were trapped inside a
car and the fire was blockingrescue attempts.
This car team is a tacticalrescue squad composed of fire
(16:29):
and rescue departments acrossthe Chicagoland area.
When the Braidwood FireDepartment heavy rescue truck
arrived at the west side stagingarea, it was set up as another
field command post.
In desperate need for morewater, command issued a call to
all responding agencies for allavailable water tanker truck
(16:50):
support.
By 11 pm they had the east sidefire under control Not out.
But almost by 11 30, the heavyfoam tanker truck from Stepan
Chemical Company showed up andquickly got set up and working.
The west side fire.
Mike Shorkey organized theStepan response.
(17:10):
They sprayed down thelocomotive and the burning
sleeper car with water and foam.
It would not take them longbefore they had the fire
completely put down and toprevent the possibility of the
fire starting back up again,they kept on hosing down the hot
metal in the wreckage.
Just to be sure, by 12.05, anemergency shelter established at
(17:33):
a nearby school building beganto receive the uninjured
passengers who were transferredfrom the temporary shelter
established at the store.
This shelter, staffed by theAmerican Red Cross and the
Bourbonnet Police Department,would remain open until 2 30 am.
The firefighters on handcontinued to fight small fires
(17:56):
that kept popping up throughoutthe night before finally putting
it out for good by dawn on the16th.
Out of the 207 passengers 17on-duty Amtrak crew members and
four off-duty Amtrak andrailroad personnel 121 of them
(18:20):
were taken to local hospitalsfor medical treatment.
35 of them were examined andreleased without receiving
medical treatment.
One of the trained crew memberswould have to be airlifted from
Provena St Mary's Hospital tothe Loyola University Medical
Center in Chicago.
John Stokes, a firefighter anda sheriff's deputy, received
(18:42):
minor injuries and were quicklytreated and released from a
local hospital.
11 passengers all from sleepingcar 32035, died from their
injuries.
Shortly after the accident,safety board investigators
compiled the activities ofStokes for the 72-hour period
(19:03):
before the accident, using hisown statements, his logbook and
materials from the IllinoisState Police investigation.
The initial findings indicatedthat Stokes had been driving for
about 10 hours and had been onduty for another two hours in
the 24-hour period before theaccident.
However, during the accidentinvestigation, investigators
(19:27):
discovered a fuel receipt thatcontradicted his accounts of his
whereabouts on the day before,and when confronted with the
evidence, stokes changed hisstory real quick.
The truth was finally comingout In the few days prior to the
accident.
He had slept only a few hoursand was on the road.
(19:48):
More than anything, stokeswould not end up being charged
with a grade crossing violation.
Following the accident, however, the federal office of motor
carrier Safety conducted acompliance review of Melco
Transfer Inc.
That would result in fines forboth the company and for Stokes.
They would also decide not topursue the case further, but
(20:12):
instead turn the case over tothe DOT's Office of the
Inspector General who conducteda criminal investigation into
the circumstances surroundingthe accident.
In October of 2001, john Stokeswas indicted by a Kankakee
(20:34):
County grand jury on two countsOne count for falsifying his
logbook and the second one forviolating the hours of service
regulation, and both of thoseare felony charges.
Stokes would be sentenced onSeptember 21st 2004 to two years
in prison for logbook and hoursof service violations and hours
(21:04):
of service violations.
At sentencing, kankakee CountyJudge Clark Erickson stated that
it was not proven if a lack ofrest played a factor in the
wreck, but that he fullybelieved Stokes would have been
more able to make safe drivingdecisions if he had been fully
rested.
John Stokes would later die inFebruary 2007 from a cerebral
hemorrhage.
Bourbonet would end up puttinga memorial to the victims at the
(21:28):
intersection of 45 and 102,across the street from Olivet
University In January of 2006,.
They would end up permanentlyclosing the grade crossing where
the accident occurred, and thatwas the Bourbonnet Amtrak crash
(21:49):
of 1999.
Thanks for listening and if youenjoyed the show, please
consider leaving a rating orreview on your Apple choice, and
you can reach out to the showat historyisadisaster at
gmailcom, or follow the show onsocial media at
historyisadisaster on Facebook,instagram and a few others and
(22:12):
share the episode, becausesharing is caring and if there
was more caring in the world,maybe history wouldn't be a
disaster.
Thanks and goodbye.
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