ROW Episode 38

In this episode we identify the deep flaws in our international nuclear non-proliferation regime and propose ways of fixing them thereby strengthening a key pillar of global peace and security.

Episode Transcript

Sovaida (00:08):
Hello and welcome to Reimagining Our World, a podcast
dedicated to envisioning abetter world and to infusing
hope that we can make theprincipled choices to build that
world.
In this episode, we identify thedeep flaws in our international
nuclear nonproliferation regimeand propose ways of fixing them,

(00:33):
thereby strengthening a keypillar of global peace and
security.
We all yearn for a world that ispeaceful and secure.
But to achieve this world, wehave to first identify the
obstacles that stand in our wayand then act resolutely and
methodically to remove them.

(00:55):
The proliferation of nuclearweapons poses one of the most
serious dangers to the peace ofthe world.
In recognition of this danger,in 1968, the international
community created something thatwe call the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty, anagreement between many nation
states that came into effect in1970.
This treaty is, according to ourcurrent Secretary General, Mr.

(01:19):
Antonio Guterres, an essentialpillar of international peace
and security.
So what is the NPT, the NuclearNon Proliferation Treaty?
It's essentially a contractbetween a whole bunch of states
or nations, and it had threemain goals.

(01:40):
To promote cooperation betweenthem for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, while alsopreventing the spread of nuclear
weapons and weapons technology.
And a key element was to ensureeventual complete nuclear
disarmament.

Essentially, this is the story: that once the bomb, the atom (02:00):
undefined
bomb, came into existence andinformation about creating it
and nuclear technology startedto become more readily
available, nations recognizedthat this posed a huge danger
and it was likely to lead to acascade of proliferation.
So they decided to come up withsome kind of mechanism to arrest

(02:23):
this proliferation.
Problem was that some nationswho had nuclear weapons, five in
particular, didn't want to givethem up.
And others who didn't have themsaid,"Wait a minute.
It's not fair that you shouldhave access to nuclear
technology and be able toeconomically develop.
We at least want to have accessto nuclear technology for

(02:43):
peaceful purposes, to createenergy, for instance, so that
our people can continue todevelop.
Eventually these two groupsstruck a deal.
The deal was the NPT, the NonProliferation Treaty, in which
the nuclear weapons states gotto keep their weapons, while
promising that they would workassiduously and in good faith to

(03:08):
disarm and to eliminate nuclearweapons.
Meanwhile, the non nuclearweapons states promised not to
try to acquire nuclear weaponsin return for having access to
nuclear technology for peacefulpurposes, for civilian purposes.
The key principle that theytried, I don't know if they

(03:29):
thought about this consciously,but that I believe underpins the
system is the principle offairness: We'll do a deal and
each side has to fulfill theconditions." It was a bargain
that was hinged on keyconditions.
Unfortunately, these conditionshave not been met.

(03:50):
Now, the NPT was signed in 1968,came into force in 1970, and
initially it was reallysuccessful in checking the
spread of nuclear weapons.
For instance, it led severalstates like South Korea, Taiwan,
Brazil, Argentina, South Africa,Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to
abandon their nuclear weaponsambitions.

(04:13):
And it made it more difficultfor non nuclear weapon states to
acquire the material andtechnology needed to build
weapons without detection, whileavoiding detection.
And then in 1957, another goodstep was taken to create an
agency called the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, the IAEA,

(04:33):
whose job was basically topromote the peaceful uses of
civilian nuclear energy, whilealso monitoring that nations
were complying with theirpromises.
Unfortunately, right from thestart, certain fundamental flaws
existed in the system that overthe years have become

(04:56):
increasingly apparent.
If you think of the nuclear nonproliferation system as a dam
that's been holding back thewaters of proliferation, there
are so many breaches, severebreaches in it now that it
threatens to have the entire damcollapse and result in a nuclear
arms race, a tremendousproliferation of nuclear

(05:16):
weapons, which would inevitablylead to a nuclear disaster and
nuclear war.
Let's look at some of the keyflaws because it's important
that we educate ourselves.
And I'm going to make thisreally simple and easy.
This is not hard stuff.
The first flaw is that the NPTis not binding on all the

(05:38):
members of the internationalcommunity, believe it or not.
States are free to sign on to itor not.
Think of it as a contract, justlike you can sign on to a
contract or not with anotherparty or several other parties,
so two states can choose.
Now, in a world where thedangers of nuclear proliferation

(05:59):
are so great, and the dangersposed by these weapons of mass
destruction are so severe, andthe peace and security of the
entire planet and our existencehinges on keeping us safe from
these weapons, and in a worldthat is so interconnected and
interdependent as ours is, andhas become essentially a single

(06:20):
organism, where the action ofthe one affects the whole-- this
is crazy.
Participation ought to bemandatory for all nations on the
grounds of internationalsecurity.
Nations talk a lot aboutnational security, but
international security should beour primary concern.

(06:40):
And once we have that, then thenational security will also be
guaranteed.
The principle that's implicatedhere, and in this series, we've
talked a lot about principles,is the principle of oneness,
that we are all interconnected.
We need to apply this principlein crafting a reformed system of
nonproliferation.

(07:01):
Essentially, if you think aboutit in practical terms, it's
ludicrous that currently nuclearweapons states like India,
Pakistan, North Korea, andIsrael can be absolved from the
requirement of participatinglike all other nations in the
NPT treaty.
It's crazy.
It's insane.
To me, it's like walking into aroom where some people have a
deadly contagious disease, ahandful of people, and then

(07:24):
saying to everybody else, youguys have to be masked and wear
all this protective gear, butthese five people can wander
around and breathe on all of usand touch us and their bodily
fluid can get everywhere.
This just makes no sense.
So we're doing things in anupside down fashion.
This is another area in whichthe principle of the curtailment

(07:47):
of national sovereignty to acertain extent kicks in, where
it's critical in certain narrowspheres of human endeavor, where
our collective interests areimplicated, like the interest of
not eliminating ourselves,annihilating ourselves through
nuclear weapons, that we curtailour national sovereignty and

(08:08):
cede our right to maintainnuclear weapons for this greater
good.
Now, the second flaw in thesystem, in the NPT system, is
that states can withdraw, anystate can withdraw at any time,
and the conditions forwithdrawal are very low, and the

(08:28):
notice required is minimal.
Basically a member state canwithdraw with a mere 90 days
notice, three months notice tothe other parties in the
Security Council.
And it's easy to do so.
All they need to say is thatsome extraordinary events have
happened related to the subjectmatter of the treaty that have
jeopardized the supreme interestof their country.

(08:51):
Unfortunately, what a supremeinterest is, is not defined in
the treaty.
So as you can imagine, nationscan make up whatever they want.
In addition, to add insult toinjury, withdrawal carries no
consequences with it.
Even if a state has been foundto have been in violation of its
treaty obligations while it wasa member, there's nothing that

(09:11):
can be done.
Have any states withdrawn?
Yes, North Korea.
It signed onto the NPT treaty.
It used it as a means to acquirenuclear technology, supposedly
for peaceful purposes.
It then used its know how todevelop a secret weapons
program.
And once it had the bomb, itannounced it and then announced

(09:32):
that it was withdrawing from theNPT.
North Korea has set a verydangerous precedent.
Unless we act quickly to makesure that there are severe
consequences for such actions,other nations are likely to
follow suit.
Iran has occasionally threatenedto withdraw from the NPT.
It has not yet.
Bottom line, it defies beliefthat given the dangers of peace

(09:56):
and security posed by nuclearweapons that we would even
entertain the notion of allowingone state party to withdraw from
such a treaty that's sofundamental to the peace of the
world.
The third flaw in the system ofnon proliferation in our world
is the absence of a reliable andshared system of intelligence

(10:19):
coupled with robust monitoringand verification to ensure that
states are actually complyingwith their obligations under the
treaty.
If you're going to have rules,you've got to be able to monitor
that people are complying withthe rules.
Otherwise, it's just somethingwritten on a piece of paper.
But wait a minute.
We said that there was a systemthat had been set up, the IAEA,

(10:41):
that provided internationalsafeguards and a system for
monitoring.
So isn't that good enough?
The answer is no.
Unfortunately, the system isvery weak and very broken.
First of all, the system isbased on states voluntarily
entering into a bilateral,meaning a two way, agreement
between the state and the IAEAfor the IAEA to be able to come

(11:05):
and inspect.
How crazy is that?
You give states nucleartechnology and then say,"Oh, do
you want to sign a safeguardsagreement or not?" If they have
any nefarious motives, they'renot going to want to do that.
Secondly, it's become clear overtime that the safeguard systems
we do have in place and thescope of the IAEA's authority

(11:26):
has been inadequate to bringbreaches of the NPT to the
attention of the internationalcommunity in a timely manner.
For example, with Iran, welearned about Iran's undeclared
nuclear activities fromdissidents and not as a result
of the safeguard system.
The world learned about NorthKorea's undeclared nuclear
activities when it itselfdecided to divulge its secret

(11:49):
and then withdraw from the NPT.
We learned about Iraq'sclandestine pursuit of a program
to develop nuclear weapons afterthe Persian Gulf War in 1991 and
not because of the efficacy ofthe safeguard system.
And on and on.
The same with Libya.
Same with Syria.
The third problem here is thatthis whole system of safeguards

(12:12):
is based on countries declaringtheir nuclear activities.
That's the first thing thathappens: states are asked when
they enter a safeguardsagreement with the IEA to
declare their nuclearactivities.
Well, if you want to hidesomething, you're going to
declare some stuff, and thenyou're going to hide other
stuff.
That's a given.
So a good example is in 2011,the IAEA board found Syria to be

(12:34):
in noncompliance with itsobligations under the safeguards
agreement, which it had signed.
The IAEA board concluded it waslikely that a building at the
Deir el Zour site destroyed byIsrael in 2007 was a nuclear
reactor that should have beendeclared to the IAEA by Syria
but hadn't been.

(12:56):
Over time we've tried to bolsterthis system and we created
something called the AdditionalProtocol to tighten the system
of safeguards, and states wereencouraged to voluntarily sign
it.
Unfortunately, the additionalprotocol continues to remain
weak.
It's not mandatory.
It's voluntary.

(13:16):
There's also a national securityexception that allows a member
state to say,"Hey, listen.
You know what?
You're going to send yournuclear inspectors in.
We'll let you inspect thesebuildings over here, but these
buildings over here, there's anational security component, and
we can't allow you to look, orthis part of the building is
okay, but this other part is notokay." It's like child's play.

(13:38):
It's crazy that we would havesuch a system.
There's also an inadequacy ofthe IAEA to go in and have
intrusive monitoring of areaswhere nuclear materials haven't
been declared.
Nations do research anddevelopment in other parts away
from their nuclear facilities,where they don't declare those

(14:00):
buildings, and the IAEA shouldbe able to go in even though
those sites are not on the listsof declared nuclear sites.
That kind of power needs to begiven to the IAEA or to a
similar body.
And they also need to be able toconduct far more no notice
inspections.
Until the additional protocol,you had to give a lot of notice

(14:22):
to the country saying,"Hey!We're going to send an
inspector." So guess what theydo?
They play cat and mouse games.
We saw this with Iraq.
Remember the video footage asthe inspectors are arriving
through the front door of thebuilding, and out the back door,
all these trucks and thingsbeing hauled out, files and so
on and material.
that's driving off in thedistance.
That's been tightened to acertain extent.

(14:43):
There are now provisions thatallow for more special
inspections with very shortnotice.
However, unfortunately most ofthe inspections are still
routine inspections where yougive notice and unfortunately
the notice given gives time to acountry that wants to hide
something to hide it.
There's an argument that, theIAEA is very robust because now

(15:05):
they use remote cameras and sothey can monitor stuff that's
going on even if they don't haveinspectors on the ground.
Well, guess what?
Countries that want to hidestuff turn the cameras off.
In fact, in the summer of lastyear, in 2022, Iran announced
that it was turning the camerasoff and did turn it off until

(15:25):
the nuclear deal, the JCPOA, wasrestored.
So again, this is all child'splay.
We need to have a really robustsystem of verifications and
monitoring.
The fourth flaw is the absenceof effective penalties to deter
member states from flouting theNPT rules and to bring them to

(15:46):
heel if they do, and to imposepenalties on them if they do.
What do we do when a nation likeIran turns off its cameras or
fails to provide adequatereasons about why highly
enriched uranium was foundsomewhere where it shouldn't
have been found.
The best that we've been able todo under the current system is
to threaten the breaching partywith a referral to the Security

(16:08):
Council, but these referrals arenot always successful.
For instance, there were threatsto refer North Korea's
activities to the SecurityCouncil, but they went nowhere
because China threatened to vetoit.
All the resolutions that theSecurity Council passed against
Iraq went unheeded.
So even referrals don'tnecessarily lead to any good

(16:31):
results in a change in behavior.
Even if a successful referral ismade, at worst what happens is
the threat of economic anddiplomatic sanctions, rather
than what we need, which iscoercive measures to enforce the
rules and if necessary toreplace the recalcitrant
government with one that'swilling to abide by

(16:51):
international rules and toimpose penalties that bite for
violations that have alreadytaken place.
Withdrawing nations should beheld responsible for violations
they've committed while theywere members of the NPT.
And they should also be requiredto give back all the nuclear
materials, facilities ortechnologies that they were

(17:14):
given for their peaceful use onthe promise that they wouldn't
divert them to military use.
You can see all the many ways inwhich we need to tighten our
system or create a new andbetter one.
The fifth flaw is that therecontinues to be an unresolved
tension between the need ofnations, particularly developing

(17:35):
ones, to have access to peacefulnuclear technology to meet their
growing energy needs on the onehand, and the need of the
international community on theother hand to limit and control
the creation of nuclearfacilities, for fear that they
will be used for militarypurposes and to create nuclear
weapons.

(17:56):
The unfortunate result of thistension is that nations who are
hell bent on developing nuclearweapons can secretly acquire the
materials and expertise to do itunder the cover of overt NPT
members.
And then as they develop theirnuclear capabilities in the
military sense and developnuclear weapons, once they're

(18:16):
ready to weaponize thetechnologies, they then say,
"Hey, you know what?
I want to withdraw." Theproposed solution here is one
that we spent an entire episodediscussing that I would invite
you to revisit or visit for thefirst time if you haven't, and
that is in episode 34 ofReimagining Our World.
It's the creation of a globalenergy authority into whose

(18:39):
hands are pooled all the nuclearfacilities and the material and
so on that allows it to keep acareful watch over what is being
produced, where it's going, forwhat purposes, and to ensure the
elimination of all nuclearweapons.
So I'm not going to spend moretime here.
Please go back and look atepisode 34.

(19:02):
The sixth flaw is that thenuclear weapon states, and this
is a key point, have failed tomake enough progress on nuclear
disarmament.
It was part of the bargain thatthey could continue holding on
to their nuclear weapons for awhile, while they, in good faith
and expeditiously, proceeded toeliminate their nuclear weapons.

(19:23):
In practice, this process hasbeen very slow.
The nuclear weapons states havegrudgingly fulfilled their
disarmament obligations andreduced their stockpiles.
Most of these have come about asa result of bilateral agreements
between two nations, especiallythe U.S.
and the former USSR and now theRussian Federation.

(19:44):
Unfortunately, even thatprogress has stagnated now.
And the only remaining nucleararms control treaty has been
suspended recently by Mr.
Putin, the Russian Federation.
This was the START, the NewSTART Treaty, S T A R T.
The argument made, which isunderstandable, is that the
whole system, the nuclearproliferation system, is

(20:08):
imbalanced and discriminatory.
It raises the principles offairness and oneness that are
not being applied.
Nations who want access tonuclear technology and weapons
say we're being unfairlydeprived.
"You nuclear weapon states getto keep your nuclear weapons and
you get to decide whether we getthem or not.

(20:28):
That's not fair." They want tobe treated as equals, and with
respect.
We saw this especially in thecontext of Pakistan and its top
nuclear scientist basicallyspending years developing secret
nuclear weapons and developingthe bomb for Pakistan, because
he thought that the whole regimewas set up to keep down Islamic

(20:50):
countries and stop them fromgetting the nuclear bomb, and he
wanted his country to be thefirst Islamic state to get one.
It's unfortunate that thisseeming unfairness, this
perceived unfairness is there,and it is unfair.
And the bargain has not beenmade.
So we need to actually create anexpedited timetable for a

(21:11):
phased, verifiable,irreversible, and transparent
nuclear disarmament.
And we also need to make surethat we deal with eliminating
current stockpiles of weapons ofmass destruction, including
nuclear weapons, and make surethat the storage sites around
the world are safe.
We hear many horror storiesabout things disappearing and

(21:32):
thefts occurring.
So that's just way toodangerous.
Terrorists can get their handson these materials and use them
to the detriment of all of us.
The seventh flaw in the NPT andthis is the final one, is the
uneven manner in which the NPThas been applied vis a vis
different nations.
Again, it implicates theprinciples of oneness and

(21:55):
fairness.
These are linchpins of anyviable, healthy system of
international relations.
The way the United States dealtwith India regarding nuclear
issues as compared to itstreatment of Iran and North
Korea is a good example.
Unlike Iran and North Korea,India never signed the NPT, went

(22:17):
ahead and developed nuclearweapons on its own, tested them
in 1976, and then again in 1998.
And even though it snubbed theNPT system for decades, in 2006,
the U.S.
agreed to provide India withcivilian nuclear technology in
exchange for India opening only14 of its 22 facilities to a

(22:38):
form of internationalinspection.
The explanation was,"Oh.
India needs energy, and thatenergy needs to include nuclear
power." But that's what Iran andNorth Korea claim they want as
well.
So why, on what basis is theinternational community
differentiating between India'sneeds for energy and Iran and

(23:00):
North Korea's needs?
These are questions that weshould all be thinking about and
recognizing that if we haverules, they need to be applied
even handedly to all nations.
Okay, in conclusion, it's clearthat the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is one of thebiggest and most existential
threats of our time, right nextto climate change.

(23:23):
Unfortunately, the flaws that wetalked about today, the breaches
in the system, have only servedto heighten tensions and create
suspicion between nations, erodetrust, and engender fear and
counter reactions.
The events have tested themettle of our world leaders,
who've been unable to dealdecisively and effectively to

(23:45):
tackle the problem.
They failed us.
They seem to be utterlyparalyzed.
And this paralysis will continueand the problems will continue
of proliferation until we dealwith them.
The war in Ukraine hasexacerbated the desire for
nuclear weapons.
Many nations feel like,"Oh gosh,maybe if Ukraine had nuclear

(24:05):
weapons, it would never havefound itself in this situation."
That's a bad message.
The breakdown of the Iran dealhas made some Middle Eastern
countries very nervous, andcountries like Saudi Arabia are
trying to find ways of gettingnuclear technology.
North Korea's continuedexperimentation and launching of
missiles is making peoplenervous.

(24:26):
And the tensions over Taiwan andthe Straits of Taiwan are also
making people nervous.
The fact that the U.S.
military and the Chinesemilitary don't have open
channels of communication likethey used to, even though live
fire drills are taking placeclose to Taiwan, is a recipe for
disaster.
And meanwhile, China is tryingto build its nuclear capacity,

(24:50):
and Russia is, according to thelatest news reports, helping it
build a fast breed reactor byproviding it with highly
enriched uranium.
This reactor would createplutonium, and there's only one
use for plutonium, and that'sfor nuclear bombs.
A lot of countries are startingto agitate for their governments
to get nuclear weapons ornuclear technology, which they

(25:13):
can then divert to thedevelopment of nuclear weapons
in this weak system that allowsfor such things.
Our system is broken.
We need to fix it.
If you found this interestingand want to learn more how we
can strengthen our globalnuclear nonproliferation regime,
pick up your digital copy of thebook called Collective Security

(25:37):
Within Reach that's available onAmazon wherever you are.
If you have any thoughts orcomments, please post them on
YouTube or on Facebook and let'shave a conversation.
Please share this video withyour friends, and again, do go
back and watch episode 34, whichis a very concrete solution

(25:57):
that's being offered to a bunchof these challenges, global
challenges.
All right, take care and I'llsee you next month.
That's all for this episode ofReimagining Our World.
I'll see you back here nextmonth.
If you liked this episode,please help us to get the word
out by rating us and subscribingto the program on your favorite

(26:17):
podcast platform.
This series is also available invideo on the YouTube channel of
the Center for Peace and GlobalGovernance, CPGG.