Deep Dive 309 - EEOC in the Trump Era

Shortly after taking office, President Trump reportedly removed two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) commissioners and the general counsel. While this has effectively left the five-member Commission without a quorum, some legal experts have questioned the limits of presidential power to remove officials from agencies like the EEOC. Now operating under Acting Chair Andrea Lucas, the EEOC has shifted its priorities and taken actions in response to President Trump’s executive orders. New priorities include removing gender ideology, protecting women, addressing anti-American bias, and combatting antisemitism in the workplace. The EEOC moved to dismiss several EEOC-initiated claims and lawsuits, alleging discrimination based on gender identity. Acting Chair Lucas sent letters to top law firms requesting information about their DEI-related employment practice.
What are the limits of presidential power over agencies such as the EEOC? What would a lack of quorum mean practically for the Commission, employees and employers, as well as the new direction of the EEOC in the Trump Era? In this webinar, employment law experts will address these questions and more.
Featuring:

Bradford J. Kelley, Shareholder, Littler
Ryan H. Nelson, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston
[Moderator] Eric Dreiband, Partner, Jones Day

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
Regulation after regulation.

Speaker 2 (00:02):
There are pagated regulations that need to be changed.

Speaker 3 (00:05):
One hundred and eighty five thousand pages.

Speaker 1 (00:08):
Our public accountability and transparency. There will be no public supports.

Speaker 4 (00:13):
It's really the best we can do. There's a regulation
that doesn't make any sense.

Speaker 1 (00:16):
Why do you kid you.

Speaker 3 (00:17):
Know who wrote the regulatory laws you must comply with.

Speaker 2 (00:20):
Welcome to the Regulatory Transparency Project's Fourth Branch podcast series.
All expressions of opinion are those.

Speaker 1 (00:27):
Of the speaker.

Speaker 5 (00:32):
Good afternoon, and welcome to today's webinar. My name is
Sarah Bankson and I serve as Deputy director of the
Regulatory Transparency Project at the Federal Society. We are honored
to host today's discussion on the EEOC and the Trump era.
Please note that the views express during this program are
those of the speakers and not the Society. Following the discussion,

(00:53):
we will open the floor to audience questions. You can
submit your questions at any time using the Q and
a function at the bottom of your zoom window. It
is now my pleasure to introduce our moderator, Eric driveband
partner at Jones Day. Eric formerly served as Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Rights Division at the Department of
Justice and as General Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

(01:17):
Thank you so much for being with us today. Eric.
To learn more about today's speakers, I invite you to
view their full biographies at regproject dot org. Thank you
once again for joining us and Eric. The Flora is yours.

Speaker 1 (01:30):
Thank you, Sarah, and thank you everyone for taking the
time to join us today. I'm delighted to introduce our
two principal speakers, first, Professor Ryan Nelson. Professor Nelson joined
the faculty at the Southwest South Texas College of Law
in Houston in twenty twenty one. His research focuses on

(01:51):
leveraging the civil litigation and other dispute resolution systems to
advance the rights of poor and other marginalized workers, often
with respect to discrimination, harassment, wages, leaves of absence, and accommodations.
Professor Nelson is widely published and has been published or
it will be publishing articles in such distinguished journals as

(02:14):
The Mission and Law Review, the Fordham Law Review, the
BYU Law Review, Yale Law and Policy Review, and online
companions to the NYU Law Review, the California Law Review,
and the Vanderbilt Law Review. Before before he joined South Texas,
Professor Nelson completed a research fellowship with the Harvard Law

(02:34):
School Project on Disability and taught on the adjunct faculty
at the Boston University School of Law, New England Law Boston,
and New York Law School. He also spent nearly a
decade practicing labor and employment law in pluting as an
in house employment law council for one of the world's
largest financial services companies and as an attorney with one

(02:56):
of the top labor and employment law firms in the country.
Professor Nelson obtained his llm degree from the Harvard Law School,
where he was awarded the Irving Oberman Memorial Prize for
Best Paper on Law and Social Change. He obtained his
law degree with honors cum laude from the Benjamin N.
Cardoza School of Law, Shiva University, where he served on

(03:18):
the editorial board of the Moot Court Honor Society, and
his undergraduate degree in economics from the University of Florida,
where he was a National Merit Scholar and became an
avid fan of Florida Gators football. Excuse. Bradford J. Kelly
is a shareholder in the law firm of Lettler in
the Washington d C. Office. He has a broad practice

(03:40):
representing employers and employment anti discrimination at wage and hour matters,
and he is an internationally recognized workplace AI or Artificial
intelligence authority. Brad has published numerous articles about workplace AI
and was also served as chief counsel to Equal Employment
Opportunity Commissioner Keith Soundraling at the EEOC, where his portfolio

(04:04):
included cases and policies regulations about Title seven of the
Civil Rights Act and several other federal anti discrimination laws
enforced by the EEOC. He was also a key advisor
to Commissioner Sounduling regarding the eeoc's initiative on artificial intelligence
and algorithmic fairness, and Brad received the EOC Chairs Circle

(04:27):
of Excellence Awards for his extraordinary commitment to the agency.
This is one of the highest honors conferred within the commission.
In addition, Brad service on Law three sixties Employment Discrimination
Editorial Board, a role that he's had since twenty twenty two,
and to round it out, he served it also as
a senior policy advisor with the Wage and Hour Division
of the US Department of Labor. So we have a

(04:50):
very distinguished Handel, Brad, I'll start with you, Brad. What
is the EOC, who are its members and how are
they appointed?

Speaker 6 (04:58):
Thanks a lot, Eric, I'm really excited to be here
today and to engage this discussion. I think it's a
very important topic. But to start off to kind of
establish a baseline, what is the EOC.

Speaker 1 (05:08):
So.

Speaker 6 (05:09):
The EOC is the federal agency responsible for enforcing workplace
anti discrimination laws in the United States. The UC was
established by the Civil Rights Act of nineteen sixty four,
Title seven, and the mission of the EOC is to
prevent in remedy unlawful employment discrimination in advance equal opportunity
for all in the workplace. Now, the EOC enforces a

(05:29):
wide variety of federal laws the prohibit employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age for workers
forty and older, disability, and genetic information. The UC is
comprised of five commissioners in one General Council, all appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. One commissioner

(05:50):
is designated by the President to serve as Chair or
acting Chair. Title seven also states that three commissioners constitute
a quorum at the agency, and as of January January
twenty eighth of twenty twenty five, the commission has two
commissioners and thus no longer has a quorum. Commissioners at
the UC serve staggered five year terms, with no more

(06:11):
than three belonging to the same political party. The Chair
of the UC has a lot of administrative power and
is responsible for overall policy direction. The Vice Chair and
other commissioners participate in decision making on enforcement and policy matters. Currently,
the UC has an acting Chair, Andrea Lucas, and one
Democratic Commissioner, Kalpona Catagel. The UC's General Council directs the

(06:34):
UC's litigation program. It ensures coordination between legal and enforcement strategies.
Currently Andy Rogers is serving as the acting General Council
of the agency. Now, the UC's main responsibilities include a
wide variety of aspects, such as investigating complaints of discrimination
filed by employees or job applicants, Mediating and resolving disputes

(06:55):
between employers and complainants when possible, Litigating cases in court
when violations are found and not resolved, Issuing guidance and
regulations to help employers comply with the law, Conducting outreach
and education to increase awareness of rights and responsibilities in
the workplace, also monitoring workplace data and identify and track

(07:17):
different issues across that data. That's kind of a high
level overview of the UC that hopefully we'll be able
to kind of guide our discussion from here.

Speaker 1 (07:26):
Okay, Professor Nelson, would you like to add or dispute
anything we just heard from Brad?

Speaker 3 (07:32):
Sure, thank you so much for having me. I don't
dispute anything Brad just said. It sounds all accurate to me.
I'll tell you all. My view was that from when
President Trump dismissed well I should I guess. Let me
give some context. So President Trump dismissed two commissioners in
late January, Commissioner Samuels and Burroughs, and from the time

(07:56):
that he announced that dismissal until about two weeks ago,
my view is that those dismissals were unlawful and that
the EEOC was what we would call an independent exec
independent agency as contrast from an executive agency. This harkens
back to the long line of cases we've had for
about one hundred years now that distinguished between an executive

(08:19):
agency under which the president has really an unfettered right
to remove regardless of any statutory limits as contrast from
an independent agency where the president's right to remove a
principal officer can be restricted statutorily by Congress. And my
view until May twenty second, So like two weeks ago,

(08:40):
I was that the EEOC was an independent agency, and
I had developed that view based on the eeoc's quasi
judicial and quasi legislative functions. So the EEOC lacks really
what I would call it strong judicial or strong legislative role,
but it does have quasi roles in those areas. So,

(09:03):
for example, the EEOC does not adjudicate the vast majority
of charges of discrimination the way we typically think of adjudication. However,
they do adjudicate charges made by federal employees. There is
some adjudicatory role. And similarly, on the legislative side, you

(09:23):
typically think of an agency engaging in legislation if they're
promulgating regulations that carry the force of law. The big
statute that the EEOC administers it's Title seven, at least
in my view, and the EEOC cannot propagate any regulations
that carry the force of law under Title seven, but
it can under a bunch of other statutes. So the

(09:45):
Age Discrimination Employment Act the Americans with Disabilities Act GENA,
the Genetic Information Non Discrimination Act, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.
The EEOC has a lot of what I would call
legislative authority in those areas. So my view leading up
until two weeks ago was that those non executive functions

(10:08):
of the EEOC, in addition, I guess, combined with its
power as an agency. Where there are these five commissioners,
as Brad described, there is a partisan a non partisan
balance between them.

Speaker 4 (10:23):
Usually it's three and two.

Speaker 3 (10:26):
This is separate from the sort of executive agencies that
the Supreme Court is pretty firmly confirmed the president has
an unfettered right to remove That.

Speaker 4 (10:39):
Changed two weeks ago.

Speaker 3 (10:40):
So two weeks ago, the Supreme Court stayed a lower
court opinion in a case called Trump versus Wilcox. In Wilcox,
there was a NLRB and MSPB different agency members were
challenging their removals by the President, alleging that they are

(11:00):
protected from removal by operation of statute.

Speaker 4 (11:04):
The Supreme Court, in a shadow docked.

Speaker 3 (11:07):
Opinion we have not yet had merits briefing, stayed a
lower court case there and the exact language that befuddled me,
But is law now, is that there is a high
likelihood or a likelihood that these agencies, the NLRB and
the MSPB are executive and therefore that the President can

(11:32):
remove their principal officers at will. The Supreme Court did
not give us any reasoning for its conclusion, but assuming
that is the law, and further assuming that they don't
change that view upon further merits briefing, which will be forthcoming,
I see no material light between those agencies and the EEOC.

(11:55):
Certainly nothing that would justify saying that the eocs independent
didn't the likes of which I thought it was until.

Speaker 4 (12:02):
Two weeks ago.

Speaker 3 (12:03):
So I think the import of that, building off of
what Brad was saying, is that I think this Supreme.

Speaker 4 (12:09):
Court will uphold the removals of EEOC commissioners Samuel's and Burrows.
Samuels has challenged.

Speaker 3 (12:18):
Her removal, to my knowledge, I don't believe Burrows has
filed anything that I've seen yet challenging her removal. If
I don't think those challenges will go anywhere. And I
think the import of that is that if this ever
climbs up to the US Supreme Court, I think they
will find that the EOC is an executive agency that

(12:39):
the president can remove the commissioners and the General Council
at will. It is worth saying we technically don't have
confirmation of that, but I don't see any way around
it after this stay in the Willcocks case.

Speaker 1 (12:53):
Thank you, Carser, Nelson brad Any thoughts.

Speaker 6 (12:56):
Yeah, I'll just add kind of taking a step back
here out this debate over whether these agencies or executive
agencies versus independent I think it's really important to keep
in mind that, as I mentioned before in the overview,
that the president appoints all five members of the UC
and the president you know, are appointed by the president
and confirmed by the Senate.

Speaker 4 (13:17):
There's a lot of executive control. I was the political.

Speaker 6 (13:20):
Appointee in the first Trump administration, and I was a
holdover in the Biden administration, and seeing the you know,
seeing the transition from one presidential administration to the next,
especially with a change of parties, you see how much power,
you know, these the presidents have over these agencies, and
you know they're they're appointed by the president, confirmed by

(13:40):
the Senate. But the chair of the UC, who's able
to be appointed you know, by the president, has a
lot of administrative power and has a lot of ability
to kind of set policy direction and enforcement priorities. And
I think it's just really important to stress how much
influence that executive control has and that executive power, and
I think that it really does. I feel as if

(14:02):
you know that definitely, it's evolved to a point where
you know these are executive agencies. I think, especially having
served an administration, seeing you know the changes there, I
feel very strongly that you know, you can't I don't
see how these are non executive agencies at this point.

Speaker 3 (14:20):
Professor Nelson, Well, I agree for the past week and
a half. I mean, I think it's inescapable now, but
I was not convinced of that based on the operations
of the agency prior to the Wilcox opinion. For example,
the EEOC can choose whether or not to bring litigation

(14:42):
without having to get approval from anybody else in the
executive branch. The EEOC can choose to issue guidance or
promagate these regulations under non Title seven statutes without getting
approval from anyone in the executive branch. So my view
had been this is pretty darn close to what independence
looks like, and barring the Supreme or giving further guidance
delineating between executive versus and premient agencies. It looked rather independent,

(15:05):
but now we have a one sentence throwaway in a
shadow doct ruling telling us otherwise.

Speaker 4 (15:11):
I think I got to defer to that.

Speaker 6 (15:12):
Well, Rian, I'd like to ask, because one thing that
I feel like looking at is that you know, as
far as the debate between independent versus executive agencies, is
that the will of the people. You know, if you're
if you're not happy with the current administration, you're like, oh,
you know, President Biden campaign to be the most pro
union president and he you know, largely was. And if
you say you want to reject that, the voters rejected that,

(15:34):
and you're saying that if an agency is independent, then
it doesn't matter what those voters elected. So I think
that that's an important kind of part to kind of
way is that I feel as if you know that
even if you're not happy with the direction of the
EOC or the NRB, you go to the ballot box
and you say, what we want a new administration. And
I think that if you're saying that, if it's an

(15:55):
independent agency, you're saying that has no impact that that
doesn't matter, and I feel like that's the reason that
I feel like looking at these agencies, elections do have consequences.
You can reject the agenda of the current president and
allow a new slate. And I think, especially now with
a lot of the agencies partnering with other executive agencies,
including the Department of Justice, I don't see you could

(16:18):
break it away and say these are independent agencies.

Speaker 3 (16:22):
I mean, I'm with you now, but I think the
reason I'm with you is because that I mean, the
will of the people is sure, it's absolutely seen through
election to the president, but it's also seen the election
of Congress, right. I mean, we've got Article one for
a reason.

Speaker 4 (16:37):
It's first. And if Article one puts restraints on independent agencies,
I mean my view would be to defer to that.
And I guess to have a less robust.

Speaker 3 (16:49):
View of of the independent executive theory, or one flavor
I should say of that theory.

Speaker 1 (16:56):
The Professor Nelson, you mentioned the will cons case, and
I do want to ask about your views of the
fact that the National Labor Relations Act, which is a
relevant statute in former member or former current how are
you want to look at a member. Willcox's case, that
statute does at least provide limitations on the president's authority

(17:19):
to remove board members. The statute that creates commissioner and
positions at the EOC, Title seven, as you know, does
not have any protections like that against removal. Does that
matter from your point of view with respect to the
president's authority to remove commissioners?

Speaker 3 (17:36):
Yeah, it's interesting, So I think the best answer is
probably not, but it's worthy of a little bit of
discussion and be interested if Brad degrees or disagrees with this.
So the general standard that Congress usually adopts whatever it
puts in place restrictions on an independent agency's removal as
the I and M standard, right, so inefficiency, neglective duty

(17:56):
or malth usits I am and yes, their differences, but
that's pretty basic.

Speaker 4 (18:04):
I haven't looked at the NLRAA.

Speaker 3 (18:05):
For a bit, but I would be reasonably confident that
it matches the I in M standard or something materially identical.
That said, to Error's point, Title seven doesn't have anything
like that, So it begs the question, Okay, are these
just once they're appointed? No one can ever remove them forever?
It always seems rather ridiculous. What I probably draw the

(18:27):
closest parallel would be, let's say a private employment contract
that guarantees you a term of employment for a year
but doesn't specify how you can terminate the individual. In
most states, I mean, certainly my state of Texas. If
there's a contract like that, what's read in is a
just cause standard. So I would presumably read in some

(18:50):
form of just cause standard when there is silence in
the case of Title seven.

Speaker 4 (18:54):
That's a good example. And Brad, what are your thoughts?

Speaker 6 (18:57):
Yeah, I generally agree, I mean, I like, I mean,
as far as the Texas point, I mean, I thought
it was mainly kind of employment and will for you
know most of that, But I mean, I guess reading
into it. But I do think that you know, again,
for if you even want to look to cause, I
mean again going back to the elections have consequences, I
do think that you could say that, you know, the
will of the people is caused for you know, the

(19:19):
executive power there. So I do think you can look
to the idea that elections do have consequences.

Speaker 4 (19:27):
Yeah, I just don't agree with that part.

Speaker 3 (19:29):
I just think I mean, to give further example, so
it's not just President Trump that has been removing office
of President Biden allegedly did the same thing, right, I mean,
he he purported to remove the General Council.

Speaker 4 (19:41):
Of the EOC.

Speaker 3 (19:42):
I thought that that was unlawful. I think that the
President Trump's doing the same thing. Well, I should say,
before two weeks ago, I believed that to be unlawful.
Now I believe that that is lawful, and the Supreme
Court would say the same.

Speaker 6 (19:55):
Well, right, I think that that's a very good point
that you know, for historically, I mean President Biden not
only fired the EUC General Council Sharon Guvsterson, but he
also fired the General Council of the NRB when he
came in. And I you know, even as far as
the you know Bruso being fired at the n RB
by at the beginning of the Trump administration, they're going
to use the same arguments that were raised by you

(20:17):
know NRB a General Council of Bruso when she was terminated.
So I feel like that's the And I think it's
an interesting question where you know, you're seeing this back
and forth now with you know, there's usually a labor
and employment law, there's this ping pong effect that with
Republican administrations it's very pro employer and then during democratic
administrations it's more pro employee slash union. And you know,

(20:40):
so I feel like, where is that ping pong effect
going to go next? I feel like that's a very
interesting question as well. I don't know the answer to that, and.

Speaker 1 (20:50):
I'd like it to shift a little bit, but real quickly,
I'm gonna turn it back to you, But I do
want to say whatever you want. But I do want
to raise an issue about guy and websites. That is
the eeoc IS issue and guidance without a quorum District
Court in Texas and joined the Commission's harassment guidance. Could

(21:12):
you just speak to that, But again, if you want
to speak to this executive agency issue too, and then
maybe seguay to that next issue.

Speaker 3 (21:19):
We totally I don't have anything new to say about
the agencies. The only thing I would note for the
audience is that the President has nominated enough commissioners now
that if they're confirmed by the Senate, we will have
a quorum. So the president is renominated acting Chair Lucas
and the President is nominated. I don't know if I'm
pronouncing the last name Pnuccio Panugio of Brittney panuc Gio

(21:41):
to serve as one of the other commissioners. So, assuming
Senate confirmation, we would then have three out of the five,
and we would have indisputably a quorum. I should add
for any ad and then I'll move on to your question, Eric,
for any admin lownd Nerds. Prior to two weeks ago,
not only did I think it would have and unlawful
for the President to have removed the commissioners, but I

(22:03):
further thought that one of the remedies would be a
declaratory judgment that they had never been lawfully removed at all,
and that my view until the two weeks ago was
that the EOC actually never lost korum, and that there
have been four sitting members the entire time. I do
parallels to some colleagues of mine saying if the President
had tweeted or truth that I hereby remove a member

(22:25):
of Congress, we wouldn't bat an eye.

Speaker 4 (22:28):
Would say no, no, They're still in their office.

Speaker 3 (22:31):
And similarly, here if this is unlawful, similarly they're still
in their office. But that said, I think all of
that has moved in much more theoretical at this point,
because my view is currently that the EOC is an
executive agency. So to turn to Eric's question about guidance, So.

Speaker 4 (22:48):
The EOC is rather peculiar for a number of reasons.

Speaker 3 (22:53):
But one of the reasons is the sub regulatory website
guidance that it promulgates. I mentioned this earlier, and I
don't think there's dispute on this point that under Title seven,
EEOC does not have congressional authority to promulgate regulations to
carry the force of law.

Speaker 4 (23:13):
Based on that premise, it has always.

Speaker 3 (23:15):
Been utterly bizarre to me that the EEOC publishes what
it would call technical guidance. And to be fair, the
statute does direct the EOC to promulgate technical guidance, but
I think they have gone.

Speaker 4 (23:27):
Quite a bit further than that.

Speaker 3 (23:29):
And this is not a feature of in my view,
not a feature of a democratic or republican administration.

Speaker 4 (23:34):
This is just something the.

Speaker 3 (23:36):
EOC has done for a long time, which is we
created these websites that read as if the EOC is
legislating when Congress is not given it that authority. So
Eric mentioned one example was that under the Biden administration,
the EEOC promulgated guidance about workplace for harassment. This is

(24:00):
the first time in quite some time that they did so.
One of the aspects of the new workplace harassment guidance
was to incorporate the Supreme Court's opinion in boss Stock
versus Clayton County, which held its sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination constitute sex discrimination under Title seven. Just a

(24:20):
couple of weeks ago, a district court here in Texas
enjoy Well vacated, I should say vacated those portions of
the eeoc's guidance, and I think it's fair to say
those portions are not law. What's bizarre to me is
that I kind of see these guidance in shrug and

(24:42):
I'm like, okay, or is it's not law?

Speaker 1 (24:44):
Anyway?

Speaker 3 (24:45):
So, whenever I wassed in private sector and I advised
my employer clients on any of these guidance, if they'd
come to me and say, the website says X, Y
and Z, what should we do about it? I would say, well,
I think it's predictive, but not restrictive. I think it
is predictive in this sensitive predicts what position the EEOC
will take if you have a charge or if you've
got a litigation, even though those are few and far between.

(25:07):
But I do not view the eeoc's guidance. It certainly
did not carry the force of law even pre Lobrabright
and now post Lobobright, I certainly don't think this website
guidance is that significant. It is interesting that the EUC
has published some I wouldn't call it that party of guidance,

(25:31):
but they've published like an FAQ, for example, in the
past couple months, which is weird because the EUOC doesn't
have forum to do anything, so I don't really understand
who is directing them to publish websites. But nonetheless, my
view is to take any of those website guidance with
a very large grain of salt, because I don't view
them as that significant.

Speaker 1 (25:52):
Professor Nelson, if I can just follow up and then
brand will come to you, are you referring with your
with you remarked only to title seven guidance, Are you
frying two guides of any standard? If you could just
elaborate briefly on.

Speaker 3 (26:06):
That, Yes, thank you for the clarification opportunity. Yes, only
with respect to his title seven. So with respect to
statutes like the ADA Title one of the ADA, GINA,
the PWFA, the EEOC does have congressional authority to promulgate
regulations that carry the force of law. Those are something

(26:29):
that you should pay quite a good deal of attention
to because they are law. In contrast, if you see
website guidance that purports to delineate issues regarding race, color,
national origin, sex, or religion the five bases of antidiscrimination
outlined in Title seven, the EOC does not have the
authority to promulgate regulations that carry the force of law

(26:51):
with respect to Title seven only.

Speaker 6 (26:54):
Thank you, Brad thought, Yeah, I think I'll just add
here that you know, from as a I have a practitioner,
someone who spends a lot of time advising clients, is
that sometimes the guidance is useful in providing something, just
as far as where the EUC stands. I mean, the
EUC just recently put out guidance on DEI I thought
was incredibly helpful. So I do think that, and I

(27:16):
do agree that it's at least to show what the
eoc's position would be and how the EUC would respond.
And I think that a lot of the guidance when
I was at the EUC. We put out religious discrimination updates,
and you know, there had been a lot of significant
decisions on religious issues, including the ministerial exception after the r.
Lady of Guadaloupe case, and we took you know, there

(27:37):
was a lot of even for the religious guidance we
put out, it was subject to notice in comment, and
we got a lot of very useful comments from you
a whole host of nonprofits, employers, employee groups, and so forth,
and it was able to provide we were able to
provide enhance guidance. We were able to take the comments
and say, well, this is the feedback we're getting. And
I do think it is useful. I do think that

(27:59):
there's a lot of guidance documents that at least help
provide employers with the idea of what the EOC is
looking for, what right looks like and what wrong looks like.
So I do think there's a lot of value in
having that guidance. And you know, especially when there's different
hearings held and noticed in comment, I think that could
really be helpful. And I do a lot of artificial intelligence,

(28:21):
and you know, in the age of AI, there's so
many questions from employers about the use of AI tools
and the hiring process, and guidance can be helpful, and
I do think that it's it's important for these agencies
to try to help employers and employees, unions, et cetera,
you know, provide some sort of answers to these questions
that are out there.

Speaker 1 (28:43):
And Brad is there's some issue you mentioned AI and guidances,
some issue about revocation of the eoc's artificial intelligence guidance.

Speaker 6 (28:52):
Well, all the eoc's AI guidance has been pulled from
the website at this point, and I do think that,
you know, it's you know, so there is some guidance
out there on artificial intelligence in the workplace, but a
lot of the best guidance out there is, you know,
making sure that you imply you comply with existing law,
don't you know, make sure that if AI tools are

(29:14):
being used to screen out applicants on the basis of
disability or race, for example, that that would be in
violation of Title seven and the ADA. So I think
it's important to really focus on how these new tools
fall within and you know, the application of existing law
to those new tools. So I do think I'm hopeful

(29:35):
that the EOC will put out new guidance, and Department
of Labor will put out new guidance as well. Just today,
the US Department of Labor announced that they're going to
be restarting the opinion letter process, so they're going to
be taking in questions from the public and issuing opinion letters.
And I'm hopeful that they'll issue opinion letters on artificial
intelligence how to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act,

(29:58):
for example, with if you're using AI tools for compensation decisions.
I think that would be particularly helpful. So I think
that there's ways for the government to look for just
providing additional guidance in a whole host of areas.

Speaker 4 (30:13):
Okay, I largely I think I agree on.

Speaker 3 (30:17):
The only quibble that I have is I completely agree
with Brad that the guidance is helpful. But like if
I wrote a really in depth law review article of
pining on what I believe Title seven says, that would
be helpful, and if I had a megaphone, it might
be as helpful as the eocs. But you know, Congress
gave me and the eeo C equal authority to interpret

(30:40):
Title seven, which is none so so like yes, it's helpful,
but like I just don't. I think there is a
fine line the EUOC has to walk between issuing the
statutorily mandated technical guidance versus what I would view as
sort of legislating and adding in helpful but congressionally not

(31:02):
approved sub regulatory websites.

Speaker 1 (31:08):
Professor Nelson, could you be you say that you're the
same authority? I mean? Title seven does contain a provision
that authorizes the regulated parties to rely on written interpretations
and instructions of the EFC under Section seven thirteen of
Title seven and to avoid liability if they do so.

(31:30):
Is that any kind of a grant of regulatory authority
that matters? So?

Speaker 3 (31:35):
I don't think so well for two reasons. So one
is that section seven thirteen only permits instructions that you
rely on instructions of the Commission, and if the Commission
lacks quorum, I don't think you can qualify that as
being an instruction of the Commission. Similarly, the formal guidance

(31:56):
documents that the EOC promulgates, for example, the harassment are
subject to a Commission vote, right, so you can say
that this is an instruction of the Commission. But not
everything goes through that level of rigor, so there is
a chance that some of the even lesser websites, the
subregulatory guidance still.

Speaker 4 (32:15):
Not something that you can rely on. And I think
even if even if you surmount those hurdles, you're still
going to run into the Supreme Court where it is
just pretty flatly said that Congress has not authorized the
EUC to promulgate regulations to carry the force of law
under Title seven.

Speaker 1 (32:33):
Okay, thank you. I want to shift a little bit
now to charges and investigations, and Brad, could you speak
to how does the statue the statues the EOC and
forces can respect the charges, whether the public or not,
whether the Commission can publicize them, who can file them,
sub pain of power, things like that.

Speaker 6 (32:54):
Yeah, so kind of most basic kind of function of
the UC is when somebody files a charge with the agents,
so they're ledging discrimination and you have to fill out
a charge statement which includes, you know, what's the basis
for this?

Speaker 1 (33:07):
Is it?

Speaker 4 (33:07):
You know, does this fall under Title seven?

Speaker 6 (33:10):
Is it under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination
Employment Act? And then the EOC from that point, will
you know, provide the employer with the opportunity to provide
a position statement, and there's all sorts of confidentiality protections
during the investigation process. But there's also the ability for commissioners,

(33:30):
so the five commissioners on the EOC, to issue what's
known as commissioner charges, and that's where it essentially means
that a EUC commissioner could say that there is a
basis to believe that there may be a violation of
one of the Equal employment Opportunity laws, and it kind
of serves as the same purpose as a individual filing

(33:51):
a charge with the EOC, And that's kind of a
high level overview of, you know, the kind of process
that it takes place. And then the commit charge will
go through the standard practice of you know, the way
that a charge is filed by an individual. There's oftentimes
there's requests from information and if the request for information
could lead to a subpoena, oftentimes there will be a

(34:14):
h there'll be a deficiency letter before subpoena is issued.
And that's just kind of a high level view of
the process involved.

Speaker 1 (34:23):
Professor Nelson and thoughts.

Speaker 4 (34:25):
Yeah, I agree with all of that.

Speaker 3 (34:27):
I think what makes the most sense to think of
this is that the sort of investigatory authority that the
agency has, which includes subpoena power, is always downwind of
a charge. So there has to be a charge first
for the EOC to have statutorily authorized investigative authority, and
that charge is, like Brad said, almost always it's a

(34:49):
charge by a person claiming to be aggrieved, which is
usually a former, current, or potential employee. However, it can
be a commissioner's charge, and something to kind of underscore here,
it is a commissioner's charge, it's not the commission's charge.
So any commissioner can file a charge under penalty of

(35:11):
surgery that the statute has been violated, then an investigation
can commence. I raised this because I'm sure a lot
of folks in this audience have probably seen that Acting
Chair Lucas sent letters to about twenty large law firms
in the country that alleged that there was suspicion that

(35:35):
the law firm had violated Title seven, and she had
requested that the firm provide a bunch of information to
any EEOC email address. So I think this is a
good way to examine the agency's power. So at the
time she sent this, the agency lacked qorn, and that said,

(35:59):
there's nothing that could stopped her from being a commissioner
from filing commissioner's charge against these law firms. However, none
have been publicized. As Brad mentioned, it's unlawful to a
crime for any officer or employee of the EEOC to
publicize a charge. However, that does not apply outside of

(36:20):
the EOC. So, for example, if you're the recipient of
a charge of discrimination, you're welcome to publicize it, but
we have no knowledge that these law firms were recipients
of charges of discrimination. My view, however, is that I
found the letters to be imprudent. I did not find
them to be appropriate, but I did not find them.

Speaker 4 (36:42):
To be unlawful either.

Speaker 3 (36:44):
In my view, Acting Terry Lucas has her First Amendment
right to speak. I see nothing wrong with writing a letter,
or for that matter, going on the news, going on
social media app and saying I have the following suspicions
based on public information. I hereby request that employers send
me information so I can further vet this. Her letter

(37:07):
did not purport to come. These letters did not purport
to come for the entire agency. They specifically said it
was from the office of the Acting Chair. She did
not purport to cite any statutory authority for what she
was doing. I see no problem with it. I should add,
by the way, however, that my view is that therefore
this was not an investigation of the EOC, and it

(37:31):
is investigations that are protected from public disclosure. So I
have a pending Foyer request for all emails sent to
or received by that EEOC email address. I am interested
to see what the result is because if the opposition
is that we don't publicize investigations pursued to charges, that

(37:52):
would surprise me because I'm not aware of charges being
filed prior to sending themse letters.

Speaker 1 (37:58):
Can I I just want to follow up, thank you
for that. First of all, I could just two questions
related to these letters. One, you mentioned that Acting Chair
Lucas was exercising your First Amendment rights. Uh, if you
could explain, I'm not sure how federal government has First

(38:19):
Amendment rights, and I'd be curious to hear your thoughts.

Speaker 4 (38:21):
Yeah, you know, you're probably right.

Speaker 1 (38:24):
Secondly, then secondly, the title seven and I think uh,
E is these procedural regulations which are the commission issue
pursuing to the grant of statutory authority that you mentioned
at the Title seven uh detail uh the enumerated procedures

(38:46):
that the Commission says in its regulations that it will
follow to enforce Title seven. And as you noted that
those letters did not sign any statute, they didn't sign
anything from the regulations either that that would authorize them.
And so is your position that they're lawful because they

(39:08):
were just kind of informal letters that had nothing to
do with Title seven enforcement, or that they are a
mechanism by which the Acting Chair can enforce or seek
to enforce Title seven.

Speaker 4 (39:23):
I think my view is closest to the former of
those two options.

Speaker 3 (39:26):
To clarify, my view is that this was not an
investigation under Title seven.

Speaker 4 (39:31):
I mean it sounds to me, and keep me honest if.

Speaker 3 (39:33):
You disagree, but it sounds like your view sounds like
an expressio unius type of argument, right that, like the
statute provides X, Y, and Z, and what Lucas has
done is some other letter and therefore not permitted by
the statute.

Speaker 4 (39:46):
I don't read the statutes that way. There I see nothing.

Speaker 1 (39:48):
It's not the regulations though, I mean the regulation say
that the Commission will enforce Title seven by following the
enumerated proceed and the SUS regulations. And that's it. I mean,
so the Commission essentially has found itself to certain procedural
requirements that are enumerated in the regulations and has announced

(40:11):
to the public through noticing comment rulemaking that these are
the exclusive procedures by which the Commission will enforced Title seven.
So then that leaves the question of these letters may
not be enforcing Title seven but doing something else or
what's you're viewing on?

Speaker 3 (40:26):
Yeah, certainly something else. I mean, it's not a Title
seven investigation. It's I mean, the Commission isn't acting. We
even had a commission for a couple of months, so
I it's certainly not a pursuant to the Commission's regulations
that you mentioned.

Speaker 4 (40:38):
I don't I view this.

Speaker 3 (40:40):
As closest to a commissioner going on TV and saying
I heard something about an employer acting unlawfully. Here's how
you can get me information again, imprudent. I didn't think
it was appropriate, and I would go further. I think that,
for example, some of the the evidence cited in the

(41:00):
letters I found quite repugnant and not reflective of potential
Title seven violations. They cited law firms websites as having
too many students of color posted on them.

Speaker 4 (41:13):
I was shocked by.

Speaker 3 (41:14):
Some things in these letters. I found them absolutely disgraceful.
But I I see nothing in either the statutes or,
to your point, the regulations that would cross the barrier
into the lawful BRAT.

Speaker 6 (41:25):
But yeah, I think it's I think that I I
don't have much to add. I think that you know,
it's a request, it's you know, from that, and I, yeah,
I think that, yeah, I have nothing to add to
those points. I think that you know, you could there's
two very good arguments to involve there as far as
you know, for both for and against. And yeah, that's

(41:47):
I have nothing more to add.

Speaker 3 (41:48):
Actually, can I can I wait one quick note because
that made me think of something that where I suspect
we'd be aligned.

Speaker 4 (41:53):
But keep me honest, of course, brat enter.

Speaker 3 (41:55):
If I represented an employer that received a letter similar
to this, I think think my advice to them would be, look,
I see nothing in the statute that compels you to respond,
But I also think you should play nice with your regulator.
And I think that I would not be silent. I
would not go to the agency. I would respond with
respect if that includes providing any documents that are requested

(42:18):
as a way of trying to stave off a potential
commissioner's charge and a follow up investigation with subpoena power.
I certainly think that is a reasonable risk mitigation technique
that an employer might undergo.

Speaker 6 (42:30):
Yeah, and I have no issue with that. I think
you know that that sounds aligned with the advice that
I would give.

Speaker 1 (42:38):
Let me ask Professor Nelson and brand Awa at your
take on there was a recent report that Acting Chair
Lucas filed a commissioner's charge about certain practices at Harvard University,
and so I really would appreciate number one, your thoughts
about the fact that that charge is public. It's not

(42:59):
I don't know who made it public, but it is public.
How did that happen if there are these penalties, including
criminal penalties for publication? And secondly, your thoughts generally about
the charm. So we'll start maybe professing else with you
then brag get your thoughts on that.

Speaker 3 (43:14):
Sure, I thought it was a fairly standard commissioner's charge.
I guess starting with the public the publicity aspect. I
have no reason to suspect that anyone at the EOC
publicized this. I have no knowledge, and if it was
anyone on the receiving end of Harvard who chose to
publicize it, there's nothing unlawful about doing so. In terms

(43:35):
of the content, I thought it was fairly.

Speaker 4 (43:40):
Usual.

Speaker 3 (43:41):
The only thing that kind of struck me as a
little odd is and this is something the agency does
all the time, so I wouldn't say it's it's that
odd is citing current demographics like a static picture of
the workforce of Harvard, as evidence of their payroll or
their practices. So like we suspect the fact that you
have x percent people of a certain race is predictive

(44:06):
or indicative of your hiring practices or any of your
other personnel practices. I've always tried to convince the agency
that those are just very different worlds, That one is
a static view, one is dynamic. One does not necessarily
talk to the other. So I didn't view that evidence
in the Harvard Commissioner's charge is compelling at all.

Speaker 4 (44:28):
But I guess from here we kind of wait to
see what happens.

Speaker 3 (44:31):
The EEOC can choose to litigate this I guess to
build on our earlier discussion of the eoc's powers within
without quorum, So the EOC has delegated its litigation authority
in large part to its General Council, but not entirely.
So if the EOC decides that this Harvard case, or

(44:52):
really any other case, any other charge is indicative of
a pattern of practice discrimination, systemic discrimination, anything that's just
going to cost the agency a whole bunch of money.

Speaker 4 (45:03):
It's really for the EEOC to.

Speaker 3 (45:05):
Decide whether or not to initiate litigation and then lessen
until it has coreum.

Speaker 4 (45:09):
It lacks that authority.

Speaker 3 (45:11):
However, if this is something that's more of a run
of the mill case, not systemic discrimination, then the GC
has the authority to bring litigation.

Speaker 4 (45:20):
So we may.

Speaker 3 (45:22):
See litigation here kind of depending on the acting GC's
view of this case.

Speaker 6 (45:28):
Brad Any thought, I think one other thing I'll add
to that is just the executive order that the Trump
administration on disparate impact. You know, there's two theories of
discrimination in employment discrimination law. It's disparate treatment, which means
it's intentional discrimination, and disparate impact, which it means unintentional.
And the Trump Administration's executive Order directed the EOC to you, basically,

(45:53):
the EOC, FTC and a number of other agencies that
there will not be a pursuit of cases involving disparate
impact theory. And I think it's going to be interesting
to see how that impacts investigations, including in the DEI space.
And I think that's something that you know, just to
kind of keep our eye on where that's going to go.
And I speak about artificial intelligence earlier. I think that

(46:14):
it's going to definitely impact the UC's view of artificial intelligence.
In most cases, the use of AI tools, if they're
possibly screening out people on the basis of race or gender,
et cetera, most of that time it's going to be
a disparate impact theory. So I do think that executive
order is going to have a big impact on a
number of different areas within the EUC.

Speaker 1 (46:36):
Thank you. I want to shoot a little bit now
to some of the Commission's priorities, Professor Nelson, could you
speak that particularly issues about tender ideology, anti semitism, anti
American bias, protecting women, things like that.

Speaker 3 (46:50):
Sure, So those four that you've just identified have been
the publicized new priorities of the EOC. I guess the
two that I'll just briefly know vote that struck me,
the gender ideology piece and the anti American bias piece.
So on the gender ideology piece, the EEOC took a
rather unusual position of moving to withdraw from seven pending

(47:17):
EEOC led civil actions where the cause of action was
gender identity discrimination filed by a charge by either a
non binary, non binary, and or transgender employee. So the
EOC withdrew from these actions effectively or moved to withdraw.

(47:41):
It strikes me as potentially problematic something I want to
kind of keep my ear to the ground. From an
equal protection clause view, what strikes me is that this
administration has exhibited rather public anti trans bias. To give
an example, in its in the president executive order banning

(48:01):
trans members of the military, he explicitly called trans people
not honorable, not truthful, and not disciplined. I don't know
that you get much more explicit biased than that. It
reminds me of the Arlington Heights type case. And when
I see an executive agency under the direction of this

(48:25):
executive decide to withdraw support from trans workers, it suggests
to me that there could be potential problems there. I'm
hedging quite a bit because I want to see how
this plays out. I mean, certainly, I want to see
what are the basis for standing. For example, what I
would imagine is if a worker comes out of the

(48:47):
woodwork and says, look, I was really relying on the
agency litigating for me. I don't have the resources too.
I would be interested in seeing a potential Arlington Heights
style challenge to the eoc's actions. And then the second
piece of the priorities that'll comment on, the one with
which I actually strongly agree is the anti American bias.

(49:09):
The EOC has not flushed this out. Really, we don't
have a lot of meat on the bones of what
this means. What I sincerely hope that they believe this
includes is the bias that I see when I represented
employers when it came to work authorizations in the United States,
specifically H one visas, where as part of the statute

(49:32):
there is a requirement that you cannot give like an
H one B visa on if there is a qualified
American citizen. For any of you in the audience who
have advised employers, you know that that is largely a
paperwork exercise, and a lot of employers try to skirt
the rules and in my view, exhibit anti American bias.
I would absolutely love for the EEOC to take on

(49:54):
that as part of their charge to combat anti American bias.
I don't know if they will. Hopefully, once the Commission
is constituted, we have a forum, we'll get a little
bit more information about these foreign priorities.

Speaker 1 (50:06):
Brad. I'm going to just transition, thank you, Professor Nelson, Brad,
a couple of things just to throw off for you,
and then I do want to preserve some time for questions.
So anti American bias EEOC versus a National Labor Relations Act, Sarah,
politics in the workplace and a new administration. Brad, what
are your thids? And Yeah, I think it just kind
of means because I said, I'm going to cut it

(50:28):
off here because we have some very important questions I
want to get to.

Speaker 6 (50:31):
Yeah, I think one thing I want to stress is that,
you know, as far as the President's priorities and the
priorities announced by Acting Chair Lucas, is that they have
the ability to you know, kind of prioritize me. The EOC,
like every government agency has limited resources in many ways,
so they're able to prioritize what they will focus on.
And I think that during the Biden administration when I

(50:52):
was at the UC, there was a lot of criticisms
from religious groups saying, you know that they're not putting
a proper focus on the COVID vaccine exemptions, especially for religion,
that just wasn't a priority. You know, during the Biden administration,
there was a lot of criticism of that. So I
do think it's important to stress that, you know, the
president can establish the priorities and what the enforcement focus

(51:14):
will be. And I think within anti American bias, I
think that that is largely it's going to be tied
with a lot of the immigration issues. I think this
will be a very interesting area to see how it develops,
and hopefully there'll be some additional guidance out on this.
But those are the main points I wanted to add there.

Speaker 1 (51:31):
Okay, I'm just going to start on questions, just so
we get some of the questions out. I'm going to
start with one, Brad for you. The question reads line
I'm just going to read it. It's surprise Brad does
not find the quote too many black people in the
photo close quote paraphrasing repugnant. Why would he choose not

(51:53):
to take the opportunity to respond similar? So, Brad, any
thoughts about that? I think this is a reference to
professor the go ahead? Yeah, yeah, I think familiar to
law firms? I think is that?

Speaker 6 (52:05):
Yeah, I'm not familiar with that exact you know, for
that charge what that's in reference to. So I don't
have a familiarity on that.

Speaker 1 (52:14):
Okay, thanks, I want the next question. This is about
the will of the people, so and maybe profession Nelson
will start with you, and then the brand is the
will of the people, a rationale that covers most, if
any presidential action. How far do we take the unitary
and executive theory? It would seem to undermine the principles

(52:36):
of a democratic republic built on checks and balances. That'son
else in bonks about that.

Speaker 4 (52:43):
Yeah, how much tited do we have?

Speaker 1 (52:45):
But well, at diminished time, But I'm trying to at
least give.

Speaker 3 (52:50):
I mean, I mean, look, whenever you're talking will of
the people, you're talking direct will of these of the
articles one and two. In directors of the article three,
I viewed separation of power both horizontal and vertical. Is
the most important feature of our constitution. I think anytime
you tweak with the separation, it must be done with
incredible nuance and care, because I am terrified of upsetting

(53:11):
that balance. And one thing that absolutely terrifies me is
that it seems like in the past five to ten
years the current Trump administration and the current Supreme Court
have tweaked the balance quite significantly. So, without going into
great specifics on various flavors of the unitary executive theory,

(53:33):
my views that the Supreme Court is not going to
go so they're certainly not going to go so far
as just to say the executive gets to control, the
president gets control absolutely everything.

Speaker 4 (53:45):
There's going to be a card out for the Fed.
They're still going to at least.

Speaker 3 (53:48):
Nominally maintain a Humphrey's Executor and the inferior officers exception.
But I think look, broadly speaking, you have a point
that you want to try to respect the will of people,
but I certainly don't think that is exclusively represented visaly
the President.

Speaker 6 (54:03):
Brad not through no I I think I think I
largely agree with that point.

Speaker 1 (54:10):
All Right, we have another question that says maybe I'll
start with you, brand and then we'll go Professor Nelson.
President Biden fired General Counsel Augustuson. Is there a difference
and looking for the audience doesn't mean I know she
was the General Counsel of the e C during President
Trump's first term. So President Biden fired General Counsel Sharing Gustinson.

(54:32):
Is there a difference between commissioners and the General counsel
when it comes to the theory of an independent agency?
Or is that something that was unlawful until two weeks ago?
So maybe Brad will start with you and then Professor
Nelson will go to you.

Speaker 6 (54:47):
So Brad, No, it's a it's a good question. I
forgot under the under title seven. I think that it's
pretty much the same as far as you know, for
what the you know, for what the I don't think
there's exact protections you know that exist there for you
know that would be different for the General Council versus
the commissioner. So I think I don't believe Sharon Gustafson

(55:08):
when she was fired by Biden. I don't believe there
was a legal challenge, So I don't think that has
that issue has been litigated, And I don't believe that
there's been a legal challenge from when Carla Gilbride was
fired either, So.

Speaker 4 (55:22):
It's going to be interesting. It's a very interesting question,
Professor Nelson. I agree.

Speaker 3 (55:28):
I don't think there is material light between the GC
versus the Commissioners when it comes to independent versus executive.
To Brad's point, this Title seven does not differentiate between
like giving those limitations on the removal of one versus
the other. They're both presidential appointees with Senate confirmation.

Speaker 4 (55:50):
The only potential light I could see would be invoking
the CFPB case, where the Supreme Court did seem to
think that the fact that the CFPB was led by
an individual made it more executive.

Speaker 3 (56:08):
That seemed to matter, And the GC doesn't lead anything
similar to that, but does have independent authority to make
decisions contrast from the Commission that is five members. So
I suspect the strongest argument I could make is that
if there is any light between the GC and the Commission,
perhaps the GC is even more executive than the Commission itself.

Speaker 4 (56:33):
So I think even two weeks.

Speaker 3 (56:35):
Ago, I probably would have taken the position that the
GC and the Commissioners were all members of an independent
agency and cannot be removed today.

Speaker 4 (56:42):
I don't think that argument has.

Speaker 1 (56:44):
Traction, Professor News And let me just follow up on
that and what about the functions of it? Because the
General Council of the e SC's response to building is
to find my statute is to be responsible for the
conduct of litigation. The General Council does not have regulatory
authority to adjudicate anything, or to issue rules or regulations

(57:06):
or some regulatory guides or anything like that. Does that
matter in terms of whether the General Counsel is more
executive than say, the commissioners.

Speaker 3 (57:15):
I haven't thought about that enough, so, working on the fly,
I would probably say it doesn't compel me. But it
also just seems so academic at this point that I
think it probably doesn't matter anyway.

Speaker 1 (57:27):
Yeah, and academic because of the decision two weeks ago.

Speaker 4 (57:30):
Is that correct? Yeah?

Speaker 3 (57:32):
And look to be fair and to clarify for the
audience that was not a full briefing on the merits.
We don't have a definitive case. There's been a lot
of bluster on social media that Humphrey's executor has been overturned.

Speaker 4 (57:44):
I think that's wrong.

Speaker 3 (57:45):
It has been chipped away and I think we'll be
further chipped away, but it is not gone by any means.
I just think that based on that Wilcox's opinion, Yes,
I think that currently the agency is certainly looks and
feels like it's an executive agency.

Speaker 1 (58:00):
Okay, we're gonna have to wrap it up then, Brad
any final thoughts, and then I'm going to turn it
back to Sarah.

Speaker 6 (58:07):
Now, this has been very enjoyable. I've really enjoyed this conversation.
Thank you very much for having us today. Agreed, Thank
you all so much.

Speaker 5 (58:14):
Okay, great, well on behalf of the Federal Society. I
want to thank all of our speakers for sharing your
time and expertise with us today, and to our audience,
thank you for tuning in. If you'd like to see
more content like this, please visit our website at regproject
dot org. Thank you all again, and I hope you
enjoyed the rest of your Monday.

Speaker 2 (58:32):
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for tuning in to the Fourth Branch podcast to catch
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Speaker 5 (59:00):
This has been a FEDSOC audio production