Executive director Justin Bassi and resident senior fellow David Wroe discuss issues of the week, including Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to China, US President Donald Trump’s overdue but welcome change of heart on support for Ukraine, and the clashes in Syria that prompted Israel to intervene on behalf of the Druze population and strike Syrian targets including in Damascus.
They talk about risks that Australia becomes once again vulnerable to economic coercion despite lessons from the recent past, and that we send Beijing the signal that we are prioritising short-term economics over security. They discuss their tentative hopes that Trump might hold to his changed position that Russia finally needs to be pressured to come to the peace table. And they unpack their views on the complex flareup in southern Syria during the week that has reportedly left hundreds dead.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
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(00:01):
Stop the world. Welcome to Stop the World, the
Aspy Podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson.
And I'm David Rowe. And today, we're staying in
house with a discussion between you, Dave and our Executive
Director, Justin Bassey. Indeed, Liv, it's a kind of more
professional version of the conversations we have when we're
going to fetch coffee in the morning.
But we thought with so much happening this week, it was a
(00:23):
good time to jump behind the mic.
So we had Anthony Albanese's visit to China, of course Donald
Trump's belated but welcome change of heart in terms of
support for Ukraine, exercise Talisman Sabre, which Australia
was hosting, the military exercise.
And of course the flare up in Syria where we had some clashes
between different factions, including government forces,
(00:46):
which brought Israel in and caused it to launch strikes
against various targets in Syria, including in the capital
Damascus. So it was all happening.
I should also say it's more professional than we are dressed
right now as well. It's Friday, so.
But none of these issues are straightforward.
There's twists and turns in every corner of the world at the
moment. And as always, between you and
Justin, there's also some disagreement, some agreement,
(01:09):
and there's plenty of interest. Interesting discussion.
I think, Dave, if we drew a vendor igram, there's about 70%
overlap between you and that leaves plenty to talk about in
the remaining 30%. Yep, and the best part is that I
felt I learned something and developed my own thinking along
the way, which is what SP is here for, so I hope listeners
feel the same way. Hope you enjoyed on the podcast.
(01:31):
All right, Justin, it's you and me today, Friday morning.
We're pumped. Welcome to Stop the World.
Let's have a chat. Thanks, Dave.
Good to be with you. We're doing this because it's
been a big week, lots happening.The biggest thing in the
Australian news is of course Anthony Albanese's trip to
China. Lots of commentary about it.
Do you want to just give me yourheadline views to start with?
(01:53):
That might be the best place to.Sure, there there is a lot
happening, Dave. My view is that these leadership
visits very important, very goodto do, economic relationships,
discussions on trade, very good to do.
The issue for me is that engagement though can't come
(02:14):
across as being the outcome itself and economics and
isolation can't be the outcome itself.
For me. There are always opportunities
in these visits. There are also risks.
I think there are three specificrisks that we have with this,
(02:35):
with this visit, like all visits, 1 is to avoid being used
as a propaganda tool or propaganda purpose.
The second is to avoid a situation where the importance
of trade and the importance of the bilateral trade relationship
(02:56):
is allowed to become a dependency and over dependency
and a complete disproportionate power base that forms between
two countries. And the third, related to the
second, is to avoid giving a perception both to China itself
but also to the Australian public, that we are prioritising
(03:20):
our short term economic interests over our immediate or
long term security interests. And I do think that there are
elements of all three of those risks that are at play through
this visit. Yeah, OK.
So on the propaganda one, I haveviews on pandas, which we can
come back to if you like. But the second one is the one
that really jumps out at me about this visit.
(03:42):
I mean, huge deals on, on the, the, the green steel, green
iron, however you want to describe a decarbonisation of,
of steel effectively, it seems to be a huge economic
opportunity, huge, huge deal forAustralia.
There's the, there's the focus on tourism that Anthony
Albanese's clearly made a big, big effort on in his in his
(04:04):
visit to the, to the Great Wall,etcetera has fed into that.
But it seems to me that we have just very easily forgotten what
the last five years or so. Well, the years between, you
know, somewhere around the mid 20 teens and 2022 actually
looked like and what we went through.
(04:25):
And we are at great risk of putting ourselves back into that
vulnerable position. If you'll allow me a quick
anecdote around the 2015 period.So this is well before even
like, you know, the, the really kind of darkest days of around
the COVID time. I was a journalist at the time.
I was speaking to a a senior Australian national security and
(04:48):
foreign affairs official who wasby no means a sort of rabid
China hawk. He was a, a pragmatic Australian
national interest advocate. And I remember very distinctly,
he said to me for the first timesince the 1970s, you know,
during the time of Gough Whitlam, we can no longer pursue
(05:11):
a policy of maximum engagement with China.
The, the, the, the behaviour that they have demonstrated,
that means that we simply cannotcontinue on this path.
If, if we, if we look for maximum engagement, we are
simply going to make ourselves increasingly vulnerable.
And that is something we are, weare actually going to have to
start moving away from that remarkable thing for a senior
(05:33):
Australian official to say as, as a, you know, as a, as a
change after something like 30 years of, of policy.
And now it feels to me as if that sort of maximalist
engagement seems to be coming back.
I guess a couple of questions that occur to me.
I mean, 1 is how much does the Trump effect actually have to do
(05:57):
with this? I mean, that's obviously been
raised like, you know, are we drifting back towards China's
orbit because we, we, we feel that the US is, is so
insufficiently reliable. Now, I'm a bit dubious about
that, not least because this wasalready happening in the first
term of the Albanese government.And that was mostly under Joe
Biden, of course. So, you know, this is, this has
(06:20):
been underway for a while. But also, I mean, I'm, I suppose
I'm somewhat sympathetic to the government's position in the
sense that it's very hard for usto take, you know, some kind of
firm China policy when it's pretty unclear to us exactly
what the US China policy is under Trump.
(06:42):
I mean, we've talked about this before, but, you know, I'd be
worried about leaving ourselves swinging in the breeze by taking
firm positions on China. But but where does that leave
us? I mean, it doesn't mean that we
just sort of drift into a position of neutrality.
I suppose that's my worry at themoment.
Yeah, all, all very good questions.
Whoever that official was 10 years ago nailed it and was
(07:06):
really at the beginning of the Australian shift in its China
policy and security policy. I I think it's too easy, Dave,
to simply blame Trump. Should we, whenever we need to
disagree or hold to account an American administration if we
(07:28):
disagree with something that they are doing or saying?
Sure, absolutely. But as you said, for the first
years of the current government stabilisation policy, it was
under President Biden. We, we, we.
(07:49):
I think we also need to counter any view that the Australian
shift on China policy happened because of President Trump's
first administration. There is always an undercurrent
of misunderstanding around some Australian decisions like the 5G
(08:09):
decision, those are examples. The 5G decision, the decision to
introduce foreign interference laws, these are all decisions
based on Australia's national security and national interest.
We made, of course, Australia made its 5G decision before the
Americans made it. So going to your point of if
(08:30):
there's uncertainty as to exactly what the Americans might
do in some situations, we'll find we would like some
predictability in many of those situations.
But that can't leave us with such a level of inertia that we
simply let others decide everything for us.
We have to be in a situation where we're saying what is in
Australia's interests. I do think that this visit has
(08:55):
shown that we at the moment are unable to do 2 things at once.
Yes, we should of course have aneconomic relationship with
China, but have a look at how the Europeans are managing their
relationship now, a relationshipthat I think was problematic a
few years ago, just as of courseEurope's relationship with
(09:17):
Russia was problematic. But Europe is absolutely
comfortable, comfortable with the wrong word.
They are clear that China is an economic partner but also a
strategic adversary. They are both.
Australia doesn't seem to be able to say that China is both
(09:40):
an economic partner and a strategic adversary.
We are, I think we are using thefact that that the Australian
population has some concerns about the US and President Trump
to create a moral equivalence ora false equivalence between the
US and China to allow ourselves to say that what's wrong with
(10:00):
the world at the moment. The instability in the world is
just great power competition. That's just not right.
And so how did the visit feed into that?
It goes to your issue that out of my 3 risks, the the trade
dependency and the economics over security is the bigger one
for you. The trade delegation that the
(10:21):
Prime Minister took with him significantly high wealth
Australian individuals, companies and of course on the
face of it, great take a trade delegation.
Business is important, but so many of the business leaders
said publicly in the public parts of their meetings with
(10:44):
their Chinese counterparts and Chinese officials that the
relationship, the Australia China relationship was based on
trust was just not right. It can't be right.
I I don't have a problem with working out where Australia
should trade with China. That's safe to do so through due
diligence, but we shouldn't be providing the Australian public
(11:09):
with the view that the AustraliaChina relationship is based on
mutual trust. One, that's the Chinese
Communist Party's phrase that weseem so willing once again to be
repeating back. But to it, it's it's not even
that we have to learn from othercountries mistakes and other
countries lessons. It's not like we're saying, or
(11:31):
is this what have we got to learn from Europe's mistakes
with Russia or what have we got to learn with Europe's mistakes
leading into World War 2? It we have just come out of
years of economic and diplomaticcoercion by China against us.
There's no trust there. The reality is that those
business leaders are there because of money.
(11:53):
That's fine. But be willing to say that the
economics makes profits for the companies, which helps
businesses in Australia and helps jobs in Australia.
Be be OK saying that. Don't try and tell the
Australian public that it's based on trust because it's
because it's not. And I think that tells the
Chinese Communist Party, it tells Beijing the wrong message
(12:13):
as well. It says we've got Australia
where we want them because they are so fearful of what we might
do again in the future that they're willing to say what is
not true. And even though in many respects
the trade measures that were on us for four or five years have
come off. I think the lack of an of either
the government, the government'slack of ability of or lack of
(12:37):
willingness to describe what thetrue nature of the security
threat is. And the business leaders being
unable to say that they are justinterested in profits and trying
to say that there is trust showsthat we are still being coerced.
Yeah, I know. I, I, I think you've put that
really quite well. I mean, I, I one of the, one of
the slight distinctions, I suppose.
(12:58):
Well, anyway, I guess one of the, one of the challenges that
I, I was going to put to you about that point about putting
economics over security is that governments need to think about
everything. I mean, like, you know, you and
I, we work in the national security space.
Of course, our, our, our preoccupation is national
security. And of course, we can make the
argument that security is the foundation for everything else.
(13:20):
If you don't have sovereignty and security, then it's very
hard to, to have control over over much else in your, in your
sort of national destiny. But, but governments have the
tough job of actually having to deal with, with all of these
things now. So they have to, they have to
calculate what the security riskis and then decide what actions
(13:42):
to, to take on that that might put constraints on their
economic activity. And that's as always, like, you
know, a job that has to be reassessed day by day.
But but you know, they do have to think about people's jobs.
So I guess, you know, it's, it's, I would, I would
distinguish the, you know, the, the, the, the billionaires going
(14:03):
on the, the trips. I wouldn't want to characterise
it purely in terms of their sortof profit seeking when they do
create companies that create jobs, that create a standard of
living for Australians. And that is actually really,
really important. And by the way, that does
actually flow through to government coffers ultimately
(14:23):
that can pay for our national security.
Now of course you and I wish that some more of that money and
that those government coffers were going towards national
security. But to come back round to, to,
to the start, I, I do agree and I think I think you've put it
rather well that that that position is perfectly
understandable. If we are a bit more frank in
(14:46):
that European style of distinct of saying, yes, this is an
economic partnership and a, and a huge economic opportunity for
us. But it is a strategic risk for
us at the same time. And we have to find a way to
live with both of those. Correct.
That's exactly right. And and why is it important?
To be frank, we've got, we've got to do the due diligence that
(15:09):
can, can show not just Australiatoday, but it's the next
generation that the Australian government, private sector,
civil society was doing enough due diligence to say, yes, we
want to cooperate. We want to collaborate to our
benefit, but we're not willing to put at risk either human
(15:30):
rights or our national security.To, to give you a couple of
examples of why I think that we are not, we don't have that
balance right at the moment. There's been a lot of talk
about, OK, well where, where arethose areas of cooperation?
We keep hearing we cooperate where we can.
So where are they apart from just generics on trade, selling
more wine, selling iron ore. One of the areas that keeps
(15:53):
cropping up, of course, is we, we, we cooperate on climate.
That's an area that Australia and China should be able to
cooperate on. OK, fine.
It doesn't remove though the absolute need for Australia to
still do due diligence that yes,of course we want to solve
climate problems, but we don't want to solve climate problems
(16:16):
by creating either human rights or security concerns.
An example being in in this in the transition to renewables.
You know, if we look at the solar power industry, we have a
situation at the moment where inmy view, because we have just
lurched into what we need to do solar.
(16:37):
We've created a situation where there is now an effective
monopoly that Chinese companies have in our solar industry.
So that if Australians who do care about the environment and
have put solar panels on their roofs, unless they've done their
own due diligence and found the very few alternatives that
exist, in all likelihood they'vegot Chinese made solar panels on
(17:01):
their roof. And unfortunately many of those
are made through Xinjiang by forced labour.
We surely don't want to say we've, we, we, we are
prioritising cheaper solar panels and not caring that that
the supply chain is full of modern slavery.
You know, if you're driving an electric vehicle in Australia,
(17:22):
no matter which company you, youhave as the car, whether it's a
Chinese company like BYD or an American company Tesla, you're
driving a, a with a with Chinesecomponents and the all important
battery is Chinese. We've got to do a better job of
recognising that simply saying cooperation is a good in itself
(17:48):
is not not right. And the and the security areas,
those human rights areas in the security area.
I, I think that we haven't, we, we are ticking a box rather than
actually acting in our national interest, Dave.
And an example being political language around, did you raise
(18:10):
for example, Prime Minister, thecase of Doctor Young, an
Australian who's been detained in China since January 2019?
And the answer was yes, I raisedthe case very good.
It is a good. But simply answering that I
raised the case and being unwilling on follow up questions
(18:31):
to go into the case and claimingsome type of privacy when the
family and Doctor Young himself isn't claiming any privacy
restrictions is a problem. Because the Australian public
should hear every single time when asked about Doctor Young
that we not didn't only raise it, but we told Beijing that
(18:53):
Doctor Young's detention is a structural problem in the
relationship. In the bilateral relationship.
We can't have stability until Doctor Young is released.
We require him to be released assoon as possible and it is
wrongful or arbitrary detention,That phrase of arbitrary
detention for Doctor Young that the system used that our
(19:14):
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade used.
Now in the last couple of years we no longer use it.
To the extent that Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade
actually went as far in a Senateestimates hearing to say that
they didn't consider anyone, anyAustralian arbitrarily detained,
that's a problem. And again, in my view, without
hearing any different, and yes, I understand, understanding
(19:36):
that, no doubt behind the scenesthere's lots of things
happening. We, we still need to provide the
Australian public with the truththat cases like Doctor Young are
not just consular cases, the equivalent of someone who's been
charged with drug peddling or anything like that.
This is a case of wrongful detention.
It's a problem for the relationship.
Yep, Yep. OK, we've got a couple of other
things to push through. I want my 32nd rant quickly on
(19:58):
pandas. I don't get pandas.
If I go the rest of my life without seeing another panda, I
will feel no less satisfied on my deathbed about my life
achievement. And I don't understand why
anyone over the age of 11 gives a hoop one way or another.
So I just, I'm baffled as to whythey have become this enormous
(20:19):
sort of diplomatic tool at China, at China's disposal.
And I and my, my plea to, to, toall of Australia's journalists
and politicians and commentatorsis that can we please never,
ever hear about pandas? Just quickly, I, I slight news,
I like the pandas, right? I mean, actually they're lovely
animals. They are, but but only, only if
(20:39):
we're able to do those two things at once.
If we're only able to say everything economically with
China is great and that visitingthe pandas and isn't that great,
but I'm unwilling to talk about the security issues, that's when
the panda diplomacy and the engagement for engagement sake
becomes a better I don't. Even want to have sex, but I
don't know, just Russia. Now we've seen a rare bright
(21:05):
spot. Yeah, we've seen a positive
shift from Donald Trump on Russia.
He's finally tweaked on to the fact that Putin might have been
stringing him along. Never mind the fact that the the
bloke who weeds the Rose Garden probably could have told him
that in in January, but OK, it it's clear now he's agreed to
supply Patriot missile by Patriot air defence systems,
(21:30):
missiles, ammunition, ammunition, etcetera, paid for
by NATO allies in in Europe. That's that's fine, that's
tolerable and that's a positive step.
Welcome your thoughts on that. My, my, my quick thoughts are
one demonstrates for all for allof the ridicule that Mark Reuter
got around the daddy remarks andthose sorts of things in The
(21:52):
Hague. And we're speculating a little
bit on on what exactly has shifted Trump's view here.
But I mean, there seems, it seems to be pretty, pretty
strong signs that that Ruta had a fair bit to do with that.
It shows that with that, that sort of, you know, rather
unorthodox diplomacy that we're we're all forced to to go
(22:13):
through now. You you can actually make a
difference to to Trump's view. I am a little worried.
I mean, obviously just the fact that it's Trump and he's
unpredictable and we, we, we, wehave to hope that he's not going
to change his mind. A little worried about the
things that he said earlier in the week that where he said I'm
on nobody's side. I mean, you know, that's that,
that that's clearly a problem. The other one that that worries
(22:34):
me a little bit is the 50 day deadline that he is set now.
I mean, it's good to have a deadline, but you know, that
feels a, a, a little bit one of those, one of those risky red
lines that if it is breached, then you know, the, the, the
next time you know, there, therewon't be an opportunity to set
another deadline. Welcome your views.
(22:58):
I agree though, it does seem a very good shift that the the
fact that the language is changing the recognition
publicly that Putin really has no interest in negotiating a
fair and just peace, That he just really wants to buy himself
more time with the aim of reallysqueezing Ukraine as much as
(23:22):
possible. So that whenever there is an
endpoint, Russia is clearly the superior party.
So I think there is a significant shift.
You're right, it needs to be a permanent shift.
I, I too don't like the idea that the US doesn't have sides.
(23:43):
I think that clearly the US has sides.
It's on the side of its allies, it's on the side of its
partners, and it's on the side of the rules based order.
Well, it should be, but that's, I mean, the, the, you know, one
of the great problems of the, the, the Trump well view is that
that is, is no longer an assuredthing.
(24:06):
Yeah. I, I, I, I think that I'm not
sure there's not assured. I'm, I think that would, would
we like, prefer to see differentlanguage?
Would we prefer to see friend and foe treated differently
rather than often, too often friend and foe treated the same
whether it be tariffs or other issues.
(24:28):
Yes. But I, I do think that the, that
too much is put on social media posts, too much is put on
language that isn't ideal, but shouldn't take away from the,
from the fact that, that we havestructural alignment in this
(24:52):
alliance that continues to be shown that even after we might
not like certain language that President Trump uses around
Russia or China or, or, or otherauthoritarian regimes, they do
the right thing. And it's in my view, throughout
the last 100 years, you know, itwas even one of Churchill's
(25:13):
famous quotes around the US willeventually effectively do the
right thing after trying as hardas possible not to for as long
as possible. We we are seeing a continuation
of the US enforcing these rules.And it is in our interests.
(25:34):
You and I share a review that the Iran's Iranian nuclear
programme was a threat to not just the region, but the globe.
And that action clearly wasn't isolationist action.
It was action to to reduce a security threat.
Clearly the US views in relationto China as the pacing threat is
(25:56):
one that we share is as a national security assessment.
And I do think your comment around Mark Reuter and the
success of NATO, the recent NATOmeeting last month shows should
be a lesson that we learn here in Australia and elsewhere.
That those leaders who are willing to, yes, take a bit of a
(26:19):
risk, but willing to engage President Trump and the US
administration and willing to have some uncomfortable
conversations that they are actually reaping the benefits
because they're also putting themselves in a position to
influence President Trump and the administration.
And the fact that if, if, if we'd been talking leading into
(26:41):
NATO and saying, well, are we going to get an uplift of NATO
defence spending and are we going to get President Trump
confirming so clearly a commitment to NATO and Article
5. I think we said, well, we don't
know. But that's what the the effort
between Secretary General Reuterand President Trump got to very,
(27:05):
very successful. I think we've got to be willing
to to have that level of engagement that sometimes
involves some uncomfortable conversations and not be so
worried every time we hear some language that we might not like.
But it's also again, goes back to we should be willing to
explain to the US where we don'tlike what they are saying or
(27:27):
doing. But we can't also, Dave, be a
country that is only willing to speak truth to power in relation
to Washington, DC, if we're not willing to speak truth to power
to other capitals like like Beijing.
So I, I think your 50 day reference very important.
We do need to ensure that red lines are met.
(27:48):
President Putin right now, he, he will be looking at what he
needs to do to get out of it. He adapts.
He, he has proven himself as many authoritarian leaders who
stay in power for so long and ability to, to, to adapt.
That's what he'll be looking to do.
We've got to ensure that rather than Putin and Russia squeezing
(28:10):
Ukraine and creating division between the US and it's NATO
partners and and other allies, we've got to be the ones who are
putting the pressure on Russia so that they're forced to come
to the table and not as the stronger party.
I think this recent shift in which the US is clearly saying
we're not going to be strung along forever today, that is
(28:33):
positive. Yep.
I'm going to, I'm fascinated to see how Putin is going to try
and, you know, the wily bastard that he is trying to pick away
through this next 50 day. I think this would be a really,
a really, really fascinating test for him.
I mean, look, as I think, you know, I'm, I'm more pessimistic
about about Trump overall than than you might be.
(28:56):
And, and therefore I think it's,I think the problems are
probably more structural than than just the sort of the
language issues. And while I recognise the work
that Ruti has done here, and I recognise that sometimes we're
just going to have to do things that feel a bit odd or feel a
bit icky or whatever, to manage a particular situation as best
we can and just get an outcome that that is, that is tolerable.
(29:21):
And then, you know, over time, hopefully we find some kind of,
you know, stabilised, you know, functioning way to deal with
what, what I regard as genuinelya new America.
But let's just quit. Just put you on that.
I I do think that there is, we have to be careful that we don't
become ourselves fatalist and wedon't so over dramatise issues.
(29:46):
I think the recent conversation this week, another one that
we've had this week in Australiais, is over Taiwan and
politicians, I think of both sides have got missiles into,
they found it challenging to describe what Australia's
position is in relation to Taiwan.
(30:06):
I think our starting problem is that we shouldn't only be having
that conversation about Taiwan off the back of reports that the
US have asked the question aboutit.
We should be having questions. We should be having
conversations about Taiwan and South China Sea because it's in
Australias interests. And I'm I'm of the view that the
allowing ourselves to simply limit the debate to would
(30:30):
Australia automatically commit to a war?
Is the wholly wrong conversationto have.
We can't only have no conversation or are we involved
in a hot war situation. The problems are there now
without a hot wire war. We're in the middle of hybrid
warfare. We've got constant military
(30:51):
aggression by China over Taiwan,unprecedented numbers of
flyovers. They've got foreign
interference, cyber attacks, there's economic coercion,
diplomatic coercion. So all that is happening now.
Avoiding those conversations might be an easy path for the
(31:12):
political class in the short term, but it inevitably means
that there's longer term problems because China thinks
that it can get away with everything up to the first
bullet fired. And effectively we're creating a
situation where we're not explaining to the public why
there is a concern. We've got to get out of this
message that the only national security threats we have are
(31:34):
actual hot wars, because we are.We are effectively creating a
situation where we're saying to Beijing, you can almost get what
you want without firing shot because we'll let you push and
push and push. Sure, sure.
And and no, no, I think that's all fair.
I have no time for what? For what Colby is demanding of
of Australia and Japan about this future hypothetical
(31:55):
scenario. That said, I, I, I would, I
think we Australia would be in amuch better position if we more
consistently projected the message that we would always
stand up for, for, for the rulesbased order.
And, and I mean, I mean, you know, we, we say it in, in the
abstract, but we don't say it enough in, in concrete terms
(32:15):
about, you know, about, about, about the way we will actually
accept some of that burden. I, I agree.
I, I, I would say that I'm not sure you know, and I don't know
this, but I think the problem isI'm not convinced that the
Americans have made a demand because I think just as many
Australians have said that the Americans themselves are upfront
(32:37):
that they aren't, they have strategic ambiguity.
So again, I think because we're not willing at this stage to be
mature enough to have the conversation of what the
security threats are that we face.
All of a sudden we talk about Taiwan.
And I actually think that we've gone down any a wrong path here.
(33:00):
If the Americans have said we demand that you lock and load
right now on a hot wall, well then that's a problem.
But I'm not sure that I've actually seen a a demand if
there are requests to talk about, are we strategically
aligned and do we not? What do we want to work with
each other to deter a a militaryintervention by China on Taiwan?
(33:27):
Then that should be a conversation that we're willing
to have. I think in part it's Australia's
reticence to even go down that path.
That means we turn it into one of a sovereignty question of all
these are hypothetical questions.
Yes, the the form of a hot war is a hypothetical question.
But Dave, as you know as well asI do that our Defence Department
do does war gaming all the time.So it's not as they don't have
(33:49):
these hypothetical questions andare looking at them, but
regardless, it falls into the trap of thinking that the
conversation over Taiwan is a day after the bullets have been
fired. I think the question that
Australia and the US and Japan need to have is what are we
doing now about the hybrid warfare that's going on?
What are we doing to prevent thewar that people want to talk
(34:12):
about? So I think that's the problem
and I think if we're being requested to have that
conversation, we should be having it.
And yes, we should having be having it in all sensitivity and
classified forms behind the scenes.
But we should be talking to the Australian public about it.
Just as frankly, post 911, post Bali, we developed a system, the
terror threat level, to talk to the Australian public about what
(34:34):
the terror threat level is. So the Australian public always
knew everyday what the terror threat level is.
It's probable at the moment. It can't just be terrorism that
we're having that conversation with the public with.
Yeah, OK. Colby could clear it up to be
fair with by by making a public remark to that effect.
Now we were going to talk about the Middle East.
We're actually over time and you're you're going to be late
(34:55):
for a meeting. Yeah.
Should we pull the pin? Well, I, I, I think if people
are happy to, to, to have 32nd bursts from me and, and for you
to respond. This week has been busy.
And I think it is why I wouldn'tmind raising is because I think
we've, we do have to try and show that as a country,
Australia can handle multiple threats simultaneously because
(35:16):
that's the world we live in. We no longer live in a world
where we can handle and only have to handle one security
threat at a time. So the Middle East again blew up
this week with issues between Israel and Syria, which shows
that the Middle East is, is not stable, completely unstable.
(35:37):
I do think that again, part of my view that we need to be
having conversations with the public more about the world that
that currently exists, which is not a stable world, It's not a
secure world, goes to this issuethat I have.
I, I do think, I personally think it's sad that effectively
the only reason we're talking about the Druze minority in in
(35:59):
Syria is because people are getting upset with Israel,
Israel's military actions in relation to Syria.
Effectively what that is saying is that we'd rather Israel not
take military action so that we don't have to worry about what's
going on in the Middle East. I think that's a problem.
I think the international community needs to be better at
(36:22):
saying sectarian violence where whether it's the regime itself
or whether it's other groups within Syria that are harming A
minority group like the Druze, that should be a problem for us.
I think that Israel does have genuine security concerns in
(36:43):
relation to an unstable Syria. We, we, we Israel and the rest
of us shouldn't want terrorist groups like Hezbollah being able
to rise again by having ungoverned pockets of countries
like Syria. We've seen that in the past.
And so I, I do think that we need to again, have a bit more
of a mature conversation and notsimply begin a conversation
(37:07):
after Israel has taken military action here.
We have also to have, I think important to inform our viewers
that the current Syrian regime, which has been trying, I think
has been legitimately trying to,to have stability in Syria and
(37:29):
the US and Israel and the UK andothers have been trying to work
with the HTS regime. But they were a terrorist
organisation that took over a very bad regime.
I'm very pleased that the Assad regime is gone.
But serious has got to. The new Syrian regime, I think
has got to come to grips with the fact that it is now has
(37:51):
control. Do they want to simply be the
the terrorist entity that took over Syria, or do they want to
work with Israel and the US and the UK and others to create
stability in Syria? Which means that even when
they're not the ones, their regime isn't the ones to create
the violence against a minority.If other if sectarian violence
(38:11):
is happening, they're responsible for it.
Australia still lists the, the regime that as a terrorist
group. So when we're talking about
Israel's actions against Syria, I think it is important to
remember that until Australia D lists the HDS, as other
(38:32):
countries have done, we're dealing with a terrorist
organisation. All these facts need to be
better understood, but but the, the, the aim here needs to be
how do we create the stability within Syria, within the region
that creates safety for all parties?
And so we have that, I think. I think it's not.
We can't simply say Israel can'ttake any action to either
(38:54):
protect itself or minorities, noting of course that the Druze
minority, the one of the few places that they are protected,
is Israel, right? OK, OK.
My, my quick take on this is that I think, I think Al Sharah
has done enough to earn some trust and credit from the
(39:14):
international community, including Israel, you know, for
the project he's embarked on fora former terrorist leader.
I think he is, I think he's doing a reasonable job and the
best he can to, to bring together the extremely fractious
elements across Syria. It's a it's a very, very tough
job that he's got. It seems to me that he
(39:36):
miscalculated here by sending government forces into Soweta
province at a very, very in a very volatile situation that was
misconstrued by by the Druze militias who who then
overreacted to their presence. They were overreactions on both
(39:57):
sides. Israel, of course, then stepped
in and frankly, in my view, overreacted as well.
I I don't really know why they had to bomb the ministries in,
in Damascus as well as as well as targets in in sway to
province. So I think it was very telling
that Marco Rubio said that this was a misunderstanding.
I think he actually. Was speaking the truth there.
(40:18):
I think they just screwed up on both sides.
And, and what, what, what, what worries me most about it is that
it might have set back what appeared to be some fairly
constructive and progressive discussions between Israel and
Damascus about a non aggression pact, which, you know, part with
(40:39):
part partly involves the way theprovince as one of the one of
the southern provinces that Israel wants to be effectively
demilitarised. That is probably a bit too much
of A stretch for Damascus, But they, you know, they, they're,
they're negotiating on that. That's a really, really positive
thing. I mean, imagine if if Israel and
and Syria could actually have, you know, a non aggression pact
(40:59):
that would be huge for the region.
So. That's that's a really all very
good points. I, I agree.
I, I think the reality though, is with the Middle East, it is
unstable. And so there there are going to
be ups and downs. Sure, sure.
What, what the, the region needsto do, what those who care about
the region needs to do. Obviously the US with such a
(41:20):
leadership role needs to ensure that we can get through those
downs and recover from them withthe aim still being that
stability and the, the Israel Syria relationship, if it can
stabilise, great, as it would bewithout the Saudis.
So I think those aims shouldn't change, but I, I do think
(41:43):
there's, it needs to be, I just think there needs to be more of
a willingness to, to understand that simply doing nothing hasn't
helped any region. And so, Yep, overstepping the
mark, you don't want anyone overstepping the mark.
But I, I think that I, I think too often we don't actually have
(42:06):
any conversations until someone does overstep the mark.
But we've, we've, we've either ignored or we've missed the
entire lead up. And that happens, you know,
Europe, we've got a hot war in Europe because not enough was
done leading into 2022 to, to deter Putin.
We've got complete instability in the Middle East because not
enough was done to either deter Iran or it's terrorist proxies.
(42:28):
And your point about misunderstanding is, is I think
and Rubio's point, I, I think, Ithink Secretary Rubio was right
as well. I agree with you.
I think that's actually a reallyimportant element that we
shouldn't just be looking at as mere onlookers.
We should say, well, OK, that's interesting.
(42:48):
In our region, there is the opportunity for misunderstanding
in the South China Sea and otherareas.
So This is why we've got to do work now.
We we've got to get out of simply saying after something
happens, all that was what was that a misunderstanding?
Was it a miscalculation? Was it intentional?
Far better to try to be in a position to deter the
(43:11):
intentional and then be well placed that if there is a
misunderstanding to be able to recover as quickly as possible.
I think we can all work towards that.
Right. OK, cooler heads prevail, but
also forward thinking heads prevail to create more stable
situations for the future. All right, let's wrap it.
I shouldn't have said pull the pin earlier.
That was a that was an insensitive metaphor in the
context. But anyway, let's wrap it up for
(43:32):
today. Thanks, Justin, Pleasure.
Thanks for watching and listening folks.
We will be back tomorrow with a special episode on one of our
recent China investigations. Look out for it on Saturday
morning.
Stop the world. Welcome to Stop the World, the
Aspy Podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson.
And I'm David Rowe. And today, we're staying in
house with a discussion between you, Dave and our Executive
Director, Justin Bassey. Indeed, Liv, it's a kind of more
professional version of the conversations we have when we're
going to fetch coffee in the morning.
But we thought with so much happening this week, it was a
(00:23):
good time to jump behind the mic.
So we had Anthony Albanese's visit to China, of course Donald
Trump's belated but welcome change of heart in terms of
support for Ukraine, exercise Talisman Sabre, which Australia
was hosting, the military exercise.
And of course the flare up in Syria where we had some clashes
between different factions, including government forces,
(00:46):
which brought Israel in and caused it to launch strikes
against various targets in Syria, including in the capital
Damascus. So it was all happening.
I should also say it's more professional than we are dressed
right now as well. It's Friday, so.
But none of these issues are straightforward.
There's twists and turns in every corner of the world at the
moment. And as always, between you and
Justin, there's also some disagreement, some agreement,
(01:09):
and there's plenty of interest. Interesting discussion.
I think, Dave, if we drew a vendor igram, there's about 70%
overlap between you and that leaves plenty to talk about in
the remaining 30%. Yep, and the best part is that I
felt I learned something and developed my own thinking along
the way, which is what SP is here for, so I hope listeners
feel the same way. Hope you enjoyed on the podcast.
(01:31):
All right, Justin, it's you and me today, Friday morning.
We're pumped. Welcome to Stop the World.
Let's have a chat. Thanks, Dave.
Good to be with you. We're doing this because it's
been a big week, lots happening.The biggest thing in the
Australian news is of course Anthony Albanese's trip to
China. Lots of commentary about it.
Do you want to just give me yourheadline views to start with?
(01:53):
That might be the best place to.Sure, there there is a lot
happening, Dave. My view is that these leadership
visits very important, very goodto do, economic relationships,
discussions on trade, very good to do.
The issue for me is that engagement though can't come
(02:14):
across as being the outcome itself and economics and
isolation can't be the outcome itself.
For me. There are always opportunities
in these visits. There are also risks.
I think there are three specificrisks that we have with this,
(02:35):
with this visit, like all visits, 1 is to avoid being used
as a propaganda tool or propaganda purpose.
The second is to avoid a situation where the importance
of trade and the importance of the bilateral trade relationship
(02:56):
is allowed to become a dependency and over dependency
and a complete disproportionate power base that forms between
two countries. And the third, related to the
second, is to avoid giving a perception both to China itself
but also to the Australian public, that we are prioritising
(03:20):
our short term economic interests over our immediate or
long term security interests. And I do think that there are
elements of all three of those risks that are at play through
this visit. Yeah, OK.
So on the propaganda one, I haveviews on pandas, which we can
come back to if you like. But the second one is the one
that really jumps out at me about this visit.
(03:42):
I mean, huge deals on, on the, the, the green steel, green
iron, however you want to describe a decarbonisation of,
of steel effectively, it seems to be a huge economic
opportunity, huge, huge deal forAustralia.
There's the, there's the focus on tourism that Anthony
Albanese's clearly made a big, big effort on in his in his
(04:04):
visit to the, to the Great Wall,etcetera has fed into that.
But it seems to me that we have just very easily forgotten what
the last five years or so. Well, the years between, you
know, somewhere around the mid 20 teens and 2022 actually
looked like and what we went through.
(04:25):
And we are at great risk of putting ourselves back into that
vulnerable position. If you'll allow me a quick
anecdote around the 2015 period.So this is well before even
like, you know, the, the really kind of darkest days of around
the COVID time. I was a journalist at the time.
I was speaking to a a senior Australian national security and
(04:48):
foreign affairs official who wasby no means a sort of rabid
China hawk. He was a, a pragmatic Australian
national interest advocate. And I remember very distinctly,
he said to me for the first timesince the 1970s, you know,
during the time of Gough Whitlam, we can no longer pursue
(05:11):
a policy of maximum engagement with China.
The, the, the, the behaviour that they have demonstrated,
that means that we simply cannotcontinue on this path.
If, if we, if we look for maximum engagement, we are
simply going to make ourselves increasingly vulnerable.
And that is something we are, weare actually going to have to
start moving away from that remarkable thing for a senior
(05:33):
Australian official to say as, as a, you know, as a, as a
change after something like 30 years of, of policy.
And now it feels to me as if that sort of maximalist
engagement seems to be coming back.
I guess a couple of questions that occur to me.
I mean, 1 is how much does the Trump effect actually have to do
(05:57):
with this? I mean, that's obviously been
raised like, you know, are we drifting back towards China's
orbit because we, we, we feel that the US is, is so
insufficiently reliable. Now, I'm a bit dubious about
that, not least because this wasalready happening in the first
term of the Albanese government.And that was mostly under Joe
Biden, of course. So, you know, this is, this has
(06:20):
been underway for a while. But also, I mean, I'm, I suppose
I'm somewhat sympathetic to the government's position in the
sense that it's very hard for usto take, you know, some kind of
firm China policy when it's pretty unclear to us exactly
what the US China policy is under Trump.
(06:42):
I mean, we've talked about this before, but, you know, I'd be
worried about leaving ourselves swinging in the breeze by taking
firm positions on China. But but where does that leave
us? I mean, it doesn't mean that we
just sort of drift into a position of neutrality.
I suppose that's my worry at themoment.
Yeah, all, all very good questions.
Whoever that official was 10 years ago nailed it and was
(07:06):
really at the beginning of the Australian shift in its China
policy and security policy. I I think it's too easy, Dave,
to simply blame Trump. Should we, whenever we need to
disagree or hold to account an American administration if we
(07:28):
disagree with something that they are doing or saying?
Sure, absolutely. But as you said, for the first
years of the current government stabilisation policy, it was
under President Biden. We, we, we.
(07:49):
I think we also need to counter any view that the Australian
shift on China policy happened because of President Trump's
first administration. There is always an undercurrent
of misunderstanding around some Australian decisions like the 5G
(08:09):
decision, those are examples. The 5G decision, the decision to
introduce foreign interference laws, these are all decisions
based on Australia's national security and national interest.
We made, of course, Australia made its 5G decision before the
Americans made it. So going to your point of if
(08:30):
there's uncertainty as to exactly what the Americans might
do in some situations, we'll find we would like some
predictability in many of those situations.
But that can't leave us with such a level of inertia that we
simply let others decide everything for us.
We have to be in a situation where we're saying what is in
Australia's interests. I do think that this visit has
(08:55):
shown that we at the moment are unable to do 2 things at once.
Yes, we should of course have aneconomic relationship with
China, but have a look at how the Europeans are managing their
relationship now, a relationshipthat I think was problematic a
few years ago, just as of courseEurope's relationship with
(09:17):
Russia was problematic. But Europe is absolutely
comfortable, comfortable with the wrong word.
They are clear that China is an economic partner but also a
strategic adversary. They are both.
Australia doesn't seem to be able to say that China is both
(09:40):
an economic partner and a strategic adversary.
We are, I think we are using thefact that that the Australian
population has some concerns about the US and President Trump
to create a moral equivalence ora false equivalence between the
US and China to allow ourselves to say that what's wrong with
(10:00):
the world at the moment. The instability in the world is
just great power competition. That's just not right.
And so how did the visit feed into that?
It goes to your issue that out of my 3 risks, the the trade
dependency and the economics over security is the bigger one
for you. The trade delegation that the
(10:21):
Prime Minister took with him significantly high wealth
Australian individuals, companies and of course on the
face of it, great take a trade delegation.
Business is important, but so many of the business leaders
said publicly in the public parts of their meetings with
(10:44):
their Chinese counterparts and Chinese officials that the
relationship, the Australia China relationship was based on
trust was just not right. It can't be right.
I I don't have a problem with working out where Australia
should trade with China. That's safe to do so through due
diligence, but we shouldn't be providing the Australian public
(11:09):
with the view that the AustraliaChina relationship is based on
mutual trust. One, that's the Chinese
Communist Party's phrase that weseem so willing once again to be
repeating back. But to it, it's it's not even
that we have to learn from othercountries mistakes and other
countries lessons. It's not like we're saying, or
(11:31):
is this what have we got to learn from Europe's mistakes
with Russia or what have we got to learn with Europe's mistakes
leading into World War 2? It we have just come out of
years of economic and diplomaticcoercion by China against us.
There's no trust there. The reality is that those
business leaders are there because of money.
(11:53):
That's fine. But be willing to say that the
economics makes profits for the companies, which helps
businesses in Australia and helps jobs in Australia.
Be be OK saying that. Don't try and tell the
Australian public that it's based on trust because it's
because it's not. And I think that tells the
Chinese Communist Party, it tells Beijing the wrong message
(12:13):
as well. It says we've got Australia
where we want them because they are so fearful of what we might
do again in the future that they're willing to say what is
not true. And even though in many respects
the trade measures that were on us for four or five years have
come off. I think the lack of an of either
the government, the government'slack of ability of or lack of
(12:37):
willingness to describe what thetrue nature of the security
threat is. And the business leaders being
unable to say that they are justinterested in profits and trying
to say that there is trust showsthat we are still being coerced.
Yeah, I know. I, I, I think you've put that
really quite well. I mean, I, I one of the, one of
the slight distinctions, I suppose.
(12:58):
Well, anyway, I guess one of the, one of the challenges that
I, I was going to put to you about that point about putting
economics over security is that governments need to think about
everything. I mean, like, you know, you and
I, we work in the national security space.
Of course, our, our, our preoccupation is national
security. And of course, we can make the
argument that security is the foundation for everything else.
(13:20):
If you don't have sovereignty and security, then it's very
hard to, to have control over over much else in your, in your
sort of national destiny. But, but governments have the
tough job of actually having to deal with, with all of these
things now. So they have to, they have to
calculate what the security riskis and then decide what actions
(13:42):
to, to take on that that might put constraints on their
economic activity. And that's as always, like, you
know, a job that has to be reassessed day by day.
But but you know, they do have to think about people's jobs.
So I guess, you know, it's, it's, I would, I would
distinguish the, you know, the, the, the, the billionaires going
(14:03):
on the, the trips. I wouldn't want to characterise
it purely in terms of their sortof profit seeking when they do
create companies that create jobs, that create a standard of
living for Australians. And that is actually really,
really important. And by the way, that does
actually flow through to government coffers ultimately
(14:23):
that can pay for our national security.
Now of course you and I wish that some more of that money and
that those government coffers were going towards national
security. But to come back round to, to,
to the start, I, I do agree and I think I think you've put it
rather well that that that position is perfectly
understandable. If we are a bit more frank in
(14:46):
that European style of distinct of saying, yes, this is an
economic partnership and a, and a huge economic opportunity for
us. But it is a strategic risk for
us at the same time. And we have to find a way to
live with both of those. Correct.
That's exactly right. And and why is it important?
To be frank, we've got, we've got to do the due diligence that
(15:09):
can, can show not just Australiatoday, but it's the next
generation that the Australian government, private sector,
civil society was doing enough due diligence to say, yes, we
want to cooperate. We want to collaborate to our
benefit, but we're not willing to put at risk either human
(15:30):
rights or our national security.To, to give you a couple of
examples of why I think that we are not, we don't have that
balance right at the moment. There's been a lot of talk
about, OK, well where, where arethose areas of cooperation?
We keep hearing we cooperate where we can.
So where are they apart from just generics on trade, selling
more wine, selling iron ore. One of the areas that keeps
(15:53):
cropping up, of course, is we, we, we cooperate on climate.
That's an area that Australia and China should be able to
cooperate on. OK, fine.
It doesn't remove though the absolute need for Australia to
still do due diligence that yes,of course we want to solve
climate problems, but we don't want to solve climate problems
(16:16):
by creating either human rights or security concerns.
An example being in in this in the transition to renewables.
You know, if we look at the solar power industry, we have a
situation at the moment where inmy view, because we have just
lurched into what we need to do solar.
(16:37):
We've created a situation where there is now an effective
monopoly that Chinese companies have in our solar industry.
So that if Australians who do care about the environment and
have put solar panels on their roofs, unless they've done their
own due diligence and found the very few alternatives that
exist, in all likelihood they'vegot Chinese made solar panels on
(17:01):
their roof. And unfortunately many of those
are made through Xinjiang by forced labour.
We surely don't want to say we've, we, we, we are
prioritising cheaper solar panels and not caring that that
the supply chain is full of modern slavery.
You know, if you're driving an electric vehicle in Australia,
(17:22):
no matter which company you, youhave as the car, whether it's a
Chinese company like BYD or an American company Tesla, you're
driving a, a with a with Chinesecomponents and the all important
battery is Chinese. We've got to do a better job of
recognising that simply saying cooperation is a good in itself
(17:48):
is not not right. And the and the security areas,
those human rights areas in the security area.
I, I think that we haven't, we, we are ticking a box rather than
actually acting in our national interest, Dave.
And an example being political language around, did you raise
(18:10):
for example, Prime Minister, thecase of Doctor Young, an
Australian who's been detained in China since January 2019?
And the answer was yes, I raisedthe case very good.
It is a good. But simply answering that I
raised the case and being unwilling on follow up questions
(18:31):
to go into the case and claimingsome type of privacy when the
family and Doctor Young himself isn't claiming any privacy
restrictions is a problem. Because the Australian public
should hear every single time when asked about Doctor Young
that we not didn't only raise it, but we told Beijing that
(18:53):
Doctor Young's detention is a structural problem in the
relationship. In the bilateral relationship.
We can't have stability until Doctor Young is released.
We require him to be released assoon as possible and it is
wrongful or arbitrary detention,That phrase of arbitrary
detention for Doctor Young that the system used that our
(19:14):
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade used.
Now in the last couple of years we no longer use it.
To the extent that Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade
actually went as far in a Senateestimates hearing to say that
they didn't consider anyone, anyAustralian arbitrarily detained,
that's a problem. And again, in my view, without
hearing any different, and yes, I understand, understanding
(19:36):
that, no doubt behind the scenesthere's lots of things
happening. We, we still need to provide the
Australian public with the truththat cases like Doctor Young are
not just consular cases, the equivalent of someone who's been
charged with drug peddling or anything like that.
This is a case of wrongful detention.
It's a problem for the relationship.
Yep, Yep. OK, we've got a couple of other
things to push through. I want my 32nd rant quickly on
(19:58):
pandas. I don't get pandas.
If I go the rest of my life without seeing another panda, I
will feel no less satisfied on my deathbed about my life
achievement. And I don't understand why
anyone over the age of 11 gives a hoop one way or another.
So I just, I'm baffled as to whythey have become this enormous
(20:19):
sort of diplomatic tool at China, at China's disposal.
And I and my, my plea to, to, toall of Australia's journalists
and politicians and commentatorsis that can we please never,
ever hear about pandas? Just quickly, I, I slight news,
I like the pandas, right? I mean, actually they're lovely
animals. They are, but but only, only if
(20:39):
we're able to do those two things at once.
If we're only able to say everything economically with
China is great and that visitingthe pandas and isn't that great,
but I'm unwilling to talk about the security issues, that's when
the panda diplomacy and the engagement for engagement sake
becomes a better I don't. Even want to have sex, but I
don't know, just Russia. Now we've seen a rare bright
(21:05):
spot. Yeah, we've seen a positive
shift from Donald Trump on Russia.
He's finally tweaked on to the fact that Putin might have been
stringing him along. Never mind the fact that the the
bloke who weeds the Rose Garden probably could have told him
that in in January, but OK, it it's clear now he's agreed to
supply Patriot missile by Patriot air defence systems,
(21:30):
missiles, ammunition, ammunition, etcetera, paid for
by NATO allies in in Europe. That's that's fine, that's
tolerable and that's a positive step.
Welcome your thoughts on that. My, my, my quick thoughts are
one demonstrates for all for allof the ridicule that Mark Reuter
got around the daddy remarks andthose sorts of things in The
(21:52):
Hague. And we're speculating a little
bit on on what exactly has shifted Trump's view here.
But I mean, there seems, it seems to be pretty, pretty
strong signs that that Ruta had a fair bit to do with that.
It shows that with that, that sort of, you know, rather
unorthodox diplomacy that we're we're all forced to to go
(22:13):
through now. You you can actually make a
difference to to Trump's view. I am a little worried.
I mean, obviously just the fact that it's Trump and he's
unpredictable and we, we, we, wehave to hope that he's not going
to change his mind. A little worried about the
things that he said earlier in the week that where he said I'm
on nobody's side. I mean, you know, that's that,
that that's clearly a problem. The other one that that worries
(22:34):
me a little bit is the 50 day deadline that he is set now.
I mean, it's good to have a deadline, but you know, that
feels a, a, a little bit one of those, one of those risky red
lines that if it is breached, then you know, the, the, the
next time you know, there, therewon't be an opportunity to set
another deadline. Welcome your views.
(22:58):
I agree though, it does seem a very good shift that the the
fact that the language is changing the recognition
publicly that Putin really has no interest in negotiating a
fair and just peace, That he just really wants to buy himself
more time with the aim of reallysqueezing Ukraine as much as
(23:22):
possible. So that whenever there is an
endpoint, Russia is clearly the superior party.
So I think there is a significant shift.
You're right, it needs to be a permanent shift.
I, I too don't like the idea that the US doesn't have sides.
(23:43):
I think that clearly the US has sides.
It's on the side of its allies, it's on the side of its
partners, and it's on the side of the rules based order.
Well, it should be, but that's, I mean, the, the, you know, one
of the great problems of the, the, the Trump well view is that
that is, is no longer an assuredthing.
(24:06):
Yeah. I, I, I, I think that I'm not
sure there's not assured. I'm, I think that would, would
we like, prefer to see differentlanguage?
Would we prefer to see friend and foe treated differently
rather than often, too often friend and foe treated the same
whether it be tariffs or other issues.
(24:28):
Yes. But I, I do think that the, that
too much is put on social media posts, too much is put on
language that isn't ideal, but shouldn't take away from the,
from the fact that, that we havestructural alignment in this
(24:52):
alliance that continues to be shown that even after we might
not like certain language that President Trump uses around
Russia or China or, or, or otherauthoritarian regimes, they do
the right thing. And it's in my view, throughout
the last 100 years, you know, itwas even one of Churchill's
(25:13):
famous quotes around the US willeventually effectively do the
right thing after trying as hardas possible not to for as long
as possible. We we are seeing a continuation
of the US enforcing these rules.And it is in our interests.
(25:34):
You and I share a review that the Iran's Iranian nuclear
programme was a threat to not just the region, but the globe.
And that action clearly wasn't isolationist action.
It was action to to reduce a security threat.
Clearly the US views in relationto China as the pacing threat is
(25:56):
one that we share is as a national security assessment.
And I do think your comment around Mark Reuter and the
success of NATO, the recent NATOmeeting last month shows should
be a lesson that we learn here in Australia and elsewhere.
That those leaders who are willing to, yes, take a bit of a
(26:19):
risk, but willing to engage President Trump and the US
administration and willing to have some uncomfortable
conversations that they are actually reaping the benefits
because they're also putting themselves in a position to
influence President Trump and the administration.
And the fact that if, if, if we'd been talking leading into
(26:41):
NATO and saying, well, are we going to get an uplift of NATO
defence spending and are we going to get President Trump
confirming so clearly a commitment to NATO and Article
5. I think we said, well, we don't
know. But that's what the the effort
between Secretary General Reuterand President Trump got to very,
(27:05):
very successful. I think we've got to be willing
to to have that level of engagement that sometimes
involves some uncomfortable conversations and not be so
worried every time we hear some language that we might not like.
But it's also again, goes back to we should be willing to
explain to the US where we don'tlike what they are saying or
(27:27):
doing. But we can't also, Dave, be a
country that is only willing to speak truth to power in relation
to Washington, DC, if we're not willing to speak truth to power
to other capitals like like Beijing.
So I, I think your 50 day reference very important.
We do need to ensure that red lines are met.
(27:48):
President Putin right now, he, he will be looking at what he
needs to do to get out of it. He adapts.
He, he has proven himself as many authoritarian leaders who
stay in power for so long and ability to, to, to adapt.
That's what he'll be looking to do.
We've got to ensure that rather than Putin and Russia squeezing
(28:10):
Ukraine and creating division between the US and it's NATO
partners and and other allies, we've got to be the ones who are
putting the pressure on Russia so that they're forced to come
to the table and not as the stronger party.
I think this recent shift in which the US is clearly saying
we're not going to be strung along forever today, that is
(28:33):
positive. Yep.
I'm going to, I'm fascinated to see how Putin is going to try
and, you know, the wily bastard that he is trying to pick away
through this next 50 day. I think this would be a really,
a really, really fascinating test for him.
I mean, look, as I think, you know, I'm, I'm more pessimistic
about about Trump overall than than you might be.
(28:56):
And, and therefore I think it's,I think the problems are
probably more structural than than just the sort of the
language issues. And while I recognise the work
that Ruti has done here, and I recognise that sometimes we're
just going to have to do things that feel a bit odd or feel a
bit icky or whatever, to manage a particular situation as best
we can and just get an outcome that that is, that is tolerable.
(29:21):
And then, you know, over time, hopefully we find some kind of,
you know, stabilised, you know, functioning way to deal with
what, what I regard as genuinelya new America.
But let's just quit. Just put you on that.
I I do think that there is, we have to be careful that we don't
become ourselves fatalist and wedon't so over dramatise issues.
(29:46):
I think the recent conversation this week, another one that
we've had this week in Australiais, is over Taiwan and
politicians, I think of both sides have got missiles into,
they found it challenging to describe what Australia's
position is in relation to Taiwan.
(30:06):
I think our starting problem is that we shouldn't only be having
that conversation about Taiwan off the back of reports that the
US have asked the question aboutit.
We should be having questions. We should be having
conversations about Taiwan and South China Sea because it's in
Australias interests. And I'm I'm of the view that the
allowing ourselves to simply limit the debate to would
(30:30):
Australia automatically commit to a war?
Is the wholly wrong conversationto have.
We can't only have no conversation or are we involved
in a hot war situation. The problems are there now
without a hot wire war. We're in the middle of hybrid
warfare. We've got constant military
(30:51):
aggression by China over Taiwan,unprecedented numbers of
flyovers. They've got foreign
interference, cyber attacks, there's economic coercion,
diplomatic coercion. So all that is happening now.
Avoiding those conversations might be an easy path for the
(31:12):
political class in the short term, but it inevitably means
that there's longer term problems because China thinks
that it can get away with everything up to the first
bullet fired. And effectively we're creating a
situation where we're not explaining to the public why
there is a concern. We've got to get out of this
message that the only national security threats we have are
(31:34):
actual hot wars, because we are.We are effectively creating a
situation where we're saying to Beijing, you can almost get what
you want without firing shot because we'll let you push and
push and push. Sure, sure.
And and no, no, I think that's all fair.
I have no time for what? For what Colby is demanding of
of Australia and Japan about this future hypothetical
(31:55):
scenario. That said, I, I, I would, I
think we Australia would be in amuch better position if we more
consistently projected the message that we would always
stand up for, for, for the rulesbased order.
And, and I mean, I mean, you know, we, we say it in, in the
abstract, but we don't say it enough in, in concrete terms
(32:15):
about, you know, about, about, about the way we will actually
accept some of that burden. I, I agree.
I, I, I would say that I'm not sure you know, and I don't know
this, but I think the problem isI'm not convinced that the
Americans have made a demand because I think just as many
Australians have said that the Americans themselves are upfront
(32:37):
that they aren't, they have strategic ambiguity.
So again, I think because we're not willing at this stage to be
mature enough to have the conversation of what the
security threats are that we face.
All of a sudden we talk about Taiwan.
And I actually think that we've gone down any a wrong path here.
(33:00):
If the Americans have said we demand that you lock and load
right now on a hot wall, well then that's a problem.
But I'm not sure that I've actually seen a a demand if
there are requests to talk about, are we strategically
aligned and do we not? What do we want to work with
each other to deter a a militaryintervention by China on Taiwan?
(33:27):
Then that should be a conversation that we're willing
to have. I think in part it's Australia's
reticence to even go down that path.
That means we turn it into one of a sovereignty question of all
these are hypothetical questions.
Yes, the the form of a hot war is a hypothetical question.
But Dave, as you know as well asI do that our Defence Department
do does war gaming all the time.So it's not as they don't have
(33:49):
these hypothetical questions andare looking at them, but
regardless, it falls into the trap of thinking that the
conversation over Taiwan is a day after the bullets have been
fired. I think the question that
Australia and the US and Japan need to have is what are we
doing now about the hybrid warfare that's going on?
What are we doing to prevent thewar that people want to talk
(34:12):
about? So I think that's the problem
and I think if we're being requested to have that
conversation, we should be having it.
And yes, we should having be having it in all sensitivity and
classified forms behind the scenes.
But we should be talking to the Australian public about it.
Just as frankly, post 911, post Bali, we developed a system, the
terror threat level, to talk to the Australian public about what
(34:34):
the terror threat level is. So the Australian public always
knew everyday what the terror threat level is.
It's probable at the moment. It can't just be terrorism that
we're having that conversation with the public with.
Yeah, OK. Colby could clear it up to be
fair with by by making a public remark to that effect.
Now we were going to talk about the Middle East.
We're actually over time and you're you're going to be late
(34:55):
for a meeting. Yeah.
Should we pull the pin? Well, I, I, I think if people
are happy to, to, to have 32nd bursts from me and, and for you
to respond. This week has been busy.
And I think it is why I wouldn'tmind raising is because I think
we've, we do have to try and show that as a country,
Australia can handle multiple threats simultaneously because
(35:16):
that's the world we live in. We no longer live in a world
where we can handle and only have to handle one security
threat at a time. So the Middle East again blew up
this week with issues between Israel and Syria, which shows
that the Middle East is, is not stable, completely unstable.
(35:37):
I do think that again, part of my view that we need to be
having conversations with the public more about the world that
that currently exists, which is not a stable world, It's not a
secure world, goes to this issuethat I have.
I, I do think, I personally think it's sad that effectively
the only reason we're talking about the Druze minority in in
(35:59):
Syria is because people are getting upset with Israel,
Israel's military actions in relation to Syria.
Effectively what that is saying is that we'd rather Israel not
take military action so that we don't have to worry about what's
going on in the Middle East. I think that's a problem.
I think the international community needs to be better at
(36:22):
saying sectarian violence where whether it's the regime itself
or whether it's other groups within Syria that are harming A
minority group like the Druze, that should be a problem for us.
I think that Israel does have genuine security concerns in
(36:43):
relation to an unstable Syria. We, we, we Israel and the rest
of us shouldn't want terrorist groups like Hezbollah being able
to rise again by having ungoverned pockets of countries
like Syria. We've seen that in the past.
And so I, I do think that we need to again, have a bit more
of a mature conversation and notsimply begin a conversation
(37:07):
after Israel has taken military action here.
We have also to have, I think important to inform our viewers
that the current Syrian regime, which has been trying, I think
has been legitimately trying to,to have stability in Syria and
(37:29):
the US and Israel and the UK andothers have been trying to work
with the HTS regime. But they were a terrorist
organisation that took over a very bad regime.
I'm very pleased that the Assad regime is gone.
But serious has got to. The new Syrian regime, I think
has got to come to grips with the fact that it is now has
(37:51):
control. Do they want to simply be the
the terrorist entity that took over Syria, or do they want to
work with Israel and the US and the UK and others to create
stability in Syria? Which means that even when
they're not the ones, their regime isn't the ones to create
the violence against a minority.If other if sectarian violence
(38:11):
is happening, they're responsible for it.
Australia still lists the, the regime that as a terrorist
group. So when we're talking about
Israel's actions against Syria, I think it is important to
remember that until Australia D lists the HDS, as other
(38:32):
countries have done, we're dealing with a terrorist
organisation. All these facts need to be
better understood, but but the, the, the aim here needs to be
how do we create the stability within Syria, within the region
that creates safety for all parties?
And so we have that, I think. I think it's not.
We can't simply say Israel can'ttake any action to either
(38:54):
protect itself or minorities, noting of course that the Druze
minority, the one of the few places that they are protected,
is Israel, right? OK, OK.
My, my quick take on this is that I think, I think Al Sharah
has done enough to earn some trust and credit from the
(39:14):
international community, including Israel, you know, for
the project he's embarked on fora former terrorist leader.
I think he is, I think he's doing a reasonable job and the
best he can to, to bring together the extremely fractious
elements across Syria. It's a it's a very, very tough
job that he's got. It seems to me that he
(39:36):
miscalculated here by sending government forces into Soweta
province at a very, very in a very volatile situation that was
misconstrued by by the Druze militias who who then
overreacted to their presence. They were overreactions on both
(39:57):
sides. Israel, of course, then stepped
in and frankly, in my view, overreacted as well.
I I don't really know why they had to bomb the ministries in,
in Damascus as well as as well as targets in in sway to
province. So I think it was very telling
that Marco Rubio said that this was a misunderstanding.
I think he actually. Was speaking the truth there.
(40:18):
I think they just screwed up on both sides.
And, and what, what, what, what worries me most about it is that
it might have set back what appeared to be some fairly
constructive and progressive discussions between Israel and
Damascus about a non aggression pact, which, you know, part with
(40:39):
part partly involves the way theprovince as one of the one of
the southern provinces that Israel wants to be effectively
demilitarised. That is probably a bit too much
of A stretch for Damascus, But they, you know, they, they're,
they're negotiating on that. That's a really, really positive
thing. I mean, imagine if if Israel and
and Syria could actually have, you know, a non aggression pact
(40:59):
that would be huge for the region.
So. That's that's a really all very
good points. I, I agree.
I, I think the reality though, is with the Middle East, it is
unstable. And so there there are going to
be ups and downs. Sure, sure.
What, what the, the region needsto do, what those who care about
the region needs to do. Obviously the US with such a
(41:20):
leadership role needs to ensure that we can get through those
downs and recover from them withthe aim still being that
stability and the, the Israel Syria relationship, if it can
stabilise, great, as it would bewithout the Saudis.
So I think those aims shouldn't change, but I, I do think
(41:43):
there's, it needs to be, I just think there needs to be more of
a willingness to, to understand that simply doing nothing hasn't
helped any region. And so, Yep, overstepping the
mark, you don't want anyone overstepping the mark.
But I, I think that I, I think too often we don't actually have
(42:06):
any conversations until someone does overstep the mark.
But we've, we've, we've either ignored or we've missed the
entire lead up. And that happens, you know,
Europe, we've got a hot war in Europe because not enough was
done leading into 2022 to, to deter Putin.
We've got complete instability in the Middle East because not
enough was done to either deter Iran or it's terrorist proxies.
(42:28):
And your point about misunderstanding is, is I think
and Rubio's point, I, I think, Ithink Secretary Rubio was right
as well. I agree with you.
I think that's actually a reallyimportant element that we
shouldn't just be looking at as mere onlookers.
We should say, well, OK, that's interesting.
(42:48):
In our region, there is the opportunity for misunderstanding
in the South China Sea and otherareas.
So This is why we've got to do work now.
We we've got to get out of simply saying after something
happens, all that was what was that a misunderstanding?
Was it a miscalculation? Was it intentional?
Far better to try to be in a position to deter the
(43:11):
intentional and then be well placed that if there is a
misunderstanding to be able to recover as quickly as possible.
I think we can all work towards that.
Right. OK, cooler heads prevail, but
also forward thinking heads prevail to create more stable
situations for the future. All right, let's wrap it.
I shouldn't have said pull the pin earlier.
That was a that was an insensitive metaphor in the
context. But anyway, let's wrap it up for
(43:32):
today. Thanks, Justin, Pleasure.
Thanks for watching and listening folks.
We will be back tomorrow with a special episode on one of our
recent China investigations. Look out for it on Saturday
morning.
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