AUKUS must succeed. With Sir Stephen Lovegrove

This week on Stop the World, we were delighted to host Sir Stephen Lovegrove, the UK Prime Minister’s special representative on AUKUS. Dave speaks to Sir Stephen about the UK and US reviews of AUKUS, what success looks like for pillars one and two and where we need to move more quickly, including focusing on specific capabilities in pillar two.

It’s a frank conversation and Sir Stephen conveys a vigilant confidence that AUKUS is on a good track provided it gets the attention and nurturing that it deserves. He describes AUKUS as the most monumental strategic partnership in decades and, although it will evolve over time,  with commitment from all three countries, the partnership will succeed.

Episode Transcript

(00:01):
Stop the world. Welcome to Stop the World, the
Aspy Podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson and today I'm
joined by a very special guest host, Justin Bassey.
Thank you for joining me, Justin.
Dave has abandoned me to take a holiday this week.
That's right, Liv, it is a pleasure to be here with you.
And Dave actually delayed his holiday to be able to record

(00:22):
this podcast, given the importance of the topic and the
expertise of the interviewee. But there's no doubt that he was
looking forward to getting out of Canberra and going straight
to the Sunshine Coast. A wise decision, but we are
still here and we have a real treat for our Stop the World
listeners this week. That's right, Liv, we're joined
by Sir Stephen Lovegrove, the UKPrime Minister's Special

(00:43):
Representative on AUCUS. He joined me first of all at
Aspen for a fireside chat beforethen joining Dave in the podcast
room for a follow on conversation to do with all
things AUCUS. He was very generous with his
time and also very forthcoming. It's easy to to deflect
questions in these sorts of roles, but Sir Stephen is pretty
frank for a public servant in a role that has political

(01:04):
sensitivities and also high stakes for all three Orcas
partners. Is he?
He was actually there at the birth of orcas in September
2021, initially as the permanentsecretary of the Ministry of
Defence and then as Boris Johnson's national Security
advisor. So he really does know this
initiative down to its DNA, at why it was important then, why

(01:24):
it's important now, and that really comes through with his
commentary. Yes, we got some insights into
his own review for the UK government, his perspectives on
the US review being carried out by the Pentagon, and what might
be described as a confidence butnot complacency.
That orcas is on a good track, provided it gets the attention
and nurturing that it deserves. This is, after all, as Sir
Stephen says, the most monumental strategic partnership

(01:47):
in decades. It really is actually an
illuminating conversation on Stop the World this week, both
for its frankness but also its resolve that we can do this with
the right commitment. And that's an important message
as achieving the three nations Orcas objectives will go a long
way to achieving our respective and collective security needs.
So please listen carefully and we hope you enjoy the

(02:08):
conversation. Welcome back to STOP THE WORLD.
I'm here with Sir Stephen Lovegrove.
Sir Stephen, thanks for coming on.
Not at all great to be here. So you were national security
advisor to the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson when
August was conceived and delivered.
Pardon the the midwifery terminology, but that that's one
way to put it. There was a declared strategic

(02:30):
logic at the time that that was compelling.
Nearly four years have passed since then, and you know, a week
is a long term in geopolitics right now now, let alone a year.
Has the strategic logic become more compelling in that time?
And what do you see as the majorsort of trend lines to explain
that? I think it probably has become

(02:52):
more compelling in that time. I mean, it's the same strategic
logic. It's about the fact that the
world is considerably more perilous than it was before.
That great power competition is back.

(03:12):
Resource competition is back. It is important to be able to
hold our adversaries at risk. That is increasingly difficult
to do in a broadly transparent world and the most survival
survivable platform that can do that is the nuclear powered

(03:35):
submarine. I mean that's a nuclear powered
submarine as opposed to nuclear armed submarine.
The fact that as a result of August there will be more of
these incredibly potent platforms being sailed around
the world in areas that it is inincredibly important for all

(03:59):
nations to remain free and open is something that we were trying
to achieve with the with with the initiative and is as
important now as it ever was. As I say, I think it is a
different probably now the need for that is exactly the same,

(04:24):
although in kind, although the degree is probably even more
acute. I mean, one of the big
developments, of course, that hadn't happened yet in September
2021 when it was originally announced, is Russia's invasion
of Ukraine. And I suppose over, you know, in
the years that have have followed just the degree of

(04:46):
peril that Russia opposes to therest of Europe.
You have talked about the indivisibility of the Euro,
Atlantic and Indo Pacific realms.
You you've made references to, you know, the importance of of
all of these areas to to countries including the United

(05:07):
Kingdom. Is it not the case that I mean,
irrespective of how useful, how valuable orcas is to the United
Kingdom and, and you have, you know, you've, you, you, you've
talked about that as well. The the Indo Pacific focus, you
will get more better boats out of orcas than you would have got
out of your submarine programme previously.

(05:31):
But nonetheless, is it as I meanit's not quite an existential.
The Indo Pacific isn't quite as existential an issue to the UK,
especially given the amount of risk that Russia currently
poses. Has that not changed the dynamic
at all for the UK it? It at it's heart, no, I don't

(05:53):
think it has. There are a variety of reasons
why I say that. And even if it was, by the way,
I think that the Orcas, the Orcas programme allows us to
deal with that particular threats more effectively than we
would have done before. I mean, we are a trading nation

(06:16):
in the UK. We completely rely on free and
open trade routes. Huge amounts of commerce goes
through the Asia Pacific, the Indian Ocean.
These are areas where the Australian boats and the
American Virginia class by and large will be patrolling and we

(06:37):
are deeply grateful for that. And we require that to foot for
National Safety to continue. So I'm not, I'm not sort of kind
of overly changing my view aboutthe importance of that as a
result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

(06:58):
Russia's it? Just turning to Russia, Russia's
aggression is clearly of very considerable concern to
everybody in Europe. It should be of very
considerable concern to everybody in the on the globe.

(07:19):
They pose a very uncomfortable challenge to what I would call
the sort of kind of political West.
This is clearly driven by issuesto do with national self
determination and national cultural issues which I think

(07:40):
are very far away from being sort of kind of economically
rational. They have ended up with a number
of not alliances, but partnerships with countries
which wish us all ill and are, you know, posing a significant

(08:01):
danger right across the piece. So I think, you know, nothing
that has happened subsequently has changed the fundamental
assessment. It has complicated some of these
things, but it hasn't changed the fundamental assessment.
I mean the other thing that I would just say, and I'm going
to, you mentioned it, the fact of a pillar, one of Orcas, which

(08:24):
is about the nuclear powered submarines will mean that in the
U KS principal area of operation, which is a Euro
Atlantic, we will be getting more and better equipped and
more capable boats to be able todeal with the threat in the Euro
Atlantic, which is at the momentprincipally a Russian one.

(08:49):
With the melting of the ice capsin the Arctic, who knows what
other hostile vessels will be sailed in the Atlantic in the
future. OK.
I just want to talk about progress across both of the
pillars, Pillar one, first of all, I mean is, is progress

(09:10):
overall across the three partners satisfactory?
Where are we doing well and where do you think we need to
pick things up? I think satisfactory is probably
a reasonable, a reasonable assessment.
We have made in the UK pretty significant commitments to the

(09:31):
investments that we need up in the northwest of the country in
Barrow. The, the, the, the, the plant
that Rolls Royce runs in Derby, which will be providing the
nuclear propulsion plants for the Australian boats.
All of that investment has pretty much gone in now and

(09:52):
we're very pleased with the progress there.
I that the plans are coming, definitely coming together.
I don't think in a programme as big as this that you can ever
take your eye off the ball though, you know, things go
wrong. We had a fire which was
reasonably well reported up in Barrow.

(10:13):
That actually is not going to provide.
They all create a sort of kind of enormous amount of delay, but
unless it was dealt with properly, it might have done so.
This is going to be a question of security being a function of
constant vigilance in the States.
They're going through their own review at the moment.
I think the principal focus of that is going to be the

(10:36):
efficiency and productivity of the submarine industrial base.
There's it's been widely reported that they're not
producing Virginia's at the ratein which they would like.
I think that's their version of what we are doing.
So we're we are all working health a leather to be able to

(10:57):
make this as effective a programme as possible.
It is not going to be one of those efforts which we can sort
of suddenly turn off and decide that it's job done there and.
And are you able to comment on Australia and the progress that
it it has made? The progress in Perth, which is
I think the principal focus of the minutes, because that's

(11:18):
obviously where the Virginias will be coming to birth is, is
going pretty well as far as I can see.
Certainly on the most critical elements of the Perth build out
there are the odd things which are sort of kind of not moving
quite as fast. And indeed I did a review, there

(11:41):
is a review going on in the Pentagon at the moment.
And of course there's been a review in Australia as well.
And I think that's probably sortof kind of identified areas
where things could, will need tomove faster.
But that's the point of these things.
These are very big programmes. They, they, they, you know, we
need, they need constant attention and they're going to
have to be veering and hauling as we go through.

(12:04):
Let's stay on the Virginias justfor a moment.
I mean, they're currently, I forget the exact figures and it
changes a little depending on where you read it, but something
like 1 1/2 and they've got to get to 2.3.
But it's, it's a significant gapthat they need to make up.
And that's, that requires a hugeeffort, I suppose.
I mean, how concerned, how convinced are you that they can
actually get there? And what would be the knock on

(12:25):
effects in your mind if they can't deliver the 3:00 to 5:00
boats that that important Step 2in the optimal pathway?
Well, I think the two things arenot necessarily linked.
I mean, let's be clear. They might be for Australia
though. Well, they might not so have it

(12:48):
to take the two questions in, inin order.
I would never bet against the American ability to do very,
very difficult things if they really put their mind to it.
They are very frustrated as we know that they're not producing
the Virginia's at the speed thatthey would like to.
There is definitely, there are definitely signs that they are

(13:11):
moving in the right direction inthat area.
Part of the answer to it are theinvestments that not only they
are making, but Australia is making in the American submarine
industrial base. So I feel, you know, it's not
going to be a sort of an easy lift by any stretch of the
imagination. But as I say, I wouldn't bet

(13:34):
against them. I, I think as I say it is not,
it is not a given that by any stretch of the imagination that
there is a specific number of Virginias that needs to be
produced in America which will therefore trigger the the

(13:57):
successful transfer of Virginiasto Australia.
I mean, that is a decision that needs to be made.
It is not. There is no automaticity about
it. And the American interlocutors
that I have spoken to are all very clear about the strategic

(14:19):
criticality of orcas and the importance of A, Australia being
able to field a fleet of SSNS which are going to increase the
security of the of the of the region.
And and B, to provide the kind of birthing and sustainment

(14:45):
facilities in WA, which providesa, an enormous uplift, not
merely in terms of sort of kind of power projection into the
area for America, but also a very significant improvement in
the, in the ability of the Americans to keep their existing

(15:05):
fleet of Virginias at sea in greater quantities because the
maintenance facilities are just increased as a result.
OK, so I suppose I mean 22 quickfollow up questions and two
different ways of looking at it.To be fair, perhaps I should be
putting these to to the Australian Defence Minister, but
the two questions that I can seeis 1.
We actually just have the capability continuity that

(15:26):
Australia needs and the Virginias part of that, but also
it seems to be a fairly indispensable stepping stone
between, you know, currently operating a conventional fleet
of boats to eventually operatingthe Orcas SSN, just to be clear.
And when you say, when you said before that it might not be a
problem, could you, do you thinkit's plausible that we could

(15:50):
actually plug that Step 2 with some other capability if there
is a problem with the Virginias,but the Orcas, Orcas SSN is on
track and that would be a sort of satisfactory replacement Step
2 in the optimal pathway? Does that make sense?
It, it, it, it, it does make sense.
I think that there are a varietyof different potential

(16:14):
capabilities that could fill part of that gap.
I think though that it's important that and I'm sure all
of your listeners and viewers understand this, that there is
no real platform or substitute for a conventionally armed

(16:41):
nuclear powered submarine. They are by some margin the most
potent platform that we have forboth deterrence and if needs be,
combat. And all of our focus needs to be
on making sure that the production infrastructure

(17:04):
investment national world is directed towards making sure
that the optimal pathway is fulfilled.
OK. Pillar 2, now you've just you've
just made some remarks here at Asby about progress on Pillar
two. You, you mentioned that there
are some areas where you would, you would hope there would be, I

(17:27):
forget the exact words you used,but some projects up and running
perhaps. And I think you made a reference
to a view that perhaps a fewer number of projects or perhaps a
fewer number of capability areasshould be concentrated on.
Can you expand on that a little bit?
I mean, are there particular areas such as, I don't know, AI
or autonomy or something like that, that you think that we

(17:48):
should collectively direct our efforts to and I suppose save
ourselves the effort on on some other areas that mightn't be as
promising? Well, I, I, I definitely think
that we need to prioritise. I mean, clearly and you, you
know, everybody knows that if you've got a list of sort of

(18:08):
kind of 120, you are going to find yourselves in a, in
difficulty because these are complicated areas and they're
expensive areas and they're difficult to manage areas.
So we are not going to be successful unless we radically
reduce the number of projects that at three we are

(18:28):
concentrating on. That does not mean to say that
if the number is 120, those are not all worth doing, but it's a
question of what are the right ones to do between the UK,
Australia and the United States.And so we need to, you know,
because joint collaboration is not straightforward and we need
to not make our lives sort of kind of harder than it needs to

(18:50):
be. So we definitely need to neck
down to a smaller number of projects and that is happening
at the moment. I'm not really in a position to
be able to tell you which ones those are, partly because I'm
not in a position to be able to tell you which ones those are
for the reasons of classification, but partly
because the final decisions havenot been made.

(19:12):
But the general principle of sort of doing so is, is, is, is,
is, is there. I think I can say without any
real risk to my level of clearance that definitely
autonomy is going to be a very big part of this.
And for my money, the more that we can make some of these

(19:40):
priority areas naturally linked to the kind of capability that
the Pillar 1 efforts with the SSNS are providing, the better
it will be. Just because I think there's a
degree of consanguinity which I think is useful.
But all I think autonomy is a isa reasonably safe bet to say

(20:01):
that we'll we'll be. Having that pretty much front
and centre. OK.
And is that because of the enormous progress being made in
artificial intelligence generally across the board?
I think it's a whole host of different things really.
Autonomy is no longer clearly merely a function of just sort

(20:21):
of setting something off which is uncrewed.
The ability to control it and for it to control itself as a
result of advances in AI are areclearly very, very important.
And we are seeing both in the Middle East and in Ukraine on a
sort of kind of daily basis how how fast these things are are

(20:45):
are moving. But you know, it's worth
thinking about the kinds of platforms that we sort of kind
of in the political W sort of kind of operate from.
They are 5th and 6th generation aircraft which are clearly not
merely fighter jets anymore or bombers.

(21:05):
They are they are systems of of of weapons and platforms which
are with a central hub which controls them.
And clearly, likewise underneaththe underneath the waves, there
are, there are very many opportunities for autonomous

(21:25):
vehicles to make a difference aswell.
So there's a whole lot of different things which are going
on here, but all of them are pointing towards, I think,
autonomy as being a very, very big part of the future.
Right. OK, interesting.
You have two quick follow UPS onthat then there you have
indicated that there has been some progress in the last or you
know things have improved basically in recent times.

(21:46):
Can you expand on that at all and explain what it is that's
improved and why and and and does that portend potentially
some actual capabilities being, you know, brought forward to the
to the point of being put in thefield in the near future?
Yeah. First of all, I think the stock
takes are important. As I said earlier on, I think
it's, I think it's right and proper that new governments,

(22:09):
when they're thinking about things which are as big and
important as orcas, you know, have a look at them and see
whether or not they're on track and achieving the kinds of
ambitions and objectives that they were set out to do.
I think partly, certainly nothing, not entirely, but
partly the reviews that I've done, Dennis Richardson has done

(22:30):
are going on at the moment in the States are leading to people
saying, right, OK, let's make sure that we are sort of, you
know, concentrating on the things that matter.
And I think that has made a difference.
It is certainly the case that a,a focus has been on not
something which is going to be potentially deployable in you
know 15 years time. But actually you can get into

(22:53):
the hands of people who are going to be able to use it in
the field much, much sooner thanthat, certainly potentially in
the next year or so. OK, the review by Eldridge
Colby, are you worried? Do you have, are you completely
confident that that will not recommend that the United States

(23:16):
step back or step away from orcas?
I am I see no reason to believe that that will be the outcome of
the review by the Pentagon. I do think that the Orcas set of

(23:37):
programmes and the the the the initiative as a whole is a very
significant improvement in the security position of all three
countries. And I haven't heard anybody
think say otherwise. I have no doubt that there will

(24:01):
be improvements and adjustments which are potentially suggested,
as there were by me, as there were by Dennis, but I would be
very confident that orcas will survive for the future under all
circumstances. OK, one of the we're on a very
tight time frame, so this might have to be the last one.

(24:24):
There's been quite a bit of a combination of speculation, but
also some anonymously sourced commentary.
But enough of it to to make you think that there's there's
something there that one of the misgivings that the US has about
pillar one with respect to Australia is that it can't
guarantee that Australia will participate in future operations
or deployments. That would be in that, that

(24:46):
would, that the US would be, andthat it would expect Australia
to be, I mean, most obviously some kind of conflict arising
from Taiwan. That I mean, it seems to, it
seems a strange position for Australia to be in, given it
would be a very unusual to, you know, alliance or no that a,
that a country and a, and a government, I suppose ex ante

(25:07):
agrees or, or confirms that it will take part in some
hypothetical future deployment. I suppose.
I mean, do do you have any reflections on that?
And, and perhaps to look at it from the point of the UK, has
the has the UK ever found itselfexpected because of the nuclear
technology sharing arrangement, that it would take part in US

(25:29):
operations as part of that agreement?
No, it hasn't. I mean, that is not to say that
there haven't been moments at which the US has wanted to see
the support of the UK in conflicts that it it it it finds
itself in. But I have never seen in my

(25:52):
experience or seen any evidence in before my time, as it were,
of the nuclear collaboration agreements playing any part in
that or whatsoever. So I mean, Harold Wilson
famously did not join in the Vietnam War.

(26:13):
Of course the Australians did, Ithere was.
I know that it made absolutely no difference whatsoever to the
nature of nuclear collaboration,both on the weapons side, which
is important for us, not important for you, or on the
propulsion side. So I think this is AI think this

(26:34):
is a bit of a red herring if I'mhonest.
OK. All right.
That's good to hear. All right.
So, Steven, thanks so much for joining us.
Not at all. It's been a great pleasure to
talking. Thanks for listening to Stop the
World. That's all we have time for
folks, but we'll be back with another episode next week.
For more from Sir Stephen Lovegrove and on Orcas, head
over to the Aspie Canberra YouTube channel to watch his
fireside chat with Justin.