July 4, 2025 • 43 mins
For a brief spell after the Cold War, the idea of an international community that would coordinate and intervene in conflicts for the global good felt like an aspiration on the move.
It feels distant today, but all is not lost. Comfort Ero, the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group, gives us her take on the toughest conflicts plaguing humanity in recent times. Rather than feeling dispirited and paralysed by dysfunction at the global level, we should concentrate on tackling each crisis with the tools available and making a difference one step at a time, whatever it takes.
It’s a tough but ultimately inspiring message as Comfort talks about some of the conflicts that rarely trouble the front pages—Sudan, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—as well as the bigger picture amid the collapse of the rules-based order. Practicality and pragmatism, not magic multilateral wands, are what organisations like the Crisis Group have to work with.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:01):
Stop the world. The question is whether we can,
as you, as you say, find a pathway to peace.
That's what we are concerned andhow we get around there.
There, you know, it's very clearto me and it's very difficult.
It's a very difficult message toto sort of put on the table.
(00:23):
But the era of sort of comprehensive peace agreements
is sort of have sort of come to an end.
It's more about the ugly, imperfect peace.
But if we can stop the human suffering, if we can end the
atrocities, if we can end the mass killings, the ethnic
cleansing, I mean, that for me is what is really important.
(00:45):
Welcome back to STOP the WORLD, the ASP podcast.
I'm Olivia Nelson. And I'm David.
Roe. Today, our guest is Comfort
Arrow. Comfort is CEO and President of
the International Crisis Group and an NGO that carries out
research, an analysis with the aim of preventing and ending
wars. And Dave, this is a really
fascinating conversation. Yeah, this conversation didn't.
Really go where we intended, which was great.
(01:08):
I had these fairly fluffy abstract questions in mind about
the nature of conflict, and instead I found comfort talking
concrete realities and best solutions in an imperfect world.
And that turned out to be much more interesting.
Comfort has a quite practical and pragmatic approach to things
and have used really come together as a conversation
progresses. Clearly some of the conflicts in
Africa that don't get the attention that they deserve are
(01:29):
high on her agenda. So you end up talking about the
Democratic Republic of the Congoand Rwanda and of course Sudan
in some detail, as well as some of the big picture questions
about multilateralism and the widest state of the world,
including the Trump effect. Yeah, I found myself.
Thinking I'm really grateful that there are people like this
in the world, doing the work they do.
Because as. Belligerent as the world feels
(01:50):
right now, and as dysfunctional and hopeless as global
governance seems, there are organisations like the Crisis
Group making a difference and just making things a bit less
crap than they would otherwise be.
I couldn't agree more. I really hope people stick with
this one because it's well worththe listen.
So let's hear from Comfort Era. I'm here with comfort era
(02:11):
comfort. Thanks for joining me.
Thank you for having me. So we're going to try and cover
a lot in a short time here, but a good place to start is the
paper that you released on the 1st of January this year.
About 10 conflicts to watch in 2025.
I have to say it holds up ratherwell, but obviously an unstable
(02:33):
world delivers surprises. What's your overall take on the
first half of this year? Is it better or worse than you
were anticipating at the start of the year?
And what's surprised you or sticks out as noteworthy?
This is a very good question. I mean, I think the first thing
(02:53):
I will say is that the 10 conflicts to watch, which is
what you're referring to, it's not a predictive document.
It's about what we consider and and there's no science behind
it. It's what we consider as Crisis
Group based on our analysts in the field, a constellation of
(03:13):
what they think that we should watch throughout the year.
And what we want are readership,what we want decision makers,
policy makers to focus on throughout the year, partly from
a humanitarian crisis position, so that what are the key
conflicts that will pose a significant humanitarian
(03:37):
challenge, partly also because of the human suffering behind
those conflicts. There's also another category of
conflicts that where we see potential opportunities or where
we see a deterioration of conflicts as well.
So when you look at the list that we've got, it won't
(03:57):
surprise you that at the top of the of the top of the conflict
to watch, particularly also because we're writing in the
context of Trump coming in the the introduction was partly
about how you deal or how the world comes together.
That's already disrupted how it comes together and aligns itself
(04:20):
with somebody who's a disruptor,which is Trump.
But it also says that given the art of deal making of the man
himself, he may come across as providing sort of unorthodox
approaches and his iconoclism may lend itself to some
potential openings that we don'tnecessarily foresee.
(04:43):
Also because he himself has proclaimed that he is against
war and he wants to end sort of US foreign adventurism overseas
as a sense in which those foundational aspects of his own
foreign policy LED us to the conclusion that we may see some
opportunities. So it shouldn't surprise you
(05:05):
that right at the top, aside from the good news that Syria
was offering, that then we look straight away at places where we
thought that Trump could providean opening.
But at the same time, we said, look, there are places that for
all the reasons that we can discuss, may lend themselves to
(05:25):
further deterioration, more mayhem, more chaos, more human
suffering. And that we don't quite see
those openings yet. But it's worth noting to your
readers that the top 2 conflictsfor Crisis Group on the list 1
is a good news story at the time.
And it's still it's still I meanthe pictures mixed.
(05:49):
It's Syria good in terms of the dramatic transition that you saw
with the fall of 30 year brutal regime of Assad.
And then also the worst situation that we see is the
worst case humanitarian crisis still for this year, Sudan.
And then then we follow on into what we're watching right now in
(06:12):
Middle East. I think the big surprise for us
to go back to your opening question is what we're watching
right now with Iran. I mean, we did not imagine that
Trump would provoke or instigateor sort of to declare U.S.
troops bombing into Iran. So that admittedly was the the
(06:36):
big shock so far in this last six months.
And then I think the pace in which Trump has gone ahead with
a number of the issues that he said he was going to project has
been the stunning pace, I would say.
I think we already had a sense around things like USAID and
things like that. But it's the pace that I think
(06:59):
has been a shock, partly enabledby his former Lieutenant of
Doge. You know mosque as well, but you
know he's left, but it doesn't mean the pace has gone down.
As well, I mean, I completely agree with you about the
surprise with Trump being his willingness to use force.
(07:20):
You know what, what was a risky situation?
I mean, it could have provoked Areckless response from Iran
targeting US bases or US personnel around the region.
And then the US presumably wouldhave been dragged further into
conflict. I mean, there are all sorts of
things that Iran could have donethat it actually, well, we, we
don't want to obviously would declare the problem solved.
But so far the reaction from Iran has been relatively
(07:43):
restrained. And therefore it's the, the, the
gamble that Trump took has not produced the, the worst
outcomes. I'm interested what you say
about, I mean, this idea of his disruptive nature creating
opportunities. And I, I completely see the
logic of that. Are there any other, I mean,
it's hard to see where else it has happened to date.
(08:04):
I mean, his, you know, his approach to Ukraine has been
fairly unproductive and, and, you know, has been dismal in its
outcomes. Unfortunately, that's, that
continues. Certainly Israel, Gaza, there,
there isn't a lot to to look at in terms of bright outcomes that
Trump's disruptiveness might have created there.
I mean, do you see any other areas where perhaps that
(08:26):
disruption might actually createa sort of surprise opening?
You know, I think the so I mean,before I I'll come back to sort
of the other things that you're hinting of.
So if Iran sort of sent shock waves and concerns about sort of
where the US was headed to, especially in the context where
(08:48):
Trump said he didn't want to getinvolved in the forever wars and
where he said he didn't want to see US sort of what I won't say
troops, but just to see you as engagement and to be dragged
into a war, I think so that's sort of the negative side.
But, and I think it's worth sortof explaining negative because
(09:10):
we don't know where it's headed to.
I think the big surprise, the other big surprise on the more
positive Ledger has been in relation to the Great Lakes and
particularly the tensions between Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of of Congo.Because we walked, we walked
into the assumption that Trump'sforeign policy would not be
(09:34):
interested in engaging with Africa except for places where
we saw some kind of like strategic interests and for our
strategic interests meant China as well.
So I think in, if I recall, Somaliland, for example, was the
only Africa mention in the Project 2025.
(09:59):
So it was, it was very curious for us to see Trump's
administration be interested in the Great Lakes, be interested
in Rwanda and be interested in the Dr in the DRC.
And so last week on the 27th of June, we saw the Rwandese and
Congolese foreign minister sign an agreement under the US
mediation sort of concerning that fight that's been taken on
(10:22):
for a long time. I mean, in Eastern DRC, there
had been a long going regional effort being led by Angola and
being LED at one time by Kenya and various forces to deal with
sort of the tensions between Kinsasha and Kigali.
And suddenly we saw Qatar get engaged and then later the baton
(10:43):
being passed over to the US and the agreement, just to quickly
provide background to your to your listeners, the agreement
recommits both parties so Rwandan and the DLC to one
respect the territorial integrity of their neighbours
and then to cease collaboration with armed groups and to result
sort of disputed the dispute peacefully.
(11:07):
You'll recall at the start of this year that the M23, the
armed group that has sort of hadextensive support from Rwanda
had marched on extensively into into Goma.
And their demands were not just about about the east, but also
(11:28):
elements of of regime change. Rwanda has claimed since the
genocide of 1994 that for national security purposes, it's
still needed to deal with elements of those who were
involved in the genocide. And, and they they often used
the east of of Congo as a base for their own incursions to the
(11:50):
country. So that tussle has been going on
for quite some time. There is obviously an economic
agenda also there that binds Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC in a
tussle. But it's a surprising
development. And there is partly also a
minerals dimension, critical minerals being the big buzzword
(12:13):
and interest this year in 2025. And I think Felix Tusikidi
looked at what was going on in Ukraine and thought and wondered
whether this would be a way in which to get the US interested
and engaged to deal with with his own security dilemma in the
east of the country as well. And look, my ignorance is
(12:33):
embarrassing on display, embarrassingly on display in
real time here. But I mean, you, you clearly
you, you are giving credit to the to the US for brokering that
deal. I mean, what to what do you
attribute their their enthusiasmthere?
I mean, is it the, you know, fora famously America first
approach that this administration is taking?
(12:53):
Is it the Critical Minerals dimension, or are there other
reasons why they've decided to throw themselves into it?
So I mean there are other, I mean, I think at the core of it
is a critical minerals. I don't think we should sort of
shy away from that. That is ultimately what is
driving Trump's interests. There is no other sort of there
(13:15):
is no other sort of agenda. I mean, I think what is
important is that the the agreement between Kisacha and
Kigali is a result of sort of sort of months long diplomatic
process that was initiated in Doha and later stayed by the US.
So Qatar has a close relationship with Rwanda.
(13:36):
Tsukidi saw that as a potential way in which to engage Qatar.
And then there was an effort also then to bring in the US.
And I should actually back up and say that the Biden
administration had played a critical role during his his
tenure. And people like Anthony Blinken
(13:59):
had been very concerned and critical of the role that Rwanda
was playing also vis A vis the DRC.
So there was a sort of a legacy already there that saw the US
engaged. And then we saw at the start of
the year when things were reallyheating up between Kigali and
(14:19):
Kinshasa, we did see, we heard Trump acknowledge that this was
a serious crisis. But as I said, it was one
conflict that that we didn't imagine the US would be engaged
in. But to security, you know,
skilfully evoked the the critical minerals as a way in
(14:41):
which to get America involved now that the agreement itself
builds on previous agreements and existing frameworks for
things that have always been at the heart of the conflict.
So regional trade corporation todiffuse the tensions around
resource management and resourcecompetition, especially around
(15:03):
minerals and the US sort of negotiators.
And certainly they, in the conversations that they've had
with my colleagues, they saw thethat the critical incentive
around around sort of the minerals as a way of getting
both sides in involvement. Of course, the US is not acting
in an altruistic manner here. It sees the minerals investment
(15:26):
as a key feature of its engagement as well, even though
it's sort of deemphasised its own commercial angle.
But it's not acting out of altruistic sort of international
sort of rules of law game here. It's purely from a, from a, from
an economic incentive as well. And sorry, just one more sort of
vibe vibey type question on thisbefore I move on.
(15:48):
I mean, as someone who is dedicated to conflict prevention
and and reduction and the head of an organisation that is the
same, how do you feel about, I suppose, the pursuit of peace
negotiations driven by that narrow economic interest rather
than as a global good? I mean a lot of people.
A lot of Ukraine. Supporters were somewhat
(16:12):
outraged by Trump's, you know, minerals deal with, with
Ukraine. Others said, well, we've got to
be more pragmatic here and, and just recognise that if, if it if
it gets them constructively engaged, then that's better for
everyone. And of course, Volodimir
Zelensky was the one who reportedly first proposed it.
But I mean, do do you, is it, I suppose, do you see a a negative
(16:33):
global trend if the you know, ifthe if the the democratic
superpower of the world is pursuing, you know, peace deals
for that narrow economic gain rather than as a global good.
Look, that's a good question. That's a fair question.
And in a sense, we, you know, myself and our executive vice
(16:55):
president, we, we issued a report that sort of looked at
Trump's unorthodox approach to, to peacemaking and we
characterised the effort to end the war between sort of the, the
Rwandan backed N 23 and the Congolese forces.
We, we characterised it as sort of a bracing mix of mercantilism
(17:20):
and peacemaking. So, so answer your, to answer
your question that that, as I said, this was not altruistic,
This was not, this was not for some greater good.
But I think the question for us,the, the two question whether it
temporarily stops the M23 offensive from sort of pushing
(17:41):
on its March towards concession.So I think that's the, the one
thing, whether it gets the 2 presidents, Philip Chesakidi and
Paul Kagame, whether it gets them to, to end their own fight
and then we can get diplomacy and that we can get Chesakidi to
agree to talk to the rebels, something he's previously
refused to do. So that's the other big issue as
(18:03):
well. So I, as much as one may want to
sort of declare this sort of theugly, this is the ugly face of
peacemaking. But if it gets us closer to
ending what are quite horrific violence being committed in the
east of Congo, the human suffering is quite astronomical
(18:24):
as well. So, I mean, we're not naive to
say that this is going to get usout of the door.
And so one of the things that wedo say is that it will require
significant attention from otherkey leaders, other key actors,
one of the most important key actors.
And one of the elements of the peace agreement is that the
Africa Union itself steps in to help shore up the the agreement.
(18:49):
As I said to you, they've been successive agreements in the
past. Much of what was signed last
week in Washington is based on those previous agreements.
There's nothing essentially new in it.
What is different is that it's been ushered in by by Qatar on
the on one side and also the US who we didn't think was going to
(19:12):
be engaged in this way. So that's what's significant,
but it but the facts, the dynamics, the history behind
this conflict is still very muchthe the the same.
And I think the key question forus now is the follow up that has
to happen to make sure that we deal with also, I think another
(19:34):
reality that we need to grapple with, which is being partly why
this conflict has just gone on and on is that there are
different competing mediators inthe room as well.
So you've got, I mentioned the Americans of Qatar and they're
going to likely hand over because they're not going to
they're not going to want to keep this file for too long.
They're going to have to hand over to the African Union and
making sure that the African mediation structure, which is
(19:57):
ill prepared at the moment and is riven rivalries, rivalries
make sure that we. And manage that to get to a more
sustainable peace because both sides in this conflict will play
off the fact that the AU and andand the competition will will as
a result undermine that the agreement as well.
So you've mentioned Sudan, You've written and spoken about
(20:19):
it as well quite a bit in the past.
We did a podcast on it ourselvesa couple of months ago.
It is the world's worst conflictin terms of the numbers of
people displaced, driven to hunger and so forth.
It's, I mean, depressingly, it has everything in terms of
drivers. It's got local sectarian and
ethnic tensions. It's got rivalry between two
(20:41):
powerful elites. It's got resources that are
being fought over or or being sought after by such as gold,
critical minerals. There are outside larger states
interfering provision of new technologies, new weapons such
as drones, obvious neglect from the international community
that's preoccupied with other things.
I mean, just if you had a momentto, I suppose, tell our
(21:06):
listeners, but imagining that you, you've got a chance to
speak to G7 leaders, for instance, and give a sort of
five minute take on on why This is, why this is a crucial
conflict for them to pay attention to What what's the,
what's the case for, for how we might actually resolve this.
I mean, I think your own openingremarks is the case as well.
(21:27):
The headlines suggest that the worst crisis of our time is Gaza
and Ukraine, and that, you know,and these two typify the crisis
of our time. But when one goes through the
numbers that you've just described again, you realise
(21:48):
that Sudan is sort of the epicentre of the sort of new
landscape of conflict that we'redealing with.
So it's a, you know, it's a world's largest displaced crisis
with over 10 million people displaced internally.
And then more than 1,000,000 refugees are crossed into Chad,
(22:10):
a very vulnerable, weak country.South Sudan, a country that was
only midwifed 10 years ago, Egypt and Ethiopia, all these
countries are going through their crisis of, you know,
crisis internally. The Horn of Africa itself is, is
a sort of a microcosm of all thesort of geopolitics, both
(22:32):
regional, both international that you can imagine as well.
It's also a region where a number of key actors, Gulf
countries, China, Europe, you know, Russia are all see
themselves as key stakeholders in this region as well.
So there is both a strategic interest, there's a humanitarian
(22:55):
imperative as well. And there's a real concern that
yet another internationalised civil war confronts this region
as well. And humanitarian agencies, if
you want to even have it in morestardom, humanitarian agencies
will tell you that 25 million people over more than half the
people of the population are in own need of assistance as well.
(23:18):
And that we were talking earlierthis year and last year that
this is a country that is varying towards famine as well.
So all the numbers, all the indicators of a humanitarian
tragedy should be the reasons why sort of international
attention should grab and shouldbe at the top of mind for
(23:40):
everybody as well. You know, at least 15 to 20,000
estimated have been killed. You know, there's limited access
to all the key areas and as and as I said, it was just 20 years
ago that we were talking about genocidal like crimes being
committed in Darfur. And Fast forward the same,
(24:04):
Darfur is now seeing sort of famine conditions, acute food
insecurity, aid delivery as well.
And the civil infrastructure hascollapsed through the many
regions of of Sudan. 80% of the hospitals in active combat areas
are non functional. So I don't know what other case
(24:26):
1 needs to make to get world's attention.
Focus on urban warfare, on the ruinous nature of Sudan.
And the conflict is not just in Sudan anymore, but it's sucking
in the region as well. It's a remarkable insight that
(24:47):
you just certainly gave to me. I mean, this idea of the
epicentre of a new landscape of conflict, it, it feels to me
like what you're describing there is, I mean, almost, I
mean, so many of the world's problems actually sort of
coalescing around around 1 country and there's conflict
there. I mean, you talk about, I mean,
I suppose geopolitical trends perhaps in the 1990s, in the
(25:08):
post Cold War period. We were talking for a while
about this, the world coming together to, to solve conflicts.
It almost feels as if you're describing there that the world
coming together to ruin a country through, you know, each
country sort of pursuing its owninterests without any, without
any sense of sort of global responsibility for conflict
(25:28):
reduction or resolution. Is it?
Is it that depressing? It is that depressing.
I mean, to add even more sort oftexture and complexity to what
you've said, it's also the battleground for middle power
contests as well. So what why I describe it as
sort of the epicentre as well isthat is that the war itself has
become a flashpoint for sort of intensifying regional
(25:52):
competition among what we call middle powers.
And those middle powers, it's Egypt, it's Saudi Arabia, it's
UAE, it's Turkey, each of them speaking to shape the conflicts
outcome to fit their own strategic interests.
So it's less about Sudan. And we said earlier this year
that if you took all of these external interests out, the path
(26:16):
towards getting close to to resolution will not necessarily
be be perfect, will not necessarily end easily, but that
complex the nature of external interference and take that away
and it may it may allow us to see some openings to end the
fighting as well. So, but it's harder now because
(26:36):
while Egypt and Saudi Arabia andTurkey all back, for example,
the Sudanese armed forces, theiragendas do it diverge.
You've got Egypt is focused on our waters security, so
preventing in state fragmentation in Saudi Arabia
having shifted from sort of being sort of mediated to
advocate now champions of Sudanese armed forces.
You've got recognition as a legitimate state.
(26:59):
And then you've got turkeys driven by its own sort of
commercial ideological interests.
And then on the other side of the Ledger, you've got the
United Arab Emirates by contrast, has emerged over time
as a sort of the the backer, assertive backer of the Rapid
Support Force that the coup Crufer, the paramilitary that
was created by the former oustedregime of Bashir, also allegedly
(27:24):
now supplying the RSF with arms and drones.
So, you know, the, the, the survival of the belligerence of,
of this crisis, it's partly because of their external
backers as well. So we need to find a way in
which to deal with those competing interests on the
outside that give that give lifeto the war internally.
(27:47):
And then we've got to start thinking about, you know,
because it's about power betweenthe the Sudanese Armed Forces
and the Rapid Support Force. It's about power.
It's about who gets control of Khartoum.
It's about who controls the resources.
Now, if you can take the external dimension out of it,
I'm not saying it's going to be easy, but it at least will
enable us to begin to think about de escalation and dealing
(28:09):
with the humanitarian crisis in the in the country as well.
Do you worry that that Sudan is an early, I guess, indication of
what may become a broader globaltrend where you have multiple
powers reaching in to other countries and contributing to
conflict? Whether it's, you know, a
(28:30):
desperate battle for resources, which, you know, critical
minerals are obviously a hugely important resource for all sorts
of technologies. The reach of other countries is
is greater. There's something like the
supply of drones and some basic ISR.
I mean, this is sort of the new AK-40 sevens of the, you know,
the twenty 20s and beyond. Are you worried that this might
(28:53):
be a a new global trend that we might see elsewhere?
No, no, I mean you're, you're right.
In fact, you're speaking directly in line with an article
again, another one that authoredwith our Executive Vice
president, Richard Atwood. And as you were speaking, it
reminded me of the article that we wrote back in 2023 that Sudan
itself today, the title of that piece was called Sudan and the
(29:19):
New Age of Conflict and How regional power politics were
Fueling deadly War. So there is a, there is a
Sudanese dimension to this. I don't want to exonerate.
I don't want to say that that there isn't, you know, and there
was a, there was a, a transition.
There was hope back in 2019 where, you know, all of us spoke
(29:41):
about a revolutionary moment, a young dynamic movement across
the Society of Sudan that has sort of propelled optimism in
the country. But that sort of that sort of
reversed itself because the, thecompetition and the and the
tussle for power between these two forces, the the the army and
(30:04):
then the paramilitary army sort of cut, cut short that an
inspiring revolution choked it to its core, prevented and
obstructed Sudan's democratic transition.
And but also, as I said, becauseof the, the various security
(30:25):
commercial interests of other players, there were signs
already that the effort to sort of put together a viable peace
in Sudan was also going to be hijacked not only by that
internal power competition, but also by the the, the interests
(30:47):
of others outside as well. So in a sense, the the
entanglement that we're seeing in Sudan today to go to your to
go to what you said is symptomatic of the larger shifts
in global power as well. And is symptomatic of the sort
of jockeying for influence in unstable arenas is symptomatic
(31:09):
of the sort of the dynamics thathelp to fuel the deadliest of
wars that we're that we're seeing.
And it's also symptomatic of thekind of weaponry that is used.
And, you know, we saw how drones, for example, were
ultimate game changers in Ethiopia war.
We saw how there were ultimate change game changes in in in
other crises as well. And we've seen also because 20
(31:34):
years ago, you know, Sudan was under the purview in terms of
managing the crisis. Sudan was under the purview of
the United States governments along around the world.
You know, they tucked themselvesbehind the United States as a
lone hegemon, you know, driving through and bringing and
stability to a number of these regions.
What one of the consequences I think today is that, you know,
(31:57):
many sense of vacuum of influence, it's a real tussle
now and you're seeing sort of crises like Sudan become proxies
for for other interests and for other rivals to advance their
own interests in a place like like Sudan as well.
It's a, it's a bit of a wearyingcliche to talk about the
(32:19):
collapse of the rules based order.
But I mean, to what extent is what you are talking about here
reflective of that collapse in the, I suppose the constraining
effect that the rules based order had on, on middle powers
on on global conflict around theworld?
I mean what, what how much do you attribute to that?
Look, it's, it's a question that's on that's on everybody's
(32:41):
mind. I mean, I, I, I mean, I more and
more people talk less about rules based international order
and talk about sort of international law.
And we're seeing the obvious wayin which that is being
undermined quite glaringly. I mean, we can talk about
Saddam, but you know, you're looking at it also in the
context of Russia own invasion into into into Ukraine, where
(33:09):
the the principle of non aggression has been violated as
well. So it's not not on the altar of
Sudan alone that you've seen sort of the principles that
govern that should govern states, especially around sort
of humanitarian principles and Geneva Convention.
It it didn't start and it wouldn't end in in Sudan.
(33:32):
But Sudan is also a reminder that the guardrails that would
often could tell or constrain leaders from excessive use of
force are no longer viable. That it's very hard now in a
situation where you see sort of things when you look at
(33:55):
developments in Myanmar, for example, where the junta is
pretty sort of entrenched and where it's used the most vicious
type of tactics. Where in Noguna Karabakh there
was nobody to restrain the takeover there, where you've
seen gangs use the most heinous forms of atrocities to control
(34:16):
Haiti and the Sahel. You can go on and on, and
nobody's able to hold any of these leaders into check.
And there's a sense in which youcan get away with them.
You know, you can get away with with with undermining the core
tenets and standards of international law because every
other leader's watching other leaders get away with the rules
(34:39):
that govern aggression. And you're seeing others trying
to sort of redraw borders by force.
You're seeing the sort of nuclear non proliferation
architecture have been undermined.
You're seeing the norms against masculine and ethnic cleansing,
for example. Everywhere you turn, you're
seeing these mass assaults. So it's no wonder that the the
(35:00):
leaders in somewhere like Sudan or elsewhere feel that they can
get away with that because there's nobody able to constrain
them. And we're in this, in this world
where the, the rules themselves have been shattered, they've
been undermined. It's a very messy world.
It's a world where I, I think, you know, to go back to our, our
(35:22):
10 conflicts to watch that you mentioned at the top of the
conversation, we did say that this was going to be the year of
lawlessness. And we're seeing it right in
front of us, our faces and in practically every conflict that
we're we're watching this ability to ride over the rules,
the principles that would govern, that would govern states
(35:44):
at a time of war as well. We're going to go over time, but
there are two more things that Ido desperately need to ask you.
And hopefully they will put us on a trajectory where we can
finish feeling a little inspiredthat we can all find a way to
contribute. I mean, the first is just tell
me about, I mean, in your time leading the Crisis Group and,
(36:05):
and elsewhere. I mean, what, what have you,
what have you seen are the the most effective pillars of
conflict resolution? How do you think those are
changing in this sort of, you know, this year of lawlessness
that we're, that we're talking about?
And, and what is the, and I guess what's the pathway for
some sort of, you know, I, I guess global resolution
mechanism, you know, in the absence of a sort of
(36:29):
functioning, I don't know, multilateral kind of, you know,
body who can, who can really help in the way that we hoped it
might, it might have 30 or 40 years ago.
Yeah. Look, let me say one thing and
I, I really do want to emphasisethis because that sometimes we,
we focus heavily on all that is wrong, that we sometimes miss
(36:52):
some of the openings that we seeor the potential path.
And so it, we deliberately started with, with Syria in the
10 conflicts to, to watch because we saw all the
opportunities, therefore all thechallenges that Syria is facing,
(37:14):
which we acknowledged when we were writing the, the 10
conflicts. We did say it was an important
good news because we saw that one of the world's sort of
bloodiest conflicts was sort of coming to, to an end as well.
Now a lot could go wrong. And we acknowledged that as
well. And I think also the the work,
(37:35):
the effort that went into getting Trump call an end to the
sanctions for Syria. Now it's going to be complicated
because there is no magic wand that you can wave to sort of
lift all all the sanctions. But he's articulation of that
when he was in Riyadh was quite significant as well.
(37:58):
So I don't think we should lose sight of what that means for
Syrians who know themselves thatthey that there's a lot of
danger around them in terms of dealing with just the multiple
of sort of disorder in the country.
We're already seeing it, the tensions in in the country as
well. So I think we should keep that
(38:20):
sort of the top of the mind thatthere are things that
international actors can do to enable the process to continue
on its path, even though we knowthat there are a number of sort
of challenges that will confrontthe country as well.
So I just want to say that as well, there are other sort of
(38:41):
areas where, you know, for all the four storms and four starts
that we see, you know, whether it's in Colombia, whether it's
in, even in, in Haiti, whether it's in the tensions that are
looming in in Bangladesh and even in Afghanistan.
The the anxiety is acute. And yet there are sort of little
(39:05):
glimmers and opportunities. And I think the key for us is to
make sure the door remains open when we see those opportunities,
even if it's going to be difficult some.
Sometimes the door is is firmly shut and sometimes it it gets
open. And it's how to make sure you
keep those doors open throughoutthe way.
And the other issue that I thinkis, is worth noting.
(39:28):
So I said to you already that atthe start, there are there are
certain things that we didn't imagine that we would see.
And as we speak, by the way, thequestion of a ceasefire for Gaza
is back on the table. It's subject to the agreement
of, of Hamas accepting it and also of, of Israel, which, you
(39:51):
know, which undermined it back in March, the one that Trump put
together. Credit to, to President Trump
for pushing it through. Now it's to get it back onto the
table and, and ensures that it sticks as well.
So there are openings the the the keys.
Whether we can keep the door open long enough to end all the
(40:11):
suffering that we're seeing as well.
So, you know, there are troubleson the horizon.
But at the same time, there are some places where we can see
some openings as well. And, you know, we didn't mention
it, but you mention it in passing with Ukraine.
(40:32):
I mean, it's going to be a tough, difficult summer, but
we've also seen some important diplomacy take place.
And I think, you know, Trump hasshown his frustration with with
with Putin, Whether it's going to alter the reality on the
ground in Ukraine, it's still the the unknown question.
(40:53):
But nonetheless, diplomacy has been crucial also in that in
that particular crisis. So the message is that we have
to hope that people of goodwill will will find creative and
imaginative solutions to to to crises and conflicts case by
case, rather than sort of hope for some some sort of
(41:16):
overarching formula or mechanism.
Is that, I mean is that a fairway to put?
It, yeah, that's one way. And I just think that in this
era of transactionalism and it didn't start with Trump and it
wouldn't start end with him and where multilateralism as well is
sort of in the doghouse. It's not performing in the way
(41:37):
there are other there has to be other ways.
And in in the end, you know, some a leader have an interest,
a leader been transactional. That's not for me that the key.
The question is whether we can, as you, as you say, find a
pathway to peace. That's what we are concerned and
how we get around there. There, you know, it's very clear
(41:58):
to me and it's very difficult. It's a very difficult message to
to sort of put on the table. But the era of sort of
comprehensive peace agreements has sort of, sort of come to an
end. It's more about the ugly,
imperfect peace. But if we can stop the human
suffering, if we can end the atrocities, if we can end the
(42:20):
mass killings, the ethnic cleansing, I mean, that for me
is what is really important. The politics of getting it to
stick. That's also going to be the
conundrum. And it's very difficult moment
to sort of peacemaking and and diplomacy as well.
But this is what this for me is the heart of the matter.
(42:41):
It's an ugly path to peace, but we have to get there because
it's just the sheer scale of human suffering that's around us
as well. Comfort look, I hope everyone
takes that on board. I, I, I suppose I, I feel a bit,
I feel wiser, perhaps a bit morerealistic.
But I think you've left me thereon a, on a note of positivity
that despite the sometimes depressing picture that we, that
(43:04):
we see around us, the, the, the,the task ahead of us is to, is,
is to press on, find solutions wherever we can, however
imperfect they are, and, and stop what is, you know, some
like almost unfathomably appalling bloodshed going on
around the world right now. Exactly.
And I think a degree of pragmatism, sure, but also
(43:28):
you're dealing with the the political realities as it is.
It's not an acceptance of those realities, but it's how you work
with those realities. I think it's it's the core to
get into to a viable piece that deals with those atrocities as
well. All right, Comfort, thank you so
much for joining us. Thank you very much.
Thanks for listening, folks. We'll be back next week.
Stop the world. The question is whether we can,
as you, as you say, find a pathway to peace.
That's what we are concerned andhow we get around there.
There, you know, it's very clearto me and it's very difficult.
It's a very difficult message toto sort of put on the table.
(00:23):
But the era of sort of comprehensive peace agreements
is sort of have sort of come to an end.
It's more about the ugly, imperfect peace.
But if we can stop the human suffering, if we can end the
atrocities, if we can end the mass killings, the ethnic
cleansing, I mean, that for me is what is really important.
(00:45):
Welcome back to STOP the WORLD, the ASP podcast.
I'm Olivia Nelson. And I'm David.
Roe. Today, our guest is Comfort
Arrow. Comfort is CEO and President of
the International Crisis Group and an NGO that carries out
research, an analysis with the aim of preventing and ending
wars. And Dave, this is a really
fascinating conversation. Yeah, this conversation didn't.
Really go where we intended, which was great.
(01:08):
I had these fairly fluffy abstract questions in mind about
the nature of conflict, and instead I found comfort talking
concrete realities and best solutions in an imperfect world.
And that turned out to be much more interesting.
Comfort has a quite practical and pragmatic approach to things
and have used really come together as a conversation
progresses. Clearly some of the conflicts in
Africa that don't get the attention that they deserve are
(01:29):
high on her agenda. So you end up talking about the
Democratic Republic of the Congoand Rwanda and of course Sudan
in some detail, as well as some of the big picture questions
about multilateralism and the widest state of the world,
including the Trump effect. Yeah, I found myself.
Thinking I'm really grateful that there are people like this
in the world, doing the work they do.
Because as. Belligerent as the world feels
(01:50):
right now, and as dysfunctional and hopeless as global
governance seems, there are organisations like the Crisis
Group making a difference and just making things a bit less
crap than they would otherwise be.
I couldn't agree more. I really hope people stick with
this one because it's well worththe listen.
So let's hear from Comfort Era. I'm here with comfort era
(02:11):
comfort. Thanks for joining me.
Thank you for having me. So we're going to try and cover
a lot in a short time here, but a good place to start is the
paper that you released on the 1st of January this year.
About 10 conflicts to watch in 2025.
I have to say it holds up ratherwell, but obviously an unstable
(02:33):
world delivers surprises. What's your overall take on the
first half of this year? Is it better or worse than you
were anticipating at the start of the year?
And what's surprised you or sticks out as noteworthy?
This is a very good question. I mean, I think the first thing
(02:53):
I will say is that the 10 conflicts to watch, which is
what you're referring to, it's not a predictive document.
It's about what we consider and and there's no science behind
it. It's what we consider as Crisis
Group based on our analysts in the field, a constellation of
(03:13):
what they think that we should watch throughout the year.
And what we want are readership,what we want decision makers,
policy makers to focus on throughout the year, partly from
a humanitarian crisis position, so that what are the key
conflicts that will pose a significant humanitarian
(03:37):
challenge, partly also because of the human suffering behind
those conflicts. There's also another category of
conflicts that where we see potential opportunities or where
we see a deterioration of conflicts as well.
So when you look at the list that we've got, it won't
(03:57):
surprise you that at the top of the of the top of the conflict
to watch, particularly also because we're writing in the
context of Trump coming in the the introduction was partly
about how you deal or how the world comes together.
That's already disrupted how it comes together and aligns itself
(04:20):
with somebody who's a disruptor,which is Trump.
But it also says that given the art of deal making of the man
himself, he may come across as providing sort of unorthodox
approaches and his iconoclism may lend itself to some
potential openings that we don'tnecessarily foresee.
(04:43):
Also because he himself has proclaimed that he is against
war and he wants to end sort of US foreign adventurism overseas
as a sense in which those foundational aspects of his own
foreign policy LED us to the conclusion that we may see some
opportunities. So it shouldn't surprise you
(05:05):
that right at the top, aside from the good news that Syria
was offering, that then we look straight away at places where we
thought that Trump could providean opening.
But at the same time, we said, look, there are places that for
all the reasons that we can discuss, may lend themselves to
(05:25):
further deterioration, more mayhem, more chaos, more human
suffering. And that we don't quite see
those openings yet. But it's worth noting to your
readers that the top 2 conflictsfor Crisis Group on the list 1
is a good news story at the time.
And it's still it's still I meanthe pictures mixed.
(05:49):
It's Syria good in terms of the dramatic transition that you saw
with the fall of 30 year brutal regime of Assad.
And then also the worst situation that we see is the
worst case humanitarian crisis still for this year, Sudan.
And then then we follow on into what we're watching right now in
(06:12):
Middle East. I think the big surprise for us
to go back to your opening question is what we're watching
right now with Iran. I mean, we did not imagine that
Trump would provoke or instigateor sort of to declare U.S.
troops bombing into Iran. So that admittedly was the the
(06:36):
big shock so far in this last six months.
And then I think the pace in which Trump has gone ahead with
a number of the issues that he said he was going to project has
been the stunning pace, I would say.
I think we already had a sense around things like USAID and
things like that. But it's the pace that I think
(06:59):
has been a shock, partly enabledby his former Lieutenant of
Doge. You know mosque as well, but you
know he's left, but it doesn't mean the pace has gone down.
As well, I mean, I completely agree with you about the
surprise with Trump being his willingness to use force.
(07:20):
You know what, what was a risky situation?
I mean, it could have provoked Areckless response from Iran
targeting US bases or US personnel around the region.
And then the US presumably wouldhave been dragged further into
conflict. I mean, there are all sorts of
things that Iran could have donethat it actually, well, we, we
don't want to obviously would declare the problem solved.
But so far the reaction from Iran has been relatively
(07:43):
restrained. And therefore it's the, the, the
gamble that Trump took has not produced the, the worst
outcomes. I'm interested what you say
about, I mean, this idea of his disruptive nature creating
opportunities. And I, I completely see the
logic of that. Are there any other, I mean,
it's hard to see where else it has happened to date.
(08:04):
I mean, his, you know, his approach to Ukraine has been
fairly unproductive and, and, you know, has been dismal in its
outcomes. Unfortunately, that's, that
continues. Certainly Israel, Gaza, there,
there isn't a lot to to look at in terms of bright outcomes that
Trump's disruptiveness might have created there.
I mean, do you see any other areas where perhaps that
(08:26):
disruption might actually createa sort of surprise opening?
You know, I think the so I mean,before I I'll come back to sort
of the other things that you're hinting of.
So if Iran sort of sent shock waves and concerns about sort of
where the US was headed to, especially in the context where
(08:48):
Trump said he didn't want to getinvolved in the forever wars and
where he said he didn't want to see US sort of what I won't say
troops, but just to see you as engagement and to be dragged
into a war, I think so that's sort of the negative side.
But, and I think it's worth sortof explaining negative because
(09:10):
we don't know where it's headed to.
I think the big surprise, the other big surprise on the more
positive Ledger has been in relation to the Great Lakes and
particularly the tensions between Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of of Congo.Because we walked, we walked
into the assumption that Trump'sforeign policy would not be
(09:34):
interested in engaging with Africa except for places where
we saw some kind of like strategic interests and for our
strategic interests meant China as well.
So I think in, if I recall, Somaliland, for example, was the
only Africa mention in the Project 2025.
(09:59):
So it was, it was very curious for us to see Trump's
administration be interested in the Great Lakes, be interested
in Rwanda and be interested in the Dr in the DRC.
And so last week on the 27th of June, we saw the Rwandese and
Congolese foreign minister sign an agreement under the US
mediation sort of concerning that fight that's been taken on
(10:22):
for a long time. I mean, in Eastern DRC, there
had been a long going regional effort being led by Angola and
being LED at one time by Kenya and various forces to deal with
sort of the tensions between Kinsasha and Kigali.
And suddenly we saw Qatar get engaged and then later the baton
(10:43):
being passed over to the US and the agreement, just to quickly
provide background to your to your listeners, the agreement
recommits both parties so Rwandan and the DLC to one
respect the territorial integrity of their neighbours
and then to cease collaboration with armed groups and to result
sort of disputed the dispute peacefully.
(11:07):
You'll recall at the start of this year that the M23, the
armed group that has sort of hadextensive support from Rwanda
had marched on extensively into into Goma.
And their demands were not just about about the east, but also
(11:28):
elements of of regime change. Rwanda has claimed since the
genocide of 1994 that for national security purposes, it's
still needed to deal with elements of those who were
involved in the genocide. And, and they they often used
the east of of Congo as a base for their own incursions to the
(11:50):
country. So that tussle has been going on
for quite some time. There is obviously an economic
agenda also there that binds Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC in a
tussle. But it's a surprising
development. And there is partly also a
minerals dimension, critical minerals being the big buzzword
(12:13):
and interest this year in 2025. And I think Felix Tusikidi
looked at what was going on in Ukraine and thought and wondered
whether this would be a way in which to get the US interested
and engaged to deal with with his own security dilemma in the
east of the country as well. And look, my ignorance is
(12:33):
embarrassing on display, embarrassingly on display in
real time here. But I mean, you, you clearly
you, you are giving credit to the to the US for brokering that
deal. I mean, what to what do you
attribute their their enthusiasmthere?
I mean, is it the, you know, fora famously America first
approach that this administration is taking?
(12:53):
Is it the Critical Minerals dimension, or are there other
reasons why they've decided to throw themselves into it?
So I mean there are other, I mean, I think at the core of it
is a critical minerals. I don't think we should sort of
shy away from that. That is ultimately what is
driving Trump's interests. There is no other sort of there
(13:15):
is no other sort of agenda. I mean, I think what is
important is that the the agreement between Kisacha and
Kigali is a result of sort of sort of months long diplomatic
process that was initiated in Doha and later stayed by the US.
So Qatar has a close relationship with Rwanda.
(13:36):
Tsukidi saw that as a potential way in which to engage Qatar.
And then there was an effort also then to bring in the US.
And I should actually back up and say that the Biden
administration had played a critical role during his his
tenure. And people like Anthony Blinken
(13:59):
had been very concerned and critical of the role that Rwanda
was playing also vis A vis the DRC.
So there was a sort of a legacy already there that saw the US
engaged. And then we saw at the start of
the year when things were reallyheating up between Kigali and
(14:19):
Kinshasa, we did see, we heard Trump acknowledge that this was
a serious crisis. But as I said, it was one
conflict that that we didn't imagine the US would be engaged
in. But to security, you know,
skilfully evoked the the critical minerals as a way in
(14:41):
which to get America involved now that the agreement itself
builds on previous agreements and existing frameworks for
things that have always been at the heart of the conflict.
So regional trade corporation todiffuse the tensions around
resource management and resourcecompetition, especially around
(15:03):
minerals and the US sort of negotiators.
And certainly they, in the conversations that they've had
with my colleagues, they saw thethat the critical incentive
around around sort of the minerals as a way of getting
both sides in involvement. Of course, the US is not acting
in an altruistic manner here. It sees the minerals investment
(15:26):
as a key feature of its engagement as well, even though
it's sort of deemphasised its own commercial angle.
But it's not acting out of altruistic sort of international
sort of rules of law game here. It's purely from a, from a, from
an economic incentive as well. And sorry, just one more sort of
vibe vibey type question on thisbefore I move on.
(15:48):
I mean, as someone who is dedicated to conflict prevention
and and reduction and the head of an organisation that is the
same, how do you feel about, I suppose, the pursuit of peace
negotiations driven by that narrow economic interest rather
than as a global good? I mean a lot of people.
A lot of Ukraine. Supporters were somewhat
(16:12):
outraged by Trump's, you know, minerals deal with, with
Ukraine. Others said, well, we've got to
be more pragmatic here and, and just recognise that if, if it if
it gets them constructively engaged, then that's better for
everyone. And of course, Volodimir
Zelensky was the one who reportedly first proposed it.
But I mean, do do you, is it, I suppose, do you see a a negative
(16:33):
global trend if the you know, ifthe if the the democratic
superpower of the world is pursuing, you know, peace deals
for that narrow economic gain rather than as a global good.
Look, that's a good question. That's a fair question.
And in a sense, we, you know, myself and our executive vice
(16:55):
president, we, we issued a report that sort of looked at
Trump's unorthodox approach to, to peacemaking and we
characterised the effort to end the war between sort of the, the
Rwandan backed N 23 and the Congolese forces.
We, we characterised it as sort of a bracing mix of mercantilism
(17:20):
and peacemaking. So, so answer your, to answer
your question that that, as I said, this was not altruistic,
This was not, this was not for some greater good.
But I think the question for us,the, the two question whether it
temporarily stops the M23 offensive from sort of pushing
(17:41):
on its March towards concession.So I think that's the, the one
thing, whether it gets the 2 presidents, Philip Chesakidi and
Paul Kagame, whether it gets them to, to end their own fight
and then we can get diplomacy and that we can get Chesakidi to
agree to talk to the rebels, something he's previously
refused to do. So that's the other big issue as
(18:03):
well. So I, as much as one may want to
sort of declare this sort of theugly, this is the ugly face of
peacemaking. But if it gets us closer to
ending what are quite horrific violence being committed in the
east of Congo, the human suffering is quite astronomical
(18:24):
as well. So, I mean, we're not naive to
say that this is going to get usout of the door.
And so one of the things that wedo say is that it will require
significant attention from otherkey leaders, other key actors,
one of the most important key actors.
And one of the elements of the peace agreement is that the
Africa Union itself steps in to help shore up the the agreement.
(18:49):
As I said to you, they've been successive agreements in the
past. Much of what was signed last
week in Washington is based on those previous agreements.
There's nothing essentially new in it.
What is different is that it's been ushered in by by Qatar on
the on one side and also the US who we didn't think was going to
(19:12):
be engaged in this way. So that's what's significant,
but it but the facts, the dynamics, the history behind
this conflict is still very muchthe the the same.
And I think the key question forus now is the follow up that has
to happen to make sure that we deal with also, I think another
(19:34):
reality that we need to grapple with, which is being partly why
this conflict has just gone on and on is that there are
different competing mediators inthe room as well.
So you've got, I mentioned the Americans of Qatar and they're
going to likely hand over because they're not going to
they're not going to want to keep this file for too long.
They're going to have to hand over to the African Union and
making sure that the African mediation structure, which is
(19:57):
ill prepared at the moment and is riven rivalries, rivalries
make sure that we. And manage that to get to a more
sustainable peace because both sides in this conflict will play
off the fact that the AU and andand the competition will will as
a result undermine that the agreement as well.
So you've mentioned Sudan, You've written and spoken about
(20:19):
it as well quite a bit in the past.
We did a podcast on it ourselvesa couple of months ago.
It is the world's worst conflictin terms of the numbers of
people displaced, driven to hunger and so forth.
It's, I mean, depressingly, it has everything in terms of
drivers. It's got local sectarian and
ethnic tensions. It's got rivalry between two
(20:41):
powerful elites. It's got resources that are
being fought over or or being sought after by such as gold,
critical minerals. There are outside larger states
interfering provision of new technologies, new weapons such
as drones, obvious neglect from the international community
that's preoccupied with other things.
I mean, just if you had a momentto, I suppose, tell our
(21:06):
listeners, but imagining that you, you've got a chance to
speak to G7 leaders, for instance, and give a sort of
five minute take on on why This is, why this is a crucial
conflict for them to pay attention to What what's the,
what's the case for, for how we might actually resolve this.
I mean, I think your own openingremarks is the case as well.
(21:27):
The headlines suggest that the worst crisis of our time is Gaza
and Ukraine, and that, you know,and these two typify the crisis
of our time. But when one goes through the
numbers that you've just described again, you realise
(21:48):
that Sudan is sort of the epicentre of the sort of new
landscape of conflict that we'redealing with.
So it's a, you know, it's a world's largest displaced crisis
with over 10 million people displaced internally.
And then more than 1,000,000 refugees are crossed into Chad,
(22:10):
a very vulnerable, weak country.South Sudan, a country that was
only midwifed 10 years ago, Egypt and Ethiopia, all these
countries are going through their crisis of, you know,
crisis internally. The Horn of Africa itself is, is
a sort of a microcosm of all thesort of geopolitics, both
(22:32):
regional, both international that you can imagine as well.
It's also a region where a number of key actors, Gulf
countries, China, Europe, you know, Russia are all see
themselves as key stakeholders in this region as well.
So there is both a strategic interest, there's a humanitarian
(22:55):
imperative as well. And there's a real concern that
yet another internationalised civil war confronts this region
as well. And humanitarian agencies, if
you want to even have it in morestardom, humanitarian agencies
will tell you that 25 million people over more than half the
people of the population are in own need of assistance as well.
(23:18):
And that we were talking earlierthis year and last year that
this is a country that is varying towards famine as well.
So all the numbers, all the indicators of a humanitarian
tragedy should be the reasons why sort of international
attention should grab and shouldbe at the top of mind for
(23:40):
everybody as well. You know, at least 15 to 20,000
estimated have been killed. You know, there's limited access
to all the key areas and as and as I said, it was just 20 years
ago that we were talking about genocidal like crimes being
committed in Darfur. And Fast forward the same,
(24:04):
Darfur is now seeing sort of famine conditions, acute food
insecurity, aid delivery as well.
And the civil infrastructure hascollapsed through the many
regions of of Sudan. 80% of the hospitals in active combat areas
are non functional. So I don't know what other case
(24:26):
1 needs to make to get world's attention.
Focus on urban warfare, on the ruinous nature of Sudan.
And the conflict is not just in Sudan anymore, but it's sucking
in the region as well. It's a remarkable insight that
(24:47):
you just certainly gave to me. I mean, this idea of the
epicentre of a new landscape of conflict, it, it feels to me
like what you're describing there is, I mean, almost, I
mean, so many of the world's problems actually sort of
coalescing around around 1 country and there's conflict
there. I mean, you talk about, I mean,
I suppose geopolitical trends perhaps in the 1990s, in the
(25:08):
post Cold War period. We were talking for a while
about this, the world coming together to, to solve conflicts.
It almost feels as if you're describing there that the world
coming together to ruin a country through, you know, each
country sort of pursuing its owninterests without any, without
any sense of sort of global responsibility for conflict
(25:28):
reduction or resolution. Is it?
Is it that depressing? It is that depressing.
I mean, to add even more sort oftexture and complexity to what
you've said, it's also the battleground for middle power
contests as well. So what why I describe it as
sort of the epicentre as well isthat is that the war itself has
become a flashpoint for sort of intensifying regional
(25:52):
competition among what we call middle powers.
And those middle powers, it's Egypt, it's Saudi Arabia, it's
UAE, it's Turkey, each of them speaking to shape the conflicts
outcome to fit their own strategic interests.
So it's less about Sudan. And we said earlier this year
that if you took all of these external interests out, the path
(26:16):
towards getting close to to resolution will not necessarily
be be perfect, will not necessarily end easily, but that
complex the nature of external interference and take that away
and it may it may allow us to see some openings to end the
fighting as well. So, but it's harder now because
(26:36):
while Egypt and Saudi Arabia andTurkey all back, for example,
the Sudanese armed forces, theiragendas do it diverge.
You've got Egypt is focused on our waters security, so
preventing in state fragmentation in Saudi Arabia
having shifted from sort of being sort of mediated to
advocate now champions of Sudanese armed forces.
You've got recognition as a legitimate state.
(26:59):
And then you've got turkeys driven by its own sort of
commercial ideological interests.
And then on the other side of the Ledger, you've got the
United Arab Emirates by contrast, has emerged over time
as a sort of the the backer, assertive backer of the Rapid
Support Force that the coup Crufer, the paramilitary that
was created by the former oustedregime of Bashir, also allegedly
(27:24):
now supplying the RSF with arms and drones.
So, you know, the, the, the survival of the belligerence of,
of this crisis, it's partly because of their external
backers as well. So we need to find a way in
which to deal with those competing interests on the
outside that give that give lifeto the war internally.
(27:47):
And then we've got to start thinking about, you know,
because it's about power betweenthe the Sudanese Armed Forces
and the Rapid Support Force. It's about power.
It's about who gets control of Khartoum.
It's about who controls the resources.
Now, if you can take the external dimension out of it,
I'm not saying it's going to be easy, but it at least will
enable us to begin to think about de escalation and dealing
(28:09):
with the humanitarian crisis in the in the country as well.
Do you worry that that Sudan is an early, I guess, indication of
what may become a broader globaltrend where you have multiple
powers reaching in to other countries and contributing to
conflict? Whether it's, you know, a
(28:30):
desperate battle for resources, which, you know, critical
minerals are obviously a hugely important resource for all sorts
of technologies. The reach of other countries is
is greater. There's something like the
supply of drones and some basic ISR.
I mean, this is sort of the new AK-40 sevens of the, you know,
the twenty 20s and beyond. Are you worried that this might
(28:53):
be a a new global trend that we might see elsewhere?
No, no, I mean you're, you're right.
In fact, you're speaking directly in line with an article
again, another one that authoredwith our Executive Vice
president, Richard Atwood. And as you were speaking, it
reminded me of the article that we wrote back in 2023 that Sudan
itself today, the title of that piece was called Sudan and the
(29:19):
New Age of Conflict and How regional power politics were
Fueling deadly War. So there is a, there is a
Sudanese dimension to this. I don't want to exonerate.
I don't want to say that that there isn't, you know, and there
was a, there was a, a transition.
There was hope back in 2019 where, you know, all of us spoke
(29:41):
about a revolutionary moment, a young dynamic movement across
the Society of Sudan that has sort of propelled optimism in
the country. But that sort of that sort of
reversed itself because the, thecompetition and the and the
tussle for power between these two forces, the the the army and
(30:04):
then the paramilitary army sort of cut, cut short that an
inspiring revolution choked it to its core, prevented and
obstructed Sudan's democratic transition.
And but also, as I said, becauseof the, the various security
(30:25):
commercial interests of other players, there were signs
already that the effort to sort of put together a viable peace
in Sudan was also going to be hijacked not only by that
internal power competition, but also by the the, the interests
(30:47):
of others outside as well. So in a sense, the the
entanglement that we're seeing in Sudan today to go to your to
go to what you said is symptomatic of the larger shifts
in global power as well. And is symptomatic of the sort
of jockeying for influence in unstable arenas is symptomatic
(31:09):
of the sort of the dynamics thathelp to fuel the deadliest of
wars that we're that we're seeing.
And it's also symptomatic of thekind of weaponry that is used.
And, you know, we saw how drones, for example, were
ultimate game changers in Ethiopia war.
We saw how there were ultimate change game changes in in in
other crises as well. And we've seen also because 20
(31:34):
years ago, you know, Sudan was under the purview in terms of
managing the crisis. Sudan was under the purview of
the United States governments along around the world.
You know, they tucked themselvesbehind the United States as a
lone hegemon, you know, driving through and bringing and
stability to a number of these regions.
What one of the consequences I think today is that, you know,
(31:57):
many sense of vacuum of influence, it's a real tussle
now and you're seeing sort of crises like Sudan become proxies
for for other interests and for other rivals to advance their
own interests in a place like like Sudan as well.
It's a, it's a bit of a wearyingcliche to talk about the
(32:19):
collapse of the rules based order.
But I mean, to what extent is what you are talking about here
reflective of that collapse in the, I suppose the constraining
effect that the rules based order had on, on middle powers
on on global conflict around theworld?
I mean what, what how much do you attribute to that?
Look, it's, it's a question that's on that's on everybody's
(32:41):
mind. I mean, I, I, I mean, I more and
more people talk less about rules based international order
and talk about sort of international law.
And we're seeing the obvious wayin which that is being
undermined quite glaringly. I mean, we can talk about
Saddam, but you know, you're looking at it also in the
context of Russia own invasion into into into Ukraine, where
(33:09):
the the principle of non aggression has been violated as
well. So it's not not on the altar of
Sudan alone that you've seen sort of the principles that
govern that should govern states, especially around sort
of humanitarian principles and Geneva Convention.
It it didn't start and it wouldn't end in in Sudan.
(33:32):
But Sudan is also a reminder that the guardrails that would
often could tell or constrain leaders from excessive use of
force are no longer viable. That it's very hard now in a
situation where you see sort of things when you look at
(33:55):
developments in Myanmar, for example, where the junta is
pretty sort of entrenched and where it's used the most vicious
type of tactics. Where in Noguna Karabakh there
was nobody to restrain the takeover there, where you've
seen gangs use the most heinous forms of atrocities to control
(34:16):
Haiti and the Sahel. You can go on and on, and
nobody's able to hold any of these leaders into check.
And there's a sense in which youcan get away with them.
You know, you can get away with with with undermining the core
tenets and standards of international law because every
other leader's watching other leaders get away with the rules
(34:39):
that govern aggression. And you're seeing others trying
to sort of redraw borders by force.
You're seeing the sort of nuclear non proliferation
architecture have been undermined.
You're seeing the norms against masculine and ethnic cleansing,
for example. Everywhere you turn, you're
seeing these mass assaults. So it's no wonder that the the
(35:00):
leaders in somewhere like Sudan or elsewhere feel that they can
get away with that because there's nobody able to constrain
them. And we're in this, in this world
where the, the rules themselves have been shattered, they've
been undermined. It's a very messy world.
It's a world where I, I think, you know, to go back to our, our
(35:22):
10 conflicts to watch that you mentioned at the top of the
conversation, we did say that this was going to be the year of
lawlessness. And we're seeing it right in
front of us, our faces and in practically every conflict that
we're we're watching this ability to ride over the rules,
the principles that would govern, that would govern states
(35:44):
at a time of war as well. We're going to go over time, but
there are two more things that Ido desperately need to ask you.
And hopefully they will put us on a trajectory where we can
finish feeling a little inspiredthat we can all find a way to
contribute. I mean, the first is just tell
me about, I mean, in your time leading the Crisis Group and,
(36:05):
and elsewhere. I mean, what, what have you,
what have you seen are the the most effective pillars of
conflict resolution? How do you think those are
changing in this sort of, you know, this year of lawlessness
that we're, that we're talking about?
And, and what is the, and I guess what's the pathway for
some sort of, you know, I, I guess global resolution
mechanism, you know, in the absence of a sort of
(36:29):
functioning, I don't know, multilateral kind of, you know,
body who can, who can really help in the way that we hoped it
might, it might have 30 or 40 years ago.
Yeah. Look, let me say one thing and
I, I really do want to emphasisethis because that sometimes we,
we focus heavily on all that is wrong, that we sometimes miss
(36:52):
some of the openings that we seeor the potential path.
And so it, we deliberately started with, with Syria in the
10 conflicts to, to watch because we saw all the
opportunities, therefore all thechallenges that Syria is facing,
(37:14):
which we acknowledged when we were writing the, the 10
conflicts. We did say it was an important
good news because we saw that one of the world's sort of
bloodiest conflicts was sort of coming to, to an end as well.
Now a lot could go wrong. And we acknowledged that as
well. And I think also the the work,
(37:35):
the effort that went into getting Trump call an end to the
sanctions for Syria. Now it's going to be complicated
because there is no magic wand that you can wave to sort of
lift all all the sanctions. But he's articulation of that
when he was in Riyadh was quite significant as well.
(37:58):
So I don't think we should lose sight of what that means for
Syrians who know themselves thatthey that there's a lot of
danger around them in terms of dealing with just the multiple
of sort of disorder in the country.
We're already seeing it, the tensions in in the country as
well. So I think we should keep that
(38:20):
sort of the top of the mind thatthere are things that
international actors can do to enable the process to continue
on its path, even though we knowthat there are a number of sort
of challenges that will confrontthe country as well.
So I just want to say that as well, there are other sort of
(38:41):
areas where, you know, for all the four storms and four starts
that we see, you know, whether it's in Colombia, whether it's
in, even in, in Haiti, whether it's in the tensions that are
looming in in Bangladesh and even in Afghanistan.
The the anxiety is acute. And yet there are sort of little
(39:05):
glimmers and opportunities. And I think the key for us is to
make sure the door remains open when we see those opportunities,
even if it's going to be difficult some.
Sometimes the door is is firmly shut and sometimes it it gets
open. And it's how to make sure you
keep those doors open throughoutthe way.
And the other issue that I thinkis, is worth noting.
(39:28):
So I said to you already that atthe start, there are there are
certain things that we didn't imagine that we would see.
And as we speak, by the way, thequestion of a ceasefire for Gaza
is back on the table. It's subject to the agreement
of, of Hamas accepting it and also of, of Israel, which, you
(39:51):
know, which undermined it back in March, the one that Trump put
together. Credit to, to President Trump
for pushing it through. Now it's to get it back onto the
table and, and ensures that it sticks as well.
So there are openings the the the keys.
Whether we can keep the door open long enough to end all the
(40:11):
suffering that we're seeing as well.
So, you know, there are troubleson the horizon.
But at the same time, there are some places where we can see
some openings as well. And, you know, we didn't mention
it, but you mention it in passing with Ukraine.
(40:32):
I mean, it's going to be a tough, difficult summer, but
we've also seen some important diplomacy take place.
And I think, you know, Trump hasshown his frustration with with
with Putin, Whether it's going to alter the reality on the
ground in Ukraine, it's still the the unknown question.
(40:53):
But nonetheless, diplomacy has been crucial also in that in
that particular crisis. So the message is that we have
to hope that people of goodwill will will find creative and
imaginative solutions to to to crises and conflicts case by
case, rather than sort of hope for some some sort of
(41:16):
overarching formula or mechanism.
Is that, I mean is that a fairway to put?
It, yeah, that's one way. And I just think that in this
era of transactionalism and it didn't start with Trump and it
wouldn't start end with him and where multilateralism as well is
sort of in the doghouse. It's not performing in the way
(41:37):
there are other there has to be other ways.
And in in the end, you know, some a leader have an interest,
a leader been transactional. That's not for me that the key.
The question is whether we can, as you, as you say, find a
pathway to peace. That's what we are concerned and
how we get around there. There, you know, it's very clear
(41:58):
to me and it's very difficult. It's a very difficult message to
to sort of put on the table. But the era of sort of
comprehensive peace agreements has sort of, sort of come to an
end. It's more about the ugly,
imperfect peace. But if we can stop the human
suffering, if we can end the atrocities, if we can end the
(42:20):
mass killings, the ethnic cleansing, I mean, that for me
is what is really important. The politics of getting it to
stick. That's also going to be the
conundrum. And it's very difficult moment
to sort of peacemaking and and diplomacy as well.
But this is what this for me is the heart of the matter.
(42:41):
It's an ugly path to peace, but we have to get there because
it's just the sheer scale of human suffering that's around us
as well. Comfort look, I hope everyone
takes that on board. I, I, I suppose I, I feel a bit,
I feel wiser, perhaps a bit morerealistic.
But I think you've left me thereon a, on a note of positivity
that despite the sometimes depressing picture that we, that
(43:04):
we see around us, the, the, the,the task ahead of us is to, is,
is to press on, find solutions wherever we can, however
imperfect they are, and, and stop what is, you know, some
like almost unfathomably appalling bloodshed going on
around the world right now. Exactly.
And I think a degree of pragmatism, sure, but also
(43:28):
you're dealing with the the political realities as it is.
It's not an acceptance of those realities, but it's how you work
with those realities. I think it's it's the core to
get into to a viable piece that deals with those atrocities as
well. All right, Comfort, thank you so
much for joining us. Thank you very much.
Thanks for listening, folks. We'll be back next week.
Popular Podcasts
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
The Joe Rogan Experience
The official podcast of comedian Joe Rogan.