Seasoned diplomat and politician Jüri Luik, who has one of the more impressive CVs we’ve ever seen, gives us his readout on last week’s NATO summit in the Hague and the perspective from the Baltic nations that border Russia to the north of Ukraine.
Estonia has an impressive defence spending record, currently at 3.4 percent of its GDP, with a plan to raise that to 5.4 percent starting next year. Jüri discusses shifts already underway in NATO, further modernisation plans, the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and the rising levels of public concern about Russia’s intentions towards the rest of Europe.
He also discusses the realities of the US presence in Europe and how to manage its gradual withdrawal. Along the way, Jüri offers up an interesting fact about Portugal.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:01):
Stop the world. If you want NATO to survive,
it's clear that the Americans simply are not ready to pay as
much as they did, full stop. So if you want the organisation
to flourish, you have to spend more.
I mean, it's it's pure mathematics.
(00:22):
Welcome to Stop the World, the ASP Podcast.
I'm David Rowe. And I'm Olivia Nelson.
So Liv, we're putting out a special episode after we managed
to snare a chat with long serving Estonian diplomat and
politician Yuri Loic. That's right, we're riding the
tailwinds of last week's remarkable NATO summit in The
Hague. Yuri joined us to talk through
the summit and the future of NATO.
And Dave, I believe Yuri has quite the resume.
(00:45):
He sure does. So listen to this.
Yuri is currently Estonia's ambassador to NATO.
But he's previously. Served as foreign minister,
defence minister over three separate periods, ambassador to
Russia, ambassador to North America and ambassador to the
Benelux countries. He negotiated the withdrawal of
Russian troops from Estonia after the end of the Soviet
(01:05):
Union and he led the negotiations for Estonia's
accession to NATO, which was finalised in 2004.
This is actually the. Third time he's been his
country's ambassador to NATO. That is 1 hell of ACV.
So if it's serious they call Yuri.
Is that what you're telling me? That's about it, yes.
So Yuri gives us his readout of last week's summit.
(01:26):
He talks about what NATO needs to do to modernise the
perspective from the Baltic countries that border Russia,
Estonia's impressive defence spending levels, the trajectory
of the war in Ukraine and the rising levels of public concern
about Russia's intentions towards Europe as a whole.
So Liv. I checked the map just to remind
myself of the geography here andI can tell you it's worth doing
(01:47):
just to get a perspective from the Baltics.
If you look at the countries bordering Russia to the West,
you can start at Georgia down onthe southwest, which Russia has
already invaded. Then there's Ukraine, which it
has. Obviously invaded, then Belarus.
Which is effectively a Russian vassal state, then Lithuania and
finally Estonia. So you can quite understand
(02:08):
strategists who worry that the Baltics are next.
Yuri is best described as concerned but resolute.
We hope you find his insights asuseful as we did.
Ambassador, thanks for coming onthe podcast.
Thank you very much for inviting.
So you were at last week's NATO summit in The Hague.
Can we start with your reflections on that meeting?
(02:29):
There was a positive outcome, obviously, with the 5% spending
target that members agreed to say for Spain, Donald Trump's
commitment to European security,of course, but some commentators
felt that Ukraine got insufficient priority.
The language on Russia's aggression was too weak and too
(02:49):
much effort was put on keeping Donald Trump happy, including
Mark Rutte's demeanour. Can you just give us your
thoughts and reflections on all of that?
Well, as always, countries view at these events from their own
standpoint and from their own national interests.
And obviously when it comes to Estonia, we had two priorities.
(03:10):
One was to reaffirm the US commitment to Europe, to NATO,
and the other was raising the defence spending, not of Estonia
itself. I mean we will next year have
5.4% of GDP as our own defence spending, but obviously we are
interested that the whole alliance would raise it's
(03:33):
collective spending, especially big countries who of course in
absolute term make a much biggerimpact on collective defence
than Estonia. So I think on both accords
things went well. President Trump was clear on his
(03:55):
commitment to European security.He has now repeated it in
various positive tweets over almost a week.
So it seems that this event lefthim with a good impression.
And on the other hand, we got 5%for defence spending.
(04:16):
However, this decision is full of compromises as you've said.
I mean it's 3.5% which you wouldcall traditional classic defence
spending and and 1.5 defence related spending.
But let's be clear, we cannot overrule the national decisions
(04:39):
of countries to raise their defence budgets, which is a very
difficult decision to any government with the NATO
declaration. I mean, it's, it's a political
agreement by the governments andobviously the governments had to
decide what the market can bear in any separate country of the
(05:00):
alliance. And there are different
political situations, coalitions, relationships
between governments and parliaments, etcetera, etcetera.
So it was evident that the decision will be not as clear
cut as perhaps we would have liked, but it's a step on the
right direction. And the concerns about Ukraine
(05:23):
and Russia, was that a problem for you?
I think on Russia we got a really pretty good statement.
I mean, it's, it's short, it's basically one sentence, kind of
half of the sentence. But it had one aspect which was
extremely important for Estonia,which is the long term threat.
(05:47):
I mean Russia as a long term threat and it was evident that
Russia should be in the this very short declaration because
let's be honest, why would countries raise their defence
budget in such a dramatic fashion?
It's only to confront Russia. There are no other obvious
reasons, at least not here in Europe to do that.
(06:10):
And of course, the governments have to go to their public and
to explain why they want such a hefty piece of public money for
defence. So, so it was evident that there
has to be a Russian dimension when it comes to Ukraine.
I mean, it's not a secret. We would have wanted a much
stronger language. We would have wanted a clear
(06:34):
commitment to spend money, to spend resources to arm Ukraine.
And I mean, we got a sentence inthe declaration, which has some
positive aspects to it, like allies committed to enduring
support to Ukraine, but also a statement which says that the
(07:00):
security of Ukraine is part of our security, which is actually
something which is, I mean, it'snot new, but the fact that NATO
countries collectively, including Donald Trump, have
signed this declaration with, with such language, I think it's
a, it's a positive, positive step forward.
(07:23):
I also think that the fact that Ukraine had President Zelensky
had a very productive and, and, and positive meeting with Donald
Trump, which lasted for 50 minutes, which in US terms is a
long, long meeting. And as far as we understand from
(07:46):
our Ukrainian friends, they werepretty satisfied with this
meeting. And there's no doubt that the
atmosphere between Trump and Zelensky has also considerably
improved. It certainly couldn't have got
any worse than it was in March. But yes, I, I couldn't agree
more. It was and, and I do agree that
that language about Ukraine, about the rest of Europe's
(08:07):
security is dependent on it or relates to it.
Also agree very important. And I'd like to come back to
that. Let's just talk about the future
of NATO. I mean, it's clear that Europe
has to provide more for its security to deter Russia.
As you point out, the US has been upfront about the fact that
it wants to focus more on China.Europe understands that Europe
(08:30):
is investing more and that's a big step towards that
continental security. But can you tell me your
thoughts on what else needs to be done, I suppose to modernise
NATO? I'm thinking joint procurement.
I mean, there are steps in that direction as well, shared
defence industry, stationing of troops further.
E just give us your thoughts on how much more reform NATO will
(08:54):
need and whether there are some fundamental things that it needs
to do to modernise. Given that we've now got this
situation in which, I mean, the US remains a member that is
committed to collective defence as per Article 5.
But it's an understood thing that you sort of day to day
Europe is going to be doing mostof the deterring on the
(09:16):
continent. I think this is absolutely true.
I mean, NATO has already made a whole slew of very important
decisions, basically returning to its roots because NATO was
and is a collective defence organisation.
But of course collective defenceis not only kind of an abstract
(09:40):
notion, it's really set of decisions which you make
starting from defence spending, but also organising your defence
forces, preparing defence plans,etcetera, etcetera.
So I I think we are moving in the right direction, but there
are obviously issues which we have to face head on.
(10:03):
One is while the United States will politically remain in
Europe, the question is how muchof the US military might will
actually physically remain in Europe.
And we are in discussions with Americans, I mean we meaning
NATO, but obviously we are all looking forward to the Global
(10:27):
posture Review which should comeout in September and which is
currently prepared in Pentagon. the US accepts that any
decisions they make regarding U.S. troops in Europe will have
influence to NATO's defensive posture.
So this this has to be discussed.
(10:49):
Obviously Europe should take a more active role in its own
defence, but we also have to accept that Europe needs some
time to prepare for that role. I mean, don't misunderstand me.
European troops are already doing a lot of important work.
(11:10):
For instance, if you look at theforward position NATO troops in
Estonia, we're talking of Brits and French.
In Latvia, in addition to Canadians, we are talking about
several European countries, Spaniards actually being the
biggest contingent. And in Lithuania there is of
(11:32):
course German armoured brigade. Very, very impressive
commitment. So actually Europe is already
playing an an active part, but Ithink we have to analyse also
taking into consideration the lessons of the war in Ukraine,
what else can Europe do? How can we be ready for the next
(11:59):
possible conflict and what are the lessons from the Ukraine
battlefield when it comes to drones, electronic warfare, air
and sea combat, etcetera, etcetera.
Because if Europe wants to take over certain functions, I mean,
we have to be clear, we don't have as much resources as the
(12:23):
Americans do. So essentially, if we want to do
these things, we have to do themcheaper.
We have to do them using AI, using modern means.
I mean, let's keep in mind that Ukrainians are keeping the whole
Black Sea essentially clean fromRussian warships using $50,000
(12:50):
drones. I mean, the warships are
somewhere between 70 to perhaps $100 million and the drones are
50 to $100,000. So things can be done cheaper.
But of course it is not so easy to reach those decisions because
(13:10):
every country fights for its ownarms industry.
Every arms industry wants to produce expensive stuff.
So to create a market which would be unified and at the same
time would produce something which is of actual use is
complicated. So it's it's a work in progress,
(13:33):
but I think we have a pretty clear understanding of where we
should, at least in ideal circumstances, direct our
efforts. Yeah, OK.
No, that you raise some interesting points there.
I mean, there's there's an industrial policy question and
obviously then there are military doctrine questions.
I mean, how do militaries work together to prepare themselves
(13:54):
for that more modern form of warfighting and then much else to
follow? But what about the extended
French nuclear deterrent that President Macron has proposed?
Do we? Does Estonia have a position on
that? I mean, he hasn't.
President Macron hasn't actuallyproposed that.
I think it, it's really sort of,he has floated the ideas
(14:19):
something to the effect that these weapons could have an
European dimension, but he, he hasn't offered it to other
countries that he, he would provide an extended deterrent to
XY and Z countries. Because obviously this would
entail not only a declaration, but a lot of stuff, a lot of
(14:42):
technical expensive stuff, whichis currently done in the
framework of NATO, of course, using the US weapons, but mainly
European planes to carry them. And there is a whole set of
procedures, communications, etcetera, etcetera, which you
(15:03):
would need to have an actual extended nuclear deterrent.
So it's, it's, it's not an easy thing.
And as long as the United Statesis ready to provide this
extended deterrent, I think it'sfair to say that it is probably
the strongest nuclear deterrent you can sort of get in the
(15:25):
market, if you will. And of course, we are not only
talking about the tactical nukesin terms of the United States,
but the whole package of what the United States can can bring
to the table. I think that will continue.
That has actually not been questioned by anybody.
Also in the United States, even the strongest matter people
(15:47):
haven't questioned the extended nuclear deterrent, why they have
questioned the conventional partof it.
So I think we are we are OK at the moment.
Right, OK, no fairpoint. So you've already mentioned
Estonia's level of defence spending.
I I've read that it's it's around 3.4% of GDP at the moment
(16:08):
with the target earlier, which you said well before the the
NATO summit in The Hague of 5.4%starting I think next year and
then continuing on average for at least four years.
I have seen that even the 3.4 atthe moment is in fact more than
the what the US is spending. It must just be a a tiny a
fraction more. I mean you, you should consider
(16:29):
giving them a strident lecture about about pulling their weight
and and sharing the burden. I I'd get a kick out of it
anyway. But look seriously, how big a
problem is it that there is suchan imbalance between NATO
members? I mean Poland yourselves, you
know, right up there in the sortof 3/4 plus percent areas.
(16:49):
Plenty of other countries, well,some of the NATO members have
not even reached the 2% originaltarget yet with that commitment
to collective security. I mean, when you have countries
further E having to spend considerably more as a
proportion of GDP. Just give me your thoughts on,
you know, what kind of internal dynamic does that create within
the alliance? Well, I think it is important
(17:12):
both in practical terms but alsopolitically that countries would
spend a certain amount of it's GDP and it would be higher than
it is today. I mean, sometimes people invoke
social spending saying we cannotspend such a high proportion of
our funds to to defence. But it's the same with Estonia.
(17:35):
I mean, of course the absolute money is much smaller, but
basically we're also taking it from other priorities which are
probably more popular and you might say perhaps more important
to an everyday voter. So governments are, are, are
(17:55):
making a very strong strategic decision.
In fact, they have to explain totheir people how integral the
Social Security and defence are to each other because no,
there's no point of, of Social Security if you cannot guard the
independence of your country. But for, for many countries who
(18:18):
are perhaps further from the actual clear cut military threat
it is, it is more difficult. Right.
I think, as I said, we are moving to the right direction.
There are no absolute decisions.I mean every decision is, is
another starting point to, to move forward.
(18:40):
Even in Wales 10 years ago, we we decided to go to 2%.
But if you look at the Wales language, we actually didn't
decide it, but it was kind of a aspirational notion that we
should. This was later reinterpreted as
making stone cold commitment to go to 2% because it was
(19:05):
politically necessary to reinterpret that in that
fashion. So, so I think these targets are
important, but it will also verymuch depend on the policy, will
depend on the threat environment, how countries are
are actually ready to spend and how quickly they are they are
(19:28):
ready to spend this money. So I think everybody accepts
that everybody should do more. Everybody also understands the
difficulties of one or the othercountry.
We, we try not to over dramatiseit.
We try not to lecture other countries.
We hope they will get there because it's a matter of
(19:49):
solidarity. And, and it's also, I mean, if
you want NATO to survive, it's clear that the Americans simply
are not ready to pay as much as they did, full stop.
So if you want the organisation to flourish, you have to spend
more. I mean, it's, it's pure
mathematics in in some ways. And it's possible that the same
(20:12):
reckoning will arrive in the Pacific area.
I, I see Secretary Hagzat already making quite strong
statements when it comes to defence spending of democracies
on your side of the world. So it's it's probably kind of a
unit universal issue in that sense.
(20:32):
And trust me when I say it's getting a lot of discussion here
in Australia as well. But no, look, thank you for your
answer. We try not to over traumatise,
said the very experienced diplomat.
I think as your, as your CV testified, that comes through.
So I'd like to hear your take onjust the atmosphere in, in the
Baltics right now. I mean, there is, I mean,
(20:53):
there's a surprisingly common view around the world that Putin
wants some part of Ukraine and we'll stop there.
The German chief of defence custom Breuer, he said, he was
quoted recently saying that Putin could move against the
Baltic NATO members in the next 4 years.
But I mean, just the fact that that made significant headlines
shows that it's still a fairly startling proposition to a lot
(21:15):
of people. What's the atmosphere in the
Baltics like at the moment, justin terms of the sort of sense of
the immediacy of the threat? And what do people in the
Baltics say when they they see other parts of the world sort of
struggling to grasp that unless Russia is confronted on its own
borders and stopped on its own borders, then it it is going to
(21:37):
be much more destructively confronted further West or or
elsewhere in Europe? I would say that the atmosphere
in in Estonia is pretty calm. I mean people are obviously
concerned, but we have lived next to Russia for a long time.
So I think there is a certain ability to to judge the
(22:01):
proportions of the immediate threat versus long term threat.
I mean, Russia would would have capabilities to attack us even
now, not in a major fashion, butin a more limited fashion.
But of course Russia then has toreckon with the response of the
(22:22):
whole alliance and people in Estonia know that.
So for us, the survival of the alliance, the fact that there
are US British, French troops onour territory is a crucial
aspect of our own deterrence andour Peace of Mind, if you will.
(22:45):
And I think from that direction also The Hague summit was was a
successful summit because it gave to our own population a
certain element of harm and and showed that our allies are with
us. But obviously we have to do a
(23:06):
lot ourselves. That's why we have such a high
defence spending because I mean we are small countries, so in
absolute terms these sums are not as big.
But you don't get a discount in war because you're small.
So automatically you simply haveto spend more and that's what we
(23:28):
are doing. What I think is very important
is that the concern has now spread over the whole of Europe.
If you look at the studies, thenfor instance, surprising the
Portuguese citizens are more concerns than the Estonian
citizen about the impression of Russia.
(23:52):
Well, this is sociology. You can.
You don't exactly know how how the question was phrased, but I
think the important aspect is that the populations all over
Europe share those concerns and understand our concerns.
And that's a huge step forward because that wasn't the case
(24:15):
before the Russian aggression of2014 to Ukraine taking Crimea
and eastern eastern Ukraine parts of eastern Ukraine.
Only in 2022 when the actor naked full scale aggression
started, people became more aware what the actual risks are.
(24:40):
We had, of course, warned about it for a very long time.
And sometimes my friends tell me, now you can proudly go to
the NATO colleagues and say, look, we were right.
And now you have to do what we want.
And I, I'm always saying it never works that way.
(25:01):
People don't like you to say that you were right.
In fact, they hate that. So, so that's not, that's not
the right approach, but I think people generally accept now more
that it is worth listening to countries who are very close to
Russian borders because they perhaps have a more clear eyed
(25:26):
approach towards towards Russia.I mean, I must say we are even a
bit concerned that countries, I think for the reason of making
their own population aware how high the stakes are, are using
the Baltic states as examples. I mean, we we have become some,
(25:47):
some kind of a illustrious example of what might happen.
And obviously that is not extremely helpful.
So we always underline that if somebody decides to attack
Estonia, then they have to be 100% certain that NATO would not
(26:07):
interfere and NATO would not fight back.
And I'm pretty sure looking at the results of The Hague Summit
and also looking from here, fromthe headquarters, seeing what
people do in preparing alliance,I'm 100% sure that there will be
a strong response, as Sajan Rutte puts it, a devastating
(26:32):
response. Now I completely understand that
Estonians and Latvians want to be seen as more than just
potential future victims of Russian aggression.
If the concern is growing even as far as Portugal, that
presumably is translating into political support for things
like increases to defence spending.
(26:56):
I suppose my question is, are you confident that it will
translate into more immediate support for Ukraine?
And I suppose returning to my point that Ukraine really is a
sort of it's such a decisive moment, not just in European
history, but really global history.
If if we fail collectively, as you know, democratic nations as
(27:16):
as rule abiding nations to to stand up and and prevent, you
know, such naked aggression and invasion of a democratic
neighbour by an authoritarian power, then it's very hard to
see how we actually going to to recover from that.
And sorry, now I just sound likeI'm, I'm preaching, but coming
around to the question of how worried are you at the moment
(27:39):
that Ukraine is, I mean, slowly losing in a, you know, military
sense on the battlefield and that support will not flow fast
enough for it to hold its groundand particularly from the United
States. I'm obviously concerned about
that. But then again, the question is
what can we do about it? I mean, again, there's no point
(28:02):
of just sort of crying in the corner saying things are really
bad. When you look at the economic
might of the European countries,then it should be a cakewalk to
to supply Ukraine with necessaryweapons.
And perhaps equally importantly,Ukraine itself has during the
(28:26):
war built up a very impressive defence industry.
So when when we are talking about the US help, then it's
obvious that Europe has to do more, Ukraine has to do more.
But there are certain unique capabilities which we cannot
duplicate. And it's intelligence, so called
(28:50):
ISR and it's air defence, especially air defence
ammunition, Patriot missiles. I mean, we cannot produce them.
We are not able to produce them.Ukrainians are not able to
produce them. So we have to get them from the
US and, and hopefully US will provide them.
(29:12):
Probably Ukraine has to buy them, possibly with the European
money. I mean, I think in a way at this
juncture, money is not an issue anymore.
I think people are ready to provide serious resources to
back up Ukraine. The question is really the
availability of weaponry, especially particular types of
(29:36):
weaponry, which are necessary everywhere.
I mean, you look at the conflictbetween Israel and Iran.
I mean, one of the key issues isair defence.
Israeli uses the same Patriot missile.
So, so the need for those missiles is almost global and we
(29:58):
really have to find ways to respond.
I think Ukraine is not losing. I mean, they have been losing
very small amounts of territory.They have perhaps lost more in
Russia in Kursk region, but thatwas an incursion which had other
aims than to keep large swaths of territory.
(30:21):
So I think they are holding on their own pretty, pretty well.
And of course, while Russian armed forces seem impressive, we
have to keep in mind that Russiais not able for a long time to
keep up the war economy the likethey are doing now.
(30:41):
So they obviously, I mean, they are clearly aiming for a longer
war. It seems that this Press of
possible peace talks, possible ceasefire has really fallen
waywards. And I mean, if we would diagnose
the situation today, we would have to say that the war will
(31:05):
continue, might continue for a long time.
And that's the long term game plan for for Putin.
He doesn't plan to finish and he's certain that he can wear us
out. So our task is to prove that he
is wrong. Yeah, Yeah.
No, good points. OK.
I will need to wrap it up and and let you go.
(31:26):
I know you've you've still got abusy day ahead of you.
I want to get your final thoughts just on the extent to
which we have collectively perhaps failed to, to forcefully
reject Russian sort of narrativegeopolitical narratives that IT
projects globally. So I'm thinking about this idea
(31:47):
that having NATO exist right up to, you know, NATO members,
right up to the Russian border, that has been a sort of
understandable provocation that makes Russia nervous and that
therefore Russia's threatening behaviour is somewhat
understandable. I mean, we, we, we hear it
either implicitly or even sometimes explicitly in some
(32:08):
quarters, including in in the USamong some of the mega
commentators in the Trump administration's sort of summary
ruling out of Ukraine. Membership seems to accept that
same logic that it would just betoo much of A provocation.
But you know, Estonia is never going to invade Russia.
NATO is a defensive pact. It should pose absolutely no
(32:31):
threat to Vladimir Putin, to Moscow, to Russia to have a
defensive packed up to its borders.
So I suppose, I mean, do you, doyou ever feel that that is not
being sufficiently forcefully rejected?
I would like that the the message would sound perhaps
stronger. But of course for many people
(32:52):
from the Global South, this is sort of the easy way out by by
saying, yeah, Ukraine was attacked, but of course there
were underlying reasons for thatcetera, et cetera.
So I, I don't think whether people actually believe this
stuff or, or this is used simplyas a pretext.
(33:13):
I mean, the fact that the boarding states are members of
NATO doesn't provide NATO with huge additional military
capabilities to use against Russia.
I mean, everybody understands that.
And the, the best example is of course, the fact that Russians
have moved all their troops fromall areas where Russian border
(33:37):
touches upon NATO border to Ukraine.
So it's evidence that they don'tsee NATO as a even a factor to
be considered, much less a military threat.
So yeah, the, the areas on the other side of the Estonian
border, Latvian border, Finnish border are, are pretty much
(34:02):
empty at the moment. And the same goes to to other
areas where they would potentially, if they are, they
are certain that there would be a conflict with NATO that they
they would have to hold, for instance, Kaliningrad.
I mean, they have moved most of their land component from
Kaliningrad to fight in Eastern Ukraine.
(34:24):
I mean, if you would seriously believe that there will be a war
with NATO, you would never do that.
So, so I think that's, that's actually the best proof.
But obviously, this is a proof more for analysts like you and
me than than for the population at large.
But but NATO should keep pushingout its message and stand by its
(34:50):
principles. I mean, you cannot be liked by
everybody. I mean, you're you're simply
have to admit that. But I think just as countries
who are not democratic are now getting more and more aligned in
their activities, like Russia, like China, I think the
(35:12):
democracies all over the world, including in the Pacific, should
find a way to cooperate more. And I mean, the fact that
Australia has helped Ukraine in such a tangible way.
I mean, you cannot have a more tangible way than sending tanks.
(35:33):
This is really impressive. And we are very happy that NATO
also has a kind of a Pacific dimension, the AP 4, where
Australia and New Zealand, SouthKorea and Japan are really
strong partners for us in various activities.
And I think this is cooperation which should only be
(35:58):
strengthened. Yeah.
And look, I think Australia is avery pleased and honoured to be
one of those outraged countries.So it's certainly a a good thing
from our point of view. And, and as you point out, I
mean, the security relationship between the Atlantic, the North
Atlantic region and the Indo Pacific region, I mean, it's
becoming clearer and clearer howindivisible they are.
(36:19):
Hence Australia's presence as a side partner at NATO.
And also just obviously the evidence of Russia and China's
increasing cooperation, the no limits partnership, the 4th
demonstrates that. But I couldn't agree more with
you about the need for democracies to work together as
as authoritarian countries do that as well.
So it's a great point to finish on.
(36:41):
Ambassador, look, thank you so much for joining us.
I know you're busy. So it was really, really great.
Great to get your take, especially so soon after that
very important meeting last week.
So thanks for joining the podcast.
Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me.
Thanks for listening, folks. We'll be back on Friday with
another episode where we speak with Comfort Arrow.
(37:03):
She's the president and CEO of the Crisis Group, and she'll be
talking to us about conflict around the world.
See you then.
Stop the world. If you want NATO to survive,
it's clear that the Americans simply are not ready to pay as
much as they did, full stop. So if you want the organisation
to flourish, you have to spend more.
I mean, it's it's pure mathematics.
(00:22):
Welcome to Stop the World, the ASP Podcast.
I'm David Rowe. And I'm Olivia Nelson.
So Liv, we're putting out a special episode after we managed
to snare a chat with long serving Estonian diplomat and
politician Yuri Loic. That's right, we're riding the
tailwinds of last week's remarkable NATO summit in The
Hague. Yuri joined us to talk through
the summit and the future of NATO.
And Dave, I believe Yuri has quite the resume.
(00:45):
He sure does. So listen to this.
Yuri is currently Estonia's ambassador to NATO.
But he's previously. Served as foreign minister,
defence minister over three separate periods, ambassador to
Russia, ambassador to North America and ambassador to the
Benelux countries. He negotiated the withdrawal of
Russian troops from Estonia after the end of the Soviet
(01:05):
Union and he led the negotiations for Estonia's
accession to NATO, which was finalised in 2004.
This is actually the. Third time he's been his
country's ambassador to NATO. That is 1 hell of ACV.
So if it's serious they call Yuri.
Is that what you're telling me? That's about it, yes.
So Yuri gives us his readout of last week's summit.
(01:26):
He talks about what NATO needs to do to modernise the
perspective from the Baltic countries that border Russia,
Estonia's impressive defence spending levels, the trajectory
of the war in Ukraine and the rising levels of public concern
about Russia's intentions towards Europe as a whole.
So Liv. I checked the map just to remind
myself of the geography here andI can tell you it's worth doing
(01:47):
just to get a perspective from the Baltics.
If you look at the countries bordering Russia to the West,
you can start at Georgia down onthe southwest, which Russia has
already invaded. Then there's Ukraine, which it
has. Obviously invaded, then Belarus.
Which is effectively a Russian vassal state, then Lithuania and
finally Estonia. So you can quite understand
(02:08):
strategists who worry that the Baltics are next.
Yuri is best described as concerned but resolute.
We hope you find his insights asuseful as we did.
Ambassador, thanks for coming onthe podcast.
Thank you very much for inviting.
So you were at last week's NATO summit in The Hague.
Can we start with your reflections on that meeting?
(02:29):
There was a positive outcome, obviously, with the 5% spending
target that members agreed to say for Spain, Donald Trump's
commitment to European security,of course, but some commentators
felt that Ukraine got insufficient priority.
The language on Russia's aggression was too weak and too
(02:49):
much effort was put on keeping Donald Trump happy, including
Mark Rutte's demeanour. Can you just give us your
thoughts and reflections on all of that?
Well, as always, countries view at these events from their own
standpoint and from their own national interests.
And obviously when it comes to Estonia, we had two priorities.
(03:10):
One was to reaffirm the US commitment to Europe, to NATO,
and the other was raising the defence spending, not of Estonia
itself. I mean we will next year have
5.4% of GDP as our own defence spending, but obviously we are
interested that the whole alliance would raise it's
(03:33):
collective spending, especially big countries who of course in
absolute term make a much biggerimpact on collective defence
than Estonia. So I think on both accords
things went well. President Trump was clear on his
(03:55):
commitment to European security.He has now repeated it in
various positive tweets over almost a week.
So it seems that this event lefthim with a good impression.
And on the other hand, we got 5%for defence spending.
(04:16):
However, this decision is full of compromises as you've said.
I mean it's 3.5% which you wouldcall traditional classic defence
spending and and 1.5 defence related spending.
But let's be clear, we cannot overrule the national decisions
(04:39):
of countries to raise their defence budgets, which is a very
difficult decision to any government with the NATO
declaration. I mean, it's, it's a political
agreement by the governments andobviously the governments had to
decide what the market can bear in any separate country of the
(05:00):
alliance. And there are different
political situations, coalitions, relationships
between governments and parliaments, etcetera, etcetera.
So it was evident that the decision will be not as clear
cut as perhaps we would have liked, but it's a step on the
right direction. And the concerns about Ukraine
(05:23):
and Russia, was that a problem for you?
I think on Russia we got a really pretty good statement.
I mean, it's, it's short, it's basically one sentence, kind of
half of the sentence. But it had one aspect which was
extremely important for Estonia,which is the long term threat.
(05:47):
I mean Russia as a long term threat and it was evident that
Russia should be in the this very short declaration because
let's be honest, why would countries raise their defence
budget in such a dramatic fashion?
It's only to confront Russia. There are no other obvious
reasons, at least not here in Europe to do that.
(06:10):
And of course, the governments have to go to their public and
to explain why they want such a hefty piece of public money for
defence. So, so it was evident that there
has to be a Russian dimension when it comes to Ukraine.
I mean, it's not a secret. We would have wanted a much
stronger language. We would have wanted a clear
(06:34):
commitment to spend money, to spend resources to arm Ukraine.
And I mean, we got a sentence inthe declaration, which has some
positive aspects to it, like allies committed to enduring
support to Ukraine, but also a statement which says that the
(07:00):
security of Ukraine is part of our security, which is actually
something which is, I mean, it'snot new, but the fact that NATO
countries collectively, including Donald Trump, have
signed this declaration with, with such language, I think it's
a, it's a positive, positive step forward.
(07:23):
I also think that the fact that Ukraine had President Zelensky
had a very productive and, and, and positive meeting with Donald
Trump, which lasted for 50 minutes, which in US terms is a
long, long meeting. And as far as we understand from
(07:46):
our Ukrainian friends, they werepretty satisfied with this
meeting. And there's no doubt that the
atmosphere between Trump and Zelensky has also considerably
improved. It certainly couldn't have got
any worse than it was in March. But yes, I, I couldn't agree
more. It was and, and I do agree that
that language about Ukraine, about the rest of Europe's
(08:07):
security is dependent on it or relates to it.
Also agree very important. And I'd like to come back to
that. Let's just talk about the future
of NATO. I mean, it's clear that Europe
has to provide more for its security to deter Russia.
As you point out, the US has been upfront about the fact that
it wants to focus more on China.Europe understands that Europe
(08:30):
is investing more and that's a big step towards that
continental security. But can you tell me your
thoughts on what else needs to be done, I suppose to modernise
NATO? I'm thinking joint procurement.
I mean, there are steps in that direction as well, shared
defence industry, stationing of troops further.
E just give us your thoughts on how much more reform NATO will
(08:54):
need and whether there are some fundamental things that it needs
to do to modernise. Given that we've now got this
situation in which, I mean, the US remains a member that is
committed to collective defence as per Article 5.
But it's an understood thing that you sort of day to day
Europe is going to be doing mostof the deterring on the
(09:16):
continent. I think this is absolutely true.
I mean, NATO has already made a whole slew of very important
decisions, basically returning to its roots because NATO was
and is a collective defence organisation.
But of course collective defenceis not only kind of an abstract
(09:40):
notion, it's really set of decisions which you make
starting from defence spending, but also organising your defence
forces, preparing defence plans,etcetera, etcetera.
So I I think we are moving in the right direction, but there
are obviously issues which we have to face head on.
(10:03):
One is while the United States will politically remain in
Europe, the question is how muchof the US military might will
actually physically remain in Europe.
And we are in discussions with Americans, I mean we meaning
NATO, but obviously we are all looking forward to the Global
(10:27):
posture Review which should comeout in September and which is
currently prepared in Pentagon. the US accepts that any
decisions they make regarding U.S. troops in Europe will have
influence to NATO's defensive posture.
So this this has to be discussed.
(10:49):
Obviously Europe should take a more active role in its own
defence, but we also have to accept that Europe needs some
time to prepare for that role. I mean, don't misunderstand me.
European troops are already doing a lot of important work.
(11:10):
For instance, if you look at theforward position NATO troops in
Estonia, we're talking of Brits and French.
In Latvia, in addition to Canadians, we are talking about
several European countries, Spaniards actually being the
biggest contingent. And in Lithuania there is of
(11:32):
course German armoured brigade. Very, very impressive
commitment. So actually Europe is already
playing an an active part, but Ithink we have to analyse also
taking into consideration the lessons of the war in Ukraine,
what else can Europe do? How can we be ready for the next
(11:59):
possible conflict and what are the lessons from the Ukraine
battlefield when it comes to drones, electronic warfare, air
and sea combat, etcetera, etcetera.
Because if Europe wants to take over certain functions, I mean,
we have to be clear, we don't have as much resources as the
(12:23):
Americans do. So essentially, if we want to do
these things, we have to do themcheaper.
We have to do them using AI, using modern means.
I mean, let's keep in mind that Ukrainians are keeping the whole
Black Sea essentially clean fromRussian warships using $50,000
(12:50):
drones. I mean, the warships are
somewhere between 70 to perhaps $100 million and the drones are
50 to $100,000. So things can be done cheaper.
But of course it is not so easy to reach those decisions because
(13:10):
every country fights for its ownarms industry.
Every arms industry wants to produce expensive stuff.
So to create a market which would be unified and at the same
time would produce something which is of actual use is
complicated. So it's it's a work in progress,
(13:33):
but I think we have a pretty clear understanding of where we
should, at least in ideal circumstances, direct our
efforts. Yeah, OK.
No, that you raise some interesting points there.
I mean, there's there's an industrial policy question and
obviously then there are military doctrine questions.
I mean, how do militaries work together to prepare themselves
(13:54):
for that more modern form of warfighting and then much else to
follow? But what about the extended
French nuclear deterrent that President Macron has proposed?
Do we? Does Estonia have a position on
that? I mean, he hasn't.
President Macron hasn't actuallyproposed that.
I think it, it's really sort of,he has floated the ideas
(14:19):
something to the effect that these weapons could have an
European dimension, but he, he hasn't offered it to other
countries that he, he would provide an extended deterrent to
XY and Z countries. Because obviously this would
entail not only a declaration, but a lot of stuff, a lot of
(14:42):
technical expensive stuff, whichis currently done in the
framework of NATO, of course, using the US weapons, but mainly
European planes to carry them. And there is a whole set of
procedures, communications, etcetera, etcetera, which you
(15:03):
would need to have an actual extended nuclear deterrent.
So it's, it's, it's not an easy thing.
And as long as the United Statesis ready to provide this
extended deterrent, I think it'sfair to say that it is probably
the strongest nuclear deterrent you can sort of get in the
(15:25):
market, if you will. And of course, we are not only
talking about the tactical nukesin terms of the United States,
but the whole package of what the United States can can bring
to the table. I think that will continue.
That has actually not been questioned by anybody.
Also in the United States, even the strongest matter people
(15:47):
haven't questioned the extended nuclear deterrent, why they have
questioned the conventional partof it.
So I think we are we are OK at the moment.
Right, OK, no fairpoint. So you've already mentioned
Estonia's level of defence spending.
I I've read that it's it's around 3.4% of GDP at the moment
(16:08):
with the target earlier, which you said well before the the
NATO summit in The Hague of 5.4%starting I think next year and
then continuing on average for at least four years.
I have seen that even the 3.4 atthe moment is in fact more than
the what the US is spending. It must just be a a tiny a
fraction more. I mean you, you should consider
(16:29):
giving them a strident lecture about about pulling their weight
and and sharing the burden. I I'd get a kick out of it
anyway. But look seriously, how big a
problem is it that there is suchan imbalance between NATO
members? I mean Poland yourselves, you
know, right up there in the sortof 3/4 plus percent areas.
(16:49):
Plenty of other countries, well,some of the NATO members have
not even reached the 2% originaltarget yet with that commitment
to collective security. I mean, when you have countries
further E having to spend considerably more as a
proportion of GDP. Just give me your thoughts on,
you know, what kind of internal dynamic does that create within
the alliance? Well, I think it is important
(17:12):
both in practical terms but alsopolitically that countries would
spend a certain amount of it's GDP and it would be higher than
it is today. I mean, sometimes people invoke
social spending saying we cannotspend such a high proportion of
our funds to to defence. But it's the same with Estonia.
(17:35):
I mean, of course the absolute money is much smaller, but
basically we're also taking it from other priorities which are
probably more popular and you might say perhaps more important
to an everyday voter. So governments are, are, are
(17:55):
making a very strong strategic decision.
In fact, they have to explain totheir people how integral the
Social Security and defence are to each other because no,
there's no point of, of Social Security if you cannot guard the
independence of your country. But for, for many countries who
(18:18):
are perhaps further from the actual clear cut military threat
it is, it is more difficult. Right.
I think, as I said, we are moving to the right direction.
There are no absolute decisions.I mean every decision is, is
another starting point to, to move forward.
(18:40):
Even in Wales 10 years ago, we we decided to go to 2%.
But if you look at the Wales language, we actually didn't
decide it, but it was kind of a aspirational notion that we
should. This was later reinterpreted as
making stone cold commitment to go to 2% because it was
(19:05):
politically necessary to reinterpret that in that
fashion. So, so I think these targets are
important, but it will also verymuch depend on the policy, will
depend on the threat environment, how countries are
are actually ready to spend and how quickly they are they are
(19:28):
ready to spend this money. So I think everybody accepts
that everybody should do more. Everybody also understands the
difficulties of one or the othercountry.
We, we try not to over dramatiseit.
We try not to lecture other countries.
We hope they will get there because it's a matter of
(19:49):
solidarity. And, and it's also, I mean, if
you want NATO to survive, it's clear that the Americans simply
are not ready to pay as much as they did, full stop.
So if you want the organisation to flourish, you have to spend
more. I mean, it's, it's pure
mathematics in in some ways. And it's possible that the same
(20:12):
reckoning will arrive in the Pacific area.
I, I see Secretary Hagzat already making quite strong
statements when it comes to defence spending of democracies
on your side of the world. So it's it's probably kind of a
unit universal issue in that sense.
(20:32):
And trust me when I say it's getting a lot of discussion here
in Australia as well. But no, look, thank you for your
answer. We try not to over traumatise,
said the very experienced diplomat.
I think as your, as your CV testified, that comes through.
So I'd like to hear your take onjust the atmosphere in, in the
Baltics right now. I mean, there is, I mean,
(20:53):
there's a surprisingly common view around the world that Putin
wants some part of Ukraine and we'll stop there.
The German chief of defence custom Breuer, he said, he was
quoted recently saying that Putin could move against the
Baltic NATO members in the next 4 years.
But I mean, just the fact that that made significant headlines
shows that it's still a fairly startling proposition to a lot
(21:15):
of people. What's the atmosphere in the
Baltics like at the moment, justin terms of the sort of sense of
the immediacy of the threat? And what do people in the
Baltics say when they they see other parts of the world sort of
struggling to grasp that unless Russia is confronted on its own
borders and stopped on its own borders, then it it is going to
(21:37):
be much more destructively confronted further West or or
elsewhere in Europe? I would say that the atmosphere
in in Estonia is pretty calm. I mean people are obviously
concerned, but we have lived next to Russia for a long time.
So I think there is a certain ability to to judge the
(22:01):
proportions of the immediate threat versus long term threat.
I mean, Russia would would have capabilities to attack us even
now, not in a major fashion, butin a more limited fashion.
But of course Russia then has toreckon with the response of the
(22:22):
whole alliance and people in Estonia know that.
So for us, the survival of the alliance, the fact that there
are US British, French troops onour territory is a crucial
aspect of our own deterrence andour Peace of Mind, if you will.
(22:45):
And I think from that direction also The Hague summit was was a
successful summit because it gave to our own population a
certain element of harm and and showed that our allies are with
us. But obviously we have to do a
(23:06):
lot ourselves. That's why we have such a high
defence spending because I mean we are small countries, so in
absolute terms these sums are not as big.
But you don't get a discount in war because you're small.
So automatically you simply haveto spend more and that's what we
(23:28):
are doing. What I think is very important
is that the concern has now spread over the whole of Europe.
If you look at the studies, thenfor instance, surprising the
Portuguese citizens are more concerns than the Estonian
citizen about the impression of Russia.
(23:52):
Well, this is sociology. You can.
You don't exactly know how how the question was phrased, but I
think the important aspect is that the populations all over
Europe share those concerns and understand our concerns.
And that's a huge step forward because that wasn't the case
(24:15):
before the Russian aggression of2014 to Ukraine taking Crimea
and eastern eastern Ukraine parts of eastern Ukraine.
Only in 2022 when the actor naked full scale aggression
started, people became more aware what the actual risks are.
(24:40):
We had, of course, warned about it for a very long time.
And sometimes my friends tell me, now you can proudly go to
the NATO colleagues and say, look, we were right.
And now you have to do what we want.
And I, I'm always saying it never works that way.
(25:01):
People don't like you to say that you were right.
In fact, they hate that. So, so that's not, that's not
the right approach, but I think people generally accept now more
that it is worth listening to countries who are very close to
Russian borders because they perhaps have a more clear eyed
(25:26):
approach towards towards Russia.I mean, I must say we are even a
bit concerned that countries, I think for the reason of making
their own population aware how high the stakes are, are using
the Baltic states as examples. I mean, we we have become some,
(25:47):
some kind of a illustrious example of what might happen.
And obviously that is not extremely helpful.
So we always underline that if somebody decides to attack
Estonia, then they have to be 100% certain that NATO would not
(26:07):
interfere and NATO would not fight back.
And I'm pretty sure looking at the results of The Hague Summit
and also looking from here, fromthe headquarters, seeing what
people do in preparing alliance,I'm 100% sure that there will be
a strong response, as Sajan Rutte puts it, a devastating
(26:32):
response. Now I completely understand that
Estonians and Latvians want to be seen as more than just
potential future victims of Russian aggression.
If the concern is growing even as far as Portugal, that
presumably is translating into political support for things
like increases to defence spending.
(26:56):
I suppose my question is, are you confident that it will
translate into more immediate support for Ukraine?
And I suppose returning to my point that Ukraine really is a
sort of it's such a decisive moment, not just in European
history, but really global history.
If if we fail collectively, as you know, democratic nations as
(27:16):
as rule abiding nations to to stand up and and prevent, you
know, such naked aggression and invasion of a democratic
neighbour by an authoritarian power, then it's very hard to
see how we actually going to to recover from that.
And sorry, now I just sound likeI'm, I'm preaching, but coming
around to the question of how worried are you at the moment
(27:39):
that Ukraine is, I mean, slowly losing in a, you know, military
sense on the battlefield and that support will not flow fast
enough for it to hold its groundand particularly from the United
States. I'm obviously concerned about
that. But then again, the question is
what can we do about it? I mean, again, there's no point
(28:02):
of just sort of crying in the corner saying things are really
bad. When you look at the economic
might of the European countries,then it should be a cakewalk to
to supply Ukraine with necessaryweapons.
And perhaps equally importantly,Ukraine itself has during the
(28:26):
war built up a very impressive defence industry.
So when when we are talking about the US help, then it's
obvious that Europe has to do more, Ukraine has to do more.
But there are certain unique capabilities which we cannot
duplicate. And it's intelligence, so called
(28:50):
ISR and it's air defence, especially air defence
ammunition, Patriot missiles. I mean, we cannot produce them.
We are not able to produce them.Ukrainians are not able to
produce them. So we have to get them from the
US and, and hopefully US will provide them.
(29:12):
Probably Ukraine has to buy them, possibly with the European
money. I mean, I think in a way at this
juncture, money is not an issue anymore.
I think people are ready to provide serious resources to
back up Ukraine. The question is really the
availability of weaponry, especially particular types of
(29:36):
weaponry, which are necessary everywhere.
I mean, you look at the conflictbetween Israel and Iran.
I mean, one of the key issues isair defence.
Israeli uses the same Patriot missile.
So, so the need for those missiles is almost global and we
(29:58):
really have to find ways to respond.
I think Ukraine is not losing. I mean, they have been losing
very small amounts of territory.They have perhaps lost more in
Russia in Kursk region, but thatwas an incursion which had other
aims than to keep large swaths of territory.
(30:21):
So I think they are holding on their own pretty, pretty well.
And of course, while Russian armed forces seem impressive, we
have to keep in mind that Russiais not able for a long time to
keep up the war economy the likethey are doing now.
(30:41):
So they obviously, I mean, they are clearly aiming for a longer
war. It seems that this Press of
possible peace talks, possible ceasefire has really fallen
waywards. And I mean, if we would diagnose
the situation today, we would have to say that the war will
(31:05):
continue, might continue for a long time.
And that's the long term game plan for for Putin.
He doesn't plan to finish and he's certain that he can wear us
out. So our task is to prove that he
is wrong. Yeah, Yeah.
No, good points. OK.
I will need to wrap it up and and let you go.
(31:26):
I know you've you've still got abusy day ahead of you.
I want to get your final thoughts just on the extent to
which we have collectively perhaps failed to, to forcefully
reject Russian sort of narrativegeopolitical narratives that IT
projects globally. So I'm thinking about this idea
(31:47):
that having NATO exist right up to, you know, NATO members,
right up to the Russian border, that has been a sort of
understandable provocation that makes Russia nervous and that
therefore Russia's threatening behaviour is somewhat
understandable. I mean, we, we, we hear it
either implicitly or even sometimes explicitly in some
(32:08):
quarters, including in in the USamong some of the mega
commentators in the Trump administration's sort of summary
ruling out of Ukraine. Membership seems to accept that
same logic that it would just betoo much of A provocation.
But you know, Estonia is never going to invade Russia.
NATO is a defensive pact. It should pose absolutely no
(32:31):
threat to Vladimir Putin, to Moscow, to Russia to have a
defensive packed up to its borders.
So I suppose, I mean, do you, doyou ever feel that that is not
being sufficiently forcefully rejected?
I would like that the the message would sound perhaps
stronger. But of course for many people
(32:52):
from the Global South, this is sort of the easy way out by by
saying, yeah, Ukraine was attacked, but of course there
were underlying reasons for thatcetera, et cetera.
So I, I don't think whether people actually believe this
stuff or, or this is used simplyas a pretext.
(33:13):
I mean, the fact that the boarding states are members of
NATO doesn't provide NATO with huge additional military
capabilities to use against Russia.
I mean, everybody understands that.
And the, the best example is of course, the fact that Russians
have moved all their troops fromall areas where Russian border
(33:37):
touches upon NATO border to Ukraine.
So it's evidence that they don'tsee NATO as a even a factor to
be considered, much less a military threat.
So yeah, the, the areas on the other side of the Estonian
border, Latvian border, Finnish border are, are pretty much
(34:02):
empty at the moment. And the same goes to to other
areas where they would potentially, if they are, they
are certain that there would be a conflict with NATO that they
they would have to hold, for instance, Kaliningrad.
I mean, they have moved most of their land component from
Kaliningrad to fight in Eastern Ukraine.
(34:24):
I mean, if you would seriously believe that there will be a war
with NATO, you would never do that.
So, so I think that's, that's actually the best proof.
But obviously, this is a proof more for analysts like you and
me than than for the population at large.
But but NATO should keep pushingout its message and stand by its
(34:50):
principles. I mean, you cannot be liked by
everybody. I mean, you're you're simply
have to admit that. But I think just as countries
who are not democratic are now getting more and more aligned in
their activities, like Russia, like China, I think the
(35:12):
democracies all over the world, including in the Pacific, should
find a way to cooperate more. And I mean, the fact that
Australia has helped Ukraine in such a tangible way.
I mean, you cannot have a more tangible way than sending tanks.
(35:33):
This is really impressive. And we are very happy that NATO
also has a kind of a Pacific dimension, the AP 4, where
Australia and New Zealand, SouthKorea and Japan are really
strong partners for us in various activities.
And I think this is cooperation which should only be
(35:58):
strengthened. Yeah.
And look, I think Australia is avery pleased and honoured to be
one of those outraged countries.So it's certainly a a good thing
from our point of view. And, and as you point out, I
mean, the security relationship between the Atlantic, the North
Atlantic region and the Indo Pacific region, I mean, it's
becoming clearer and clearer howindivisible they are.
(36:19):
Hence Australia's presence as a side partner at NATO.
And also just obviously the evidence of Russia and China's
increasing cooperation, the no limits partnership, the 4th
demonstrates that. But I couldn't agree more with
you about the need for democracies to work together as
as authoritarian countries do that as well.
So it's a great point to finish on.
(36:41):
Ambassador, look, thank you so much for joining us.
I know you're busy. So it was really, really great.
Great to get your take, especially so soon after that
very important meeting last week.
So thanks for joining the podcast.
Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me.
Thanks for listening, folks. We'll be back on Friday with
another episode where we speak with Comfort Arrow.
(37:03):
She's the president and CEO of the Crisis Group, and she'll be
talking to us about conflict around the world.
See you then.
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