August 9, 2024 • 39 mins
Can Russia's relations with the Western world be structured in cycles?
20th-century Russian philologist Vadim Tsymbursky thought so when he came up with what would be known as Tsymburskian cycles—a set of five moves ranging from alliance to confrontation and resistance against the West.
However, Tsymburksy did not take into account the domestic politics factor in his original theorization of the cycles—a gap that Gordon Hahn fills in his essay for Russia In Global Affairs titled "Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations."
Gordon Hahn is an expert analyst at Corr Analytics ,a New-York-based political risk advisory firm. Hahn is a notable scholar of politics, international relations, and Islamist terrorism in Russia and Eurasia. He is the author of The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin, and Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West, and the “New Cold War.” Hahn’s most recent book is 'Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Culture, Thought, History, and Politics.
Gordon has previously taught at Boston University, American University, and Stanford University. He also served as a visiting fellow at the Kennan Institute in Washington, DC, and the Hoover Institution.
In this episode of Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, I sat down with Hahn to discuss his neo-Tsymburksian cycles and how they can explain Russia's current predicament in Ukraine and the future of Russia's relations with the occident.
During our conversation, we discussed ontological security, the origins of Western and Russian discontent with relations between each other, and how the West can have more stable respect-based ties with Moscow.
Listen to the episode on your favorite podcast streaming platform: bit.ly/strategicwisdom.
This is Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I’m Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC-based security policy analyst and news reporter, bringing you timely analyses and commentary on issues in international relations, war, and security policy.
The views expressed by the podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily represent the official positions of Andrew Jose, Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, and Andrew Jose Media.
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew Jose Media
20th-century Russian philologist Vadim Tsymbursky thought so when he came up with what would be known as Tsymburskian cycles—a set of five moves ranging from alliance to confrontation and resistance against the West.
However, Tsymburksy did not take into account the domestic politics factor in his original theorization of the cycles—a gap that Gordon Hahn fills in his essay for Russia In Global Affairs titled "Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations."
Gordon Hahn is an expert analyst at Corr Analytics ,a New-York-based political risk advisory firm. Hahn is a notable scholar of politics, international relations, and Islamist terrorism in Russia and Eurasia. He is the author of The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin, and Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West, and the “New Cold War.” Hahn’s most recent book is 'Russian Tselostnost’: Wholeness in Russian Culture, Thought, History, and Politics.
Gordon has previously taught at Boston University, American University, and Stanford University. He also served as a visiting fellow at the Kennan Institute in Washington, DC, and the Hoover Institution.
In this episode of Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, I sat down with Hahn to discuss his neo-Tsymburksian cycles and how they can explain Russia's current predicament in Ukraine and the future of Russia's relations with the occident.
During our conversation, we discussed ontological security, the origins of Western and Russian discontent with relations between each other, and how the West can have more stable respect-based ties with Moscow.
Listen to the episode on your favorite podcast streaming platform: bit.ly/strategicwisdom.
This is Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I’m Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC-based security policy analyst and news reporter, bringing you timely analyses and commentary on issues in international relations, war, and security policy.
The views expressed by the podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily represent the official positions of Andrew Jose, Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, and Andrew Jose Media.
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew Jose Media
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:01):
If you have closely studied the history of Russia's relationship
with the West, one thing that becomes evident to you
is that the country has had a somewhat never ending
cycle of a love hate relationship with the West, cooperating
and trying to become like Western Europe at times and
violently resisting any perceived erosion of sovereignty and identity.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
If you have perceived so, you're not alone. Such a
pattern was also noted by Videm Simbirski, a Russian political
scientist and scholar of geopolitics.
Speaker 1 (00:26):
You're listening to Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. Strategic Wisdom
is a foreign affairs and politics podcast brought to you
by Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC based security policy analyst
and news reporter, bringing you timely commentary on issues in
international relations, war, and security policy. We're your hosts Ian Stormfeldt.
Speaker 2 (00:46):
And Gabriel Savchuk. Joining Andrew today is Gordon Hahn, a
scholar of Russian and Eurasian politics, to discuss Simbirski's theorization
of cycles in relations between Russia and the West and
how Simbirski's ideas can be adapted and applied to unders
standing Moscow's current approach to Washington, London and Brussels.
Speaker 1 (01:04):
Pahn is the author of Neo Simbirskian Cycles in the
History of Russian Western Relations, an essay published by the
journal Russia in Global Affairs. This essay forms the main
subject of Andrew's discussion with Dr Han Today.
Speaker 2 (01:16):
Without further ado, We're going to hand the floor to
Andrew Jose.
Speaker 3 (01:54):
Gordon Hann is an expert analyst at Core Analytics, a
New York based political risk advisory firm. Hahn is a
notable scholar of politics, international relations, and Islamist terrorism in
Russia and Eurasia. He is the author of The Russian Dilemma, Security,
Vigilance and Relations with the West. From Ivan the Third
(02:17):
to Putin and Ukraine Over the Edge, Russia, the West
and the New Cold War. Han's most recent work is
Russian Salosnost Wholeness in Russian Culture, Thought, History and Politics.
He has previously taught at Boston University, American University, and
Stanford University. He has also served as a visiting fellow
(02:41):
at the Keenan Institute in Washington, d C. And the
Hoover Institution. Gordon Hand Welcome to the show.
Speaker 4 (02:50):
Thank you very much, Andrews, thank you for inviting me
glad to be here.
Speaker 3 (02:54):
In your recent essay for Russia and Global Affairs, Doctor Hand,
you mentioned neo Simbirskian cycles in the history of Russia's
relationship with its Western counterparts. Could you explain to the
audience what are Simborskian cycles and what are neo Simbirskan
cycles and how do the neo Simberstian cycles differ from
(03:17):
Timberski's original theorization of the cycles of Russia's relationship with
the West.
Speaker 5 (03:26):
Well, Simborski's original cycles were devoted entirely to foreign relations,
that his relations mostly with the West that he touches
on Eurasia and Eurasia. He argued that there were there
were three different cycles in Russian history, with the with
the West and the relations of the West, and each
cycle had five what he called moves so uh move
(03:50):
age typically saw Russia becoming sort of second tier secondary
ally of some European alliance.
Speaker 4 (03:57):
One or another.
Speaker 5 (03:59):
And then move B came in two forms in which
the failure of Russia's shall we say unsuccessful, unfortunate involvement
in these geopolitical alliances leads to the European conflict extending
into Russia in one of two ways, either invasion by
a European.
Speaker 4 (04:18):
Hegemon or one or more two two or more.
Speaker 5 (04:21):
Parties to the dispute bring the dispute into Russia, the
fight into Russia, the conflict into Russia.
Speaker 4 (04:28):
That's a move B. Move C is a Russian counter offensive.
Speaker 5 (04:33):
The Russians regroup and try to quote unquote catch the
aggressor in his lair, and they invade, seize a protectorate
in some territory beyond Eastern Europe and use that.
Speaker 4 (04:45):
Hope to use that to project Russian Russian power.
Speaker 5 (04:50):
Moved is the West consolid consolidates and conducts a counter offensive,
pushes Russia back behind the Baltic Black Sea Line to fight,
and dividing East Europe from Western Europe you could say,
or word Eastern Europe from Eurasia, depending on the period
in your view point of view. And Russia is now
cut off from its European other, or Europe is cut
(05:12):
off from it's Russian Russian other as Russian seed Russia's
being part of Europe usually in some Europeans do as well,
and this leads to a quot kind of catastrophic isolation.
And then movie is Russia response to this situation by
returning ton Asia or Eurasia in what Simpersky called the
Eurasian intermedia. You call it the Eurasian interval or Eurasian alternative.
(05:37):
And the free cycle lasted from beginning with the Napoleonic
Wars circular eighteen twenty to the defeat of Russia in
the Japanese War in nineteen oh six. Cycle two extends
from nineteen oh seven to the maltav Ribbon Trope pack
of August nineteen thirty nine, through world through World War one,
that is in leading World War Two, and then cycle
three leads from the Great Patriotic War with the Russians
(05:59):
called the Great Page or World War War two to
the Pope two post Soviet.
Speaker 4 (06:04):
Russia. And so what I tried to do is.
Speaker 5 (06:08):
Add the domestic factor into the cycles and come up
with my own cycles.
Speaker 4 (06:12):
So they don't they do not correspond to.
Speaker 5 (06:16):
H siverse py cycles chronologically or temporarily or in terms
of the period. And they're also they also differ in
that they take into account domestic changes that are either
a result of foreign involvement or preparation for involvement in
relations with Europe.
Speaker 4 (06:35):
So I argued there were four cycles, each had four phases.
Speaker 5 (06:40):
In the first phase phase you have a traditionalist statust
typically a traditionalist status quo, which typically in Russia would
mean some form of authoritarian rule except for the Soviet
period of reliance on Russian orthodoxy UH, a preference for
(07:02):
national unity as opposed to pluralism, and a post conflicts
standoff with the West.
Speaker 4 (07:09):
That's that's phase one.
Speaker 5 (07:10):
Phase two is some kind of westernization or liberal liberalization domestically,
at the same time, a retrochemont with the West or
elements there. Up four three is the West tip typically
then overplaced its hand UH. There's either a military invasion
or some other operational or political UH intervention. Before that,
(07:36):
there may be influence and an attempt to maximize that influence.
There may be other there may be forms of meddling
in the in the in the internal politics, and this
leads to a Russian reaction, and domestically this means a
de westernization and a re retraditionalization of Russia. So that's
(07:59):
phase UH. Phase three, and then phase four is the
last in any cycle, and it's a Russian counter offensive.
Speaker 4 (08:07):
In which it regroups.
Speaker 5 (08:11):
Engages either in military action or some other military, political
or military jew strategic action against the West. And then
there's a restoration of something that's close to what had
been the Russian tradition in the previous previous at the
beginning of the cycle, so there's a sort of a
(08:32):
traditional or neo traditional restoration. And then I delineated five
cycles as far as I could make out, and the
first is from fifteen oh five with the establishment of
the Muscovite Kingdom to sixteen thirty and the restoration of
the roman the creation of the Romans, the restoration of
(08:54):
Russian stability and the creation of the Romanov dynasty in
the periods sixteentheen to sixteen.
Speaker 4 (09:00):
Thirty, you could say.
Speaker 5 (09:01):
And then cycle two is sixteen thirty to eighteen twenty five,
that is, from the end of the Smutah the establishment
of the Romanov dynasty to Nicholas's defeat Nicholas the first
defeat of the Decembrist revolt and movement. In a third
cycle is eighteen twenty sixth to nineteen twenty two Nicholas's
(09:22):
reign to the end of the Russian Civil War, marking
the consolidation of ocean rule.
Speaker 4 (09:26):
Cycle four is from nineteen twenty two.
Speaker 5 (09:31):
Leading through to approximately two thousand and eight, the mid
early Putin era, and so I argue there's actually now
a fifth cycle has begun, and that is the restoration
of a sort of tradition, neo traditional system under Putin
that harkens back come more to the pre imperial period
in terms.
Speaker 4 (09:50):
Of political structure, with some.
Speaker 5 (09:52):
Democratic elements quasi democratic elements, and a return to con
inflick with the West, and in about face as in
the Simbirski cycle, to eur Asia with new Eurasianism and
then the attempt to bring it construct things like things
like bricks, and then the militarily the incorporation incorporation of
(10:18):
crime in twenty fourteen, and the beginning of a sharp
turn towards in Russian Western relations.
Speaker 4 (10:24):
So that's basically my five cycles.
Speaker 3 (10:27):
What question I had when looking at your research and
also Simboorski's original theory, is it a valid assumption to
make that we went through another revolution from and by revolution,
I'm referring to the start of one cycle till about
the middle or end of one cycle, from the end
(10:49):
of the Soviet Union with Russia trying to reach out
to the West and work with the Western system to Ukraine.
Would it be reasonable to say that fall of the
Soviet Union sort of marked the start of a new
revolution off the cycle rather than being part of the
macrocycle exclusively.
Speaker 4 (11:13):
Well, the claps the claps of the Soviet Union.
Speaker 5 (11:15):
If if using my model right, you have the Peristroika period,
in the post Perishtroika period, which were periods of westernization
and liberalization, right, and at the same time with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the established of a
quasi democratic system nascent democratic system under in the new Russia.
Speaker 4 (11:38):
The problem, the problem that emerged was that NATO expansion began.
Speaker 5 (11:42):
So this was perceived by Russians as another So we
say West overplaying its hand in a period of westernization,
which is what I talked about as being a as
being phase three.
Speaker 4 (11:57):
I believe of the of a cycles, so I mean
phase four.
Speaker 5 (12:01):
So what we're seeing now here is a we So
we post Peristroyka and the Parishtroika period, we're kind of
we're uh, we're phased two. Right, you have a democratization, liberalization,
then you have NATO expansion, continuing, this is seen as
a reaction. And then when Putin and then restores elmore
(12:23):
authoritarian system and then begins to move against the West
year strategically, you have a shift now to the first
phase of cycle five.
Speaker 4 (12:32):
So really the Soviet period, the.
Speaker 5 (12:35):
Peristroyka and post per Restroyka period are really phase four
of the fourth cycle.
Speaker 4 (12:41):
The war in Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (12:43):
What phase of the cycle or cycle do you think
it is characteristic of, and based on your model and research,
what might we expect from this cycle? We are in
considering the current geopolitical climate, not to be a dumer,
but is this phase the phase to end all faces?
Speaker 4 (13:03):
I'm we're here with the reactions. This is part of the.
Speaker 5 (13:08):
Counter offensives by ra Ussia in phase four that leads
to the first phase of fifth cycles. So it's hard
to make a neat cutoff right between say phase four
of cycle three and phase one of cycle four. In
this case, we're talking about phase four of cycle four
and phase one of cycle five. If if if one
(13:32):
buys my interpretation right, So Ukraine is a continuation really
of this pushback against the West that forced Putin then
to move in a more authoritarian uh direction.
Speaker 4 (13:47):
And you know, Crimea, the Georgian War going.
Speaker 5 (13:49):
That's why I designate the beginning of the of the
fifth phase two two thousand and eight, is that the
Georgian War really is the first major pushback Russia. You
know a lot of words about we don't want NATO expansion,
you know, problems during the Yugoslav Wars and so forth
and so on, but Russia really never undertook any major
(14:11):
step to counter NATO expansion until the Georgian War.
Speaker 4 (14:18):
Occurred. So that's why I designate two o eight really
as a beginning.
Speaker 5 (14:22):
One can argue, one could argue it's twenty fourteen with
the Midan and the reaction to Midon.
Speaker 4 (14:27):
That is a beginning of the fifth cycle.
Speaker 5 (14:29):
So you're okay. Ukraine fits into the end really the
end of the fourth cycle, in the beginning of the
fifth cycle. And we can see this evidence of this
in that simultaneous with the problems in Georgia and Ukraine,
we see Russia turning to adopting more of this idea,
this neo Eurasian oh I wouldn't call it state ideology,
(14:53):
but in ideology, and elements of them certainly influenced Boudent's thinking.
Now we can see this in Bricks in the Shanghai
co Op or Asian Organization and various other Russian policies
where Russia is now really feels and it is that
cut off from Europe because of the invasion in Ukraine
(15:14):
and is now turning into your age, returning to a
sort of Eurasian interval that's Simbirsky Simbirski's described, and this
is really the work there if you look at it
in Zimbirski's terms, right, they're pushed back essentially at the
Black the Baltic Sea line, and again you have this
turn to bricks and Shanghai Cooperation Organization and an attempt
(15:38):
to build basically a.
Speaker 4 (15:39):
Counter alliance to uh NATO.
Speaker 3 (15:42):
Could you elaborate on this concept of ontological security, which,
according to your essay, influences Russia's approach to the West.
What is it exactly and what are some modern day
examples of policy desitions by Russia in pursuit of ontological security?
Speaker 5 (16:04):
Right? So, given you know this to and fro between
traditionalists and then periods and then more reformist periods like
the Peristrotic and post better Strike, go whether you go
back earlier the period of Alexander the Second Reign or
the first part of Alexander the First Reign.
Speaker 4 (16:25):
Other than those periods of reform, there's.
Speaker 5 (16:27):
Sort of a classic ideas of Russian what is Russian
national identity. So one classic example would be Nicholas First
official nationality right, the idea that the Russian style of life,
which is called nationality or in Russian and the world
just under the official nationality of Nicholas the First right,
and then or orthodoxy as as one element, and then
(16:51):
autocracy or in modern terminology, authoritarianism, and that's sort of
the Russian tradition. There might be different variations on the theme,
but that's the general idea, and so that is sort
of a basic sort of rational Russian national identity. It's
not an ethnone, it's not an ethnic national idea. It's
(17:12):
more of more of a Russian cultural idea form of identity.
And often it's connected with the idea of Russia being
part of an alternative civilization of from Europe. At the
same time it is also being part of Europe, and
so when the West comes in, and this gets to
the whole problem of if one views Russia as being
(17:33):
sort of paranoid and alien to all farign influences. This
is clearly an exaggeration because Russia doesn't have this problem
with non Western civilizations as this problem only with Western civilization,
because it's Western civilization that's constantly try to influence, then
meddle in, or interfere in Russian politics, and if that
(17:53):
doesn't work, then try to intervene or invade, invade. And
so this is so when when, for example, a period
of reform begins and begin to see Western influence, that
it may be sponsored initially by the ruling elite, what
typically happens is is the West tries to intensify that influence,
(18:14):
and at some point this becomes mobilizes those who either
at the beginning of the reform stor as the reforms
began to radicalize, were suspicious or opposed to the reforms,
raised the red flag calls for a return to tradition
or something like the previous tradition, depending on what period
you're talking about. And so this is what autological security is,
(18:38):
basically the security of one's traditional national identity as not
as an ethnonational entity.
Speaker 4 (18:44):
But as a civilization.
Speaker 3 (18:47):
In putting it briefly, another thing you mentioned in your
essay doctor han is that Russia has a culture of
security vigilance, which has shaped its approach to the West,
particularly during Putin's presidency, Moscow's historical experiences with Mongols and Tartars,
(19:10):
and also Napoleon. How do you think that these historical
experiences have influenced the country's national psyche to the extent
that some claim that Russia has a fortress state mentality
with suspicion towards other civilizations, but particularly other civilizations from
(19:32):
the West. What do you think are the main historical
events that framed or gave rise to this culture of
security vigilance.
Speaker 4 (19:43):
MHM. Largely it's been it's been relations with the West.
Speaker 5 (19:46):
You know, if you go back to Russian history and
relations with the West, you know it's UH.
Speaker 4 (19:53):
There were there were problems early on, even before.
Speaker 5 (19:56):
My cycles, and then and in the first cycle it
was three with Poland and the Vatican and Vatican's attempts
to expand Catholicism into UH traditional traditionally Orthodox populations that
neighbored Russia UH and that were ethnic were Slavic and
followed the Orthodox faith. And then it peaked with the
(20:18):
first with the project to place the so called false
Dmitri on the Russian throne after the death of Ivan
the Third support and so Worth sponsored where the where
where the Poles essentially created a invading army led by
someone who was claiming to be the former son, the
killed son of Ivan the Terrible, and that he was
(20:41):
the rightful heir to the throne.
Speaker 4 (20:43):
And they sent this army into what is now Ukrainian territory.
Speaker 5 (20:47):
Interesting enough, right, And they came up, moved up north
and then eventually seies Moscow. And this led to the
Tarra time of troubles, which may have been the worst
period in Russian history, in which you had chaos, roaming,
ban Polish invasions, Swiftish incursions, uh, revolutionary activity, if you
want to put it that way. The Soviets tend to
(21:08):
play that up, the whole thing up as a revolutionary episode,
but that's not a cuber an accurate description of the
of the thing. So this uh, the problem is that
there's a not a fortress mentality, but great suspicion, distrust,
and in some quarters in Russia, even during periods of reform,
(21:30):
people who absolutely despise the West and warn the liberals
and reformers that this is going to lead to a crisis.
Speaker 4 (21:35):
But this is purely in relation to Western civilization.
Speaker 5 (21:38):
Russia doesn't have this problem for hundreds of years except
going you know, if you want to go back to
the Mongols, right, but we know they don't have this
problem with Hindu civilization. They don't have this problem with
the Chinese civilization, they don't have this problem with Muslim civilization.
It simply doesn't exist. Uh, Russia in this sense for
(21:59):
Europeussia is its main other. Russia is constantly viewing itself
in relation to the West in terms of its sophistication,
power and so forth development, and at the same time
it wants to be part of often wants to be
part of Europe. And then there's some kind of episode
(22:21):
which leads to the rejection, and then this becomes a backlash.
That's sort of what's covered in different ways in my
four four cycles. So if you look at to simply
look at today and you look at the bricks, right,
the four bricks, the four bricks, the four original four bricks,
Betoy besides Russia represented all basically all except for the
(22:45):
Muslim civilization, all the non Western civilization, right, indie, Indu civilization, China,
asiac Now they've brought in in Saudi Arabia and the
Yid Aer Bevertts, so now they are Muslim representatives. All
the civilizations, basic civilizations, a lot. If you want to
consider Latin America separate civilization, Latin America with Brazil are
(23:06):
represented in bricks.
Speaker 4 (23:07):
It's the West that's not represented in brick.
Speaker 5 (23:09):
And there's a reason for that because it's it's considered
a counter two to the West, and it's one that's
becoming more and more robust take covering more and more
spheres of political life. One can expect, in fact, at
some point a militarization or at least the creation of
a block calendar block to NATO, which already exists in
(23:32):
the economic terms, and so forth and so on.
Speaker 4 (23:35):
So this is dictated largely by historical experience.
Speaker 5 (23:38):
Again, the Smootha, then the Smuta, but is followed by
the invasion of Napoleon. Invasion of Napoleon is followed by
Hitler's invasion, and then NATO expansion occurs at the end
of the Cold War, after Russia gave up twenty five
million of its come ethnic Russian compatriots, Russian speaking compatriots
(23:58):
on let them, Uh, let them be separated from mother
Russia to put it in Russian terms instead, and in reaction,
instead of finding an open path to Europe, they found
NATO expansion being discussed really within one two years of
the u of Soviet collapse, and within five years it
(24:21):
was already on the table and a done deal and
with no geo strategic cause whatsoever. So this was uh,
this was basically this reinforced the traditionalist view and the
security vigilance culture that's part of the traditionalist view in Russia, right, yeah,
(24:42):
idea that and it played into those who were traditionalists
in Russia who were fighting for power, and they are
the ones who moved. You know, if you look at
the succession struggled to Yeltsin the inner circle of Yeltsin.
Speaker 4 (24:54):
We began to look for someone these to say, this
is almost a direct quote.
Speaker 5 (24:57):
We were looking for someone with epaulets, you know, someone
with a shoulder billboards, either military or KGB right to
replace Chelson, because we needed someone who would be looking
out for.
Speaker 4 (25:09):
Russian national security.
Speaker 3 (25:12):
Moving away from Russia and looking at the West, what
would you say are the factors influencing the West's approach
Sometimes hostile towards Russia. Is it some sort of historical
racism or dismissal of Russia's suitability for being part of
quote Western civilization. What do you think are the factors
(25:35):
that influences how the West perceives Russia.
Speaker 4 (25:39):
I think all these things come into play.
Speaker 5 (25:43):
I think it began with more parochial, mundane things during
the Clinton administration, when basically Clinton first he needed credentials
because he had been a draft up dodger, and he
needed defense credentials in terms of getting re elected. He
needed support of the defense industry, and he also needed
(26:03):
the support of the state of Illinois, which has a
large Polish and Ukrainian population. So those three factors I
think drove his agreement to Expanado. I think was largely
domestic politics that drove it, because he was a governor
of Arkansas. I don't think he had any grand international vision,
(26:27):
and so all these domestic factors tended to trump any
geo strategic concerns, and since Russia was weak at the time,
those concerns could were not particularly great in terms of some.
Speaker 4 (26:40):
Kind of Russia reaction.
Speaker 5 (26:41):
It was a gross misinterpretation of the situation and miscalculation,
when in fact it was a possibility for the first
time in you know, three hundred years, really to bring
Russia into Europe in a in a important ways.
Speaker 4 (27:00):
Uh.
Speaker 5 (27:00):
I think that's that that started the ball rolling and
send sent things in a general direction. And then as
you know, the situation in Yugoslavbia was another factor that
sort of began to kick in the old ideas of
imperial and the national competition between the West and Russia,
and that began to touch on ideas of Russian national
(27:21):
identity and the most and then the more Russia began
to look for an alternative West, non Western alternative identity.
Then that provoked in the West the reaction, Oh, to see,
the Russians are returning to their old.
Speaker 4 (27:33):
Colonial pass, which.
Speaker 5 (27:34):
In fact is not any different from the Western colonial path.
The Russians, you know, joined in the three Part two
along with Western powers and the three partitions of Poland.
And in fact it was the the West that often
encouraged Russia to take up imperial operations, going back to
Ivan the Third when they uh when they requested that
(27:55):
the Evne the Third. Evan the Third declared Moscow the
successors of the Holy Holy Roman Empire and the third
Romans and that whole idea that encouraged that idea which
is now played up in the West, when in fact
the idea, even the third rejected the idea, and the
third role idea remained simply a sort of more of
a religious political idea than a geopolitical idea with absolutely
(28:19):
no geo you know, no military political geopolitical impigations.
Speaker 4 (28:27):
Involved.
Speaker 3 (28:28):
Uh.
Speaker 5 (28:29):
And so then you had then you have other factors,
right like in fact, the defense enterprise wanting to take
over for arms markets at Eastern you're Europe, and then
you have the standard view of the Russians being uh,
second tier Europeans, those other less sophisticated, less developed Europeans,
and that's that's that's that's the most generous view that
(28:49):
you'll often find in the West. Usually you'll hear them
be referred to as Mongols and and other such things.
The Ukraine's used the words of vatniks and lady bugs
and so forth, and so it's up. So this is
not unusual in certain circles of the West, and it's
(29:09):
and it's parlad. So there are all sorts of factors,
you know, there are cultural factors, there are factors of.
Speaker 4 (29:17):
National superiority in the West.
Speaker 5 (29:21):
Economic factors of course also not just selling arms, but
selling oil and gas and so forth. So, and then
the bureaucratic interests and the electoral interests of an administration
going going back early.
Speaker 4 (29:33):
So it's a complex picture. It's not just it's not
one factor or another. That's the main thing.
Speaker 5 (29:38):
I don't think at this point you maybe now you
have security factors being at the four because you have
an actual direct military conflict between we're almost direct in
military conflict in the NATO Russia Ukrainian in war.
Speaker 3 (29:54):
With the internal dynamics in Russia. One thing we noticed
with the war in Ukraine is that the Uchens, notably
Ramzan kaduro has gained arguably influence in the current Russian
political establishment. Do you think this influence on internal dynamics
is significant enough to change certain things in this cycle?
Speaker 4 (30:19):
No, I don't think.
Speaker 5 (30:19):
I think Kadirov does not have any serious influence inside
the Kremlin or anywhere else.
Speaker 4 (30:26):
He he basically is someone who is he's kind of
deal with the with the Kremlin, and that is.
Speaker 5 (30:34):
Chechia can develop its own culture, It can ignore certain
aspects of the Russian constitution in Russian law, and promote
Islam over other religions and institute elements of Sharia law
and other cultural standards in the Chechen life. It can have,
it can violate the federal centers monopoly on the means
(30:57):
of coercion by having these large, this large military force
under its control and in serve and in return for that,
they're supposed to serve Moscow's interests. So Cardirov sends some
of those troops into Ukraine to help the Russian cause
in Ukraine.
Speaker 4 (31:17):
But Kadirov, I think Cardirov.
Speaker 5 (31:20):
Began began Ramzan cardiro that has began following the model
of his father, in the words of his father, Aukmedic
Cardeiro who said, at some point, you know, we spent
three hundred years trying to gain our independence by fighting
the Russians. Maybe we should try to should spend three
hundred years trying to gain our independence peacefully. And I
think Cardira is playing that game, you know, I don't.
(31:42):
I think at this point any idea of Chechen independence
is out the window. There could be some opening for
elements in Chechena once Cardirov is replaced or passes away.
There are rumors that he has he has a severe
kidney disease or diabetes, and the health is not all
that well, and they're beginning to position people from his
(32:06):
clan or other clans into a position.
Speaker 4 (32:08):
To succeed him.
Speaker 5 (32:09):
But Uh, Kadiro, you know he has he has very
indirect influence in that he represents, you know, way an
element of the Muslim popular population in Russia. He is
and can be seen as sort of containing radical Islamism
and jihadism in the North Buxuses. But these more sources
(32:32):
to the Kremlin, and they are having any great uh influence,
So I don't see him having influencing grominent policy in
any way.
Speaker 3 (32:42):
Coming to our last question, doctor Han, are we doomed
to go through this cycle repeatedly or do you think
there is hope for us as the West to break
the cycle and have good relations with Russia? And if so,
what actions should Western policymakers take to ensure that the
relationship with Russia is more stable and peaceful instead of
(33:06):
going through these regular cycles. Or do you think because
of the powers that be, we're doomed to repeat the cycle.
Speaker 5 (33:15):
Well, I don't think we're doomed to repeat the cycle eternally.
I mean, there are always chances, and there's always posical change.
Politics is nothing. If there's nothing else is it's changed.
So but I think for the next decade, situation is
rather dismal. Basically, we're going to have to engage in
conflict management, you know, after this phase ends and there's
(33:35):
some kind of semi peaceful or peaceful standoff over the
issue of Ukraine. The most important thing would be not
to persist in expanding NATO. As long as the West
persists in expanding NATO to Russia's borders, there is going
to be conflict and potential conflict with Moscow. And there's
no way getting around it because in the amongst the
(33:56):
elite and in Russian society, they are very low to
see a large military alliance based in the West along
its borders. And that's because of the history that I
mentioned earlier. Uh.
Speaker 4 (34:11):
The other the other thing is I think it would
be good if both.
Speaker 5 (34:13):
Sides started to lay off the sort of the mckendrey
and geopolitical interpretation of geographical interpretation of politics, in which
Russia and your Asia is seen as the world island
and he who controls the world island.
Speaker 4 (34:32):
Controls the world.
Speaker 5 (34:33):
So the West is constantly trying to control the world island,
and Russia constantly sees the West's trying to control the
world island. And it would be good if we got
a little bit away, it got away from that kind
of thinking. Certainly, one can keep it in mind. So
it certainly is a factor in politics, but it shouldn't
be a sort of an ideology that drives.
Speaker 4 (34:55):
Policy. So I think that those are some of the
things could be could be done.
Speaker 5 (35:00):
Other thing would be not to not to again by
doing things like NATO expansion, uh, to insult the Russian honor,
to by doing so, kick in that security vigilance culture.
It's better when that security vigilance culture is not the
dominant culture, but it's recessive in Russian in the overall
Russian culture. UH. And those are the periods when there
(35:22):
there's accommodation with the West, there is westernization, there's liberalization, UH,
and all those things we we tend to support. One
of the main things that one of the important things
that people often overlook is that quite often westernization and
liberalization was undermined by Western actions. So if you look
(35:43):
at Bora's Godinov, who began to engage in reforms like
Western Westernizer reforms that Peter and Great would implement a
century later. And when he got wind of the conspiracy
that the Bold in the Vatican were hatching in regarding
a false Tameach, he abandoned the reforms. Alexander the First
(36:04):
had planned a constitution and the and Ending surved them,
And because of the conflicts with the Napoleon and his
involvement in the alliances, the European alliances against Napoleon, he
had to abandon that project twice and ultimately a third time.
Speaker 4 (36:18):
And then in the last four or five years of
his reign he became a conservative.
Speaker 5 (36:23):
One can look at the protection of Russian revolutionaries during
the nineteenth century leading up to the.
Speaker 4 (36:30):
Russian Revolution.
Speaker 5 (36:31):
One can look at the Germans support when Kerensky was
on the verge of creating creating possibly a Russian republic,
the Germans sending Lenin with lots of money back into
Russia to make a revolution. So all these examples are
examples of the West actually undermining the westernization that we
say we want to see in Russia. So the Russia
would become part of a West, and then we would
(36:53):
have this sort of democratic peace that the Europeans love
to talk about, in which everyone is a Republican or
a democrat in small d and all small art terms,
and therefore there will be no conflict because it's only
authoritary leaders supposedly they create wars.
Speaker 3 (37:10):
Ladies and gentlemen, You just listen to Gordon Hand, expert
analyst at Core Analytics. Gordon Hand, thank you so much
for your time. Thank you for inviting me.
Speaker 1 (37:21):
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew
Jose Media. The views expressed by guests on this show
do not necessarily represent the official positions and opinions of
Andrew Jose, Andrew Jose Media, and Strategic Wisdom.
Speaker 2 (37:38):
Thank you for listening to Strategic Wisdom. Be sure to
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(38:01):
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Speaker 3 (38:18):
Thank you so much, Gabby, and thank you so much
Ian ladies and gentlemen. This is your host, Andrew Jose
signing off.
If you have closely studied the history of Russia's relationship
with the West, one thing that becomes evident to you
is that the country has had a somewhat never ending
cycle of a love hate relationship with the West, cooperating
and trying to become like Western Europe at times and
violently resisting any perceived erosion of sovereignty and identity.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
If you have perceived so, you're not alone. Such a
pattern was also noted by Videm Simbirski, a Russian political
scientist and scholar of geopolitics.
Speaker 1 (00:26):
You're listening to Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. Strategic Wisdom
is a foreign affairs and politics podcast brought to you
by Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC based security policy analyst
and news reporter, bringing you timely commentary on issues in
international relations, war, and security policy. We're your hosts Ian Stormfeldt.
Speaker 2 (00:46):
And Gabriel Savchuk. Joining Andrew today is Gordon Hahn, a
scholar of Russian and Eurasian politics, to discuss Simbirski's theorization
of cycles in relations between Russia and the West and
how Simbirski's ideas can be adapted and applied to unders
standing Moscow's current approach to Washington, London and Brussels.
Speaker 1 (01:04):
Pahn is the author of Neo Simbirskian Cycles in the
History of Russian Western Relations, an essay published by the
journal Russia in Global Affairs. This essay forms the main
subject of Andrew's discussion with Dr Han Today.
Speaker 2 (01:16):
Without further ado, We're going to hand the floor to
Andrew Jose.
Speaker 3 (01:54):
Gordon Hann is an expert analyst at Core Analytics, a
New York based political risk advisory firm. Hahn is a
notable scholar of politics, international relations, and Islamist terrorism in
Russia and Eurasia. He is the author of The Russian Dilemma, Security,
Vigilance and Relations with the West. From Ivan the Third
(02:17):
to Putin and Ukraine Over the Edge, Russia, the West
and the New Cold War. Han's most recent work is
Russian Salosnost Wholeness in Russian Culture, Thought, History and Politics.
He has previously taught at Boston University, American University, and
Stanford University. He has also served as a visiting fellow
(02:41):
at the Keenan Institute in Washington, d C. And the
Hoover Institution. Gordon Hand Welcome to the show.
Speaker 4 (02:50):
Thank you very much, Andrews, thank you for inviting me
glad to be here.
Speaker 3 (02:54):
In your recent essay for Russia and Global Affairs, Doctor Hand,
you mentioned neo Simbirskian cycles in the history of Russia's
relationship with its Western counterparts. Could you explain to the
audience what are Simborskian cycles and what are neo Simbirskan
cycles and how do the neo Simberstian cycles differ from
(03:17):
Timberski's original theorization of the cycles of Russia's relationship with
the West.
Speaker 5 (03:26):
Well, Simborski's original cycles were devoted entirely to foreign relations,
that his relations mostly with the West that he touches
on Eurasia and Eurasia. He argued that there were there
were three different cycles in Russian history, with the with
the West and the relations of the West, and each
cycle had five what he called moves so uh move
(03:50):
age typically saw Russia becoming sort of second tier secondary
ally of some European alliance.
Speaker 4 (03:57):
One or another.
Speaker 5 (03:59):
And then move B came in two forms in which
the failure of Russia's shall we say unsuccessful, unfortunate involvement
in these geopolitical alliances leads to the European conflict extending
into Russia in one of two ways, either invasion by
a European.
Speaker 4 (04:18):
Hegemon or one or more two two or more.
Speaker 5 (04:21):
Parties to the dispute bring the dispute into Russia, the
fight into Russia, the conflict into Russia.
Speaker 4 (04:28):
That's a move B. Move C is a Russian counter offensive.
Speaker 5 (04:33):
The Russians regroup and try to quote unquote catch the
aggressor in his lair, and they invade, seize a protectorate
in some territory beyond Eastern Europe and use that.
Speaker 4 (04:45):
Hope to use that to project Russian Russian power.
Speaker 5 (04:50):
Moved is the West consolid consolidates and conducts a counter offensive,
pushes Russia back behind the Baltic Black Sea Line to fight,
and dividing East Europe from Western Europe you could say,
or word Eastern Europe from Eurasia, depending on the period
in your view point of view. And Russia is now
cut off from its European other, or Europe is cut
(05:12):
off from it's Russian Russian other as Russian seed Russia's
being part of Europe usually in some Europeans do as well,
and this leads to a quot kind of catastrophic isolation.
And then movie is Russia response to this situation by
returning ton Asia or Eurasia in what Simpersky called the
Eurasian intermedia. You call it the Eurasian interval or Eurasian alternative.
(05:37):
And the free cycle lasted from beginning with the Napoleonic
Wars circular eighteen twenty to the defeat of Russia in
the Japanese War in nineteen oh six. Cycle two extends
from nineteen oh seven to the maltav Ribbon Trope pack
of August nineteen thirty nine, through world through World War one,
that is in leading World War Two, and then cycle
three leads from the Great Patriotic War with the Russians
(05:59):
called the Great Page or World War War two to
the Pope two post Soviet.
Speaker 4 (06:04):
Russia. And so what I tried to do is.
Speaker 5 (06:08):
Add the domestic factor into the cycles and come up
with my own cycles.
Speaker 4 (06:12):
So they don't they do not correspond to.
Speaker 5 (06:16):
H siverse py cycles chronologically or temporarily or in terms
of the period. And they're also they also differ in
that they take into account domestic changes that are either
a result of foreign involvement or preparation for involvement in
relations with Europe.
Speaker 4 (06:35):
So I argued there were four cycles, each had four phases.
Speaker 5 (06:40):
In the first phase phase you have a traditionalist statust
typically a traditionalist status quo, which typically in Russia would
mean some form of authoritarian rule except for the Soviet
period of reliance on Russian orthodoxy UH, a preference for
(07:02):
national unity as opposed to pluralism, and a post conflicts
standoff with the West.
Speaker 4 (07:09):
That's that's phase one.
Speaker 5 (07:10):
Phase two is some kind of westernization or liberal liberalization domestically,
at the same time, a retrochemont with the West or
elements there. Up four three is the West tip typically
then overplaced its hand UH. There's either a military invasion
or some other operational or political UH intervention. Before that,
(07:36):
there may be influence and an attempt to maximize that influence.
There may be other there may be forms of meddling
in the in the in the internal politics, and this
leads to a Russian reaction, and domestically this means a
de westernization and a re retraditionalization of Russia. So that's
(07:59):
phase UH. Phase three, and then phase four is the
last in any cycle, and it's a Russian counter offensive.
Speaker 4 (08:07):
In which it regroups.
Speaker 5 (08:11):
Engages either in military action or some other military, political
or military jew strategic action against the West. And then
there's a restoration of something that's close to what had
been the Russian tradition in the previous previous at the
beginning of the cycle, so there's a sort of a
(08:32):
traditional or neo traditional restoration. And then I delineated five
cycles as far as I could make out, and the
first is from fifteen oh five with the establishment of
the Muscovite Kingdom to sixteen thirty and the restoration of
the roman the creation of the Romans, the restoration of
(08:54):
Russian stability and the creation of the Romanov dynasty in
the periods sixteentheen to sixteen.
Speaker 4 (09:00):
Thirty, you could say.
Speaker 5 (09:01):
And then cycle two is sixteen thirty to eighteen twenty five,
that is, from the end of the Smutah the establishment
of the Romanov dynasty to Nicholas's defeat Nicholas the first
defeat of the Decembrist revolt and movement. In a third
cycle is eighteen twenty sixth to nineteen twenty two Nicholas's
(09:22):
reign to the end of the Russian Civil War, marking
the consolidation of ocean rule.
Speaker 4 (09:26):
Cycle four is from nineteen twenty two.
Speaker 5 (09:31):
Leading through to approximately two thousand and eight, the mid
early Putin era, and so I argue there's actually now
a fifth cycle has begun, and that is the restoration
of a sort of tradition, neo traditional system under Putin
that harkens back come more to the pre imperial period
in terms.
Speaker 4 (09:50):
Of political structure, with some.
Speaker 5 (09:52):
Democratic elements quasi democratic elements, and a return to con
inflick with the West, and in about face as in
the Simbirski cycle, to eur Asia with new Eurasianism and
then the attempt to bring it construct things like things
like bricks, and then the militarily the incorporation incorporation of
(10:18):
crime in twenty fourteen, and the beginning of a sharp
turn towards in Russian Western relations.
Speaker 4 (10:24):
So that's basically my five cycles.
Speaker 3 (10:27):
What question I had when looking at your research and
also Simboorski's original theory, is it a valid assumption to
make that we went through another revolution from and by revolution,
I'm referring to the start of one cycle till about
the middle or end of one cycle, from the end
(10:49):
of the Soviet Union with Russia trying to reach out
to the West and work with the Western system to Ukraine.
Would it be reasonable to say that fall of the
Soviet Union sort of marked the start of a new
revolution off the cycle rather than being part of the
macrocycle exclusively.
Speaker 4 (11:13):
Well, the claps the claps of the Soviet Union.
Speaker 5 (11:15):
If if using my model right, you have the Peristroika period,
in the post Perishtroika period, which were periods of westernization
and liberalization, right, and at the same time with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the established of a
quasi democratic system nascent democratic system under in the new Russia.
Speaker 4 (11:38):
The problem, the problem that emerged was that NATO expansion began.
Speaker 5 (11:42):
So this was perceived by Russians as another So we
say West overplaying its hand in a period of westernization,
which is what I talked about as being a as
being phase three.
Speaker 4 (11:57):
I believe of the of a cycles, so I mean
phase four.
Speaker 5 (12:01):
So what we're seeing now here is a we So
we post Peristroyka and the Parishtroika period, we're kind of
we're uh, we're phased two. Right, you have a democratization, liberalization,
then you have NATO expansion, continuing, this is seen as
a reaction. And then when Putin and then restores elmore
(12:23):
authoritarian system and then begins to move against the West
year strategically, you have a shift now to the first
phase of cycle five.
Speaker 4 (12:32):
So really the Soviet period, the.
Speaker 5 (12:35):
Peristroyka and post per Restroyka period are really phase four
of the fourth cycle.
Speaker 4 (12:41):
The war in Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (12:43):
What phase of the cycle or cycle do you think
it is characteristic of, and based on your model and research,
what might we expect from this cycle? We are in
considering the current geopolitical climate, not to be a dumer,
but is this phase the phase to end all faces?
Speaker 4 (13:03):
I'm we're here with the reactions. This is part of the.
Speaker 5 (13:08):
Counter offensives by ra Ussia in phase four that leads
to the first phase of fifth cycles. So it's hard
to make a neat cutoff right between say phase four
of cycle three and phase one of cycle four. In
this case, we're talking about phase four of cycle four
and phase one of cycle five. If if if one
(13:32):
buys my interpretation right, So Ukraine is a continuation really
of this pushback against the West that forced Putin then
to move in a more authoritarian uh direction.
Speaker 4 (13:47):
And you know, Crimea, the Georgian War going.
Speaker 5 (13:49):
That's why I designate the beginning of the of the
fifth phase two two thousand and eight, is that the
Georgian War really is the first major pushback Russia. You
know a lot of words about we don't want NATO expansion,
you know, problems during the Yugoslav Wars and so forth
and so on, but Russia really never undertook any major
(14:11):
step to counter NATO expansion until the Georgian War.
Speaker 4 (14:18):
Occurred. So that's why I designate two o eight really
as a beginning.
Speaker 5 (14:22):
One can argue, one could argue it's twenty fourteen with
the Midan and the reaction to Midon.
Speaker 4 (14:27):
That is a beginning of the fifth cycle.
Speaker 5 (14:29):
So you're okay. Ukraine fits into the end really the
end of the fourth cycle, in the beginning of the
fifth cycle. And we can see this evidence of this
in that simultaneous with the problems in Georgia and Ukraine,
we see Russia turning to adopting more of this idea,
this neo Eurasian oh I wouldn't call it state ideology,
(14:53):
but in ideology, and elements of them certainly influenced Boudent's thinking.
Now we can see this in Bricks in the Shanghai
co Op or Asian Organization and various other Russian policies
where Russia is now really feels and it is that
cut off from Europe because of the invasion in Ukraine
(15:14):
and is now turning into your age, returning to a
sort of Eurasian interval that's Simbirsky Simbirski's described, and this
is really the work there if you look at it
in Zimbirski's terms, right, they're pushed back essentially at the
Black the Baltic Sea line, and again you have this
turn to bricks and Shanghai Cooperation Organization and an attempt
(15:38):
to build basically a.
Speaker 4 (15:39):
Counter alliance to uh NATO.
Speaker 3 (15:42):
Could you elaborate on this concept of ontological security, which,
according to your essay, influences Russia's approach to the West.
What is it exactly and what are some modern day
examples of policy desitions by Russia in pursuit of ontological security?
Speaker 5 (16:04):
Right? So, given you know this to and fro between
traditionalists and then periods and then more reformist periods like
the Peristrotic and post better Strike, go whether you go
back earlier the period of Alexander the Second Reign or
the first part of Alexander the First Reign.
Speaker 4 (16:25):
Other than those periods of reform, there's.
Speaker 5 (16:27):
Sort of a classic ideas of Russian what is Russian
national identity. So one classic example would be Nicholas First
official nationality right, the idea that the Russian style of life,
which is called nationality or in Russian and the world
just under the official nationality of Nicholas the First right,
and then or orthodoxy as as one element, and then
(16:51):
autocracy or in modern terminology, authoritarianism, and that's sort of
the Russian tradition. There might be different variations on the theme,
but that's the general idea, and so that is sort
of a basic sort of rational Russian national identity. It's
not an ethnone, it's not an ethnic national idea. It's
(17:12):
more of more of a Russian cultural idea form of identity.
And often it's connected with the idea of Russia being
part of an alternative civilization of from Europe. At the
same time it is also being part of Europe, and
so when the West comes in, and this gets to
the whole problem of if one views Russia as being
(17:33):
sort of paranoid and alien to all farign influences. This
is clearly an exaggeration because Russia doesn't have this problem
with non Western civilizations as this problem only with Western civilization,
because it's Western civilization that's constantly try to influence, then
meddle in, or interfere in Russian politics, and if that
(17:53):
doesn't work, then try to intervene or invade, invade. And
so this is so when when, for example, a period
of reform begins and begin to see Western influence, that
it may be sponsored initially by the ruling elite, what
typically happens is is the West tries to intensify that influence,
(18:14):
and at some point this becomes mobilizes those who either
at the beginning of the reform stor as the reforms
began to radicalize, were suspicious or opposed to the reforms,
raised the red flag calls for a return to tradition
or something like the previous tradition, depending on what period
you're talking about. And so this is what autological security is,
(18:38):
basically the security of one's traditional national identity as not
as an ethnonational entity.
Speaker 4 (18:44):
But as a civilization.
Speaker 3 (18:47):
In putting it briefly, another thing you mentioned in your
essay doctor han is that Russia has a culture of
security vigilance, which has shaped its approach to the West,
particularly during Putin's presidency, Moscow's historical experiences with Mongols and Tartars,
(19:10):
and also Napoleon. How do you think that these historical
experiences have influenced the country's national psyche to the extent
that some claim that Russia has a fortress state mentality
with suspicion towards other civilizations, but particularly other civilizations from
(19:32):
the West. What do you think are the main historical
events that framed or gave rise to this culture of
security vigilance.
Speaker 4 (19:43):
MHM. Largely it's been it's been relations with the West.
Speaker 5 (19:46):
You know, if you go back to Russian history and
relations with the West, you know it's UH.
Speaker 4 (19:53):
There were there were problems early on, even before.
Speaker 5 (19:56):
My cycles, and then and in the first cycle it
was three with Poland and the Vatican and Vatican's attempts
to expand Catholicism into UH traditional traditionally Orthodox populations that
neighbored Russia UH and that were ethnic were Slavic and
followed the Orthodox faith. And then it peaked with the
(20:18):
first with the project to place the so called false
Dmitri on the Russian throne after the death of Ivan
the Third support and so Worth sponsored where the where
where the Poles essentially created a invading army led by
someone who was claiming to be the former son, the
killed son of Ivan the Terrible, and that he was
(20:41):
the rightful heir to the throne.
Speaker 4 (20:43):
And they sent this army into what is now Ukrainian territory.
Speaker 5 (20:47):
Interesting enough, right, And they came up, moved up north
and then eventually seies Moscow. And this led to the
Tarra time of troubles, which may have been the worst
period in Russian history, in which you had chaos, roaming,
ban Polish invasions, Swiftish incursions, uh, revolutionary activity, if you
want to put it that way. The Soviets tend to
(21:08):
play that up, the whole thing up as a revolutionary episode,
but that's not a cuber an accurate description of the
of the thing. So this uh, the problem is that
there's a not a fortress mentality, but great suspicion, distrust,
and in some quarters in Russia, even during periods of reform,
(21:30):
people who absolutely despise the West and warn the liberals
and reformers that this is going to lead to a crisis.
Speaker 4 (21:35):
But this is purely in relation to Western civilization.
Speaker 5 (21:38):
Russia doesn't have this problem for hundreds of years except
going you know, if you want to go back to
the Mongols, right, but we know they don't have this
problem with Hindu civilization. They don't have this problem with
the Chinese civilization, they don't have this problem with Muslim civilization.
It simply doesn't exist. Uh, Russia in this sense for
(21:59):
Europeussia is its main other. Russia is constantly viewing itself
in relation to the West in terms of its sophistication,
power and so forth development, and at the same time
it wants to be part of often wants to be
part of Europe. And then there's some kind of episode
(22:21):
which leads to the rejection, and then this becomes a backlash.
That's sort of what's covered in different ways in my
four four cycles. So if you look at to simply
look at today and you look at the bricks, right,
the four bricks, the four bricks, the four original four bricks,
Betoy besides Russia represented all basically all except for the
(22:45):
Muslim civilization, all the non Western civilization, right, indie, Indu civilization, China,
asiac Now they've brought in in Saudi Arabia and the
Yid Aer Bevertts, so now they are Muslim representatives. All
the civilizations, basic civilizations, a lot. If you want to
consider Latin America separate civilization, Latin America with Brazil are
(23:06):
represented in bricks.
Speaker 4 (23:07):
It's the West that's not represented in brick.
Speaker 5 (23:09):
And there's a reason for that because it's it's considered
a counter two to the West, and it's one that's
becoming more and more robust take covering more and more
spheres of political life. One can expect, in fact, at
some point a militarization or at least the creation of
a block calendar block to NATO, which already exists in
(23:32):
the economic terms, and so forth and so on.
Speaker 4 (23:35):
So this is dictated largely by historical experience.
Speaker 5 (23:38):
Again, the Smootha, then the Smuta, but is followed by
the invasion of Napoleon. Invasion of Napoleon is followed by
Hitler's invasion, and then NATO expansion occurs at the end
of the Cold War, after Russia gave up twenty five
million of its come ethnic Russian compatriots, Russian speaking compatriots
(23:58):
on let them, Uh, let them be separated from mother
Russia to put it in Russian terms instead, and in reaction,
instead of finding an open path to Europe, they found
NATO expansion being discussed really within one two years of
the u of Soviet collapse, and within five years it
(24:21):
was already on the table and a done deal and
with no geo strategic cause whatsoever. So this was uh,
this was basically this reinforced the traditionalist view and the
security vigilance culture that's part of the traditionalist view in Russia, right, yeah,
(24:42):
idea that and it played into those who were traditionalists
in Russia who were fighting for power, and they are
the ones who moved. You know, if you look at
the succession struggled to Yeltsin the inner circle of Yeltsin.
Speaker 4 (24:54):
We began to look for someone these to say, this
is almost a direct quote.
Speaker 5 (24:57):
We were looking for someone with epaulets, you know, someone
with a shoulder billboards, either military or KGB right to
replace Chelson, because we needed someone who would be looking
out for.
Speaker 4 (25:09):
Russian national security.
Speaker 3 (25:12):
Moving away from Russia and looking at the West, what
would you say are the factors influencing the West's approach
Sometimes hostile towards Russia. Is it some sort of historical
racism or dismissal of Russia's suitability for being part of
quote Western civilization. What do you think are the factors
(25:35):
that influences how the West perceives Russia.
Speaker 4 (25:39):
I think all these things come into play.
Speaker 5 (25:43):
I think it began with more parochial, mundane things during
the Clinton administration, when basically Clinton first he needed credentials
because he had been a draft up dodger, and he
needed defense credentials in terms of getting re elected. He
needed support of the defense industry, and he also needed
(26:03):
the support of the state of Illinois, which has a
large Polish and Ukrainian population. So those three factors I
think drove his agreement to Expanado. I think was largely
domestic politics that drove it, because he was a governor
of Arkansas. I don't think he had any grand international vision,
(26:27):
and so all these domestic factors tended to trump any
geo strategic concerns, and since Russia was weak at the time,
those concerns could were not particularly great in terms of some.
Speaker 4 (26:40):
Kind of Russia reaction.
Speaker 5 (26:41):
It was a gross misinterpretation of the situation and miscalculation,
when in fact it was a possibility for the first
time in you know, three hundred years, really to bring
Russia into Europe in a in a important ways.
Speaker 4 (27:00):
Uh.
Speaker 5 (27:00):
I think that's that that started the ball rolling and
send sent things in a general direction. And then as
you know, the situation in Yugoslavbia was another factor that
sort of began to kick in the old ideas of
imperial and the national competition between the West and Russia,
and that began to touch on ideas of Russian national
(27:21):
identity and the most and then the more Russia began
to look for an alternative West, non Western alternative identity.
Then that provoked in the West the reaction, Oh, to see,
the Russians are returning to their old.
Speaker 4 (27:33):
Colonial pass, which.
Speaker 5 (27:34):
In fact is not any different from the Western colonial path.
The Russians, you know, joined in the three Part two
along with Western powers and the three partitions of Poland.
And in fact it was the the West that often
encouraged Russia to take up imperial operations, going back to
Ivan the Third when they uh when they requested that
(27:55):
the Evne the Third. Evan the Third declared Moscow the
successors of the Holy Holy Roman Empire and the third
Romans and that whole idea that encouraged that idea which
is now played up in the West, when in fact
the idea, even the third rejected the idea, and the
third role idea remained simply a sort of more of
a religious political idea than a geopolitical idea with absolutely
(28:19):
no geo you know, no military political geopolitical impigations.
Speaker 4 (28:27):
Involved.
Speaker 3 (28:28):
Uh.
Speaker 5 (28:29):
And so then you had then you have other factors,
right like in fact, the defense enterprise wanting to take
over for arms markets at Eastern you're Europe, and then
you have the standard view of the Russians being uh,
second tier Europeans, those other less sophisticated, less developed Europeans,
and that's that's that's that's the most generous view that
(28:49):
you'll often find in the West. Usually you'll hear them
be referred to as Mongols and and other such things.
The Ukraine's used the words of vatniks and lady bugs
and so forth, and so it's up. So this is
not unusual in certain circles of the West, and it's
(29:09):
and it's parlad. So there are all sorts of factors,
you know, there are cultural factors, there are factors of.
Speaker 4 (29:17):
National superiority in the West.
Speaker 5 (29:21):
Economic factors of course also not just selling arms, but
selling oil and gas and so forth. So, and then
the bureaucratic interests and the electoral interests of an administration
going going back early.
Speaker 4 (29:33):
So it's a complex picture. It's not just it's not
one factor or another. That's the main thing.
Speaker 5 (29:38):
I don't think at this point you maybe now you
have security factors being at the four because you have
an actual direct military conflict between we're almost direct in
military conflict in the NATO Russia Ukrainian in war.
Speaker 3 (29:54):
With the internal dynamics in Russia. One thing we noticed
with the war in Ukraine is that the Uchens, notably
Ramzan kaduro has gained arguably influence in the current Russian
political establishment. Do you think this influence on internal dynamics
is significant enough to change certain things in this cycle?
Speaker 4 (30:19):
No, I don't think.
Speaker 5 (30:19):
I think Kadirov does not have any serious influence inside
the Kremlin or anywhere else.
Speaker 4 (30:26):
He he basically is someone who is he's kind of
deal with the with the Kremlin, and that is.
Speaker 5 (30:34):
Chechia can develop its own culture, It can ignore certain
aspects of the Russian constitution in Russian law, and promote
Islam over other religions and institute elements of Sharia law
and other cultural standards in the Chechen life. It can have,
it can violate the federal centers monopoly on the means
(30:57):
of coercion by having these large, this large military force
under its control and in serve and in return for that,
they're supposed to serve Moscow's interests. So Cardirov sends some
of those troops into Ukraine to help the Russian cause
in Ukraine.
Speaker 4 (31:17):
But Kadirov, I think Cardirov.
Speaker 5 (31:20):
Began began Ramzan cardiro that has began following the model
of his father, in the words of his father, Aukmedic
Cardeiro who said, at some point, you know, we spent
three hundred years trying to gain our independence by fighting
the Russians. Maybe we should try to should spend three
hundred years trying to gain our independence peacefully. And I
think Cardira is playing that game, you know, I don't.
(31:42):
I think at this point any idea of Chechen independence
is out the window. There could be some opening for
elements in Chechena once Cardirov is replaced or passes away.
There are rumors that he has he has a severe
kidney disease or diabetes, and the health is not all
that well, and they're beginning to position people from his
(32:06):
clan or other clans into a position.
Speaker 4 (32:08):
To succeed him.
Speaker 5 (32:09):
But Uh, Kadiro, you know he has he has very
indirect influence in that he represents, you know, way an
element of the Muslim popular population in Russia. He is
and can be seen as sort of containing radical Islamism
and jihadism in the North Buxuses. But these more sources
(32:32):
to the Kremlin, and they are having any great uh influence,
So I don't see him having influencing grominent policy in
any way.
Speaker 3 (32:42):
Coming to our last question, doctor Han, are we doomed
to go through this cycle repeatedly or do you think
there is hope for us as the West to break
the cycle and have good relations with Russia? And if so,
what actions should Western policymakers take to ensure that the
relationship with Russia is more stable and peaceful instead of
(33:06):
going through these regular cycles. Or do you think because
of the powers that be, we're doomed to repeat the cycle.
Speaker 5 (33:15):
Well, I don't think we're doomed to repeat the cycle eternally.
I mean, there are always chances, and there's always posical change.
Politics is nothing. If there's nothing else is it's changed.
So but I think for the next decade, situation is
rather dismal. Basically, we're going to have to engage in
conflict management, you know, after this phase ends and there's
(33:35):
some kind of semi peaceful or peaceful standoff over the
issue of Ukraine. The most important thing would be not
to persist in expanding NATO. As long as the West
persists in expanding NATO to Russia's borders, there is going
to be conflict and potential conflict with Moscow. And there's
no way getting around it because in the amongst the
(33:56):
elite and in Russian society, they are very low to
see a large military alliance based in the West along
its borders. And that's because of the history that I
mentioned earlier. Uh.
Speaker 4 (34:11):
The other the other thing is I think it would
be good if both.
Speaker 5 (34:13):
Sides started to lay off the sort of the mckendrey
and geopolitical interpretation of geographical interpretation of politics, in which
Russia and your Asia is seen as the world island
and he who controls the world island.
Speaker 4 (34:32):
Controls the world.
Speaker 5 (34:33):
So the West is constantly trying to control the world island,
and Russia constantly sees the West's trying to control the
world island. And it would be good if we got
a little bit away, it got away from that kind
of thinking. Certainly, one can keep it in mind. So
it certainly is a factor in politics, but it shouldn't
be a sort of an ideology that drives.
Speaker 4 (34:55):
Policy. So I think that those are some of the
things could be could be done.
Speaker 5 (35:00):
Other thing would be not to not to again by
doing things like NATO expansion, uh, to insult the Russian honor,
to by doing so, kick in that security vigilance culture.
It's better when that security vigilance culture is not the
dominant culture, but it's recessive in Russian in the overall
Russian culture. UH. And those are the periods when there
(35:22):
there's accommodation with the West, there is westernization, there's liberalization, UH,
and all those things we we tend to support. One
of the main things that one of the important things
that people often overlook is that quite often westernization and
liberalization was undermined by Western actions. So if you look
(35:43):
at Bora's Godinov, who began to engage in reforms like
Western Westernizer reforms that Peter and Great would implement a
century later. And when he got wind of the conspiracy
that the Bold in the Vatican were hatching in regarding
a false Tameach, he abandoned the reforms. Alexander the First
(36:04):
had planned a constitution and the and Ending surved them,
And because of the conflicts with the Napoleon and his
involvement in the alliances, the European alliances against Napoleon, he
had to abandon that project twice and ultimately a third time.
Speaker 4 (36:18):
And then in the last four or five years of
his reign he became a conservative.
Speaker 5 (36:23):
One can look at the protection of Russian revolutionaries during
the nineteenth century leading up to the.
Speaker 4 (36:30):
Russian Revolution.
Speaker 5 (36:31):
One can look at the Germans support when Kerensky was
on the verge of creating creating possibly a Russian republic,
the Germans sending Lenin with lots of money back into
Russia to make a revolution. So all these examples are
examples of the West actually undermining the westernization that we
say we want to see in Russia. So the Russia
would become part of a West, and then we would
(36:53):
have this sort of democratic peace that the Europeans love
to talk about, in which everyone is a Republican or
a democrat in small d and all small art terms,
and therefore there will be no conflict because it's only
authoritary leaders supposedly they create wars.
Speaker 3 (37:10):
Ladies and gentlemen, You just listen to Gordon Hand, expert
analyst at Core Analytics. Gordon Hand, thank you so much
for your time. Thank you for inviting me.
Speaker 1 (37:21):
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew
Jose Media. The views expressed by guests on this show
do not necessarily represent the official positions and opinions of
Andrew Jose, Andrew Jose Media, and Strategic Wisdom.
Speaker 2 (37:38):
Thank you for listening to Strategic Wisdom. Be sure to
follow and subscribe to us on whatever podcast platform you
are using to listen to this show in order to
not miss out any future interviews and conversations that Andrew
Jose will bring to you on this podcast. We're streaming
on YouTube, Spotify, Apple Podcasts, yandex geosovin, Amazon Music, and
many other podcasts streaming services. Also, be sure to subscribe
(38:01):
to Strategic Wisdom on substack at Strategicwisdom dot substack dot
com and to follow Strategic Wisdom on Twitter and Instagram
at stratwisdom. Do support our work by buying from our
merch store. For more details, visit Strategicwisdom dot substack dot com.
Speaker 3 (38:18):
Thank you so much, Gabby, and thank you so much
Ian ladies and gentlemen. This is your host, Andrew Jose
signing off.
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