July 12, 2024 • 27 mins
For this episode of Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, I sat down with Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia In Global Affairs and research professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics (HSE University) to discuss how Putin's fifth term as President of Russia will influence the country's long-term strategy and Russia’s foreign policy.During our discussion, we looked at different questions many have regarding Putin and his new term:
This is Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I’m Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC-based security policy analyst, and news reporter, bringing you timely analyses and commentary on issues in international relations, war, and security policy.
The views expressed by the podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily represent the official positions of Andrew Jose, Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, and Andrew Jose Media.
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew Jose Media.
- How has Putin been a transformative force in Russia's rise? What does Putin's new term mean for Russia's role in the world order?
- How is the Ukraine war likely to play out?
- What will Russia's relationship with the Middle East look like going forward?
This is Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I’m Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC-based security policy analyst, and news reporter, bringing you timely analyses and commentary on issues in international relations, war, and security policy.
The views expressed by the podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily represent the official positions of Andrew Jose, Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, and Andrew Jose Media.
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew Jose Media.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
Russia was once thought to be adead power after the fall of the Soviet
Union with the end of the ColdWar. In the nine of each the
country experienced one of its worst economiccrises and suffered a humiliating defeat at the
hands of Chechen insergeants during the FirstChechen War and at the hands of NATO,
(00:20):
which, contrary to Russian wishes,expanded eastwards to incorporate countries that were
once part of the Warsaw Pack.Today things have changed. The country has
grown powerful, is considered a greatpower once again, has successfully subdued and
destroyed the Chechen insurgency, and hasso far prevented Georgia and Ukraine, two
(00:42):
countries in its near abroad, frombecoming members of NATO. Much of Russia's
revival is attributed to Russia's President VadimirPutin, who entered his fifth term this
year as President of the Russian Federation. Putin's leadership in the next six years
will be instrumental for the future ofthe Russian Federation as the country grapples with
(01:06):
several geopolitical realities, the rise ofChina and non Western powers, the war
in Ukraine, and what many analystshave called multipolarity and the collapse of the
US dominated financial system. What willRussia under Putin's new six year term look
like? What impact will the termhave on Russia's foreign policy and long term
(01:27):
strategy. This is Strategic Wisdom withAndrew Jose. I'm Andrew Jose, a
Washington, DC based security policy analystand news reporter, bringing you timely analysis
and commentary on issues in international relations, war and security policy. Joining me
today is Fyodor Lukyanov, editor inchief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs,
(01:51):
published by the Moscow based Foreign PolicyResearch Foundation. Fyodor Lukyanov is the
(02:31):
author of several publications on Russian foreignpolicy and the problems facing contemporary international relations.
He is a research professor part ofthe Faculty of World Economy and International
Affairs at the Higher School of EconomicsHC University in Moscow, Russia. Fyodor
(02:52):
is also research director at the EsteemedValdaye discussion Club. Like I am today,
Fyodor also has worked in journalism.He was a senior editor at the
international Moscow radio The Voice of Russiaand the editor in chief of Rimia Novosti.
Fyodor, Welcome to the show.Hello, Thank you for having me,
(03:13):
before we discuss the transformation Russia's foreignpolicy will undergo in the next six
years, I want to look atthe phenomenon of Vladimir Putin in Russian politics.
Many say he was a transformative forcein Russia's post Soviet history. Is
Putin, as many say, indeeda transformative force. If so, how
(03:35):
has Putin impacted for the better orworse Russia standing on the world stage,
and what has Putin's role been inreturning Russia to great power status. Putin
has been in a transformative force.That's very easy to prove if you look
at the situation almost twenty five yearsago when he became first Prime Minister and
(03:59):
then acting President of Russian Federation andsituation today. Of course, we see
dramatic changes in both performance of Russianstate, first of all internally and the
Russian place an international stage. Havingsaid that, I must note that whoever
(04:19):
would replace President Yelsen after his secondterm a two thousand changes were inevitable,
and the situation in which Russia operatedin nineteen nineties, after the collapse of
the previous statehood and enormous decline ineverything, including the social economic situation for
(04:44):
most people, that was an absolutelyabnormal situation. President Alson and his team,
they tried to struggle with this,but by the end of nineteen nineties
it was clear that that's something youwas required to re establish the functionality,
the ability of the Russian state andthe Russian economy in the first line,
(05:10):
and of course to be to tryto find a new position in the world.
The first it's a very long discussionall those twenty five years. We
don't have time for that, butI can say one thing. Yes,
indeed put In's initial purpose, initialaim very clearly read in his very first
(05:31):
programmatic article which was published the daybefore Yelson resigned and put It was nominated
as the acting president. So themain aim in this article was clear to
restore Russian place on the international stageas one of leading powers and put it
(05:51):
the road in his article that forthe first time since very very long years,
decades and it maybe even cent risk, it was a risk for Russia
to slide down into the second oreven third echelon of international powers, and
that was he wrote the main taskto prevent it from happening and to restore
(06:17):
Russian position. We can say nowtwenty five years after that of course,
Putting achieved this goal. I meanthat Russia is one of the most leading
powers on the world stage. Thisis a pretty controversial situation because we understand
that some people glorify these achievements someother have diametrically opposite meaning. But of
(06:43):
course, the place of Russia todayand place of Russia twenty five years ago
is absolutely different. It should be. It must be noted that Putting tried
hard to restore this position of Russiato different means, including his first period
a rule between approximately two thousand andtwo thousand and five or six, when
(07:08):
he worked hard to make Russia partof the Western led system. He was
ready, I think we can interpretin this way, he was ready to
make or RuSHA be embedded in theWestern centric political and economic international system,
of course, and special conditions andconditions which he and all Russias would consider
(07:30):
as a decent pace. But hewas ready to meeting this effort, not
to try to challenge the Western system, just the opposite. But it failed,
I would say, for many reasons, but the most important reason,
the principal reason, was that theWest did see Russia as part of its
(07:50):
system, and the more or lesse ballfirms, and that since that Putting
started to try other meals, andnow we are very now. In one
of your recent articles in Russia inGlobal Affairs titled put in his back for
another six years, this is whathis foreign policy will look like, you
(08:11):
described the Ukraine conflict as a turningpoint that ended what you call Russia's post
Soviet rebound. What is the postSoviet rebound and why has it ended?
How do you envision Russia redefining itsgeopolitical strategy now that it has reached the
ceiling of the rebound Twenty five yearsafter collapse of the Soviet Union, maybe
(08:35):
slightly longer, Russian activitists were directedtowards attempts to compensate for the losses I
mean political losses, losses in termsof international posturing connected to the end of
(08:56):
the Soviet Union, because collapse ofthe Union did mean such a tremendous decline
in international status of Russia that itwas probably unprecedented in world history that quickly
and that profound. So many years, even a couple of decades after collapse
(09:16):
of the Soviet Union, Russia triedto tumpensate for it, to make a
new, new basis for important placeon the international stage. But it was
again that was catchup war, butthat was the ceiling was has been reached
(09:37):
approximately by mid two thousand tenths,a Russian operation in Syria, the first
overseas military campaign since collapse of theSoviet Union, was so to say,
the final step in this Soviet orSoviet restoration. So Russia, and that
(10:03):
was one of the aves of putting. As we discussed, Russia reached the
position of a country which is importantnot just in Eurasia, not just in
the former with space, but alsoworldwide in the global political ostellation. And
after that the question came what next. Because the resource of this compensatory growth
(10:30):
geo political growth was exhausted for aproclound change in Russian positioning didn't happen.
So the domination of the West inthe world and especially in the euro Atlantic
and euro European sphere was still there, and the West continued the very consistent
expansion of its interest and its institutionstowards former Russian sphere of pheasants. And
(10:58):
in this regard, what started tohappen in the post Soviet area in last
decade twenty tens, not just inRussia, but in many countries like Karmenia,
like Ukraine, like Belarus, likeother important countries in the Kazakhstan.
It demonstrated that the new period began. And in this situation, Russian Russia
(11:22):
is in need to find a completelynew format or relationship with doused all Soviet
republics because the previous model has beenexhausted based on the Soviet heritage. But
the new model is still is stillnot in place, and I would not
say that we know exactly how tobuild up this relationship now. Certainly,
(11:48):
Alsovietarian Euasia as a space for exclusiveRussian interest has gone. We see many
other powers to be present there beit Western powers, beat China, beat
India, the Turkey, bait Iranand so on. So I think now
that we are facing this new situationand we need still to invent how to
(12:15):
address it. What are the maintrends we can expect in Putin's new term
as it relates to Russia's foreign policyand also trade policy, What relationships Russia
is most likely to prioritize and whatregions The obvious priority for now, and
I'm afraid for the next couple ofyears will be the campaign military campaign in
(12:39):
Ukraine, because that turned into themost important challenge to Russian quest for international
influence. It wasn't I meant inthis way initially. Now we understand that
the initial plan of this operation wasdifferent. It was planned as a quite
(13:05):
stormy and efficient short campaign. Itdid happen. So now we have this
prolonged attrition war, which is muchbigger today than when it started, because
the West has engaged a full scaleon the Ukrainian side. So now,
whether Russia wants it or not,this is seen as a struggle for principles
(13:33):
how this area, European Eurasian areawill be organized in the future. I
mean in terms of security, interms of hierarchy of influences, and I
believe that this task will dominate significantpart of a Ladmir puts a new term
at least for next maybe two years, no, no doubt about that.
(13:58):
But the very the very campaign,the campaign itself means that Russia needs to
totally restructure its international relations. Sofor the first time since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, were even earliersince the Peristroica barbatuos Perstrika and you're thinking
(14:20):
started, Russia built up a verysuccessful and deficient relationship with the global Southern
global is to be almost as importanttask as an operation. That's very,
very difficult because being inclined anti WesternRussia has not a very big experience to
(14:43):
work with the north western world.So it needs to be learned. And
now I think for the importance termthat will be one of the most important
priorities. What do you foresee tobe the likely resolution for the conflict in
Ukraine? What objectives do you thinkRussia will have in place for post conflict
(15:05):
reconstruction and the political reconfiguration of theEastern europe region. We don't know the
exact result of this campaign. Wedon't know where the armies will stop.
With the end much depends on theconfiguration of Ukraine and configuration of Russia this
(15:26):
point when the hostilities will stop,that's one thing. Another thing, of
course, we have a very tenserelationship with nature with the United States.
I still believe that this escalation gamewill not eachieve the culmination, which unfortunately
might include the nuclear factor. Butcertainly the relationship with the West is now
(15:50):
going through extremely risky period. Asfor the post war reconfiguration, I can
say one saying the contrary to whatpeople in the West usually say and believe,
that the main Hutia and Russia inthis war was territorial gains to get
(16:11):
as much Ukrainian soil as possible asso on, so typical imperial revenge.
Don't believe it was the real priorityfrom the beginning. The whole crisis started
much earlier than February twenty two,and it was generated by Russian the very
(16:32):
painful reception of the enlargement of NATO, which was seen by the West as
actually the word for European security.To put it quietly simplified. The whole
European security after the Old War wasbased on the idea that NATO is equal
(16:53):
to European security. The more NATA, the more secured, which was initially
I say initially was accepted by theSoviet Union and then by earlier Russia.
But this acceptance was rather forced bythe weakness, and that's why Russia started
(17:14):
to be more and more vocal aboutthis, as we believed in justice later.
So the main driving force of thiswar was security concerns on the Russian
side, but native expansion and NATIstrengthening around Russia and Ukraine was the final
(17:36):
draw when it became clear that Ukrainewill be not necessarily part of NEED,
but certainly part of the NATO infrastructureinformal infrastructure. So the Russian reaction came
in a very overs way. Butagain the memorandum which was issued by Russian
(17:56):
Foreign Ministry in November and December twothousand twenty one was not about Ukraine per
se. It was about European securityand it was a call to rediscuss principles
of this security, the call whichwas ignored or rather rejected by NATO and
the United States, and that ledto the military operation. So I think
(18:18):
that any resolution of a Ukrainian crisisshould be based primarily on the acceptance and
taking into account those Russian concerns aboutEuropean security. Ukraine should not be included
in NATO and the non aligned statusneutral status of Ukraine. This is one
(18:40):
of the absolutely most important demands onthe Russian side. As for the rest,
again, initially, if we lookat the so called Stanbul Istanbulul discussions
and the agreements which were prepared butnever signed, so Russia was ready to
accept those week Security I principles andeven give back significant part of Ukrainian territory
(19:08):
at that time, at that momentnow and that wasn't that. That was
rejected for several reasons by Ukraine andthe West. So since that situation changed,
Russia made the significant gains and nowit's much more difficult to discuss any
territorial conceptions on Russian side. Idon't believe it's possible, but of course
(19:32):
again it should do. It isvery important. The main issue in this
crisis is not about Ukraine, it'sabout status of NATO in Europe. As
long as we will not start todiscuss this issue between Russia and the West,
Russia and the United States, I'mafraid this war will continue. The
Middle East has gone back to beingon fire again. What will Russia's main
(19:56):
objectives in the Middle East be inthe next few years in light of its
alienation from Western powers? And howis Russia going to balance its relationships with
various actors in the regions such asIran, Israel, Syria and the Arabian
Gulf States. Russian presence in theMiddle East, especially after Russian interasial in
(20:17):
Seria twenty fifteen, has grown verymuch, and for a while Russia was
one of the most important players there. Most important unique players, because Russia
actually enjoyed workable relationship with basically allThe only entity which Russia rejected by purposes
of principal position was iis. Allother actors including Israel, Iran, Saudi
(20:45):
Arabia, Hamas, Hezbola, GolfMonarchy's thirty everybody, Syria, of course,
Jordan, all those countries had avery constructive relationship with our countries entities,
and that was a unique situation becausethe United States, after what happened
(21:07):
in Iraq and after the Arab Spring, lost a significant part of capacities in
in the region. Now situation changed, of course because of Ukrainian conflict,
but in primarily because of situation inPalestine, the war in Gaza, and
Russia is more on the side ofArab countries, while Arab and Muslim countries,
(21:30):
while never expoined to break relationship withIsrael, but objectively Israel now is
much more on the American side andRussia on the other side. I would
dare to say that Russian priority inthe Middle East just now is very much
pragmatic. It's not about geopolitical role. It's about cooperation in terms of money,
(21:55):
in terms of trade, in termsof innovations in some particular areas,
and of course Muslim world is suchan important player on the international stage in
general, not just on the originalissues, that Russia needs a lot of
support now in the situation when theWest is trying to isolate Russia, and
(22:18):
in this regard, constructive mutually beneficialrelations with the Muslim countries, be it
in the Middle East or somewhere else, is very needed for Russia ederation.
I would say this is the mainaim. Again, it's not about geopolitical
transformation of the Middle East, becausemy take on international relations at large just
(22:44):
now is that no one wants inbig powers from the outside to play the
sizive role individuals because the original powersthey start to prefer to find their own
solutions and they don't need any bigbrothers, be it the United States,
China or Russia. But in casethey can strengthen their positions in relationship with
(23:11):
all those big powers, of coursethey will do it. And Russia now
needs to expand as much of constructiverelationship with all these countries as possible.
How will Russia's relationship with international organizationsand the international order be in the next
six years under Putin, will Russiaseek a reform or will it seek an
(23:33):
overthrow of the post World War twoliberal international order and its structures. I
don't believe that Russia will seek aone for one simple reason. No one
believes that reformers doable doll. Idon't believe that Russia will seek to overthrowle
those institutions for one simple reason,because we see they being in decline without
(23:59):
any special effort by anybody. Theinstitutional framework of international system has been created
after the Second World War, andthat was a very successful take. It
was a very sophisticated and a smartsystem, but adapted to the particular situation
of the second half of the twentiethcentury and the whole system, the international
(24:23):
organization's structures, they worked pretty well, pretty efficient. But now we see
that they are in decline, notjust because of behavior of particular countries,
be it Russia to the United States, be it Tehran by China, whoever.
It is because the completely changing internationalcontext environment. Yes, indeed,
(24:47):
countries including Russia to behave a muchmore voluntary and free say way, but
this is reaction to the decline ofinternational framework. So it's very I wouldn't
say that this is that Russian behavioror anybody else's behavior is the cause for
that. Any institutions have a certainexpiration date, and I'm afraid that now
(25:14):
this date is being is approaching.As for the reform here, I would
probably say very politically incorrect thing.I don't expect any new world order to
expect any time soon replacing the currentone, or the declining one, whatever,
because international structure, international system issuch just now that you cannot simply
(25:41):
create a balance between most important playersand actors, which is necessary to build
up an order. So you see, at least I don't know, twenty
five maybe thirty powers of different scaleand different caliber, who influence in the
(26:06):
national system in different way by differentmeans locally and globally. Originally what they
do, and all of them playroles. How is it possible to balance
them, to create a balance systemconsisting out of them, I don't know.
I don't see this opportunity. Itdoes not mean that the whole situation
(26:30):
will necessarily need to all out waragainst all. I think that since countries
will start to realize that they cannotrely on institutional and institutional career work anymore,
they will start to behave in amuch more cautious way to understand the
risks, and that might be sometimesbetter than to expect international institutions to interview
(26:59):
ladies and Jeni. You just listento Editor in chief of Russia and Global
Affairs, Professor Fyodor Lukanav Fyodor,thank you for your time. Thank you
very much. Thank you for listeningto Strategic Wisdom. Be sure to follow
and subscribe to us on whatever podcastplatform you're using to listen to this show
(27:22):
in order to not miss any futureinterviews and conversations that I bring to you
on this podcast. Also, besure to subscribe to Strategic Wisdom on substack
at strategic Wisdom dot substack dot com. This is your host, Andrew Jose signing up
Russia was once thought to be adead power after the fall of the Soviet
Union with the end of the ColdWar. In the nine of each the
country experienced one of its worst economiccrises and suffered a humiliating defeat at the
hands of Chechen insergeants during the FirstChechen War and at the hands of NATO,
(00:20):
which, contrary to Russian wishes,expanded eastwards to incorporate countries that were
once part of the Warsaw Pack.Today things have changed. The country has
grown powerful, is considered a greatpower once again, has successfully subdued and
destroyed the Chechen insurgency, and hasso far prevented Georgia and Ukraine, two
(00:42):
countries in its near abroad, frombecoming members of NATO. Much of Russia's
revival is attributed to Russia's President VadimirPutin, who entered his fifth term this
year as President of the Russian Federation. Putin's leadership in the next six years
will be instrumental for the future ofthe Russian Federation as the country grapples with
(01:06):
several geopolitical realities, the rise ofChina and non Western powers, the war
in Ukraine, and what many analystshave called multipolarity and the collapse of the
US dominated financial system. What willRussia under Putin's new six year term look
like? What impact will the termhave on Russia's foreign policy and long term
(01:27):
strategy. This is Strategic Wisdom withAndrew Jose. I'm Andrew Jose, a
Washington, DC based security policy analystand news reporter, bringing you timely analysis
and commentary on issues in international relations, war and security policy. Joining me
today is Fyodor Lukyanov, editor inchief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs,
(01:51):
published by the Moscow based Foreign PolicyResearch Foundation. Fyodor Lukyanov is the
(02:31):
author of several publications on Russian foreignpolicy and the problems facing contemporary international relations.
He is a research professor part ofthe Faculty of World Economy and International
Affairs at the Higher School of EconomicsHC University in Moscow, Russia. Fyodor
(02:52):
is also research director at the EsteemedValdaye discussion Club. Like I am today,
Fyodor also has worked in journalism.He was a senior editor at the
international Moscow radio The Voice of Russiaand the editor in chief of Rimia Novosti.
Fyodor, Welcome to the show.Hello, Thank you for having me,
(03:13):
before we discuss the transformation Russia's foreignpolicy will undergo in the next six
years, I want to look atthe phenomenon of Vladimir Putin in Russian politics.
Many say he was a transformative forcein Russia's post Soviet history. Is
Putin, as many say, indeeda transformative force. If so, how
(03:35):
has Putin impacted for the better orworse Russia standing on the world stage,
and what has Putin's role been inreturning Russia to great power status. Putin
has been in a transformative force.That's very easy to prove if you look
at the situation almost twenty five yearsago when he became first Prime Minister and
(03:59):
then acting President of Russian Federation andsituation today. Of course, we see
dramatic changes in both performance of Russianstate, first of all internally and the
Russian place an international stage. Havingsaid that, I must note that whoever
(04:19):
would replace President Yelsen after his secondterm a two thousand changes were inevitable,
and the situation in which Russia operatedin nineteen nineties, after the collapse of
the previous statehood and enormous decline ineverything, including the social economic situation for
(04:44):
most people, that was an absolutelyabnormal situation. President Alson and his team,
they tried to struggle with this,but by the end of nineteen nineties
it was clear that that's something youwas required to re establish the functionality,
the ability of the Russian state andthe Russian economy in the first line,
(05:10):
and of course to be to tryto find a new position in the world.
The first it's a very long discussionall those twenty five years. We
don't have time for that, butI can say one thing. Yes,
indeed put In's initial purpose, initialaim very clearly read in his very first
(05:31):
programmatic article which was published the daybefore Yelson resigned and put It was nominated
as the acting president. So themain aim in this article was clear to
restore Russian place on the international stageas one of leading powers and put it
(05:51):
the road in his article that forthe first time since very very long years,
decades and it maybe even cent risk, it was a risk for Russia
to slide down into the second oreven third echelon of international powers, and
that was he wrote the main taskto prevent it from happening and to restore
(06:17):
Russian position. We can say nowtwenty five years after that of course,
Putting achieved this goal. I meanthat Russia is one of the most leading
powers on the world stage. Thisis a pretty controversial situation because we understand
that some people glorify these achievements someother have diametrically opposite meaning. But of
(06:43):
course, the place of Russia todayand place of Russia twenty five years ago
is absolutely different. It should be. It must be noted that Putting tried
hard to restore this position of Russiato different means, including his first period
a rule between approximately two thousand andtwo thousand and five or six, when
(07:08):
he worked hard to make Russia partof the Western led system. He was
ready, I think we can interpretin this way, he was ready to
make or RuSHA be embedded in theWestern centric political and economic international system,
of course, and special conditions andconditions which he and all Russias would consider
(07:30):
as a decent pace. But hewas ready to meeting this effort, not
to try to challenge the Western system, just the opposite. But it failed,
I would say, for many reasons, but the most important reason,
the principal reason, was that theWest did see Russia as part of its
(07:50):
system, and the more or lesse ballfirms, and that since that Putting
started to try other meals, andnow we are very now. In one
of your recent articles in Russia inGlobal Affairs titled put in his back for
another six years, this is whathis foreign policy will look like, you
(08:11):
described the Ukraine conflict as a turningpoint that ended what you call Russia's post
Soviet rebound. What is the postSoviet rebound and why has it ended?
How do you envision Russia redefining itsgeopolitical strategy now that it has reached the
ceiling of the rebound Twenty five yearsafter collapse of the Soviet Union, maybe
(08:35):
slightly longer, Russian activitists were directedtowards attempts to compensate for the losses I
mean political losses, losses in termsof international posturing connected to the end of
(08:56):
the Soviet Union, because collapse ofthe Union did mean such a tremendous decline
in international status of Russia that itwas probably unprecedented in world history that quickly
and that profound. So many years, even a couple of decades after collapse
(09:16):
of the Soviet Union, Russia triedto tumpensate for it, to make a
new, new basis for important placeon the international stage. But it was
again that was catchup war, butthat was the ceiling was has been reached
(09:37):
approximately by mid two thousand tenths,a Russian operation in Syria, the first
overseas military campaign since collapse of theSoviet Union, was so to say,
the final step in this Soviet orSoviet restoration. So Russia, and that
(10:03):
was one of the aves of putting. As we discussed, Russia reached the
position of a country which is importantnot just in Eurasia, not just in
the former with space, but alsoworldwide in the global political ostellation. And
after that the question came what next. Because the resource of this compensatory growth
(10:30):
geo political growth was exhausted for aproclound change in Russian positioning didn't happen.
So the domination of the West inthe world and especially in the euro Atlantic
and euro European sphere was still there, and the West continued the very consistent
expansion of its interest and its institutionstowards former Russian sphere of pheasants. And
(10:58):
in this regard, what started tohappen in the post Soviet area in last
decade twenty tens, not just inRussia, but in many countries like Karmenia,
like Ukraine, like Belarus, likeother important countries in the Kazakhstan.
It demonstrated that the new period began. And in this situation, Russian Russia
(11:22):
is in need to find a completelynew format or relationship with doused all Soviet
republics because the previous model has beenexhausted based on the Soviet heritage. But
the new model is still is stillnot in place, and I would not
say that we know exactly how tobuild up this relationship now. Certainly,
(11:48):
Alsovietarian Euasia as a space for exclusiveRussian interest has gone. We see many
other powers to be present there beit Western powers, beat China, beat
India, the Turkey, bait Iranand so on. So I think now
that we are facing this new situationand we need still to invent how to
(12:15):
address it. What are the maintrends we can expect in Putin's new term
as it relates to Russia's foreign policyand also trade policy, What relationships Russia
is most likely to prioritize and whatregions The obvious priority for now, and
I'm afraid for the next couple ofyears will be the campaign military campaign in
(12:39):
Ukraine, because that turned into themost important challenge to Russian quest for international
influence. It wasn't I meant inthis way initially. Now we understand that
the initial plan of this operation wasdifferent. It was planned as a quite
(13:05):
stormy and efficient short campaign. Itdid happen. So now we have this
prolonged attrition war, which is muchbigger today than when it started, because
the West has engaged a full scaleon the Ukrainian side. So now,
whether Russia wants it or not,this is seen as a struggle for principles
(13:33):
how this area, European Eurasian areawill be organized in the future. I
mean in terms of security, interms of hierarchy of influences, and I
believe that this task will dominate significantpart of a Ladmir puts a new term
at least for next maybe two years, no, no doubt about that.
(13:58):
But the very the very campaign,the campaign itself means that Russia needs to
totally restructure its international relations. Sofor the first time since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, were even earliersince the Peristroica barbatuos Perstrika and you're thinking
(14:20):
started, Russia built up a verysuccessful and deficient relationship with the global Southern
global is to be almost as importanttask as an operation. That's very,
very difficult because being inclined anti WesternRussia has not a very big experience to
(14:43):
work with the north western world.So it needs to be learned. And
now I think for the importance termthat will be one of the most important
priorities. What do you foresee tobe the likely resolution for the conflict in
Ukraine? What objectives do you thinkRussia will have in place for post conflict
(15:05):
reconstruction and the political reconfiguration of theEastern europe region. We don't know the
exact result of this campaign. Wedon't know where the armies will stop.
With the end much depends on theconfiguration of Ukraine and configuration of Russia this
(15:26):
point when the hostilities will stop,that's one thing. Another thing, of
course, we have a very tenserelationship with nature with the United States.
I still believe that this escalation gamewill not eachieve the culmination, which unfortunately
might include the nuclear factor. Butcertainly the relationship with the West is now
(15:50):
going through extremely risky period. Asfor the post war reconfiguration, I can
say one saying the contrary to whatpeople in the West usually say and believe,
that the main Hutia and Russia inthis war was territorial gains to get
(16:11):
as much Ukrainian soil as possible asso on, so typical imperial revenge.
Don't believe it was the real priorityfrom the beginning. The whole crisis started
much earlier than February twenty two,and it was generated by Russian the very
(16:32):
painful reception of the enlargement of NATO, which was seen by the West as
actually the word for European security.To put it quietly simplified. The whole
European security after the Old War wasbased on the idea that NATO is equal
(16:53):
to European security. The more NATA, the more secured, which was initially
I say initially was accepted by theSoviet Union and then by earlier Russia.
But this acceptance was rather forced bythe weakness, and that's why Russia started
(17:14):
to be more and more vocal aboutthis, as we believed in justice later.
So the main driving force of thiswar was security concerns on the Russian
side, but native expansion and NATIstrengthening around Russia and Ukraine was the final
(17:36):
draw when it became clear that Ukrainewill be not necessarily part of NEED,
but certainly part of the NATO infrastructureinformal infrastructure. So the Russian reaction came
in a very overs way. Butagain the memorandum which was issued by Russian
(17:56):
Foreign Ministry in November and December twothousand twenty one was not about Ukraine per
se. It was about European securityand it was a call to rediscuss principles
of this security, the call whichwas ignored or rather rejected by NATO and
the United States, and that ledto the military operation. So I think
(18:18):
that any resolution of a Ukrainian crisisshould be based primarily on the acceptance and
taking into account those Russian concerns aboutEuropean security. Ukraine should not be included
in NATO and the non aligned statusneutral status of Ukraine. This is one
(18:40):
of the absolutely most important demands onthe Russian side. As for the rest,
again, initially, if we lookat the so called Stanbul Istanbulul discussions
and the agreements which were prepared butnever signed, so Russia was ready to
accept those week Security I principles andeven give back significant part of Ukrainian territory
(19:08):
at that time, at that momentnow and that wasn't that. That was
rejected for several reasons by Ukraine andthe West. So since that situation changed,
Russia made the significant gains and nowit's much more difficult to discuss any
territorial conceptions on Russian side. Idon't believe it's possible, but of course
(19:32):
again it should do. It isvery important. The main issue in this
crisis is not about Ukraine, it'sabout status of NATO in Europe. As
long as we will not start todiscuss this issue between Russia and the West,
Russia and the United States, I'mafraid this war will continue. The
Middle East has gone back to beingon fire again. What will Russia's main
(19:56):
objectives in the Middle East be inthe next few years in light of its
alienation from Western powers? And howis Russia going to balance its relationships with
various actors in the regions such asIran, Israel, Syria and the Arabian
Gulf States. Russian presence in theMiddle East, especially after Russian interasial in
(20:17):
Seria twenty fifteen, has grown verymuch, and for a while Russia was
one of the most important players there. Most important unique players, because Russia
actually enjoyed workable relationship with basically allThe only entity which Russia rejected by purposes
of principal position was iis. Allother actors including Israel, Iran, Saudi
(20:45):
Arabia, Hamas, Hezbola, GolfMonarchy's thirty everybody, Syria, of course,
Jordan, all those countries had avery constructive relationship with our countries entities,
and that was a unique situation becausethe United States, after what happened
(21:07):
in Iraq and after the Arab Spring, lost a significant part of capacities in
in the region. Now situation changed, of course because of Ukrainian conflict,
but in primarily because of situation inPalestine, the war in Gaza, and
Russia is more on the side ofArab countries, while Arab and Muslim countries,
(21:30):
while never expoined to break relationship withIsrael, but objectively Israel now is
much more on the American side andRussia on the other side. I would
dare to say that Russian priority inthe Middle East just now is very much
pragmatic. It's not about geopolitical role. It's about cooperation in terms of money,
(21:55):
in terms of trade, in termsof innovations in some particular areas,
and of course Muslim world is suchan important player on the international stage in
general, not just on the originalissues, that Russia needs a lot of
support now in the situation when theWest is trying to isolate Russia, and
(22:18):
in this regard, constructive mutually beneficialrelations with the Muslim countries, be it
in the Middle East or somewhere else, is very needed for Russia ederation.
I would say this is the mainaim. Again, it's not about geopolitical
transformation of the Middle East, becausemy take on international relations at large just
(22:44):
now is that no one wants inbig powers from the outside to play the
sizive role individuals because the original powersthey start to prefer to find their own
solutions and they don't need any bigbrothers, be it the United States,
China or Russia. But in casethey can strengthen their positions in relationship with
(23:11):
all those big powers, of coursethey will do it. And Russia now
needs to expand as much of constructiverelationship with all these countries as possible.
How will Russia's relationship with international organizationsand the international order be in the next
six years under Putin, will Russiaseek a reform or will it seek an
(23:33):
overthrow of the post World War twoliberal international order and its structures. I
don't believe that Russia will seek aone for one simple reason. No one
believes that reformers doable doll. Idon't believe that Russia will seek to overthrowle
those institutions for one simple reason,because we see they being in decline without
(23:59):
any special effort by anybody. Theinstitutional framework of international system has been created
after the Second World War, andthat was a very successful take. It
was a very sophisticated and a smartsystem, but adapted to the particular situation
of the second half of the twentiethcentury and the whole system, the international
(24:23):
organization's structures, they worked pretty well, pretty efficient. But now we see
that they are in decline, notjust because of behavior of particular countries,
be it Russia to the United States, be it Tehran by China, whoever.
It is because the completely changing internationalcontext environment. Yes, indeed,
(24:47):
countries including Russia to behave a muchmore voluntary and free say way, but
this is reaction to the decline ofinternational framework. So it's very I wouldn't
say that this is that Russian behavioror anybody else's behavior is the cause for
that. Any institutions have a certainexpiration date, and I'm afraid that now
(25:14):
this date is being is approaching.As for the reform here, I would
probably say very politically incorrect thing.I don't expect any new world order to
expect any time soon replacing the currentone, or the declining one, whatever,
because international structure, international system issuch just now that you cannot simply
(25:41):
create a balance between most important playersand actors, which is necessary to build
up an order. So you see, at least I don't know, twenty
five maybe thirty powers of different scaleand different caliber, who influence in the
(26:06):
national system in different way by differentmeans locally and globally. Originally what they
do, and all of them playroles. How is it possible to balance
them, to create a balance systemconsisting out of them, I don't know.
I don't see this opportunity. Itdoes not mean that the whole situation
(26:30):
will necessarily need to all out waragainst all. I think that since countries
will start to realize that they cannotrely on institutional and institutional career work anymore,
they will start to behave in amuch more cautious way to understand the
risks, and that might be sometimesbetter than to expect international institutions to interview
(26:59):
ladies and Jeni. You just listento Editor in chief of Russia and Global
Affairs, Professor Fyodor Lukanav Fyodor,thank you for your time. Thank you
very much. Thank you for listeningto Strategic Wisdom. Be sure to follow
and subscribe to us on whatever podcastplatform you're using to listen to this show
(27:22):
in order to not miss any futureinterviews and conversations that I bring to you
on this podcast. Also, besure to subscribe to Strategic Wisdom on substack
at strategic Wisdom dot substack dot com. This is your host, Andrew Jose signing up
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