July 5, 2024 • 48 mins
As tensions between Israel and the Iran-backed Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah reach a boiling point, how likely is it that Israel will mount an invasion of Lebanon to end the threat Hezbollah poses to its northern regions?
How will Turkey, Russia, and Iran respond to such an invasion? How has the current war in Gaza and the potential war in Lebanon been impacting Israel's regional security environment and its ties to the Abraham Accords states?
To answer these questions, I sat down with Irina Tsukerman, a Fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Irina Tsukerman is a foreign policy analyst and national security lawyer based in New York. Irina is also the President of Scarab Rising, a media and security strategic advisory firm. She is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, a project of Scarab Rising, focused on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. Her analyses have appeared in several major publications, including Newsweek, National Interest, Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel, and Arab News.
This is Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I’m Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC-based security policy analyst, and news reporter, bringing you timely analyses and commentary on issues in international relations, war, and security policy.
The views expressed by the podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily represent the official positions of Andrew Jose, Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, and of Andrew Jose Media.
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew Jose Media.
How will Turkey, Russia, and Iran respond to such an invasion? How has the current war in Gaza and the potential war in Lebanon been impacting Israel's regional security environment and its ties to the Abraham Accords states?
To answer these questions, I sat down with Irina Tsukerman, a Fellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Irina Tsukerman is a foreign policy analyst and national security lawyer based in New York. Irina is also the President of Scarab Rising, a media and security strategic advisory firm. She is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, a project of Scarab Rising, focused on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. Her analyses have appeared in several major publications, including Newsweek, National Interest, Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel, and Arab News.
This is Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I’m Andrew Jose, a Washington, DC-based security policy analyst, and news reporter, bringing you timely analyses and commentary on issues in international relations, war, and security policy.
The views expressed by the podcast guests are their own and do not necessarily represent the official positions of Andrew Jose, Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose, and of Andrew Jose Media.
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew Jose Media.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
As the current Israel Gaza war crossesits nine month mark this July seventh,
the conflict no longer appears to bewon. Among the many customary skirmishes between
Israel and Godza based Palestinian militants thatthe region has grown used to in the
past two decades, both in casualtiesin length, this war has taken a
more expansive character, nearing the statusof a regional war, as several states
(00:25):
and non state actors take active rolesin supporting the belligerents. The Huthis and
Yemen, in an attempt to supportHamas, have mounted a blockade of ships
headed to and from Israel and Israel'sallies through the Bab Almandeb strait. As
Balah has struck northern Israel with dailyrocket barrages, forcing evacuations of residents in
(00:48):
Israel's north. The group has alsothreatened an October seventh style attack on northern
Israel. To Israel's east, Iranbacked militias in Iraq have occasionally fired drones
at Israel to back Hamas. InApril, Iran and Israel have even directly
clashed, exchanging airstrikes. You're listeningto strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I'm
(01:12):
Andrew Jose, a Washington, DCbased security policy analysts and news reporter,
bringing you timely analyzes and commentary onissues in international relations, war and security
policy. What is the future ofIsrael's relations with its adversaries in the region?
(01:32):
What about Yemen? Lebanon? Toanswer these questions, I will be
speaking today with New York based geopoliticalanalyst, journalist, and national security lawyer
Irena Suckerman. Arena Suckerman is aforeign policy analyst and national security lawyer based
(02:23):
in New York. She is afellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute and the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Arenais also the president of scab Rising,
a media and security strategic advisory firm. She is the editor in chief of
The Washington Outsider, a project ofscab Rising focused on foreign policy, geopolitics,
(02:46):
security, and human rights. Heranalyzes have appeared in major publications including
Newsweek, National Interest, Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel, and Arab News.
Arena, welcome to the show.Thank you so much. I'm been
very glad to be here. Israel'sborder with Lebanon has been heating up since
(03:07):
October seventh. Hesballah has been firingregular rocket barrages, prompting internal displacement up
north. Talk among Israeli officials andanalysts, and plans by many countries to
evacuate their citizens from Lebanon all hintat a possible war with Hesbela. What
is the likelihood of us seeing aIsrael has Bulah war in the near future?
(03:30):
Should there be a war, whatwill it look like? Everything is
pointing out that the war would breakout as long as three weeks from now.
There's been every sign of preparation forthe war effort. You've had senior
journals visiting the northern front in herstatements for private Estanithinia for warning aboard the
(03:55):
preparations for the war, and ofcourse there's been evidence of creation between the
two sides. That so the likelyinevitability of some sort of engaged combat actions
due to the increasingly aggressive nature ofattacks but his Boa. They include arson
(04:15):
attacks on the North, and ofcourse parts of the North have been evacuated
since since October, with the thousandsof Israelis as many as a cond the
thousand Israelis not being able to returnfor now. Of course, this could
be a very different type of warfrom what is happening in Guards. From
(04:35):
one thing, there are rumors thathis book has actually started evacuation of civilians
from its own side, which meansthat essentially the Israelis would be facing mostly
combatants, very clearly marked combatants inthe front lines, even if they're not
(04:57):
necessarily wearing uniforms. So the sortof constructs and restrictions and humanitarian and human
rights back pulls back against the urbanwarfare in gazet that would likely not come
up until and unless QUI situation ofcomplete and complete entry into Lebanon, which
(05:17):
is also a qualifie thereat. Someparties essentially trying to push Israel to enter
Lebanon, not only to fully toengage in a full part of the invasion.
I don't know that it will cometo that, but it is true
that his Bola is a very differentorganization from Commerce. It is much more
(05:39):
of a p Akwaisi army than itis a terrorist organization with limited asymmetrical resources.
It's got at least one hundred andfifty thousand Laune missiles in its possession.
It is better trained. Even thoughCommas has grown substantially in the past,
(06:00):
Bora has is considered to be themost important asset for Iran from a
military perspective. So we're facing onehand, much less considering about potential high
level civil and casualty, but onthe other hand, a huge arsenal of
rockets and a huge well prepared andvery serious of course, with sophisticated surveillance
(06:25):
capabilities, as we have here froma recent journal lego of Kaifa released by
his bo. Very different type ofwar. And let's not forget that it's
that Israel would have to allocate someof its resources or parking revisers to the
fight in the North, given thattheir apparitions in Gaza are not yet over,
(06:46):
and it's not clear when they're goingto be over. Some are saying
and that Gaza that the Gaza parkingcould take as much as six to eight
once to complete. What that wouldlook like you're fighting a two front war.
It could be very very different.And there's also been concerns about the
access to equipment for both North andSouth frust so that two could complicate this
(07:13):
war. One of the things Hazbolahhas periodically flaunted is it's personnel somewhat battle
experience, in Syria and also thegroup's artillery systems and drones. How has
the group been allowed to accrue somuch strength over the years that it is
considerably powerful? Would you say it'sa policy failure by Israel, the US
(07:36):
and Lebanon. How has this cometo be? You know, it's not
for lack of trying on on theIsrael's part. We have seen that Israel
has bought a different another war withthe Hazbola in two thousand and six,
but it did not at that pointthe idea of was not could arguably was
(07:57):
under prepared, right, it couldbe said, and they are waxed in
the equipment necessary to achieve a verydecisive victory. Boa at the time was
also not what it is today,but it was already a payally strong force
that has been active for decades.Let's not forget the deadly Kisbola released attacks
(08:20):
in Lebanon on the US forces,in Kisbula's involvement in Argentina's barns. It
has been a an international parting force, not just a local in militia for
decades already. In terms of Israel, pass tried to disrupt its activities as
large as possible, but in Syriawas also distracted with Gaza and West Bank
(08:43):
related matters. It was not wellprepared for full front confrontation with his Bola,
and it was also not prepared forthe confrontation with Iraqan, which has
been supplying his Bola with these typesof weapons. US would have been in
a far better position to disrupt theseapparitions, but for many years the US
(09:05):
has tried to actually serpent one thisissue through first through direct negotiations with the
are A, second two policies ofengagement with Lebanon, and essentially pretending a
way that hence Bola is actually afunctional part of governance in Lebanon and not
merely and acting as if it's merely, you know, a separate anentiqity that
(09:31):
happens to be operating in Lebanon,which was not the case in a long
time. His bolar fat achieved politicalsupport in Lebanon and thrust through the so
called social Jihad and eventually through outrightterrorizing all the population, accumulation of basis
(09:52):
of support and the sheer portions ofthe population, and to political gills with
with some of the more co Christianparties, so Chisboa has become a political
problem as much as a military problem, and trying to intervene in the supply
of weapons could also bring accusations ofattacking a sovereign a sovereign state, So
(10:16):
Years did not want to get engageddirectly in the disruption of the supply chains.
They wanted to deal with Iran onlydiplomatically. And also Years recognized the
Lebanese military forces as an ally andprovided them for many years for decades,
i would say, the official supportand funding, which is still the case
(10:37):
to this date in other countries.Like Parents at various times tried to negotiate
with his Boa with the Lebanese government. There's been a period of time when
Syria was worked quite influential in Lebanonas well, which she trowed the complicated
matters when Lebanon at one point wasbasically a colony. Theories are set and
(11:01):
these have seen for an a colonialof Syria, Lebanon discipally become a colony
of Iran and less so than arecompletely independent state. So yes, there's
been a lot of policy failures,but those policy paylists are not merely a
lack of sufficient military decision making it'salso a pro political misassessment. It's war
(11:22):
food and continues to bear fruit tothis day. This rejection of seeing Lebanon
as merely at this point and extensionof Iran's for one policy in the region,
Lebanon is a sectarian country. AboutLebanese Mayrionite Christians, what role do
you think that they would play inthis conflict? Do you think Israel would
(11:45):
work with Lebanese Mayrionite Christians as itdid in the nineteen eighty two Lebanon War,
or do you think that Israel isgoing to try to pursue his Ballah
independently like it attempted to do inthe two thousand and six Lebanon War.
Well, I think it's it's harderto call man that Christians are uniform an
hour party at this point. AsI mentioned, some of the parties made
(12:07):
a very calculated move to side thatHis Bora at this point, which inherently
makes them on the side of HisBola and Iran, despite the fact that
you would think that His Bora's westfrom of from Manarpol and power is anti
ctical to the interest. But manyChristians fled Labanon unwilling to be over the
(12:28):
situation. Those who remain are closelyand a curse Dettecht to government circles.
I enabled the sort of corruption thathelps his Bola move it and take advantage
of the economic situation to begin withthem. Not necessarily this sort of parties
Israel could align and even if theywanted to, they simply not necessarily going
(12:50):
to side the digital against his Bola. Those of the population of the Christians
who are opposed to his Bolo requestsin Labana are we might be able to
assist on some small level, butthey know what, have the independent power
to make much of a difference necessarily. I also think that Israel in general
(13:13):
of has become a form of pussin terms of relying on any particular group
of ethnicity or religious party in phuneratingits own military policy in such confrontations,
precisely due to the pre to thatprevious experience. The trust is not there.
And you know, there is anexample of the trail and the political
(13:35):
alignment inspired on Israel with Israel beingeventually accused of the human rights abuses that
were perpetuated by some of the maliciousback in the days. So this is
not something that Israel wants to contactgiven especially the bead publicity from Gaza.
I do think that, as withany word Israel, of course, to
(13:58):
look for who is willing to supportanti Hubula movement. I think I do,
you'll find our out of people fromdifferent Vebarans are weekly unhappy with his
Bula and who wish to see itgone. But many of these people are
disempowered. They may have been inposition to assist with anything other than non
(14:18):
intervention on the half of his Bolaor logistics and intelligence and things like that,
and others that it's just going tobe Christian Maroonites. I think they're
Suny Muslims and even Share Muslims whowant to see Iran's hand out of their
country at this point, and theywould be willing to cooperate quietly, whether
or not this is going to bea formal alliance or the sort of beteen
(14:41):
decades ago. I very much doubtLebanon's formal government. How do you think
the Lebanese army and Lebanon's government reactto an Israeli attack or invasion of southern
Lebanon? Do you think the Lebanesearmy would also engage Israeli forces? I
don't think Israel wants to invade Lebanon. I think they will do everything possible
(15:03):
to avoid education where they have todo more than simply push his Bolo forces
out of the way sufficiently to notcontinue, you know, in their direction.
But we already see that the LebanesePrime Minister spoke out against Israel,
blaming therefore what's happening in Gaza,of course, and warning them to blaive
(15:24):
on an engagement in Lebanon, eventhough he knows Buler well who is too
blame for their situation. His Bullet'srelentless attacks as day one, which have
only escalated over time, are entirelyany initiative of his Bola, with no
provocation whatsoever from Israel. I dothink that even those of the in the
(15:46):
Lebanese government who are wary of hisBola presence are at this point not fully
independent, and they they cannot reallycontact with his bola a goal against it.
And I think there's sufficient influence andpenetration of the Lebanese armed forces,
but his Bulo that it can itcan also not be called entirely and independent
(16:07):
entity, which is why continuing tofund and armored by the United States at
this point the time, it's alreadya mistake. It is not an allied
forces supported that is, in aINVESTI scenario penetrated by his Bola, and
worst case scenario rach portions of itwould side with his Bola in the event
(16:27):
of our full confrontation or Israel's inthe revision. Of course, Israel will
do whatever it needs to to guaranteethe safety of its Oan citizens, including
taking the fight all the way tothe end. I don't think they want
to do that. I don't thinkthey necessary will view the entire country as
a target or as an enemy,but they do understand that His Bola's presence
(16:51):
makes it impossible for everyone else notto be involved in some capacity. During
the Gaza War, we have seenHamas being supported by who these and Iraq
based militias. In the event ofa war with Hisbola, how do you
think the so called access of resistancewill come to play? What will the
escalation ladder look like with the Axisof resistance involved? Already, the Access
(17:18):
of resistance is much better integrated thaneven just a couple of years ago,
and they have been watching it veryclosely together, and both on military,
financial, communications and political matters werepreviously many of them would have found differences
in political clashes due to the verydiverse nature of some of these groups.
(17:42):
And we want to see even mostof over time, even if without the
war with his Bola. But Ithink the war, the war would would
expedite and badvance this corporation. We'rebookweting very very far. You know,
already seeing their Gespha instance, saggingtheir coritingines to train in Lomblon in preparation
(18:03):
for the wars. So we canexpect Iranian forces to potentially they're directly in
the world getting love with his Bolla, especially if there is a good chance
that his Bola forces are going tobe decimated decimated physically. Now, of
course, uh, the Iran andothers are relying on over in Israel's differences
(18:23):
uh with the with his bullets arsenalof missiles, But that is not the
only aspect to the war. Ithink there is much greater deal of parity
in the physical forces than his Bolercares to admit. After all, them
up a full full on army,and they have not had the right confrontation
(18:45):
with this role since two thousands setsin such in such a direct face to
face way, so it's not clearwhether they're just just how well their estimation
of the idea power is Israeli ison the other and have been training specifically
against his capabil and I think theirassessment of his bullets strengths is likely to
(19:11):
be far better than the other wayaround. But let's not forget the other
parties now. The Cookies so farhave already been fairly engaged even without his
bull for involvement. They've had avery clear mission, which is to disrupt
the shipping, to make it verydifficult for Israel's allies, and to continuous
(19:33):
stale allies and make it very expensivefor them to continue to engage with digital
economically. They've all been testing andtheir own efforts in disrupting Israel directly through
their own missiles. I think hisBowler gets involved. His Bula has been
training the Coolies and the Wookies haveActually the military training has been based on
(19:55):
his bullas and on ERGC, sowe will s see a far greater level
of direct co operation to the tothe point of possible in punming learning all
the forces to some extent. ButI don't think the FUTI mission will substantially
change due to the geographic necessity,I think, I think we're likely to
(20:18):
see all his bullets in the Yemen, but not necessarily. No No Hooki
is traveling to say, Lebanon simplybecause they have a clear need to continue
disrupting things they're shipping in the RedSea, to continue pusing programs. From
that angle, I don't think thenthey needed all that much in Lebanon until
and unless his bullart really starts losingthe world, then we could see great
(20:45):
deal of footie is probably coming into join them and becauld see other forces
as well, which from pretty veryvolunteer to help in Gaza, even Taliban,
and I mean we have seen thedevelopment of Irates in Soma enjoying the
frame in their coordination with them.There's some coordination with al Shabab inside the
Emen. The book is coordinating theelements of Archai that are all these forces
(21:11):
going to necessarily work together and atlast it's not clear, but it is
clear that some of them will usean opportunity of any big confrontation to Champa
in for their own reasons and tocause problems for Israel, even if they're
not directly to Iran, so itis going to be a far more complicated
confrontation. We want to see Iraqiand Syrian militias also attempt to put pressure
(21:36):
on Israel. For those France aswell, just to distract from the main
world with his bol Iran is veryconcerned about losing his Bola as an asset
because it is their most successful projectin the region. So they will try
to cause very much to weaponize theencirclement of Israel by these various France and
(21:57):
forces as much as possible, andas I mentioned, the coordination of world
will improve and increase a significant point. Aside from the access of resistance.
Another regional actor that has expressed supportfor Hezbollah has been Turkey under President Aragon.
(22:18):
How do you think President Aragon willfollow up on his statement of support
for Hezbollah when he said that allIslamic countries should support Lebanon. Do you
think he's just going to give moraland diplomatic support or is there a possibility
that Turkey could escalate its hostility towardsIsrael by potentially arming Hbolah. Well,
(22:40):
let's not forget two things. Onthe one hand, Turkey is facing a
significant financial problem internally, economic problem. Now that the US sanctions have tittered
against Russian ante Keys and anyone whodoes business with them, Turkey is losing
a significant a significant aspect of itseconomic right fra and so it will look
(23:02):
for other solutions, such as militarization, which always refocuses the economy on military
production. And with that set,I think Truthy will be looking to provide
assistance to its allies and travelers whereverit can, not only for ideological reasons
but as an economic opportunity. Turkeyis also already present in Lebanon, mostly
(23:26):
in the area of Tripoli where thelocal Muslim Brotherwood Contingenty is based. So
far it's involvement has been mostly ideologicaland humanitarian and for limited but Juty has
a fairly good handle and Lebanon anda general area because it views recent Cyprus
as a very problement targets in thatregard, so can in Turkish by based
(23:52):
upperat Is to provide support because weare locally with a sort of things,
intelligence, logistics, even even coordinationof some sort of necessary absolutely. Another
issue to remember is that ergc Iselgin Bo are already both present on Turkey
soil and they've been cooperating with theTurkish intelligence of various brants, including abduction
(24:15):
and intimidation of Iranian dissidents and basicallythe factors who are based in Turkey.
They've been cooperating on it, andthe courtousy Isstus and ERGYC at one point
in attempted in operation abducting Israelis andthey did not intervene until it became fairly
obvious that the Iranians came close tosucceeding. Surely, essentially Turgy has allowed
(24:40):
them to operate with relative freedom.We can certainly assume all of the same
going forward. Can it get worse? Can they also be working with elements
of the Turkish military or assorted informalgroups that have the blessing of Ardavan Muslim
Brotherwood contingents Commas Opera gives based inTourkia, absolutely without a question, and
(25:03):
we can expect a lot of thatwill Tourty necessarily we want to show its
hand in this war if it isthat has good change of losing. Probably
not. I think it will continueto very much be a source of open
for political support, but I thinkmost of its assistance is going to be
indirect. I think Dan wants toget engaged openly in the wars. He
(25:27):
does not think she can ruin easily. How do you think other regional actors
will respond to this potential war,and I'm talking about Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf States. Do youthink they're just going to watch and maybe
give occasional condemnations of Israel's actions ordo you think they're going to pick a
(25:49):
side? And I'm particularly concerned aboutthe reactions of Abraham Accords states like Bahrain
and the United Arab Emirates in noneof those offense of his Bola to put
a malway in fact, you know, in fact Vezurula attacked Egypt work openly
prior to October seventh and got avery harsh response from the Egyptian government.
(26:12):
Iran has been trying to normalize withEgypt, but so far with no success.
Egypt is one of the last calledouts. Jordan is another country that
his Boa is a direct thread toit to itself. Jordan has been instrumental
in stopping Iranian shipments of weapons tocomas based in the West Bank, and
(26:33):
they have also been the targets overdrugs such as kato gun, which are
partially produced in Lebanona and Syria.So all these countries do his boa as
a direct threat to the only interestsin the general stability in the region.
But there's a significant difference festival theyknew the access of resistance as winning a
nine because his role has been stoppedin Gaza for nine months. Admittedly there
(26:56):
are good reasons for that, butit also has failed to annihilate people with
Sinewa are considered to be the physicalorganizers of the aps of flood operation in
October seventh. It has felt sofar to free all of its pastiges.
It has faced the Great Guild internationalpolitical back where it's been. There's been
(27:18):
stories about equipment and ammunition shortages.That's been questioned with the US government on
some issues. So all that weekendsIsrael's military image in the eyes of these
countries makes them less likely to wantto get involved on Israel's behalf. What
doesn't help is that when Israel didhave a more direct opportunity to work against
(27:40):
his board with its Arab neighbors,it has not necessarily done. So what
is quite, you know, sendingout a very clear political political message of
support. It has not taken theopportunity to physically engage and integrate when the
when the sentiment in the weekend wasmuch more favorable to Israel's In a rule,
(28:02):
in this matter, I think they'remore likely to them and take a
more neutral and passive positions to seehow Israel actually does physically. I don't
think they're necessarily going to be praisinghis bullet. There is still a great
deal of concern, But we alsosee many of these countries animalis with the
run one or to another, andso they're less likely to contend any of
(28:25):
Evan's access of resistance members. Eventhe Cookies who have been directly attacking other
countries and not just Israel, arenow in the middle of peace talks in
Zagaroba. Unsuccessful and difficult admittedly,but Sagareba have been reluctant to grants even
the US the territorial leverage to attackthem from their territory from the waters.
(28:48):
So with his bullet, it's verylikely to be the same story. And
so far as you know, Israelis not openly prevailing, and all these
countries remain normalized with the run,and there's all the coaraction from the US
against any of these Yankee Kies,whether it's who kis his Boler or around
itself, the Arab States are goingto be not going to be, you
(29:10):
know, full fledged allies to Israel, and in some cases they're going to
be even siding with his Boler.By the way, we have seen Uee
for the first tire have diplomatic,open diplomatic meetings with his Boler leadership and
moving in the direction of normalizing withhis Boler. Part with out for its
own safety y because the US isMAP is getting increasingly uninvolved or played,
(29:33):
is playing a very limited and defensiverole in the regional security, and part
of it due to Iran's pushback thefailure of the Ibraham Accords. In many
respects, Bakraine, even which wasthe last GCC holdout normalizing with the Run,
was finally pushed into expressing interest innormalizing with the Run. They have
(29:56):
not yet done so, but theyare starting the talks in that direction,
and Brokoln is very much representing withSaria Redia things on the Sumata. So
if if the trend is towards normalizingthe Iran, they took them not in
favor of these countries Confrontingbola and certainlynot until they see that Israel has a
(30:18):
reluctance of succeeding and the US isactually very seriously re arranging its regional our
City strategy m H. In responseto Western power sending arms to Ukraine,
President Vladimir Putin of Russia recently threatenedto provide arms two groups hostile to the
(30:41):
West to attack Western interests. Doyou think that a war between Israel and
Hezbela is one conflict where he couldact on his threats or do you think
he's going to stay away from beinginvolved directly in a conflict between Israel and
as Boulah. Russia will do everythingin a specifically, it will do anything
(31:06):
that can harm in the West andthat can boost its own image and its
own rule. It's no secret thatthat Putin has been coordinating with his Boa
in the past on many issues,during training exercises, sell of weapons,
things of that nature. I thinkhe is certainly a she has even opened
a back mass for it. Clearly, I think he's not going to shy
(31:30):
away from backing his older ra andhis relationship with his bo Harb failure open.
And now that Russia's relationship with Iranhas taken a new and much more
integrated dimension that working on a majorthree D together. I think Russia is
going to be a formal visible wasin any such circumstance. Do I think
(31:53):
that they will join the fray quiteopen the same way they promised to be
to have a united front with Chinaand nor career in the event of any
confrontation of what they valid are probablynot there. Those relationships are not yet
on the same level. But willhe be help in there with assorted intelligence
(32:15):
matters, with logistics, with politicalsupport, even in some level of military
advice absolute Now, let's remember thatRussia is facing its own military travels in
Ukraine. It is not fighting avery successful war. Now that Ukraine has
unmitigated capabilities to fire a long rangemissiles attackers into the United from the United
(32:38):
States that it has acquired from theUS into Russia's territory. Russia also has
to play these times much more sothan in the previous two years, and
it's facing dramatic fotages of fighting offighting forces. It has most approximately six
hundred thousand who been killed or it'sis wounded in Ukraine. It has had
(33:01):
to reallocate some of its forces fromits own borders with the Baltics, from
the peacekeepers in the South Caucuses.Even as three found the system from Syria,
it has had to move all thesethings into Ukraine. So on the
one hand, a major world withhis Bola could be the major distraction from
Ukraine that Russia creates and seeks,requiring much more weapons for all parties involved.
(33:25):
On the other hand, it cannotit kept draining its own resources and
helping others in their world. Socycle what Russia is going to do is
activated its civilian assets as much aspossible. Basically various groups that had been
helping his bullet in Europe and havebeen working on acquired supplies, but form
(33:49):
a civilian rather than military side,and I think that is going to be
the sort of assistance Russia will bebest place to provide. What will the
end of a conflict with Hazbela looklike? Do you think Israel will win
or do you think Israel will loseor do you think the outcome would be
inconclusive? Who do you think wouldemerge better off after a war in the
(34:13):
north between Habela and Israel? Andwhat will depends on and what happens.
First of all with Gaza. Imean what there is a kind of secure,
clear victory there where it can accreate the sort of I think the
only way for a clear victory inGaza. If Israel creates a pathway to
(34:34):
securitizing both Gaza and West Bent alongsideother countries in the region, I cannot
imagine that is in the long jointfight, a battle, or that endless
battle on itself. Given the ideologicalnature of the conflict. She curre the
tunnels to Egypt to prevent Hamas fromgating access to weapons, decimate the forces,
(34:57):
but it means a strategy to preventeHamas from the group, and it
meets a strategy to keep those tunnelssecure and the low jar and it reads
a strategy to counter recruitment and reinforcementefforts in the long run. Even if
you know six eight to eight monthsfrom now, centiver stilled hostages are released,
Hamas forces lose a lot of powerand emulation and I cannot function as
(35:22):
a singular force. There needs tobe some sort of a way to ensure
they do not rebuild very quickly orat all. And there is an ideological
kind of paradigm in place that preventsthat prevents this quote unquote resistance from rising
up, and that can only happenit's rules that he's diplomatically and politically in
(35:45):
the region, and for now Ijust don't see a strategy towards the ten.
It is possible, but it wouldrequire a single minded commitment to oppose
Muslim broda food, to oppose Irandirectly and not you know, and all
of its access of resistance, andto not view the simple as and Israeli
problem, but there's a original problem, and to to overcome the current divisions
(36:08):
through the Arab states. So thatthat is that is one aspect of it.
A second a what depends on onIsrael's level of preparedness, ability to
acquire equipment independent of or whoever isin office in the US, and to
rebuild its own capabilities that have beenshaken by the war in the South and
(36:30):
by the general level of unpreparedness thatthat has been leaking out through the resources,
lack of access to equipment, lackof Q and necessary provisions and so
forth. That meets a completely reallyreal envisioning of Israel's strategy in the North
that does not depend on simply undefensivecapabilities to to hold an indefinite conflict until
(36:55):
it's b runs out of assiles.So because it's not controller missiles, so
far as Iran is capable of deliveringnew missiles, so far as Russia is
active assisting Iran, I think Iranwill be able to get new missiles through
his boget even it starts running outof its called surprise. So there needs
to be a clear strategy that theoften was disruptive capabilities, that this offensive
(37:23):
not only against his boler fighters onthe ground, but also against the they
reach their capabilities, their international appeal, all of these groups. You need
to so is Israel needs to befighting on many fonts. It cannot be
looking at it as a very conventionalconfrontation of the type of the time it
would have ten years ago. ItIsrael understands the nature of the problem faces
(37:46):
it's a very well. When itcan, it can prevail because none of
these forces actually contributing anything positive toanybody in the world, including Lebanon.
If Israel continues to real it asa simple direct threat, it's interests and
nothing more than that, and continuesto fail to communicate why these groups are
(38:07):
actually AMPTI said the all to anysecurity interest, to any fuming writes interest
to other countries as well. It'syour fail because I think at the end
of the day, Ivan, withsuccess, Iran and Mozambardo Coo were successful
in creating this alternative narrative of resistancethat this is all about the occupation,
(38:27):
this is all about liberating Aginna.She's always not liberating anybody enslaving the region,
just like Iran. It's a coriennialistpower. So as Israel find finds
a will to reverse the tables onthe narrative, winning the war is going
to build mutual defen Coming to thelast second question of our episode. Recently,
(38:50):
has Bala's leader Hassan Asralla made athreat against Cypress that he could attack
Cypress if it gets involved in somecapacity in a war between Hisbela and Israel.
Do you think that should a waroccur, that Hassan Zraula would start
attacking Cyprus or do you think hisBola would be more restrained on that in
(39:13):
order to avoid getting into a conflictwith the European Union. Yeah, he's
not thinking about Ostrala is on theone hand, spiritual pillar of his ball,
but on the other tid He's aguy who's been fighting in the Bonker
for many years, so it's notclear just how seriously his pot was or
his calls are want to be takenby Hbola's military leadership. I don't think
(39:37):
they want to be fighting on France. That will split their mission, and
that will split their forces and forcethem into a confrontation that they cannot win.
Greece and Cyprus exception around at thispoint can activate local cells on whose
terrorist attacks, but full front militaryconfrontation with both Israel and Cyprus lush Greece,
(40:00):
and you know, I just don'tthink it's doable. You know,
if if by confrontation by attacks hemeans terrorist attacks, yes anything is possible.
His Bola and other terrorists can activateanywhere in the world, but a
all confrontation. I don't think hisBola currently wants that, no matter what
Hassan and Zola says. I thinkthis is just a way of signaling to
(40:23):
Israel that his Bola has an internationalpresence everywhere in the region. It could
make things more complicated, but yet, and yes, it can make matters
more complicated. You get activate itcells in Cyprus and in Greece and other
countries. It also create a muchmore difficult situation. But on the other
(40:44):
hand, it can galvanize those countriesto join Israel much more formally against the
common threat, and that's not somethingthat his Bola would want, So I
would take these comments with a hugegrain of salt. I think Kola is
escalating its rhetoric to kind of showor paceage on significance and reach but what
(41:04):
it means. But pragmatically, Ithink it will try to stay very,
very focused on Israel and not tryto give opportunity for other countries to get
involved. I think is Bula wantsthe opposite of Israel growing it's international support
in the region. I think itwants to kind of actually scare others from
not getting involved and providing assistance.But I really think that it's going to
(41:30):
be managing expectations very careful, asit has up until it was blood.
It has been slowly escalating over time, but it did not immediately join the
war. I don't know went Israelin Gaza. I don't think it's going
to do so now either unless itbecomes necessary for its own walls or survival,
(41:51):
and I think it will be balancingrhetoric versus you know, escalation and
other places, very careful against needsa resource. Moving from the specifics and
looking at long term trends, whatdo you think that the security environment for
Israel going forward is going to looklike? How will the conflicts that are
(42:12):
currently going on and that will goon in the future affect the abraham A
Core's process, And most importantly,what should we expect of Iran. I
think it's a mistake for Israel tosteer away from a clear discussion on Iran.
First of all, Iran is muchcloser to nuclear capabilities than it's ever
bil. Some are arguing that itmight have nuclear capabilities, or it might
(42:37):
have nuclear golanties from Russia or Charity, and which is why it's as it
involve in as it is not.Iran is very much a genocidal path towards
Israel. It's made no secret ofit. In twenty sixteen Itobah Harmony actually
declared it's twenty forty twelve, whichinvolves are the destruction of Israel by the
(42:58):
date, and that's a bit workdiligently in the direction operational acts applot is
only one aspect of it. Themobilization of the information warfare is quite succeeded
in isolating Israel politically. The disruptionof the Ibraham, of course, and
now even attacks on the camp datedof course with Egypt through pro Broghamda campaigns,
(43:19):
mobilizing extremeness and and by the way, antagonizing Israel against Egypt as well,
that's also been quite successful. SoI think the Abraham, of course
in very shaky grounds. Some ofthe countries have threatened to break the cords,
but in the bill reluctant to doso in a foil capacity. It's
(43:40):
not a good look that you enteragreements and then and you talk about doing
all these defense separations with Israel andthen all of a suddenly you disengage politically
over a matter that is not directlydoes not does not directly Involvedalage. That's
why they have been thinking twice aport of actually breaking the agrelens. But
(44:02):
practically speaking, the trade value isnext to nothing. The tourism has deteriorated,
there's a roll back of discussions orany sort of support in favor of
visual and some of these countries theyare basically Israel is becoming increasingly on work.
So I think that political speaking hasbeen a huge loss and it will
(44:25):
take a great deal of rebuilding allthese relations to reverse this impact. And
I think some of it has startedhappening before October Sama's Dutfuly changes in the
region that Israel has been turning ablind eye to. It has been focused
on domestic matters. If has notbeen looking towards these countries. It has
(44:45):
been relying on a lot of disinformationand kind of open source media information about
what got long in those countries.That has not been looking at them way.
Iran has been trying to mobilize itsown forsts. The normalization, the
run and the impact of the normalizationand all agreement which brought Cutar back into
(45:06):
the fourth with the juice and Egyptempowered it to influence local political discourse and
interest a great region, and howit changed the financial trajectory of trade in
the region. They having been lookingat the Muslim brotherhood trends and the attempted
return of the old Gods that's beenanti normalization with the Israel all over the
(45:28):
region. So all of these thingshave been all of these political incharges has
been ignored by Israel, whichually makeit much much harder to kind of reconstitute
and rebuilds its political strengths. Imean step one would be winning the war
conclusively. But you have split commentscoming in from the Israeli political leadership and
(45:51):
military leadership. You have military mistakesbeing made, such as not going into
Rapah and cutting off access to forHamas right away. There's been a lot
of time ways that are double speaking. It's will still is stuck in Gaza.
You know, the Commas propaganda machineis working over time, and it's
(46:12):
relis have not been successful in disruptingthese is almost narratives and the objects of
the dead, big dis and soforth in Gaza. So all these things,
I certainly are very much making aconclusive vector on any one front very
difficult. At the end of theday, it's refers choice but to emerge
as a as a very clear winnerin a very dramatic way. This abscess
(46:36):
of resistance concept and needs to bedecimated. You know, it must be
made where then none of these coursesput together have any operitional future in the
region. But it has to alsounderstand that it cannot be evading the source
of the problem, which is inaround over there, the United States and
us to find ways of making itvery consely for a round to do any
(47:00):
progress, to take any for thesteps in the implementation, Oh it's oh,
it's foran A needs to show seatsfor you? Are you have to
deal with internal issues and not beable to focus its externally. That that's
what I'm going to say. Brocas, ladies and gentlemen, you just listened
to geopolitical analyst and journalist Arena Suckerman. Arena Suckerman, thank you for your
(47:24):
time. Thank you so much.This was great. Thank you for listening
to Strategic Wisdom. Be sure tofollow and subscribe to us on whatever podcast
platform you're using to listen to thisshow in order to not miss any future
interviews and conversations that I bring toyou on this podcast. Also, be
(47:46):
sure to subscribe to Strategic Wisdom onsubstack at Strategic Wisdom dot substack dot com.
This is your host, Andrew Josesigning up. Sh
As the current Israel Gaza war crossesits nine month mark this July seventh,
the conflict no longer appears to bewon. Among the many customary skirmishes between
Israel and Godza based Palestinian militants thatthe region has grown used to in the
past two decades, both in casualtiesin length, this war has taken a
more expansive character, nearing the statusof a regional war, as several states
(00:25):
and non state actors take active rolesin supporting the belligerents. The Huthis and
Yemen, in an attempt to supportHamas, have mounted a blockade of ships
headed to and from Israel and Israel'sallies through the Bab Almandeb strait. As
Balah has struck northern Israel with dailyrocket barrages, forcing evacuations of residents in
(00:48):
Israel's north. The group has alsothreatened an October seventh style attack on northern
Israel. To Israel's east, Iranbacked militias in Iraq have occasionally fired drones
at Israel to back Hamas. InApril, Iran and Israel have even directly
clashed, exchanging airstrikes. You're listeningto strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I'm
(01:12):
Andrew Jose, a Washington, DCbased security policy analysts and news reporter,
bringing you timely analyzes and commentary onissues in international relations, war and security
policy. What is the future ofIsrael's relations with its adversaries in the region?
(01:32):
What about Yemen? Lebanon? Toanswer these questions, I will be
speaking today with New York based geopoliticalanalyst, journalist, and national security lawyer
Irena Suckerman. Arena Suckerman is aforeign policy analyst and national security lawyer based
(02:23):
in New York. She is afellow at the Arabian Peninsula Institute and the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Arenais also the president of scab Rising,
a media and security strategic advisory firm. She is the editor in chief of
The Washington Outsider, a project ofscab Rising focused on foreign policy, geopolitics,
(02:46):
security, and human rights. Heranalyzes have appeared in major publications including
Newsweek, National Interest, Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel, and Arab News.
Arena, welcome to the show.Thank you so much. I'm been
very glad to be here. Israel'sborder with Lebanon has been heating up since
(03:07):
October seventh. Hesballah has been firingregular rocket barrages, prompting internal displacement up
north. Talk among Israeli officials andanalysts, and plans by many countries to
evacuate their citizens from Lebanon all hintat a possible war with Hesbela. What
is the likelihood of us seeing aIsrael has Bulah war in the near future?
(03:30):
Should there be a war, whatwill it look like? Everything is
pointing out that the war would breakout as long as three weeks from now.
There's been every sign of preparation forthe war effort. You've had senior
journals visiting the northern front in herstatements for private Estanithinia for warning aboard the
(03:55):
preparations for the war, and ofcourse there's been evidence of creation between the
two sides. That so the likelyinevitability of some sort of engaged combat actions
due to the increasingly aggressive nature ofattacks but his Boa. They include arson
(04:15):
attacks on the North, and ofcourse parts of the North have been evacuated
since since October, with the thousandsof Israelis as many as a cond the
thousand Israelis not being able to returnfor now. Of course, this could
be a very different type of warfrom what is happening in Guards. From
(04:35):
one thing, there are rumors thathis book has actually started evacuation of civilians
from its own side, which meansthat essentially the Israelis would be facing mostly
combatants, very clearly marked combatants inthe front lines, even if they're not
(04:57):
necessarily wearing uniforms. So the sortof constructs and restrictions and humanitarian and human
rights back pulls back against the urbanwarfare in gazet that would likely not come
up until and unless QUI situation ofcomplete and complete entry into Lebanon, which
(05:17):
is also a qualifie thereat. Someparties essentially trying to push Israel to enter
Lebanon, not only to fully toengage in a full part of the invasion.
I don't know that it will cometo that, but it is true
that his Bola is a very differentorganization from Commerce. It is much more
(05:39):
of a p Akwaisi army than itis a terrorist organization with limited asymmetrical resources.
It's got at least one hundred andfifty thousand Laune missiles in its possession.
It is better trained. Even thoughCommas has grown substantially in the past,
(06:00):
Bora has is considered to be themost important asset for Iran from a
military perspective. So we're facing onehand, much less considering about potential high
level civil and casualty, but onthe other hand, a huge arsenal of
rockets and a huge well prepared andvery serious of course, with sophisticated surveillance
(06:25):
capabilities, as we have here froma recent journal lego of Kaifa released by
his bo. Very different type ofwar. And let's not forget that it's
that Israel would have to allocate someof its resources or parking revisers to the
fight in the North, given thattheir apparitions in Gaza are not yet over,
(06:46):
and it's not clear when they're goingto be over. Some are saying
and that Gaza that the Gaza parkingcould take as much as six to eight
once to complete. What that wouldlook like you're fighting a two front war.
It could be very very different.And there's also been concerns about the
access to equipment for both North andSouth frust so that two could complicate this
(07:13):
war. One of the things Hazbolahhas periodically flaunted is it's personnel somewhat battle
experience, in Syria and also thegroup's artillery systems and drones. How has
the group been allowed to accrue somuch strength over the years that it is
considerably powerful? Would you say it'sa policy failure by Israel, the US
(07:36):
and Lebanon. How has this cometo be? You know, it's not
for lack of trying on on theIsrael's part. We have seen that Israel
has bought a different another war withthe Hazbola in two thousand and six,
but it did not at that pointthe idea of was not could arguably was
(07:57):
under prepared, right, it couldbe said, and they are waxed in
the equipment necessary to achieve a verydecisive victory. Boa at the time was
also not what it is today,but it was already a payally strong force
that has been active for decades.Let's not forget the deadly Kisbola released attacks
(08:20):
in Lebanon on the US forces,in Kisbula's involvement in Argentina's barns. It
has been a an international parting force, not just a local in militia for
decades already. In terms of Israel, pass tried to disrupt its activities as
large as possible, but in Syriawas also distracted with Gaza and West Bank
(08:43):
related matters. It was not wellprepared for full front confrontation with his Bola,
and it was also not prepared forthe confrontation with Iraqan, which has
been supplying his Bola with these typesof weapons. US would have been in
a far better position to disrupt theseapparitions, but for many years the US
(09:05):
has tried to actually serpent one thisissue through first through direct negotiations with the
are A, second two policies ofengagement with Lebanon, and essentially pretending a
way that hence Bola is actually afunctional part of governance in Lebanon and not
merely and acting as if it's merely, you know, a separate anentiqity that
(09:31):
happens to be operating in Lebanon,which was not the case in a long
time. His bolar fat achieved politicalsupport in Lebanon and thrust through the so
called social Jihad and eventually through outrightterrorizing all the population, accumulation of basis
(09:52):
of support and the sheer portions ofthe population, and to political gills with
with some of the more co Christianparties, so Chisboa has become a political
problem as much as a military problem, and trying to intervene in the supply
of weapons could also bring accusations ofattacking a sovereign a sovereign state, So
(10:16):
Years did not want to get engageddirectly in the disruption of the supply chains.
They wanted to deal with Iran onlydiplomatically. And also Years recognized the
Lebanese military forces as an ally andprovided them for many years for decades,
i would say, the official supportand funding, which is still the case
(10:37):
to this date in other countries.Like Parents at various times tried to negotiate
with his Boa with the Lebanese government. There's been a period of time when
Syria was worked quite influential in Lebanonas well, which she trowed the complicated
matters when Lebanon at one point wasbasically a colony. Theories are set and
(11:01):
these have seen for an a colonialof Syria, Lebanon discipally become a colony
of Iran and less so than arecompletely independent state. So yes, there's
been a lot of policy failures,but those policy paylists are not merely a
lack of sufficient military decision making it'salso a pro political misassessment. It's war
(11:22):
food and continues to bear fruit tothis day. This rejection of seeing Lebanon
as merely at this point and extensionof Iran's for one policy in the region,
Lebanon is a sectarian country. AboutLebanese Mayrionite Christians, what role do
you think that they would play inthis conflict? Do you think Israel would
(11:45):
work with Lebanese Mayrionite Christians as itdid in the nineteen eighty two Lebanon War,
or do you think that Israel isgoing to try to pursue his Ballah
independently like it attempted to do inthe two thousand and six Lebanon War.
Well, I think it's it's harderto call man that Christians are uniform an
hour party at this point. AsI mentioned, some of the parties made
(12:07):
a very calculated move to side thatHis Bora at this point, which inherently
makes them on the side of HisBola and Iran, despite the fact that
you would think that His Bora's westfrom of from Manarpol and power is anti
ctical to the interest. But manyChristians fled Labanon unwilling to be over the
(12:28):
situation. Those who remain are closelyand a curse Dettecht to government circles.
I enabled the sort of corruption thathelps his Bola move it and take advantage
of the economic situation to begin withthem. Not necessarily this sort of parties
Israel could align and even if theywanted to, they simply not necessarily going
(12:50):
to side the digital against his Bola. Those of the population of the Christians
who are opposed to his Bolo requestsin Labana are we might be able to
assist on some small level, butthey know what, have the independent power
to make much of a difference necessarily. I also think that Israel in general
(13:13):
of has become a form of pussin terms of relying on any particular group
of ethnicity or religious party in phuneratingits own military policy in such confrontations,
precisely due to the pre to thatprevious experience. The trust is not there.
And you know, there is anexample of the trail and the political
(13:35):
alignment inspired on Israel with Israel beingeventually accused of the human rights abuses that
were perpetuated by some of the maliciousback in the days. So this is
not something that Israel wants to contactgiven especially the bead publicity from Gaza.
I do think that, as withany word Israel, of course, to
(13:58):
look for who is willing to supportanti Hubula movement. I think I do,
you'll find our out of people fromdifferent Vebarans are weekly unhappy with his
Bula and who wish to see itgone. But many of these people are
disempowered. They may have been inposition to assist with anything other than non
(14:18):
intervention on the half of his Bolaor logistics and intelligence and things like that,
and others that it's just going tobe Christian Maroonites. I think they're
Suny Muslims and even Share Muslims whowant to see Iran's hand out of their
country at this point, and theywould be willing to cooperate quietly, whether
or not this is going to bea formal alliance or the sort of beteen
(14:41):
decades ago. I very much doubtLebanon's formal government. How do you think
the Lebanese army and Lebanon's government reactto an Israeli attack or invasion of southern
Lebanon? Do you think the Lebanesearmy would also engage Israeli forces? I
don't think Israel wants to invade Lebanon. I think they will do everything possible
(15:03):
to avoid education where they have todo more than simply push his Bolo forces
out of the way sufficiently to notcontinue, you know, in their direction.
But we already see that the LebanesePrime Minister spoke out against Israel,
blaming therefore what's happening in Gaza,of course, and warning them to blaive
(15:24):
on an engagement in Lebanon, eventhough he knows Buler well who is too
blame for their situation. His Bullet'srelentless attacks as day one, which have
only escalated over time, are entirelyany initiative of his Bola, with no
provocation whatsoever from Israel. I dothink that even those of the in the
(15:46):
Lebanese government who are wary of hisBola presence are at this point not fully
independent, and they they cannot reallycontact with his bola a goal against it.
And I think there's sufficient influence andpenetration of the Lebanese armed forces,
but his Bulo that it can itcan also not be called entirely and independent
(16:07):
entity, which is why continuing tofund and armored by the United States at
this point the time, it's alreadya mistake. It is not an allied
forces supported that is, in aINVESTI scenario penetrated by his Bola, and
worst case scenario rach portions of itwould side with his Bola in the event
(16:27):
of our full confrontation or Israel's inthe revision. Of course, Israel will
do whatever it needs to to guaranteethe safety of its Oan citizens, including
taking the fight all the way tothe end. I don't think they want
to do that. I don't thinkthey necessary will view the entire country as
a target or as an enemy,but they do understand that His Bola's presence
(16:51):
makes it impossible for everyone else notto be involved in some capacity. During
the Gaza War, we have seenHamas being supported by who these and Iraq
based militias. In the event ofa war with Hisbola, how do you
think the so called access of resistancewill come to play? What will the
escalation ladder look like with the Axisof resistance involved? Already, the Access
(17:18):
of resistance is much better integrated thaneven just a couple of years ago,
and they have been watching it veryclosely together, and both on military,
financial, communications and political matters werepreviously many of them would have found differences
in political clashes due to the verydiverse nature of some of these groups.
(17:42):
And we want to see even mostof over time, even if without the
war with his Bola. But Ithink the war, the war would would
expedite and badvance this corporation. We'rebookweting very very far. You know,
already seeing their Gespha instance, saggingtheir coritingines to train in Lomblon in preparation
(18:03):
for the wars. So we canexpect Iranian forces to potentially they're directly in
the world getting love with his Bolla, especially if there is a good chance
that his Bola forces are going tobe decimated decimated physically. Now, of
course, uh, the Iran andothers are relying on over in Israel's differences
(18:23):
uh with the with his bullets arsenalof missiles, But that is not the
only aspect to the war. Ithink there is much greater deal of parity
in the physical forces than his Bolercares to admit. After all, them
up a full full on army,and they have not had the right confrontation
(18:45):
with this role since two thousands setsin such in such a direct face to
face way, so it's not clearwhether they're just just how well their estimation
of the idea power is Israeli ison the other and have been training specifically
against his capabil and I think theirassessment of his bullets strengths is likely to
(19:11):
be far better than the other wayaround. But let's not forget the other
parties now. The Cookies so farhave already been fairly engaged even without his
bull for involvement. They've had avery clear mission, which is to disrupt
the shipping, to make it verydifficult for Israel's allies, and to continuous
(19:33):
stale allies and make it very expensivefor them to continue to engage with digital
economically. They've all been testing andtheir own efforts in disrupting Israel directly through
their own missiles. I think hisBowler gets involved. His Bula has been
training the Coolies and the Wookies haveActually the military training has been based on
(19:55):
his bullas and on ERGC, sowe will s see a far greater level
of direct co operation to the tothe point of possible in punming learning all
the forces to some extent. ButI don't think the FUTI mission will substantially
change due to the geographic necessity,I think, I think we're likely to
(20:18):
see all his bullets in the Yemen, but not necessarily. No No Hooki
is traveling to say, Lebanon simplybecause they have a clear need to continue
disrupting things they're shipping in the RedSea, to continue pusing programs. From
that angle, I don't think thenthey needed all that much in Lebanon until
and unless his bullart really starts losingthe world, then we could see great
(20:45):
deal of footie is probably coming into join them and becauld see other forces
as well, which from pretty veryvolunteer to help in Gaza, even Taliban,
and I mean we have seen thedevelopment of Irates in Soma enjoying the
frame in their coordination with them.There's some coordination with al Shabab inside the
Emen. The book is coordinating theelements of Archai that are all these forces
(21:11):
going to necessarily work together and atlast it's not clear, but it is
clear that some of them will usean opportunity of any big confrontation to Champa
in for their own reasons and tocause problems for Israel, even if they're
not directly to Iran, so itis going to be a far more complicated
confrontation. We want to see Iraqiand Syrian militias also attempt to put pressure
(21:36):
on Israel. For those France aswell, just to distract from the main
world with his bol Iran is veryconcerned about losing his Bola as an asset
because it is their most successful projectin the region. So they will try
to cause very much to weaponize theencirclement of Israel by these various France and
(21:57):
forces as much as possible, andas I mentioned, the coordination of world
will improve and increase a significant point. Aside from the access of resistance.
Another regional actor that has expressed supportfor Hezbollah has been Turkey under President Aragon.
(22:18):
How do you think President Aragon willfollow up on his statement of support
for Hezbollah when he said that allIslamic countries should support Lebanon. Do you
think he's just going to give moraland diplomatic support or is there a possibility
that Turkey could escalate its hostility towardsIsrael by potentially arming Hbolah. Well,
(22:40):
let's not forget two things. Onthe one hand, Turkey is facing a
significant financial problem internally, economic problem. Now that the US sanctions have tittered
against Russian ante Keys and anyone whodoes business with them, Turkey is losing
a significant a significant aspect of itseconomic right fra and so it will look
(23:02):
for other solutions, such as militarization, which always refocuses the economy on military
production. And with that set,I think Truthy will be looking to provide
assistance to its allies and travelers whereverit can, not only for ideological reasons
but as an economic opportunity. Turkeyis also already present in Lebanon, mostly
(23:26):
in the area of Tripoli where thelocal Muslim Brotherwood Contingenty is based. So
far it's involvement has been mostly ideologicaland humanitarian and for limited but Juty has
a fairly good handle and Lebanon anda general area because it views recent Cyprus
as a very problement targets in thatregard, so can in Turkish by based
(23:52):
upperat Is to provide support because weare locally with a sort of things,
intelligence, logistics, even even coordinationof some sort of necessary absolutely. Another
issue to remember is that ergc Iselgin Bo are already both present on Turkey
soil and they've been cooperating with theTurkish intelligence of various brants, including abduction
(24:15):
and intimidation of Iranian dissidents and basicallythe factors who are based in Turkey.
They've been cooperating on it, andthe courtousy Isstus and ERGYC at one point
in attempted in operation abducting Israelis andthey did not intervene until it became fairly
obvious that the Iranians came close tosucceeding. Surely, essentially Turgy has allowed
(24:40):
them to operate with relative freedom.We can certainly assume all of the same
going forward. Can it get worse? Can they also be working with elements
of the Turkish military or assorted informalgroups that have the blessing of Ardavan Muslim
Brotherwood contingents Commas Opera gives based inTourkia, absolutely without a question, and
(25:03):
we can expect a lot of thatwill Tourty necessarily we want to show its
hand in this war if it isthat has good change of losing. Probably
not. I think it will continueto very much be a source of open
for political support, but I thinkmost of its assistance is going to be
indirect. I think Dan wants toget engaged openly in the wars. He
(25:27):
does not think she can ruin easily. How do you think other regional actors
will respond to this potential war,and I'm talking about Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf States. Do youthink they're just going to watch and maybe
give occasional condemnations of Israel's actions ordo you think they're going to pick a
(25:49):
side? And I'm particularly concerned aboutthe reactions of Abraham Accords states like Bahrain
and the United Arab Emirates in noneof those offense of his Bola to put
a malway in fact, you know, in fact Vezurula attacked Egypt work openly
prior to October seventh and got avery harsh response from the Egyptian government.
(26:12):
Iran has been trying to normalize withEgypt, but so far with no success.
Egypt is one of the last calledouts. Jordan is another country that
his Boa is a direct thread toit to itself. Jordan has been instrumental
in stopping Iranian shipments of weapons tocomas based in the West Bank, and
(26:33):
they have also been the targets overdrugs such as kato gun, which are
partially produced in Lebanona and Syria.So all these countries do his boa as
a direct threat to the only interestsin the general stability in the region.
But there's a significant difference festival theyknew the access of resistance as winning a
nine because his role has been stoppedin Gaza for nine months. Admittedly there
(26:56):
are good reasons for that, butit also has failed to annihilate people with
Sinewa are considered to be the physicalorganizers of the aps of flood operation in
October seventh. It has felt sofar to free all of its pastiges.
It has faced the Great Guild internationalpolitical back where it's been. There's been
(27:18):
stories about equipment and ammunition shortages.That's been questioned with the US government on
some issues. So all that weekendsIsrael's military image in the eyes of these
countries makes them less likely to wantto get involved on Israel's behalf. What
doesn't help is that when Israel didhave a more direct opportunity to work against
(27:40):
his board with its Arab neighbors,it has not necessarily done. So what
is quite, you know, sendingout a very clear political political message of
support. It has not taken theopportunity to physically engage and integrate when the
when the sentiment in the weekend wasmuch more favorable to Israel's In a rule,
(28:02):
in this matter, I think they'remore likely to them and take a
more neutral and passive positions to seehow Israel actually does physically. I don't
think they're necessarily going to be praisinghis bullet. There is still a great
deal of concern, But we alsosee many of these countries animalis with the
run one or to another, andso they're less likely to contend any of
(28:25):
Evan's access of resistance members. Eventhe Cookies who have been directly attacking other
countries and not just Israel, arenow in the middle of peace talks in
Zagaroba. Unsuccessful and difficult admittedly,but Sagareba have been reluctant to grants even
the US the territorial leverage to attackthem from their territory from the waters.
(28:48):
So with his bullet, it's verylikely to be the same story. And
so far as you know, Israelis not openly prevailing, and all these
countries remain normalized with the run,and there's all the coaraction from the US
against any of these Yankee Kies,whether it's who kis his Boler or around
itself, the Arab States are goingto be not going to be, you
(29:10):
know, full fledged allies to Israel, and in some cases they're going to
be even siding with his Boler.By the way, we have seen Uee
for the first tire have diplomatic,open diplomatic meetings with his Boler leadership and
moving in the direction of normalizing withhis Boler. Part with out for its
own safety y because the US isMAP is getting increasingly uninvolved or played,
(29:33):
is playing a very limited and defensiverole in the regional security, and part
of it due to Iran's pushback thefailure of the Ibraham Accords. In many
respects, Bakraine, even which wasthe last GCC holdout normalizing with the Run,
was finally pushed into expressing interest innormalizing with the Run. They have
(29:56):
not yet done so, but theyare starting the talks in that direction,
and Brokoln is very much representing withSaria Redia things on the Sumata. So
if if the trend is towards normalizingthe Iran, they took them not in
favor of these countries Confrontingbola and certainlynot until they see that Israel has a
(30:18):
reluctance of succeeding and the US isactually very seriously re arranging its regional our
City strategy m H. In responseto Western power sending arms to Ukraine,
President Vladimir Putin of Russia recently threatenedto provide arms two groups hostile to the
(30:41):
West to attack Western interests. Doyou think that a war between Israel and
Hezbela is one conflict where he couldact on his threats or do you think
he's going to stay away from beinginvolved directly in a conflict between Israel and
as Boulah. Russia will do everythingin a specifically, it will do anything
(31:06):
that can harm in the West andthat can boost its own image and its
own rule. It's no secret thatthat Putin has been coordinating with his Boa
in the past on many issues,during training exercises, sell of weapons,
things of that nature. I thinkhe is certainly a she has even opened
a back mass for it. Clearly, I think he's not going to shy
(31:30):
away from backing his older ra andhis relationship with his bo Harb failure open.
And now that Russia's relationship with Iranhas taken a new and much more
integrated dimension that working on a majorthree D together. I think Russia is
going to be a formal visible wasin any such circumstance. Do I think
(31:53):
that they will join the fray quiteopen the same way they promised to be
to have a united front with Chinaand nor career in the event of any
confrontation of what they valid are probablynot there. Those relationships are not yet
on the same level. But willhe be help in there with assorted intelligence
(32:15):
matters, with logistics, with politicalsupport, even in some level of military
advice absolute Now, let's remember thatRussia is facing its own military travels in
Ukraine. It is not fighting avery successful war. Now that Ukraine has
unmitigated capabilities to fire a long rangemissiles attackers into the United from the United
(32:38):
States that it has acquired from theUS into Russia's territory. Russia also has
to play these times much more sothan in the previous two years, and
it's facing dramatic fotages of fighting offighting forces. It has most approximately six
hundred thousand who been killed or it'sis wounded in Ukraine. It has had
(33:01):
to reallocate some of its forces fromits own borders with the Baltics, from
the peacekeepers in the South Caucuses.Even as three found the system from Syria,
it has had to move all thesethings into Ukraine. So on the
one hand, a major world withhis Bola could be the major distraction from
Ukraine that Russia creates and seeks,requiring much more weapons for all parties involved.
(33:25):
On the other hand, it cannotit kept draining its own resources and
helping others in their world. Socycle what Russia is going to do is
activated its civilian assets as much aspossible. Basically various groups that had been
helping his bullet in Europe and havebeen working on acquired supplies, but form
(33:49):
a civilian rather than military side,and I think that is going to be
the sort of assistance Russia will bebest place to provide. What will the
end of a conflict with Hazbela looklike? Do you think Israel will win
or do you think Israel will loseor do you think the outcome would be
inconclusive? Who do you think wouldemerge better off after a war in the
(34:13):
north between Habela and Israel? Andwhat will depends on and what happens.
First of all with Gaza. Imean what there is a kind of secure,
clear victory there where it can accreate the sort of I think the
only way for a clear victory inGaza. If Israel creates a pathway to
(34:34):
securitizing both Gaza and West Bent alongsideother countries in the region, I cannot
imagine that is in the long jointfight, a battle, or that endless
battle on itself. Given the ideologicalnature of the conflict. She curre the
tunnels to Egypt to prevent Hamas fromgating access to weapons, decimate the forces,
(34:57):
but it means a strategy to preventeHamas from the group, and it
meets a strategy to keep those tunnelssecure and the low jar and it reads
a strategy to counter recruitment and reinforcementefforts in the long run. Even if
you know six eight to eight monthsfrom now, centiver stilled hostages are released,
Hamas forces lose a lot of powerand emulation and I cannot function as
(35:22):
a singular force. There needs tobe some sort of a way to ensure
they do not rebuild very quickly orat all. And there is an ideological
kind of paradigm in place that preventsthat prevents this quote unquote resistance from rising
up, and that can only happenit's rules that he's diplomatically and politically in
(35:45):
the region, and for now Ijust don't see a strategy towards the ten.
It is possible, but it wouldrequire a single minded commitment to oppose
Muslim broda food, to oppose Irandirectly and not you know, and all
of its access of resistance, andto not view the simple as and Israeli
problem, but there's a original problem, and to to overcome the current divisions
(36:08):
through the Arab states. So thatthat is that is one aspect of it.
A second a what depends on onIsrael's level of preparedness, ability to
acquire equipment independent of or whoever isin office in the US, and to
rebuild its own capabilities that have beenshaken by the war in the South and
(36:30):
by the general level of unpreparedness thatthat has been leaking out through the resources,
lack of access to equipment, lackof Q and necessary provisions and so
forth. That meets a completely reallyreal envisioning of Israel's strategy in the North
that does not depend on simply undefensivecapabilities to to hold an indefinite conflict until
(36:55):
it's b runs out of assiles.So because it's not controller missiles, so
far as Iran is capable of deliveringnew missiles, so far as Russia is
active assisting Iran, I think Iranwill be able to get new missiles through
his boget even it starts running outof its called surprise. So there needs
to be a clear strategy that theoften was disruptive capabilities, that this offensive
(37:23):
not only against his boler fighters onthe ground, but also against the they
reach their capabilities, their international appeal, all of these groups. You need
to so is Israel needs to befighting on many fonts. It cannot be
looking at it as a very conventionalconfrontation of the type of the time it
would have ten years ago. ItIsrael understands the nature of the problem faces
(37:46):
it's a very well. When itcan, it can prevail because none of
these forces actually contributing anything positive toanybody in the world, including Lebanon.
If Israel continues to real it asa simple direct threat, it's interests and
nothing more than that, and continuesto fail to communicate why these groups are
(38:07):
actually AMPTI said the all to anysecurity interest, to any fuming writes interest
to other countries as well. It'syour fail because I think at the end
of the day, Ivan, withsuccess, Iran and Mozambardo Coo were successful
in creating this alternative narrative of resistancethat this is all about the occupation,
(38:27):
this is all about liberating Aginna.She's always not liberating anybody enslaving the region,
just like Iran. It's a coriennialistpower. So as Israel find finds
a will to reverse the tables onthe narrative, winning the war is going
to build mutual defen Coming to thelast second question of our episode. Recently,
(38:50):
has Bala's leader Hassan Asralla made athreat against Cypress that he could attack
Cypress if it gets involved in somecapacity in a war between Hisbela and Israel.
Do you think that should a waroccur, that Hassan Zraula would start
attacking Cyprus or do you think hisBola would be more restrained on that in
(39:13):
order to avoid getting into a conflictwith the European Union. Yeah, he's
not thinking about Ostrala is on theone hand, spiritual pillar of his ball,
but on the other tid He's aguy who's been fighting in the Bonker
for many years, so it's notclear just how seriously his pot was or
his calls are want to be takenby Hbola's military leadership. I don't think
(39:37):
they want to be fighting on France. That will split their mission, and
that will split their forces and forcethem into a confrontation that they cannot win.
Greece and Cyprus exception around at thispoint can activate local cells on whose
terrorist attacks, but full front militaryconfrontation with both Israel and Cyprus lush Greece,
(40:00):
and you know, I just don'tthink it's doable. You know,
if if by confrontation by attacks hemeans terrorist attacks, yes anything is possible.
His Bola and other terrorists can activateanywhere in the world, but a
all confrontation. I don't think hisBola currently wants that, no matter what
Hassan and Zola says. I thinkthis is just a way of signaling to
(40:23):
Israel that his Bola has an internationalpresence everywhere in the region. It could
make things more complicated, but yet, and yes, it can make matters
more complicated. You get activate itcells in Cyprus and in Greece and other
countries. It also create a muchmore difficult situation. But on the other
(40:44):
hand, it can galvanize those countriesto join Israel much more formally against the
common threat, and that's not somethingthat his Bola would want, So I
would take these comments with a hugegrain of salt. I think Kola is
escalating its rhetoric to kind of showor paceage on significance and reach but what
(41:04):
it means. But pragmatically, Ithink it will try to stay very,
very focused on Israel and not tryto give opportunity for other countries to get
involved. I think is Bula wantsthe opposite of Israel growing it's international support
in the region. I think itwants to kind of actually scare others from
not getting involved and providing assistance.But I really think that it's going to
(41:30):
be managing expectations very careful, asit has up until it was blood.
It has been slowly escalating over time, but it did not immediately join the
war. I don't know went Israelin Gaza. I don't think it's going
to do so now either unless itbecomes necessary for its own walls or survival,
(41:51):
and I think it will be balancingrhetoric versus you know, escalation and
other places, very careful against needsa resource. Moving from the specifics and
looking at long term trends, whatdo you think that the security environment for
Israel going forward is going to looklike? How will the conflicts that are
(42:12):
currently going on and that will goon in the future affect the abraham A
Core's process, And most importantly,what should we expect of Iran. I
think it's a mistake for Israel tosteer away from a clear discussion on Iran.
First of all, Iran is muchcloser to nuclear capabilities than it's ever
bil. Some are arguing that itmight have nuclear capabilities, or it might
(42:37):
have nuclear golanties from Russia or Charity, and which is why it's as it
involve in as it is not.Iran is very much a genocidal path towards
Israel. It's made no secret ofit. In twenty sixteen Itobah Harmony actually
declared it's twenty forty twelve, whichinvolves are the destruction of Israel by the
(42:58):
date, and that's a bit workdiligently in the direction operational acts applot is
only one aspect of it. Themobilization of the information warfare is quite succeeded
in isolating Israel politically. The disruptionof the Ibraham, of course, and
now even attacks on the camp datedof course with Egypt through pro Broghamda campaigns,
(43:19):
mobilizing extremeness and and by the way, antagonizing Israel against Egypt as well,
that's also been quite successful. SoI think the Abraham, of course
in very shaky grounds. Some ofthe countries have threatened to break the cords,
but in the bill reluctant to doso in a foil capacity. It's
(43:40):
not a good look that you enteragreements and then and you talk about doing
all these defense separations with Israel andthen all of a suddenly you disengage politically
over a matter that is not directlydoes not does not directly Involvedalage. That's
why they have been thinking twice aport of actually breaking the agrelens. But
(44:02):
practically speaking, the trade value isnext to nothing. The tourism has deteriorated,
there's a roll back of discussions orany sort of support in favor of
visual and some of these countries theyare basically Israel is becoming increasingly on work.
So I think that political speaking hasbeen a huge loss and it will
(44:25):
take a great deal of rebuilding allthese relations to reverse this impact. And
I think some of it has startedhappening before October Sama's Dutfuly changes in the
region that Israel has been turning ablind eye to. It has been focused
on domestic matters. If has notbeen looking towards these countries. It has
(44:45):
been relying on a lot of disinformationand kind of open source media information about
what got long in those countries.That has not been looking at them way.
Iran has been trying to mobilize itsown forsts. The normalization, the
run and the impact of the normalizationand all agreement which brought Cutar back into
(45:06):
the fourth with the juice and Egyptempowered it to influence local political discourse and
interest a great region, and howit changed the financial trajectory of trade in
the region. They having been lookingat the Muslim brotherhood trends and the attempted
return of the old Gods that's beenanti normalization with the Israel all over the
(45:28):
region. So all of these thingshave been all of these political incharges has
been ignored by Israel, whichually makeit much much harder to kind of reconstitute
and rebuilds its political strengths. Imean step one would be winning the war
conclusively. But you have split commentscoming in from the Israeli political leadership and
(45:51):
military leadership. You have military mistakesbeing made, such as not going into
Rapah and cutting off access to forHamas right away. There's been a lot
of time ways that are double speaking. It's will still is stuck in Gaza.
You know, the Commas propaganda machineis working over time, and it's
(46:12):
relis have not been successful in disruptingthese is almost narratives and the objects of
the dead, big dis and soforth in Gaza. So all these things,
I certainly are very much making aconclusive vector on any one front very
difficult. At the end of theday, it's refers choice but to emerge
as a as a very clear winnerin a very dramatic way. This abscess
(46:36):
of resistance concept and needs to bedecimated. You know, it must be
made where then none of these coursesput together have any operitional future in the
region. But it has to alsounderstand that it cannot be evading the source
of the problem, which is inaround over there, the United States and
us to find ways of making itvery consely for a round to do any
(47:00):
progress, to take any for thesteps in the implementation, Oh it's oh,
it's foran A needs to show seatsfor you? Are you have to
deal with internal issues and not beable to focus its externally. That that's
what I'm going to say. Brocas, ladies and gentlemen, you just listened
to geopolitical analyst and journalist Arena Suckerman. Arena Suckerman, thank you for your
(47:24):
time. Thank you so much.This was great. Thank you for listening
to Strategic Wisdom. Be sure tofollow and subscribe to us on whatever podcast
platform you're using to listen to thisshow in order to not miss any future
interviews and conversations that I bring toyou on this podcast. Also, be
(47:46):
sure to subscribe to Strategic Wisdom onsubstack at Strategic Wisdom dot substack dot com.
This is your host, Andrew Josesigning up. Sh
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