Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Earlier this year, India's Prime Minister Noranda Modi won the
elections once again, propelling him to a third term. What
effects will Noranda Modi's third term hold for India's foreign policy,
economic policy, and long term trajectory? How can we best
(00:20):
understand the phenomenon of Nourendra Modi. You're listening to Strategic
Wisdom with Andrew Jose. I'm Andrew Jose, and today I
will be sitting with Atlantic Councils South Asia Program Assistant, Trew,
said Paulcar about further Ado, Let's proceed to the interview.
(01:16):
Sturgeon Paulkar is a Washington, DC based commentator and South
Asia analyst. A graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School
of Advanced International Studies, Sturgeon is a Program assistant with
the Atlantic Council's South Asia Program. He's also an informal
yoga instructor and is fluent in several Indian and world languages,
(01:37):
including English, Marathi, Hindi, German, and Mandarin. Sturgeon, Paulcar, Welcome
to the.
Speaker 2 (01:43):
Show, Andrew, thank you so much for having me. Sturgeon.
Speaker 1 (01:48):
Modi's first election victory in twenty fourteen and is subsequent
triumph in twenty nineteen marked as some analysts claimed, the
end of the Raoul Gandhi Rajiv Gandhi dinner in Indian
politics and the rise of popular and populist nationalism in India.
I want to discuss with the usurgeon the phenomenon of
(02:08):
Nrander Modi. What are the political factors you say that
broad Modi to power and the factors that are keeping
him in power in India? Why has he been able
to win election after election to the dismay of the
Indian National Congress.
Speaker 2 (02:27):
Right, let's map out these eleven years then of having
Prime Minister Naridramodi with first starting off with the people
the mode of the people in twenty twelve twenty fourteen,
when we saw the rise of then Chief Minister Nari
Dramodi becoming the Prime ministerial candidate the United Progressive Alliance
(02:50):
to point zero that government had two years of sustained
campaigns against it like India against corruption which brought tens
of millions of people onto the streets. Corruption crime and
lack of commitments from the UPA played a huge role
in the people being against the UPA in general and
(03:11):
people were for the developmental model in particular, and the clean,
humble image that Prime Minister Modi had in twenty fourteen.
It was an image of a man of the people
who rose from humble beginnings and had a success story,
an example in how he had run Gujrah. And other
(03:32):
organizations obviously like the Rashisym Sawak Sang and the Baradya
Janata Party were key allies in the protest movements against
the UPA, so like the India Against Corruption movement and
all of the moments movements that were taking place against
the up in general. And so that triad, especially of
(03:55):
a Modi plus BJP plus RSS coming together consolidated that
pro mo the movement. Because we must remember that the
BJP and RSS are some of the largest, essentially the
first and second largest organizations globally, So having those two
organizations behind you so strongly, and when you look at
(04:19):
the BJP of twenty fourteen, it was a huge consolidation
of a pro mo the movement within his party. So
the smoothness of that process was quite contrasting with the
chaos that was in the opposition alliance at that point.
And so the BJP itself rode all the more they
wave the RSS back then, which had about six million
(04:42):
volunteers were key grass roofs volunteers who were going and
knocking on doors, spreading that awareness, spreading that message. And
we must highlight the Congress confusion that has prevailed in
all of these ten years. First for twenty fourteen, twenty
nineteen and twenty twenty four, one question where we did
not have an answer was who is the prime ministerial
(05:05):
candidate of either the Indian National Congress or their alliance.
They claim that the trend is that they don't announce
this until the elections are done, which is true. But
then when you are competing, when you are going up
against a highly, highly well regarded individual like Prime Minister Modi,
(05:27):
you either read a very strong topic or most preferably
a person or a group of people who can take
that person on. And it is confusing to pinpoint Congress's
positions on it because was it Rahal Gandhi, was it
Malika jun Kargi, especially in this election. Now I'll come
(05:48):
to that, but I do want to highlight, since you
highlighted the Gadhi dynasty, a fun fact that the Gandhi
dynasty is It's essentially celebrating it's one hundred years. If
you count post India's independence, then it is the first
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who started the dynasty. But Motila
(06:08):
Al Nehu, his father, was very much active in pre
independence politics in the nineteen twenties. At this point, Sonia Gandhi,
the matriarch, is in the upper house of the parliament
in the Raja Sabah. Raoul Gandhi is now in the
Lok Saba representing a seat that has historically been with
his family, and his sister Priyanka Ghandhi is set to
(06:31):
contest from Waynard, which Raoul Gandhi vacated just recently and
held from twenty nineteen to twenty twenty four in the
last parliament. But the confusion within the Congress remains, and
I think that's where your question on the dynasty part
comes in, because neither ra Gandhi nor Priyanka Gandhi have
(06:54):
held official offices. None of them have been cabinet members.
This is for the first cabinet level position. Raul Zandi
has as Leader of Opposition because the leader of Opposition
is a cabinet level position in India and so in
that sense, we do not know if Raoul Gandhi is
(07:14):
the legitimate or that chosen a competitor to Prime Minister Modi.
He is genuinely the leader of Opposition. But if you
look at the prime ministerial positions, then a key contender
would be the President of the Indian National Congress, mister
Malikarjun Kargi. And if you look at Prime Minister and
the Raida Modi speaking about mister Kurghai, there is a
(07:38):
great amount of reverence, there's a great amount of friendliness
and acknowledgment of mister Kurgei's track record, which is quite
impressive given that mister Kargai first competed in his elections
and I believe in nineteen seventy two and the first
time he ever lost an election was in twenty ninety,
which is a high track record that compares way with
(08:01):
that of Prime Minister that Indramodi himself. But mister Karki
has never been pitched against mister Modi as any sort
of and as any sort of a challenger.
Speaker 1 (08:14):
So with Raul Ghandhi being a cabinet level well with
the leader of the Opposition being a cabinet level position in India.
Does that mean that in important political deliberations, Raul Ghani
will have a say on the table or is it
more like a ceremonial title that is part of the
cabinet and usually the interactions will happen in the looks
(08:36):
of a.
Speaker 2 (08:39):
I would say that remains to be seen based on
how much the government is willing to share with the
leader of opposition and how much the leader of opposition
is able to consolidate their voice and their authority. Constitutionally, Yes,
there are better more authority positions that ral Ghandi will
(09:00):
now have compared to what he had in previous the
previous ten years. So yes, quite significantly, there would be
a stronger voice from the leader of opposition. But the
leader of opposition does need to come with a message
an objective. It's significantly difficult to say what the message
(09:23):
was pre elections. Pre elections, it seems the Congress's message
was that they are not the BJP, and I don't
know if that message has changed. I don't know where
that message has consolidated, because so far we have not
seen the Congress be the loudest voice on some of
(09:43):
the things that have happened in the country.
Speaker 1 (09:45):
Since the elections, when it comes to Narandrum or the
twenty nineteen and then recently, what are the factors that
make him, let's say, a fixture in the art because
you know, Congress has launched several attempts, spending a lot
of money trying to unsee it Maudi, but then they
(10:08):
have failed. And particularly in addition to the question and
what kept no rather Maudi as a sticky feature in
Indian politics, why has he not succeeded the way he
expected in this election? The first point of what makes
(10:30):
him a fixture is perhaps he's a unique phenomenon of
the Indian Dean, of an Indian hero, of someone emerging
from humble beginnings and gaining the trust of the Indian people.
If you remember a lot of his policies, a lot
(10:52):
of his statements, those resonated with people, and whether it
is during COVID, whether it is during other policy launcher
that he did, there was a faith and there is
rather still a faith that the Indian people collectively put
in Prime Minister Modi. And so since twenty fourteen, even
(11:13):
in twenty nineteen and now in twenty twenty four there
were a good number of seats that the BJP won
because Prime Minister and Arrange Modi, and it's that kind
of a personal connect that people feel. If you look
at one of his small but quite impactful series, which
(11:34):
is the dialogue that he has over the radio nearly
weekly or monthly monkey bath as he calls it, or.
Speaker 2 (11:44):
As it can be translated to a park of the mind,
Talk of the mind. It's indeed, and it's a very
nice coffee chat and it seems like quite a DC
feature where you can have coffee chat with the Prime
Minister on the things that he's dealing with, the things
that he's thinking of. And he's done this and similar
(12:07):
initiatives since before he became the Prime Minister, since he
started campaigning for that position.
Speaker 1 (12:12):
And I think that one similarity between Narendermoli in that
regard and a US president, I think is FDR or
somebody during the Great Depression where he had something called
the fireside chat, where you know, instead of being this
isolated person from the people, the presidency until FDR or
even a few presidents before him, was largely something that
(12:35):
was elite. You know, it was a constitutional office, but
then over time it became a populist position. The US presidency.
I want to hear your thoughts practically in that point,
would you say that even this, the whole monkey bod
phenomenon kind of made the role of Prime Minister a
populist personality based position.
Speaker 2 (12:58):
Yes, and I would add the word accessible to that
if it's not just monkey baths. That's how he started.
Now we also have the NM or the app, which
is an application where you can directly connect, so to say,
with the Prime Minister and his initiatives. That's quite a
(13:19):
unique approach, utilizing digital public infrastructure, utilizing the fact that
hundreds of millions of Indians have come onto the Internet
and have gotten access to the Internet in the last
couple of years. So utilization of technology communication well and
making it a personal connect is very much a thing
(13:41):
and to an extent, sorry cut that to an extent please,
That was the part. And the other thing is it's
been very difficult for the opposition, whether it is the
Congress or whether it is others, to consolidate against Prime Mody.
(14:01):
And overall, just given the nature of politics, with ten
years of a single government running a country of one
four to one point five billion people, there should have
been enough topics there should have been enough time for
the opposition to get their act together. It's quite a
(14:23):
surprising fact that the opposition formed their Indian National Democratic
Inclusive Alliance short shortened to India only a year ago,
which is barely eight or nine months before the elections
that merely fell apart in January twenty twenty four. So
while Prime Minister Mody must get that huge credit for
(14:45):
the connect that he has managed to establish, the trust
that he has managed to build, there is also the
fact that the opposition has struggled to get their act together,
to get on the same message, or to have meaningful
comebacks to Prime Minister Movie's policies. The opposition argument that
(15:07):
they are not BGP, it's not an argument. There needs
to be an alternative vision and I think that alternative
vision was missing, and what Prime Minister Movie had was
a strong vision and a convincing vision.
Speaker 1 (15:22):
Why did Moise results in this election not come up
to the mark? Is it because his attempts to appear
as a moderate alienated some of his base, some of
his supporters from the RSS or was there some other
factor that was ended up with Mody just gaining a
(15:46):
slim majority.
Speaker 2 (15:51):
I think it's a number of factors. The first is
anti incumbency for a government that has run for ten years.
Indian population is smart and if you look at the
voting patterns in India, Indian voters love bucking the trend.
That's one pattern you can know for sure that Indian
(16:13):
voters will not follow that trend. And that is something
that the lead author of the constitution talked about, being
brown Baker. He pioneered that thought where you give voters
that responsibility and they will carry it out. So when
you look at a lot of the voting patterns, especially
in twenty twenty four compared to twenty nineteen, this was
(16:34):
more of a regional election and a local election. If
you look at areas like fazzabadh where you obviously have
Ayodia as a constituent. There it wasn't the national narrative,
but what Areothians were feeling and what Aodians were thinking
(16:55):
That made a difference. And you see that all across India.
You see that all across Indian district constituencies. And that's
a key feature of Indian democracy that the people will
be very difficult to predict. The second one is, along
with that simple anti incumbency, just statistics. Prime Minister Modi
(17:21):
has led a majority government for his entire political career,
and even now he hasn't lost that majority in a
gravely concerning manner. It has reduced significantly to the point
where he is now reliant on his National Democratic Alliance partners.
(17:43):
But as many analysts have pointed out, as the Prime
minister's own party pointed out, it is still a victory.
It is still a strong victory. It's not right to
say that the government is itself in any way slowed
down by this election result. To have to work on
(18:05):
consensus building a lot more than they have. It's going
to be less of an executive level approach. But it's
a victory that has come with that statistical load of
constantly performing higher and higher, and so that's not a
load that that is easy to carry. And so I
(18:26):
don't think overall the government or the BJP specifically is
concerned about where they stand. You can expect that they're
working doubly hard to make a comeback. And whatever internal
discontent there might be within the BJP as you entered
a little bit, I think that was sorted by speeches,
(18:49):
by actions that have come about after the elections, and
most importantly, whether this loss of majority in twenty twenty
four was as impactful as some analysts have said. That
question will be answered in the state elections that are
coming now, especially the Maharasha elections where BJP came out
(19:13):
as the largest party but there wasn't a clear winner
in this six way race, and so state elections coming
up in the next few months will be a key
factor in telling us whether this was a complete movement
against the BJP or was it just a simple statistical correction.
Speaker 1 (19:36):
About Modi's relationship with RSS. You know, usually people tend
to conflate the BJP with the RSS, but then it
appears to observers that over the years, Modi has has
tried to distance himself from some of the extreme Hindutwa
forces in his own party and also with the RSAs.
(19:57):
So what would you say is Modi's were relationship with
the RSS and also the Hindud per movement. And I'm
not talking about the bureaucratic relationship, but also the informal
the bit of the relationship between Modi and the Hindud
Movement and the RSS pervement.
Speaker 2 (20:16):
Both of these are extremely large organizations they have had connections,
and many have regarded the BJP as the Rashi symcax
Sung's political wing. While there is some truth to that,
the BGP has and will continue to act on its
own as a political party. When you're a political party
(20:39):
versus an ideological organization, there are different expectations of you
when you're as an ideological organization. The RSS brands itself
more focused on the social issues, the political issues and
raising these issues up to the political level, and the
BGP as a political party brands itself as executed these policies,
(21:02):
not necessarily what artists is seeing, but bringing out policies economic, social,
what have you. So there is certainly a connection there,
There used to be connections there. Artists artist's swimcvics have
most certainly campaigned more in favor of BJB politicians than
(21:27):
anyone else. But you can't say that both of these
are the same organization or that they are completely integrated.
Speaker 1 (21:38):
The phenomena of Narandra Modi. How transformative has Modi been
in India's domestic and foreign policy? In what ways you'd
say Modi departed from the traditional Indian foreign policy consensus
and what ways you'd say he remained committed to the
traditional non alignment consensus.
Speaker 2 (22:03):
Interestingly, this is something I was working on right before
the elections enjured and I've come across a lot of
biases about India and its foreign policy and a few
misunderstandings as well. Here's what is interesting. First, Prime Minister
Mode has impressed upon the Indian public the idea of
(22:27):
foreign policy and of India's role in foreign policy. So
Indians in diaspora are generally more positive about India's foreign policy,
as surveys have shown time and again, So he has
given that voice. Secondly, this voice is where the non
(22:47):
alignment transforms from strategic autonomy and builds into all alignment.
As even the Foreign Minister, as Jack Shanka has spoken about,
it switches from being an ideologic policy of non alignment
to an issue based policy of all alignment. And Indian
(23:10):
leadership is explaining this very clearly. And if it sounds
like an extremely practical or rational position, I would say
it is because as the Foreign Minister especially has voiced clearly,
and I think the last he did that was or
the big one of the biggest stages he did that
on was for the Unit Security Conference, where he pointed
(23:31):
out that the Indian government is responsible for eighteen percent
of the world's population and for the next few decades,
India will continue to be home to eighteen percent of
the world's population. So compare that to any other set
of eighteen percent of the population, especially democratic, there aren't
(23:51):
any comparison. The entirety of Europe is perhaps a comparison,
even though it is much smaller in population than India
and slightly bigger in size, But if you were to
think of Europe itself, it does not take any sides.
So it's a in a sense, a simple rational position
(24:12):
that the Prime Minister has taken in the last ten years,
and that we'll see him taking further and more assertively
in the coming few years. That they are interested in issues,
aligning on issues that matter because they recognize that eighteen
percent of the world's population, they are of their voice,
(24:32):
and that eighteen percent of the world's population would be
responsible for this kind of an issue.
Speaker 1 (24:40):
And with regards to foreign policy, for long in India,
foreign policy was something that was relegated to the bureaucrats.
It wasn't really much of a from my perspective, a
electoral issue. People weren't concerned about foreign policy as much
as in intellectuals or bureaucrats were. Would you say that
(25:02):
has changed over the recent years, as you know, the
incomes of the average Indian and the education level of
the average Indian has gone up, and Indians are traveling
abroad at a rate higher than before. Would you say
foreign policy is slowly gaining a foothold in the political
(25:23):
considerations of the Indian voter.
Speaker 2 (25:30):
I think on a larger level that correlation does make sense.
But we should note that the difference between electoral issues
and policy consistency. Foreign policy was actively guided and led
(25:51):
by Indian politicians. I don't think it's fair to say
that it's just the bureaucrats and the Foreign service who
were guiding it. I think politicians were actively involved. But
that's where the electoral difference comes in. That it wasn't
an electoral issue because to their credit, Indian political parties
have good alignment on foreign policy issues. They stand behind
(26:15):
each other. In the nineteen nineties, then Prime Minister Nelsamraus
sent the leader of opposition out, will be a rewatch
by to represent the country. Now, I don't think we'll
see that happening in the next five years. But you
still do see that kind of an agreement on foreign
(26:38):
policy in India's electoral process. In India's foreign policy process,
there is a good cohesion and that's something that makes
India's larger foreign policy highly reliable. And certainly it has
continued with the bureaucrats doing a good job, but politicians
(26:59):
have been act Prime Minister Manman Singh himself staked his
government on the nuclear deal with the United States, and
Prime Minister Modi has been an active leader on foreign
policy with help from enabled minister like Shushman Savaraj before
and now a seasoned bureaucrat who has become a politician
(27:23):
himself Foreign Minister as Jashanka.
Speaker 1 (27:28):
In one way is Many analysts have said Modi departed
from the traditional Indian consensus has been on his approachment
with Israel. What would you say explains India's change in
approach where it start to appear more neutral, but then
over the years it has been more open, let's say,
(27:52):
in open in courting Israel, going away from being shy
about openly expressing you know, strong time with Israel. Why
has this change occurred and is it the sort of
departure that many analysts make it to be, or we
still see some continuity in India's relationship with Israel and
(28:14):
the Israel Palestinian conflict.
Speaker 2 (28:21):
India's position has always been that there should be a
two state solution to the Israel Palestine conflict. I think
that that hasn't changed. India's reiterated that since last year
and especially the events on quoting Israel. India's main thing,
as we've discussed before, is all alignment based on issues.
(28:47):
So I don't think this is actually, let me not
do the negative if you think about it, India's foreign
policy has been guided why all alignment based on issues.
So the India Middle East Economic Corridor, where Israel plays
a major role in, that's not an ideological thing that
(29:12):
brings in an extremely diverse group of countries that goes
from India all the way to Europe and is an
economic corridor. You bring in the quad, you bring in
all of the other groupings that India has become an
active part of, and the kind of policy that it
has pursued, it's a policy of consensus, solutions and inclusivity.
(29:37):
So I think that is what it has pioneered here
and as Foreign Minister. As Joe Shunkar has stated time
and again, India is allowed as a sovereign nation to
have its own separate position that does not align with
anyone else, because that is the nature of being a
sovereign democratic republic. And India has spoken and out against
(30:02):
and India has spoken out against and for different issues.
But again it has spoken for issues. It has not
spoken for ideologies that you're saying, yes, I will highlight sure.
One of the things that India does well is communication
(30:24):
on its foreign policy, and I think it's getting better
by the day. One of the things that India ought
to be bringing up in these kinds of global discussions
is its own experience where India has been a home
to all religions for centuries, even millennia, and especially if
(30:49):
you look at India after twenty six November two thousand
and eight, when one of the biggest terrorist attacks in
India happened. I don't know if it is the exact biggest,
but it shook the entire country. It went on for
a few days and nations were ready for war to
break out. The Indian military was on a high alert,
(31:11):
the Pakistani military was a high alert, and Russia, China
and the United States were on a high alert. The
European Union was watching this quite closely. And the policies
and the response that India adopted was that of restrained
and was a very typical and signature Indian move where
(31:36):
there was a restrain and you see that not just
in Prime Minister but moren Singh's response, but in Prime Minister.
More these foreign policy as well when it comes to Pakistan,
where the response to Pakistan since two thousand and eight
has been quite effective and impactful. Pakistan finds itself a
(31:56):
significant Paraiya state because of India's initiative zen because of
India's actions, and the security situation, especially when it comes
to terrorism in India, has improved exponentially in India.
Speaker 1 (32:14):
Before we move on to China and India's immediate neighborhood,
I want to address the issue of Pakistan. So for
a long aspiring peace activists from both sides have hoped
for a normalization between India and Pakistan, especially as you know,
the new generations come, generations that have forgotten the painful
(32:39):
experiences of the partition. How likely would you say, not
just with Modi, but in the next few years or
in the next few decades, we could see a normalization
of relations between India and Pakistan. What barriers would you
say are exist in that process and are there any
(33:00):
moves that you have observed towards normalization between the two
countries in that regard.
Speaker 2 (33:08):
I think India regards that the ball is in Pakistan's
core firstly, and secondly, I don't think the Indian government
is actively considering this anymore, because it's the de hyphenation
of India Pakistan just globally when it comes to the
US speaking about South Asia and even China speaking about
(33:32):
South Asian, everyone else thinking of South Asian in general.
That applies to even India thinking of its issues. So
that de hyphenation has taken place strongly, and it's not
in India's immediate interest to start that approachment with Pakistan
(33:53):
while Pakistan has not agreed to some of the terms
that India has been laying out, and so I don't
know if there's a timeline, but I know that India
doesn't need to have that timeline. Makes sense, makes sense.
Speaker 1 (34:11):
So early on during Modi's premiership, Modi championed and ACTIAST policy,
which was a successor to former Prime Minister narsam A
Rau's Look East policy. This entailed Modi courting Xi Jinping briefly,
whether it was through inviting China for infrastructure projects in India,
taking selties with Chinese officials and so on. But then
(34:34):
over the years, why would you say India's relations with
China take and why has India's relations with China taken
a dramatic turn in this decade? What were the tipping
points you noticed during your research about South Asia in
the India China relationship, And also beyond the obvious things
(34:58):
like the border disputes, what would you say were the
actors that kind of brought a divorce between Maudi and
his act's policy and even approachment with see Jim Pain.
Speaker 2 (35:15):
I think perhaps the best explanation of this comes from
former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador Vijaigoklay, who explained that in
his experience, Chinese foreign policy or Chinese statements on India
are based more on perception than communication with Indian officials
(35:38):
or with Indian counterparts in general, and you see that
perception playing out a lot when you see statements. I
won't go into those because they are quite traumatic memories
in general to highlight, but if you look at some
(35:58):
of the statements that were coming from Chinese officials when
India was going through one of its biggest COVID waves,
for example, those kinds of stereotypes, those kinds of biases,
those kinds of statements are just a small example of
how Chinese foreign policy itself comes from perceptions of India
(36:22):
rather than statements and tried and tested communication diplomatic methods
with India. As a small example, and I hope sorry,
as a small example, China did not have an ambassador
to India for eighteen months. The ambassador to India came
(36:44):
this year a few months ago and he just completed
his one hundred days ambassador's shoe Fey Hoong and not
having China not having an ambassador to India for eighteen
months is a big deal. And so that methodology of
(37:09):
just going by perception is a huge thing. And it's
combined with this lack of communication where you do not
have China reciprocating or responding to Indian communication directly. And
I don't mean one on one meetings, I just mean
in general China being subtle, if that makes sense, rather
(37:33):
than tackling India head on with communication, because the idea
there is that India is a catalytic factor that in
whatever India does is a factor of what the United
States wants, and until China is able to give that
(37:53):
reciprocal respect that India is making its decisions, India's making
its policies on its own as a sovereign nation and
not in not in step with the United States. China
is not going to let go of that perception based policy.
(38:15):
And it's I believe India is trying, and India will
continue to try, as it does in every foreign policy platform,
but it's that perception from China, that lack of communication
and this connection or this idea that India is only
(38:38):
a factor based on what the US wants, that all
of which hamper and give us. What is now.
Speaker 1 (38:48):
About the relationship with China and its future under Moli's term.
How will you assess India's relationship with China and how
will it change after Moi's third term in the next
few decades now, Optimists of the Quad and the Indo
Pacific Pivot in the United States often overestimate India's commitment
(39:12):
to this sort of broad based alliance ideological alliance against India,
when Indian officials have been hesitant to commit to any
ideological alliance against China. And also over the years, like
the like, like the how the US shifted from seeing
(39:35):
Russia as the main enemy to the Soviet Union as
the main foe, to seeing China as the same foe.
Arguably India too has shifted from seeing Pakistan as the
main foe but more as a spoiler now and then
focusing on China as the main rival. But with this
in mind, how would you say India India's relationship which
(40:00):
will evolve over the years. Will India eventually join the
ideological block and commit to grant scheme of things like
defending Taiwan? Or will India try to negotiate away it's agreement,
will try at least to negotiate away its issues with
(40:23):
China and sort of retreat back to the comfort of
staying disentangled from these ideological blocks. First, again, I don't
think India will engage. India's foreign policy is based on ideology.
(40:46):
If you look at perhaps the US foreign policy, the
brand is democracy of that ideology. China's brand was economic
support without questions on ideology, India's brand is issues. So
for example, during the height of the COVID pandemic, India
(41:07):
was lobbying for sharing vaccines. Not only did it have
the largest production of vaccines, but it was lobbying for
vaccines to be shared widely, the technology to be shared widely.
And it's done a similar thing with its base research organization,
the Indians Based Research Organization AZRO has made a collaborative
(41:29):
effort around the world and even on conflicts going on
in the world. India speaks about the issues, not the ideology.
So I think you'll see something similar here as well,
where India will have that assertive outreach based on its
issues based foreign policy and based on that foreign policy
(41:50):
of all alignment. And India has done that well of
post independence. That has been a policy of communication and
it if China or the US or anyone else would
to think of India's foreign policy, undeniably a big thing
would be consistency. That India's foreign policy is reliable and consistent.
(42:16):
And if you look at the diplomatic blitz that Prime
Minister mode has been on in the last ten years,
it has been a successful diplomatic blitz that capped off
a successful g twenty last year and this year he's
already been to Russia once he's about to head to Ukraine.
And as we speak, the Defense Minister Rajhna Singh is
(42:39):
in the United States Foreign Minister as Jerry Shunker was
in Maldives just a few days ago. And so that
diplomatic blitz will continue and India will continue being consistent.
I think if China does not listen to that, that's
(43:00):
on China. But India has given globally that signal of
Vishua Mitra or global friend as their platform is, and.
Speaker 2 (43:14):
That's what it is. It has worked well for India.
So we can absolutely expect more of that and more
of that assertively. Egan.
Speaker 1 (43:23):
Coming to our last second question, Maldives elected an anti
India president or a president that is viewed by media
as being anti India. Sri Lanka frequently courts China, allowing
Chinese by ships to doken its ports and fund its
infrastructure in areas that are very close to the Indian coast.
(43:46):
Bangladesh has deposed an India friendly president for long. India
has tried to manage a non aligned, anti imperialist approach
to its neighborhood preferring to avoid a big stick approach.
Do you think that UNDERMOA these third term or the future,
(44:06):
we'll see India willing to take on a big stick
interventionist approach in its neighborhood to prevent neighbors from falling
too much into China's camp, not ideologically, but from a
strategic point of view, from allowing China too much of
military and strategic assets in India's neighborhood. Will India try
(44:30):
to stop that using perative measures? And what would you
say would be India's red lines before India decides to
go on a big stick approach where it aggressively intervenes
for strategic and not ideological interests.
Speaker 2 (44:44):
Of course, I think we've partially answered this question already,
and let's begin with highlighting something that you highlighted in
this question, that of the tough neighborhood. And the thing
is India has always been in a tough neighborhood. It's
not like this neighborhood has become what it has in
(45:08):
only the last couple of years. Since nineteen forty seven,
So we ought to acknowledge that India has been a
reliable democratic country since its independence in a neighborhood that
doesn't have the best track record. So India has done
very well domestically and so as such it has done
(45:31):
that in its foreign policy as well, especially the principle
of sovereignty which I highlighted before, that every nation has
the right to make its own decisions. And so the
Indian response comes in on the point of how the
nation's actions affect India and its people. So where the
(45:52):
US has struggled with balancing its partnerships with countries that
are undemocratic, because the US brand is ideology. China's brand
was economic support without questions on ideology. India's issues based
ideas come in again because if you look at this
as I wouldn't say anti imperialists, I would say democratic partnership.
(46:15):
It's more about cooperation.
Speaker 1 (46:16):
Over core.
Speaker 2 (46:19):
Is elected the president and he asked for the Indian
military to go out of mal Live's. It was not
a military issue, it was a non issue. These soldiers
were there to maintain helicopters that the Indian government, the
(46:43):
Indian military had given to their Maldivian counterparts. Sri Lanka
was similarly pushed to the brink by China and had
to recommunicate with India, had to rely on India for
its supports. So neighbors see what happens to those who
get close to China on their own and that's the
(47:03):
basic idea of India's sovereignty principle, that you see what
is happening to you and so you make that decision.
You see that around the world in all of India's partnerships.
You see that in the race that China and India
have in Africa and their partnerships there as well. So
will you see that shut as well. It's always been
(47:27):
a tough neighborhood, but you will continue to see that
strategy of going for cooperation not core.
Speaker 1 (47:37):
And coming to our last question, if you were to
lay down six main themes that we will see in
Modi's next term where Modi will have the most influence in,
what will these six main themes be.
Speaker 2 (47:56):
I think the first three are quite apparent. Jobs. Jobs, jobs.
If you look at the vacancies that the government has
in government positions themselves, that's a very high number. And
fixing that, fixing overall the job market will be a
(48:21):
high priority for this government and certainly something that they
want to have an impact on jobs were a key
factor in this election. And just as a statistic, for example,
it's not just jobs, it's quality jobs because as a statistic,
(48:45):
you can be in the top ten percent of the
Indian income category by earning about twenty five thousand dollars
twenty five thousand rupees a month, which translates to about
three hundred dollars not long so increasing that it's going
to be as a larger economy, it's going to be huge,
(49:08):
no doubt. But it's through the creation of jobs that
you will see the per capita income rise exponentially in India.
And connected to that would be then let's say the
fourth thing, which would be programs for employment guarantees, skilling,
(49:29):
credit to small enterprises. India has done welfare schemes well.
Prime Minster Mody has expanded on these welfare schemes and
has had success with them. So expect that to expand
energy and particularly clean energy investments and rise in general
in energy investments and energy innovation, growing India's global profile.
(49:55):
And this is where the concept of Vishwamitra comes in.
A Friend of the World or as Atlantic Council's Presidentency
of Fred Kemp has opined, this is where the global
India influence comes in, because when you're representing eighteen percent
of the world, you can't just look InWorld. You have
(50:18):
to have a voice and that's where the Indian people
will rely on Prime Minister Modi to be that voice.
And so far on the international stage he has done
that diplomatic blitz and has shown his capacity to do
that in the last ten years. So in this term,
that idea of Vishwamitra, that idea of global India where
(50:43):
both the President and cy of Atlantic Council Fred Kemp
and the Foreign Minister ci to I will absolutely reach
new heights.
Speaker 1 (50:54):
Ladies and gentlemen, you just listen to South Asia analysts
Rujen Palkar of Atlantic Counts stroudent Paulkar, thank you very
much for your time and insight.
Speaker 2 (51:05):
Thank you so much, Brander.
Speaker 3 (51:06):
Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose is an initiative of Andrew
Jose Media. The views expressed by guests on this show
do not necessarily represent the official positions and opinions of
Andrew Jose, Andrew Jose Media and Strategic Wisdom.
Speaker 4 (51:21):
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