Ep. #131 – Breaking Down the IG’s Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding UAP/UFOs

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), led by Inspector General Robert P. Storch, has released an unclassified summary of a previously classified report titled “Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP).” This disclosure follows a full version of the classified report issued on August 15, 2023. This video is a deep dive and history of that report.

The post Ep. #131 – Breaking Down the IG’s Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding UAP/UFOs first appeared on The Black Vault.

Episode Transcript

John Greenewald (00:09):
Did you miss it? The DoD Inspector General
Office released their reportsummarizing what they called
their evaluation into how theDOD has handled the UAP issue.
But what, if anything, can welearn? Well, to my surprise, a

(00:30):
lot more than you might think,let's explore the highs, and the
lows, and everything in between.Join me, John Greenwald, Jr, as
we take a deep dive into what wecan all take away. So stay
tuned, you're about to journeyinside the black vault.

(01:17):
That's right, everybody. Asalways, thank you so much for
tuning in and taking thisjourney inside the black vault
with me. I'm your host, JohnGreenewald, Jr, founder, creator
of the black vault.com. Andtoday, we're taking a deep dive
into that new DoD inspectorgeneral report that summarizes
their what they call evaluationinto how the DoD handled the UAP

(01:41):
issue. Now, there was very, verylittle known about this, and I
tried through FOIA to get more,we got a little bit of a
glimpse, I'm gonna go throughsome of those documents to give
you a little bit better of abackground. But then go over the
report itself. I know deep divesare not for everybody. So after
the live version of this, I'mgonna put channel markers so
that way, if you want to skiparound, you can do so. Because

(02:04):
again, a lot of detail is notfor everybody. But in this
instance, it's absolutelyworthwhile to take a little bit
of extra time to trulyunderstand this. So let's just
go ahead and get get into ithere. Let me go ahead and pull
up the PowerPoint presentation.I've got a bunch of slides to go
over with you. So let's just goahead and dive in. If you missed

(02:28):
it, here is the cover page ofthe report that was was released
on January 24 2024, titledunclassified summary of Report
Number DoD IG Dash 2023 Dash 109evaluation of the DoD actions
regarding unidentified anomalousphenomena, August 15 2023. Now,

(02:52):
what's the date differencethere? August 15 2023, was when
they finally came out and saidthat they finished their
evaluation, which was firststarted in May of 2021. That
classified report that came outin August of last year. But we
we the people had to wait untila unclassified version or

(03:15):
summary, if you will, of thosefindings came out. So that's
what we're gonna go over. Now,just so you're aware, in August,
the moment that this wasannounced, I went after that
through what's called amandatory declassification
review, or MDR, that essentiallymandates them to review that
classified product and hopefullyin hopes that will get some type

(03:37):
of release, whether or notthat's going to happen. Your
guess is as good as mine. Butlet's before we dive into that
report, let's get a little bitof history, in case you guys
have not followed this. Don'tknow what I'm talking about.
Let's go ahead and take a lookat this. May 3 2021 was when we
all found out about it. Andagain, when I say all the

(03:58):
general public, this wassomething that was announced on
the website. This was somethingthat the DoD IG talked about
openly but details were verythin about what exactly it was
that they were doing. You cansee from this memo dated May
3 2021. Evaluation of DODactions regarding the

(04:20):
unidentified aerial phenomenaand then it gives a long project
number we plan to begin thesubject evaluation in May 2021.
The objective of this evaluationis to determine the extent to
which the DOD has taken actionsregarding unidentified aerial
phenomena or UAP. We may revisethe objective as the evaluation

(04:42):
proceeds and we will considersuggestions for management for
additional or revised objectionsobject objectives, excuse me.
So, in other words, there wasnot a whole lot known there
really wasn't. And this was it.This was all we were allowed to
to essentially understand aboutit. And when this was announced,

(05:04):
I immediately started goingafter records. And I've, as I've
already mentioned, we'll getinto some of those that came
out. But looking at the originalannouncement, very, very little
was known about it. This was thedistribution of this memo. So
this memo essentially instructedthem, hey, we need some liaisons

(05:25):
from your agencies for thisevaluation. That way we can take
a look at the UAP Issue. Issue,you know, essentially how the IG
works is they'll evaluate theissue, and then submit some
recommendations or whatevertheir findings are, and go from
there. So they needed thoseliaisons that were connected to
those agencies. And here's alist of those agencies. I won't

(05:48):
go over all of them. Everythingis linked in the show notes
below. So you can follow alongwith me with the documents or
take your time and read it morein detail at your leisure. But
you can see here, CENTCOM was onthere North calm, Special
Operations Command, DARPA, diaDTRA, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, MissileDefense Agency, the NSA, the

(06:11):
NRO, the Army, the Navy, the AirForce, so essentially, they were
going across the gamut on whothey wanted to speak with during
the course of their evaluation.Again, what did that evaluation
entail other than what was inthe memo? Well, I tried shortly
after that memo was issued tocontact the IGs office at the

(06:31):
DOD, and say that I was coveringthe topic which I was not only
on this YouTube channel, but buton my website, the black
vault.com as well, trying toinform all of you what is going
on, because there was a lot ofrumors at this time to one of
the one of which being that theywere evaluating how they were

(06:51):
treating Luis Elizondo. As timewent on, it was known that he
submitted a inspector generalcomplaint. So some people
believe that this was part ofthat. So what was it so I
reached out to them. And as youcan see here, the DOD does not
have any additional informationto offer, beyond what is
published on our projectannouncement that gives the big
old long address. And here wasthe announcement page. I already

(07:15):
read to you, very briefly thememo. But this is where you
could download that memo. Yousee down here, the related
documents. That number here isfor that that memorandum that I
went over, but essentially, itwas the same very scant detail
announcement where they say weplan to begin the subject in May
of 2021. The objective is theevaluation to determine the

(07:39):
extent to which the DOD hastaken actions regarding
unidentified aerial phenomenaUAP, the exact same wording. So
there was absolutely nothinghelpful of trying to figure out
what this was. So that's when Istarted hammering through FOIA.
Later that year, in 2021, I wasable to get out some documents
that shed not much, but a littlebit more light on it now going

(08:00):
over this, not only for thehistory, but to show you guys,
this is how you piece togetherthe puzzle, and try and figure
out and unfold what they'redoing behind the scenes. Because
as I got the response from theIG, a little bit more again
unfolded where they declassifieda

(08:22):
PowerPoint presentation thattalked about the evaluation. Now
I say declassified actuallywasn't classified it was CUI or
controlled unclassifiedinformation. But essentially,
you know, has to go through areview process, not everything
is able to be released to thepublic. So you still have that
review process. The FOIA yieldedit. There's a video on this

(08:44):
channel if you want to go aheadand see even more of what was
revealed. But I'm just going toshow you a couple key points.
This was that cover of thePowerPoint presentation, you can
see that it was made in June of2021, only took them about a
month to create thispresentation. Not exactly known.
Exactly what for it was exactlywhat it was for. But rather it

(09:09):
gave a little bit more detail onthis evaluation. You can see
here by this slide theevaluation process it this was
the little more light I wastalking about, on what they were
going to do. They were going tobe doing data requests,
interviews, site visits,documentation, review and
analysis during theirevaluation, fieldwork, so

(09:29):
doesn't really tell us much, butat least it tells us that they
were going to be activelylooking into things,
interviewing people and so on.They were going to create a
draft report to where they weregoing to have official
management, look at it, haveabout a month to review it,
submit comments, so on and soforth. The final response, same
deal, they were going to makesure that everybody had their

(09:51):
two cents in there. So it justgave a little bit of an idea of
how it was going to unfold. Theother thing that was fairly
interesting about this was thelist of people that were
involved in this evaluation fromthe IGs office, the majority of
them were redacted. Now, that'snot too uncommon. A lot of times

(10:13):
these agencies will redact forprivacy reasons, people that
work for their agency or thatare involved in projects. Why?
Well, we're seeing a little bitof a glimpse of it. Now, if
you're paying attention toNASA's different meetings and
broadcasts that they've talkedabout their UFO personnel that
were studying these phenomenafor the depth for that agency,

(10:34):
and were subjected to quite abit of harassment from the
general public. Dr. ShawnKirkpatrick has come out, he was
talking about harassment fromthe general public, to him in
his office, and even his family.Apparently, somebody showed up
at his house and was arrested, Iguess they got federal
authorities involved. So there'sa lot of reason to cover up. But

(10:57):
I don't mean that in a negativeway, but to cover up and redact
those types of names, you didhave a couple though Randolph
stone, he was the one that thatsigned the original memo. So
when you have more publicfigures, that's when you more
get a glimpse, Michael Ruark,the Deputy Inspector General for
evaluations, his name was onthere, again, obviously much

(11:18):
more public name. And then stonewas the Assistant Inspector
General for space, intelligence,engineering, and oversight. Now,
even though these names herewere all redacted, you can at
least see where they came from,again, shedding that little more
light space missile and nucleardivision, sensitive activities,
division, intelligence,division, research and
engineering division, and thenall these project managers and

(11:39):
evaluators and an auditor inthere as well. So you get an
idea of how big the team was,where they were coming from, and
again, just those differenttypes of offices that they were
coming from. So that was alittle bit of a help, before
this report came out to see howit was going on behind the

(12:00):
scenes. Now, fast forward toAugust of 2023. You can see here
on the website, this was apublic posting of the classified
report from that evaluation. SoSo we've gone over the 2021
material, but it probably butbut you know, there was
absolutely nothing else untilAugust 15 2023, when they

(12:25):
announced that the classifiedreport was done. But it was just
done. That was it, we didn't getto see it. And we didn't get to
understand anything about whatthey found, what they concluded
what they recommended, what theywanted to do next. Nothing,
nothing was given to the generalpublic. All we were told was
that at a later date, aunclassified report would come

(12:48):
out. Now, as I've alreadymentioned, I'm going after that
classified report, some of youmay say, Hey, that's a big fat
chance, there's no way you'regonna get that. Well, I've
gotten the previous one of anyway the classified UA UAP
reports submitted to Congress,although it was partially
released, it still spoke volumesabout the classified level of

(13:10):
what they were talking about.Same here, I hope to have the
same luck. And there's othercases as well, which will
probably have very similaroutcomes where he won't see
everything, but you'll start toget a better understanding of
what's in that classifiedversion. So now, last week, now
we're caught up. Now thatunclassified version came out.

(13:31):
And we get a idea about theevaluation, what they did, what
they talked about, and what theyrecommended for the Department
of Defense. So let's get backinto that report. Again, this is
the cover page, all linked inthe show show notes below. So
you have it this to theclassified version of the

(13:52):
evaluation, or excuse me, aclassified version of the
evaluation of the DoD is actionsregarding unidentified anomalous
phenomena form the basis of thisunclassified summary. So just
pointing out a punching thenote, this takes from that
classified version, and puts onthere, essentially, the, the
shield, if you will, for theclassified information softens

(14:15):
everything makes it a lot lessinteresting and boring. And
that's why it's unclassified.I'm not going to read the whole
report to you, it's not reallylong. But for the sake of time
here, we're just going to kindof focus in on the most
important parts, but the waythat it did start was a
historical background. And itgives you all the way back to
the 1940s of how the USgovernment collected UFO

(14:38):
information looked into casefiles, talked about Project
Bluebook and then theythemselves fast forwarded into
the year 2000. That's what I'mgoing to zoom in on because I
know that this created quite afirestorm when it first came out
a lot of our has a lot of I toldyou so and all of that good
stuff. Specifically, peoplereally honed in on this Hi lated

(15:00):
portion. The DoD did notofficially look at UAP again
until mid 2000. When selectmembers of Congress initiated
and funded a program to studyUAP called the advanced
aerospace Weapon SystemApplications Program, or all
SAP, as many of you have heardit referred to, well look, this

(15:21):
yet adds another muddy layer ona already very muddy and
convoluted story. I havefollowed this since day one
since October of 2017. When welearned of what what Luis
Elizondo called a aerial threatResearch Program, never said a

(15:42):
tip never said OS app, andrather just more talked about
aerial threats. So I've followedit since then, and have tried to
unravel the mystery. It wasn'ttill the next year that we
learned about this offsetprogram. And as we continued to
dig, then we realized thatDecember 2017, New York Times

(16:05):
article was wrong in a lot ofareas. And don't take my word
for that. You know, I'm nottrying to take a shot at them,
but rather take the director ofoffset that's not disputed. Dr.
James McCaskey from the DIA takehis word for it, that he
published a book and in there,I'm paraphrasing this part. But
essentially, he said I'm here toset the record straight. So he

(16:28):
said that the New York Times wasnot accurate when they portrayed
what they had labeled a tip. Butin reality that $22 million went
to OS app. Well, here's where itgets even kind of more muddy is
that the government has deniedthat OS app, which was nicknamed
a tip nine unless you listen toLuis Elizondo, and he says it

(16:49):
was a program but regardless,because it gets really, really
bad when it comes to theconfusion. But back to the
government, they say no, thesewere not UFO research programs.
But what a lot of people forgetis the government finally
amended their statement andstance. This was an article I
published in 2021, thegovernment made kind of a

(17:12):
cobbled together but much largerstatement about a tip. Now why
is that messy? Well, they'rereally calling it. They're
calling it a tip, but really, itwas all SAP. And that's just by
their own documentation. Butregardless, they gave this
longer statement of the A tipprogram, and

(17:35):
essentially said that theyutilized some UAP material for
OS app, but it was not a UAPresearch program. Rather, it was
aimed to investigate foreignadvanced aerospace weapon system
applications with futuretechnology progress projections
over the next 40 years. And tocreate a center of expertise for

(17:58):
advanced aerospace technologies.The goal was to help understand
the threat posed byunconventional or leap ahead
aerospace vehicles andtechnologies that could have
national security implicationsfor the United States. It goes
into much more details. But downhere is obviously kind of like
that, I would say one at alittle bit, where they kept

(18:19):
saying no, it did not deal withUAP. And then all of a sudden,
they say in developing thereports and exploring how to
create a center of expertise.The contract allowed for
research drawn from a widevariety of sources, including
reports of UAPs. However, theexamination of UAP observations
was not the purpose of a tip.Now again, kind of confusing,

(18:44):
but this is something that theywere referring to as a tip, but
in reality was more so awesome.Now, this was submitted in 2021.
But even as early as last year,in 2023, The New York Post's
specifically Stephen GreenStreet, got more statements in
detail from the Pentagon on allof these issues. And

(19:06):
essentially, they reinforcedthat these types of programs off
SAP, a tip were not UFO or UAP.specifics. So this seems to be
the current stance of theDepartment of Defense in the
Pentagon. So where did thatthing go arrive in this new
report? Or is it arrived?Meaning is it now accurate that

(19:27):
these were created for UAPresearch purposes? We only know
what has come out thus far. Soin addition to this report, I
went over the PowerPointpresentation. Well, in other
FOIA requests, I was able todetermine that during the course
of this evaluation, they spokewith Luis Elizondo, and they

(19:48):
spoke with David grush, both ofwhich were connected to the
evaluation. So how much did theydig? Did they listen to these
guys and formulate that sectionof The report based on the
testimony there and just notfact, check it beyond. Is this
the absolute gospel? I don'tknow, I don't know the answer to
that. All we know is thismaterial came out, and we know

(20:13):
who they spoke with. So Ireached out to the Inspector
General's office again, tried tofigure out the answer to that
stated that the officialPentagon stance has been X, why
are you guys stating why? Theytold me that they are working on
that, but by the recording ofthis, they have not given me any
answer whatsoever. And I'vetried to follow up a couple

(20:35):
times. It's why it took menearly a week or so to record
this video piece. Because Ican't I can't get an answer. And
I wanted to get an answer foryou guys. Regardless of what the
answer is, I'll bring it to you,and I'll report it. But it's
just so weird, right? It doesn'tmatter what you believe you
could think that it was a UFOresearch programming, you think
it wasn't? It doesn't matter. Weshould all agree on how

(20:58):
absolutely horrible thegovernment has been describing
these programs. Why is that?What, what's wrong with it? And
whose fault is that? Ifanybody's why are we getting
mixed messages? I don't have ananswer for you on that. But it
is fascinating to see unfold,because here we are years after

(21:19):
we first heard the acronymative, and they still can't keep
their story straight. Who knowswhat's right or wrong. But we
can't keep our stories straighthere on the side of the
government. And and that'sabsolutely ridiculous. It
really, truly is. So hopefully,somebody will add clarity and
maybe I can do an update videoto this. But as of now,

(21:40):
absolutely nothing has beenclarified. I also wrote to Susan
Goff in the Pentagon, but butalso the IGs office and their
media affairs and said, Hey, youguys are completely
contradicting each other. Canyou please tell me what's going
on? And well, nothing yet. Soback to the report. We have this

(22:01):
section here chapter six, title10. United States Code
establishes the authorities ofcombatant commanders who are
responsible for detecting,deterring, and preventing
threats and attacks against theUS and its territories,
possessions and bases. After areview of the laws, policies and
guidance issued by Congress, theDOD and other federal agencies,

(22:23):
we determined that while theservices and components have an
important role to play, thecombatant commands would be the
logical organizations to detect,report, collect and identify UAP
incidents to arrow, it was kindof an interesting thing to put
into this report, to note thatthe combatant commands would be
kind of at the forefront ofthis, because maybe they aren't,

(22:47):
maybe they haven't submittedthat. And it's kind of
interesting that, for example,some of these commands are where
the UAP material has leaked fromespecially the Middle East
material over Baghdad or overMissoula. So we're obviously
talking about a very interestingpoint on top of that's where the

(23:07):
leaks are coming from. So notreally sure if there's a
correlation there. But it shouldbe interesting to note, but if
you're not familiar with thecombatant commands, here they
are, here's a list of them,including Africa Command,
CENTCOM, Cyber Command, SpaceCommand, Strategic Command, full
list is on your screen there. Sothat's, that's an idea of, of
maybe where they're going withthis, that maybe it's the war

(23:30):
zones, the active militarypresences that really are the
ones that are driving a lot ofthese sightings. Obviously,
that's been their focus fromwhat we've been told. But it
sounds like that they want alittle bit more coordination out
there with their commands, inthe introduction part give a
little bit more detail on theobjective, not much. The
objective of this evaluation wasto determine the extent to which

(23:53):
the DoD military services,defense agencies and military
department counter intelligentcounter intelligence
organizations took intelligence,counterintelligence and force
protection actions to detect,report, collect, analyze, and
identify UAP. Not a whole lotdifferent than then the very,
very, I would say, briefobjectives that they originally

(24:19):
published. But it shows you thatthey really didn't update their
objectives. They did note in thepast, especially in that
original memo, they may actuallyupdate. It's clear they didn't
they were just looking at howthe DoD was handling the UAP
issue. Now, one thing and thisis primarily for all my FOIA
people out there that you'rekind of exploring documents,

(24:41):
these are the best things tolook for. And generally, they're
in finer print, buried at thebottom of the pages. These are
the citations. It gives, in somecases, gives FOIA fodder,
meaning stuff to go after, orstart Just to paint pictures
about things that we didn't knowa whole lot or and all about

(25:04):
prior, for example, some of thecitations in the beginning of
the report, look at thisclassified annex to the Senate
Armed Services Committee reporton the fiscal fiscal year 2020
NDAA. enclosure two entitledadvanced operational
capabilities, collection,exploitation, and research.
That's from July of 2019.Another citation references the

(25:28):
same document, but enclosure 13unidentified aerial phenomena,
that would be an excuse me, notthe same report. Exactly. But
same report, but that one forfiscal year 2022. Sorry about
that. And that was from October19 2021. So you start to see a
little bit of a picture.Obviously, that's very minimal,

(25:50):
we don't get to see theclassified annex, or at least
not yet. But now we know it'sthere. Now we start to see what
the enclosures are about. Andyou piece these puzzles
together, to move forward andsee if you can get a hold of it
at a later date. So I could bewrong. But I don't believe that

(26:10):
report was ever known before. Isearched to see if maybe there
was a public annex that was outthere a public report that may
have had this kind of stuff. Andknow the only references that
come up, especially when you'reusing search engines are
actually going right back tothis report. So there's not a

(26:31):
whole lot known about thisreport, if at all. So very
interesting to take a look atthose citations. So I bring that
up, because those are greatthings to look for. When you're
trying to piece together, thingsto look for later, through FOIA
or at least trying to get apicture of those classified
annexes and reports and so on.This was a very important part

(26:54):
of the IG report and one thatreally deserves a mention. The
DOD does not have acomprehensive coordinated
approach to address UAP. Wereviewed the DOD has policies,
procedures and actions fordetecting, reporting,
collecting, analyzing andidentifying UAP and determined
that, among other things, theDOD has not used a coordinated

(27:14):
approach to detect, report,collect, analyze and identify
UAP DoD components have largelyexcluded geographic combatant
commands, which are responsiblefor detecting, deterring, and
preventing threats and attacksagainst the US and its
territories possessions andbases in their respective areas
of
responsibility, and developingUAP policies and procedures.

(27:37):
That's obviously the combatantcommands we talked about earlier
and how they've kind of been itseems like excluded from all of
this. And finally, DODcomponents develop varying
processes to collect, analyzeand identify UAP incidents. As a
result, the DoD may not havedeveloped a comprehensive and
coordinated strategy forunderstanding identifying and

(27:59):
protecting against the UAP thatmay present a safety threat to
military personnel andterritory. The DoD has not
issued a comprehensive UAPresponse plan. The DoD has not
issued a comprehensive UAPresponse plan that identifies
roles, responsibilities,requirements and coordination,

(28:19):
procedures for detecting,reporting, collecting, analyzing
and identifying UAP incidents.As a result, the DoD response to
UAP incidents is uncoordinatedand concentrated within each
military department. Officialsfrom the military services and
MD CEOs stated that they havebeen waiting for the DOD to
issue comprehensive UAP guidancebefore developing their own

(28:43):
guidance. Essentially, whatthey're saying there, the DoD as
a whole should create some typeof central procedure, something
that all the Army, the Navy, theAir Force, can model their
procedures after and the DoDnever did it. We'll touch on
that again in a second. DODcomponents have largely excluded

(29:04):
geographic combatant commandsand UAP processes. So they're
punching this point again. Weinterviewed senior officials at
Oh USD ins, the militaryservices, the MDC o's and the
defense agencies to learn howtheir organizations detect,
report, collect, analyze andidentify UAP incidents. We
concluded that theseorganizations generally adapted
existing systems and that theDoD components existing UAP

(29:27):
processes largely exclude therole of the geographic combatant
commands. We also reviewed thegeographic combatant commands
processes for responding to UAPincidents, and determine that
the commands processes alsogenerally adapted existing
systems to report UAP incidents.Chapter Six title 10 US Code
establishes the authorities ofcombatant commanders who are

(29:50):
responsible for detecting,deterring and preventing threats
and attacks against the US andits territories possessions
basis. Therefore, the combatantcommands would be the logical
organizations to detect, reportcollect and identify UAP
incidents to arrow. So they'rereally punching that point. And
you'll see there's a lot ofrepetitiveness here also. So the

(30:11):
report kind of would have beenbetter served to be trimmed down
even more. But hey, that's just,you know, that's just me.
footnote here at the bottomthough don't miss this. We made
other classified observationsand findings that are not
included in this unclassifiedsummary. So obviously, there's a
lot more here that's kind of agiven, but it's always good to

(30:32):
see it in writing. So let me askyou something. And this is
something I think that we haveto deal with. Take yourself out
of the storyline that we'veheard from some of these
individuals and look at it witha broader lens from 2007 to
2008, depending upon who youlisten to, all the way to 2023.

(30:57):
These guys here on the screen,which includes Luis Elizondo
with a tip excuse me, there wego, Luis Elizondo with a tip,
you've got Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrickwith Arrow you've got Dr. James
McCaskey with us AP, you've gotJohn J. Stratton, J. Stratton is
generally how he's referred towith the UAP Task Force. All of

(31:21):
these guys collectively have 16years of leadership. And if you
believe all of them and take thecontroversy of whether or not
this is a UAP, you know,research effort with or SAP or a
tip or was a tip a program, takeall of that out of the equation
for purposes of this. For 16years, none of these guys were
able to develop any type ofprogram policy or procedure that

(31:45):
the DoD could utilize. Now,let's just say some of these
individuals were in on theground floor, and their
intentions were 100% genuine andthey wanted to make this happen.
Fine. But why is it that no onewas able to make it happen all
through those 16 years, thatthese guys lead their respective
programs, even those that aren'tdisputed as being UAP? specific

(32:09):
efforts? What happened duringthose years? Now, I'm not trying
to specifically blame theseguys, but they are the leaders.
A lot of people out there throwa lot of hate at Dr. Shawn
Kirkpatrick. And you know what,maybe, and I would even say
myself that it is deserved. Butif you blame him, you have to

(32:30):
blame the others that camebefore him. What did they do? It
should be noted. Now, I'm sorry,it has to be noted that there is
not a single UAP research reportfrom our SAP, or from a tip that
leads us to believe that theydid anything from a

(32:50):
investigative standpoint, thematerial that came out through
the offset program was allthings that were non UFO
related. The exception was theone dird report that talked
about UAP effects. But the onethat leaked out and was
published, I believe, first byPopular Mechanics was actually
different from the one that diasubmitted and released out via a

(33:14):
FOIA request. So what happenedthere? Are they hiding it? Well,
maybe. But let's just say for amoment that there was UAP angles
to all SAP? Where is thatmaterial? And this is an age old
question that some out there areso sick and tired of me asking,
but we have to keep asking it.What happened to the 10s of

(33:37):
millions of dollars if thisreally was a research program
devoted to UAP where's thatmaterial? And if it's sitting in
the private sector, well, theydon't own it, the DIA and the
taxpayers do. So you know, I cango off on a whole tangent on on
OS app alone. And the idea andconcept and allegation and rumor

(34:01):
that they with taxpayer money,meaning bass, the contractor
purchased databases like MUFON,which, you know, I know that
Bigelow did get involved withthat. But was it taxpayer money?
Was this something that the DIAwanted? Fast forward to a tip?
Was it a continuation of allSAP? Specific to UAP? Nuts and

(34:23):
Bolts, aerial threats, not theparanormal stuff that Skinwalker
Ranch, but specifically to that,okay, let's say it is where is
there any supportingdocumentation to support that?
And what were they doing foryears, it wasn't just Luis
Elizondo, he had other people,right. It wasn't just James
kasky. He

(34:44):
had other people, right. Whathappened there fast forward to
the UAP taskforce and J.Stratton. What happened there?
So there's a lot of unansweredquestions here that yeah, I've
asked for years, but we need tocontinue asking them because
it's a fascinating tale to seeunfold. And the story is not
told yet. And it doesn't matterif you believe me or support the

(35:07):
questions that I asked. Thebottom line is we still don't
have the answers. And what'seven more interesting about this
is those that you see on thescreen here, don't agree about
the relationship between theirown programs. For example, if
you read and hear and listen toJames McCaskey from the DIA, DIA

(35:27):
and his leadership of OSS app,he contradicts Luis Elizondo.
Why is that why why don't morepeople care about that? What
happened there? What's thedisconnect? So those types of
things? Yeah, I mean, may havean easy answer. But you know
what, the longer it goes withoutanswers, without these gentlemen
actually addressing it, the moreinterested I get, and the more

(35:49):
loud I will become asking thequestions because there's
something there, there'ssomething there that they don't
want us to see. Not about UAP,but about these programs
themselves, and what is that?And we can speculate until our
eyes fall out. But until we getthose answers, that's all what
we're left to do. So let's justkeep asking, keep pushing. And

(36:12):
hopefully, we'll get someclarity. Because yes, it is
absolutely important to thesetopics. And yes, it is important
because it shows how we got heretoday. It's the foundation, we
can all at least agree to thatright. It was the foundation
that led us to Congress doingwhat they're doing today, and

(36:32):
creating the legislation, thelegislation that they have. And
so if this is the foundation,then let's understand how strong
or how weak it is. That's whyit's important. Some people just
want to shove it to the side.They're like, yeah, yeah, leave
it alone, John, you're reallyannoying. Well, maybe. But I'm
not going to leave it alone.Because again, this is the

(36:55):
foundation that everything thatwe talked about, in 2024 and
beyond, is built on. And if thatstarts to crumble, then
everything else will crumblealong with it. And are we seeing
that as we speak? Is thatsomething that's going on? Is
Congress losing interest? I saidit a little while ago, to be

(37:16):
honest with you, I'll stand bythat. There's not a whole lot of
people that are out hereadvocating for the issue.
There's some, but there's not alot. And some of those that were
champions a year and a half ago,kind of fall off the map. They
haven't really been around.You've had some others that have
come forward. But theirstrength, let's just say and
that's not supposed to bedisrespectful. But the power,

(37:38):
the strength of the power theythey yield within the Senate or
Congress is not necessarily asstrong as it was maybe a year
and a half ago. So what's goingon? What what are we? What are
we seeing unfold here. So that'swhy a lot of that history is
important. And that's why weneed to figure it out because it
makes a lot of these otherthings that makes it a lot

(38:01):
easier to understand and grasp.Back to the report and some of
the findings, DOD componentsdeveloped varying processes to
detect and report UAP incidents.The NDAA of 2022 assigns arrow
under the Oh USD insresponsibility for synchronizing
and standardizing the collectionanalysis and identification of

(38:23):
UAP incidents. However, the DODhas not yet issued comprehensive
UAP guidance. So again,Kirkpatrick is just to blame
just as those other guys in theearly days. In the absence of
DOD level guidance, the DoDcomponents have developed
varying informal processes todetect and report UAP incidents.

(38:43):
For example, an Air Forceremotely piloted aircraft, and
airborne intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance
technical adviser, stated thatthe Air Force designated UAP as
a special interest item, whichrequires air crews to document
and report UAP observationswithin 24 hours of engine

(39:04):
shutdown and mission completionusing the Marauder system. An
army Senior Advisor for Scienceand Technology and Innovation,
stated that army personnel alsouse the Air Force's Murata
system to document and reportUAP observations. Because the
army has not developed its ownUAP specific processes. The
military services and MTC O'shave sent some UAP incident

(39:27):
reports to arrow, but the DODdoes not currently currently
formally require them to do so.That is an explosive and in my
opinion, one of the moreimportant parts of this report
all that stuff about the AirForce and how the Air Force is
collecting even informally, theUAP incidents and reports. So,

(39:53):
the one military branch that hasmysteriously been mum, for
years, they don't talk Got thiskind of stuff, really at all.
Now all of a sudden, we find outthat they've got this special
interest item label over UAP.And that they are using systems
to catalog these reports and insome cases, or maybe all, send

(40:17):
them over to arrow. So that thatto me was a pretty interesting
part of this because when youlook at the citation on the same
page, US Air Force SpecialInterest item, unidentified
aerial phenomena reporting April8 2022, Air Force Lifecycle
Management Center Maraudermission reporting User Guide,

(40:38):
September 2021. The broadersystem provides the Global
Mission reporting capability onthe secret Internet Protocol
router network, including reportdrafting, quality control,
rejection and approval pipelineto ensure fidelity of reporting,
publication of reports forGlobal Access and export of
published reports for analysis.In other words, they're using a

(40:59):
established system that tiesinto this Marauder mission, and
labeling UAP special interestitems and gender and using that
system to generate the reportsand potentially get them over to
arrow for analysis. So eventhough it's all in formal,
they're taking action, and theyhave been proactive to do their
own reporting procedure. To me,that's absolutely fascinating

(41:20):
because again, this is the AirForce, that military branch that
denied any interest for decadessince project Bluebook, then was
mysteriously mom when the Navy'sjust blurting out stuff. Every
day, it seemed like there for alittle bit. On UAP, the Air
Force was quiet now we're seeingthat they were actually doing a
lot behind the scenes. The DoDis lack of a comprehensive

(41:42):
coordinated approach to addressUAP may pose a threat to
military forces and US nationalsecurity. We determined that the
DOD has no overarching UAVpolicy. And as a result, it
lacks assurance that nationalsecurity and flight safety
threats to the US from UAP havebeen identified and mitigated.

(42:04):
So obviously, they're not doingmuch. They're doing these
informal things. But beyondthat, not so much. Now,
according to the press releasefor this report, there were 11
recommendations that weregenerated by the IGs office five
of which were listed in thereport itself. Now, I know it

(42:26):
gets a little bit tediousreading these, but I think it's
important not only for the audioversion of this particular
podcast, but on top of this toreally hear it out loud and to
understand exactly what the IGdetermined what they want done
and whether or not anything wasdone about it. Recommendation
one, we recommend that theUndersecretary of Defense for
intelligence and security, incoordination with the all domain

(42:48):
anomaly Research OfficeDirector, issue a Department of
Defense Policy to integrateunidentified anomalous phenomena
roles, responsibilities andrequirements and coordination
procedures into existingintelligence,
counterintelligence, and forceprotection policy and
procedures. The policy shouldinclude methods and address
unidentified anomalous phenomenaincidents, and should align with

(43:11):
policies and procedures for theprotection of the US person's
civil liberties. So now they'rejust trying to address
everything that we've gone over.And it seems again, like it's
pretty repetitive in thisreport. They're trying to
address it create some kind of,you know, uniform system for
this Undersecretary of Defensefor intelligence and security
and all domain anomalyresolution office comments.

(43:35):
The Undersecretary of Defensefor intelligence and security
responding for the owe us theins and the arrow director
agreed with the recommendation.The Undersecretary noted that
the findings that inform excuseme, that informed the
recommendation appear to bebased on observations that
largely predate the establishedof air the establishment of aro

(43:55):
organizationally aligned underthe Oh USD ins on July 2020 22.
The Undersecretary alsocommented that the report
describes aro as having beenoperational at the time of its
established establishment, whenin fact, the office was not at
initial operational capability.The Undersecretary stated that

(44:17):
arrow will achieve fulloperational capability using the
resources provided in the in thefuture year defense plan,
beginning in fiscal year 2020.For the under the undersecretary
also stated that arrows progressand detecting, identifying and
resolving UAP includes thedevelopment of analytic
framework science plan,operational framework of

(44:40):
strategic communications plan,and implementing guidance on the
UAP related roles andresponsibilities of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense,arrow, combatant commands,
military services and combatsupport agencies. The
Undersecretary stated that arrowis developing policy guidance
including Recently releasedGeneral Administration guidance

(45:03):
through the Joint Staff to thecombatant commands to delineate
UAP roles, responsibilities,requirements and coordination
efforts, or excuse meprocedures. This guidance will
modify existing intelligence,counterintelligence and force
protection policies andprocedures as well as adhere to
all policies and procedures forthe protection of US persons

(45:25):
civil liberties. Our responseare the IG comments from the
Undersecretary of Defense forintelligence and security fully
addressed the recommendation.Therefore, the recommendation is
resolved but open. We will closethe recommendation when the Oh
USD ins in coordination withArrow provides us with the issue
of DOD policy to integrate UAProles, responsibilities,

(45:47):
requirements, and coordinationprocedures into existing
intelligence,counterintelligence and force
protection policies andprocedures and procedures. A
mouthful from top to bottom. Butyou can see that it looks like
the DoD is starting to takeaction. The second
recommendation we recommend thatthe Secretary of the Army issue

(46:08):
interim guidance forunidentified anomalous phenomena
while waiting for the Departmentof Defense to issue policy at a
minimum, this guidance forunidentified anomalous phenomena
should a integrate existingintelligence counterintelligence
and force protection policiesand procedures be integrate
procedures for coordinating withgeographic combatant commands,

(46:29):
see incorporate roles,responsibilities and
requirements for the militaryservices and their respective
military departmentcounterintelligence operations.
The Secretary of the Armycomments, the Senior Advisor for
Counter Intelligence DeputyChief of Staff of army G to
responding for the Secretary ofthe Army agreed in principle

(46:50):
with the recommendation, theSenior Advisor stated that army
counterintelligence plans tointegrate existing intelligence,
counterintelligence, and forceprotection policies and
procedures into interim guidancefor UAP IGS comments from the
Senior Advisor forcounter-intelligence Deputy

(47:10):
Chief of Staff of the Army G tofully address the
recommendation, therefore, therecommendation is resolved. But
open. We will close therecommendation when the
Secretary of the Army providesus with the issued interim UAP
guidance. The thirdrecommendation, we recommend
that the Secretary of the Navyissue interim guidance for UAP

(47:30):
while waiting for DOD to issuepolicy at a minimum, and it goes
through essentially the samepoints again. So I'll jump down
to Secretary of the Navycomments. The Secretary of the
Navy did not provide officialcomments for inclusion in our
final report, as requested.However, the director of
intelligence DeputyUndersecretary of the Navy,
intelligence and securityresponding for the Secretary of

(47:53):
the Navy after our final reportissuance agreed with the
recommendation and stated in theresponse that the Navy began
developing interim guidance forUAP. Here's what's odd about
this. The Navy years ago,already had UAP guidelines. That
story was first broken byPolitico and Brian bender. I

(48:13):
went after it through FOIA, I'llhave to look back, I actually
forgot to look at it. Butregardless, that case is still
open. I don't have an ETA, Idon't think that's what I wanted
to check. But the case is stillopen. So clearly, there's
there's kind of a disconnectthere, where they have this
guidance years ago about how theNavy was going to report UAP.

(48:35):
And then fast forward, IGrecommends them to do it again,
and they're going to do itagain. So it's like, Well, what
happened to all that stuff fromyears ago? It's just really
weird when you try and trulyunraveled some of these details,
and how you thought certainthings were done. And it was
reported as being done and thenall of a sudden, we find out
it's not or it's being redone.Who knows. But IG stated in the

(49:00):
report, comments from thedirector of intelligence Deputy
Undersecretary of the NavyIntelligence and Security,
Department of the Navy fullyaddressed the recommendation.
Therefore, the recommendation isresolved. But open we will close
the recommendation when theSecurity Secretary of the Navy
provides us with the issuedinterim UAP guidance. We

(49:21):
recommend that the Secretary ofthe Air Force issue interim
guidance for UAP get I'm gonnajump down it's again, just a
recommendation that the AirForce do the same as the Navy
and the Army and previousrecommendations. Secretary of
the Air Force comments. TheSecretary of the Air Force did
not provide official commentsfor inclusion in this report, as
we requested in our draft.However, the strategic programs

(49:43):
and Policy Associate DirectorSecretary of the Air Force
Inspector General, respondingfor the Secretary of the Air
Force provided us in formalcomments, stating quote in
coordination with OSI and ourSecretary of the Air Force
inspector general's specialinvestigate shins directorate,
Deputy Director. We concurwithout comment and look forward

(50:05):
to the final published report.Man, these titles get so
difficult and wordy. So sorryabout that. But obviously
they're they're acknowledging itin a informal comment way. IG
responds the strategic programsand policy. Associate Directors
in formal response stated thatthe Air Force agreed with the
recommendation. However, thisresponse did not provide the

(50:28):
specific actions that the AirForce would take and the dates
for for those actions.Therefore, this recommendation
is resolved. But open, we willclose the recommendation when
the Secretary of the Air Forceprovides us with the issued
interim UAP guidance. Here's thelast recommendation that they
have. In this particular report.We recommend that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staffissued guidance to the

(50:49):
geographic combatant commandersregarding UAP detection,
reporting, collection, analysisand identification with their
area within their area ofresponsibility. At a minimum,
the guidance should includetools to help commands determine
the threats posed by UAP. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff did not provide officialcomments for inclusion in our

(51:11):
final report, as we requested,however, in official from the
Joint Staff J three respondedand agreed with the
recommendation. Further, theJoint Staff issued guidance to
the geographic combatantcommanders on UAP detection,
reporting, collection, analysisand identification within their
area of responsibility. Ourresponse, the formal response

(51:32):
from the joint staff fullyaddressed the recommendation,
therefore the recommendation isresolved and closed. Yet one
thing that it's always fun tosee, but frustrating to see. And
interesting all at the sametime, is how the Office of the
Inspector General within the DODcan't get their own military

(51:53):
branches to respond properly.And obviously, they have ample
opportunity to do so. So itseems like these offices have
power that again, wield a lot ofpower in their respective ways
cannot get answers. You look atthe Senate, you look at the
house, you look at politiciansthat also wield their own

(52:13):
respective power. And they tryand get answers from different
either, and even the inspectorgeneral. But other military
branches and offices and thePentagon itself, you look at
that and you realize, man, ourown government will not talk to
each other. They will not helpwith reports that are aimed to

(52:34):
help pilots be safer in theskies to help Americans be safer
where they live to help nationalsecurity concerns. They don't
talk. So you see it. And likeevery recommendation, we asked
for this, but we didn't get it.It's like come on, like try and
talk to each other to help usunderstand what's going on

(52:57):
number one, but number two, whatare you doing about it. And
that's something that's reallyimportant to look at. The last
slide that I want to talk to youguys about is the scope and
methodology. And you look again,won't read the whole page here
but we interviewed seniorofficials and requested UAP
related data and organizationalpolicies, procedures and

(53:20):
guidance from the following DoDorganizations, oh Usdi and s
arrow military services like theArmy, Navy and Air Force,
military service intelligencecommand components army G to
Navy and to Air Force A to MDCowes, which include the army
counter intelligence NCIS Officeof Special Investigations, that

(53:42):
would be for the Air Force,Defense Intelligence agencies
which included the DIA, theNational Geospatial Intelligence
Agency, or NGA, the NationalReconnaissance Office or NRO and
NSA, the National SecurityAgency. You know what that is,
that is a list. Now that we havea a roadmap for someone like me,

(54:04):
and any of you that are watchingon who was directly involved
with this particular evaluation,spoiler alert, I have filed
requests to each and every oneof those that I just went over
to look at what was thecoordination between the IG
during this evaluation and thoserespective branches, offices and

(54:29):
so on. That will help us so alot of people were let down at
this report, you know, I don'tknow what they expected. I'm not
sure what they wanted to see. Idon't know I think it's across
the gamut when you when you talkto to various people and, and
and groups and so on, that theythey have their heart set on
something. For me. I always I'velearned over the years learned

(54:52):
over the decades actually don'thave any expectations, because
you never know what you're gonnaget. And that's kind of why I
wanted To do this particulardeep dive, when you look at that
information, and you look atwhat they have told us, your
expectations, if you have themway, way too high, it's going to

(55:14):
be blown out of the water. Butwhen you look at it for what it
is, you look at it for, for, fortrying to get some more puzzle
pieces and put this picturetogether. That's when it becomes
really interesting. And in thisrespect, there was so much that
someone like me and all of youout there that do FOIA requests

(55:34):
and look for things. There wereso many leads in this. And that
was actually unexpected. Again,I try not to have expectations,
but I didn't expect that manyleads. Because this now offers
an opportunity to go and dissectnot only that list I just went
over. But all those citationsthat I said, Hey, look, look at
look at these, I can't go aftercongressional records. But I can

(55:57):
go after Air Force policy andprocedure, I can dig in there, I
can go into communicationbetween the IGs office and these
respective agencies. Becausekeep in mind that classified
report may take a while to getthat MDR case that I talked to
you earlier about in thispresentation. But what won't
take as much time is theinformation that was passed on,

(56:20):
let's say, from the army, or theNavy, or NCIS or aft OSI, that
information is processed at theagency itself, not the IGs
office. So the report itself isgoing to take a while because it
has to coordinate with all ofthose offices. And then it has

(56:42):
to wait until the end. But theinformation I can go after
directly with AF OSI or the navyor whatever, specific to this
DoD IG evaluation, that will nottake as long and why am I
telling you that because I knowsome of you are bored stiff,
it's the way you have to look atthis. And and I always try and
throw in those FOIA tips andhints if I can, for those that

(57:04):
may be thinking about using itor may maybe you've started but
you're not entirely sure what tolook for. That's what you look
for. You look at every singleword and character in reports
like these, because it's not themain brunt of the report, that's
the most interesting, it's thefine print. And it's those
little things that you can pickup on and used to create one or

(57:26):
two, or 10 or 20 other FOIAcases, to all of these other
agencies. So that's something tolook out for. Overall, again,
this was a great, I think, agreat report for the research
end, not necessarily for tellingthe public anything other than

(57:46):
the DoD hasn't done anything toset up UAP policies, procedures
that are uniform, DOD wide.That's the bottom line. So the
general public is going to walkaway with very little from this,
again, other than the DOD hasfailed. And we do have to ask
that one question 10s ofmillions of dollars at least

(58:08):
have gone into these programsover the course of that 16
years. So what is it thatthey've done? These are a lot of
failure marks from the InspectorGeneral's office. And those
recommendations, the ones thatwe could read should never be in
there if everybody else wasdoing their job. And let's just
say the most structured effort,likely or arguably, being arrow,

(58:32):
what have they been doing? Like,why can't they get some type of
a system down? As the generalpublic, we are not privy to
everything? So again, maybethere is a fair answer. Maybe
there's a fair answer with why atip didn't do it or why OSS app
didn't do it. There's a lot of,you know, question marks there.
But the bottom line is theydidn't do their job. And that's

(58:55):
what we have to look into andask why and how are we going to
fix it? Obviously, the IG issuedtheir recommendations, will the
DoD take action? Time will tell.But I had a lot of fun going
over this report with you guys.Hopefully, you learned at least
one thing in the past hour orso. So thank you for joining me.

(59:16):
If you can, if you're watchingthe live stream version or the
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(59:36):
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(59:58):
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(01:00:22):
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