Dr. Kurt Campbell, former Deputy Secretary of State and an architect of the U.S. “Pivot to Asia,” joins the Burn Bag to unpack the strategic crossroads the United States faces in the Indo-Pacific. In a wide-ranging conversation, Campbell discusses the Trump administration’s ongoing tariff negotiations with key allies and partners, the shifting contours of U.S.-China competition, and why he believes the United States is underestimating Beijing’s long-term scale and capacity. Drawing from his recent Foreign Affairs essay with Rush Doshi, we explore his call for a new strategy of “allied scale” that fuses defense, trade, and technology cooperation. Campbell shares sharp insights on the future of AUKUS, the role of partners such as India, Japan, and Korea, and how the U.S. must adapt its strategy to stay competitive in a region that’s central to the 21st century.
Read Kurt's Foreign Affairs op-ed (co-authored with Rush Doshi) here.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Andre Gonawela (00:00):
Hi, my name is Andre Gonawela.
Welcome back to the Burn BagPodcast.
My guest today is Dr.
Kurt Campbell, one of thearchitects of modern US strategy
in the Indo-Pacific.
He recently served asthe Deputy Secretary of State
(00:22):
and was the Bidenadministration's first
Indo-Pacific coordinator at theNational Security Council.
A former assistant secretary ofstate and U.S.
Navy officer, he's widelycredited with shaping the pivot
to Asia and co-founded both theCenter for a New American
Security and the Asia Group.
Folks, for transparency, I alsowork at the Asia Group, so I'm
going to be quite really nice toKurt today.
Kurt Campbell (00:45):
Exceptionally careful, Andre.
That's what's on tap for today.
Andre Gonawela (00:49):
Exceptionally careful.
Thanks, Kurt.
So in today's episode, we'll beunpacking the U.S.
approach to China, the role ofallies and partners, ongoing
tariff negotiations, and what itwill take to compete at scale
in the region.
Kurt recently co-authored withRush Doshi, a great piece in
Foreign Affairs called“Underestimating China”.
(01:10):
We'll dive into that piece in alittle bit as well.
But Kurt, thanks so much forjoining me here today.
I really appreciate it.
Kurt Campbell (01:16):
It's great to be with you, and I really look
forward to the conversation.
Andre Gonawela (01:19):
So, Kurt, big picture, the U.S.
posture in the Asia-Pacific.
So, as I said, you've beencredited with shaping that pivot
to Asia during the Obamaadministration.
Are we still pivoting to Asiaor have recent crises such as
what we've been seeing in theMiddle East, the recent tariff
agenda and other things?
(01:40):
Has that pulled us back towardsa more narrow protectionist
posture?
,
Kurt Campbell (01:46):
Let me first say, Andre, that this idea of
spending more time, focusingmore resources on the
Indo-Pacific is not a recentthing.
Several precedingadministrations have sought to
make the turn to perhaps spendmore time in the Indo-Pacific
(02:10):
and less in some of the verychallenging geographies of the
Middle East in particular.
What turns out, however, isthat it's easier said than done,
much harder to do than peoplerealize.
And so every administration hassought over the last 30 years
to focus more on theIndo-Pacific, only to find that
(02:33):
either domestic preoccupationsor challenges that arise in
Europe with the Russian invasionof Ukraine or the cascading
conflicts in the Middle Eastdraw the United States as the
global superpower into the fray.
And as a consequence, some ofthe time and attention that
(02:58):
would be naturally devoted tothe Indo-Pacific gets focused
there.
And so I think in truth, thischallenge has, struck every
administration, including theone I most recently served in.
I think President Biden did anadmirable job at continuing to
(03:22):
focus on major initiatives likethe Quad, like AUKUS, like the
trilateral engagement betweenthe United States, Japan, and
South Korea, even in the midstof pressing other challenges in
other regions and the like.
But it is undeniably difficult,and it stresses our system to
(03:44):
have these competing interestsand areas of focus.
I think when the Trumpadministration came to power,
many of their key adherentsinside the government talked a
lot about focusing more on theIndo-Pacific, but but often in a
(04:05):
very narrow way, almost asingular military focus on the
China challenge.
Less focus on building upallies and partners.
Indeed, the major initiative inthe Indo-Pacific to begin with
has been frankly, discord in avariety of capitals around trade
(04:27):
issues, which rather thanbuilding consensus and
partnership among like-mindedstates, if anything, has just
created anxieties.
Andre Gonawela (04:37):
So, I mean, I think tariffs are the top of
mind for a lot of folks inWashington, D.C.
right now.
It's certainly been top of mindat the Asia Group.
But I mean, the Trumpadministration is pressing for
these tariff concessions fromkey partners like Japan, South
Korea, India and so many others,while still advancing these
reciprocal tariff measures, howdo you assess the current U.S.
(05:00):
negotiating approach,especially in the context where
I think we saw a bunch ofletters go out to our trading
partners yesterday?
Can we secure trade wins inthis fashion while still
sustaining long-term strategictrust with allies and partners?
Kurt Campbell (05:19):
You know, Andre, there's so much embedded into
that simple question.
So the first thing that we'vegot to underscore is that these
initial, quote, quote, dealsthat have been struck with Great
Britain, Vietnam, a couple ofothers, you know, it's something
(05:41):
more than musings on a back ofa napkin, but certainly
something far less than anegotiated text kind of
agreement that approaches whichis a treaty.
These are general parametersthat will guide future
conversations.
And in general, the focus haslargely been at this juncture on
(06:06):
issues associated with tariffs.
There's been much less focus onissues that what might be
described as structuralimpediments that have made it
difficult, for instance, incertain markets for American
products and services toeffectively penetrate.
And there's less in the senseof these agreements being caught
(06:34):
or defining.
Many of these countries struckdeals with the Trump
administration during hisprevious term, and so are asking
the question, you know, what'sdifferent now?
You know, and is this aunilateral decision for the
United States at any point todecide, well, we need or want
(06:59):
more.
I think the strategy that hasbeen followed by many of these
countries, and there are six orseven ongoing negotiations in
the Indo-Pacific, in Asia, as wespeak, the most important one
obviously being with China.
But generally speaking, in anumber of circumstances, the
(07:23):
country faces a very seriouspotential step with respect to
tariffs on autos, like, forinstance, in Japan and South
Korea.
So the strategy has been forthese countries to try to find
areas where it can signal adesire both to arrest these
(07:45):
imbalances, but also to perhapsfind other areas issues on the
other side of the ledger thatfavor the United States.
And so Japan is looking atinvesting more in the United
States, buying more agriculturalproducts, perhaps looking at
energy infrastructure in Alaska,shipbuilding and the like.
(08:09):
But I think the worry now is,after what's happened in
Vietnam, is it looked like theVietnamese were negotiating all
these various sort of side dealsand complementary elements in
order to lower the actual tariffon products.
(08:31):
And I think the Vietnamesethought they had done that only
at the last to find that theUnited States had raised that
level again to 20%.
And so, again, very complicatedset of interactions.
I don't think many of thecountries involved are that
comfortable with either theprocess or the outcomes.
(08:53):
It almost feels as if there area number of negotiations that
take place.
There's some early work that'sbeen done almost like clearing
the field by staffers atTreasury at Commerce and the
National Economic Council, thenengagement at the cabinet level,
(09:14):
and then it's ultimatelydelivered to the president.
The challenge is that the textthat presented to the president
from our side and from theperspective of our negotiating
partners, they've thought ofthat as being a final text or a
final approach.
But the president sometimes hasdifferent ideas.
(09:35):
So once he gets on the line,maybe he decides to add another
10% here or there, right?
And it's challenging for thesecountries because they don't
necessarily want to incur thewrath or the disappointment of
the president, so are inclinedto be more quiet about their
misgivings.
(09:56):
And so it's a very complicatedprocess.
And the way that the governmentsort of the diktats have been
presented publicly has createdreally substantial market
turmoil in ways that I do notthink are in the interests of
(10:16):
the United States, our keybusinesses, or the interests of
our allies and partners.
Andre Gonawela (10:22):
Absolutely.
And I mean, it's so easy to getbogged down in so many of these
details, so much of the churn,so much of the daily changing
headlines around the tariffnegotiations and what we're
trying to get access to, whatproducts we're talking about,
what services we're talkingabout.
So many of my friends who arenot working in foreign policy,
(10:42):
not working in economics.
They're trying to ask me, youknow, Andre, like what's going
on with the tariff stuff?
And sometimes I have a hardtime explaining that my dad who
works in retail, my mom whoworks at a daycare, they're just
confused about the wholesituation right now.
Can—
Kurt Campbell (10:57):
Can I just add to this real quickly?
That is the question that comesup the most from Indo-Pacific
partners and friends, eitheralong the quarters of power in
government offices orboardrooms.
And that is like, what's thestrategy behind all of this?
(11:17):
And it's difficult to try toconvey.
You know, I'll give you anexample.
So in Asia, it's often possiblethat to do two things that
appear contradictory at once.
And so, for instance, Iremember talking to a very
senior Vietnamese diplomat and Iasked him, like, what does it
(11:40):
take to be effective as arepresentative of your country
in this complex contemporarytime?
And he said, you have to keepin mind two things constantly.
And I said, oh yes, what'sthat?
He said, number one, you haveto get along with China.
It is absolutely essential.
to find ways to get along withthe big neighbor to the north.
(12:03):
And I understood that.
I said, well, what's numbertwo?
What's the second thing youalways have to do?
He said, at the same time, youmust always resist China.
You must always challengeChina.
And so this idea of these twoseemingly contradictory things,
sometimes harder for a Westernperspective to fully understand.
(12:26):
Likewise, it is hard forinterlocutors in the
Indo-Pacific to imagine thatpolicy is sometimes being made
without some sort of strategicperspective.
I think the president isanimated by daily events, by
contemporary issues, by how he'sfeeling, by long long-held
(12:51):
grievances and disappointmentsand biases.
And so I'm not sure there is aneat strategic frame that can be
applied that reveals the deeperyou know, kind of understanding
about how the formulation andexecution of American foreign
(13:13):
policy works under PresidentTrump.
And so the one thing I wouldjust simply tell you is that
when searching for that patternthat somehow links everything
together, I'm not sure you'regoing to be successful in
finding it.
And what our job really is, isto and convince interlocutors to
(13:39):
understand how much evencomplex policy is being made on
the fly.
Andre Gonawela (13:47):
Absolutely.
It's all very confusing.
There's so much happening.
And I think, though,transitioning into another topic
that's somewhat related, you'vetalked about the need for
pooled markets, greater alliedeconomic scale to compete with
China.
As you mentioned earlier, A lotof Indo-Pacific countries are
(14:09):
trying to balance, you know,trying to get along with China,
but trying to resist China atthe same time.
Given that current U.S.
tariff posture, what practicalsteps can the U.S.
and its partners actually taketo build the shared economic
space, even though we still haveso much of these ongoing trade
(14:29):
frictions?
Kurt Campbell (14:31):
Yeah, that's so I would just say the framework
that you lay out, which is let'swork more closely with allies
and partners, I'm not sure thatgeneral framework is accepted by
the dominant actors in theTrump administration.
And in fact, I think in manyrespects, you have a worldview
(14:53):
that suggests that some of thesepartnerships are encumbering
and that are somehow, you know,holding the United States down
from being able to accomplishwhat it really needs to do.
And so you occasionally hearcommentary about Europe and even
about partners in the AsiaPacific, the Indo-Pacific, that
(15:19):
question reliability, defensespending you can just go down
the list.
And so I'm not quite sure thatthere is the same sense in this
administration about the need tocreate scale.
From my perspective, everychallenge that we have faced in
foreign policy and nationalsecurity over the course of the
(15:40):
last century, we haveessentially been able to meet
that challenge with our own sortof internal unilateral
capacity, right?
We had enough during the SecondWorld War, during the Gulf War,
during Vietnam.
Even though we worked inconjunction and coordination
(16:04):
with other countries, we had thecapacity necessary to deal with
the particular challenges.
This is the first time that weconfront a potential challenger
in which we do not have theadvantage of scale.
We are not able to take this onalone.
(16:24):
But I think that very, in myview, obvious insight, I think
might be rejected by folks onthe Trump team who would say,
look, we've got to be able tomanage this more on our own.
and be careful and wary aboutputting too much hope that
(16:48):
allies and partners will be withus.
I think that worldview, ifanything, underestimates the
solidarity that we've seenhistorically between the United
States and its allies andpartners.
And so what I worry about rightnow is that through the steps
(17:10):
that the president has taken intrade in particular, we are
running the risk of alienatingour closest partners in the
region because of perceptionsaround imbalances in a few key
areas like autos.
Andre Gonawela (17:32):
Absolutely.
And you mentioned that termscale.
And I do want to dive into thattheme in the context of allied
scale, which you write about inthat foreign affairs piece.
But before then, I just want todive a little bit into US-China
competition and some of therisks present therein.
So you've argued againstunderestimating China's scale.
(17:53):
What's your current read?
Is China playing for regionaldominance, global leadership, or
both?
So
Kurt Campbell (18:00):
look, Andre, I think one of the things that is
undeniable is that as aleadership group, China spends
an inordinate amount of time onnational strategies, both
domestically andinternationally.
And I think some of that workand those gatherings are
shrouded in secrecy, but what wethink we know is that China
(18:25):
believes that its time is comingand that it will...
play the dominant role inglobal politics.
And I think most Chinesestrategic interlocutors, they
may not, you know, kind of shoutit from the rooftops, but they
probably believe that the UnitedStates is in decline.
(18:45):
And some would suggest that theUnited States is in hurtling
decline.
And so what they have allsought to do in, as they think
about China, China's ownresponse to that is the question
about when do you challenge theUnited States head on directly.
(19:06):
And I think the surprise withXi Jinping was that he chose to
take on the United States quitepublicly early and earlier than
probably was warranted withrespect to its ultimate power,
and that that effort could havewaited 10 or 15 years.
But by doing so, it alerts theUnited States and other allies
(19:30):
and partners about what isunderway.
But also, it has made clear tothose of us in the West the
areas and the terms on which thefight will be based on in
technology and a variety ofother areas where China is
seeking to both husband its ownresources, carefully prepare for
(19:56):
potential challenges againstit, and basically have a game
plan for achieving dominance ina number of key areas with
respect to technology, at least.
So I guess my point here,Andre, would be simply this,
that I think the Chinese do havea...
(20:17):
clear set of where they want togo.
And I think much of that isanimated by a belief that their
time has come and that they'regoing to reassert their
traditional role at the centerof the tributary system in the
(20:37):
Indo-Pacific.
And I think there are more andmore signs that that goal, that
objective often hit it kind ofclandestine is increasingly
animating the views andobjectives of senior Chinese
interlocutors.
Andre Gonawela (20:55):
So how should we think about our U.S.
interdependence with China?
I mean, where isdisentanglement achievable and
where is a structure impossible?
Because, I mean, that's thequestion that so many people
have, that we are so dependenton China.
China is also dependent on us.
Where can we actually...
grow apart, if that's at allpossible.
Kurt Campbell (21:16):
Yeah.
So look, the first thing Iwould say is that there are no
two countries moreinterdependent than the United
States and China.
There are no two countries moreuncomfortable with that
interdependence as well.
Both countries have come tolearn and realize the hard way
that taking steps to reduceinterdependence, mutual
(21:39):
vulnerability is challenging.
It will take decades probably,and that many of the efforts
will be met with either failureor will stir the anxiety of the
other nation and perhaps thosearound it.
I would say that at a verybasic level, the United States
(22:07):
is in a position where it isseeking to ease certain areas of
vulnerability in rare earthsand critical minerals and a
variety of other highlysignificant areas.
It turns out that the pathtowards self-sufficiency is
(22:31):
unbelievably long and difficult.
And in some cases, we've madealmost no progress whatsoever.
And so I think the dominantrealization on policymakers is
just how reliant we are in eachother.
China, having made such aninvestment in the dollar over
(22:51):
decades, finds it difficult nowto diversify.
The United States finds itdifficult to undertake major
manufacturing with certaintechnologies, given that so many
of them have come or will comefrom China.
Andre Gonawela (23:07):
So your recent foreign affairs piece, with Rush
Doshi, argues that the UnitedStates has to build, quote,
allied scale to offset China'sadvantages.
What exactly is this term,allied scale?
And what's the single biggestobstacle to actually achieving
this in practice?
Kurt Campbell (23:26):
Well, allied scale is meant to conjure up
periods in the past where weworking with other countries
have been effective at puttingtogether kind of a formidable
arena of joint cooperation,whether it's co-production,
co-development, operations,military and the like.
(23:50):
It's extremely important to beable to undertake some of those
steps.
And I think the scorecard thatyou're asking for we would have
to, the best we could hope foris an incomplete grade.
Because I think what you'redescribing is a process where
(24:12):
it's gone much slower thananticipated for a variety of
reasons.
Again, this interdependence,these interdependence elements
are designed in such a way thatthey often embed in the system
and then it's more difficult toremove them over time.
And so I'm not at all clearthat we're in a situation in
(24:37):
which it will be even possibleto do the fundamental reordering
that the United Statessometimes talks about.
Andre Gonawela (24:46):
So bipartisanship on China has held
in so many areas, but we'realso living in a hyper-partisan
political climate right now.
Are we really capable ofsustaining long-term coalition
building that you say would beessential?
I think at the heart of this,
Kurt Campbell (25:03):
Andre, is the key question about national
policymaking and the periods inwhich we enjoyed a degree of
elite consensus around the majorthrust avenues of American
policy, either domestic orinternational, were clear.
There may have been a fewoutliers on each side, but that
(25:26):
dominant view remained.
And the view that I think makesthe most sense is this, excuse
me, deeply engaged set ofinitiatives on technology and
the like between our allies andpartners.
It means transcending oftenpaternal relationships that are
(25:46):
based in earlier securitytreaties that don't quite
measure up to 21st centuryconditions.
The journey is still out aboutwhat ultimately this will mean.
I do believe at some point inthe future that we are likely to
have a kind of crisis ofreassurance or trust, and then
(26:10):
being able to muster thecapacity to indicate that no,
despite some of the challengesthat we have faced mutually, we
are determined to tackle theseproblems together.
I think what we've seen to datehas been quite a harsh Japanese
approach to issues involvingJapan, for instance, and much
(26:36):
more flexibility when it comesto Vietnam or other countries as
well.
Andre Gonawela (26:43):
So in stepping into this concept of the scaled
leadership the United Statesneeds, how should we think about
the roles of allies such asJapan and Korea or partners such
as India?
Can they step into this idea ofscaled leadership or would we
still be defaulting to a hub andspokes type of model?
Kurt Campbell (27:04):
So I think my own counsel, Andre, is that the hub
and spoke framework, themetaphor was most applicable
during an earlier period ofAmerican strategy.
And that had it with the UnitedStates kind of at the center,
reaching out to a variety ofdisconnected actors.
(27:25):
What we're increasingly seeingis coordination and engagement
among those actors, amongthemselves, right?
Some of it involving the UnitedStates, but some of it acting
and taking place alone.
And so I think that is a newand important feature that is
playing out as we speak.
(27:45):
I think it is also the casethat it would be hard to
describe the level of anxiety inthe Indo-Pacific, largely
because they do not know what toexpect going forward.
So for instance, Japan, who hasbasically put so much towards
(28:06):
the idea of a closeU.S.-Japanese relationship, we
have the same thing with Korea,only to find that they're in a
situation sort of adisintegrating security
situation around theIndo-Pacific.
You know, challenges from arevanchist Russia, provocations
(28:29):
from North Korea, China on themarch, huge defense spending.
In that environment, you want arock-solid relationship with
the United States, but everyheadline is of every newspaper
and news show across Asia isabout how much the United States
and Japan are struggling to endup with a final sort of
(28:51):
agreement.
And much as they talk and tryto explain it to Japanese
friends, much as they try toexplain it to us, it's been hard
to get that message through, ifyou know what I'm saying.
Andre Gonawela (29:06):
No, absolutely.
Kurt, I want to touch onanother topic that you worked on
in the Biden administrationthat a lot of people have been
paying attention to in a defensecontext, and that is AUKUS.
This defense cooperationagreement, this pact between the
United States, Australia, andthe United Kingdom, pillar one
focused on submarines, pillartwo has focused on other
(29:27):
critical and emergingtechnologies.
It was seen as, I think, agreat achievement by the Biden
administration to push forwardthat defense cooperation but
there's been recent growingconcern among allies about the
AUKUS review that the Pentagonis now undertaking.
Kurt, can you tell us a littlebit more about why is AUKUS
(29:48):
important, and is AUKUS actuallyat risk with this review?
Kurt Campbell (29:53):
Andre, thank you for the question.
Well, first of all, as youunderscore, it links Great
Britain, the United States, andAustralia in a unique way in
terms of the construction andengagement on the next step
nuclear-powered conventionallyarmed submarine.
This would be the first timethat we shared this kind of
(30:14):
technology with a country since1957, 1958, so more than 65
years.
I think there was a belief thatAustralia reached that level of
partnership and mateship thatthey should be and wanted to be
included in this.
Great distances involved, thesize of the oceans meant that
(30:37):
nuclear power Propulsion mademore sense than simply
conventional diesel submarines.
So I think the strategicrationale was clear, bringing
our partners in Europe more intothe Indo-Pacific made sense.
So I think the strategicrationale is exciting.
(30:59):
It also brought substantialAustralian resources into the
United States to help our ownsubmarine industrial base here.
The truth is that both GreatBritain and Australia did a
review with new governmentscoming in, new groups.
It's not unusual for the UnitedStates to do a review.
(31:23):
There are elements in the U.S.
government that question someof the central parameters of
AUKUS, but I am confident that,first of all, it's completely
appropriate to do a review, andwe have to be open to some of
the conclusions There may besuggestions of more defense
(31:44):
spending, more certaintyassociated with the use of this
incredible platform.
But at the same time, thelarger questions about whether
to undo the pact or move inanother direction, I do not
believe fundamentally that kindof recommendation is possible.
(32:08):
likely or valid.
I just think there's so muchmoney, there's so much focus on
this program.
If there was a decision to walkaway from it on the part of the
United States, then I thinkthat would lead to a crisis in
confidence, not just with ourallies and partners, but others
who are watching this agreementclosely.
(32:31):
Lots of things that are beingdebated, whether Australia would
provide some assurances abouthow a submarine in this
arrangement would be used in awarfighting situation.
All I can tell you is that theAustralians have been with us at
(32:51):
every major turn.
They would probably be a littlebit more careful to talk about
it.
publicly or to deal with it.
I think, Andre, you probablyhave tracked this as well.
But at the same time, you know,there is, I think, a belief in
(33:11):
some quarters that the momentumis there and it will carry on
and the recommendations will beon the margins.
I've engaged with a lot ofpeople who are working on it and
with undersecretary at theDefense Department who is
(33:32):
undertaking the review.
Time will tell.
But ultimately, the number ofsenior leaders and others who've
weighed in in support of AUKUSis substantial.
The British Prime Ministerengaged President Trump and
basically said, look, we're allin.
And at least in that meeting,President Trump gave it the
vote, the thumbs up.
(33:53):
Now, we'll just have to see howthis plays out.
But I worry that too muchtinkering and focus on how it
looks, whatever could lead to asituation in which we have
backlogs and difficulties comingforward.
Andre Gonawela (34:10):
No, absolutely.
And I think we have been seeingbipartisan support for AUKUS.
I mean, we recently saw somecongressional bills that were
introduced by Republican andDemocratic members of the House
aiming to bolster AUKUS.
But I mean, you know, AUKUSsort of fits in to the goal, I
guess, of this two-way allieddefense industrial base.
(34:35):
In terms of driving forwardthis defense industrial base
shared by the allies, especiallyas we're trying to push forward
defense innovation, we'retrying to accelerate and advance
emerging and new technologies,what's probably the most urgent
policy or legal change that weneed to unlock to get there?
Kurt Campbell (34:57):
Gosh, I'd love to tell you there was just one or
two simple things that have tobe like, like, like, you know,
in your mind, you've got to likea switch that you just flick.
That is not the case.
So I would simply say that,like, for instance, I believe
being able to share certainkinds of technology work in
(35:19):
co-production is, Those arethings that are going to be
essential.
We have plowed through reservesof certain key munitions as
we've provided it in both Israeland in the Ukraine.
At the same time, it's harderto replace those systems.
(35:42):
We've tried to do and work onsome co-production.
Some of those initiatives arestill up in the air, and there's
lots of trying to glean whereis Trump and his team going
here.
Ultimately, I believe that wewill not be possible
unilaterally as a country to beable to deal with these issues
(36:07):
alone.
I think we're going to needallies and partners to assist us
in capacity building,particularly when it comes to
high value, you know, kind oflow numbers in arsenal kinds of
(36:30):
circumstances and that, youknow, this kind of initiative is
going to be essential goingforward.
Andre Gonawela (36:37):
So in our last 10 minutes, I do want to go
through some strategic decisionpoints having to do with current
events.
So first, we've seen thesemounting concerns about China's
military industrial support toRussia, particularly with
sensitive technology transfersthat you flagged actually last
year while you were in office.
Has this deepening China-Russiaaxis meaningly shifted the
(37:01):
strategic picture for U.S.
and Asian allies and evenEuropean allies?
Kurt Campbell (37:06):
I think it's a great question.
I like all these questions.
In my view, it does.
I would just say a couple ofthings if I can, though.
There's probably norelationship that the United
States has gotten more wrongmore times than the Sino-Russian
relationship.
We missed the Sino-Soviet splitby something like 10 years.
(37:27):
It took us that long to reallyunderstand what was going on.
And more recently, we havetended to...
overlook the deep strategicbonds that President Xi and
President Putin have built nowover the course of the better
part of a decade or a decade anda half in which dozens of
(37:48):
meetings, a thousand hours ofengagements.
It is a major project torebuild and to make this
bilateral relationship a keytouchstone in how both countries
think about the foreign policyestablishment and the foreign
policy they are seeking toimplement.
I frankly am deeply troubled bywhat China is doing in Russia.
(38:16):
Its efforts have helped prolongthe war.
It's helped Russia in itsefforts to basically rewrite the
territorial lines of Europe.
If you look at China'straditional approach to how to
conceptualize the global system.
Non-interference and respectfor lines of territorial
(38:42):
integrity are thought to beabsolutely central features of
how they think about the world,and here they are supporting a
conflict that is seeking tochange the lines of sovereignty
and nationality in the heart ofEurope where American strategic
(39:03):
purpose was birthed.
I'm quite concerned by that.
I'm not sure fundamentally.
Europe is anxious, Andre, buthow deep that is, I'm not sure.
And that's largely because thisinvasion has been such a shock.
It's been since the SecondWorld War that there'd been
(39:27):
really no conflict in Europe.
You know, brief things inBosnia and like, but this is a
major conflict with hugeconsequences.
It's been deep strategicallytroubling to Europe friends and
partners.
The first step they made,obviously, was to cut off oil
(39:49):
supplies from Russia.
That was a major blow, andthey've had to diversify under
the gun in a very short periodof time.
If you tell them that, look,Russia is being very ably
supported by China, and thenexpect the Chinese to take,
(40:11):
excuse me, the Europeans to takereally consequential sanctions
of the like, that would mean atthe same time doing both Russia
energy sanctions and otherthings on the Chinese side that
would hurt their economy.
They're worried about that, andthey are very careful how they
talk about what China does.
(40:33):
and Russia are doing together.
And they try to talk with theChinese about it, but they talk
about it often in a fairlypolite European way, like, you
know, lots of pleases andoftentimes the...
Russians tell European friendskind of what they want to hear.
(40:56):
And much of that is aroundPablum about we want peace and
we want to end the conflict.
But the truth is, as much asWestern nations and Ukraine have
indicated they'd be preparedfor certain kinds of
engagements, more and more, moreand more, it looks as if
(41:20):
Russia, with China's backing, isprepared to fight this to the
finish.
Andre Gonawela (41:25):
So I also want to touch on the Middle East now.
We have the ceasefire that'sstill holding between Israel and
Iran.
How should the U.S.
be thinking about regionalpriorities in the Middle East
without losing focus on theIndo-Pacific?
Kurt Campbell (41:38):
Well, look, you know, we've already made our bed
in so many different ways.
I think the hard thing is goingto be ultimately how does Iran
respond or have they decided notto?
My own sense, and I'm not anexpert, but my recent experience
working on these issues at theState Department would suggest
(41:58):
that Iran is not going to leaveit at that.
They're going to have someresponse at some point, either
directly at the U.S.
or against one of our allies.
And so we just have to beprepared for that as a
likelihood, not as apossibility.
It is also the case that theviolence that continues on in
(42:22):
Gaza is deeply troubling.
And I think in China'sinterest, excuse me, in Israel's
interest to find the best wayforward to suspend hostilities,
get the hostages released, andtry to find some modicum of
stability there going forward.
(42:43):
What we've seen in the recentweeks is that in rapid
succession, Chinese armed forceshad moved aggressively in
Lebanon, in Syria, against theHouthis, and now against the
Revolutionary Guard in Iran.
And almost all of those, afterthe terrible surprise and
(43:05):
setback of the October 7thattacks, since then, I think
it'd be fair to say thatIsrael's responses have been
probably more predictable andmore in line with the
expectations I think many hadfor the Israeli armed forces.
(43:28):
But ultimately, The jointness,the ability to operate together,
to have very senior folks inbed, those are all things that
Israel serves with advantage andto their advantage more
directly.
How to think about the Ukrainething is difficult.
(43:52):
On the one hand, the Ukrainiansappreciate the support all the
things that we've done.
But ultimately, they believe itis their choice to decide when
and where it's time to not fightthe challenges that they're
dealing with.
Andre Gonawela (44:09):
So to round this whole conversation out, my last
question, what is the mostpersistent misconception that
U.S.
policymakers, lawmakers, andothers have have about the U.S.
role in Asia today?
Kurt Campbell (44:21):
Well, look, I think probably there are a
couple under.
One is to underestimate howmuch countries think about
American decline, which isfascinating given how powerful
we have been over the course ofthe last half century.
But there have been persistentanxieties beginning first during
(44:41):
the Korean War when NorthKorean forces smashed through
Task Force Smith at the ChosinReservoir.
There was a sense that just afew years after the end of the
Second World War that Americahad lost its fighting edge and
would be defeated.
Only we came surging backduring the Vietnam War, a sense
(45:04):
that we had lost, tremendoussetback, enormous anxiety in
Southeast Asia, uncertaintyabout what to expect.
End of the Cold War, a viewthat, you know, both the United
States and the former SovietUnion were exhausted.
Maybe Japan was the winner,followed by a period where the
(45:24):
idea was it was a unipolarmoment of just tremendous power
of the United States as far asthe eye can see, 90s financial
crisis, 2007, 2008, globaleconomic crisis, these all call
into question the Western model,China's rise.
In each of these case studies,each of these periods, lots of
(45:46):
worry about whether the UnitedStates has the staying power,
the inventiveness to continue toplay such a dominant role.
Now, in each previous period,we have had the wit and wisdom
to be able to define ourparameters, to reinvent using
(46:07):
innovation and technologyeffectively, and then continue
to play a leading role.
Now, the question is, is therea time going to come where we
cannot answer the call of thatbell?
And my answer would be, Icertainly hope not in my
lifetime, but I just don't, youknow, it's hard to have a a
(46:28):
crystal ball here generally.
But there are anxieties in theregion about the United States,
about whether we're eitherinward-looking or less effective
in many respects in comparisonto our Chinese and other
interlocutors more directly.
I think that would be the issuethat I would want most for
(46:53):
people to understand and reflecton carefully.
Andre Gonawela (46:57):
Kurt, thank you so much for joining me here
today.
For our audience, we'll have alink to Kurt's piece co-authored
with Rush Doshi calledUnderestimating China, where he
talks about those concepts ofallied scale in foreign affairs,
linked in the episodedescription.
But for now, Kurt, thank you somuch.
I really appreciate it.
Kurt Campbell (47:15):
Andre did a great job.
You live to work another day.
I appreciate all the goodquestions.
Thank you for this opportunity.
I look forward to watching itmyself.
So really appreciate the chanceto be with you today.
Thank you very much.
Hi, my name is Andre Gonawela.
Welcome back to the Burn BagPodcast.
My guest today is Dr.
Kurt Campbell, one of thearchitects of modern US strategy
in the Indo-Pacific.
He recently served asthe Deputy Secretary of State
(00:22):
and was the Bidenadministration's first
Indo-Pacific coordinator at theNational Security Council.
A former assistant secretary ofstate and U.S.
Navy officer, he's widelycredited with shaping the pivot
to Asia and co-founded both theCenter for a New American
Security and the Asia Group.
Folks, for transparency, I alsowork at the Asia Group, so I'm
going to be quite really nice toKurt today.
Kurt Campbell (00:45):
Exceptionally careful, Andre.
That's what's on tap for today.
Andre Gonawela (00:49):
Exceptionally careful.
Thanks, Kurt.
So in today's episode, we'll beunpacking the U.S.
approach to China, the role ofallies and partners, ongoing
tariff negotiations, and what itwill take to compete at scale
in the region.
Kurt recently co-authored withRush Doshi, a great piece in
Foreign Affairs called“Underestimating China”.
(01:10):
We'll dive into that piece in alittle bit as well.
But Kurt, thanks so much forjoining me here today.
I really appreciate it.
Kurt Campbell (01:16):
It's great to be with you, and I really look
forward to the conversation.
Andre Gonawela (01:19):
So, Kurt, big picture, the U.S.
posture in the Asia-Pacific.
So, as I said, you've beencredited with shaping that pivot
to Asia during the Obamaadministration.
Are we still pivoting to Asiaor have recent crises such as
what we've been seeing in theMiddle East, the recent tariff
agenda and other things?
(01:40):
Has that pulled us back towardsa more narrow protectionist
posture?
,
Kurt Campbell (01:46):
Let me first say, Andre, that this idea of
spending more time, focusingmore resources on the
Indo-Pacific is not a recentthing.
Several precedingadministrations have sought to
make the turn to perhaps spendmore time in the Indo-Pacific
(02:10):
and less in some of the verychallenging geographies of the
Middle East in particular.
What turns out, however, isthat it's easier said than done,
much harder to do than peoplerealize.
And so every administration hassought over the last 30 years
to focus more on theIndo-Pacific, only to find that
(02:33):
either domestic preoccupationsor challenges that arise in
Europe with the Russian invasionof Ukraine or the cascading
conflicts in the Middle Eastdraw the United States as the
global superpower into the fray.
And as a consequence, some ofthe time and attention that
(02:58):
would be naturally devoted tothe Indo-Pacific gets focused
there.
And so I think in truth, thischallenge has, struck every
administration, including theone I most recently served in.
I think President Biden did anadmirable job at continuing to
(03:22):
focus on major initiatives likethe Quad, like AUKUS, like the
trilateral engagement betweenthe United States, Japan, and
South Korea, even in the midstof pressing other challenges in
other regions and the like.
But it is undeniably difficult,and it stresses our system to
(03:44):
have these competing interestsand areas of focus.
I think when the Trumpadministration came to power,
many of their key adherentsinside the government talked a
lot about focusing more on theIndo-Pacific, but but often in a
(04:05):
very narrow way, almost asingular military focus on the
China challenge.
Less focus on building upallies and partners.
Indeed, the major initiative inthe Indo-Pacific to begin with
has been frankly, discord in avariety of capitals around trade
(04:27):
issues, which rather thanbuilding consensus and
partnership among like-mindedstates, if anything, has just
created anxieties.
Andre Gonawela (04:37):
So, I mean, I think tariffs are the top of
mind for a lot of folks inWashington, D.C.
right now.
It's certainly been top of mindat the Asia Group.
But I mean, the Trumpadministration is pressing for
these tariff concessions fromkey partners like Japan, South
Korea, India and so many others,while still advancing these
reciprocal tariff measures, howdo you assess the current U.S.
(05:00):
negotiating approach,especially in the context where
I think we saw a bunch ofletters go out to our trading
partners yesterday?
Can we secure trade wins inthis fashion while still
sustaining long-term strategictrust with allies and partners?
Kurt Campbell (05:19):
You know, Andre, there's so much embedded into
that simple question.
So the first thing that we'vegot to underscore is that these
initial, quote, quote, dealsthat have been struck with Great
Britain, Vietnam, a couple ofothers, you know, it's something
(05:41):
more than musings on a back ofa napkin, but certainly
something far less than anegotiated text kind of
agreement that approaches whichis a treaty.
These are general parametersthat will guide future
conversations.
And in general, the focus haslargely been at this juncture on
(06:06):
issues associated with tariffs.
There's been much less focus onissues that what might be
described as structuralimpediments that have made it
difficult, for instance, incertain markets for American
products and services toeffectively penetrate.
And there's less in the senseof these agreements being caught
(06:34):
or defining.
Many of these countries struckdeals with the Trump
administration during hisprevious term, and so are asking
the question, you know, what'sdifferent now?
You know, and is this aunilateral decision for the
United States at any point todecide, well, we need or want
(06:59):
more.
I think the strategy that hasbeen followed by many of these
countries, and there are six orseven ongoing negotiations in
the Indo-Pacific, in Asia, as wespeak, the most important one
obviously being with China.
But generally speaking, in anumber of circumstances, the
(07:23):
country faces a very seriouspotential step with respect to
tariffs on autos, like, forinstance, in Japan and South
Korea.
So the strategy has been forthese countries to try to find
areas where it can signal adesire both to arrest these
(07:45):
imbalances, but also to perhapsfind other areas issues on the
other side of the ledger thatfavor the United States.
And so Japan is looking atinvesting more in the United
States, buying more agriculturalproducts, perhaps looking at
energy infrastructure in Alaska,shipbuilding and the like.
(08:09):
But I think the worry now is,after what's happened in
Vietnam, is it looked like theVietnamese were negotiating all
these various sort of side dealsand complementary elements in
order to lower the actual tariffon products.
(08:31):
And I think the Vietnamesethought they had done that only
at the last to find that theUnited States had raised that
level again to 20%.
And so, again, very complicatedset of interactions.
I don't think many of thecountries involved are that
comfortable with either theprocess or the outcomes.
(08:53):
It almost feels as if there area number of negotiations that
take place.
There's some early work that'sbeen done almost like clearing
the field by staffers atTreasury at Commerce and the
National Economic Council, thenengagement at the cabinet level,
(09:14):
and then it's ultimatelydelivered to the president.
The challenge is that the textthat presented to the president
from our side and from theperspective of our negotiating
partners, they've thought ofthat as being a final text or a
final approach.
But the president sometimes hasdifferent ideas.
(09:35):
So once he gets on the line,maybe he decides to add another
10% here or there, right?
And it's challenging for thesecountries because they don't
necessarily want to incur thewrath or the disappointment of
the president, so are inclinedto be more quiet about their
misgivings.
(09:56):
And so it's a very complicatedprocess.
And the way that the governmentsort of the diktats have been
presented publicly has createdreally substantial market
turmoil in ways that I do notthink are in the interests of
(10:16):
the United States, our keybusinesses, or the interests of
our allies and partners.
Andre Gonawela (10:22):
Absolutely.
And I mean, it's so easy to getbogged down in so many of these
details, so much of the churn,so much of the daily changing
headlines around the tariffnegotiations and what we're
trying to get access to, whatproducts we're talking about,
what services we're talkingabout.
So many of my friends who arenot working in foreign policy,
(10:42):
not working in economics.
They're trying to ask me, youknow, Andre, like what's going
on with the tariff stuff?
And sometimes I have a hardtime explaining that my dad who
works in retail, my mom whoworks at a daycare, they're just
confused about the wholesituation right now.
Can—
Kurt Campbell (10:57):
Can I just add to this real quickly?
That is the question that comesup the most from Indo-Pacific
partners and friends, eitheralong the quarters of power in
government offices orboardrooms.
And that is like, what's thestrategy behind all of this?
(11:17):
And it's difficult to try toconvey.
You know, I'll give you anexample.
So in Asia, it's often possiblethat to do two things that
appear contradictory at once.
And so, for instance, Iremember talking to a very
senior Vietnamese diplomat and Iasked him, like, what does it
(11:40):
take to be effective as arepresentative of your country
in this complex contemporarytime?
And he said, you have to keepin mind two things constantly.
And I said, oh yes, what'sthat?
He said, number one, you haveto get along with China.
It is absolutely essential.
to find ways to get along withthe big neighbor to the north.
(12:03):
And I understood that.
I said, well, what's numbertwo?
What's the second thing youalways have to do?
He said, at the same time, youmust always resist China.
You must always challengeChina.
And so this idea of these twoseemingly contradictory things,
sometimes harder for a Westernperspective to fully understand.
(12:26):
Likewise, it is hard forinterlocutors in the
Indo-Pacific to imagine thatpolicy is sometimes being made
without some sort of strategicperspective.
I think the president isanimated by daily events, by
contemporary issues, by how he'sfeeling, by long long-held
(12:51):
grievances and disappointmentsand biases.
And so I'm not sure there is aneat strategic frame that can be
applied that reveals the deeperyou know, kind of understanding
about how the formulation andexecution of American foreign
(13:13):
policy works under PresidentTrump.
And so the one thing I wouldjust simply tell you is that
when searching for that patternthat somehow links everything
together, I'm not sure you'regoing to be successful in
finding it.
And what our job really is, isto and convince interlocutors to
(13:39):
understand how much evencomplex policy is being made on
the fly.
Andre Gonawela (13:47):
Absolutely.
It's all very confusing.
There's so much happening.
And I think, though,transitioning into another topic
that's somewhat related, you'vetalked about the need for
pooled markets, greater alliedeconomic scale to compete with
China.
As you mentioned earlier, A lotof Indo-Pacific countries are
(14:09):
trying to balance, you know,trying to get along with China,
but trying to resist China atthe same time.
Given that current U.S.
tariff posture, what practicalsteps can the U.S.
and its partners actually taketo build the shared economic
space, even though we still haveso much of these ongoing trade
(14:29):
frictions?
Kurt Campbell (14:31):
Yeah, that's so I would just say the framework
that you lay out, which is let'swork more closely with allies
and partners, I'm not sure thatgeneral framework is accepted by
the dominant actors in theTrump administration.
And in fact, I think in manyrespects, you have a worldview
(14:53):
that suggests that some of thesepartnerships are encumbering
and that are somehow, you know,holding the United States down
from being able to accomplishwhat it really needs to do.
And so you occasionally hearcommentary about Europe and even
about partners in the AsiaPacific, the Indo-Pacific, that
(15:19):
question reliability, defensespending you can just go down
the list.
And so I'm not quite sure thatthere is the same sense in this
administration about the need tocreate scale.
From my perspective, everychallenge that we have faced in
foreign policy and nationalsecurity over the course of the
(15:40):
last century, we haveessentially been able to meet
that challenge with our own sortof internal unilateral
capacity, right?
We had enough during the SecondWorld War, during the Gulf War,
during Vietnam.
Even though we worked inconjunction and coordination
(16:04):
with other countries, we had thecapacity necessary to deal with
the particular challenges.
This is the first time that weconfront a potential challenger
in which we do not have theadvantage of scale.
We are not able to take this onalone.
(16:24):
But I think that very, in myview, obvious insight, I think
might be rejected by folks onthe Trump team who would say,
look, we've got to be able tomanage this more on our own.
and be careful and wary aboutputting too much hope that
(16:48):
allies and partners will be withus.
I think that worldview, ifanything, underestimates the
solidarity that we've seenhistorically between the United
States and its allies andpartners.
And so what I worry about rightnow is that through the steps
(17:10):
that the president has taken intrade in particular, we are
running the risk of alienatingour closest partners in the
region because of perceptionsaround imbalances in a few key
areas like autos.
Andre Gonawela (17:32):
Absolutely.
And you mentioned that termscale.
And I do want to dive into thattheme in the context of allied
scale, which you write about inthat foreign affairs piece.
But before then, I just want todive a little bit into US-China
competition and some of therisks present therein.
So you've argued againstunderestimating China's scale.
(17:53):
What's your current read?
Is China playing for regionaldominance, global leadership, or
both?
So
Kurt Campbell (18:00):
look, Andre, I think one of the things that is
undeniable is that as aleadership group, China spends
an inordinate amount of time onnational strategies, both
domestically andinternationally.
And I think some of that workand those gatherings are
shrouded in secrecy, but what wethink we know is that China
(18:25):
believes that its time is comingand that it will...
play the dominant role inglobal politics.
And I think most Chinesestrategic interlocutors, they
may not, you know, kind of shoutit from the rooftops, but they
probably believe that the UnitedStates is in decline.
(18:45):
And some would suggest that theUnited States is in hurtling
decline.
And so what they have allsought to do in, as they think
about China, China's ownresponse to that is the question
about when do you challenge theUnited States head on directly.
(19:06):
And I think the surprise withXi Jinping was that he chose to
take on the United States quitepublicly early and earlier than
probably was warranted withrespect to its ultimate power,
and that that effort could havewaited 10 or 15 years.
But by doing so, it alerts theUnited States and other allies
(19:30):
and partners about what isunderway.
But also, it has made clear tothose of us in the West the
areas and the terms on which thefight will be based on in
technology and a variety ofother areas where China is
seeking to both husband its ownresources, carefully prepare for
(19:56):
potential challenges againstit, and basically have a game
plan for achieving dominance ina number of key areas with
respect to technology, at least.
So I guess my point here,Andre, would be simply this,
that I think the Chinese do havea...
(20:17):
clear set of where they want togo.
And I think much of that isanimated by a belief that their
time has come and that they'regoing to reassert their
traditional role at the centerof the tributary system in the
(20:37):
Indo-Pacific.
And I think there are more andmore signs that that goal, that
objective often hit it kind ofclandestine is increasingly
animating the views andobjectives of senior Chinese
interlocutors.
Andre Gonawela (20:55):
So how should we think about our U.S.
interdependence with China?
I mean, where isdisentanglement achievable and
where is a structure impossible?
Because, I mean, that's thequestion that so many people
have, that we are so dependenton China.
China is also dependent on us.
Where can we actually...
grow apart, if that's at allpossible.
Kurt Campbell (21:16):
Yeah.
So look, the first thing Iwould say is that there are no
two countries moreinterdependent than the United
States and China.
There are no two countries moreuncomfortable with that
interdependence as well.
Both countries have come tolearn and realize the hard way
that taking steps to reduceinterdependence, mutual
(21:39):
vulnerability is challenging.
It will take decades probably,and that many of the efforts
will be met with either failureor will stir the anxiety of the
other nation and perhaps thosearound it.
I would say that at a verybasic level, the United States
(22:07):
is in a position where it isseeking to ease certain areas of
vulnerability in rare earthsand critical minerals and a
variety of other highlysignificant areas.
It turns out that the pathtowards self-sufficiency is
(22:31):
unbelievably long and difficult.
And in some cases, we've madealmost no progress whatsoever.
And so I think the dominantrealization on policymakers is
just how reliant we are in eachother.
China, having made such aninvestment in the dollar over
(22:51):
decades, finds it difficult nowto diversify.
The United States finds itdifficult to undertake major
manufacturing with certaintechnologies, given that so many
of them have come or will comefrom China.
Andre Gonawela (23:07):
So your recent foreign affairs piece, with Rush
Doshi, argues that the UnitedStates has to build, quote,
allied scale to offset China'sadvantages.
What exactly is this term,allied scale?
And what's the single biggestobstacle to actually achieving
this in practice?
Kurt Campbell (23:26):
Well, allied scale is meant to conjure up
periods in the past where weworking with other countries
have been effective at puttingtogether kind of a formidable
arena of joint cooperation,whether it's co-production,
co-development, operations,military and the like.
(23:50):
It's extremely important to beable to undertake some of those
steps.
And I think the scorecard thatyou're asking for we would have
to, the best we could hope foris an incomplete grade.
Because I think what you'redescribing is a process where
(24:12):
it's gone much slower thananticipated for a variety of
reasons.
Again, this interdependence,these interdependence elements
are designed in such a way thatthey often embed in the system
and then it's more difficult toremove them over time.
And so I'm not at all clearthat we're in a situation in
(24:37):
which it will be even possibleto do the fundamental reordering
that the United Statessometimes talks about.
Andre Gonawela (24:46):
So bipartisanship on China has held
in so many areas, but we'realso living in a hyper-partisan
political climate right now.
Are we really capable ofsustaining long-term coalition
building that you say would beessential?
I think at the heart of this,
Kurt Campbell (25:03):
Andre, is the key question about national
policymaking and the periods inwhich we enjoyed a degree of
elite consensus around the majorthrust avenues of American
policy, either domestic orinternational, were clear.
There may have been a fewoutliers on each side, but that
(25:26):
dominant view remained.
And the view that I think makesthe most sense is this, excuse
me, deeply engaged set ofinitiatives on technology and
the like between our allies andpartners.
It means transcending oftenpaternal relationships that are
(25:46):
based in earlier securitytreaties that don't quite
measure up to 21st centuryconditions.
The journey is still out aboutwhat ultimately this will mean.
I do believe at some point inthe future that we are likely to
have a kind of crisis ofreassurance or trust, and then
(26:10):
being able to muster thecapacity to indicate that no,
despite some of the challengesthat we have faced mutually, we
are determined to tackle theseproblems together.
I think what we've seen to datehas been quite a harsh Japanese
approach to issues involvingJapan, for instance, and much
(26:36):
more flexibility when it comesto Vietnam or other countries as
well.
Andre Gonawela (26:43):
So in stepping into this concept of the scaled
leadership the United Statesneeds, how should we think about
the roles of allies such asJapan and Korea or partners such
as India?
Can they step into this idea ofscaled leadership or would we
still be defaulting to a hub andspokes type of model?
Kurt Campbell (27:04):
So I think my own counsel, Andre, is that the hub
and spoke framework, themetaphor was most applicable
during an earlier period ofAmerican strategy.
And that had it with the UnitedStates kind of at the center,
reaching out to a variety ofdisconnected actors.
(27:25):
What we're increasingly seeingis coordination and engagement
among those actors, amongthemselves, right?
Some of it involving the UnitedStates, but some of it acting
and taking place alone.
And so I think that is a newand important feature that is
playing out as we speak.
(27:45):
I think it is also the casethat it would be hard to
describe the level of anxiety inthe Indo-Pacific, largely
because they do not know what toexpect going forward.
So for instance, Japan, who hasbasically put so much towards
(28:06):
the idea of a closeU.S.-Japanese relationship, we
have the same thing with Korea,only to find that they're in a
situation sort of adisintegrating security
situation around theIndo-Pacific.
You know, challenges from arevanchist Russia, provocations
(28:29):
from North Korea, China on themarch, huge defense spending.
In that environment, you want arock-solid relationship with
the United States, but everyheadline is of every newspaper
and news show across Asia isabout how much the United States
and Japan are struggling to endup with a final sort of
(28:51):
agreement.
And much as they talk and tryto explain it to Japanese
friends, much as they try toexplain it to us, it's been hard
to get that message through, ifyou know what I'm saying.
Andre Gonawela (29:06):
No, absolutely.
Kurt, I want to touch onanother topic that you worked on
in the Biden administrationthat a lot of people have been
paying attention to in a defensecontext, and that is AUKUS.
This defense cooperationagreement, this pact between the
United States, Australia, andthe United Kingdom, pillar one
focused on submarines, pillartwo has focused on other
(29:27):
critical and emergingtechnologies.
It was seen as, I think, agreat achievement by the Biden
administration to push forwardthat defense cooperation but
there's been recent growingconcern among allies about the
AUKUS review that the Pentagonis now undertaking.
Kurt, can you tell us a littlebit more about why is AUKUS
(29:48):
important, and is AUKUS actuallyat risk with this review?
Kurt Campbell (29:53):
Andre, thank you for the question.
Well, first of all, as youunderscore, it links Great
Britain, the United States, andAustralia in a unique way in
terms of the construction andengagement on the next step
nuclear-powered conventionallyarmed submarine.
This would be the first timethat we shared this kind of
(30:14):
technology with a country since1957, 1958, so more than 65
years.
I think there was a belief thatAustralia reached that level of
partnership and mateship thatthey should be and wanted to be
included in this.
Great distances involved, thesize of the oceans meant that
(30:37):
nuclear power Propulsion mademore sense than simply
conventional diesel submarines.
So I think the strategicrationale was clear, bringing
our partners in Europe more intothe Indo-Pacific made sense.
So I think the strategicrationale is exciting.
(30:59):
It also brought substantialAustralian resources into the
United States to help our ownsubmarine industrial base here.
The truth is that both GreatBritain and Australia did a
review with new governmentscoming in, new groups.
It's not unusual for the UnitedStates to do a review.
(31:23):
There are elements in the U.S.
government that question someof the central parameters of
AUKUS, but I am confident that,first of all, it's completely
appropriate to do a review, andwe have to be open to some of
the conclusions There may besuggestions of more defense
(31:44):
spending, more certaintyassociated with the use of this
incredible platform.
But at the same time, thelarger questions about whether
to undo the pact or move inanother direction, I do not
believe fundamentally that kindof recommendation is possible.
(32:08):
likely or valid.
I just think there's so muchmoney, there's so much focus on
this program.
If there was a decision to walkaway from it on the part of the
United States, then I thinkthat would lead to a crisis in
confidence, not just with ourallies and partners, but others
who are watching this agreementclosely.
(32:31):
Lots of things that are beingdebated, whether Australia would
provide some assurances abouthow a submarine in this
arrangement would be used in awarfighting situation.
All I can tell you is that theAustralians have been with us at
(32:51):
every major turn.
They would probably be a littlebit more careful to talk about
it.
publicly or to deal with it.
I think, Andre, you probablyhave tracked this as well.
But at the same time, you know,there is, I think, a belief in
(33:11):
some quarters that the momentumis there and it will carry on
and the recommendations will beon the margins.
I've engaged with a lot ofpeople who are working on it and
with undersecretary at theDefense Department who is
(33:32):
undertaking the review.
Time will tell.
But ultimately, the number ofsenior leaders and others who've
weighed in in support of AUKUSis substantial.
The British Prime Ministerengaged President Trump and
basically said, look, we're allin.
And at least in that meeting,President Trump gave it the
vote, the thumbs up.
(33:53):
Now, we'll just have to see howthis plays out.
But I worry that too muchtinkering and focus on how it
looks, whatever could lead to asituation in which we have
backlogs and difficulties comingforward.
Andre Gonawela (34:10):
No, absolutely.
And I think we have been seeingbipartisan support for AUKUS.
I mean, we recently saw somecongressional bills that were
introduced by Republican andDemocratic members of the House
aiming to bolster AUKUS.
But I mean, you know, AUKUSsort of fits in to the goal, I
guess, of this two-way allieddefense industrial base.
(34:35):
In terms of driving forwardthis defense industrial base
shared by the allies, especiallyas we're trying to push forward
defense innovation, we'retrying to accelerate and advance
emerging and new technologies,what's probably the most urgent
policy or legal change that weneed to unlock to get there?
Kurt Campbell (34:57):
Gosh, I'd love to tell you there was just one or
two simple things that have tobe like, like, like, you know,
in your mind, you've got to likea switch that you just flick.
That is not the case.
So I would simply say that,like, for instance, I believe
being able to share certainkinds of technology work in
(35:19):
co-production is, Those arethings that are going to be
essential.
We have plowed through reservesof certain key munitions as
we've provided it in both Israeland in the Ukraine.
At the same time, it's harderto replace those systems.
(35:42):
We've tried to do and work onsome co-production.
Some of those initiatives arestill up in the air, and there's
lots of trying to glean whereis Trump and his team going
here.
Ultimately, I believe that wewill not be possible
unilaterally as a country to beable to deal with these issues
(36:07):
alone.
I think we're going to needallies and partners to assist us
in capacity building,particularly when it comes to
high value, you know, kind oflow numbers in arsenal kinds of
(36:30):
circumstances and that, youknow, this kind of initiative is
going to be essential goingforward.
Andre Gonawela (36:37):
So in our last 10 minutes, I do want to go
through some strategic decisionpoints having to do with current
events.
So first, we've seen thesemounting concerns about China's
military industrial support toRussia, particularly with
sensitive technology transfersthat you flagged actually last
year while you were in office.
Has this deepening China-Russiaaxis meaningly shifted the
(37:01):
strategic picture for U.S.
and Asian allies and evenEuropean allies?
Kurt Campbell (37:06):
I think it's a great question.
I like all these questions.
In my view, it does.
I would just say a couple ofthings if I can, though.
There's probably norelationship that the United
States has gotten more wrongmore times than the Sino-Russian
relationship.
We missed the Sino-Soviet splitby something like 10 years.
(37:27):
It took us that long to reallyunderstand what was going on.
And more recently, we havetended to...
overlook the deep strategicbonds that President Xi and
President Putin have built nowover the course of the better
part of a decade or a decade anda half in which dozens of
(37:48):
meetings, a thousand hours ofengagements.
It is a major project torebuild and to make this
bilateral relationship a keytouchstone in how both countries
think about the foreign policyestablishment and the foreign
policy they are seeking toimplement.
I frankly am deeply troubled bywhat China is doing in Russia.
(38:16):
Its efforts have helped prolongthe war.
It's helped Russia in itsefforts to basically rewrite the
territorial lines of Europe.
If you look at China'straditional approach to how to
conceptualize the global system.
Non-interference and respectfor lines of territorial
(38:42):
integrity are thought to beabsolutely central features of
how they think about the world,and here they are supporting a
conflict that is seeking tochange the lines of sovereignty
and nationality in the heart ofEurope where American strategic
(39:03):
purpose was birthed.
I'm quite concerned by that.
I'm not sure fundamentally.
Europe is anxious, Andre, buthow deep that is, I'm not sure.
And that's largely because thisinvasion has been such a shock.
It's been since the SecondWorld War that there'd been
(39:27):
really no conflict in Europe.
You know, brief things inBosnia and like, but this is a
major conflict with hugeconsequences.
It's been deep strategicallytroubling to Europe friends and
partners.
The first step they made,obviously, was to cut off oil
(39:49):
supplies from Russia.
That was a major blow, andthey've had to diversify under
the gun in a very short periodof time.
If you tell them that, look,Russia is being very ably
supported by China, and thenexpect the Chinese to take,
(40:11):
excuse me, the Europeans to takereally consequential sanctions
of the like, that would mean atthe same time doing both Russia
energy sanctions and otherthings on the Chinese side that
would hurt their economy.
They're worried about that, andthey are very careful how they
talk about what China does.
(40:33):
and Russia are doing together.
And they try to talk with theChinese about it, but they talk
about it often in a fairlypolite European way, like, you
know, lots of pleases andoftentimes the...
Russians tell European friendskind of what they want to hear.
(40:56):
And much of that is aroundPablum about we want peace and
we want to end the conflict.
But the truth is, as much asWestern nations and Ukraine have
indicated they'd be preparedfor certain kinds of
engagements, more and more, moreand more, it looks as if
(41:20):
Russia, with China's backing, isprepared to fight this to the
finish.
Andre Gonawela (41:25):
So I also want to touch on the Middle East now.
We have the ceasefire that'sstill holding between Israel and
Iran.
How should the U.S.
be thinking about regionalpriorities in the Middle East
without losing focus on theIndo-Pacific?
Kurt Campbell (41:38):
Well, look, you know, we've already made our bed
in so many different ways.
I think the hard thing is goingto be ultimately how does Iran
respond or have they decided notto?
My own sense, and I'm not anexpert, but my recent experience
working on these issues at theState Department would suggest
(41:58):
that Iran is not going to leaveit at that.
They're going to have someresponse at some point, either
directly at the U.S.
or against one of our allies.
And so we just have to beprepared for that as a
likelihood, not as apossibility.
It is also the case that theviolence that continues on in
(42:22):
Gaza is deeply troubling.
And I think in China'sinterest, excuse me, in Israel's
interest to find the best wayforward to suspend hostilities,
get the hostages released, andtry to find some modicum of
stability there going forward.
(42:43):
What we've seen in the recentweeks is that in rapid
succession, Chinese armed forceshad moved aggressively in
Lebanon, in Syria, against theHouthis, and now against the
Revolutionary Guard in Iran.
And almost all of those, afterthe terrible surprise and
(43:05):
setback of the October 7thattacks, since then, I think
it'd be fair to say thatIsrael's responses have been
probably more predictable andmore in line with the
expectations I think many hadfor the Israeli armed forces.
(43:28):
But ultimately, The jointness,the ability to operate together,
to have very senior folks inbed, those are all things that
Israel serves with advantage andto their advantage more
directly.
How to think about the Ukrainething is difficult.
(43:52):
On the one hand, the Ukrainiansappreciate the support all the
things that we've done.
But ultimately, they believe itis their choice to decide when
and where it's time to not fightthe challenges that they're
dealing with.
Andre Gonawela (44:09):
So to round this whole conversation out, my last
question, what is the mostpersistent misconception that
U.S.
policymakers, lawmakers, andothers have have about the U.S.
role in Asia today?
Kurt Campbell (44:21):
Well, look, I think probably there are a
couple under.
One is to underestimate howmuch countries think about
American decline, which isfascinating given how powerful
we have been over the course ofthe last half century.
But there have been persistentanxieties beginning first during
(44:41):
the Korean War when NorthKorean forces smashed through
Task Force Smith at the ChosinReservoir.
There was a sense that just afew years after the end of the
Second World War that Americahad lost its fighting edge and
would be defeated.
Only we came surging backduring the Vietnam War, a sense
(45:04):
that we had lost, tremendoussetback, enormous anxiety in
Southeast Asia, uncertaintyabout what to expect.
End of the Cold War, a viewthat, you know, both the United
States and the former SovietUnion were exhausted.
Maybe Japan was the winner,followed by a period where the
(45:24):
idea was it was a unipolarmoment of just tremendous power
of the United States as far asthe eye can see, 90s financial
crisis, 2007, 2008, globaleconomic crisis, these all call
into question the Western model,China's rise.
In each of these case studies,each of these periods, lots of
(45:46):
worry about whether the UnitedStates has the staying power,
the inventiveness to continue toplay such a dominant role.
Now, in each previous period,we have had the wit and wisdom
to be able to define ourparameters, to reinvent using
(46:07):
innovation and technologyeffectively, and then continue
to play a leading role.
Now, the question is, is therea time going to come where we
cannot answer the call of thatbell?
And my answer would be, Icertainly hope not in my
lifetime, but I just don't, youknow, it's hard to have a a
(46:28):
crystal ball here generally.
But there are anxieties in theregion about the United States,
about whether we're eitherinward-looking or less effective
in many respects in comparisonto our Chinese and other
interlocutors more directly.
I think that would be the issuethat I would want most for
(46:53):
people to understand and reflecton carefully.
Andre Gonawela (46:57):
Kurt, thank you so much for joining me here
today.
For our audience, we'll have alink to Kurt's piece co-authored
with Rush Doshi calledUnderestimating China, where he
talks about those concepts ofallied scale in foreign affairs,
linked in the episodedescription.
But for now, Kurt, thank you somuch.
I really appreciate it.
Kurt Campbell (47:15):
Andre did a great job.
You live to work another day.
I appreciate all the goodquestions.
Thank you for this opportunity.
I look forward to watching itmyself.
So really appreciate the chanceto be with you today.
Thank you very much.
Popular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.
Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.