August 6, 2025 • 15 mins
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More than two years after the implosion of a submersible expedition to the Titanic wreck, the U.S. Coast Guard has released its final report into what went wrong.
According to the 335-page document, the disaster, which killed five people, was preventable – driven by flawed design, regulatory avoidance, and a toxic workplace culture. This landmark report paints a damning picture of OceanGate (the company behind the mission) and of its late CEO, Stockton Rush.
Today, we’ll take you through what happened to the Titan, what the report found, its recommendations, and whether anyone could still face legal consequences.
Hosts: Emma Gillespie and Sam Koslowski
Producer: Orla Maher
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Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Before we jump into today's podcast, We've got a really
quick ask of you to ensure this podcast remains really
relevant and useful to everyone listening. We'd love to learn
more about you. We've put a short survey in today's
show notes, and we'd be so grateful if you could
fill it out. It'll only take a couple of minutes.
Thanks in advance for helping TDA. Now let's get into
(00:20):
it already, and this this is the Daily This is
the Daily OS.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
Oh, now it makes sense. Good morning, and welcome to
the Daily OS. It's Thursday, the seventh of August. I'm
Emma Gillespie.
Speaker 1 (00:40):
I'm Sam Kazlowski.
Speaker 2 (00:41):
More than two years after the implosion of a submersible
expedition to the Titanic wreck, the US Coast Guard has
released its final report into what went wrong. According to
the three hundred and thirty five page document, the disaster,
which killed five people, was preventable and driven flawed design,
regulatory avoidance, and a toxic workplace culture. This landmark report
(01:06):
paints a damning picture of Oceangate, the company behind the mission,
and of its late CEO, Stockton Rush. Today we are
going to take you through what happened to the Titan,
what the report found, its recommendations, and whether anyone could
still face legal consequences.
Speaker 1 (01:26):
Emma, why don't we go back to revisit this story.
It was two years ago. It was the biggest story
in the world for a while there. It's now got
a documentary on Netflix that has almost brought it back
into the frame. And now we've got this report. Take
me back to what the titan sub was and what
happened to it.
Speaker 2 (01:43):
Yes, so the titan was a deep sea submersible operated
by this private US company called ocean Gate. Now when
I say submersible, it was a vessel about the size
of a mini van and for the price of two
hundred and fifty thousand US dollars per per tourists were
offered the chance to travel down in the submersible to
(02:05):
see the wreck of the Titanic, the iconic shipwreck which
lies about three and a half thousand meters underwater in
the North Atlantic. Now, on the eighteenth of June twenty
twenty three, five people were on board the Titan that
includes Ocean Gates CEO and pilot of the vessels stocked
and Rush, a British billionaire named Hamish Harding, French Titanic
(02:27):
expert Paul Henri Najalais, and Pakistani businessman Shazada Darwood, who
was there with his teenage son. The vessel lost contact
about an hour and forty five minutes into its journey,
and what followed was, as you would remember, an international
search and rescue effort that absolutely gripped the world.
Speaker 1 (02:48):
And when they first went missing, there was this hope
that the crew could still be alive.
Speaker 2 (02:51):
Absolutely so we knew that the crew had four days
worth of oxygen emergency oxygen, so in the event that
they got trapped on the ocean floor, there would be
four days hypothetically for them to survive down there. But
on the twenty second of June, debris from the sub
was found near the Titanic site, roughly six hundred k's
(03:11):
off the coast of Newfoundland in Canada. Now officials confirmed
pretty much straightaway that the vessel had imploded on its descent,
killing everyone on board instantly.
Speaker 1 (03:24):
And the reason we're talking about it today is that
the US Coast Guard has released this very lengthy report
into the incident, trying to break down exactly where things
went wrong. Before we get into the report itself. Just
explain to me the role of the US Coast Guard
in all of this.
Speaker 2 (03:40):
Yes, so the Coast Guard or the USCG is responsible
for a whole raft of maritime measures, including leading rescue missions,
does that in US waters or in international areas under
US responsibility. It has maritime security responsibilities, and it also
acts as a regulatory and certificational authority, so it has
(04:00):
some safety responsibilities. Like in the case of the Titan Sub.
The Coast Guard leads investigations also into marine casualties, So
where there is loss of life or potential violations of
maritime law, it will lead investigations. Now, in line with that,
the Coast Guard led the Titan sub investigation because Oceangate
(04:21):
was a US based company and several of its passengers
were US citizens, despite the fact that it imploded somewhere
in international waters off Canada.
Speaker 1 (04:30):
So they've spent two years looking at this incident. What's
the top line finding here?
Speaker 2 (04:34):
So the biggest finding here is that the deaths of
the five people on board were entirely preventable and that
Oceangate failed at its leadership level and at every level
across the board. So the report found that the vessel's
design was never certified by independent engineers, and if you've
(04:55):
seen the Netflix stock o that goes into this a
little bit. Essentially, the vessel constructed and needed the certification
of a third party group to say, yep, this is
fit to explore the ocean floor to this certain depth,
and with that certification it would have been able to
sell tickets and operate as a fully legit tourist provider.
(05:17):
Safety warnings from engineers and staff were repeatedly ignored, the
report found, and it also said that key safety processes
were missing or deliberately avoided. One of the biggest red
flags that we've learned about in this report and over
the course of the last two years from various whistleblowers
is the use of carbon fiber for the Titan's main
(05:37):
pressure hull.
Speaker 1 (05:38):
As in the hull itself was made of carbon fiber.
Speaker 2 (05:41):
Yes, so the part of the sub that keeps the
passengers alive under extreme pressure at depths of three thousand
and four thousand meters below the sea level. That material
had never been used in a deep sea sub like
this before, so in the early days of the Titan sub,
the carbon fiber element was seen as really innovative as
this big breakthrough because carbon fiber is incredibly light, it's
(06:03):
a lot cheaper and easier to use, so there were
a lot of reasons to kind of be excited about
carbon fiber being in the hull.
Speaker 1 (06:10):
So is that actually in terms of the mechanics of it,
is that what failed to lead to the implosion? Yep.
Speaker 2 (06:17):
Now to understand this we have to do a little
bit of quick science talk about carbon fiber. But think
of carbon fiber like millions of little strands of string,
all connected, so all of those little strands can break
or weaken. An analysis of the sub showed that this
process had begun, called delamination. The layers of the carbon
(06:40):
fiber had started to separate, so there was evidence of
stress damage to the hull, and every time one of
those strings broke or came apart, it weakened the entire structure.
Engineers and staff had reportedly raised concerns about the design
on several occasions over the course of many years, but
according to the report from the Coast Guard oceangate created
(07:02):
a quote culture of fear and retaliation that silenced employees.
One employee was even fired after raising safety concerns and
multiple employees left the company during the development of the
sub and prior to that fatal journey in June twenty
twenty three.
Speaker 1 (07:19):
And I think what really strikes me about this report
is that it doesn't seem to be one factor just
in isolation. It's the conflation of factors. It's the idea
that you can have a material that wasn't seaworthy, but
then the concerns raised not being heard because of company
culture exactly. Either one of those by itself perhaps wouldn't
have led to this outcome. Tell me about the role
(07:41):
of the CEO, Stockton Rush in all of this, because
he was on board when the sub imploded, right.
Speaker 2 (07:47):
Yeah, so he died with the four other passengers. But
the findings against him in this report are incredibly scathing.
So the overarching theme or all of the findings kind
of trace back to this common finding that he had
this intense influence over everything and almost a narcissistic arrogance
(08:07):
about achieving the goal of taking the sub to the Titanic,
regardless of any safety risks. So he was the CEO,
the lead designer, the pilot, and the report says he
pursued innovation and speed as in speed to achieve the
expedition over safety and skipped established testing procedures. In fact,
(08:29):
the report says, and I think this is really critical
and what a lot of people have been waiting for,
that if he had survived, he would have likely faced
criminal charges for his role in the disaster and for
contributing to the deaths of the passengers.
Speaker 1 (08:41):
The report was really detailed about the way in which
he influenced company culture and his leadership style. Give me
a quick sense of the specifics there about that culture piece.
Speaker 2 (08:53):
Yes, so there's a strong link between Rush and these
findings of a toxic work environment. The report states that
for several years preceding the incident, Oceangate cut corners, quote,
leveraged intimidation tactics and what the report called the company's
favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny. So this reputation of
being a really innovative company doing something exciting and different,
(09:16):
and that they took advantage of that. The finding stated
that by strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges,
Oceangate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of
the established deep sea protocols, which had historically contributed to
a strong safety record for commercial submersibles.
Speaker 1 (09:36):
And what about the other passengers in all of this,
I mean, were they aware of all of these risks
and perhaps regulatory missing pieces before they jumped into that vessel.
Speaker 2 (09:47):
Yeah, that's a question that has come up a lot
over the last couple of years. And the report found
ultimately that the passengers were misled by the company. The
report says Oceangate called the passengers mission special and this
was a sort of loophole to get around the fact
that they were not certified to run the expedition with
paying tourists. But by bringing these people on as mission specialists,
(10:09):
they could argue that each person on board had a
particular role so served a purpose in that way, and
the contracts that they were made to sign really downplayed
the risks. In some cases, they overstated how tested and
safe the vessel really was. And to quote the report quote,
there was a systematic pattern of misrepresentation in how Oceangate
(10:30):
described for Titan's capabilities and testing history to clients and
to the public.
Speaker 1 (10:35):
So this large report has come out. Have we heard
from Oceangate in response to the report, and are they
still actually operating as a company.
Speaker 2 (10:43):
Yeah, it's worth noting the company essentially ceased operations after
the disaster just weeks after, so it hasn't responded directly
to the report at the time of recording. The website's
been taken down, and Oceangate hasn't made any public statements
for over a year. I don't think anyone is really
expecting to hear from anyone affiliated with Oceangate. A lot
(11:04):
of the people that worked for them have tried really
hard to distance themselves from that period of their careers.
Speaker 1 (11:10):
Have we heard much from the families of the passengers
who died.
Speaker 2 (11:14):
Yeah, some of the families have spoken out this week,
in particular the Darwood family, so that's the father and
son who died on board. They released a statement saying
no report could ease their loss, but they're hopeful that
it will lead to accountability and prevent future tragedies.
Speaker 1 (11:29):
I was really interested by that note that you raised
around the fact that it was likely that the CEO
would face criminal charges had he not been part of
the group that died. Are they going to be any
legal consequences for this? Obviously not surrounding him, but surrounding
other personnel in the company or the company itself.
Speaker 2 (11:47):
It is possible. So while we know Oceangate no longer
exists as a company, the Coast Guard has referred the
case to US federal prosecutors, and that could then open
the door to civil lawsuit or even criminal charges for
anyone else involved. But in terms of criminal proceedings, Stocked
and Rush, the CEO really is at the center of
(12:09):
all of the negligence that can be traced back to
human decision makingper interesting, but on a broader level, you know,
we could see civil suits from the families. And the
report calls for really significant change to how submersibles like
this are regulated, and particularly how private companies operate them,
because right now it's a pretty unregulated space.
Speaker 1 (12:29):
And one quote that really stood out to me in
those recommendations and that sense of discussing, you know, this
isn't the last time that we're going to see people
try and push the barriers of exploration, be it in
space or under the ocean or on land. That line
around innovation must never come at the cost of safety. Yeah,
tell me about the recommendations to kind of wrap this
(12:51):
all up, how does the US Coast Guard think that
we should all move forward in this space.
Speaker 2 (12:56):
So there are seventeen recommendations, a lot focused on safety
and certification. So the fact that that third party certification
never happened for the Titan, ultimately the Coastguard wants to
ensure that never happens again. So there's a series of
regulations there. There are recommendations for stronger whistle blower protections
because we know that several employees really tried to raise
(13:20):
the alarm on this before the tragedy happened. And there's
recommendations around clearer oversight of deep sea exploration, so frameworks
around international waters tourism in that space and who should
be responsible for kind of global safety and safety frameworks.
And it's recommended to ban or strictly limit the use
(13:41):
of unproven materials like carbon fiber for primary hold pressure
vessels until they can be independently validated in deep ocean conditions.
Speaker 1 (13:51):
It really gives me the sense that they're trying to
strike a balance between preserving that space for deep sea exploration,
the natural human desire to figure out what's out there
and what's deeper than we've ever gone before. But also
make sure that things are happening safely.
Speaker 2 (14:08):
Yeah, and you don't want to over regulate this space
to limit scientific exploration. But I guess there's a divide
between tourism versus valid scientific exploration and research. I think
to wrap it up, it's all about kind of correcting
failures and plugging regulatory gaps. But as the report said,
(14:29):
Oceangate strategy was to circumvent regulatory frameworks rather than engage
with them in good faith. So hopefully this is a
turning point for how deep sea tourism is regulated.
Speaker 1 (14:40):
All right, m So, right now the Coast Guard will
hand this to prosecutors and we'll wait to see if
some of those more formal criminal charges or civil cases
are laid. Thank you so much for taking us through that,
Thanks for having me, and thank you for joining us
on the Daily Ods this morning. We're going to be
back in your headphones with those headlines in the afternoon.
Until then, have a fantastic dame. We'll speak to you later.
(15:03):
My name is Lily Maddon and I'm a proud Arunda
Bungelung Calkatin woman from Gadighl Country. The Daily oz acknowledges
that this podcast is recorded on the lands of the
Gadighl people and pays respect to all Aboriginal and torrest
Rate island and nations. We pay our respects to the
first peoples of these countries, both past and present.
Before we jump into today's podcast, We've got a really
quick ask of you to ensure this podcast remains really
relevant and useful to everyone listening. We'd love to learn
more about you. We've put a short survey in today's
show notes, and we'd be so grateful if you could
fill it out. It'll only take a couple of minutes.
Thanks in advance for helping TDA. Now let's get into
(00:20):
it already, and this this is the Daily This is
the Daily OS.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
Oh, now it makes sense. Good morning, and welcome to
the Daily OS. It's Thursday, the seventh of August. I'm
Emma Gillespie.
Speaker 1 (00:40):
I'm Sam Kazlowski.
Speaker 2 (00:41):
More than two years after the implosion of a submersible
expedition to the Titanic wreck, the US Coast Guard has
released its final report into what went wrong. According to
the three hundred and thirty five page document, the disaster,
which killed five people, was preventable and driven flawed design,
regulatory avoidance, and a toxic workplace culture. This landmark report
(01:06):
paints a damning picture of Oceangate, the company behind the mission,
and of its late CEO, Stockton Rush. Today we are
going to take you through what happened to the Titan,
what the report found, its recommendations, and whether anyone could
still face legal consequences.
Speaker 1 (01:26):
Emma, why don't we go back to revisit this story.
It was two years ago. It was the biggest story
in the world for a while there. It's now got
a documentary on Netflix that has almost brought it back
into the frame. And now we've got this report. Take
me back to what the titan sub was and what
happened to it.
Speaker 2 (01:43):
Yes, so the titan was a deep sea submersible operated
by this private US company called ocean Gate. Now when
I say submersible, it was a vessel about the size
of a mini van and for the price of two
hundred and fifty thousand US dollars per per tourists were
offered the chance to travel down in the submersible to
(02:05):
see the wreck of the Titanic, the iconic shipwreck which
lies about three and a half thousand meters underwater in
the North Atlantic. Now, on the eighteenth of June twenty
twenty three, five people were on board the Titan that
includes Ocean Gates CEO and pilot of the vessels stocked
and Rush, a British billionaire named Hamish Harding, French Titanic
(02:27):
expert Paul Henri Najalais, and Pakistani businessman Shazada Darwood, who
was there with his teenage son. The vessel lost contact
about an hour and forty five minutes into its journey,
and what followed was, as you would remember, an international
search and rescue effort that absolutely gripped the world.
Speaker 1 (02:48):
And when they first went missing, there was this hope
that the crew could still be alive.
Speaker 2 (02:51):
Absolutely so we knew that the crew had four days
worth of oxygen emergency oxygen, so in the event that
they got trapped on the ocean floor, there would be
four days hypothetically for them to survive down there. But
on the twenty second of June, debris from the sub
was found near the Titanic site, roughly six hundred k's
(03:11):
off the coast of Newfoundland in Canada. Now officials confirmed
pretty much straightaway that the vessel had imploded on its descent,
killing everyone on board instantly.
Speaker 1 (03:24):
And the reason we're talking about it today is that
the US Coast Guard has released this very lengthy report
into the incident, trying to break down exactly where things
went wrong. Before we get into the report itself. Just
explain to me the role of the US Coast Guard
in all of this.
Speaker 2 (03:40):
Yes, so the Coast Guard or the USCG is responsible
for a whole raft of maritime measures, including leading rescue missions,
does that in US waters or in international areas under
US responsibility. It has maritime security responsibilities, and it also
acts as a regulatory and certificational authority, so it has
(04:00):
some safety responsibilities. Like in the case of the Titan Sub.
The Coast Guard leads investigations also into marine casualties, So
where there is loss of life or potential violations of
maritime law, it will lead investigations. Now, in line with that,
the Coast Guard led the Titan sub investigation because Oceangate
(04:21):
was a US based company and several of its passengers
were US citizens, despite the fact that it imploded somewhere
in international waters off Canada.
Speaker 1 (04:30):
So they've spent two years looking at this incident. What's
the top line finding here?
Speaker 2 (04:34):
So the biggest finding here is that the deaths of
the five people on board were entirely preventable and that
Oceangate failed at its leadership level and at every level
across the board. So the report found that the vessel's
design was never certified by independent engineers, and if you've
(04:55):
seen the Netflix stock o that goes into this a
little bit. Essentially, the vessel constructed and needed the certification
of a third party group to say, yep, this is
fit to explore the ocean floor to this certain depth,
and with that certification it would have been able to
sell tickets and operate as a fully legit tourist provider.
(05:17):
Safety warnings from engineers and staff were repeatedly ignored, the
report found, and it also said that key safety processes
were missing or deliberately avoided. One of the biggest red
flags that we've learned about in this report and over
the course of the last two years from various whistleblowers
is the use of carbon fiber for the Titan's main
(05:37):
pressure hull.
Speaker 1 (05:38):
As in the hull itself was made of carbon fiber.
Speaker 2 (05:41):
Yes, so the part of the sub that keeps the
passengers alive under extreme pressure at depths of three thousand
and four thousand meters below the sea level. That material
had never been used in a deep sea sub like
this before, so in the early days of the Titan sub,
the carbon fiber element was seen as really innovative as
this big breakthrough because carbon fiber is incredibly light, it's
(06:03):
a lot cheaper and easier to use, so there were
a lot of reasons to kind of be excited about
carbon fiber being in the hull.
Speaker 1 (06:10):
So is that actually in terms of the mechanics of it,
is that what failed to lead to the implosion? Yep.
Speaker 2 (06:17):
Now to understand this we have to do a little
bit of quick science talk about carbon fiber. But think
of carbon fiber like millions of little strands of string,
all connected, so all of those little strands can break
or weaken. An analysis of the sub showed that this
process had begun, called delamination. The layers of the carbon
(06:40):
fiber had started to separate, so there was evidence of
stress damage to the hull, and every time one of
those strings broke or came apart, it weakened the entire structure.
Engineers and staff had reportedly raised concerns about the design
on several occasions over the course of many years, but
according to the report from the Coast Guard oceangate created
(07:02):
a quote culture of fear and retaliation that silenced employees.
One employee was even fired after raising safety concerns and
multiple employees left the company during the development of the
sub and prior to that fatal journey in June twenty
twenty three.
Speaker 1 (07:19):
And I think what really strikes me about this report
is that it doesn't seem to be one factor just
in isolation. It's the conflation of factors. It's the idea
that you can have a material that wasn't seaworthy, but
then the concerns raised not being heard because of company
culture exactly. Either one of those by itself perhaps wouldn't
have led to this outcome. Tell me about the role
(07:41):
of the CEO, Stockton Rush in all of this, because
he was on board when the sub imploded, right.
Speaker 2 (07:47):
Yeah, so he died with the four other passengers. But
the findings against him in this report are incredibly scathing.
So the overarching theme or all of the findings kind
of trace back to this common finding that he had
this intense influence over everything and almost a narcissistic arrogance
(08:07):
about achieving the goal of taking the sub to the Titanic,
regardless of any safety risks. So he was the CEO,
the lead designer, the pilot, and the report says he
pursued innovation and speed as in speed to achieve the
expedition over safety and skipped established testing procedures. In fact,
(08:29):
the report says, and I think this is really critical
and what a lot of people have been waiting for,
that if he had survived, he would have likely faced
criminal charges for his role in the disaster and for
contributing to the deaths of the passengers.
Speaker 1 (08:41):
The report was really detailed about the way in which
he influenced company culture and his leadership style. Give me
a quick sense of the specifics there about that culture piece.
Speaker 2 (08:53):
Yes, so there's a strong link between Rush and these
findings of a toxic work environment. The report states that
for several years preceding the incident, Oceangate cut corners, quote,
leveraged intimidation tactics and what the report called the company's
favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny. So this reputation of
being a really innovative company doing something exciting and different,
(09:16):
and that they took advantage of that. The finding stated
that by strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges,
Oceangate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of
the established deep sea protocols, which had historically contributed to
a strong safety record for commercial submersibles.
Speaker 1 (09:36):
And what about the other passengers in all of this,
I mean, were they aware of all of these risks
and perhaps regulatory missing pieces before they jumped into that vessel.
Speaker 2 (09:47):
Yeah, that's a question that has come up a lot
over the last couple of years. And the report found
ultimately that the passengers were misled by the company. The
report says Oceangate called the passengers mission special and this
was a sort of loophole to get around the fact
that they were not certified to run the expedition with
paying tourists. But by bringing these people on as mission specialists,
(10:09):
they could argue that each person on board had a
particular role so served a purpose in that way, and
the contracts that they were made to sign really downplayed
the risks. In some cases, they overstated how tested and
safe the vessel really was. And to quote the report quote,
there was a systematic pattern of misrepresentation in how Oceangate
(10:30):
described for Titan's capabilities and testing history to clients and
to the public.
Speaker 1 (10:35):
So this large report has come out. Have we heard
from Oceangate in response to the report, and are they
still actually operating as a company.
Speaker 2 (10:43):
Yeah, it's worth noting the company essentially ceased operations after
the disaster just weeks after, so it hasn't responded directly
to the report at the time of recording. The website's
been taken down, and Oceangate hasn't made any public statements
for over a year. I don't think anyone is really
expecting to hear from anyone affiliated with Oceangate. A lot
(11:04):
of the people that worked for them have tried really
hard to distance themselves from that period of their careers.
Speaker 1 (11:10):
Have we heard much from the families of the passengers
who died.
Speaker 2 (11:14):
Yeah, some of the families have spoken out this week,
in particular the Darwood family, so that's the father and
son who died on board. They released a statement saying
no report could ease their loss, but they're hopeful that
it will lead to accountability and prevent future tragedies.
Speaker 1 (11:29):
I was really interested by that note that you raised
around the fact that it was likely that the CEO
would face criminal charges had he not been part of
the group that died. Are they going to be any
legal consequences for this? Obviously not surrounding him, but surrounding
other personnel in the company or the company itself.
Speaker 2 (11:47):
It is possible. So while we know Oceangate no longer
exists as a company, the Coast Guard has referred the
case to US federal prosecutors, and that could then open
the door to civil lawsuit or even criminal charges for
anyone else involved. But in terms of criminal proceedings, Stocked
and Rush, the CEO really is at the center of
(12:09):
all of the negligence that can be traced back to
human decision makingper interesting, but on a broader level, you know,
we could see civil suits from the families. And the
report calls for really significant change to how submersibles like
this are regulated, and particularly how private companies operate them,
because right now it's a pretty unregulated space.
Speaker 1 (12:29):
And one quote that really stood out to me in
those recommendations and that sense of discussing, you know, this
isn't the last time that we're going to see people
try and push the barriers of exploration, be it in
space or under the ocean or on land. That line
around innovation must never come at the cost of safety. Yeah,
tell me about the recommendations to kind of wrap this
(12:51):
all up, how does the US Coast Guard think that
we should all move forward in this space.
Speaker 2 (12:56):
So there are seventeen recommendations, a lot focused on safety
and certification. So the fact that that third party certification
never happened for the Titan, ultimately the Coastguard wants to
ensure that never happens again. So there's a series of
regulations there. There are recommendations for stronger whistle blower protections
because we know that several employees really tried to raise
(13:20):
the alarm on this before the tragedy happened. And there's
recommendations around clearer oversight of deep sea exploration, so frameworks
around international waters tourism in that space and who should
be responsible for kind of global safety and safety frameworks.
And it's recommended to ban or strictly limit the use
(13:41):
of unproven materials like carbon fiber for primary hold pressure
vessels until they can be independently validated in deep ocean conditions.
Speaker 1 (13:51):
It really gives me the sense that they're trying to
strike a balance between preserving that space for deep sea exploration,
the natural human desire to figure out what's out there
and what's deeper than we've ever gone before. But also
make sure that things are happening safely.
Speaker 2 (14:08):
Yeah, and you don't want to over regulate this space
to limit scientific exploration. But I guess there's a divide
between tourism versus valid scientific exploration and research. I think
to wrap it up, it's all about kind of correcting
failures and plugging regulatory gaps. But as the report said,
(14:29):
Oceangate strategy was to circumvent regulatory frameworks rather than engage
with them in good faith. So hopefully this is a
turning point for how deep sea tourism is regulated.
Speaker 1 (14:40):
All right, m So, right now the Coast Guard will
hand this to prosecutors and we'll wait to see if
some of those more formal criminal charges or civil cases
are laid. Thank you so much for taking us through that,
Thanks for having me, and thank you for joining us
on the Daily Ods this morning. We're going to be
back in your headphones with those headlines in the afternoon.
Until then, have a fantastic dame. We'll speak to you later.
(15:03):
My name is Lily Maddon and I'm a proud Arunda
Bungelung Calkatin woman from Gadighl Country. The Daily oz acknowledges
that this podcast is recorded on the lands of the
Gadighl people and pays respect to all Aboriginal and torrest
Rate island and nations. We pay our respects to the
first peoples of these countries, both past and present.
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