Counterfactuals: Roosevelt and Churchill at Christmas, 1941

On today’s episode, we talk about a little-remembered presidential visit in the wake of Pearl Harbor - Christmas, 1941, when Winston Churchill risked the U-boats of the Atlantic to visit his new allies in the White House.

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:07):
Welcome to The History Guy podcast Counterfactuals. What is a
counterfactual in the context of studying history. It is a
kind of analysis where we examined what might have happened
had historical events gone differently as a thought experiment. The
goal is to learn and understand history as it is
by talking about what it could have been as a

(00:27):
twist on the historical stories that we tell on the
History Guy YouTube channel. This is a series of podcasts
that dwell on that eternal question what if. I'm Josh,
a writer for the YouTube channel and son of the
History Guy. If you're a fan of the channel, you
already know Lance the History Guy himself. To liven up
our discussions on what might have happened, we have invited

(00:48):
Brad wagnan history officionado and a longtime friend of The
History Guy to join us. Remember that if you'd like
to support us, you can find us on Patreon, YouTube,
and locals dot com. Join us as we discuss what
deserves to be remembered and what might have been.

Speaker 2 (01:06):
On today's episode, we talk about the little remembered presidential
visit in the wake of Pearl Harbor Christmas nineteen forty one,
when Winston Churchill risked the U boats of the Atlantic
to visit his new allies in the White House. Without
further ado, let me introduce the history Guy.

Speaker 3 (01:34):
Despite the focus on friends and family, polls suggests that
the holidays can be among the most stressful times of
the year, especially for people who are hosting out of
town guests. So you can guess that it might have
been somewhat difficult for the President and First Lady to
host the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for Christmas
just two weeks at that the Japanese had.

Speaker 4 (01:53):
Attacked Pearl Harbor.

Speaker 3 (01:57):
The Christmas of nineteen forty one wasn't the first time
that Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had met in person,
nor by any means would it be the last. But
it arguably maybe was the most consequential and quite possibly
the most important Christmas ever.

Speaker 4 (02:14):
At the White House. It is history that deserves to
be remembered.

Speaker 3 (02:20):
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December seventh, nineteen
forty one, the US was thrown into a war that
they were both expecting and unprepared for. But while December
seventh may have been as the President would declare on
December eighth, a date which will live in infamy. At
least one world leader slept better that night in his
own recollection, recording in his History of the Second World War,

(02:41):
after hearing the attack, the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved.
France had capitulated in the Armistice of June nineteen forty,
and Britain, along with her Empire, had stood alone against
the Third Rig until Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union
year later. The two had officially become allies with the

(03:03):
Anglo Soviet Agreement signed to twelve July. Roosevelt had worked
to stretch all boundaries of neutrality to assist the imbattled allies,
but despite material support via cash and carry and Lindley's
the outlook was still bleak. The Office of the Historian
of the US Department of State notes by the end
of May, German forces had inflicted humiliating defeats upon British,

(03:23):
Greek and Yugoslav forces in the Balkans, and were threatening
to overrun Egypt and close off the Suez Canal, thereby
restricting British access to its possessions in India. When the
Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June twenty second, nineteen
forty one, few policymakers in Washington or London believed that
the Soviets would be able to resist the Nazi onslaught
for more than six weeks. Churchill wanted the US to

(03:45):
enter the war. Perhaps Roosevelt did, two he understood that
war was inevitable, and that prospect almost certainly impacted his
decision to seek an unprecedented third term in nineteen forty.
In August, the two made secret plans to meet their
first meeting since the outbreak of war. Ostensibly, the Atlantic Conference,
held aboard the cruiser U S. S Agasta August nine

(04:06):
to twelfth, was to outline British and American goals for
the post war world, working from the assumption certainly in
question at the time that Nazi Germany would be ultimately
defeated and that the United States and the United Kingdom
would play significant roles in the post war world. But
the charter, a list of principles that impacted several post
war agreements, represented what can only be called a failure
of the Conference to achieve the goals of either Roosevelt

(04:29):
or Churchill, The Office of the Historian continues, President Roosevelt
had hoped that the Charter might encourage the American people
to back US intervention in World War Two on behalf
of the allies. Whoever, public opinion remained adamantly opposed to
such a policy, while Churchill's goal had been, the Historian explains,
to get America into.

Speaker 4 (04:48):
The war, but the US was still divided.

Speaker 3 (04:50):
On the subject, and many echoed the sentiments expressed by Mitscher. H. G. Dotson,
quoted in an August fifteenth edition of the Amarillo Daily News.
I would take a gun by and fight to defend
this country, the fiery mister Dotson said, if the fight
really is for defense. He continued by stating that he
thought the United States had no business meddling in Europe's affairs,

(05:12):
but the question of the US entering the war was
settled by the Japanese on December seventh. Churchill later wrote
that the news filled him with the greatest joy, as
the US was now in the war to the neck
and in it to the death, something he believed meant
that England would live, Britain would live, the Commonwealth of
Nations in the Empire would live.

Speaker 5 (05:31):
I asked that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked
and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, nineteen
forty one, a state of war has existed between the

(05:56):
United States and the Japanese Empire.

Speaker 3 (06:01):
Congress obliged. Roosevelt had given the speech at twelve thirty
p m. And by four to ten p m. He
signed the declaration of war passed by the House and
the Senate. The United Kingdom declared war on Japan the
same day, but the declaration offered a reason for concern
for the Prime Minister. While the US declared war on Japan,
they had not declared war on Germany. In fact, Hitler

(06:21):
decided to declare war first on December eleventh. Churchill had
numerous concerns, but foremost was the concern, according to a
twenty sixteen edition of the Magazine of the US National
Endowment for the Humanities, that the pride and desire for
revenge would lead Roosevelt and his military chiefs to focus
on Japan. In fact, Churchill had already determined on December

(06:41):
eighth to visit Fdr. The Prime Minister wanted to make
his case to the President and at new ally over
how the war should be fought. He requested the permission
to make the trip from King George the sixth, arguing
that he needed to make the case for the US
to continue to deliver the war supplies it had promised,
fearing that they would now be diverted to the US military.
He cabled Roosevelt's on December ninth, Now that we are,

(07:03):
as you say, in the same boat, would it not
be wise for us to have another conference? We could
review the whole war plan in light of reality and
new facts. The website of the National Endowment for the
Humanity notes the President, knowing full well what the Prime
Minister was up to, expressed concern that the voyage across
the Atlantic, which called through German submarines, might.

Speaker 4 (07:22):
Be too hazardous.

Speaker 3 (07:23):
Churchill waved away Roosevelt's fears about safety, arguing the bigger
danger lay in not coordinating strategy. Immediately, knowing how tenacious
Churchill could be, Roosevelt quickly relented. Delighted to have you
here at the White House, the president wrote. On December tenth.
Historian and retired Brigadayer General John Shortall wrote in his
twenty twenty one book Arcadia, the First Wartime Council of

(07:44):
Churchill and Roosevelt. The American chiefs of staff were not
pleased when formed four days after Pearl Harbor that they
would have to host the British military leaders at a
conference in Washington. Their greater worry was that Britain had
a grand strategy. They did not, and they preferred more
time to prepare for the meeting. Vents were unfolding quickly.
The website for the National Endowment for the Humanities notes
the global picture was harsh and threatening, with each new

(08:06):
angle in the conflict giving way to another. Even the
attack on Hawaii was part of a larger Japanese offensive
that included assaults on Guam, the Philippines, Wake Island, and
Midway Island. Britain suffered ongoing losses from Japanese attacks on
Hong Kong and Malaya. Churchill's ten day trip across the
Atlantic was made in secret aboard the battleship Duke of York.
A twenty seventeen edition of the Journal of the Royal

(08:26):
Society of Medicine noted that the Atlantic crossing was so
rough that passengers were confined below decks for much of
the journey. Churchill self medicated with Mothersill's seasick remedy twice.
On the first day his absence was noted. The website
of the National Endowment for the Humanities explains it's not
really possible for a prime minister to disappear from London
without anyone noticing. There is only so long that regrets

(08:48):
can be given, and excuses may before people begin to speculate.
German radio speculated on either Washington or Moscow. On December
twenty second. However, they confidently announced that the diplomatic appasion
is increasingly voiced that Churchill is in the Middle East.
That same day, the Duke of York docked at Hampton Roads, Virginia.
The Prime Minister was flown in the US Navy plane

(09:09):
to Washington, where he later wrote, there was the President
waiting in his car. I clasped his strong hand with
comfort and pleasure. He wasn't just German radio that was surprised.
In her nineteen ninety five book No Ordinary Time, Franklin
and Eleanor Roosevelt The Home Front in World War Two,
author Doris Kerns Goodwin wrote that Alonso Field, the chief
White House butler walked in in an argument between Franklin

(09:31):
and Eleanor Roosevelt. The first Lady, it seems, had not
been warned of the Prime Minister's visit. Something of a
strain and a hostess sudden expected to entertain a dinner
party of twenty guests, and the rest of the nation
was just as surprised. A December twenty eighteen edition of
the Washington Examiner writes and December twenty third, White House
Press Secretary Steve Early herded some one hundred journalists into

(09:52):
the Oval Office for a press conference with President Franklin Roosevelt.
Press conferences were much different then. They were held more frequently,
and they were remarkably ca afterr enjoyed the give and
take with reporters who simply crowded around his desk and
peppered him with questions. The Fourth Estate loved him in return.
He was a master of the game who could always
be relied on for a good copy. With America's involvement

(10:13):
in the war just days old, the press knew that
they would likely get good information that Tuesday, but nobody
expected what greeted the newsmen as they rushed into the room.
There comfortably seated in a chair beside Roosevelt's famous cluttered desk,
sat British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. If a lightning bolt
had struck the room, the reporters could not have been
more surprised. This was more than an unannounced state visit.

(10:36):
Everyone realized it was a critical meeting of two new
wartime allies. When members of the press complained they could
not see the Prime Minister and ask him to stand,
he not only obliged, but climbed up and stood on
his chair. The York Times reporter of the Churchill was
somewhat shorter than expected, but with confidence and determination written
on the countenance so familiar to the world, the Prime
Minister demonstrated his famous sense of humor. When a reporter

(10:59):
asked how long the war would take, the Prime Minister responded,
if we manage it well, it will only take half
as long as if we manage it badly. Churchill's visit
lasted three weeks. A January twenty seventeen edition of Smithsonian
Magazine notes that Churchill turned the second floor Rose Suite
into a many headquarters with the British government, with messengers
carrying documents to and from the embassy in red leather cases.

(11:21):
In the Monroe Room, where the First Lady held her
press conferences, he hung up enormous maps that tracked the
war effort. The visit was a work visit, and in
that perhaps one of the most important of the war.
As Smithsonian Magazine notes, those maps told a gloomy tale
Germany and Italy in control of Europe from the English
Channel to the Black Sea, Hitler's army besieging Leningrad, Japan
sweeping through the Philippines, and British Malayan for sing Hong

(11:42):
Kong's render on Christmas Day. That made Roosevelt and churchill
summit doubly important. The Allies needed an immediate morale boost
and a long range plan to reverse the tide of fascism.
The Prime Minister had brought with him a retinue of
eighty six from high ranking military officers and diplomats to
clerks and private secretaries. Important decisions were made, including agreeing

(12:03):
upon a Germany First strategy that the Allies would operate
under a joint command. In an address to Congress on
December twenty six, Churchill described the meetings as mapping out
of our military plans and for all those intimate meetings
the high officers of the armed services in both countries,
which are indispensable for the successful prosecution of the war.
But the visit was also about unity and about courage

(12:24):
in a difficult time. The Prime Minister demonstrated his vaunted
oratorical skills before Congress, saying, if you will allow me
to use other language, I will say that he must
indeed have a blind soul who cannot see that some
great purpose and design is being worked out here below,
of which we have the honor to be the faithful servants.
It is not given to us to peer into the
mysteries of the future. Still, I avow my hope and faith,

(12:47):
sure and inviolate that in the days to come, the
British and American people's will for their own safety and
for the good of all, walk together in majesty, in justice,
and in peace. The message resonated the website the National
Endowment for the Arts Rights. Thunderous applause filled the chamber.
Members of Congress and gallery occupants rose to their feet.
Stepping off the rostrom, Churchill gave the V symbol for victory,

(13:09):
prompting the chamber to roar again. Only after the Prime
Minister's death in nineteen sixty five, in Churchill's personal physician
revealed a stunning surprise. After his speech to Congress, the
Prime Minister suffered a mild heart attack, the fact that
he hid even from the President. But as important as
his business was when st Churchill's Christmas at the White

(13:29):
House was also about the relationship between the two men
who faced the daunting task before them. Smithsonian Magazine writes
at Churchill and Roosevelt ate lunch together every day in midafternoon,
Churchill would often suddenly declare I'll be back, and then
retreat for a two hour nap. Daytime was a prelude
to his deepest work hours. From dinner along into the night.
He kept Roosevelt up until two or three am, drinking brandy,

(13:50):
smoking cigars, and ignoring Eleanor's exasperated hints about sleep. It
was astonishing to me that anyone could smoke so much
and drink so much and keep perfectly well, she later wrote,
and the magazine notes the sixty seven year old Prime
Minister proved an eccentric HouseGuest. I must have a tumbler,
shehrry in my room before breakfast. Churchill told Fields the
butler a couple of glasses of Scotch and soda before lunch,

(14:13):
and French champagne and ninety year old brandy before I
go to sleep at night. And of course they enjoyed Christmas,
including attending church at Foundry Methodists on Sixteenth Street, where
the altar was flanked by the stars and stripes and
the Union Jack. They died on oysters on the half
shell with crackers, clear soup with sherry, celery, assorted olives
and thin toast, roast, turkey, chestnut dressing, sausage, gibblet, gravy, beans,

(14:37):
cauliflower casseroll of sweet potatoes, cranberry jelly, grapefruit, salad and cheese,
croissants and rolls, and finely plum pudding and hard sauce,
ice cream, coffee, salted nuts, and assorted bonbonds. Despite the
clear importance of the strategic decisions that were made in
the Prime Minister's three week visit to the White House
and the Christmas season of nineteen forty one, perhaps more
important was the message of of courage of hope to

(15:04):
a nation that was still reeling from the devastation of
the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Washington Examiner explains that
in the Prime Minister's visit, America got the Christmas surprise
that it needed. Given the grim time in the Black
House conditions, it was unsure whether they would be in
National Christmas Tree Lighting in nineteen forty one, but the

(15:25):
lighting went forward in nineteen forty The President and First
Lady had decided that it should be a more homey event,
and so instead of having the National tree out on
the Ellipse, they decided to hold it on the White
House grounds, where two trees had been moved to just
inside the fence on the south side of the White House,
and it was there eighty one years ago today, on
December twenty third, nineteen forty one, that the President and

(15:46):
the Prime Minister spoke of the importance of Christmas. The
President said, our strongest weapon against this war is the
conviction of the dignity and brotherhood of the man, which
Christmas Day signifies more than any other day or any
other symbol. Against enemies who preach the principles of hate
and practice them, we set our faith in human love

(16:09):
and in God's care for us and all men everywhere.
For his part, the Prime Minister noted the importance of
Christmas to children. Let the children have their night of
fun and laughter, Let the gifts of Father Christmas delight
their play.

Speaker 4 (16:21):
Let us grown.

Speaker 3 (16:22):
Ups share to the full in their unstinted pleasures. Before
we turn again to the stern task and the formidable
years that lie before us, resolve that, by our sacrifice
and daring, these same children shall not be robbed of
their inheritance or denied their right to live in a
free and decent world. And so, in God's mercy, a

(16:44):
Happy Christmas to you all. Perhaps only in the darkest
hour can we grasp the true meaning of Christmas.

Speaker 1 (16:58):
Now for the fun part, where I the History Guy
himself and longtime friend of the History Guy Brad Wagnan
discussed what might have happened if it all went differently. Today,
we're talking about an event that really gets glossed over
in a lot of history books, but really was a
very interesting story. And that's this event where right after
the United States is involved in the war, that Churchill

(17:20):
comes to the White House for Christmas. And it's a
really interesting way to think about how these two nations
were being brought together at that moment because it wasn't
just their shared their shared cultures, but suddenly a shared war.
There was a really interesting you know, Churchill gives a
really interesting speech there from the White House, and it
was a meaningful moment in terms of how that war

(17:43):
was going to go, I think, and what discussion there
might have been between those two men at a time
when things were still pretty nascent.

Speaker 4 (17:52):
It was.

Speaker 3 (17:53):
You know, we talk about great Man theory and what's
wrong with great Man theory. We chatted that with that
a couple times on the podcast. So this one's interesting
because it's not just working from the great Man theory, like,
you know, without the war, what would without Churchill and
FDR with the war have been. But I mean we're
literally arguing that Christmas between two dudes impact the war,

(18:14):
you know, the broad war that's involving millions of people.

Speaker 4 (18:16):
So it's an interesting one to discuss.

Speaker 3 (18:18):
And you know, I when I went back and watched
this one again, it really is. I Mean, there's just
so many questions that it raises. There's just lots of
different directions that it could go that I think are
really really interesting. This episode. I'll have to just make
a plug as the history it's not been viewed enough.
It's something about like fifty thousand views or something like that.
It's a really really interesting time and I think maybe

(18:39):
because it came out as a Christmas episode, but if
you aren't really familiar with that visit it is well
worth a watch because so much happened in that period
of time.

Speaker 6 (18:48):
I think that to call this meeting during a consequential
time in World War two is an underestimate of just
how important it was. One of the reasons that this
is so consequential is because, as alluded to, this literally
is sixteen days after Pearl Harbor. If you also look

(19:13):
at what is going on in the war contemporaneous to this,
it is not all sunshine, unicorn and rainbows for the Allies.
In fact, it's pretty much exactly the opposite. At this point,
the Philippines is being invaded Wake Island, if it has
not fallen, will fall very soon. The British possessions in

(19:33):
the Indian Ocean are being threatened by a Japanese navy
that is surrounded by an aura of indestructibility. So it
really is a very very consequential time. And there are
a lot of different ways that the personal relationship between
FDR and church Hill could have spun what we know

(19:56):
of this history into different pathways if you will, into
all their histories. You know, again, not under estimate just
how important this is. If you look at the axis
at this point in time, Hitler, Huzzolini and Tojo here
he to Are, they're not on the same page. And

(20:17):
you can make a good argument that's one of the
reasons that the that the Allies ultimately tryumph.

Speaker 3 (20:22):
Absolutelyeah, yeah, I mean that's just kind of never were
on the same pid. There were there were things that
the Japanese desperately needed that the Germans had, and then
two of them never talked, uh, and you know, and
vice versa two.

Speaker 4 (20:32):
And yeah, I mean it's it's interesting.

Speaker 3 (20:35):
It's interesting at the start because Japan entering the war,
I mean that that threatens Hong Kong, that threatened Singapore,
that threatens Australia and India even and yet the day
that had happened, Churchill, you know, here over here, while
we're talking about a date that will live in infamy
in our nations. In chalk, Churchill said he slept well
that night. He slept the slep of those who had
been saved, because he's so desperately wanted the US into

(20:56):
the war. So, I mean it is an interesting period
and the and the idea that the two of them
came into it. So there's a lot of decisions that
were made there that we can talk about as a
lot of different ways we can spend but let's just
start with I mean the basic one in terms of
this and what if everything else is the same and
Churchill just doesn't come for Christmas, how much does that
change what could go on with the war, because I

(21:16):
think it could be quite a lot. FDR didn't want
Churchill to come. FDR what a time with his staff
to decide what they were going to bring before he
had a meeting with Churchill and to make their decisions
so that they could advocate for them. Churchill wanted to
get in there before that happened. He wanted to direct
their thinking before they before it happened. So FDR was

(21:37):
was clearly just trying to dissuade him, and Churchill was
fairly insistent on coming. You know, maybe because you know,
food was cheaper in the US at the time, or
you know, I don't know. He wanted the oysters and
it was a dangerous time, like, you know, FDR said, so,
you know, it's dangerous across the Atlantic. And then it
turns out, you know, Churchill has a heart attack. You know,
was not necessarily a safe time to come. What if

(21:59):
FDR gott in his way and they don't meet at Christmas?
What if they meet, you know, two months later, and
the US has had a different time to think about things.
I mean, how much did the war depend upon the
relationships that were built and the decisions that were made
at Christmas? How important was these two men sharing Christmas
together as well as Churchill addressing Congress and the American public.

(22:22):
Because it's an interesting question because it's, you know, the
first counterfactional here. What if it's all the same, but
Churchill just doesn't come for Christmas in nineteen forty one.

Speaker 6 (22:31):
At that point, I would posit that the so called
European First strategy might have turned out looking a little
bit different.

Speaker 4 (22:40):
Now.

Speaker 6 (22:41):
It's I do say the America First myth because the
fact is is that if you look by number of
service personnel, aircraft, naval vessels involved in the war, it
wasn't as if the Pacific got three and the European
theater got three million in fact, it was fairly evenly

(23:03):
balanced throughout UH and the US was I think marshaling
its resources. So it is very possible that without Churchill there,
it is very possible that Sir Admiral King, who is
basically head of the Navy at that point, very aggressive,
very ambitious. My guess is is that he probably would

(23:26):
have pushed hard for a hit the Japanese hard in retaliation,
and with the recent attack of Pearl Harbor, the American
public had been, you know, was whipped into a into
a fever pitch against the Japanese.

Speaker 3 (23:43):
One of Churchill's concerns was that we would be so
angry that the Japanese would go there first. I'm going
to say, I think that Europe first was always going
to happen. And this is this is why I would
say that, is that it was a very easy thing
for the Americans to say. North Carolina had been had
been commissioned in April, South Dakota and Alabama were in construction,

(24:05):
seven Iowa's were in construction, sixteen Essex aircraft carriers were
in construction, already in the process either been approved or
had already been laid down. So I think when he
said Europe first. I mean, it really was. He knew
FDR knew that we were going to wildly outclass the
Japanese within two years time. So I mean what we

(24:25):
did in the Pacific, since we was trying to hold
our own with what we had, until we could just
dump so many ships out there that it became I mean,
by the end of the war, more than half of
the of the capital ships in the world were the
US Navy. So I mean, that's one of the first
questions you would ask of this is what if we
had not done Europe first?

Speaker 4 (24:43):
What if he had done Japan first?

Speaker 3 (24:45):
And my opinion is if we had, if we had
put more interest in Japan than who that would have
served most would have been Stalin, who probably would have
ended up taking a greater portion of Europe in the war.
But I don't think it would have made a difference to Hitler.
And I also think it was a fairly easy thing
for fda Are to give because he knew that we
were we were building the resources to win the Pacific War,

(25:06):
and that you know, there wasn't much sense in throwing
what we had that direction until until we did that.
But I mean, just just just my opinion there. But
so if they had had more time, if Americans had
thought about it more, that might be part of what
was going on, is that we were going to make
an advocacy for for Asia or I mean as the
Japanese kind of tore through and took the Philippines and

(25:28):
took you know, Singapore and Hong Kong and threatened you know,
that might have changed our thinking because we were making
Europe first decisions before the Japanese had really done all
that they were going to do in the Pacific, before
we really saw how powerful they were going to be.
So but if we had you know, if you had
marginally shifted resources, but if we took say the force

(25:49):
that had invaded an Operation Torch and we tried to
use that to defend Guaddal Canal, would that have materially
reduced the fight in the Pacific? And I mean it's
that's a fair amount of resources. But uh, like I said,
I don't think we were going to do that. But
I mean, what what would have happened in the Pacific
if we hadn't done Europe first? And how would that

(26:12):
have impacted the war in Europe?

Speaker 4 (26:14):
Well?

Speaker 7 (26:14):
And quite honestly, could could we have gotten our soldiers
to quadal Kanow while we're still waiting for some of
those ships to be built. I mean, that's a that's
a logistical question.

Speaker 4 (26:23):
When our navy was outclassed by the Japanese.

Speaker 1 (26:26):
Navy, there really is a there's a practical aspect to
that which says that the Atlantic and Europe was was
a much safer go at least until you know, we
were able to outclass the navy way closer.

Speaker 4 (26:38):
Yeah, if you've played Access and Allies.

Speaker 7 (26:40):
Yeah, it's actually it's it's a little crazy. I think
sometimes we get this idea of how of that we
kind of cut the Pacific on most of our globes.

Speaker 3 (26:48):
You know, we see how really really big the Pacific is. Well,
and here's an argument too, is that maybe maybe it
didn't make that much difference. I mean, for all that
we did, I mean, what Africa really did for the
Americans is to tach them how to fight. But in
the end, the soft underbelly didn't turn out to be
all that soft. It maybe brought Italy out of the war.
But I mean, you know, if if we had instead

(27:10):
of what if we hadn't done North Africa, what if
we hadn't done Operation Torch. What if we had just
immediately started putting, you know, our effort into preparing for
an attack on Fortress Europe, which is what a lot
of people were advocating for and which that really came
out more out of Casablanca than out of the out
of the Christmas visit.

Speaker 4 (27:27):
Uh, you know, would that have changed?

Speaker 3 (27:30):
I mean, the you know, the biggest thing that was
going on here that impacted the wars that we immediately
started more supply for Russia, and that made a huge difference,
and we participated more aggressively and protecting, you know, in
the Battle of the Atlanta, the Battle of the not
the battle some time before the Battle of the Atlantic.
So I mean, even even if we had if we'd
had more time and and and and we had come

(27:52):
up with with the alternative strategies, which is to go
to the Pacific first, or and not to do Operation
Torch and the soft underbelly, but to plan the invasion
on Portress Europe, how much would that have impacted the
outcome of the war. I'm not sure. I mean, things
could have been different. And if it had delayed anything
coming from the West, I mean, it could have I mean, certainly,

(28:14):
if we weren't providing the lend lease and et cetera
quickly to Russia, then that could have been very different.
If the Soviet Union hadn't gotten the supply that we sent,
I mean, Stalingrad could have gone differently if it weren't
for the studebakers, you know, six hundred some studebakers that
we sent. But I mean, in terms of you know,
what we were really going to do, I mean that,
you know, I don't know that anything that we were

(28:35):
going to change prior to this visit would have been
anything that would have actually changed the world that much.

Speaker 7 (28:41):
It's interesting to me that Churchill was concerned that we
might actually start sending less in terms of supply. I
don't know what the chances were on that, because I mean,
you're right, if we decided to end lend lease because
we felt like we needed those supplies for ourselves, that
that could have had an impact on the war in Russia.

(29:03):
Russia certainly was was struggling and toward and toward the
end of the war. Of course, their production starts to
Germany couldn't keep up with them eventually, but that had
a lot to do with what they were able to do.
You know that they were able to keep fighting because
they had tanks and trucks and the ability to move stuff.

Speaker 3 (29:20):
Yeah, you know, they're building their industry past the years
and if if they had you know, if they didn't
have time to do that's at their point. Uh yeah,
I mean, I I think Churchill was concerned about I
don't know that that ever was like gonna, I don't
know the Christmass. That is what made the difference for
us saying that we're gonna stop supplying the other allies
because we want to we need to build ourselves. I
think that we probably were already moving to what we

(29:42):
really planned, which is to just widly ramp up production.
I think I think FDR realized, absent Churchill, that the
in the immediate moment, the most that we could do
is send a lot of supply to the ally. So
I mean, was was that realistically going to change?

Speaker 7 (29:55):
And the Soviets were at that point the by far
the most part of the conflict. That was where almost
all the soldiers were, and so there was fighting going
on in Africa. But the truth is, for for as
much as as Rommel has talked about and the whole
African the whole North African part of the war was

(30:15):
always pretty marginal. I mean it was it was it
was a sideshow compared to the rest of it the French,
and there was very little chance, I mean, unless something
changed significantly. It's it doesn't seem like the Germans were
very serious about cutting off the Seuetz.

Speaker 1 (30:29):
No.

Speaker 3 (30:29):
I mean, if if you go back, if you say,
say after Dunkirk, if the British had negotiated another piece
and essentially just let the let the the Reight take
the oil from the Middle East, uh uh, and then
you know that could have maybe changed outcome because oil
ended up being very important to them. And at that
point where if you don't have a you know, a
Western Front, you have a lot of troops that you

(30:50):
can go apply to the and you know that might
have swung the difference.

Speaker 4 (30:53):
Uh.

Speaker 3 (30:53):
I mean there's some who argued that the Russians really
beat the Germans. I don't know, because we distracted you know,
some what six hundred submarines and nine hundred aircraft.

Speaker 7 (31:02):
If you don't have to, if you don't have to
man fortress Europe, I mean, that's that's not insignificant. I know,
it's a smaller number than what was you know, what
was on the Eastern Front. But it's not insignificant. It
really isn't.

Speaker 3 (31:14):
Well, even though the numbers are small compared to the
whole front. I mean the Africa Corps. I mean, that
would have been enough to have a you know, military
difference on the eastern fronduc if they weren't having a
bum around Africa. But but you know, at this point,
the Battle of Britain is already over before even we
even are showing up. And you're right, the fight is
going on in Russia, and so I think that we

(31:35):
But I mean, was.

Speaker 4 (31:37):
That going to change? Did Churchill coming to Christmas? I
don't know.

Speaker 3 (31:41):
I mean, I think the biggest impact of Churchill coming
to Christmas is that we were able to coordinate so fully,
because I mean that was a difficult thing.

Speaker 4 (31:49):
I mean, it was a difficult thing to have a supreme.

Speaker 3 (31:50):
Allied commander who happened to be an American or you know,
I guess you know, we pretty much argue they had
to be an American. It was a difficult thing for
us to all to coordinate army groups the way we did.
I mean, we have literally army groups that were multinational
that's and there were times when they were Americans under
British command too, and that's that's something that might have
been difficult. I mean, remember, even Pershing insisted that American

(32:13):
troops be under American command, and the only troops, the
only American troops that we allowed to be under foreign command.
There were you know some actually there were you know,
troops from from New York that were black troops that
our guys didn't respect, so we put those into French command.
But I mean that was still as powerful as the
Harlem Rattlers were they. I mean, that was a fairly
small bit of the four so that you know, the idea,

(32:35):
I mean, you were talking about how coordinated.

Speaker 4 (32:37):
The Allies were.

Speaker 3 (32:38):
That might not have been possible, though, I don't know,
could that have been built at Casablanca or you know,
when they when they met in Canada, I don't know's
I think that that initial relationship between the two was
really really critical at the start, and that might have
affected overall how they prosecuted the war. I just feel
like decisions that were made there were were not likely

(32:58):
to be significantly different, and the way that they might
have been different were probably not likely to significantly impact
the war.

Speaker 7 (33:05):
I think you're right. I think the personal relationship was
important there. There's maybe something to talking about the the
special relationship between between England and between the UK and
and America during during that time. But when you look
at what is other his other choices were, you know,
I don't think there was ever going to be a
version where the United States was much closer to the Soviets.

(33:26):
The obvious ally, the obvious you know, to partner ally
was the UK and the United States, And of course
France was there, But France I was always a lesser
partner in terms of me. They didn't have.

Speaker 3 (33:37):
Any China too. Yeah, in terms in terms of the allies.
But I guess that's initially one I hadn't thought of
what if Stalin had made it for Christmas instead of
convinced a more Russia was you know, was a leftist?
I mean he he was, I mean, he probably had
some sympathy for the you know, the Soviet idea. I
don't I don't think that he was really a Stalinist.

(33:59):
But what could is there is there a possibility that
the relationship among the allies would have been different. I
was thinking it might be less coordinated. But I mean
it's true maybe you know, maybe that special relationship between
FTR and Churchill was was was significant, uh, and that
that impacted decision making.

Speaker 6 (34:16):
I think that this uh, this hypothetical Christmas with Stalin,
first of all, it would make a phenomenal musical, uh.

Speaker 4 (34:25):
Along the lines of.

Speaker 6 (34:29):
Along the lines of the recent of the recent mega
hit the death of Stalin the producers, uh, you know,
kind of the Macai hitler in Germany. And to bring
that a little more seriously, Stalin was deeply mistrustful of

(34:49):
the West. And I mean, I think it's fairly obvious
the way that World War Two went, the way that
it ended up, and how quickly the Stalin is so
you broke with the West, is indication that that was
kind of a marriage of convenience. Now, if Stalin comes
in and is actually able to charm FDR and perhaps

(35:11):
start breaking some of the ice, it might have been
interesting to see a little more, a little more support
of the Soviet Union to the point where say they
move the dtayed timetable forward so that it takes place earlier.

Speaker 3 (35:26):
And forte instead of torch and worrying about the vishy
What if we you know, immediately start preparing for D
Day and save all that time that went you know,
went crawling through in order to just you know, run
into the mountains in Italy and find out that we
had nowhere, yeah.

Speaker 6 (35:42):
Exactly for this to happen. And this is a piece
of World War two history that oftentimes gets glossed over.
There was only one reason that the Soviets were not
allies with the US and Britain and by extension, France
when the war started, and that was because of Soviet

(36:03):
territorial ambitions in Karelia. They declared war on the Fins,
and that was seen as such a dastardly move that
Russia basically put itself in the doghouse on that Stalin
Stalin specifically. So also there was the whole hit live
on Ribbentrop Pact and again the you know, Stalin had

(36:29):
shown that he was not a trustworthy ally. So a
Christmas visit from Stalin to overcome that that would have
been a chore. It would have been a task, but
it could have materially affected how possibly the US is
negative view of the Soviets, and their abilities might have

(36:52):
been modified. Perhaps we would have been even a little
more supportive of Lindley's even though, as you've pointed out already, Yeah,
the Soviet war effort was kept alive by Lease.

Speaker 4 (37:05):
Yeah, it was critical there.

Speaker 3 (37:07):
Yeah, I mean, because it's true that kind of through
the war, what you really see is that Churchill and
and FBR working together to try to manage Stalin.

Speaker 7 (37:15):
Yeah, was was Stalin the character that could have you know,
made us made us?

Speaker 3 (37:20):
Yeah, but he an Fdr Eleanor probably wouldn't have liked
the guy. That is a tough line on the side there.
People will sometimes argue that the Soviets really beat the
Germans and that the Western Front wasn't necessary, And my
to me, the response to that is, if if Stalin
thought that Stalin could beat the Germans without the Western allies,
he definitely would have didn't like us. And if we

(37:42):
thought we could win the war without Stalin, we definitely
would have we didn't like him. So the fact that
we remade allies is kind of proved to me that
we all knew that that all of us had to
be working together.

Speaker 4 (37:51):
I mean.

Speaker 3 (37:52):
And they'll argue that it's so much so many of
the Germans, about three quarters of the German casualties came
on on that Eastern front. I mean, but essentially, you know,
we the agreement that we kind of made is that
they don't have to fight with the navy, they don't
have to fight with an air force, they don't have
to mess with Japan at all. Their job is just
to kill Germans that are trying to come into Russia.
And that was that was the role that they were given,

(38:14):
and we were fighting, you know, another war on another front.
So I don't know that that necessarily convinced. I think
the fact that Stalin decided to, you know, continue to
be an allies proof that he knew that without the
Western allies, that that that the Soviet Union would would
be in trouble.

Speaker 4 (38:29):
That's that's one alternative.

Speaker 3 (38:31):
What if it had been Stalin's Churchill, Probably Joe Stalin
was not going to be able to give the same
sort of speech in front of the Congress that Churchill
was able to do.

Speaker 4 (38:39):
Churchill gave that speech to Congress at Christmas.

Speaker 3 (38:43):
How important was that and him talking to reporters, How
important was that to the war effort in America?

Speaker 6 (38:48):
I would say incredibly important because at this point, essentially
the United States has just been kicked in the ship
pretty badly. And there's you know, there are questions about, okay,
are the Western democracies going to be able to stand
up to these tatalitarian systems that are virtually unstoppable. Again,

(39:10):
we are talking Japanese carriers, we are talking the Wehrmacht
when it literally is rolling through any resistance with very little,
very little pedance. So it's just it was crucial, I think,
for the American public to get a dose of reassurance.
And Churchill, despite all of the great Man theory problems

(39:34):
that we have, he certainly was a very good candidate
for the right person to deliver that message at that
particular time.

Speaker 3 (39:42):
I mean, if you look at the alternatives to Churchill,
I mean, and I guess another one here is what
if he died of his heart attack?

Speaker 4 (39:47):
What if his boat had been some by you vote?
But that the alternative to Churchill at the time is
really Clement Atlely.

Speaker 3 (39:52):
And Atlee probably thought very similarly to Churchill in terms
of how to prosecute the war, but he was simply
not the inspirational leader, speaker guy that Churchill was. I mean,
if Attlee was giving that speech in front of Congress,
I don't think it would have nearly the impact though.
I mean, the hard thing to say is, especially after
Pearl Harbor, I mean, did we need you know, did

(40:13):
we need anything more? I mean, where we already ticked
off enough that we were going to do what we did,
which is to shift the whole war effort and have
half the half the nation volunteer and all.

Speaker 4 (40:21):
The stuff that we had going on.

Speaker 3 (40:22):
Yeah, I don't know. I mean, I think it was
an inspirational speech. I don't know if it was necessary
after December seventh, but I mean, I'm sure it was
very reassuring to the public that we had allies again.

Speaker 4 (40:32):
It had a lot to do with that, that relationship.

Speaker 7 (40:35):
An ally that was you know, had been fighting the
war for and fairly successfully at least that they had,
they didn't stop existing. And you know, by that time,
the threat to well, well I imagine wasn't completely off
off of the people in the United Kingdom's minds. The
Battle of Britain, like you said, had been had been won,

(40:56):
and it was looking pretty unlikely that Germany was going
to be able to to invade you know, actually land
in the UK. I think there is some important stuff
to talk about when we talk about, you know, if
we had decided to attack in France first instead of
instead of North Africa, I do think in some ways
that it would have been a very different battle. D

(41:18):
Day might have come earlier. I'm not one hundred percent
sure that it would have been as successful. It's I
think we learned a lot about landing because we we
landed at Torch at Sicily.

Speaker 4 (41:30):
Yeah.

Speaker 3 (41:30):
One of the things we learned in Africa is that
is that the British knew a lot about fighting Germans
that we didn't. Yeah, I mean, what if Casserine Pass
was going on, you know, and in northern France that
is I mean as much as we were training troops
that we learned a lot, we learned a lot about invasions.
I mean, honestly, Operation Torch talk about it.

Speaker 4 (41:48):
You know.

Speaker 3 (41:49):
That's that's like you know when when Nebraska plays Northeast,
you know, Missouri State or something like that.

Speaker 4 (41:55):
In the first game of this.

Speaker 7 (41:57):
And yet it was still full of so many there
there was a lot of I guess what you might
call teething problems is that it was a it was
a difficult It was it was not difficult because I mean,
in most places that there was no there wasn't even
a contested landing, but it was it still showed us
a lot of the weaknesses, and you know, we took

(42:17):
all of that to heart, and even in much more
successful landings like what we what we did at Sicily,
we were able to really learn a lot about what
it means to make these combined arms landings and and.

Speaker 3 (42:28):
What would the large landings in the Pacific have been
like if we because we really use that experience for
operations Huskey, we used that experience out in the Pacific,
So I mean.

Speaker 7 (42:37):
That because it might have been a very difference it
certainly the Atlantic Wall was built up more by forty
four than it would have been if we were able
to get there. You know by the time of say
Operation Torch and forty three, uh there, the Germans were
perhaps a little less prepared for a landing there, but
it's also you know where we prepared to make that landing. Ultimately,

(43:00):
you know, those those amphibious landings are difficult and as
we learned its at like Anzio, they don't go right
every time, and that there are many ways they can
go wrong.

Speaker 3 (43:10):
And Torch Torch was really pretty bush league compared to
would we.

Speaker 4 (43:15):
So that's a good point.

Speaker 3 (43:16):
Yeah, So, I mean, yeah, if we had, if we
had shifted that strategy, maybe we would. I mean there
is no small shift even that that couldn't have had
an impact on the outcome of the work. Of course
we want, you know, and so I mean it's hard
to make it, you know, feel like it could have
gone a whole lot better.

Speaker 6 (43:31):
And there were What's interesting is, by the way, there
were some very very serious discussions going on with the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as their counterparts
in Great Britain, and there was talk about in nineteen
forty three. Basically the idea was is that the British

(43:51):
and Americans were going to land several several divisions in
northern in the northern area of Normandy near Cherborg, and
then there would be a follow on invasion of Scherborg
and then that ultimately would be the would be the
logistical hub for the invading forces. In retrospect, we can

(44:14):
look at that plan and just you know, kind of
kind of shake our heads and say that was probably
not realistic. But you know, there was there was a
serious there was a serious discussion about okay, how are
we going to make this work?

Speaker 4 (44:29):
And how are we going to do it? In forty three?

Speaker 6 (44:32):
Is the United States prepared at that point? No, just
flat out no. US troops at that point, even though
they had received good training, they had zero combat experience.
And now the good news is is that the senior
leadership of World War two cut their teeth in World

(44:54):
War One, So the senior officers who were leading the
men at least had some combat experience, and it probably
would have done a credible job. But as we've seen
on previous episodes, there are good generals and their badges,
and the United States was lucky that we were able

(45:14):
to weed out the bad and find enough of the
good ones at the right place at the right time.
So but yes, realistically I don't think that the United
States has what its needs. It comes down to another
detail of the discussion of that is, well, what landing
craft are you going to use? Are you going to
use Higgins boats or do you have to use the
larger I believe sales cts.

Speaker 3 (45:36):
Yeah, LSD pendingship tank Yeah. So I hate here it
comes out to It's hard to see any decision that
we would have made if Churchill hadn't come for Christmas.
That would have probably made things better, especially giving you know,
it kind of worked out the way that it was.
That it could have it could have meant some delay
in the war, which could have meant just a longer

(45:58):
and more prolonged war, or possibly meant that the Soviets
took more of Europe before before the you know, Western
now I said, done something than so there could have
been a disaster. It could have you know, it could
have been the US advocated for nineteen forty three strategy,
and that the nineteen forty three strategy failed and they
died on the beaches.

Speaker 4 (46:16):
But that, I mean, that's that's you're.

Speaker 3 (46:17):
Kind of pushing where we're going to where you can
go on a you know, on a counterfaction at that point.
But I think it's fair to say it's sure could
have been worse if Churchill hadn't come.

Speaker 4 (46:25):
It's sure could have been worse.

Speaker 3 (46:27):
Yeah, I'll say part of the reason that I was
talking about talking about this episode is that we've been
getting kind of sometimes in comments, this kind of new
idea that the wars Churchill's fault, and that argument goes
something along the lines of Hitler was only seeking to
keep his campaign promises of getting back the part of
the German Empire that had been lost in the Treaty
of Versailles. That he wasn't planning to go beyond that.

(46:49):
That when he was asking for you know, the the
Danzig and a and a and a safe route to
Danzig or whatever, that he that was all he was
going to do. That It was the French and the
British that, you know, because the French and the British
actually declared war.

Speaker 4 (47:01):
Hitler did declared war on them, they declared war on him.
You know.

Speaker 3 (47:04):
I think the French and the British thought when they
created a mutual non Aggression pack or a mutual defense
pack with Poland, that that would keep Hitler from attacking Poland,
and it didn't. And so you know, at that point
they're kind of stuck because either if they lose all
credibility if they don't fight, but they weren't really prepared
to fight, so that, you know, that whole argument says,
you know, it's really the war is really Churchill's fault,
and if we had continued with a Chamberlain sort of leadership,

(47:27):
that the whole Second World War could have been avoided,
and you know, all we end up was is a
you know, a third rank that's got you know, Czechoslovakia
and Austria and Poland, a greater Germany, but doesn't you know,
doesn't attack France, maybe gets into a you know, a
big fight with the Soviet Union that we can just
sit and sort of look at and you know, not
pay attention to. And I mean there are certainly people
that are arguing that now, and I think part of

(47:47):
that is that the US has had such an experience
over the length of the of the you know, the
global War on terrorgy want and all that, that we're
becoming more I mean that the attitudes in the US
are now closer to where they were in between World
War two, World War Winter, world War two, where we're where,
you know, we were in our most isolationist mode and
like we've been dragged into wars that we shouldn't have
been dragged into.

Speaker 4 (48:07):
I don't know. I mean, I thought it was worth
it to come and.

Speaker 3 (48:09):
Talk about that here and say, is there is there
is there any Is that a realistic discussion at all?
Is there a discussion that if that you hadn't had
someone as hawkish as Churchill, you know, might it not
have turned into the global war that it turned into.

Speaker 7 (48:23):
I mean, honestly, my first instinct for that is that
it's pretty silly. You could have had a path to
Danzig without taking all of Poland. And I think it's
pretty clear from the very beginning that that's never what
he intended to do. He always intended to take all
of Poland. That was not some trick that he decided
he had to because if he was going to attack
any part of Poland, he was going to get in
a war with England and France, so he may as.

Speaker 4 (48:44):
Well take all of it.

Speaker 7 (48:45):
If if France and England hadn't declared war on him
over Poland. I mean, that's that's an interesting question, I guess,
because in some ways, you know, when you when you
look at what kind of Hitler's goals were, he was
more interested in the East than he was in the West,
and the French were not among his, you know, his
his real targets racially, And I'm not sure though, I'm

(49:08):
still I'm still just I think Hitler was looking for war.
I think Hitler would have gone to war over Czechoslovakia
with with England and France, and I think that he
was perfectly happy if.

Speaker 3 (49:20):
The idea was to restore the German borders. That also
means Alsace and Lorraine, which are the Are the French
going to give that up just to you know, say, okay, yeah,
gives these backies. We're going to pretend that there was
no Treaty of Versailles and that back what you want.
I just don't know that we ever could have give
him all that he wanted. But I hear that argument that.
I just think it's kind of foolish. Hitler's ambitions were

(49:41):
well beyond the you know, going back to the borders
of Versailles. The mount that he built up certainly suggested
much more than going back to Versailles could. Would he
maybe have fought Russia instead of taking on the Western allies?
I don't think so, because I think he felt like
he needed to take Europe. I mean, the whole idea
that the thousand year Reich was going to be that

(50:02):
he he dominates Europe. So I find it unconvincing. I mean,
people will certainly make that argument. I find it unconvincing
that and any sort of situation where the US could
have simply stayed out of the war and and haven't
come to anything other than this fairly terrible conclusion.

Speaker 4 (50:18):
It's kind of hard to It's really hard to see that.

Speaker 6 (50:21):
For the entire Yeah, for the entire argument of all,
Churchill is at fault for causing World War Two. I
can't quite hear you about the Hitler rubent Tromp pact.
That's I'm yeah, if that comes across as harsh edited out.
Otherwise I'm going to stand by that one.

Speaker 7 (50:40):
Yeah, I agree, I agree with you.

Speaker 3 (50:43):
I mean, if you go back some because after I
wanted to get us into the war before he was
able to kind of move the public into the war.
So I mean Hitler actually declared war on the US
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harvard because of because
of the you know, what we've been doing in the
in the Atlantic. You know, we have really gotten to
a point where our destroyers were essentially you know, engaging

(51:03):
in warfare. You know, if they say we're going to
go along with a convoy, and if we say, you
mess with a conboy would drop depth charges on you
feel like that point, right, But if we led Germany
and Russia just fight it out, because we didn't really
like either of them. And we had just focused, you know,
on the Pacific and only fought the Pacific War. But
I mean, could you fight the Pacific War meaningfully without
the British as alloy, because without Australia, I mean, I

(51:27):
think it's very difficult for the US to take part
in the war.

Speaker 7 (51:30):
That might make this Christmas meeting more important if Churchill
jumps over here to and his job is to try
to convince US to fight Germany, even though that that
you know, they didn't declare war on us. But I mean, ultimately,
I think what happens is even if Germany doesn't declare
war within the month, probably we declare war on them.

Speaker 4 (51:49):
I mean, I think that's yeah.

Speaker 3 (51:51):
I mean, if if Japan hadn't attacked Pearl Harbor, I
believe the US is in the war by nineteen forty two, unavoidably.

Speaker 4 (51:59):
I just don't think it was any we were going
to continue to avoid were.

Speaker 3 (52:01):
Now we might go into it very differently the public mind.
If it isn't for the attack on Pearl Harbor, I
think that we were, you know, more and more understanding
that we couldn't stand just like we did in World
War One. But I don't think when you look at
the public and where the public imagination is moving. I
don't think if you look at what FDR understood with
the world, et cetera, that that it's realistic to say
that we could have we could have sat it out.

Speaker 4 (52:24):
Definitely not.

Speaker 6 (52:26):
Yeah, we would have been drawn in the fact is
we were more or less at war with Germany, even
though we were not actively shooting at one another, but
we were kind of death and uh, you know there
were lanes and some Americans and the flying Tigers.

Speaker 4 (52:45):
We were throwing explosures at them too.

Speaker 3 (52:46):
Well, you know, we had we had taken over the
occupation of Iceland in order to free it.

Speaker 4 (52:50):
Brettish true, Yeah, that's I mean.

Speaker 7 (52:52):
There were awful lot of trucks and tanks and things
with American market.

Speaker 4 (52:57):
It's hard to argue that len police was not an
active for it.

Speaker 3 (53:00):
It's really hard to argue that we weren't engaged, Yeah,
because we were straight up giving weapons to their enemies.
And you know, it wasn't like it was going both ways.
It wasn't like we were selling them to No. Ford
might have been. I mean, for there's that argument that
Ford Germany was doing stuff for him but I mean
the US was not, so I mean, it's hard to
say that we weren't in the war prior to to Yeah, disappears.

Speaker 6 (53:21):
Now we know we weren't actively we had not declared
war at that point. But yes, I do believe you're
correct that at one point or another something is going
to happen, because the Germans were neck deep in it
at this point, and I think that they understood exactly
how badly fighting a land war in Asia and fighting

(53:41):
a war on two fronts affects military outcomes.

Speaker 3 (53:45):
That's a lesson they could have learned, you know, in
the in the previous war. You know how I was
in a comedian who I says, you know, the Germans decided.

Speaker 4 (53:52):
To go to war with who? The world? Twenty years later?
The world?

Speaker 6 (53:57):
Yeah?

Speaker 4 (53:58):
Who?

Speaker 5 (53:59):
Did?

Speaker 7 (53:59):
They not declared?

Speaker 5 (54:00):
Yes?

Speaker 6 (54:00):
And how many dictators have foundered in the Russian winter? Well, okay,
that's not a short list.

Speaker 4 (54:08):
So all of them? Yeah?

Speaker 6 (54:10):
Yeah, But ultimately I do think, I do think what
happens is is that America becomes more and more aggressively
assertive in supporting Britain and the Soviet Union, and eventually,
much like World War One, the Germans come to the
conclusion of, hey, we've got approximately twelve to eighteen months

(54:31):
to wrap this thing up. Otherwise we just we collapse.
So total unrestricted offensives against you know, on naval and
then whatever whatever ways you can poke an eye, poke
the American eye. Yeah we'll we'll take that. So I
think you would have seen, you know, an even more

(54:54):
aggressive you about campaign, and you might actively Hitler may
have changed plan and said, okay, you know, let's put
some more naval air assets out to make those convoys
harder to find. And eventually enough American sailors would have
been killed as well as civilians because it was civilians

(55:15):
who were actually pulling the who are actually manning the craft,
who were bringing those supplies.

Speaker 3 (55:19):
And so yeah, eventually, eventually if Atlanta was going to
draw us, and yeah, I don't, I don't.

Speaker 4 (55:24):
Think in World War two we really had that what
would in World War One?

Speaker 3 (55:27):
Essentially, you know, by designer, by the way it worked out,
we just waited until everybody exhausted each other, and then
we you know, like they're they're standing there at the
brink of a tie, all bloodied, and we're like, yeah,
we'll just come in and push you know, push it
over the knife edge there. It's especially given you know
how quickly France was knocked out of the war. I
don't know that that that was a realistic possibility there.

Speaker 4 (55:45):
Uh. And this, what if Germany had not attacked Russia?

Speaker 3 (55:48):
I mean Russia was going to attack Germany. I mean
there's there's a lot of you know, the dynamics of
World War two that are going to go.

Speaker 7 (55:53):
Yeah, the question there might you might have been able
to talk about a question of time, you know that
it maybe would have taken a couple of year years
about Yeah, on one side of the other was going
to push that button?

Speaker 4 (56:03):
Yeah, definitely.

Speaker 6 (56:05):
There's another plausibility here, and that is if this Christmas
meeting does not occur, perhaps the Access powers think that, okay,
maybe there is some distance between the United States and
Britain that we can still exploit. So do the Japanese
change their strategy with the with the perception that relations

(56:27):
between again the United States and Britain are not as
rosy as they should be. In fact, we can we
can depend on them actively fighting.

Speaker 4 (56:37):
So what if.

Speaker 3 (56:38):
Churchill comes to Christmas and they just don't get on.
I mean, what if it goes on and it doesn't
build the relationship that they do, and they don't like
each other very much. Then, you know, could that have
created some sort of friction that would have would have
made a difference in the Pacific or in the Atlantic.

Speaker 7 (56:53):
It still feels like we're that has the biggest impact
is on our you know, the combined commands structure, and
which definitely could I mean, I could have had some
pretty significant consequences, but I don't know, it's hard to
see that. It is hard to see it really turning
the you know, kind of the course of the war.

(57:13):
Because even if we're like I mean Churchill, I think
Churchill benefited from being and being able to be gregarious
and liked and do so well in front of audiences.
But I think that even if he was hard to
work with, we would have figured it out.

Speaker 3 (57:28):
As as said, if Churchill had come and died of
his heart attack, I mean, that would have been tragic
and it would have meant something for leadership in the UK.
But I honestly think the UK is going to continue
to fight under Atlee. I think it would take something
more significant than that. I mean, there was a point
when Churchill was talking about fatum on the beaches or
you know Dunkirk where I mean Chamberlain was talking about

(57:50):
talking about appeasement. But I think they were past that point, right,
you know, in nineteen forty Christmas of forty one. So
some of these counterfactoris are coming to plenty of what
if us had just given on one of it. I mean,
you're coming to the point where it's it's just as
real as if what we hadn't you know, enlisted Sasquatch
in the battle.

Speaker 4 (58:06):
I mean, you know, there's there's as much chance of that.

Speaker 6 (58:08):
I would like to say that a division made of
nothing but Sasquatch properly supported with you know, air and
armor assets, that they might have ended the ore. But
war by Christmas a fortieth maybe.

Speaker 4 (58:22):
Maybe would have been on faster.

Speaker 3 (58:24):
I'm not sure given what we know about Sasquatches that
they would have been able to fit in any armor
that we know of.

Speaker 4 (58:29):
It would have been hard to supply them. It would
have been like you know, the Wookies fighting.

Speaker 3 (58:33):
You know, it's hard because they don't you know, they
they're too tall for the for the ships. But yeah,
I mean that, you know, we we always we always
talk about Saska. I mean some of this stuff is
you know, Sasquatch level change for it to be so.

Speaker 4 (58:45):
I mean, I think it was. I think it was.

Speaker 3 (58:48):
It's underappreciated this this visit at Christmas things, underappreciated what
it had to do with relationships. I think it's under
appreciated what it had to do with bring the America
into the public. I think maybe it's underappreciated in terms
of best coordinating strategy that eventually, you know, did work.
Although I mean, what are the strategic options that we had,
you know, I don't know, but I think to an

(59:09):
extent it kind of disproves the great Man theory.

Speaker 4 (59:11):
And that is when we think all this through.

Speaker 3 (59:13):
You know, if it had been any other two American
and British leaders meeting at Christmas in nineteen forty one,
would it really have changed?

Speaker 4 (59:21):
I mean, would have be done that much differently?

Speaker 3 (59:22):
I think most of the choices we made were choices
we didn't have much, you know, much alternative.

Speaker 1 (59:28):
Thank you for listening to this episode of the History
Guy podcast. We hope you enjoyed this episode of counterfactual history,
and if you did, you can find lots more history
if you follow the History Guy on YouTube. You can
also find us at the historyguy dot com, Facebook, Patreon,
and locals. If you want to hear more counterfactuals, stay tuned.
We release podcasts every two weeks.

Speaker 5 (01:00:04):
Don't beatingly in