All Episodes

June 3, 2025 68 mins
On today’s episode, we talk about one of the largest naval battles in history, Leyte Gulf, and the task group that was never created: Task Force 34. A series of decisions often called mistakes led to one of the most famous underdog fights when the small force called Taffy 3 faced down Japanese battleships in the Battle off Samar. If any of those decisions had gone differently, the world might have taken a different path.
Mark as Played
Transcript

Episode Transcript

Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:07):
Welcome to The History Guy podcast Counterfactuals. What is a
counterfactual in the context of studying history. It is a
kind of analysis where we examined what might have happened
had historical events gone differently as a thought experiment. The
goal is to learn and understand history as it is
by talking about what it could have been as a

(00:27):
twist on the historical stories that we tell on the
History Guy YouTube channel. This is a series of podcasts
that dwell on that eternal question what if. I'm Josh,
a writer for the YouTube channel and son of the
History Guy. If you're a fan of the channel, you
already know Lance the History Guy himself. To liven up
our discussions on what might have happened, we have invited

(00:48):
Brad wagnan history officionado and a longtime friend of The
History Guy to join us. Remember that if you'd like
to support us, you can find us on Patreon, YouTube
andlocals dot com. Join us as we discuss what deserves
to be remembered and what might have been. On today's episode,
we talked about one of the largest naval battles in history,

(01:09):
Leyte Gulf and the Task Force that was never created.
Task Force thirty four, A series of decisions often called mistakes,
led to one of the most famous underdog fights in history,
when the small force called Taffy three faced down Japanese
battleships in the Battle off Samar. If any of those
decisions had gone differently, the world might have taken a
different path. Without further ado, let me introduce the.

Speaker 2 (01:34):
History guy seventy five years ago today. On October twenty third,
nineteen forty four, the Gaeto class submarines USS Darter and
USS Days discovered a Japanese fleet of the command of

(01:54):
Imperial Japanese Navy Vice Admiral to Kayo Karita. Their discovery
marked the beginning of one of the largest and most
interesting naval battles in all of history. There's so many
great stories to tell about the epic Battle of Leyte Gulf,
but one of the most interesting is one that's kind
of forgotten, that's relegated to the arcane discussion of naval strategists,
and that's the story of Task Force thirty four, or

(02:18):
why it is that in one of the greatest naval
battles in history, some of the greatest battleships ever built
never shot at each other it is history that deserves
to be remembered. In October nineteen forty four, the Japanese
Navy was a shell of its former south. Most notably,
its air arm had been devastated in the June Battle
of the Philippine Sea, where three fleet carriers have been

(02:38):
sunk and over six hundred aircraft lost. Japan was more
and more forced to deploy pilots with insufficient training, the
fact that showed in early October and the devastating Formosa
Air Battle, where another five hundred planes were lost. On
October twentieth, the U S sixth Army had begun its
invasion of the Philippine island of Leyte. The invasion represented
a choice. The original plan in the ice land hopping

(03:00):
campaign was to take the southern Philippine island of Mindanao,
but US air operations that concluded that Japanese defenses and
the Philippines were degraded and so mindan Now had been bypassed. Instead,
the decision was made to make an attack in the
central Philippines, the invasion of Leta instead of mendan Now
moved up the timeline of the campaign, but the choice
would also come to haunt the US. The US had

(03:23):
both the powerful Third Fleet under the command of Admiral
William Halsey and the Seventh Fleet under Vice Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid supporting the Latin invasion. Given the state to the
Japanese Air arm in Imperial Japanese Navy, an attack seemed
well insane, but to the Imperial Japanese Navy, there was
no real choice. Japan realized the importance of holding the Philippines,
which straddled their supply lines to Southeast Asia, critical to

(03:46):
their war effort, most notably for their fuel oil. If
Latetay were to fall, the remaining ships of the Japanese
Navy would essentially have two choices. They could go north
to the Japanese Home Islands, but that would cut them
off from their fuel supplies in Southeast Asia, or they
could go south to the holdings in Southeast Asia, which
would cut them off from their food and ammunition supplies
at the Home Islands. There was no point, the Japanese reasoned,

(04:08):
in preserving their fleet if they could not hold the Philippines.
The Japanese collected virtually their entire remaining heavy fleet elements
and prepared a plan to attack the American fleet with
the Gold destroying the vessel supporting the battle on Leyte
With their air assets in ruins. The desperate attack would
depend upon the big guns of the Japanese Imperial Fleet,

(04:28):
including the eighteen inch guns of the battleships Yamato and Musashi,
the largest battleships ever built. The Japanese plan was called
Operation shog A northern fleet centered on the carrier Zukaku,
Japan's last fleet aircraft carrier and the last of the
aircraft carriers that had participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor,
would be sent as a decoy. It was hoped that the

(04:50):
tempting target of the aircraft carriers would drop much of
Halsey's third fleet. Two other fleets, a Southern fleet coming
through the Sirogau Strait and a powerful center force including
Yamato and mo Tashi coming through the San Bernardino Strait,
would converge, wipe aside what American ships were left behind,
and attacked the transports and supply vessels supporting the troops
under General Douglas MacArthur fighting on the island. It was

(05:12):
a daring plan and a virtual suicide mission for the
ships of the Northern decoy fleet. The first scent of
battle came in October twenty third, when the Ghato class
submarines Darter and Dace detected Japanese vessels on radar. It
was the Center Force, the most powerful of the three,
under the command of Vice Admiral to Kao Kurita. The
fleet included five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers,

(05:35):
and fifteen destroyers, but no aircraft carriers. Darter and Dace
made an attack the next morning that was uncommonly effective,
singing the heavy cruiser Otago in may end so damaging
a third heavy cruiser to Kyo that it had to withdraw.
The submarines avoided attack, but Darter ran aground on a
shoal the next day and had to be abandoned. It
was a heavy blow. Otago had been Kurita's flagship, but

(05:57):
the admiral survived. The Americans now knew where the main
strike fleet was and had a good idea of its intentions.
With no aircraft carriers to provide air cover, it should
have been easy to overwhelm Coreta's group with air attacks
by the third fleet's carrier groups, but the earlier decision
to bypass Mendenaw now loomed large. The nearest land base
for Allied planes was more than five hundred miles from Layta.

(06:18):
That stretched Halsey's air assets in many ways. With no
ground base nearby, the planes had to be used for scouting,
reducing the numbers available for combat. Carl zingeim Staff, historian
of the US Midway Museum, noted in an essay this
year that nearly one hundred fighters and fifty eight dive
bombers from Halsey's fleet were diverted to reconnaissance rolls to
locate Japanese forces on the critical day of October twenty fourth.

(06:42):
Also because they were responsible for air cover for the invasion,
many of Third Fleet's air elements had to be kept
near Japanese air bases around Manila, stretching Halsey's air assets
along the entire length of the Philippine Archipelago. The broad
demands were also wearing out his air assets. Two of
his carrier groups had been dispatched to the rear, to
the Caroline Islands, more than eight hundred miles from the

(07:02):
Philippines to rest and rearm. One was called back when
Daughter made its first report, but the strongest carrier group
of the third Fleet, was allowed to continue rearward. By
the time Halsey realized the Japanese intention and called them back,
they were too far away to impact the battle. The
largest naval battle of the Second World War was materializing.
With a major Japanese surface force lacking air cover, and

(07:24):
some forty percent of Halsey's third Fleet air assets were
not available, the mistake could have had devastating consequences. On
October twenty fourth, and a day of scattered attacks, US
planes were able to sink the massive battleship Musashi, finally
worn down from numerous attacks, and forced another heavy cruiser
than Yoko, to retire. Other ships were hit, including the

(07:44):
battleship Yamato, but not crippled. The air arm had failed
to do what it should have been able to do
destroy Karita's force. But what was worse, the reports from
the air groups greatly overestimated the amount of damage that
was done to Karreita's fleet and misinterpreted a turn that
he took to avoid the airplanes. Halsey was convinced that
Karita's fleet was destroyed and retreating it was a costly

(08:07):
misconception and That is where Task Force thirty four comes in.
For Kurita had been engaged, Halsey established a plan in
case the force was to reach the San Bernardino Strait.
He ordered the creation of a powerful task group under
Vice Admiral Willis Lee. Lee was the correct man for
the job. An expert on gunnery, he was a man
set aside for the day that the big guns of

(08:28):
the American battleships, but after engage the enemy in direct combat.
Lee had been in tactical command at the naval Battle
of Guadalcanal, where USS Washington and South Dakota had sunk
the Japanese battleship Kiroshima by some majors, the only battleship
on battleship kill of the Second World War. Task Force
thirty four was powerful, including four fast battleships, the Washington, Alabama,

(08:51):
New Jersey, and Iowa, along with seven cruisers and nineteen destroyers.
Halsey gave the order that the group be created, and
that order was heard by Admiral Kincaid, commanding the seventh Fleet,
But there was a problem. Halsey sent a clarifying order.
Task Force thirty four was only to be created on
his command if he saw risk in the San Bernardino Strait.

(09:13):
Kincaid's group did not receive the clarification, nor did Halsey's commander,
Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas,
who was at Pearl Harbor. Thus, kin Kate thought that
a group had been assigned to defend the San Bernardino Strait,
but that group had not in fact been created. Kinkaid
took his main fleet elements, including six older battleships, to
set a trap for the southern Japanese force moving through

(09:36):
the Surghaus Strait. Then Halsey received the word that the
northern fleet, the Japanese aircraft carriers, had been discovered. He
immediately gave chase, thinking that Karita had been defeated. He
took his entire fleet with him. He never gave the
order to create Task Force thirty four. The San Bernardino
Strait was undefended. Karida's group was not, as Halsey surmised,

(09:59):
crippled or to turned back, and King Kaid had gone south.
As darkness was approaching, Admiral Lee, concerned that Curita might return,
sent a message to Halsey, recommending that Task Force thirty
four be activated. Later, planes from the USS Independence, the
only US carrier built for night operations, confirmed that the
Center Force was operating with running lights and appeared to

(10:19):
be approaching the San Bernardino Strait. Halsey appeared to shrug off,
both convinced that sinking the carriers was the key to
crippling any future operations For the Imperial Japanese Navy, kin
Kaida laid a trap for the ships of the Southern
Japanese Fleet. To fleet, under the command of Admiral Jesse Oldendorff,
attacked the force, including two older battleships and four cruisers
under the command of Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura in a

(10:41):
night action. The Japanese fleet was largely sunk by torpedoes
from destroyers attacking in the straits where Nishimura's larger ships
could not maneuver. But Nishimura's flagship, the battleship Yamashiro, came
within range of the battleships of the Seventh Fleet, five
of which had been damaged or sunk at Pearl Harbor.
Those battleships were happy to have their fourteen inch guns
participate in the last battleship on battleship action in history.

(11:05):
Nishimura's fleet was devastated, but there was a problem. At
almost the same time, about three m that the Young
Ashiro was falling under the guns of old endorsed battleships,
the small fleet supporting the ground forces on Leyte were
citing the masts of Curita's central force. The ij In's
unlikely plan seem to have worked. Despite their losses, the

(11:27):
Leaytae invasion fleet was now virtually undefended and at the
mercy of a large Japanese fleep that included the largest
battleship ever built. As soon as reports about Curita's fleet
came in, Kincaid started sending messages to Halsey. The first said,
is task Force thirty four guardings and Bernardino strait. The
next said, urgently need fast battleships at Leyte Gulf at once.

(11:48):
Another said our escort carriers being attacked by four battleships,
eight cruisers plus others. Requests Lee cover Leaytae at top speed.
Requests fast carriers make immediate strike and finally but call
so urgent that it was not encoded. Where is Lee?
Send le Lee was not there. Task Force thirty four

(12:09):
had not been constituted, and that ships were sailing north
far from Kurita and Leayta. Halsey was still convinced that
the Japanese carriers were more important. He only detached a
task force after a message from his commander, adderal Niements
which also may have been misunderstood. The American fast battleships
were detached early enough to miss the action against the
northern fleet, but too late to arrive at Laytay during

(12:31):
the largest naval battle of the war. Some of the
best ships of Halsey's fleet were never able to engage.
The defense by Taffy three. The tiny task group that
was supporting the invasion on Layta is legendary. The tiny
group included a handful of destroyers and destroyer escorts and
tiny escort carriers. They were wildly outmatched by Karita's fleet,

(12:52):
but they put up a tenacious defense. They took terrible losses,
but in one of the most enigmatic decisions of the
Second World War, Rita, unaware of the power of the
force in front of him, retreated. Had he pressed the
attack and been able to attack the invasion fleet, it
probably would have been devastating to the Allies plans, because
at that point the Imperial Japanese Navy was virtually destroyed,

(13:14):
but the losses on the transport and support vessels and
among the soldiers that were depending upon that support, well,
they would have been terrible. Karita's precipitous retreat saved the
United States from what could only be called a disaster.
Halsey spent the rest of his career justifying his decisions,
arguing that he had gotten King Kaid's messages too late

(13:36):
to do anything about it, and that the aircraft carriers
were the more important target. The Japanese Northern Fleet, under
the command of Vice Admiral jisuburro Ozawa, was devastated by
Halsey's remaining group, but a couple of ships survived that
might also have been sunk had his battleships not been
pulled off at the last moment. As a terrifying PostScript,
at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, as Koreita was retreating,

(13:57):
the escort carriers of Taffy three came under air attack
by planes that were being deliberately crashed into the ships.
Several ships were damaged, and the CASABIANCA class escort carrier
Saint Lo was sunk. It was the first mass use
so the Japanese Kamakazis, and the war had moved into
another terrible phase. If you're an aficionado of World War Two,

(14:20):
one of the great tragedies of Task Force thirty four
is the battle that was never fought. Had Lee's force
been defending the San Bernardino Strait, then that would have
been a contest between roughly equal sized fleets, including four
of America's best battleships, against four of Japan's best battleships,
including the Yamato. Contemporary scholars argue that the better fire

(14:41):
controlled the American ships meant that it would have been
a mismatch, but you'll have to think that the eighteen
inch guns of Yamato would have had something to say
about that. It's history that never quite happened and yet
deserves to be remembered.

Speaker 1 (14:56):
Now for the fun part, where I the history guy
himself and long time for to the History Guy Bradwagnan
discuss what might have happened if it had all gone
a bit differently. You know, this is really an interesting
episode where you get to talk about you know, Taffy three,
which is I think people love talking about that without
talking directly about Taffy three.

Speaker 2 (15:15):
So I wasn't trying to just talk about Lata. I
was trying to give you a lesser known, you know,
kind of talk about Lata. I don't know. I think
people who are familiar with Lati were probably familiar with
that there was supposed to be this task Force thirty forty,
but I mean not necessarily. A lot a lot of
people that were talking about the battle off of Samar,
and they love to hear about, you know, the destroyers

(15:37):
at Samar and stuff like that, but they they honestly didn't.
You know, I had never heard this idea that there
should have been ships, but it I mean, in some
ways it's a straightforward question. I mean, you know, well
the battle essentially the US ends up ending the battle anyway, right,
So I mean, had we had more pleat element there,
would it have changed the results? Or is there a

(15:58):
chance that the curate who blinked, what would he have
done if there had been real battleships there? I mean,
so is there really any realistic possibility that the Japanese
could have won if we had more fleet there than
if we had less sleep there, Uh, and that I mean,
but that answers not necessarily straightforward as it sounds. So
I mean there's a lot of what what if? Because
it was such an interesting plan. Here was a decision

(16:20):
made in the heat of battle in a major in
the largest naval battle in history, right, and how would
this decision have affected things? I think it's I think
it's a great discussion. It's a fun thing to talk about.
You can't get into the weeds about how you know
ship's compared in et cetera, or you can go to
a broader level, but there's you know, there's also the question,
you know, what if you know, if the Japanese have won,

(16:42):
had won, what would that have meant? If the American
victory was more complete in terms of the ij in,
what would that have meant? So, yeah, I agree, I
think that this is a very fun start for a
counter factual.

Speaker 3 (16:51):
I'm really looking forward to this discussion because not so
much of the direct question or the direct counterfactual, but
all of the ripple effects, which involve some of the
most interesting personalities in World War Two and ultimately are
going to play a huge role out until even into

(17:14):
the nineteen.

Speaker 2 (17:14):
Fifties, and that's an interesting spin too. I mean, what
does it mean in the long term? Certainly kind of traditionally,
it seems is a huge mistake on Halsey's part. So
I mean, we can maybe try to address is it
is it really well? I mean, it's a strange question
to ask in a battle that you know essentially was
one usually the mistakes made on behalf of the loser,
you know.

Speaker 1 (17:32):
I do think a good place to start is talking
about about how it's when you when you look at
it from you know, from like at the kind of
a thousand yard distance you tried to look at what
was going on here, it is hard to ignore that
it feels like calls he made a series of decisions
that we're definitely mistakes. He doesn't he you know, he
doesn't create this group. He makes his orders were unclear

(17:56):
so that people thought that it was made. When when
it starts being clear that it was a mistake and
people are telling him it's a mistake, he doesn't act
on it until it was really too late to do
anything about it. All of this stuff kind of comes together,
and it's really incredible that despite all of that, it
was a victory.

Speaker 2 (18:13):
So I mean, is that the fog of battle and
his focus elsewhere, or did Halsey literally think it was
a feint or that the carriers were truly the most
important target. I mean, did he strategically say I didn't
do that on purpose because I thought I was doing
the right thing, or was he it was at all
a mistake him being distracted and going on. It's you know,

(18:35):
in retrospect, there was nothing in the Northern Fleet that
was going to challenge his fleet. I mean, in retrospect,
he didn't need the ships of that task force, and
they only engaged very small amount anyway, it ended up
not being very much a direct engagement. So it's I
don't know if there's a clear answer to that question,
if because Halsey's never quite made it clear, you know,
did I air or was this a very deliberate choice.

Speaker 1 (18:58):
Well, there's some reasons why you wouldn't make it as
a deliberate choice, and certainly the Japanese plan was designed to,
you know, to get the Americans on board. It was
it was a good move putting the carriers there because
that there was there was reason to believe that the
carriers were the important part there were also there was
also maybe some reason too that you could have seen
that that was the faint and it does it does

(19:21):
make you wonder maybe one of the biggest problems is
that he thought that that central Fleet was destroyed and
he seems to have made.

Speaker 2 (19:28):
That assumption or turned back, yeah, or had.

Speaker 1 (19:30):
Turned back that it was defeated at any rate, and
I mean, he was wrong about that, and it seems
like maybe there was some reason that he should have
known that before it was too late to get Task
Force thirty four some version of it into a defensive position.
And yet you know, he's still ultimately, you know, what
was the if we're talking about mistakes, what was left
at Leyte was ultimately enough to fight off the center fleet,

(19:54):
And like would it was that because he knew that
or he really truly believed that, or or was it
just that he didn't think there was going to be
an attack there and so he left, you know, he
left his his flank unprotected. Essentially, the first mistakes is
that they're they're over confident and they send the entire
carrier group for you know, rearm uh and which was

(20:15):
I mean, they were they were exhausted.

Speaker 2 (20:16):
There was reason for that, but I mean, the the
the whole thing could have been a disaster if they'd
even gotten farther because they had it turned back. Uh.
That was McCain's force, uh, in order to attack that
that center fleet. But it's it's interesting because the Japanese
divided their divided their fleet in the face of the
enemy on a plan that all based on the idea
that the Americans would not do something stupid like divide

(20:38):
their forces in the face of the enemy. And that's it.
It's it's an interesting plan on on both sides. Uh,
and you know, it just it kind of works out
differently than you would expect. But I mean there there
there is some fun discussion. I mean, the the Amato,
you know, was built to be the largest battleship in history,
and it never got to fight in any sort of
true you know, surface engagement. Uh. And so would the

(21:00):
you motto have acquitted itself well against the American fast battleships,
which were smaller, but faster and probably more technologically advanced.
They made the eighteen inch naval gun just to defeat
the American sixteen inch gun. So that's a fun discussion
to begin with. I think a lot of people argue
that US fire control might have made the difference. But

(21:20):
on the other hand, I think that the other difference
there is that the Motto had been severely damaged. The
reason it really didn't engage off of Samar was because
its maneuverability was severely limited due to flooding. I don't
think your Motto would have been the factor actually in
the Center Force battle.

Speaker 3 (21:36):
One of the things that I think gets overlooked in
this battle a lot is that American air power, by
this point in the war, especially after the Marianna's Turkey
shoot which occurs just a few weeks earlier, the Japanese
Japanese naval strength, naval air strength is almost non existent,

(21:58):
and the ground base air that's available in the Philippines
just really isn't enough. So what ends up happening is, uh,
Taffy three is able to put seventy five planes into
the air, Taffy two lends quite a few planes, and
then there's some uh some air assets that are flying

(22:19):
out of out of the Philippines. So one of the
things about the fleet, and this is I think ultimately
one of the one of the questions UH.

Speaker 2 (22:29):
And you know, in my opinion.

Speaker 3 (22:30):
I think it's a it's a pretty good one, and
that is, you know, does career to turn back just
because he's spent an entire half a day trying to
dodge torpedo laden avengers who are flying in on a
fairly regular basis, and ultimately he is never he is
not able to reach the jeep carriers to the point

(22:52):
that he'd like to now, you know, not not to
minimize the fact that yes, one g carrier was was
sunk directly in the other was I think there was
another that some pretty pretty soon after. You know, a
lot of the a lot of the decisions that are
being made, I think with a with a fuller with
a fuller picture of what's going on, do the do

(23:13):
the fleet battleships to the fast battleships, you know, if
they're there, especially if they have air cover or at
least some air coming in from the Taffy's which are
not that far from the San Bernardino Straits. You know,
suddenly you get this situation where it's much like not
quite a midway, but you know, another another chance for

(23:36):
America America's naval air to score a resounding hit on
what's left of the Japanese.

Speaker 1 (23:44):
Fleet, the planes we had there between Taffy two and
Taffy three, that we were running out of big ship uh,
they were running out of torpedoes, they were running out
of abilities to fight those big ships. But of course,
I mean, one of the big things there is that
Kreta didn't know that. He didn't know that we were
perhaps running out of our ability to fight him. No

(24:05):
matter what he did there, even if he what did
push through, there were going to be more planes showing
up very shortly. There would have been, you know, other
parts of the fleet would have been showing up. I
think that ultimately, if Center Fleet did reach the beaches
and started attacking, it seems very unlikely that Center Fleet

(24:27):
escapes after that, And so the question becomes, you know,
what damage could they have done in that short time
that they might have had. But he would have had
to make the assumptions correctly, and that's just that was
hard to do with the fog of war.

Speaker 3 (24:41):
Yeah, and you know, there's also the attitude of Kreta himself. Karita,
a professional Japanese military officer who has been trained from
you know, day one at the academy to defeat the enemy.
Navy bring glory to the Emperor. Is told, hey, there's
this suicide mission. We want you to go bomb ard
a bunch of transports. So, you know, there's some conjecture

(25:04):
that he was not particularly as you know, perhaps is motivated,
or he was definitely not at the top of his
game and really focused on that mission. I do think
that he was dealing with some I think they was
dealing with some reluctance in regards to this, because he
also felt that, you know, he knew that his men

(25:26):
were on a suicide run.

Speaker 2 (25:27):
Basically, well, I mean Japanese naval doctrine at the time
was actually preserved the fleet, and that was really the
decision that got returned back. And of course, you know,
he's the very first thing that happens in this battle
is that the Swordfish sinks hit the ship he's on.
They fish him out of the water and his flagship
that's really the first shots.

Speaker 1 (25:45):
Of the battle damaged, right, I mean, you can't say
he didn't hurt that set or fleet.

Speaker 2 (25:50):
So oh yeah, there's a reason they thought it turned
Oh they sank the Musashi for Heaven's sake. So so
I mean, there's so there's there's there's kind of these
two scenarios. One is that Kurita is entirely dependent upon
the whole idea that they've drawn the American fleet away
as it was he thought he was, you know, perceiving
the ships that he was seeing as big, bigger ships
than they were. That he comes and he sees, you know,
the Task Force thirty four there, and he says, no,

(26:12):
this didn't work and leave it. Uh, and there's no battle.
But a second one, this is a legos because these
fleets are actually fairly fairly comparable in size and displacement
and their broadside ability and et cet. The other one
is that leg It's there and says, holy cow, this
is a much bigger fleet than I expected. I'm going
to pull back and wait for the air cover to
come in, which is actually this point hours away. And

(26:34):
so there's there's a possibility that either Admiral bay Blink,
that either Admiral may not want to go there, that
you know, you know, Lee would be coming with a
munch regous force, a small force, not expecting to have
an apocalyptic battle with a massive Japanese force. Uh. And
you know, both of them were presumably thinking in terms
of I don't want all my ships to be sunk.
I mean, that was That's a difficult thing. That's one
of the things that MacArthur always griped about is that

(26:55):
these navy guys hate to lose their ships. He says,
why do we you know, why do we build them
if we're not going to throw them at the enemy.
Was easy for you to say, Doug, you were not
the thing. But I don't know how well Doug could swim,
but he seemed to think ships were more disposable. So,
I mean, either of those are are interesting arguments, and
it's really difficult to see, say, because Kurita did really

(27:15):
did not behave kind of like he was expected off
off of Samar And so then there's the other argument,
which is to say that if it had been a real,
you know, sink your teeth into a battle, that maybe
Kurita wouldn't have ever left, but he would he would
have gone in for that suicide run, on which case
it could have been an extremely bloody battle. I mean,
there was a lot of powerful Japanese fleet there. So

(27:37):
even if even if you want to say that Americans
had better fire control at that point, or that our
battleships were outclassing, or that the Motto was damaged. Certainly
there was going to be a whole lot of damage.
And you know, one of the things about the you know,
the brave, crazy defense of Taffy three is that the
losses are relatively small because there really wasn't that much
there to lose, you know. So you know what happens
if we actually have that apocalyptic battleship you know, engagement.

(28:00):
It's hard to imagine that the US wouldn't have lost
at least one battleship, which which otherwise we didn't throughout
the war. Right, But so this if the battle I
mean is is Curita, you know, presumably he would be
even more scared if you had what was there with
the Task Force and which is what was coming with
Task Worth thirty four war and would be more likely

(28:21):
to run away. But you know, is there a possibility
of a reverse So I don't know what you know,
what do you think who would have blinked? Or would
it have been a giant scrum on two very evenly
matched fleets.

Speaker 3 (28:32):
Yeah, just initially I would say that with Center Force
essentially coming through the San Bernardino Straits as we saw
the Southern Force. Basically they came out of the Straits
and they already had you know, they were fighting with
their t cross So I think that it's a it's

(28:53):
a fair assumption to assume that if the fast battleships
had been there, or if they arrived before the Japanese
fleet gets to the strait, that you probably have a
repeat and it goes down in history as the battleship
still has a role even in the carrier age. So
you know, there's there's that possibility. Now if if the fact,

(29:16):
if the fast battleships get there later and actually cut
off Karita's perceived direction of retreat at that point, then
we have a wild counterfactual. Where does Kurita go. Does
he turn around immediately and try to take it to
the to the vast battleships that are coming in as
a relief force, or does he turn south face another

(29:38):
TATHY unit and try to try to make his escape
through the cigar.

Speaker 1 (29:44):
You know, the Japanese make this action because they thought
this was the best that was left for the whole
Japanese surface fleet. And I mean I think they knew
that nothing, nothing significant was going to come out of
it surviving because I mean, that's that's what we see
with with all of those scenario was essentially is it
seems unlikely that any of Center Fleet is able to escape.

(30:07):
They might be able to do more damage. And that's
that's the question. Where do they do that damage, who
do they do that damage to? And what does that
you know, how does that have an impact later at
the It's it's very difficult to imagine that they defeat
the US surface fleet here, and partially that's because I mean, yeah,
they lost the whole Southern Fleet and the Center Fleet

(30:27):
was pretty beat up even by the time it you know,
got into any of the possible battles that we're talking
about here. I think that if you look at the
even on the the outside of the possible you know,
scenarios here, we're still talking entire Japanese fleet lost US.

Speaker 2 (30:46):
I mean, because it's a fair question just to start with,
was there ever any chance that the Japanese plan would succeed? Uh,
Because presumably even if Taffy three hadn't put up the
defense that it did, and even if Karita was able
to run rampant and sink the I mean, the aircraft
were going to show up and sing them eventually, right,
he was, he didn't have a real escape. So so

(31:06):
that's I mean, that's that is a fair place to start. Uh.
And so then it's fair when you ask about Task
Force thirty four to say, given what happened, I mean, essentially,
you know, America wins the battle, but Curita is able
to retreat with still substantial force. If Kurita's force is
entirely eliminated, uh, and you probably less damage to the

(31:27):
Northern fleet if you're if you're making that trade. But
I mean, and the Southern Fleet is essentially destroyed down
at straight, then what does the essentially the removal of
the Imperial Japanese Navy as a meaningful surface force mean
for the rest of the war, Because at least as
a fleet in being at least they're they are offering
risk through the rest of the war. It's not it's

(31:48):
largely shifted to the Kamakazi. But I mean, if what if,
how how does the war proceed differently? If essentially the
the the Imperial Japanese Navy is just utterly defeated and
all of the ships of the Central Force destroyed and
they only have you know, just a few, you know,
reallys left over? How different is the war from there on? Yeah?

Speaker 3 (32:07):
One potential disruption there are you know, one one possible
outcome there is one of Halsey's later actions, his attack
on the Inland Sea and the naval basic Coure. Hopefully
I'm pronouncing that correctly. I am sure that many will
tell me i'm not, but that's that's my best guess
at it. One of the reasons that Halsey gave his

(32:29):
justification for that was that with the with the end
of the war in Europe getting becoming fairly close, and
it was fairly obvious how how this is going to
end up, the Soviets were being enticed to join the
war with the Allies against the Japanese, and at that

(32:50):
point Stalin actually had designs on the northernmost home island
of Hokkaido. Had had there been a functional Japanese fleet,
perhaps that would have been a further risk to Russian
forces entering the war against Japan on the side of
the outlies.

Speaker 2 (33:09):
So that that's an interesting take that if if the
US had destroyed the I j in at Lette, then
maybe the Soviets would not have been shy to ender
the war because they were essentially slow to ender the
war because they wanted to gather forces. That's an interesting
potential take. And does that mean that, you know, because
they Soviets still haven't given back the two, the two
more than most small islands. So with sole In and

(33:33):
the would they have ever given anything back? That's an
interesting question too, because then then then you're talking about
changing well into the Cold War. And I'm sure from
there we can find a connection to Bigfoot somehow. Uh
what you want to get that for up north clear?
And as far as I know, there's not a Philippine version. Well,
I guess there are, you know, some or Pandan stuff.
There's some of that right in Southeast Asia kind of.

(33:55):
But yeah, I don't know how Bigfoot was really going
to get involved in a naval battle. That would have
been a different thing to say, maybe the mermaids were
going to catch the dead people or something. But I mean,
that's that's an interesting take. I mean, in the farthest
in let's say that is it possible when because Task
Force thirty four was relatively evenly matched with the Japanese force,
Let's say the Japanese force gets a strategic advantage fairly

(34:18):
early on, which can be to evenly match fleets can
go pretty differently, you know. Is there a chance that
he can by getting Halsey to split his force in
the face of the enemy. Is there a chance that
they can kind of destroy the American fleet in detail?
Is there a chance that they could have taken out
then the older carriers that were down at Siragau and
done enough damage to the American fleet to significantly reduce

(34:40):
the you know, the American progress through the Pacific. Is
there any chance really that this is going to shift
the war in Japanese favor down there? And is it possible?
I mean, we seem to tend to think in terms of, oh,
if we'd had more force there, we would have been
able to defeat Kurita. But is it possible that really
what could have happened is it would have given Karita
a chance to destroy America's foot forces in detail because

(35:01):
they were sweat well.

Speaker 1 (35:02):
And see, that's that's part of the question, because certainly
the way that Taffy three responded was significant. I think
in in you know, how Karita makes that decision, and
I think that if he meets Task Force thirty four,
the response might be more conventional, and that might be
enough for Kreita to you know, more accurately understand what

(35:23):
he's facing. And that truly might that that amount of
time might mean that, you know, we have we have
a battle there. Mind you, Kreta was running on. He
only had so much time. He couldn't wait too long.
He'd have to defeat them and then and then move.
And of course his his big mission is to get
to layte and sink as many of the landing ship

(35:47):
tanks as he can as he can find. That was
his his big goal. But if he's able to defeat
the fleets, which I think is the would be an
exciting thing to talk about. It does seem difficult purely
because of honestly, because of his air power. The US
had such a at that point had such a significant
advantage with air power. Is it feels like even if

(36:07):
he is able to defeat is able to truly defeat
the carriers at at this at you know, at this
Battle of Taffy three and then move on to attack
more carriers, and it would still be difficult for him
to take enough planes out before he could because he's
going to be taking damage that whole time, and he
just only has so much stamina. Essentially, a late ends

(36:27):
up being a much a much longer fight than they
expected it to be, and a much harder fight. And
part of that was because and part of it was
because of the lack of availability of those landing ships,
which you know delayed D Day as well, and the
need to have those, and so if he's able to
sink them, I was looking into just how many he'd

(36:49):
be able to sink, and it looked like his best opportunity.
There were about twenty three of those LST's and twenty
eight liberty ships in Leyte Gulf at the at that time.
So if he gets through Taffy three and can get there,
there is some possibility that they would have had some
warning and so some of them escape. But he essentially
would have been able to destroy about a month's worth

(37:10):
of landing ships tanks that we that we could that
we could built. That's that's how long it would have
taken us to replace some and only about two weeks
worth of liberty ships. And so you when you when
I was looking at that, I'm thinking, it really shows
you how the production of the United States at that
point was just a behemoth weighing against Japan. That we're

(37:32):
talking that this was what the Japanese thought they could
best do. This was their best chance of getting something
out of their their surface fleet, and they're hoping to
maybe slow the United States down in terms of production
by a month. I think that ultimately what they could
have done was a greater impact than that in terms
of you know, slowing down the Philippines and how that

(37:55):
slows other things down. It is hard to see a
world where that changes the outcome of the war. But
as we saw in that Pacific, you know, every every delay,
every every island was was a costly battle. And so
that's the the idea of what it would cost in
terms of material and the human the human cost of
just trying to take or having to fight these battles

(38:17):
longer is a different question. I think the idea of
him destroying the fleet is an interesting one. It seems
like a like long.

Speaker 2 (38:25):
Odds, you know, to talk about you know, the logistics
of it. The Essex character Essex carriers had been laid
down before the war started, and so you can easily
back up in the Pacific War. And even though you
look at the breath of that war, and say if
the Japanese don't win by the end of forty two,
it's an unwinnable fight. After that, it's simply a war

(38:45):
of attrition that they cannot possibly win, they can't possibly
keep up with. And so it is this, I mean,
if if you destroyed that invasion fleet, what does it mean?
Does that? Do the ground forces? Are they really trapped?
Do they lose at Leta? Do they lose you know,
massive amounts of forces? Is the US swings for a
separate piece. The bottom line is we're producing so much
so quickly at that point that probably none of that

(39:06):
is true. Probably they hold out. They maybe don't you know, advance,
but they hold out and enough, you know, and curity
is going to be destroyed eventually when the airplanes arrive. Yeah,
and then well we'll we'll restock that fleet in a
couple of weeks. And that's probably what would have happened. So,
I mean, you can look at Layta and this massive battle,
in the largest battle, and it's fairly easy as a
counterfactural simply to say the war is already lost. This

(39:28):
is an act of desperation by the Japanese. You can
see it. By the nature of the plan. That is
an active desperation by the Japanese. As a matter of fact,
before that, the Battle of the Philippine Sea was an
active desperation. And so, you know what, what does LATA matter?
I mean, if you look at it and say, though,
you know what, if Lata had mattered, then that at
least gives you some other interesting questions. So I think

(39:48):
I think you get to a good point there. I
think that the feeling that everybody had is that really
there was only so much they were ever going to
accomplish in the battle play take off, even if it
accomplished to their wildest streaks, their biggest hopes, There's only
so much that was going to accomplish, and Brad was
getting to that previously, essentially saying this created is this
creed a even believe in this plan, especially since your
batto's dead and that sort of thing. I don't know.

(40:10):
I mean, if the US, I mean, despite the losses,
the personnel losses and et cetera, the material losses of
World War Two with the US of the Pacific were
much less than we imagine they could be. In all
of these battles, the Japanese are taking much more severe
losses than we are. If we really get our noses bloodied,
you know, this isn't this isn't you know, the Saratoga

(40:31):
or the Lexington. If we send Task Force thirty four
and it gets brutalized, we really take it on the
nose and we lose battleships and then we have a
major setback on ground invasion. Is there a chance that
the US blinks? Is there a chance that, you know,
with the era of invincibility broken, that despite our production advantages,

(40:52):
that we start to see a shift in American public
opinion and a possibility of some sort of negotiated settlement
that then gets to a different postward.

Speaker 1 (41:00):
And well, and that's and that's an interesting question, right
because it's less in that in that case about the
about whether we could win it, and a question of
whether the whether the cost was something that could be born,
especially by you know, by the public. And certainly at
that point, you know, we went back to the Philippines
because MacArthur. MacArthur argues that we had a we had

(41:22):
a we had a responsibility to go back to the Philippines.
That was that was somewhere we were supposed to protect
it somewhere we abandoned. But you can see a world
where you wonder, why are we throwing American lives away
for the Philippines.

Speaker 2 (41:37):
Well, and you know in the end, when you look
at how bloody the battles were the Philippines and when
we're throwing Philippine lives away too, Yeah, absolutely take that
by floating all the way up to the peninsula. So is
it I mean, is there in the wildest end, is
there a chance that Lete causes the United States to
negotiate a settlement that leaves the Philippines with Japan, takes
Japan maybe out of Southeast Asia, and comes to a

(41:58):
p street with Japan. And does that say lies or alternatively,
could Lata have have resulted in the defeat so significant
for the Imperial Japanese Navy literally taking them out of
the war, that the Japanese don't fight to the death,
that they don't surrender and we never have to use
the atomic bomb. I mean, is is that much on
the line at Lete or is Leati just at this

(42:20):
point the war's already you know, you're into the end
game of the chess match and they're just throwing their
pieces away.

Speaker 3 (42:27):
I think that the one of the questions definitely leads
into some potential counterfactual discussion. Does the United States sue
for our you know, approach Japan and say, hey, you know,
let's this meat grinder has to stop. The answer is
definitely that I just don't. I don't see the American

(42:47):
the American tone at the time. You can see it
in popular entertainment during that era. There's this wonderful movie
that comes out, I think in nineteen forty three where
the picture of the jab these pilot dive bombing Americans
with a grin on his face, and yeah, they remember
Pearl Harbor was so fresh in people's mind that no

(43:09):
one was, I think, really seriously going to talk. I
was going to talk to peace. Now, if Task Force
thirty four is there, and then if the Amato and
the other ships of Kurita's force steam over the horizon,
see at extreme range, they've got a potential shot. And

(43:31):
suddenly they put two shells into the magazine of the
New Jersey or one of the other fast battleships, and suddenly,
you know, the tables are turned. The Japanese fleet comes through,
never threatens the ships that lay Tae Gulf, but gives
the American Navy bloody. Nos, at that point, what happens

(43:52):
to some of the players who are so important going
forward in the in the struggle for the Pacific. Is
this a situation in which Halsey is relieved of command
for you know, throwing his throwing his fast battleships without
sufficient support. There's a possibility. Now the next question is

(44:13):
who replaces him? And I think that there there is
an interesting counterfactional because I would nominate a admiral named
Spruance who would carry on and has a fair amount
of aggressiveness and is really the mastermind who executes at midway,

(44:33):
a proven commander who basically is facing a reinvigorated Japanese fleet.
That's bloody the nose of the Americans. So potentially, yeah,
the war drags on a little bit longer. Also, you know,
laying down a battleship keel, Yeah, you can turn out
a liberty ship. I think that the record was one

(44:53):
week to lay the first bit of the keel all
the way to completion. But a battleship that's little, that's
a little more involved, that costs costs quite a bit more.
And if you give the American Naval Command at that point.

Speaker 2 (45:09):
Pause.

Speaker 3 (45:11):
You know, are they quite as aggressive on that island
hopping campaign they or do they decide now, we're not
gonna leave any anything behind us. So perhaps you could
have seen a shift in tactics and perhaps a caution
on the part of the Americans that they did not
have after Essentially, you know, Center Force is more than

(45:33):
half wiped out, and you know the Southern Force as
well as the Northern Force take heinous casualties.

Speaker 2 (45:41):
I think that's the only that's the only real thing
to talk about. Could the could the Japanese have won?
And first of all, I'm with you there. Actually we
had had our nose bloody plenty down to Iron Bottom Sound.
We had taken plenty of losses in the Pacific, and
all it did was meant that we, you know, we
were ticked off more so, I honestly don't think that
a defeat of Task Force thirty would have changed the
American attitude towards the war. In terms of battleships too,

(46:04):
we had we had what three of the Montana class
were laid that we ended up not completing. And the
Montana class they call them super heavy cruisers, but I
mean those would have been our versions of the motto
that would have been bigger than the past battleships. So
we I mean this stuff. By this point, the US
has more you know, fifty thousand plus gross ton ships
than the rest of the world combined. Yeah, it's it's

(46:27):
nice to speculate. What if they had sat task the
thirty four and what if Tasked Force thirty four had
been defeated? Would seem so counterintuitive since he Curita was
defeated by the you know, the Samuel B. You know,
he certainly wasn't gonna like the New Jersey in the Iowa,
in the Missouri. But if Center Force had been defeated,
would that have changed the American attitude or would you know,

(46:47):
we our fleets were so big at that point and
the Japanese fleet and their ability to replace that fleet
was so small. I honestly don't think that whole scenario, Trader,
I don't think there's any possibility on the scenario. I
don't think it would even possibly move us to you know,
a negotiated settlement. It could just it could have slowed up,
you know, the invasions in the Philippines. It might have
changed strategy on what islands we were going to hop

(47:09):
but I kind of doubt as a counterfact that would
have made a huge difference of it. I kind of
lean more the other way. If there had been truly
a devastating defeat of the ij in at Leta and
the Center Force had not made it out, is there
a possibility of an earlier Japanese surrender that doesn't include
using nuclear weapons, Which then leads to this interesting point

(47:30):
because if we had nukes, and we wanted the world
to know we had nukes at that point, and we
were certainly using nukes to give a message to Russia,
what do we do if Japan surrenders before we get
a drop one?

Speaker 1 (47:44):
It is because it's maybe a more interesting question because
because yeah, there was you could at least argue, I
mean people argue about this all over the internet about
whether or not there was there was, you know, a
legitimate military reason to drop those nukes on Japan. But
if you're thinking about the which they of course, of
course the planners and the droppers of the bomb were

(48:05):
thinking about what it might mean to the you know,
the post war world, that too, that too is an
interesting one. Of course. I mean, if we do we
just come up with an excuse for it. Do we
find a way to how do you how do you
do it? Because it's I don't know.

Speaker 2 (48:21):
There's because just or some US some US presidents trying
to figure out the place where they get to use
an atomic bomb to show that we could use an
atomic bomb. And is it something where they just go
do a demonstration in the middle of the Pacific and
fry you know, a butch of fish, or are there
do we fabricate a whole nother war? Do we continue
the war? Do we maybe go to war with the Soviets?

(48:42):
I mean, do we do we do something else? Because
we got to use our nukes because we put this
money into building them, then we want to show that
we are the power of the post war power.

Speaker 1 (48:49):
It certainly doesn't have the you know, doing a test
does not have the same does not have the same.

Speaker 2 (48:57):
So so if if the Japanese lose it lay and
the Japanese surrender earlier, does that give a possibility that
the United States less wounded by the way having putting together,
you know, these million manned forces for the invasion of Japan,
that the US does decide to do what Paton wanted
to do and continue the war in Europe against the Soviets,

(49:18):
and darn it, no more comedies in the world because
we we we win the battle. Of course this time.

Speaker 1 (49:22):
It's it's hard to it's hard to imagine that dropping.
I mean, it would have been a difficult fight. The
fact that we were simply tired after fighting.

Speaker 2 (49:30):
A long war.

Speaker 1 (49:30):
So it's hard to then imagine fighting another big war.

Speaker 2 (49:33):
But a big nuclear war, and a war we're the
only warm and we're the only one to have them,
you know, you know, we had three or whatever. We
kind of misrepresent that, but I mean, you know, the
B twenty nine, we're finally working the Kings out of
the Ya. We were in a I mean, already there's
this position where we have to there had to have
been some thinking in the American up, in the American
government of we know this is going to continue, we

(49:56):
know that Stalin is really an enemy. You know, there
had to be some thinking about the already, and certainly
they was thinking in terms of dropping the atomic bombs
and trying to keep Stalin from taking Korea and moving
you know, into the Far East. So so is an
earlier Japanese surrender does that make a a West or
US Soviet war more likely, and what would that war
look like, especially since we had we had the clear

(50:16):
weapons and we were not only able to use them,
we were rare.

Speaker 1 (50:19):
The Soviets do see some stuff in the Far East,
and it makes you wonder if we use that, you know,
if they if the Soviets decide we're still going to
try to seize some stuff because we want uh, and
we see this opportunity, do we use that as a
you know, we're going to show off with a nuke?
And I mean, even if you're not talking, you know,
blow up a blow up Moscow. You don't have to

(50:40):
blow up Moscow to make a pretty dang big statement
to say, you know.

Speaker 3 (50:46):
Dropping a tompic bomb on blot of a stock.

Speaker 1 (50:48):
Okay, the Soviets, yea, but does that just mean does
that just mean you know, does that does that engender
even more hatred between the two countries come the Cold War?
Because you know some that's well presumed.

Speaker 2 (51:01):
Presumably, Yes, if we had the Soviets, they would be
more mad at us. Uh. I think we could assume that.
But but oh, you know, we've also seen I mean,
the Soviets are willing to lose you know, whole army,
millions of people and then just like, yeah, we'll just
keep going. So I mean, would would would that? Would
the nukes necessarily have won the war? Would the world
have sunk into I mean, another ten years of war

(51:23):
that eventually the other side would get atomic weapons? And
you know, there you get a very the scenario can
get a lot, a lot broader from there. I don't
want to mention something Brad mentioned because I think it
was a really interesting point to say that Halsey got
so much criticism for not sitting tasks for thirty four.
It's interesting to say, what if he had and it
had gotten mauled and would you know, would would he
actually could he have? Because he wasn't relieved? I mean,

(51:45):
they kept they kept it going. But would he have
been relieved had he said with everybody says a great blunder?
Had he done that and it just didn't turn out?
So to an extent, you know, the coach is a
hero if they catch the ball and he's he's the goat.
If they don't, I mean that's that's.

Speaker 1 (51:59):
It does see like either either way, I mean, unless
unless he just literally doesn't take the bait and go
for the Northern fleet at all, or you know, Sen
sends something like a token force up there, which changes
the changes the I mean, if the whole fleet had
stayed there, obviously the center fleet doesn't stand a chance.
And right, but we're talking could the center fleet have

(52:20):
defeated some some tiny portion of it as opposed to
if he does. You know, if he does leave thirty
four there and he has significant loss, it becomes intern
you know, politically, you don't get the heroics of Taffy
three as as a as a as a story you
can tell. You get we a costly battle where many
people died, where we lost important ships. I mean, that's
a lot harder to spin, right, And so maybe that

(52:43):
is that that he gets kicked out because ultimately he stays.
He gets to stay because Taffy three had saved his butt. Yeah,
it would have been a different story if if they
had destroyed Taffy three had gone and had sunk all
the landing ship tanks, had had just had done serious
damage to the you know, the beach on the beaches
to where where we were trying to invade lets there.

(53:03):
Suddenly that makes suddenly that makes his mistake look look
really really bad. But I think you're right that I
think that he might have had a harder time keeping
his seat if.

Speaker 2 (53:13):
As it turned out, might have been the best for
Halsey even with them dealing where's war's leave? So and
if you want, if you want the most fun from
a war gamer perspective, that is that we keep the
entire fleet together, that we haven't sent the Southern Force
down to the Strait, so that both the Japanese Center
Force and the Japanese Southern Force come up and you've
got all the old you know, all the old Pearl
Harbor battleships, all the fast battleships, all the Japanese battleships,

(53:37):
pretty much everything they got, And then you know what
would that huge scrum have looked like? So it would
be it would also be fun to see, you know,
the California and the West Virginia sluging it out with
the Imatto, And you know, would we have gotten revenge
for Pearl Harbor. So, I mean, did it did it
really turn out the best it possibly could have turned
out for the Americans or could it have turned out
better for the Americans. That's in question because this might

(53:59):
have been the outcomes it was might have been the
one that leaves Halsey in the best position. And if
it doesn't, then you know, we then we're talking changes
the leadership, and what would a change of leadership.

Speaker 1 (54:09):
Which could be I mean those can be troubling too.

Speaker 3 (54:12):
That's going to be the same way that I'm going
to grasp that desperately. There is another there's another personality
who has been strangely absent from this conversation, and that
would be a certain General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur in our
alternate future loses a good number of landing craft and supplies,

(54:35):
and his reconquering at the Philippines turns into a bloody
slugfest that the American public maybe begins to say, hey,
you know, this MacArthur guy, even though he's been presented
to us as a near missonionic figure, you know, maybe
he actually doesn't know what he's doing. This brings in

(54:58):
some really wonderful I think, counterfactuals, obviously MacArthur, who, in
my preparation for this one, I have discovered that MacArthur
was a very, very egotistical individual. He has moments of
utter brilliance and moments of being an utter twit. Now

(55:20):
one of those moments of brilliance is if MacArthur, say,
you know, runs into the point where he loses a
lot of his popular support. Is he appointed as essentially
the military governor of Japan after the war, a role
for which he was uniquely I think suited, and probably

(55:40):
the most brilliant moment of his career is when he's
able to, you know, to basically help modernize, demilitarize, and
bring Japan into the sphere of Western nations with a
you know, with democratic institutions. Then you also have to
get the opposite side of the coin. What if MacArthur

(56:04):
is not in charge in nineteen fifty when the North
Koreans jump the thirty eighth Parallel, because for the first
few days MacArthur is telling President Truman that, oh no,
this is just a border clash, this is not a
full scale invasion by the North, when in fact it was.
And then to add the next brilliant move, the landings

(56:25):
of Inchom definitely classic MacArthur who has learned that hey,
assaulting where assaulting the enemy where he doesn't think he
can if it's executed correctly, works really really well. And
then you have the twit moment when he decides that
the Chinese are never going to come over the Yalu River,

(56:48):
I can just you know, rock it up the peninsula.

Speaker 2 (56:51):
Yeah.

Speaker 3 (56:53):
So it's I think that this is one of those
that you know, potentially one of the side effects of
Task thirty four, perhaps you know, not being there and
MacArthur not being Johnny on the spot in the rebuilding
of Japan, and the critical mistakes and brilliant maneuversity makes

(57:14):
in the Korean War that we get are much different,
much different outprot history.

Speaker 2 (57:20):
The other personality which is harder to see, but Nimmits
also who becomes the nice chief naval Operations if there's
a significant loss those two, I mean Nimittsen and MacArthur
are responsible for the Pacific. Is there a chance that
they're replaced? And what happens to the fleet would be
different if Nimts had not become Chief of Naval Operations,
and you know, if we didn't have MacArthur with and

(57:42):
then you're right, the occupation and then Korea iming MacArthur
goes on for quite quite a bit longer. So this
was touching on some very large personalities that were in charge.
I mean, and I don't know, maybe on the other side,
which I know less. I really don't know how to
talk about this. But there was a victory, and Karita
becomes more famous than Yamato, How does he affect Japanese history?

(58:07):
Different from the point if he wins the miracle victory
at Lete and does he change the military policy? Does
he end up becoming an important figure in post war Japan?
I mean certainly, you know, reputations rise and fall on battles,
and it's a lot harder to see that what would
have happened with the guy that didn't rise. So it's
a good point. I mean, MacArthur is so he loops

(58:28):
so large into the nineteen fifties. If something changes MacArthur
himself in the you know, I know it's great man theory,
but MacArthur himself does change maybe the course of history
in other places.

Speaker 1 (58:39):
You know, how we worked with Japan in the post
war was significant for not just Japanese history, but of
course everything that Japanese Japan has touched afterward. Right, So
I mean we could have I mean, we could have
approached that very differently. In a lot of ways. We
were rather gentle with Japan. I don't think that was
necessarily like the way we were definitely going to do it,

(59:00):
you know, and if if you choose a different tech
mean to make, you may have a very different different world.
And of course Japan has been important since World War Two.

Speaker 3 (59:11):
The tom Laiir song. Once all the Germans were war
like in being. But that couldn't happen again we taught
them at eight. So yeah, what happens if you send
in someone who is non a MacArthur, who, by the way,
spent time in Japan as a child, so uh he
actually has you know a little bit of an understanding

(59:34):
of Japanese culture. What if you send in someone who
is the bull in the China shop, you end up
getting more of a Treaty of Versailles type with reparations
and basically poor policy that's designed to punish versus someone
who comes and says, look, yes you are the bad guys,
but now hey, you know it's it's it's much more

(59:56):
profitable and it's going to be a much better life
for you if you, you know, trade with us and
try to begin to adopt some of the some of
the modernity, some of the Western ideals and will be
good friends if we can do that, if we can
come to that agreement. I do think that MacArthur deserves
full credit for an enlightened and relatively mild role it

(01:00:18):
basically as an military governor during the reconstruction post war.

Speaker 1 (01:00:21):
That's a big deal. I mean, for one, Japan as
a base for the United States and for people who
are on our side in the Cold War, is I
mean that was significant, right? I mean that was that
allowed us to have essentially this presence in the far Eace.
That if we didn't have a good relationship with Japan,
I mean that alters perhaps how we approach Korea, how

(01:00:43):
we approach step in Southeast Asia in the years that
follow after that. That is an interesting conversation and maybe
the most interesting piece that of alternate history that we
can talk about here is how that might have impacted
that policy there, which of course drove huge parts of
the Cold War and huge parts of American history, and
of course huge parts of Asian history.

Speaker 2 (01:01:04):
It's a lot harder to see the UN I guess
involvement in Korea if Japan has not so aligned with you.

Speaker 3 (01:01:11):
Yeah, and the fact that the only troops that were
available to get to Korea in short order were Interestingly enough,
the twenty thousand or so troops that were occupying Japan
was relatively quick to get them over. Korea was a
very near run thing. Can you imagine a post nineteen
fifty two world in which North Korea unifies the Korean

(01:01:35):
Peninsula and as a staunch soviet.

Speaker 2 (01:01:39):
Ally presumably they could have starved the South just as
well as they starved the.

Speaker 1 (01:01:43):
Newark crazy to think that that might that might have
relied a mistake that Halsey might have made.

Speaker 2 (01:01:51):
You know, yeah, well, you know the butterfly effect. The
Battle of Light is a pretty dwnk good sized pyify.
So yeah, I mean it's that when you talk about
it rippling into history, that that's probably right. That the
biggest way it might have rippled into history is the
way that detected the reputation MacArthur, which is interesting because
it was a sea battle. He was, you know, a

(01:02:13):
land officer.

Speaker 1 (01:02:14):
But certainly it impacted how well he was able to
fight that battle. And that battle already became more of
a slog than we wanted it to. So how much
more of a slog could it have become before it started?
Really impacting public public perception of him or of the
in the fight in the Philippines.

Speaker 2 (01:02:32):
And to an extent, you could argue, I guess that
everything that was going on there was his risk, even
if even if it was a naval battle, that you know,
he was choosing where we were fighting and when, and
was it really necessary for us to Could the Philippines
have been an island hopped?

Speaker 3 (01:02:51):
At the time, the Joint chiefs of Staff actually did
not want to go after the Philippines. They were far
more interested in looking at four months. But ultimately there
there's a problem, and that is that the intelligence at
the time indicated that, you know, based on our best
guess to take the Philippines, it's going to take at
least a couple of hundred thousand to take. Foremost it's

(01:03:11):
probably gonna take half a million.

Speaker 2 (01:03:13):
But I mean, so if there's a setback at leate,
does that mean that we change strategy and it don't
attack the Philippines? And actually that brings up another thing.
So we're talking about us randomly wanting to use a
nuclear bomb if instead of against the Soviets, do we
use that in the Chinese Civil War? It's our excuse
to use the nuclear bomb to get rid of Mao,
and it's for a nationals. So if we're if we

(01:03:36):
end up, you know, having nuclear bombs and no reason
to drop them on the Japanese and we're just looking
for who we're going to new and order to prove
that we can China. China is a possibility, the Chinese
Civil war? Is it possibility? How different is it if
if Mao never takes China, if if instead we knew
now at some.

Speaker 3 (01:03:51):
Point, or I mean, even if it's as simple as Okay,
we decide, you know, ay, this Philippines thing is just
too much. We're just gonna buy pass. We're going to
go for Moosa. Part of the Joint Chief's plan involved
getting China far more actively involved in the war. You know,
I can't think of anyone else that we might have

(01:04:11):
dropped the bomb on, unless I suppose that one of
the I mean, perhaps the French would have prevailed upon
us to drop a nuke on Hanois to deal with
the little dust up they were having there.

Speaker 2 (01:04:29):
That is a fun counterfactual to say, what if Japan
it's sur rendered and then we were casting about for
an excuse to use the bomb where we might have well,
we might have thought because it could have I mean
that also could have been Yugoslavia, that could have been
I mean it's it's it's a random president with a
with a nuke and a good reason to show that
we can do it. Is you would hope that we

(01:04:50):
were simply reserved that we would not have done that,
rather than that we got to use this on somebody
miny more. You know.

Speaker 1 (01:04:56):
Yeah, you would rather perhaps the.

Speaker 2 (01:04:58):
Swiss to the Swiss, since we're since we're already gone
to a counterfactial that says we have to randomly nuke somebody.
I mean who we got to new someone, you know,
who's who's the who's the least we shouldn't do this to?
Uh uh.

Speaker 3 (01:05:13):
Then the Australians.

Speaker 2 (01:05:14):
Yeah, well the Australia. I don't think we're going to
New c Australia. I think that's I think that's very
very unlikely. I think we were probably pretty solid there.
I think I think I think Australia, Canada and Britain
those would have been those would have been on very
much on the outside, even though they were powers. I
think they've been very much on the outside. We might
have come up with an excuse just to nwke Japan anyway.
But I mean, you know we were still off. We

(01:05:34):
don't mad at them.

Speaker 3 (01:05:36):
Actually a plausibility, honestly, Uh, thinking about this, you know,
now they've had a few minutes for the brain to
engage and vitamin caffee to kick into the sufficient level
for me to form a rational until he thought, if
the Soviets take hol Kaido essentially as a war trophy
at the end of World War Two due to American UH,

(01:05:57):
the American UH naval forces, the defeat at Leyte Gold,
the setbacks, and the basically the war drags on for
another few months. And again another possibility. We draw up
a couple of nukes on Japan and the Soviet and

(01:06:18):
the Japanese emperor does not decide to throw in the
towel for another two months. So the Soviets take Socole
in and they start taking hol Kaido. Finally, you know
the word that surrenders here the Soviets hold the northern
part of Hokkaido.

Speaker 2 (01:06:35):
Yeah, and you could have changed that let end up
in the I think there's probably more elegant ways for
it to end up. For the for a difference that
lete too, have wound up with the Soviets o Kaido.
I guess as we get there, I didn't think about it.
But of course the obvious target, the one that we
haven't really thought of, but the obvious place where we
would use their nuclear weapon in order to prove our
dominance and dominate the Cold War would have been against
the Sasquatch. Easy to eat. It's easy to clear a

(01:06:58):
war against them. You have relatively low loss, but you
can defeat their military force very very quickly. And then
the rest, who's going to mess with us? If we
have defeated Bigfoot? Truly? So I think we we've been
missing the most obvious target clearly. That's why this kind
of fact I had. Someone said on a comment the
other day they said, hypotheticals aren't history, and you know,
I disagree. I think counterfactuals are a fundamental part of history.

(01:07:21):
They really help you understand the context of the era
and there, and they're they're really a lot of fun
because it really tells you that history history is history.
But I mean, there's so many points and it obviously
things could have gone differently, and it leads you to
order how different might things be?

Speaker 3 (01:07:36):
I think what we need to do here is, you know,
take a real world example for that commentator, and that
is what do people who study history do when they're
sitting around a campfire, have an adult beverage in hand.

Speaker 2 (01:07:48):
They argue over who the best general of the second World're.

Speaker 3 (01:07:50):
Pretty close to this, right, they they might, but quite
a few of those arguments are going to start out
what if but if?

Speaker 2 (01:07:57):
Yeah?

Speaker 1 (01:07:58):
Thank you for listening to this episode out of the
History Guy podcast. We hope you enjoyed this episode of
counterfactual history, and if you did, you can find lots
more history if you follow the History Guy on YouTube.
You can also find us at the historyguid dot com, Facebook, Patreon,
and locals. If you want to hear more counterfactuals, stay tuned.
We release podcasts every two weeks.
Advertise With Us

Popular Podcasts

My Favorite Murder with Karen Kilgariff and Georgia Hardstark

My Favorite Murder with Karen Kilgariff and Georgia Hardstark

My Favorite Murder is a true crime comedy podcast hosted by Karen Kilgariff and Georgia Hardstark. Each week, Karen and Georgia share compelling true crimes and hometown stories from friends and listeners. Since MFM launched in January of 2016, Karen and Georgia have shared their lifelong interest in true crime and have covered stories of infamous serial killers like the Night Stalker, mysterious cold cases, captivating cults, incredible survivor stories and important events from history like the Tulsa race massacre of 1921. My Favorite Murder is part of the Exactly Right podcast network that provides a platform for bold, creative voices to bring to life provocative, entertaining and relatable stories for audiences everywhere. The Exactly Right roster of podcasts covers a variety of topics including historic true crime, comedic interviews and news, science, pop culture and more. Podcasts on the network include Buried Bones with Kate Winkler Dawson and Paul Holes, That's Messed Up: An SVU Podcast, This Podcast Will Kill You, Bananas and more.

24/7 News: The Latest

24/7 News: The Latest

The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.

Dateline NBC

Dateline NBC

Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com

Music, radio and podcasts, all free. Listen online or download the iHeart App.

Connect

© 2025 iHeartMedia, Inc.