Bootstrapping to $20M with Amir Salihefendic (Todoist)

What if you could build a leading brand in a highly competitive market and grow to $20M in annual revenue without raising venture capital?

In this episode, I chat with Amir Salihefendic, the brain behind Doist and its popular task management app, Todoist.

Amir reveals his journey of bootstrapping Doist from a side project to a full-blown business. He shares his experience of assembling a top-notch team on a shoestring budget and underscores the importance of a remote-first strategy.

Amir also discusses Twist, Doist’s innovative communication tool, and its potential to revolutionize asynchronous work.

Amir's story sheds light on the tech trends that have shaped Doist’s evolution, from the rise of web and mobile apps to the transition from B2C to B2B. 

Discover the origins of Todoist as a personal solution and how understanding user needs can drive a product’s success. 

Amir provides a candid look at the unpredictable market adoption of products like Twist and shares valuable insights into the iterative nature of entrepreneurship, emphasizing the need to adapt and experiment constantly.

Throughout our conversation, Amir talks about the gritty details of maintaining momentum and the pivotal moments that directed Doist's focus toward full-time development. 

He shares the importance of recognizing product-market fit signals, the challenges of growing a passionate and unique team, and the strategies that have ensured Doist’s financial stability without succumbing to the pressures of becoming a billion-dollar company. 

Join us for an enriching discussion on the principles behind Doist’s sustained growth and success.

Episode Transcript

Amir Salihefendic (00:00):
We paid like very, very poorly because there
was like not a lot of money.
You need to like be able toconvince people and then you
kind of need to live up to thatconviction.
What I was good at is kind oflike, you know, getting some
really smart people convincedthat this is worth you know
doing, and then they had like alot of fun doing that.
What we did in the beginningyou know like not many companies

(00:22):
were remote first, like workingacross borders.
Like we were just, like youknow, different.
We had, like you know, peoplein Russia, in, like you know,
portugal I was in Chile at thetime, you know so like there was
like just like weirdness, and Ithink that also like attracts
people because like you're justlike doing something that not
many other people are doing.

Ariel Camus (00:54):
Welcome everyone.
This is Ariel Camus and you'relistening to the Only Thing that
Matters, the podcast where Iinterview successful founders to
deconstruct their path toproduct market fit and uncover
the principles and frameworksbehind their success.
My guest today is AmirSalihefendic, the founder and

(01:14):
CEO of Doist, the company behindthe legendary task management
app Todoist.
Amir has built a lasting andprominent brand in one of the
most competitive markets, allwhile bootstrapping and
maintaining a fully distributed,asynchronous team.
In today's episode, we willexplore Amir's journey with

(01:35):
Doist, learn about the company'soperations with over 100 team
members globally and how theyhave achieved over $20 million
in annual recurring revenue as afully bootstrapped company.
We will also discuss thechallenges and strategies of
managing a distributed team anddelve into the creation and
impact of their underappreciatedcommunication tool, twist.

(01:57):
Join us as we uncover thesecrets to building a
sustainable bootstrap company ina highly competitive space.
I hope you find thisconversation as enlightening as
I did and without further ado,Amir Salihefendic.
Amir, thank you so much forbeing here with us today.

(02:20):
I've been looking forward tothis episode for weeks.
In fact, we've spent a lot oftime together chatting about our
companies, our stories, but Ihope today we can get into much
more depth of how you got tobuild this amazing company.
I have a lot of respect forwhat you've done.
You have managed to build avery long-lasting company that

(02:46):
has such a huge presence as abrand worldwide.
You have done this in one ofthe most competitive, crowded
markets.
You've done it bootstrapping,without raising capital, with
your team being fullydistributed, fully async.
I mean, half of that wouldalready be difficult to do and
you keep adding stuff andsomehow you make it sound or you

(03:08):
make it seem like it's not thathard, although I know there was
so many years of hard work.
But I really want to get toknow, like, how did this happen?
How did you make this happen?
But before we get into that,could you share for those of the
people listening that might notknow as much as I do about Dois
what is Dois?

(03:29):
And maybe a little bit abouthow did the company start?

Amir Salihefendic (03:35):
Yeah, it's amazing to be here.
I'm really looking forward forthe conversation and digging
deep into the principles.
Yeah, so a bit about me.
I'm the founder and CEO ofDoist, so we have been operating
for at least like 10 years as acompany and I like started to
do this, which is like one ofthe most popular task management
apps in the world in 2007.

(03:58):
So it's like 14 years on thisjourney and, yeah, it has been,
you know, quite like ups anddowns and everything in between,
and you know, and I'm stillhaving a lot of fun.
So that's a very critical aspect.
Yeah, and we have like about100 people spread around the
world.
We have passed like 20 millionin the ARR and you know,

(04:21):
ambition and appetite isbuilding something much larger
than this, and basically, what Ifocus on, like you know, like
building simple yet powerfultools that empower people.
So that's something that I'vebeen passionate about for a long
time.
Many inside tourists arepassionate about that as well,
and I think there's like so muchopportunity in this space.

(04:41):
Yeah, so that's kind of like avery broad, broad view of you
know what we're doing and whatI'm doing.

Ariel Camus (04:47):
Yeah, you have two products in the company, the one
that everyone knows about to do, and then you also have my, one
of my favorite products in theworld, that is highly under
appreciated.
That's twist.
Um, I want to focus more todayon on the on the to do it side
of things.
Just because it's such acrowded market and and I want to

(05:10):
ask you uh, maybe an an obviousquestion to you, but, like, in
which way is to do is different,and how does that allow it to
compete in this such complex,competitive market?

Amir Salihefendic (05:25):
yeah, um, you know, yeah, we do have like
another product called twist.
Like we, we have been verypassionate about that, but you
know, I think, like, like wetalked, talked about before,
this uh like started.
Like you know, like the worldis not really ready yet for
async and you know, we, we havethe product.
We're just waiting for peopleto figure out.

(05:45):
Like you know, synchronous,like chat and one-liners, is not
really how you build greatcommunication, but you know, we
are still not there yet.
So you know, we are just, uh,yeah, I, I like to tell you the
truth, like I will be veryexcited to return back to
communication space and, like,really, you know, give just
another goal, but right now,like of the company we are
focused on to this because, youknow, the product market is just

(06:10):
so strong and the opportunityis so large that it's like very
hard for us to prioritize Twistwhen we have something that's,
like, you know, hot.

Ariel Camus (06:22):
And why is to do it so hot?
Like, how is it that after like14, 15 years of building this
product without capital, youhave managed to make it stand
out so much?
Why is it different?

Amir Salihefendic (06:36):
Yeah, you know like I read somewhere like
that.
You know like getting toproduct market fit is like
catching, you know, lighting ina bottle.
So like once you catch that,you really need to focus on like
keeping it in the bottle.
And I think, like with today's,you know, there hasn't been
like ups and downs but like wealways know what the priority is

(06:59):
.
Like we are super passionate.
You know I probably use liketoday's for most days the last
14 years.
You know many on the team feelsthe same.
There's like a lot of passionand then also like people are
super excited about it as well.
So it's basically like aflywheel where you have like
very excited users.
You build them, you know, moreexciting stuff, they get even
more excited and just like aflywheel and that's kind of like

(07:24):
.
You know, like we have liketried to define what is our
flywheel and it's kind of likebuilding useful stuff for people
.
You know, because that's kindof the core driver.
So you do that, you get morecustomers and then you basically
get more resources to investinto building more useful stuff.
And that's basically been theformula since the beginning.
You know, like one of thereasons why it got some traction

(07:48):
is because it was useful forpeople and people were very
passionate about it.

Ariel Camus (07:53):
Yeah, why can't someone come with a lot of
venture capital and just spendmore money trying to, you know,
steal the customers away or getthe new customers or build more
features, or build betterfeatures, like, why can't, why
doesn't that allow you to dothat that other people cannot

(08:13):
replicate?

Amir Salihefendic (08:15):
You know, I mean, we have had some very
heavy like funded companies inour space, like including, like
Wunderlist, which I think soldfor $200 million to Microsoft
and got killed in the process.
We had a lot of competition.
They just died out after awhile.
And why?

(08:36):
If this was about capital, thenyou will basically have only
very rich companies competingeverything away.
Um, so that's maybe thebeautiful part as well.
It's kind of like.
It's kind of like you know itrequires art and like finding
like this, you know, lightningand capturing in the bottle, uh,

(08:57):
that that that is very, verydifficult even with a lot of
capital.
So, so actually, capital likeit makes it maybe a bit easier
or much easier to do that, butthere's like no guarantee.
And then also another aspect aswell it's kind of like this is
freaking hard Like so we haveseen this with Twist.
Like Twist does not have thesame product market fit as

(09:19):
Todoist and even like it'salmost the same people that have
worked on it.
You know we got into that witha lot more capital and we have
invested a ton like millionsinto twist.
We have had some of our bestpeople work on this, you know,
and still like there's noguarantee that you're actually
going to get a product out thathas product market fit, um yeah.

(09:42):
So I think you know that's abeautiful part and the hard part
is kind of like you know,building products that really
resonate with people.
Yeah.

Ariel Camus (09:52):
Yeah, and that it's interesting that you have the
two experiences happeningsimultaneously with Twist and
Todoist, because you get to seehow the exact same team, putting
the same resources, the sameeffort, the same hard work,
doesn't necessarily deliver thesame level of success, the same
level of product market fit.

(10:13):
So I wonder if we can maybe tryto go back, travel back in time
to the early days of Todoistand identify what was that
initial lighting that you'reable to capture and I don't know
.
Maybe we can extract ways inwhich people can extract that
type of lighting nowadays in adifferent sector or different,

(10:35):
you know, opportunity and maybeI think I have the feeling that
to explain that, it could alsobe useful to frame the
competitive landscape whereTodoist sits.
Would you say that a companylike Asana is a competitor of
Todoist?

Amir Salihefendic (10:53):
I mean indirectly but not really.
Maybe with our new teamworkspaces product we are more a
competitor to them.
But to this as a whole, most ofthe like real product market
fit is in the individual usecase, like empowering the
individual.
Um, that's where we are reallytrying to like create the, the

(11:14):
space for ourselves.

Ariel Camus (11:16):
Uh yeah, makes sense it's.
It's the best model.

Amir Salihefendic (11:19):
Is, for the most part, uh, b2c right yeah,
and we are getting much betterat b2b as well.
Like that's uh, yeah, but youknow, historically it has been
mostly b2c.
Yeah, but you're like travelingback in time.
Um, you know, I started like todo this as a student, uh, and

(11:39):
there's like zero ambition of,like you know, starting a
startup or like you know, uh,like, or even even this being
very big or being a company.
There was none of that.
It was basically I created thetool for myself and then I
thought it could be useful forothers.
So that's mainly the firstpattern.
It's kind of like scratch yourown itch, be your own user.

(12:04):
Know, like, uh, yeah, scratchyour own itch, be your own user,
because I think, in fact, likethe problem becomes much easier
to manage if you actuallyunderstand it like fully.
Um, I think it's very hard toactually build like products for
others where you're not theuser.
Um, so that's maybe the firstum, the the first like pattern,

(12:25):
the first pattern.
The second pattern is, I think,a lot of really successful
companies ride on waves.
So the thing is, when I startedto do this in 2007, web apps
were just getting started,mobile apps were just getting
started and they were quiteprimitive as well.

(12:49):
So actually today is maybe oneof the first real web apps where
you have a real applicationlike SaaS app that you can use
and it's super dynam, dynamical.
You know it also uses like likethe fact and they use like
modern technology such as likeAjax.
Probably right now like peopledon't really know what it is,

(13:12):
but you know Ajax is just likeyou know, dynamical.
Like you do a request and youjust change one part of the page
.
You don't like change the whole, like page, and that makes it
like much more dynamical thewhole experience so that's
something it sounds.

Ariel Camus (13:28):
It sounds so obvious like every app has that
every day, every app has thatnowadays.
But, like, like you're right,10, 15 years ago that was not a
thing.
I remember building the firstlike lines of like this
asynchronous request with ajaxand uh, it was magical to see
that happening.

Amir Salihefendic (13:45):
Yeah, yeah, and even something like as well
like another way we wrote wasthe mobile wave.
So it really like opened uplike a huge distribution
channels for us and really likethat was like a very, very
critical change that we did Likeat some point.
Like we built, like built someamazing mobile apps and we made

(14:09):
that transition, yeah, so ifyou're starting out, I think
starting out on a wave that isstarting out or forming and then
riding that wave is superpowerful.
So those are maybe like in theearly, like patterns that I can
see, uh, that are critical, uh,and, of course, like there's

(14:31):
like no guarantee that this willbe a success.
so something to note is, likeyou know, we were like one of
the first maybe like largercompanies, maybe over 50 people,
to become like remote first andasynchronous first, and we kind
of like became to like bepreachers of this very early on
um.
And then also we started twistin 2014 or like or 17 I'm

(14:54):
actually unsure where we started, but we started like way before
the pandemic, you know, and youwould say, okay, like you have
been in this space for a longtime and like Twist had so much
potential to grow like huge,when everybody you know was
forced to work from home andthat didn't happen, you know,
because the market you knowmoved in a very different

(15:16):
direction, like moved into Zoomcalls and Slack chats, yeah.
So, like this, I also thinklike even if you're early in the
wave and you kind of identifylike a need or, like you know, a
market, there's no guaranteethat you're actually going to
build the product that satisfiesit, or like, yeah, you know, so

(15:37):
that's why like you know it's afun aspect of our job.
Like there's no certainty, likeit's all like experiments yeah.

Ariel Camus (15:44):
No, there is no certainty, but's all like
experiments.
Yeah, no, there is no certainty, but there are definitely
patterns that start emerging,right like the scratching your
own itch.
It's a very obvious one.
It's not the only way, but it'sdefinitely a way to de-risk the
, the bet that you're making onstarting a business.
The second one you'rementioning is writing a wave.
Um, and it also sounds like youdidn't just write away, you

(16:08):
wrote a wave.
You were also making the mostout of it.
You were not just like trying tolike play with the concept of
like dynamic web apps or likemobile apps, like you went all
in and you made them a core partof your strategy to take the
most advantage and to positionthe company as a key player,
taking advantage of those things.
And, of course, then withsomething like Twist building

(16:33):
software for remote asynccompanies maybe I guess what I,
in my own experience, like usingTwist.
It's a product that is not asas obvious to see the benefit.
Once you start using it for awhile, you realize there is no
way I can go back to like slack,but it's not that obvious
because it takes some time andit takes a whole team to be on

(16:56):
board to try to like change theway you work, and that takes
some time right.
And I think the pandemic Iagree with you gave us a moment
of hope where we thought that,even though there was a lot of
difficult stuff going on,companies were going to be
forced to have to try these newways of working.
But I don't think maybe Twistwas so obviously better at face

(17:18):
value compared to something likeSlack, so a lot of companies
decided not to transitionsomething like slack.
So a lot of companies decidednot to transition.
And and now that we are back inthe you know, remote is not
forced, it's not.
The need to change is not notthat big.
But I agree with you that thetime will probably come and and
I think you're doing in that waysomething that is very
interesting, which is building acompany that is here to last

(17:41):
right, you're not building acompany to try to sell it very
quickly, and that means thatwhen the time is right, you will
be able to like turn that intoan opportunity for some of the
products and ideas that you have.
But I also know and this ismaybe more about the present
than about the past, but now Iguess we have a new wave.
It's a wave of AI.

(18:02):
Do you find yourself alsotrying to ride that wave, like
you did with web apps and mobileapps, you know back in 2007?
And if so, does it feel likeyou're back in the early days in
that sense?
What are you doing about it?

Amir Salihefendic (18:18):
Yeah, I mean, that's a great question and I
think a lot of you know likepeople are asking the same
question, especially likefounders, especially founders.
Yeah, so, like I told youbefore this recording started,
I'm super excited about thisMeta Tree release, like Meta

(18:39):
Lama Tree release that they didyesterday, and there's multiple
reasons why this is veryexciting.
You know, it's kind of like anopen model.
You can run it on your ownhardware.
It's small and it's efficientand I think it opens up like the
whole competitive landscape.

(19:00):
So, like Meta will put like 16billion per year or maybe even
more in ai and they're givingalmost all of this value away.
You know, this is like really,really significant and, uh,
there's like so much opportunityto take advantage of this.
Uh, so something like you know,before yesterday, uh, so I can

(19:23):
tell just how I looked at ai.
Um, I was very excited.
So I've actually done like somework.
We have done some work as wellinside, doing some this.
I use it almost every day, uhlike to kind of augment myself
and my decision making andyou're just like when you're
coding, it's also amazing.
Um, so there's like a lot ofutility and something I think as

(19:46):
well, this kind of like.
I do think with Meta, especiallypush, this becomes a commodity
and I think maybe all apps willhave some kind of like AI
assistance inside them, so youcan basically think about
integrating chat GPT directlyinside your app and you can use
this.
I mean, for instance, like forTwist, which is a communication,

(20:08):
you can use it for summaries,for search, for filtering and
like.
The AI does not actually haveto be super smart for this to be
useful.
It needs to be fast, it needsto have like some smartness in
it, but you don't need likesuper intelligence and it will
be like much, much better thanwhat we have right now, because
right now, like all of like theranking, sorting, filtering

(20:29):
algorithms are like very stupid,you know, like they are not
very smart.
They have like zero smartnessin them.
It's just like statistics, uh,and if you could just have like
a bit of smartness so you cankind of, like you know, just see
some threat and say, okay, thisis actually critical for you
because of this, or like evenlike knowing a bit about your
context, that can also be superuseful and same with today's

(20:53):
discount, like you can actuallyintegrate these like AI systems
directly and I think like thisis actually available for all,
so like you don't need to beMicrosoft to do your own
co-pilot, and I don't think techis very hard to actually do
this, and I also think it'sscalable and it's also not that

(21:14):
expensive.
Yeah, so that's one wave that'scurrently opening up in this app
system and we are definitelygoing to ride this yeah, like
app, uh system and like we aredefinitely going to write this.
Yeah, and we want to be on theforefront and, like you know,
create something where peopleare just like holy shit, like
this is amazing.
Uh, yeah, similar to you know,when, uh like people initially

(21:36):
like used to do this in 2007,they were like amazed at how
fast it was, because if you hadlike the old model, like old
task management apps, like youneed to reload the whole page
and wait for it.
You know, while, like in ajaxworld, you could just like add
something and you would see itright away.
You didn't need to wait.
Like it made the wholeexperience like much, much

(21:57):
better and same with ai, it'skind of like, you know, if you
have products that have likeintelligence in them and done
like, it would be like night andday.
Yeah, and maybe you're juststarting out right now, like you
know, I would definitely figureout, like, how do I ride like
the AI way, because that's thenew big wave, you know, and it's
just starting up, so likethere's so much opportunities.

Ariel Camus (22:19):
Yeah, and it sounds like you do believe there is
like a first mover competitiveadvantage if lighting strikes
and you are in this, you know,and it sounds like you do
believe there is like a firstmover competitive advantage If
lighting strikes and you are inthis, you know wave and you're
one of the first ones to use itwell, to take advantage to
create a better product, but youare the first ones then that
allows you to capture somethingthat can become somehow of a

(22:41):
competitive advantage tocontinue growing and having a
you know, a loyal, I guess fanbase behind the product, correct
?

Amir Salihefendic (22:51):
Correct, correct, yeah, this said.
You know, like I do think Imean there's many examples, but
this has not been the case.
You know.
So, like it definitely helps tobe early and but also like you
need to be able to execute aswell.
You know, so just being earlyis not enough, like you need to

(23:12):
be able to execute and keep withthe wave.
You know, because maybe, likesomebody they should could be,
like, you know, maybe youidentify the wave, but then
somebody comes with a lot morecapital and a lot more like
efficiency and just, you know,crushes you and like, uh, the
wave is like bye-bye and you'rejust like stranded.

(23:35):
Uh, yeah, and that is likemaybe also a very common pattern
.
Uh is like, yeah, you reallyneed to, like you know, get the
wave, get on it and stay on it.

Ariel Camus (23:50):
You know how.
How did you stay back in 2008,2009, 2010,.
As more and more companiesstarted integrating Ajax to
create this?
You know dynamic web apps andstarted launching iOS and
Android apps?
How did you manage to stay ontop of the wave, to to remain
kind of a leader in those areas?

Amir Salihefendic (24:08):
You know, the honest question is, like I
didn't, Like I actually like Ihad a pause, so I started this
and I only worked on today's,like during the night.
So I had like another job.
I co-founded another company, Ico-founded actually two other
companies while I worked to dothis during the night.
And how do you actually do this?

(24:31):
I think it's really difficultand I think it's difficult on
different stages.
In the beginning, you're likeyourself or a few people.
You really need to keeplearning, keep improving.
You know, keep shipping.
So actually, if you look atlike my shipping, like I ship
stuff every day in 2007, 8 and 9, you know every day Like there

(24:57):
was maybe very few exceptionswhere I didn't ship.

Ariel Camus (25:00):
And that was when you were working at night on
Todoist.
Yes, yes.
When did you start likefull-time?

Amir Salihefendic (25:10):
In 2011.

Ariel Camus (25:11):
Yeah, okay.

Amir Salihefendic (25:12):
Yeah.
So actually, when I was inStartup Chile, that's where I
actually at some point likestarted working on Todoist
full-time, but before that, youknow, it was just like yeah,
like hobby, you know, like like,uh, yeah, like hobby.
You know like, uh, for formyself, like hacking at night
and uh, yeah, um, yeah, and thething is also like it's so
beautiful and that's also likesome like sometimes I had like

(25:34):
these mini projects myself whereit's only myself, um, and you
can go so fast, because there'slike no bullshit, you know, it's
just like.
You see, okay, this is afeature I want to do.
You just code it, you know, andyou ship it.
So that's also like somethingthat's beautiful about.
Like you know, single personcompanies are a few people.

(25:57):
It's like you can moveincredibly fast.
There's like very littlebureaucracy, yeah.

Ariel Camus (26:03):
Okay, I'm super curious now to reconstruct that
timeline and the details aboutit, if you allow me.
You said that you started onyour own at night in 2007.
That happened while you wereworking on a couple of other
things.
2011, you go full-time.
When did you join Startup Chile?

(26:24):
In 2010.
2010, perfect.
So there we go with the bubbleof well, since we're going to go
all the way, we're going to goall the way Perfect, oh my God.
I didn't know that one.

Amir Salihefendic (26:39):
That's an amazing one.
Wow, yeah, I have some funnyones.

Ariel Camus (26:45):
So 2010,.
You joined Startup Chile.
What happened at that point?
What changed that made you, Iimagine, kind of drop the other
projects and say I'm going to goall in full time with Todoist.

Amir Salihefendic (26:59):
Yeah, I mean, the thing is like I got a lot
more experience.
I tried to actually buildanother like for Startup Chile.
I applied with VDUIST, whichwas like team task or project
management app, and then Ireally struggled a lot to get
like some traction, you know.

(27:20):
And then I saw like holy shit,like I have, like you know, like
I think maybe I had 100,000users on Todoist and many I had
like maybe like a thousand$2,000 income per month.
I was like but I'm like, but Ithink like starting this other
company, let's just go to stuffthat works and like improve this

(27:44):
, yeah.

Ariel Camus (27:46):
And actually let me ask you something here yeah,
did someone give you the advicethat you should go for, like you
know, team task solution andproject management, because that
was maybe like a larger marketwith more willingness to pay.
Or that was your own internal,you know guru telling you now
you have to go for a largermarket yeah, I mean it's a good

(28:10):
question.

Amir Salihefendic (28:11):
Um, I don't think anybody gave me any tips
on this.
Like, uh, yeah, I did have likealso a lot of passion uh for
for this like you know, teamaspect of like project
management.
Uh, and there was also, yeah,again like there was some
interesting ideas in videos aswell, um, that I hadn't really

(28:33):
seen.
Like there was a kind of a feedum, so there's like different
ideas there that could beinteresting as well, but you
know it didn't really take offand now it's just like okay, you
know I really need to focus onstuff that actually has, you
know, product market fit.
Yeah, and when I did returnback to Todoist, like I returned

(28:56):
back with so much likeknowledge that I could like
easily ramp up like a lot of thestuff.
What?

Ariel Camus (29:02):
what, what?
What did you try for we do iswhat did you try to to generate
traction, do you remember?
Because, like what, what youknow, we'll like naively think
that if you had a hundredthousand people who are super
passionate about it to do up,some of those people probably
work for companies that alsoneed project management that you

(29:22):
could, like, probably eithersell to them or at least
convince them to try it andeventually get into the
companies.
But it sounds like either youdidn't try that or that didn't
work.
Like, um, what, what did youtry?
The attraction for that, uh,different product and app that's
a good question.

Amir Salihefendic (29:40):
Um, yeah, I mean, honestly I don't think I
tried a lot of stuff, like youknow, because like marketing and
like ads and stuff like that,like that was never my go-to
model, like uh, um, so Idefinitely didn't try like ads,
I just like tried organic, youknow traction and but you know

(30:04):
the problem is also like if youhave product market fit, like
you know, we just actually hadsignups.
They were just not sticking, youknow, and there was not the
same passion as into this case,you know, into this case, like I
would get like these emails youknow, like where, like there's
a pissed off like user thatwants some feature and they will

(30:25):
basically, you know like dolike a you know PhD thesis about
like why I should add this tothe product On VDList, like I
had zero of that, like there waslike very little fashion for
the product and I do think, likeyou know, that's also something
like signal you can take in.
It's kind of like, you know,either positive or negative.

(30:48):
It's like much better, like theworst you can have is kind of
like silence.
You know, like people don'treally care.

Ariel Camus (30:54):
Then you have a problem?
Yeah, and it's hard, becauseunless you have a frame of
reference which you did have youhad the to-do list frame of
reference that told you how itfeels when someone loves what
you are doing and takes it outof your hands.
But so many entrepreneurs donot get that confused or, you

(31:17):
know self, you know, trickedinto believing that, hmm, people
are signing up for this projectmanagement tool and they're not
sticking around that much.
But maybe that's because of me,maybe I need to improve the
features here, maybe, like, Ineed to keep working, keep
hustling, and maybe I keep doingthat for years and years before
I realized that I never hadreally real product market fit.

(31:38):
Is there like, like what?
What?
Is there anything that youcould quantify in some ways?
Maybe comparing to Todoist,that like, how will you describe
in a maybe quantitative way,maybe even qualitative as well,

(31:58):
how does it feel different whatyou felt with Todoist, different
what you felt with doers versuswhat you felt with to-doers at
that point?

Amir Salihefendic (32:06):
Yeah, yeah, I mean, you know there's like
different like product marketfit frameworks that people can
use.
Like Superhuman has one whereyou basically ask people how
they will feel if the productgot removed, and I think you
need to have like 40% that aregoing to be very disappointed or

(32:29):
something like that, and thenyou have product marketed.
But honestly, I feel like it'skind of like you can feel it.
But there's also a differentaspect here and I think like a
lot of founders as well havethis is you have so much
conviction, you know, becauselike that's the only way you can
actually commit yourself tothis crazy thing.

(32:49):
It's kind of like you need tohave a ton of conviction,
absolutely, and you can be likeso blindsided by that and you
can kind of say, okay, like if Ijust improve like this aspect
and add this feature, then likepeople will understand this.
Um, yeah, uh.
So I think like it's a very,very tricky question to to

(33:11):
answer and I don't think there'sa heuristic, but, um, I do
think, like you know, feedbackfrom users is a very good tell,
especially passionate feedback.
That's a very good sign.
I mean even right now, like ifyou read on, like our Todoist,

(33:32):
which is like the Reddit Todoistsubreddit, like you know like
people are very passionate andyou know like both negative and
positive, you know there's likea lot of like stuff, uh, and
that's a good tell, so like yeah, so maybe that that signal,
like from feedback, can be verycritical of course like you
should probably be careful of.

(33:52):
Like, if it's like a very goodfriend or, like you know, family
member that's giving youfeedback, maybe it's not really
as powerful as like some randomperson telling you that they are
really like they love this orlike they hate it.
Yeah.

Ariel Camus (34:07):
And so I think it sounds like product market fit
seems to always feel a littlebit extreme.
It's not a lukewarm, it's not amaybe, it's when you see it,
it's obvious.
And if it's not super obvious,becausewarm it's not a maybe,
it's when you see it, it'sobvious.
And if it's not super obvious,because people are, like you
know, yelling at you, asking formore yelling at you, because

(34:29):
they need something that youhaven't built yet, and it's the
only thing that they're missing.
If they're not, like you know,taking your servers down,
probably the answer is that youdon't have product market fit.

Amir Salihefendic (34:41):
Exactly, yeah , yeah.
And then you know anotherproblem as well is kind of like
I mean, we have also experiencedthis with Twist Like we didn't
have like clear product market.
We had some.
That's maybe also a realproblem as well, Because then
you have some hope.

Ariel Camus (34:57):
Why do you say you had some?
Like what?
How would you describe somehope?
Why do you say you had some?
How would you describe someproduct marketing?
That seems to go against what Iwas just saying, that it feels
so obvious and loaded andpassionate.
What was that?
Some level of PMF?

Amir Salihefendic (35:10):
So some level is kind of like you have
customers that are paying, youalso have fans I always got some
super feedback from you and youhave some negative know,
negative as well, etc.
Um, uh, but the traction maybeisn't there when it needs to be,
you know, um.
So I think also like somethingthat's maybe very useful and

(35:33):
something I didn't actually havewhen I started out with to do
this, and I think think peopleright now have so much of it.
It's kind of like you caneasily find out what is actually
great growth numbers In anymetric.
You can kind of figure out whatdoes for my market, what does
great churn look like, what doesgreat expansion revenue look

(35:57):
like, or whatever else you wantto, and that can kind of make it
very clear to figure out.
Like you know how, yeah, howgood is the fit?
You know, um, yeah, and I'll sayin this case, like we were very
ignorant, you know, and theproblem is also like we had so
much conviction.
You know, like, uh, like wereally thought like we were on

(36:18):
to something and you know andthat's also a beautiful thing
it's just like it's a problem ifyou do it for many years, like
you, if you pour many, you know,yeah, a lot of effort, a lot of
money into something that isnot going to work out in the end
.
Yeah, so I think most like forfounders, you know like a

(36:39):
critical element as well is kindof like figuring out like when
you need to stop, you know, exit, because, yeah, like you have
so much conviction, you have somuch sunk cost that, like
stopping can become very, veryproblematic, yeah, Absolutely,
it's a double-edged sword andit's purest definition, because
it is the weapon that allows youto keep going and fight the

(37:02):
difficult battles that you willhave to fight, yet, at the same
time, is the one that can keepyou fighting against the, the
windmills.

Ariel Camus (37:10):
You know that, that you shouldn't be battling
because there is no battle towin there.
So, um, absolutely and so like,if I, if I were to recap or
summarize something you said orextract something from what you
said, is that sometimes webelieve that if we niche down
and it's good to start in aniche you didn't go for whole

(37:32):
project management, you went formore individual kind of task
management.
It's a good place to start,it's a more approachable problem
and you will find people wholove, who are passionate about
what you do.
But that's not enough.
You also need a growing numberof people.
If there is no traction, ifthere is no growth, probably
that means that probably thegroup of people that are

(37:55):
passionate, like it happenedwith Twist, is not going to be
large enough.
The market is not large enoughthat it can actually support a
stable business in the long term, and I think that is something
important, because we often hearthat, yes, we need to get this
passion from people who you know.
There's a very common piece ofwisdom from Y Combinator that

(38:15):
it's better to have 10 users wholove your product than 100 that
like your product.
But the reality is that youneed to start with 10, but you
also need to quickly validatethat you can grow from 10 to 100
people that love it.
Otherwise, the market might notbe there and then that's not
going to be a business.

Amir Salihefendic (38:35):
I mean Harpo said that real.
That's very, very well said.

Ariel Camus (38:38):
So how did, or if you had to quantify that
traction that you were having inthe early days let's say 2000
well, you started 2007.
You grew, it sounds like to ahundred thousand people using uh
to do is while they were stillworking on it part-time by the
time you decided to go full-timein 2011.

(38:58):
What did traction look like?
Um, what was the level ofgrowth that you were seeing and
where?
Where was that growth comingfrom?

Amir Salihefendic (39:08):
yeah, you know, uh, the beautiful part of
like starting out is like I hadlike zero insight into any kind
of growth metrics.
Uh, yeah, so, actually, likethe way I would like like check
out like synopsis, like I woulddo a query directly against like
the user table, yeah, sothere's like zero metrics.

(39:29):
Uh, uh, I I'm actually evenlike maybe I had like google and
because that's it, uh, um, yeah, uh, and it was like 100,000
signups and I'm not sure howmany actives I had, but it did
generate a few thousand dollarsper month in income.

Ariel Camus (39:52):
How did it evolve from there?
At which point do you rememberstarting to measure monthly
active users, or weekly or daily?
At which point did you rememberstarting to measure like
monthly active users, or likeweekly or daily?
Um, at which point did youstart like kind of like, well,
did you at any point obsess on,like you know, the revenue
growth side of things?
Or it was more like you know, Idon't know how much growth is
too much growth, but this isgrowing, and as long as it keeps

(40:13):
growing uh, and I'm enjoyingthis then I keep going I mean
honestly like uh, that's likethe beauty and like the.

Amir Salihefendic (40:22):
The shock is like we had like zero control or
anything like uh the the thinglike also like uh, I I hired
some people early on.
Like some of them are still inthe company.
I told them, like you know, Ican probably pay you like a
month of salary.
You know that's guaranteed.
But after that, like I had anextra, I'm sure like what will

(40:45):
happen.

Ariel Camus (40:47):
When did you hire the first person?

Amir Salihefendic (40:49):
I mean I did it like very early on, like
because I mean there was kind oflike, so something that was
very good is kind of like.
Once I returned back to Todo,to Todoist, I had a lot of
skills, maybe not in analytics,but I had in building and
knowing, for instance,optimizing the upgrade screens.

(41:17):
That made a huge difference.
Upgrade screens, you know, thatmade a huge difference.
And I was like, I think in thefirst six months I grew like
from a few thousand dollars like$30,000 per month.

Ariel Camus (41:28):
In how long?
Like six months?

Amir Salihefendic (41:31):
Wow, that's super impressive.
Yeah, because I had like somuch, like so many ideas and so
much like skills that I learneddoing some other stuff that I
could easily like skills that Ilearned doing some other stuff,
uh, that I could easily likeaccelerate that a lot um.

Ariel Camus (41:44):
Did that require doing anything to bring new
users?
Or it was mostly the organic umgrowth and just learning how to
convert, or like applying yourlearnings to convert some of
those free users into paid users?

Amir Salihefendic (41:59):
Yeah, I mean I think there was multiple
aspects of this.
One is kind of just optimizingthe paths, like landing page.
I mean before that I had codedthe landing page myself and
created the copy as well and thelogo and stuff like that.
So actually when I returnedback I hired a copywriter just

(42:20):
freelancing design.
That also got my laptop.
You know like there was a lotlike stuff that I invested in
that were like quite critical,um, uh, but of course, like I,
you know I didn't really do alot of analytics, I didn't do
paid um, but I improved like alot like just the organic growth

(42:40):
that we already had.
Yeah, and of course, likesomething that we also started
to do is like I figure out likemobile was very, very critical.
So I hide, like some of my firstlike engineering hires was like
mobile devs and honestly, likethe first thing I did is I hired
an outsourcing company inRomania and the thing is, my

(43:05):
background is development, so Ican easily read code and what
they have produced was justfreaking horrific, just the most
garbage code that you couldimagine.
Holy shit, like this is not,this is not good, and I have
like spent you know like maybeten thousand dollars on like

(43:26):
hiring them and that was justlike huge mistake.
Like, uh, yeah, um.
So that's when I actuallyfigured out, okay, like, if I
want to do this properly, Ireally need to hire people that
are super passionate, you know,and they are super invested.
So that's like when I did someof the early like, for instance,
our cto gonzalo like was one ofthe first hires uh that went in

(43:51):
and like did our android appand they were like amazing like
him and another guy called joaocosta.
Like they, uh, I mean, yeah,they gave it like like 100
percent uh, and we got like oneof the best, I think, android
apps at the time.
Like it was really, really wellmade.
And they have so much passionfor the craft you know building

(44:15):
beautiful apps yeah.

Ariel Camus (44:19):
I think there's a lot of wisdom and, yeah, not
every person is the same when itcomes to building your you know
first version of the product.
Like you need a lot of passion,care, quality, what you're
saying, you know craft right Forthat, and it's hard to get that
from from an agency.
It's hard to get that fromsomeone who doesn't care as much

(44:41):
as you do as a founder.
How did you get these initialpeople to care so much about it?
Were you paying really well, oryou were paying really well on
equity, or you just found peoplewho were passionate about the
product because they were usersof the product, or you got lucky
.
I don't know how did you dothat.

Amir Salihefendic (45:01):
It's a great question.
Yeah, the thing is we paid likevery, very poorly like because
there was like not a lot ofmoney like there was no capital.
So it's a very good, you knowlike question, yeah, and then I
don't think that's also a skillas a founder, you need to like

(45:23):
be able to convince people, anda founder you need to be able to
convince people, and then youkind of need to live up to that
conviction.
Yeah, so I think what I wasgood at is getting some really
smart people convinced that thisis worth you know doing, and
then they had like a lot of fundoing that because, for instance

(45:46):
, like uh, like gonzalo and joaocosta, the android deaths uh,
like they had created appsbefore and they had like a real
passion for like craftingandroid apps and they were
always like super passionateabout android development you
know, uh, um, and then, like youknow, like creating like a, uh,

(46:10):
a space where they couldactually like just go 100 into
that.
You know, for them that was likehaving a lot of fun, uh, uh,
yeah.
And then also, like you know aswell, like creating momentum
and, like you know, just like,uh, yeah, shipping and, like you
know, there was a lot of likeexcitement as well because, like
what we did in the beginning,you know like not many companies

(46:31):
were remote first uh likeworking across borders, like we
were just, like you know,different.
We had, like you know, peoplein russia, in, like you know,
portugal uh, I was in ch Chileat the time, so there was a lot
of just weirdness, and I thinkthat also attracts people,
because you're just doingsomething that not many other
people are doing.

(46:52):
Yeah, so that's maybe also verycritical because as a founder,
as a new founder, you will nothave the capital, you will not
have the reputation.

Ariel Camus (47:01):
You must convince and build on momentum, yeah, and
I think everyone know everyonecan well not everyone, but a lot
of other people and companiescan offer a high salary or a
higher salary, so that if that'syour way to attract talent,
most likely is not going toattract the right talent or

(47:22):
allow you to retain the talent,because it's like a never ending
someone can always pay more.
But offering a very uniqueenvironment to work where you
get to do what you love withfreedom, freedom to explore,
freedom to play, freedom to youknow to be excellent at what you
do, freedom to do with peoplethat you really enjoy working

(47:45):
with, those are things that, tobe honest, most larger companies
can't offer.
But as a startup, I think ifyou create your own weird flavor
again, like talking aboutniches right, like it might not
be a flavor that everyone likes,but those who like it can only
find it in your company, in thisstartup, which means they're

(48:05):
much more likely to be superpassionate and enjoy and stay,
and I think that is a reallypowerful thing at the beginning
that it's hard to maintain.
I think you need to work really, really hard, but it's really
easy to do at the beginning.
So maybe the principle here isat the beginning, if you want to
attract people, just be weird,right, like be different,

(48:27):
because that's the onlyadvantage you have, that you can
afford to do that I love thatarea.

Amir Salihefendic (48:32):
Yeah, that's a beautiful uh, beautiful, uh,
yeah, beautiful way to actuallyframe that.

Ariel Camus (48:38):
You know be weird yeah yeah, I'm, I'm just
listening to, to what you'resaying.
It's your experience.

Amir Salihefendic (48:45):
I'm just trying to see if there's any
conclusion there and I thinkit's very easy to kind of begin

(49:08):
to believe that you need toattract everybody.
You know, I think actually someof the worst like company
cultures is when you try to.
You know, please, everybodysome of the stronger ones is
kind of like either you fit inlike perfectly or you don't fit
at all, like there's no grayzones.
And I also feel like in thisover the years, like we have
kind of slacked a bit, like wehave improved in like the last
year or so, but we kind of likewe became, like you know, too

(49:30):
complacent about like whatvalues we stand for.
You know what is our culture,and I think like that is
something, as a founder, youreally need to be very
protective about, especially inthe beginning, you know, because
, because, like the first peoplethat you hire will define the
culture that you will have.
Uh yeah, so is this something?

Ariel Camus (49:51):
you, you, you think you can be.
I think we sometimes, like wecan look at your case, for
example, and try to deconstructokay, if you attract people who
are super passionate, you know,um, but sometimes it's hard to
know what's the chicken, what'sthe egg right like, can you fake
those?
Can you fake the culture bysaying this is the culture that

(50:13):
I want, and then I'm only goingto attract people like this,
versus maybe at the beginning,when it's just you.
Probably a lot of that comesfrom like, okay, this is who I
am and what I am and this iswhat, what I care about, what I
stand for.
But the question is, does itwork if you, at the beginning,
try to attract people who arelike you or you think that
happens in a more kind of likenatural, out of control way,

(50:35):
with the first few team membersand it's not just the founder,
but the first few members thatend up giving shape to what the
culture and the values of thecompany will become few members
that end up giving shape to whatthe culture and the values of
the company will become.

Amir Salihefendic (50:48):
Yeah, I mean, I I think it's a very hard
question to to answer and like,uh, you know, like something I
wish we have done before andmaybe like something that that
you can do, like if, if you'restarting from zero, it's kind of
like define the values, definethe culture, like early on, like
we waited way too long to dothat I I've done, by the way,

(51:12):
the opposite of like doing itfrom from day one, and I think
it helped a lot and it did feellike it does feel authentic like
that even today.

Ariel Camus (51:23):
Those values are super strong.
So I I was asking you to be Ihave the feeling that it is
definitely worth doing.
Yet, at the same time, the newpeople that you add will bring
new flavors to that, to thosevalues and to and to that
culture.
And it's it's hard to tell whenthose new flavors are, you know

(51:44):
, flavors that you want to likemix, because you know there are
just good spices for this sauce,versus when you're just like
putting sugar on a savory dish.
And well, I don't know, somesavory dishes can have sugar and
be great, right, but you knowwhat I mean.
Um, but I, I do think it's,it's, it's definitely worth
doing.
I really do like doing it early.
It's important.

Amir Salihefendic (52:05):
Yeah, I think the beauty about culture is
that it changes over time, and Ithink that's also something
that you need to embrace, andmaybe the designer of that or
the owner of that is you or thefounding team.
You really need to beopinionated about what kind of
flavors you want in your know,or else you're going to end up

(52:27):
with a dish that nobody likes,like that's yeah, absolutely.

Ariel Camus (52:31):
There are some ingredients you don't want to
mix, but most importantly, Iguess, if the founder doesn't
like the dish, you know it'sreally hard for that to keep
going.
So you better, you know, cooksomething you really like.

Amir Salihefendic (52:42):
If you want to keep extending the analogy,
yeah, and you know it'ssomething to note, and this is
especially like for VC-backedcompanies.
It's like so many of thefounders end up like building
companies they don't want towork in.
You know that is why you seethem like they sell out.
They just leave right away, youknow, because they have built
something that they are notwanting to work with.

(53:03):
They have like taken many likeshortcuts or compromises along
the way and I think that's likea beautiful part of like
bootstrap to like independentcompanies.
Like you know, uh, yeah, likeyou can be very opinionated, uh,
and you can also like reallybuild a company you want to work
with and in for a long time, uh, and you're not.

(53:26):
You don't have like thispressure from the board or, like
you know like hyper scalingwhere you need to hire you know
like 2x, 3x people per year.
That is just like not verysustainable to build like a very
good culture.

Ariel Camus (53:39):
Yeah absolutely I've been there right and even
if you convince yourself thatyou are aligned with that
because you want the growthiseson two things that I think we
have discussed that are superimportant.

(54:06):
One is the quality of thetalent and two is the the
culture fit with the company'svalues and culture.
So I can clearly see that.
How, how did you manage to toto survive this long without
raising capital?
Like what?
Were there some moments whereyou felt like, hmm, if I had
more capital I could do x, y andz and uh, what made you decide

(54:29):
not to raise capital?

Amir Salihefendic (54:33):
yeah, I mean, there's definitely been moments
where I've explored this option, but whenever I do, actually
like I'm never convinced.
Um, so my wife tells me, youknow, like I'm kind of like you
know like schizophrenic or likeabout it because, like I had
like like sometimes I get likevery convinced this is what we

(54:56):
need to do, and then I kind ofgo into that and then I get like
very unconvinced that, likethat is not a very good option.
Yeah, and, honestly, I thinkit's a tool like many others,
like I'm, like I, you know wehave been bootstrapped for a
long time, uh, and I think itworks, but also, like I think
you can easily raise money aswell and get it to work.
Um, the thing, though, is, like, as a founder, like you really

(55:20):
need to know what you're signingup for.
You know you're signing up for,like, building a billion dollar
plus company and like,historically, you know, there's
been very few of those Like, and, of course, like there's like
some peaks of like inflationwhere, you know, just valuation
gets sky high, but, like, if youlook at how many software

(55:42):
companies has like over abillion in revenues, it's like
very, very, very smallpercentage.
Um, so there's something youneed, like you know, ask
yourself is like do you reallywant to build, you know, that
type of company you probablyalso need to manage like
hundreds or thousands of people.
Maybe you're not really, youknow, the right person for that,

(56:04):
but the thing is like thejourney becomes very different
and also the expectations becomevery different.
You know, like you need to growa lot and there's a pressure,
and then you also need to exitas well.
So, like taking all of thatinto account, like my conclusion
is always like you know, whywould I do this?

(56:25):
So that's why we have neverraised yeah.

Ariel Camus (56:34):
Makes total sense, and I think it's very compelling
, or maybe obvious, to say, well, you need to become a billion
dollar company.
Oh, yeah, I also want that, youknow.
And it's not just about money,right, and you can be.
Yeah, I want to change theworld, I want to make the world
a better place, and, of course,a billion dollars will happen if

(56:54):
I'm impacting a lot of lives.
I think what's easy to ignoreis what's necessary to get to
that level of growth, right, andwhat are the compromises that
will be necessary for that tohappen.
And then, you know, we, we getinto the whole conversation we
have been having about, you know, culture, creating your own
like weird rules and and values,and bringing the people that

(57:16):
you're happy to work with,allowing them to to be weird and
unique and have fun in the waythey work.
So, yeah, the compromises are.
I think maybe we highlight toomuch the positive side of having
a lot of capital and we forgetto mention what are the
difficulties, what are some ofthe maybe, what have been some

(57:36):
of the most difficult moments,if any, by the way, when it
comes to like capital.
I imagine not every month was,you know, a profitable month,
but on average.
As a company, you need to beprofitable.
Uh, if you're uh here today,you know 15 years later but were
there some moments where, likecapital was, you know, a big
issue, and how did you handlethat?

(57:57):
I?
I'm asking you because I Iwould love to see more companies
bootstrapping and and I wishthey can see that the difficult
moments will come, but thatthere are ways to deal with that
as well.

Amir Salihefendic (58:09):
Yeah, I mean, the honest truth is like we
have never been like capital incapital issues, you know,
because we have never livedabove our means.
We have always like hired veryconservatively, spent money very
conservatively.
Even right now, you know, likeI think I mean we could probably

(58:31):
like have zero revenue andstill pay salaries for like a
half a year or a year, you know,or maybe even more.
So that's kind of like theculture that we have.
So that's why we have neverbeen in these issues where we

(58:55):
are strapped for cash.
I think one of the mostdifficult aspects of my journey
with DoS is of, like, my journeywith DSAs.
You know, when you have a codethat is sliding in a bottle,
it's very easy.
You know, growth comes very,very easy.
So, actually like from 2014 andeven like before that, but like

(59:17):
we didn't actually begin tocheck our numbers before 2014.
That's so wild.
Yeah yeah, yeah.
So we had like 50% year-on-yeargrowth almost, I think, every
year until like 2019 or 20 orsomething like that.
Um, and then, like our growthbegan to like falter a bit and

(59:41):
like actually, 2021 and 2022were really tough years.

Ariel Camus (59:45):
growth became really really hard and in our
history, you know what, what,what happened, uh, at that point
, you know, I think like there'smultiple issues here, like I
think one issue is just likemarket situation.

Amir Salihefendic (01:00:03):
You know, the market also became a lot more
competitive.
I mean, even right now, we haveon one side, like billion
dollar startups.
On the other side, we havetrillion dollar companies that
are doing almost the same thingas us, so it's really, really
competitive in that sense.
But also, I like we just becamevery complacent as a company.

(01:00:26):
Uh, like the standards were notset high enough, and that's
also something like that I thinkhas changed a lot in recent
years is, you know, thestandards have become much, much
more tough.
You know it's like much harderto create growth right now than
it was like when I started out.

(01:00:46):
Um, uh, and you know, yeah, solike you need, as a company,
also like always set thestandards higher and higher and
higher, like this, neverstopping, and like you know,
just like like uh, yeah,relaxing, you know, be on the
beach drinking p pina coladas.
There's like none of that.

Ariel Camus (01:01:07):
Unless it's one of those 25 years of vacation you
offer to everyone, right?

Amir Salihefendic (01:01:12):
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
So that is like really, I think, a tough period for any company
.
It's kind of like you havegrowth and then you don't have
growth and then you must fightvery hard to restore growth.
So that's me Like, financially,you know that is maybe the most

(01:01:33):
tough thing, but you know, Ithink we are very lucky that we
have never had issues about notbeing able to pay salaries or
like.
You know, like seeing you knowour like cash deplete or any any
of that.
You know like, yeah, and Ithink that's that's something
you can design as a bootstrapcompany is kind of like you know

(01:01:53):
, don't live above your means,you know.

Ariel Camus (01:01:55):
Yeah, I, I, I was going to say that probably that
is a principle, right, it's like, do not put yourself in a
likely financially difficultsituation.
Right by I was.
There is this metric that I'vediscussed in another podcast
episode on, you know, revenueper team member, and I think
it's a great one to talk about.
Like capital efficiency and thecompanies that survive and do

(01:02:19):
well with less venture capitalobviously tend to have higher
you know per per team member.
But it's also true of the someof the best companies that also
had capital, like you know, likea google or a meta, like the
revenue producer is really highand you know, I was just doing
the numbers for you.
Well, it's a very easy number,like the 20 million plus of

(01:02:40):
revenue you have divided by 100people and it's like 200k um per
team member.
Right, that's a.
It's a pretty good one.
Um, we were discussing in aprevious uh episode that
anything above 100 000 per teammember, it's already a really
good one.
So I I think that that is a,very even if it wasn't
intentional in the quantitativenature of it.

(01:03:03):
Like you have achieved a levelof capital efficiency that
probably gives you a lot ofpeace of mind that it will be
really hard for this to changesuddenly in such a way that
would put you in financialtrouble.

Amir Salihefendic (01:03:18):
Yeah, I think that is correct, you know.
This said, I do think like200,000, it's it's good, you
know, but it's not really wherewe want to play at.
Like I think that, like, thingsbecome much easier the more
revenue you have per employee,and I also think like you really

(01:03:40):
need to set the high standardand really aim for much higher.
If you look at the bestcompanies, it's like a million
plus, so that's what best inclass looks like and that is
something that I think companiesshould try to achieve All right
.

Ariel Camus (01:03:56):
Amir, I'm so grateful again for having you
here today.
Thank you so much fordedicating us your time and
sharing your wisdom, your story,and I hope that we get to
continue this conversation soon.
Take care.

Amir Salihefendic (01:04:11):
Ariel, thank you for having me.
This is awesome, thank you.

Ariel Camus (01:04:17):
Thank you so much for tuning in.
Your support means the world tome.
If you enjoyed today's episode,please consider subscribing and
leaving a review.
It's one of the best ways youcan help this podcast get off
the ground and help moreentrepreneurs like you.
Thank you and until the nextepisode.