Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Allan Rutter (00:14):
Howdy everyone.
Welcome to ThinkingTransportation--conversations
about how we get ourselves andthe stuff we need from one
place to another. I'm AllanRutter with the Texas A&M
Transportation Institute. As atransportation nerd, I
understand that the safetyrisks of driving to the airport
are greater than the safetyrisks of traveling in the
(00:37):
airplane that leaves theairport. While I appreciate the
mechanics and physics involvedin commercial aviation at a
visceral level, the act ofmoving hundreds of miles per
hour, 30,000 feet in the airjust seems unnatural. Yet, as
commercial aviation has becomemore affordable, it has also
remained remarkably safe.
(00:58):
Today, we'll be talking abouthow the National Transportation
Safety Board works to make surethat airline travel stays safe.
We are joined by RobertSumwalt, who was a member of
the National TransportationSafety Board from 2006 through
2021, and chairman from 2017 to2021. Robert, welcome to our
(01:22):
podcast and thanks for makingtime amidst your remarkably
busy travel schedule.
Robert Sumwalt (01:27):
Al , thank you.
It's wonderful to be with you.
Allan Rutter (01:30):
So let's talk a
little bit about something you
may be uncomfortable with.
Let's talk about yourself. Howdoes a young man from Columbia,
South Carolina, get involved inaviation and ultimately find
himself on the NationalTransportation Safety Board?
So, you attended the Universityof South Carolina as a resident
of the town?
Robert Sumwalt (01:49):
That's right.
I'm from Columbia, SouthCarolina, and so I did attend
the University of SouthCarolina right here in the
capital city. I think there'sbeen a little bit of a rivalry
between Texas A&M and theGamecocks, but unfortunately
the Aggies have dominated that series. But yeah,
I'm the luckiest guy in theworld, Allan. I got to do what
(02:11):
I love doing. I started flyingwhen I was in high school and
got my private pilotcertificate before I finished
high school, and then I justwent straight to the university
and started studying there.
Didn't study very long, butcontinued my flying all through
college. But I was alsointerested in accident
investigation. I found thegovernment documents library to
(02:33):
be incredibly interesting. Iwould go there and read NTSB
accident reports. So I thoughtone day I want to work for the
NTSB , I wanna be one of theboard members that gets to sign
these final reports. So I gotto be an airline pilot, did
that for 24 years, and then Igot to be on the NTSB for 15
(02:54):
years. So I consider myself tobe truly one of the luckiest
guys in the world to be able tolive a couple of different
dreams.
Allan Rutter (03:01):
It's really
remarkable. My younger brother
is that kind of person who wasdoing things in his high school
days that he eventually, that'swhat he did for a living. He
was an artist and was reallyinterested in advertising and
after getting his degree off,he went to Madison Avenue and
that's what he ended up doing.
My journey was a lot morecircuitous, but that's really
an impressive story. Now let'stalk a little bit about the
(03:24):
NTSB. Accident investigationhas been something that the
federal government has donepretty much since the advent of
aviation, but the NTSB itselfwas created in 1967 with the
creation of the Department ofTransportation and the Johnson
Administration. Tell ourlisteners a little more about
how the NTSB is organized andhow does it go about doing its
(03:48):
work, investigatingtransportation events and then
making safety recommendationsto prevent similar incidents in
the future.
Robert Sumwalt (03:57):
Well, I'll tell
you , I was always so proud to
be a part of the NTSB . In1974, it became an independent
federal agency, so no longeraffiliated with the DOT , and
we can talk about the pros andcons of that. But as an agency
of about 430 staff so far, theyare surviving government
(04:20):
cutbacks because, you know, Ithink the administration
realizes how essential it is tohave a strong NTSB . The NTSB
is an independent agencycharged by Congress to
investigate transportationaccidents, to make safety
recommendations, to improvesafety, to make sure those
accidents don't happen again.
(04:40):
And it's not just an aviationorganization. Yes, it does
investigate aviation accidents,but it also--as you know from
your background, Allan--theyinvestigate selected rail
accidents, selected pipelineaccidents, highway accidents,
and also maritime accidents. Soit's got a broad mission there
(05:02):
and it does, it has a very goodreputation. So it was great to
be a part of that organization.
Allan Rutter (05:09):
So how does the
agency, when do they choose to
roll out on an incident? Isthere a sort of protocol or
algorithm of this is the kindof thing that we would go do?
Is that a matter of theleadership of the board? How do
you choose to launch aninvestigation?
Robert Sumwalt (05:26):
Great question.
When it comes to aviation,there are no decisions to be
made because the statute statesthat the NTSB shall investigate
all civil aviation accidentsthat occur in this country. So
that's easy, but it gets alittle more discretion when it
comes to investigating othermodes of transportation.
(05:46):
Unfortunately, as you know, wehave highway crashes, roadway
crashes in this country everyday . So the NTSB does not go
to every one of those, butthey're going to look at the
factors, circumstances,conditions surrounding those
crashes and say, you know, thisinvolved a school bus or this
involved an electric vehiclewhere the battery continued to
(06:09):
relight, so they're going tolook at it on a case-by-case
basis and then decide how torespond if they will at all, to
some of those other accidentsand other modes of
transportation.
Allan Rutter (06:21):
I think a good
illustration of that is a
couple of years ago here in theDallas-Fort Worth area. During
an ice storm, there was aparticularly high-profile,
high-consequence crash within amanaged lanes that became the
subject of an NTSBinvestigation and report.
Robert Sumwalt (06:39):
Yes, and I left
the NTSB before that
investigation was completed,but I certainly followed it as
it was going on.
Allan Rutter (06:46):
So on average,
about how long does it take to
complete an investigation andconsider the adoption of a
final report?
Robert Sumwalt (06:54):
You know, it
used to be, we could say about
12 months. There's been somemission creep in there, and so
now it's about 12 to 18 months.
When I was chairman, we reallylooked at how we could get
these reports done more quicklyand not sacrifice quality, and
that's a real balancing actthere. So I would , I'd rather
(07:15):
take a little bit longer tocomplete a report and not
sacrifice quality. So it's ahard balance there, but the
NTSB is known for being verydeliberate, being very precise.
And so , it does take a while.
But as we saw earlier thisweek, in the case of the midair
collision in in Washington D. C. , the NTSB can come out with
(07:40):
a preliminary report, but alsoissue urgent safety
recommendations. Theinvestigation on the midair is
only less than two months old,but yet the board has already
identified safety issues thatwarrant immediate attention
Allan Rutter (07:54):
And have resulted
in immediate response from the
newly confirmed transportationsecretary.
Robert Sumwalt (08:01):
You're right,
and here's a case where the
NTSB had a press conference attwo o'clock. It wrapped up by
about 2:20, 2:30; they issuedthese urgent safety
recommendations, and at fouro'clock the Secretary of
Transportation held a pressconference and he accepted
those urgent safetyrecommendations. He says, yes,
(08:22):
we are going to do that. SoI've never seen recommendations
implemented or agreed to beimplemented that quickly.
Allan Rutter (08:31):
And we'll talk
about some of the particular
features of that January crashin Reagan National. There's
something special not onlyabout the consequence of that
incident, but the place thathappened as a non-aviation
person; I'm a trained guy, butit strikes me that one of the
reasons why that has suchimportance--one, it's the
(08:51):
highest consequence aviationcrash in a long time; and the
fact is that Reagan National iswhere most of the members of
Congress fly in and out of. AmI overstating that?
Robert Sumwalt (09:02):
No, I don't
think so at all. I think that
we are a victim of our ownsuccess and I'm happy for that.
Before the midair on Januarythe 29th, the last fatal crash
involving a U. S. scheduledmajor airline was back in 2009.
(09:22):
And so we had gone 16 yearswithout a major crash. And so
once one happened, I thinkpeople almost forgot that these
things can happen. And so Ithink it was the fact that we
haven't seen one in a longtime. I especially think since
it happened right there goinginto Washington, D.C., the
(09:44):
nation's capital . Anotherthing we didn't have 20 years
ago was everybody's got a cellphone, ring doorbell camera,
all of these things, securitycameras. So we actually saw
this midair collision happenbased on video that was there.
So I think these things aremaking these events more
(10:05):
spectacular, yes. I don't meanto understate the importance of
the loss of 67 lives, but thefact that you can actually see
it made it even morespectacular.
Allan Rutter (10:17):
Yeah, I think
that's one of the things that
distinguished the railderailment in East Palestine a
couple of years ago, is theubiquity of everybody's cell
phones . There were majorderailments that happened when
I was FRA administrator in theprevious geological age, but
there were no cell phonecameras. And so if nobody was
(10:37):
there to take pictures of us ,it was almost as if it didn't
happen. But clearly the adventof that immediate communication
also means that everybody hasan immediate hot take about it.
That gets back to what you weretalking about of the
deliberation that the NTSB goesabout its work in. Maybe talk a
little more about why theability to take that time
(11:01):
results in better outcomes.
Robert Sumwalt (11:03):
Well, the rush
to judgment is not always the
accurate judgment. And so yes,we know what happened. I mean,
the fact is, is that twoaircraft came together over the
Potomac River. The realquestion is why did that
happen? And digging down intothe why to do it right , it
does take time and the NTSB hasto be insulated from these
(11:29):
external pressures and they cangenerally do a very good job of
just doing what they need todo, going about it very
scientifically and verymethodically.
Allan Rutter (11:38):
One of the things
that you just described is this
is the first time it's happenedin a long time, but once these
kinds of things happen, it'salmost like when you're
thinking about buying a car,you suddenly see that car
everywhere on the road. Afterthe January event, there were a
couple other incidents thatweren't fatal, but they started
being more visible with morefrequency. What are you telling
(12:01):
people about the sort ofoverall state of commercial
aviation safety?
Robert Sumwalt (12:07):
Well, in fact,
I'm supposed to do that very
thing tonight on CBS EveningNews, so I'll need to put on a
little more makeup before I dothat. But the fact of the
matter is, is that we arehaving a lot of these things
that are getting on TV that arecertainly , uh, reported on
social media. Just yesterday,there was something that
happened in Denver with anengine on fire. And so that was
(12:30):
on this morning's news. There'sa lot of things going on right
now and people's emotionalbrain is telling them flying
may not be very safe; but ifthey use their intellectual
brain, they'll realize that45,000 flights operate safely
each day. I've seen a statisticthat you could board an
(12:54):
airplane at random every dayfor the next 100,000 years
before statistically speaking,you would be killed in an
airplane crash. And so , I've gotta get on an airplane
tomorrow. I'm not sure I wantto get on an airplane every day
for the next hundred-thousandyears . But you know, I
(13:15):
think when you really thinkabout it, those kinds of
statistics put it inperspective that the chance of
being killed in a major airlinecrash these days is extremely
low , and the system generallyworks very well. So I
understand the anxiety thatpeople have. I do understand
that, but buy that ticket, getout there and fly and have a
(13:40):
good time where you're goingand be safe.
Allan Rutter (13:43):
Well, and I think
it goes back to something you
described about the distinctionbetween these are events that
happen on the news. There are40,000 fatalities, fatalities,
on the nation's roadways, andbecause they happen with such
frequency and relatively, Imean it , it makes a real
impact on the familiesinvolved, but it happens one or
(14:06):
two at a time. So thatintellectual story we tell
ourselves, we don't seem tohave much concern about getting
behind the wheel and headingoff on a multi-lane freeway at
highway speeds, even thoughstatistically that's a lot more
dangerous than getting on anairplane.
Robert Sumwalt (14:25):
No, I agree
with you. And frankly, we
should have social outrage thatwe are killing as many people
on our nation's roadways as wedo, especially due to factors
such as impaired driving, wherewe lose between 10[000] and
15,000 people each year due toimpaired driving alcohol
impaired drug impaired. So wereally ought to have social
(14:46):
outrage on that.
Allan Rutter (14:49):
So one of the
reasons why aviation is as safe
as it is, is that there's anaviation safety culture that
starts with how aircraft arebuilt, how they're maintained,
how they're operated, therelationship between the FAA in
its regulatory structure andthe FAA as the operator of the
(15:13):
aviation system from an airtraffic control standpoint, the
airlines themselves, and thenlabor organizations at every
one of those levels, whetherit's pilots, mechanics, the
people who are building theaircraft. As somebody from
other modes of transportationlooks at that safety culture,
it seems to be a lot morestructured, a lot more
(15:36):
balanced, and frankly a lotless about gotcha moments and
more about collectively owningsafety than it does in certain
other industries. Talk a littlebit about all of the people
involved in making sure thatcommercial aviation operates
safely.
Robert Sumwalt (15:51):
Well, there are
a lot of organizations that are
out there to make sure that ouraviation system is safe as it
is. One of the things that hasoccurred over the last few
years is the voluntaryreporting, the voluntary safety
programs. It used to be that ifyou, you would never wanna
(16:12):
report a safety problem becauseif you did, then you're going
to get your hand slapped; thatif you said, "Hey, I screwed
up, I made this mistake." Nowfortunately, somebody caught it
before it became problematic,but nowadays the FAA really
encourages this voluntaryreporting and if you do report
something, they're not going topunish you over it because
(16:34):
they've realized--and not onlythe FAA , the regulatory
authority, but the airlines arerealizing this as well. They'd
rather learn where theseproblems are and head them off
before they cause accidentsthan worry about punishing
somebody. And I believe that'sone of the reasons that our
system is as safe as it is inaviation.
Allan Rutter (16:57):
Well, as much
work as you've done in human
factors safety, one of thethings that distinguishes how
the cockpit works that'sdifferent from almost any other
place where a vehicle isoperated is the fact that the
pilot and copilot and peoplethat are in that cockpit are
both looking out for each otherand holding each other
(17:19):
accountable. But it's done in aless accusatory and more
supportive kind of way. That'sgotta be based on some
research, right?
Robert Sumwalt (17:28):
Well, yeah, and
I started flying for an airline
in 1981. I was just a youngsterthen, but I have a picture of
me standing or sitting at theflight engineer's panel where I
started as a flight engineer ona Boeing 727. And in the
background you can see thatsomebody had placed a crutch
tip, a rubber crutch tip overthe cockpit microphone. So in
(17:53):
other words, the captain didnot want people quote /unquote
"spying on" what we weresaying. So that was 1981. You
fast forward to now, 2025, andnow airlines routinely in a
de-identified fashion, they notonly share data with each other
(18:16):
but with the FAA as well. And Ithink that's how far we've come
with... In one case, somebodydoesn't want somebody spying on
them to where now we wereopenly airing our dirty laundry
and again, in a de-identifiednon-punitive sort of manner so
we can see where the systemproblems are so we can correct
(18:37):
those before we have majorproblems.
Allan Rutter (18:40):
That's certainly
one of the things that we're
seeing from a regulatorystandpoint. In other modes,
cab-facing cameras on the motorcarriers or for locomotive crew
members, I think the naturaltendency not to want have
people look over your shoulder,frankly must be a little
curious for people who work incall centers whose every
(19:02):
utterance is coached, is lookedat and criticized. So it's one
of those things where the restof the world is probably
saying, welcome to our party,pal .
Robert Sumwalt (19:13):
Well, that's
right. If you work at a seven
11 , you probably have a camerapointed at the cash register
too. So you're right.
Allan Rutter (19:20):
One of the things
that that multimodal
comparison... As a formerperson who was in an agency
that had rulemaking authority,I found myself being invited to
testify in Congress and sitnext to NTSB board members. One
of the things that's sort ofdifferent and unique about that
sort of experience is, the NTSBfor a long time it said, "Gee,
(19:44):
having a positive train controltechnology system could solve
an awful lot of rail accidentsthat have high consequence."
And as a regulator, I wouldhave to stand there or sit
there and say, well, one of thethings that Congress had given
me, the constraint on makingrules, is to respond through
(20:04):
the Administrative ProcedureAct, which meant that there was
a benefit-cost ratio thing.
Congress created those modaladministrations with rulemaking
and regulatory responsibilityin the NTSB with different but
complimentary roles. And so onthe one hand, NTSB can make
recommendations that don't haveanything to do with
(20:25):
benefit-cost, but that's yourjob. And the regulatory
agencies can't tell regulatedindustries "this is something
you're gonna do" unless there'sthat benefit cost thing. Talk
about the sort of balancebetween the recommendations and
the people who thoserecommendations are given to.
Robert Sumwalt (20:45):
Well, and you
raise a great point there. The
NTSB does not have to considerfeasibility or cost when they
issue a safety recommendation.
Now, granted, we wanted to makesure that we are issuing
something that can be done, butsometimes these are going to be
stretch goals. I mean, you lookat the implementation of
positive train control. Yeah,it was a great idea. In 1990,
(21:09):
when the NTSB first establisheda most wanted list, they called
for something that looked likepositive train control, great
idea. But yet the technologywas not mature enough for PTC
to be implemented until acouple of decades later. You
know, the NTSB should be verypure and they should say, this
(21:30):
is what happened and this iswhat we think would keep it
from happening again. And thenthey issue these safety
recommendations to theregulatory authority or to to a
company, to an organization.
And it's up to therecommendation recipient to
figure out how to do it. Notall of NTSB's recommendations
(21:50):
can be done in acost-beneficial manner, and
fortunately as a citizen, wedon't want an over burdensome
government telling us what wehave to do and what we can't
do. So that's where theAdministrative Procedure Act
comes into effect. It says,"Hey, we wanna make sure
there's a very deliberateprocess for implementing
(22:13):
recommendations before weimpose laws." And so there's
executive orders that say thateach new law has to have a
cost-benefit analysis. So thatmakes sure that the benefits of
something from a financialpoint of view do outweigh the
costs.
Allan Rutter (22:31):
I think one of
the interesting things when you
mentioned earlier in ourconversation about how the
secretary of transportationresponded in the January D. C.
qir crash, immediately thereason why there was positive
train control was not becausethe FRA determined that was
something they should do. Itwas because there was a huge,
high-consequence commuter railcrash in California in 2008
(22:54):
that killed 25 people. AndCongress within months took
action and said, there will bePTC, we're gonna take that away
from you FA kids. This issomething that's gonna happen.
So, there are both limits tothe, sort of, administrative
process. And then there aretimes when Congress will just
step in and say, "Yeahwhatever, this is gonna
(23:15):
happen."
Robert Sumwalt (23:15):
That's a good
point. And yet, Congress may
have gotten a little ahead oftheir skis on that too because
the PTC deadline had to keeprolling back because--
Allan Rutter (23:25):
It took a while .
Robert Sumwalt (23:27):
Yeah, the
technology just wasn't there.
You can't snap your fingers andsay you're gonna put up 25,000
antennas across the rail systemand make it happen. But it did
happen. And we're sorry for allof the casualties that have
occurred in order to requirethat mandate , but now we have
it in place.
Allan Rutter (23:48):
Well, and one of
the things we've now learned as
a result of that being put inplace is the railroads
themselves are gaining someproductivity benefits from
having the technology in placeas much as they kvetch about
doing it. And I think thatthere are now data collection
that PTC makes possible thatallows us to learn a lot more
about other safety andcommunity interests, like
(24:10):
blocked crossings and and otherthings that PTC makes it
possible to get that kind ofdata from.
Robert Sumwalt (24:16):
Exactly.
Allan Rutter (24:18):
Tell me a little
bit about your work at Embry
-Riddle and the Boeing Centerfor Aviation and Aerospace
Safety. What is that and whatdo you guys do?
Robert Sumwalt (24:27):
Well, thanks a
lot. Embry-Riddle, it's an
aeronautical university.
They'll celebrate theircentennial next year. It's got
about 32,000 students betweenthe residential campuses at
Daytona Beach and Prescott,Arizona, and then a worldwide
campus with about 22,000 peoplemostly on the Internet. I got
(24:48):
my master's throughEmbry-Riddle. When I retired--I
failed retirement. Allan, Ithink probably like you--I left
the NTSB on my 65th birthdayand the president of
Embry-Riddle invited me to cometo Embry-Riddle and talk to him
about starting a Center ofExcellence for Aviation Safety.
And before he could even finishhis sentence, I said, yes, I'd
(25:10):
like to do that. So I've beenthere for three years. We are
building a center of excellencefrom scratch. Boeing came and
liked what we were doing andthey made a nice donation. So
we named the center. They areour beneficiary. We're the
Boeing Center for Aviation andAerospace Safety. We're part of
Embry-Riddle, but we do conductimpactful safety research. We
(25:32):
support our academic programs.
We offer continuing educationor professional education
courses for industryprofessionals who want to come
and take courses on accidentinvestigation or emergency
response and planning or safetymanagement systems, human
factors, whatever it is. Theycan come and take a five-day
course a three-day course fromus, whatever it is. I was in
(25:54):
Jakarta, Indonesia, last monthteaching a course on safety
management systems for Boeing.
And then the last thing we dois industry engagement. So, I
consider the opportunity tospeak with you right now, one
of those industry engagementsort of things where we can go
out and we can speak toindustry, we can support the
industry and their safetyinitiatives.
Allan Rutter (26:14):
So it sounds a
little like what the Boeing
Center does in conjunction withEmbry-Riddle is sort of similar
to what TTI does in conjunctionwith the A&M University System.
We are sort of a practicalextension of a land-grant
university as part of the workthat they do. In the same way
the county extension agents andand other kinds of things get
(26:35):
done. We're a practical elementof the underpinning from our
civil engineering folks at thevarious universities in passing
there. You mentioned somethingthat I think is pretty
important and I don't wanna letgo of it. You mentioned safety
management systems. One of thethings that looked to be an
interesting outcropping of thelast administration was the
(26:58):
expansion of safety managementsystems as a discipline for
thinking about safety in othermodes, particularly on the
highway side. Could you talk alittle bit about what safety
management systems are and whatkind of a benefit they could
have in other modes oftransportation?
Robert Sumwalt (27:16):
Yeah. It's been
a buzzword in the aviation
industry now for abouttwo-and-a-half decades. And now
it's mandated for varioussectors of aviation. But
basically SMS provides astructure for a business
approach to managing safety.
Now people think, oh, managingsafety. You know, just tell
people, "be more careful." Youknow, that doesn't really work.
(27:39):
But safety management systemsgive people an actual structure
that they can follow to ensurethat they are assessing level
of risk and deciding whether ornot that level of risk is
acceptable. And if not, how tomitigate that risk. It talks
about how to promote safety. Ittalks about how to have safety
(28:01):
assurance to make sure thatyour risk controls are actually
accomplishing what they'reintended to do. So that's
really what I look as safetymanagement systems is, is a
business approach to managingsafety.
Allan Rutter (28:16):
One of the things
that we've seen our sponsors at
the Texas Department ofTransportation--one of the
things they've done as aninternal safety measure--'cause
they've got lots and lots ofpeople who are on the road all
the time and they've inculcateda different sort of approach on
... before you get in the car,you're gonna do a walk around
and make sure that your car'sokay, you're gonna back into
(28:38):
parking spaces so that you canget out safer so that you can
see where you're going. It's acomprehensive approach about
operating a vehicle that it'snot just about turning the key,
it's about making sure thatyou've got an environment in
which you're gonna be safewhile you're doing the part of
your job that involves being ina vehicle.
Robert Sumwalt (29:00):
Well, and let
me ask you this. Generally
speaking, do those measureswork?
Allan Rutter (29:06):
Probably so. I
think they're seeing real
benefits from it, yeah.
Robert Sumwalt (29:08):
Yeah. And so
yeah, you can do certain things
to actually improve your safetyperformance. And so now with
safety management systems, it'srequired for all airlines in
the U. S. [to] have to have inplace an FAA -accepted SMS. Now
, charter operators will haveto as well as aircraft
(29:30):
manufacturers and enginemanufacturers, they will have
to have this moving forward.
Allan Rutter (29:35):
I was part of a
National Academies panel that
did a study that the Congressrequired on the impacts of long
train operations. And one ofthe things we noted was, the
FRA had put in some newregulations requiring more of a
risk-based safety approach onthe railroads and how the
(29:56):
decisions on how and when tohave longer train operations
needed to be made in a sort ofcomprehensive safety management
approach. Think about the risksand how you're gonna mitigate
those risks. Sounds like that,slowly but surely, other modes
are adopting what has beenproven as a proven approach at
the aviation world .
Robert Sumwalt (30:19):
Yeah. You know,
and I think generally when we
start living our lives thatway, we can improve safety. I
mean risk management, you know,it sounds complicated, but I've
seen a good definition thatcame out of the FAA that says
that we manage risk whenever wemodify the way that we do
something to increase thechances of success or decrease
the chances of injury, failure,or loss. And I like that
(30:43):
definition because I think, ifwe're going to to live very
long, we actually do that inour normal lives. And we may
not realize it, but... I knowthat coming out of my
neighborhood, there's two exitsI can go out of one way that
might be a little bit quicker,shorter, but to exit you have
to leave from a blind curve anda car could be zipping around
(31:03):
that curve and you'd get hit.
So I think for us who practicerisk management, we elect to go
out of the other exit becauseyou don't have that blind exit
when you leave.
Allan Rutter (31:12):
That is a great
definition. I'm gonna have to,
we'll get the transcript andI'll put that on some bumper
stickers. Talking about theother things that the aviation
industry can inform others...
In the state of Texas over thelast couple years, commercial
space operations have becomemuch of a bigger thing, both in
West Texas and in South Texas,down in Brownsville on the
(31:35):
coast, there's a lot morecommercial space activity. The
state of Texas has invested insome more institutes about
that. It's part of the state'seconomic development
opportunities. What is it thatas space operations move from a
governmental thing that's donewith relative infrequency to
(31:56):
something that's a commercialoperation with more frequency,
what can that operation learnfrom what aviation has
demonstrated as part of theirsafety culture?
Robert Sumwalt (32:07):
Well, it's a
great question . You know,
certainly when space was beingconducted by NASA... NASA is a
wonderful agency. In fact, theycontinuously rank at the top of
the best places to work in thefederal government. I've got a
lot of respect for NASA, butgenerally the private sector
can do things a little bitbetter and more efficiently
(32:28):
than can the government. So aswe've seen a lot of successful
commercial space launches overthe past few years, I think
they're going to continue to doa good job. But it is important
not to see how fast you can go,but to make sure that you're
doing it while you are managingthose risks to an acceptable
level. And I don't want thereto be... you know, we used to
(32:51):
hear about the Space Race.
Well, we don't want there to bea race that we a re actually
sacrificing s afety by racingto see how many rockets we can
put in the air.
Allan Rutter (33:02):
I think anybody
who's an aficionado or fan of
either NASCAR or Formula One,there's more than frequent
crashes that happen there. Butwe'd rather not see that in
commercial space activity.
Robert Sumwalt (33:13):
Exactly.
Allan Rutter (33:15):
So to close out,
as we mentioned earlier, you're
demonstrating on a sort ofmonthly basis the ubiquity of
commercial aviation by the factthat it connects the entire
world and you're on some ofthose really long distance
flights on a regular basis. Ican't imagine that you'd be
doing it if it wasn't a passionof yours. Tell our listeners a
(33:36):
little more about why you'reeager to show up to work every
day ... why you agreed to"unretire." What is it that
keeps you going?
Robert Sumwalt (33:45):
Well, thank
you. It really is a passion.
You know, we are trying to makethe world a better place. Our
work is meaningful. And mostimportantly, Allan, I think
that our work, if we do itright, it saves lives.
Allan Rutter (33:59):
That's a powerful
motivator. And to be able to
say that, that's the kind ofthing that you were able to do.
I think it's one of the reasonswhy it's been something that
I've helped folks that I'vecome in contact about
transportation as a whole isit's the kind of thing where
once you do something, you cansee the result of it. There's a
facility, there's a road,there's something there that
(34:21):
you say, "I did that." We builtthat together.
Robert Sumwalt (34:24):
I think you hit
on something very important
right there. We did ittogether. Nobody does any of
this by themselves. It's allteamwork . For the NTSB , we
could sit there and hammer ourfist and point fingers, but it
took the regulatory authoritiesor the recommendation
recipients to actually do whatwe called for. So it really is
a team effort, and together weare making our transportation
(34:48):
system more safe .
Allan Rutter (34:51):
More safe . Well,
that's certainly something to
celebrate and as we alsocelebrate the fact that you
were able to spend some timewith us today. Robert, thanks
so much for joining us on ourpodcast.
Robert Sumwalt (35:01):
It's a pleasure
to be with you. Thank you. And
again, everybody be safe.
Allan Rutter (35:07):
After Robert
mentioned the number of yearly
highway fatalities compared toaviation incidents, I checked
the numbers. In 2023, almost41,000 people died across the
nation. In highway crashes inTexas, almost 4,300. When I
think about the holisticapproach to aviation safety,
Robert discussed, I feelconvicted to approach my own
(35:31):
driving with more purposefulattention to safety. I can
leave my phone alone when mylittle pickup is moving. I can
add some time to my longertrips to finish eating before I
get back in the car. And ratherthan getting angry at
aggressive drivers, I canchoose to give them a wide
berth and stay focused on myown driving. Just as many
(35:53):
parties cooperate to make airtravel safe, we too can
cooperate to make our roadwaysa safer place to drive. Thanks
for listening. If you likedwhat you heard or learned
something, please take just aminute to give us a review,
subscribe, and share thisepisode. I invite you to join
us next time for anotherconversation about getting
(36:15):
ourselves in the stuff we needfrom point A to point B.
Thinking Transportation is aproduction of the Texas A&M
Transportation Institute, amember of The Texas A&M
University System. The show isedited and produced by Chris
Pourteau. I'm your host, AllanRutter. Thanks again for
joining us. We'll see you nexttime .