Death from Below: WW2’s Daring Bismarck Sea Strike

Greetings, history enthusiasts. I'm Steve Matthews, and welcome back to WW2 Stories. Today, we're diving into one of the most audacious and innovative air-sea battles of World War II—the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. This remarkable engagement saw Allied airmen pioneering tactics that would revolutionize naval warfare and deliver a devastating blow to Japanese forces in the South Pacific. It's a story of ingenuity, courage, and the willingness to fly straight into the jaws of death to change the course of a war.

Episode Transcript

(00:00):
Greetings history enthusiasts. I'm Steve Matthews and welcome
back to WW2 stories. Today we're diving into one of
the most audacious and innovative air sea battles of
World War 2, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
This remarkable engagement saw Allied airman pioneering tactics

(00:20):
that would revolutionize naval warfare and deliver a
devastating blow to Japanese forces in the South Pacific.
It's a story of ingenuity, courage, and the willingness to
fly straight into the jaws of death to change the course of a
war. By early 1943, the Pacific War
had reached a critical juncture.After the brutal 6 month

(00:43):
struggle for Guadalcanal, the Japanese were on the defensive
for the first time since Pearl Harbor.
Yet in New Guinea, the situationremained precarious.
Japanese forces still held the northern coastline, including
the vital base at La Allied intelligence revealed that the
Japanese plan to reinforce LA with substantial troops and

(01:05):
supplies, a move that could potentially reverse Allied gains
in the region. To understand the significance
of the Bismarck Sea battle, we need to appreciate the strategic
context of the Southwest Pacific.
In early 1943, the island of NewGuinea, second largest in the
world after Greenland, formed a critical barrier between Japan

(01:27):
and Australia. Since early 1942, Japanese
forces had occupied much of the island's northern coast,
establishing bases at La Salamawa and Finchafen.
From these positions, they launched air raids on Port
Moresby and posed a direct threat to Allied shipping lanes.

(01:47):
The struggle for New Guinea had already claimed thousands of
lives. Australian troops fighting along
the Kokoda Track had barely halted the Japanese advance
toward Port Moresby in late 1942.
American forces had established tenuous beach heads at Buena and
Ghana, enduring some of the mostbrutal fighting of the Pacific

(02:07):
War. By February 1943, the Allied
position had improved but remained far from secure.
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied
Forces in the Southwest Pacific,had developed a strategy to
isolate and neutralize the Japanese stronghold that rebel
on New Britain Island. This plan required first

(02:29):
securing the New Guinea coastline.
Japanese reinforcement of laughsthreatened to delay or derail
this entire strategy, making theinterception of any
reinforcement convoy a top priority.
In late February 1943, Allied intelligence, drawing on a
combination of coast watchers, aerial reconnaissance, and radio

(02:51):
intercepts, identified Japanese preparations for a major
reinforcement operation. Reports indicated that a convoy
was being assembled at Ribow, comprising multiple transport
ships in a strong destroyer escort.
The Japanese 51st Division, a veteran infantry unit that had
previously fought in China and Malaya, would be transported to

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strengthen Japanese forces around LA.
General George Kenny, commander of Allied air forces in the
Southwest Pacific, began preparing for what he recognized
would be a decisive engagement. Kenny, an innovative and
aggressive leader, had already been experimenting with new air
tactics specifically designed tocounter Japanese shipping.

(03:36):
Now he would have the opportunity to implement these
innovations on a large scale against a major target.
On February 28th, 1943, reconnaissance aircraft reported
that a major Japanese convoy haddeparted Rabal heading for Lao
around the northern coast of NewGuinea.
The convoy consisted of eight transport ships carrying

(03:57):
approximately 7000 soldiers of the Japanese 51st Division,
along with tons of supplies, ammunition and equipment.
Escorting these vulnerable transports were 8 destroyers,
formidable warships bristling with anti aircraft guns and
ready to fend off any Allied attack.
The Japanese commanders had planned their operation with

(04:20):
considerable care. The convoy's route would keep it
within range of land based air cover for much of the journey.
The transports were distributed in a dispersed formation to
minimize vulnerability to air attack.
The powerful destroyer escort, comprising some of Japan's most
modern warships, would provide formidable anti aircraft defense

(04:42):
and protection against potentialsubmarine threat.
Japanese naval planners believe these precautions, combined with
the region's notoriously unpredictable weather, would
ensure the convoys safe passage to LA.
Admiral Masatomi Kimura, commanding the convoy, was
experienced naval officer with areputation for thoroughness and

(05:03):
caution. His flagship, the destroyer
Shurayuki, led the formation as a departed Rabal Harbor.
Undercover of darkness. The convoy maintained radio
silence to minimize the risk of detection, though Japanese
commanders were well aware that Allied intelligence might
already be tracking their movements.
For General George Kenney, this convoy presented both a

(05:26):
tremendous opportunity and a daunting challenge.
If the reinforcements reached LA, the hard won Allied position
in New Guinea would be in jeopardy.
But if Kenny's air forces could destroy the convoy at sea, they
might deal Japan a blow from which it could not recover.
In this theater, Kenny's air command was a diverse and

(05:46):
multinational force. The core attack units included
the US Fifth Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force RAF.
These forces operated a variety of aircraft types, each with
specific capabilities that Kennywould need to orchestrate into a
coordinated assault. The challenge lay not just an

(06:07):
assembling sufficient aircraft, but in developing tactics that
could overcome the convoys formidable defenses.
Kenny began assembling every available aircraft for the
coming battle. American B17 Flying Fortresses
and B24 Liberators would providehigh altitude bombing.
Medium bombers, including B25 Mitchells and a 20 Havocs would

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execute low level attacks. Australian bullfighters would
strafe the ships with their formidable array of cannon and
machine guns. P38 Lightning fighters would
provide escort and additional strafing capability.
But Kenny had something more in mind than conventional tactics.
Months earlier he had ordered the modification of B25 Mitchell

(06:53):
bombers to carry additional forward firing machine guns,
transforming them from traditional bombers into
devastating gunships capable of suppressing anti aircraft fire
during low level approaches. More significantly, he had been
experimenting with a technique called skip bombing, where bombs
were released at low altitude toskip across the water like

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stones and strike ships at the water line.
These innovations had not emerged in isolation.
They represented the culminationof months of tactical evolution
driven by the harsh realities ofcombat in the Southwest Pacific.
Early in the campaign, Allied air crews had discovered that
conventional high altitude bombing was largely ineffective

(07:36):
against moving ships. The accuracy was simply too poor
to reliably hit vessels that could maneuver to avoid bombs
seen falling from above. Initial experiments with low
level bombing had proven more successful, but extremely
hazardous. Aircraft flying at low altitude
were highly vulnerable to anti aircraft fire.

(07:58):
Kenny's solution was to modify the B25 Mitchell bomber, adding
eight forward firing .50 calibermachine guns in the nose to
suppress shipboard anti aircraftpositions during the approach.
Some aircraft were further modified with additional machine
guns mounted in blisters along the fuselage, creating what
crews called the Commerce Destroyer configuration.

(08:21):
Skip bombing itself was adapted from British techniques
developed against German shipping in the English Channel.
The theory was straightforward, but the execution incredibly
demanding. Bombers would approach at
extremely low altitude, just feet above the waves, and
release bombs with delayed action fuses at specific
distances from target ships. Ideally, the bombs would skip

(08:45):
across the water like stones before striking the target at or
below the waterline, where the ship's armor was typically
thinnest. To prepare for these hazardous
tactics, air crews trained intensively, practicing against
mock targets in the relative safety of Australian coastal
waters. The training was dangerous even
without enemy opposition. Several aircraft were lost to

(09:08):
accidents when they misjudged altitude or distance during
practice runs. Those who completed the training
emerged with a unique and lethalskill set, but one that would
require extraordinary courage toimplement against the defended
target. These innovations had been
tested but never fully implemented in major combat
operations. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea

(09:31):
would be their ultimate trial byfire.
The risks were enormous. Flying at mast height would
expose aircraft to devastating anti aircraft fire and leave
little margin for error 1. Minor miscalculation could send
a plane crashing into the sea orcolliding with a ship's
superstructure. As the convoy departed Rebal on

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February 28th, 1943, nature initially sided with the
Japanese. Severe tropical storms lashed
the Bismarck and Solomon Seas, hampering Allied reconnaissance
efforts. For several anxious days, Allied
aircraft searched through thick cloud cover and driving rain,
catching only occasional glimpses of the Japanese fleet.

(10:16):
The weather conditions were characteristic of the region
during monsoon season. Tropical storm systems generated
towering thunderheads that couldreach altitudes of 40,000 feet
or more. These weather systems create a
dangerous turbulence, poor visibility, and unpredictable
wind conditions that made both reconnaissance in attack

(10:37):
operations hazardous for Allied pilots flying over hundreds of
miles of open ocean. Such conditions also magnified
the risk of becoming disorientedand running out of fuel before
reaching base. The Japanese convoy commander,
Admiral Kimura, believed the foul weather provided A
protective shield against air attack.

(10:58):
Rather than pushing through the land or cover of darkness, he
maintained a daylight schedule, confident that the storms would
conceal his ships from Allied ice.
This decision reflected standardJapanese naval doctrine, which
emphasized the importance of allowing destroyer captains to
effectively coordinate the convoys defense in daylight

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conditions. Japanese naval planners had
historically underestimated the threat posed by Allied air
power, a miscalculation that hadalready proven costly at Midway
and would now be tested again inthe confined waters of the
Bismarck Sea. But on March 1st, a patrolling
B24 Liberator broke through the clouds long enough to spot the

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convoy, triggering the first Allied strikes.
B seventeenths attacked from high altitude but achieved
limited results in the poor weather conditions.
Additional raids on March 2nd scored some hits but failed to
sink any vessels. The convoy continued toward its
destination, apparently weathering the Allied attacks

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without catastrophic damage. March 3rd dawn with clearing
skies, a development that would prove fatal for the Japanese as
morning mist burned away. Allied reconnaissance located
the convoy approximately 100 miles southeast of Finchafen,
still 2 days from its destination.
Kenny immediately launched the full weight of his assembled air

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Armada. Over 100 aircraft coordinated in
a complex multi wave attack plan.
The morning of March 3rd found the Japanese convoy sailing in a
loose formation approximately 50miles off the New Guinea coast.
The 8 transports were ranged in two columns with destroyer
escorts positioned on the flanksand ahead of the formation.

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The sea state was moderate with a light chop and scattered white
caps that indicated winds of about 10 to 15 knots.
Visibility was excellent. The curse of clear weather had
replaced the blessing of storms for the Japanese aboard the
transports. Thousands of Japanese soldiers
endured crowded conditions belowdecks.

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Most were veterans of earlier campaigns now being relocated to
shore up Japan's defensive positions in New Guinea.
Few had any inkling of the danger rapidly approaching from
Allied bases to the South. Their officers maintain
discipline and routine, conducting equipment inspections
and briefings on the combat conditions they expected to face

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after landing. The first wave consisted of 13
Royal Australian Air Force bow fighters from #30 Squadron, led
by Squadron Leader Ivan Gledhill.
These twin engine fighters, eacharmed with 420mm cannon and 6.3
O 3 caliber machine guns, approached the convoy at wave

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top height, using the morning sun to mask their approach.
The Bristol Bull Fighter was a formidable aircraft.
Originally designed as a night fighter for the defense of
Britain, It's adaptation to the maritime strike role in the
Pacific showcased Allied flexibility in repurposing
aircraft for evolving combat requirements.

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With its heavy forward armament concentrated in the nose, the
bow fighter could deliver devastating fire against ships,
decks, bridges and gun positions.
It's twin engine configuration provided the range necessary for
operations over the vast distances of the Pacific Theater
Squadron Leader Glenn Hill, a 29year old former airline pilot

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from Sydney, had been flying combat missions for over a year.
His leadership style emphasized meticulous planning and
aggressive execution, qualities that would prove decisive in the
coming engagement. As his formation approached the
Japanese convoy, Glenn Hill maintained strict radio silence,
relying on pre arranged signals in the thorough briefing he had

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conducted before takeoff. The Australian air crews had
trained specifically for this type of attack, practicing
extreme low level flying over water and coordinated strafing
runs. Many had already participated in
smaller scale shipping strikes, but nothing approaching the
magnitude of the target they nowconfronted.

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Despite this, morale was high. The opportunity to strike a
decisive blow against Japanese forces reinforced their
determination. At 10 AM, the bow fighters swept
in a full throttle just feet above the water.
Japanese lookouts spotted them only moments before they opened
fire. The Australian air crews

(15:39):
deliberately targeted the ship'sbridges and anti aircraft
positions, raking them with a devastating hail of cannon and
machine gunfire. The effect was immediate and
catastrophic. Japanese Gunners, caught by
surprise, were cut down at theirposts.
Command and control was disrupted as officers on the

(15:59):
bridges were killed or wounded. Defensive fire, when it came,
was sporadic and ineffective. Japanese captains, believing
they face torpedo bombers, beganturning their ships to present
smaller profiles, A maneuver that would have reduced
vulnerability to torpedoes but inadvertently exposed their

(16:19):
flanks to the approaching bombers.
Flight Lieutenant Charles Liermont, flying one of the lead
bullfighters, later described the scene.
We came in so low I could see the shocked expressions on the
Japanese sailors faces. Many were still pointing their
guns skyward, expecting a high level attack.
We hit them with everything we had, cannon, machine guns,

(16:43):
aiming for the bridges and gun positions.
It was brutal but effective. Liermont's aircraft sustained
multiple hits during the attack,with one bullet passing through
the cockpit between him and his navigator.
Despite the damage, he completedhis strafing run and returned
safely to base. His courage exemplified the

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determination of the Australian air crews, many of whom were
motivated by the direct threat Japan had posed to their
homeland during earlier stages of the war.
The bull fighters strafing run lasted less than a minute but
transformed the tactical situation as they pulled away.
The next wave of attackers appear on the horizon. 16 B 25

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Mitchell bombers of the 38th Bombardment Group led by Major
Ed Larner. These aircraft had been
specially modified for this new form of attack with additional
forward firing machine guns mounted in the nose and on the
fuselage. Major Larner, a 31 year old
career officer from Pennsylvania, had been

(17:47):
instrumental in developing the low level attack techniques the
B20 Fives would now employ. His leadership combined
technical expertise with a calm,deliberate approach to combat
operations. As his formation approached the
Japanese convoy, Larner could see the results of the bow
fighters attack, smoke rising from several ships and visible

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confusion in the Japanese formation.
The B25 Mitchell was a versatilemedium bomber that had gained
fame as the aircraft used in theDoolittle Raid against Tokyo in
1942. With a normal crew of five, it
combined good speed and range with substantial payload
capacity. The modifications for the

(18:29):
Bismarck Sea operation had transformed these aircraft from
conventional bombers into formidable gunships capable of
both strafing and precise bomb delivery.
What followed was perhaps the most daring bombing technique
ever attempted in combat. Rather than climbing to
conventional bombing altitude, Larner let his be 25 straight

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toward the Japanese ships at an altitude of just 100 feet.
As they close to within a mile, they dropped even lower,
skimming the waves at barely 25 feet above the water.
Japanese Gunners, those still alive and able to respond, found
tracking these aircraft extraordinarily difficult.

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The B20 Fives were moving in over 250 mph, presenting rapidly
changing targets. Their extreme low altitude meant
that most conventional anti aircraft guns couldn't depress
their barrels enough to engage effectively.
Lieutenant Charles W Howe, piloting one of the B20 fives,

(19:31):
described the approach. We were so low I could see fish
scattering as our shadows passedover them.
The Japanese ships loomed largerand larger until they filled our
windshields completely. Their sides were like cliffs
rising from the water. We could see individual sailors
running for cover or manning guns, and then we were on them.

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The psychological impact on the B25 cruise was intense.
Flying at such low altitude compressed reaction times and
magnified every threat. The aircraft vibrated violently
from the proximity to the water surface, an effect known as
ground effect that altered the aircraft's handling
characteristics. Pilots had to maintain absolute

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focus, managing their airspeed and altitude while tracking
their targets and coordinating with their bombardiers for the
precise moment of weapons release.
The B20 Fives opened fire with their forward guns, first
housing down the ship's decks and sides with .50 caliber
rounds, suppressing any remaining anti aircraft fire.

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Then at precisely calculated distances so close that a split
second error meant disaster, they released their bombs.
The physics of skip bombing required precise execution.
Bombs needed to be released at an exact height and distance to
skip across the water and strikeships at the waterline, rather

(20:57):
than bouncing over them or plunging into the sea.
The pilots had practiced this technique extensively, but never
under combat conditions against an alerted enemy.
Standard bombs had been modifiedwith special fuses that would
delay detonation for a few seconds after impact, allowing
the bombs to penetrate the ship's hulls before exploding.

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This maximized damage below the waterline, where flooding would
be most difficult to control. The £500 bombs used in these
attacks could tear massive holesin the relatively thin hole
plating of transport ships, ensuring catastrophic flooding.
The results exceeded all expectations.
Major Larner's aircraft scored adirect hit on a transport,

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tearing a massive hole in its side.
Lieutenant House bombs struck another transport amidships,
causing a secondary explosion asammunition stored in the hole
detonated. After releasing their bombs, the
B20 Fives maintain their low altitude, strafing other ships
before escaping at wave top height. 1B25 pilot Lieutenant

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Earl Smith flew so low that his aircraft's propellers were
momentarily stopped by the wall of water thrown up by a near
miss bomb. Somehow he managed to restart
his engines and escape. Another pilot reported being
splashed by water from his own bombs explosions, evidence of
just how perilously close they came to their targets.

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The precision and effectiveness of these low level attacks
represented a revolution in air sea warfare.
Previously, a considerable percentage of bombs dropped from
conventional altitude might misstheir targets entirely.
With skip bombing, the accuracy rate increased dramatically,
with some squadrons reporting hit rates exceeding 70%, an

(22:50):
unprecedented level of effectiveness against moving
naval targets. From the Japanese perspective,
these attacks were unlike anything they had previously
experienced. Their naval doctrine had
anticipated and prepared for conventional high altitude
bombing and torpedo attacks. The combination of strafing runs

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and skip bombing presented a threat for which they had no
effective counter ship. Captains found themselves in an
impossible tactical situation. Maneuvering to avoid one type of
attack only increased vulnerability to another.
As the B20 Fives pulled away, more Allied aircraft appeared by
20 Havocs employing similar low level tactics, additional B20

(23:33):
Fives and high altitude B 17th dropping conventional bombs.
P38 Lightning circled overhead, engaging the few Japanese
fighters that managed to reach the bow area from distant bases.
The A20 Havoc was a light attackbomber, well suited to the low
level attack roll. Smaller and more maneuverable

(23:55):
than the B25, it carried a lighter bomb load, but could
deliver it with considerable precision.
Like the B20 Fives, Summit 20s had been modified with
additional forward firing guns to enhance their strafing
capability. The B17 Flying Fortresses,
operating from high altitude provided a different form of

(24:16):
pressure on the Japanese convoy.While they're bombing, accuracy
against moving ships was limited.
Their presence forced Japanese vessels to maneuver, disrupting
formation integrity and making the ships more vulnerable to low
level attackers. The psychological impact of
constant attacks from multiple altitudes added to the confusion

(24:37):
and stress faced by Japanese crews.
P38 Lightning fighters played a crucial dual role in the battle.
Their primary mission was to intercept any Japanese fighters
attempting to defend the convoy with their distinctive twin boom
design. Excellent speed and heavy
armament, the P30 Eights were more than a match for the Zero

(24:59):
fighters that might be encountered.
Additionally, when not engaged in air to air combat, the P30
Eights conducted strafing runs against the ships, adding to the
pressure on Japanese anti aircraft Gunners.
The Japanese convoy, already wounded by the initial attacks,
now began to disintegrate under this relentless assault.

(25:20):
Transport ships packed with troops and supplies proved
particularly vulnerable. As bombs tore open their holes,
many caught fire or began listing heavily.
Destroyers, while more maneuverable and better armed,
suffered hits that disabled engines or weapons systems.
The human cost aboard the Japanese ships was appalling.

(25:44):
When bombs struck transports carrying hundreds or thousands
of soldiers packed into confinedspaces, casualties were massive
and immediate. Men below decks have little
chance to escape vessels that began sinking rapidly.
Those who reached the open decksfaced strafing from allied
aircraft in the prospect of abandoning ship into shark

(26:04):
infested waters far from shore. By noon the battles outcome was
no longer in doubt. The convoy had been shattered,
with multiple ships sinking or ablaze.
In the afternoon, Allied aircraft returned for further
attacks, finding a scene of utter devastation.
Burning ships dotted the sea. Thousands of Japanese soldiers

(26:28):
struggled in the water amid floating debris.
The afternoon attacks were conducted with the same
methodical precision as the morning strikes.
Fresh aircraft from Allied basesarrived to continue the assault,
targeting ships that remained afloat.
Inoperational Japanese destroyers attempting to rescue
survivors from sinking transports themselves became

(26:51):
targets. The relentless pressure
prevented any effective damage control efforts that might have
saved damaged vessels. In a controversial decision that
remains debated by historians, Allied aircraft strafed
lifeboats and survivors in the water.
The rationale was coldly strategic.
Every Japanese soldier who reached shore would become an

(27:14):
enemy combatant on the New Guinea front.
From a humanitarian perspective,it was a brutal action.
From a military standpoint, it reflected the No Quarter nature
of the Pacific War. By 1943, this aspect of the
battle highlights the ethical complexities of warfare.
International conventions regarding the treatment of

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shipwrecked personnel existed, but the Pacific War had already
seen numerous violations of suchrules by both sides.
The strafing of survivors represented a further erosion of
traditional distinctions betweencombatants and those rendered or
to combat by shipwreck. By nightfall, the results were
catastrophic for the Japanese. All 8 transport ships had been

(27:59):
sunk or were sinking. 4 of the 8escorting destroyers had been
destroyed. Of the approximately 7000
Japanese troops in the convoy, fewer than 1000 would ultimately
reach LA. Most rescued by Japanese
submarines and small crafts sentout after the battle.
The night brought little respitefor Japanese survivors floating

(28:21):
in the Bismarck Sea. Sharks attracted by blood in the
water took a terrible toll on wounded men.
Exposure caused additional deaths as the tropical waters,
while not cold, still conducted body heat away more rapidly than
air. By morning, hundreds of bodies
floated among the debris fields marking the convoys route.

(28:44):
The next day, March 4th, Allied aircraft returned to complete
the destruction of any remainingvessels.
They found several damage destroyers attempting to rescue
survivors. These ships, already crippled by
earlier attacks, were finished off by further skip bombing
runs. By the day's end, only fragments

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of the once powerful convoy remained afloat.
Allied losses were remarkably light for aircraft shot down and
13 airmen killed. The disparity in casualties,
perhaps 5000 Japanese dead compared to 13 Americans and
Australians, underscored the revolutionary impact of the new
air tactics, Captain William Sermon, AB25 pilot who

(29:30):
participated in the battle, later reflected.
None of us had ever done anything like this before.
We'd practiced skip bombing, sure, but against mock targets
under ideal conditions, this wasdifferent.
Ships shooting back the sea rough from near misses, other
aircraft crossing your path. It was chaos, but controlled

(29:52):
chaos. Everyone knew their job and did
it, even though we were making up the doctrine as we went
along. The experience of Allied air
crews during the battle combinedintense stress with the
adrenaline rush of combat. Flying at extremely low
altitudes required total concentration.
A moment's distraction could result in collision with the sea

(30:13):
surface or with a ship's superstructure.
The physiological impacts included tunnel vision, time
distortion in the heightened sensory awareness characteristic
of extreme stress situations. For many of the pilots and
aircrew, the Bismarck C represented their first
experience of direct combat, thepsychological transition from

(30:36):
training to actual warfare. Witnessing the real world
effects of their weapons on human targets created lasting
impacts that many would carry for the rest of their lives.
Some reported nightmares featuring men in the water or
burning ships. Others developed the emotional
detachment common among combat veterans, a psychological

(30:56):
defense mechanism against the trauma of warfare.
The human cost of the battle wasmost acutely felt by the
Japanese troops caught in this maelstrom of fire and water.
Private Takaharu Miyamoto, one of the few survivors, provided a
harrowing account. We were below decks when the
first bombs hit. The ship shuddered like it had

(31:18):
hit rocks. Then another explosion, bigger
than the first. Water began pouring in.
Men were screaming, officers shouting orders that no one
could hear. I fought my way topside just as
the ship began to roll over. The sea was full of men, some
swimming, others just floating face down.

(31:40):
American planes were everywhere,so low we could see the pilots
faces. They kept coming back, firing at
anything that moved. Miyamoto's account highlights
the terrifying reality faced by Japanese soldiers trapped aboard
the transports. Many were crushed or drawn below
decks as ships capsized or sank rapidly.

(32:02):
Those who reached the water faced new threats from Allied
strafing runs, from sharks, and from the sheer distance to
shore. Miyamoto himself survived only
by clinging to floating debris for nearly two days before being
rescued by a Japanese patrol boat.
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea had immediate tactical and

(32:22):
longer term strategic impacts. Most immediately, it prevented
the reinforcement of Japanese forces at La, leaving the
Garrison there vulnerable to theAllied offensive that would come
in September 1943. More broadly, it demonstrated
that air power alone could decisively defeat naval forces,

(32:42):
a concept that would reshape military thinking.
From a tactical perspective, thebattle confirmed the
effectiveness of coordinated multi layer air attacks against
shipping. By combining high altitude
bombing, medium altitude attacks, and low level strafing
and skip bombing, Allied air forces created a situation where

(33:03):
Japanese ships had no safe option.
Maneuvers to avoid one form of attack increased vulnerability
to others. This approach would be refined
and applied throughout the remainder of the Pacific War.
For the Japanese military leadership, the catastrophic
loss of the Lac convoy forced a fundamental reassessment of

(33:24):
their strategy in the Southwest Pacific.
Their ability to maintain and reinforce forward bases had been
critically compromised. The Imperial Japanese Navy,
already stretched thin by lossesat Midway and Guadalcanal, could
no longer guarantee the sea lanes necessary for major troop
movements. The psychological impact on both

(33:46):
sides was equally significant. For the Allies, it provided A
tremendous morale boost, confirming that innovative
tactics could overcome, even determine Japanese resistance.
For the Japanese high command, it forced a re evaluation of
their entire strategy in the Southwest Pacific.
After the Bismarck Sea, they never again attempted to send

(34:09):
large convoys through areas within range of Allied aircraft.
Instead, they resorted to using submarines and small, fast
warships for transport methods that could not sustain major
ground operations. Japanese Admiral Chuchi Nagumo,
who had commanded carrier forcesat Pearl Harbor and Midway,

(34:29):
received reports of the BismarckSea disaster with growing
concern. In his diary, he wrote, If enemy
air power can achieve such complete destruction of a well
defended convoy, what implications does this hold for
our broader strategy? The sea lanes which are our
empires life lines now appear vulnerable in ways we had not

(34:50):
anticipated. General Kinney's innovative
tactics quickly became standard doctrine.
Skip bombing and masthead level attacks would be employed
throughout the remainder of the Pacific War, though never again
with such devastating effect against such a large target.
The modifications to the B25 Mitchell, adding additional

(35:11):
forward firing guns for strafing, influenced aircraft
design and tactics for decades to come.
The battle also highlighted the effectiveness of allied
cooperation. Australian and American air
crews work together seamlessly, each contributing unique
capabilities to the overall plan.
This multinational approach would continue throughout the

(35:33):
Pacific campaign, with Australian and New Zealand
forces making crucial contributions alongside their
American allies. For individual participants, the
battle often represented the defining moment of their
military careers. Major Ed Larner received the
Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership of the B25

(35:54):
formations. Many other pilots and aircrew
received decorations for valor. Their willingness to fly
directly into the face of enemy fire at altitudes that left no
margin for error exemplified thecourage that characterized
Allied airmen throughout the war.
Not all returned to tell their stories.

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Captain Ernest Pruitt's B 25 washit by anti aircraft fire during
its bomb run. Witnesses reported seeing the
aircraft fly directly into a Japanese transport, exploding on
impact. Whether this was a deliberate
ramming attack or the result of battle damage remains unknown.
Pruitt and his crew were among the 13 Allied airmen lost during

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the battle. The technical aspects of the
Allied victory deserve further examination.
The success of skip bombing relied on precise calculations
of release altitude, airspeed, and distance from target.
Bombs needed to be dropped from approximately 200 to 300 feet at
speeds of 200 to 275 mph and at distances of 400 to 600 feet

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from the target. These parameters created the
conditions for the bomb to skip across the water surface and
strike the ship at or below the waterline.
Special modifications to standard bombs enhanced their
effectiveness. Delayed action fuses allowed
bombs to penetrate ship hulls before detonating, maximizing

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internal damage. Some bombs were fitted with
special nose caps that preventedthem from breaking apart on
impact with the water surface. These technical refinements,
combined with the skill and courage of the air crews who
delivered them, created a weaponsystem of unprecedented
effectiveness against naval targets.

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Aircraft modifications were equally important to the Bao's
outcome. The B25 Mitchell bombers that
performed the skip bombing attacks had undergone
substantial changes from their original configuration.
Most notable was the addition ofeight forward firing .50 caliber
machine guns in the nose, replacing the standard

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bombardier's position. Some aircraft received
additional guns and blisters along the fuselage, creating
what became known as the strayfer configuration.
These modifications transformed the B25 from a conventional
medium bomber into a formidable attack aircraft capable of
suppressing shipboard anti aircraft defenses during low

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level approaches. The concentrated firepower of
eight heavy machine guns could devastate exposed gun positions
and clear the decks of enemy personnel, creating the
conditions necessary for successful skip bombing runs.
The legacy of the Bismarck Sea extended far beyond its
immediate impact on the New Guinea campaign.

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It demonstrated the vulnerability of surface ships
to air attack, influencing navalconstruction and doctrine for
generations. Aircraft carriers, already
important now, became absolutelyessential for fleet protection.
Anti aircraft defenses were substantially strengthened on
all classes of warships. Naval operations without air

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superiority were recognized as increasingly untenable for the
US Navy. The battle provided compelling
evidence supporting the carrier centric approach that would
dominate naval strategy in the latter stages of the Pacific War
and beyond. Admiral Chester Nimitz,
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, studied the
Bismarck Sea action carefully, noting how land based aircraft

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had achieved what previously might have required carrier air
groups. The implications for fleet
composition and deployment were significant, reinforcing the
shift toward air power as the decisive element in naval
warfare. Perhaps most significantly, the
battle showed how innovation andadaptation could overcome enemy

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advantages. The Japanese 0 fighter had
dominated early air battles withits maneuverability in range.
Japanese destroyers were among the world's best.
Armed with the exceptional Long Lands torpedo, Japanese troops
had proven themselves formidablejungle fighters.
Yet none of these advantages mattered when Allied airmen,

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flying directly into the teeth of enemy defenses applied new
tactics with determination and precision.
General George C Kinney, the architect of the victory, later
wrote The Bismarck C action was the payoff for a lot of hard
work, training and modification of equipment.
We had figured out how to sink ships with airplanes, and we had

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the crews trained to do it. The result was the most
devastating air attack on shipping up to that time in the
war. Japanese Admiral Mato Migaki
provided a different perspectivein his diary.
How could we have lost an entireconvoy?
Our destroyers are the best in the world.
Our air cover was adequate, our planning careful.

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Yet everything was destroyed in a matter of hours.
We must reconsider our entire strategy in the face of this new
air threat. The human stories behind the
battle statistics deserve particular attention.
Squadron Leader Ivan Gledhill, who led the Australian bow
fighters in the initial attack, had been a commercial pilot

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before the war. His experience flying low over
New Guinea's terrain while delivering mail and supplies,
and formed his approach to combat flying.
After leading the bow fighter attack, he continued flying
combat missions until being shotdown and killed near Wewak in
August 1943. Glen Hill's death highlights the

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constant attrition faced by Allied air forces throughout the
Pacific campaign. Many of the pilots who
participated in the Bismarck SeaBattle would not survive the
war. The skills that made them
effective in combat, the willingness to press attacks at
extremely low altitude to fly directly into enemy fire, also

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increased their vulnerability. The courage that produced
victory often came at the ultimate price.
Lieutenant Thomas Peebles, AB 25pilot who scored direct hits on
a Japanese destroyer, had been acrop duster in Texas before
enlisting. His experience in low level
flying proved invaluable during the skip bombing attack.

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He survived the war and returnedto agricultural aviation, often
telling fellow pilots after skipping bombs into a destroyer
while people are shooting at youdusting cotton seems pretty
straightforward. Peebles represents the diversity
of backgrounds that characterized allied air forces.
Many pilots brought civilian flying experience that proved

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unexpectedly valuable in combat situations.
Crop dusters, barnstormers, airline pilots and flight
instructors all found their pre war skills applicable to the
demands of military aviation. This civilian expertise,
combined with military training,created air crews capable of
executing the innovative tacticsthat produced victory at the

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Bismarck Sea. For the people of New Guinea,
both indigenous populations and Australian colonists, the battle
represented a turning point in their ordeal.
Japanese occupation had brought harsh treatment, forced labor,
and atrocities against civilians.
The failure to reinforce Lam marked the beginning of the end

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for Japanese presence on the island.
Though difficult, fighting wouldcontinue for many months.
Indigenous New Guineans had played crucial roles in the
Allied war effort, serving as stretcher bearers, construction
workers, guides, and coast watchers.
Their knowledge of local terrainand conditions proved
invaluable, and their contribution to Allied victory

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has been increasingly recognizedby historians.
The success at the Bismarck Sea helped ensure that their
sacrifices would ultimately leadto liberation rather than
continued occupation. Australian civilians in New
Guinea had endured particular hardships under Japanese
occupation. Many had been killed or interned

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under brutal conditions. Others had fled into the jungle,
where they face disease, starvation and the constant fear
of capture. The Bismarck Sea victory brought
the promise of eventual liberation closer, though for
many it would come too late.