Focus on the Mission, with Mike Pompeo | GoodFellows | Hoover Institution - GoodFellows: Conversations from the Hoover Institution

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>> Peter Robinson (00:00):
Keep them or abolish them, department of agriculture?

>> Milton Friedman (00:03):
Abolish.

Gone.
Department of Commerce?

Abolish.

Gone.
Department of Defense?

Keep.

Keep it.
Department of Education?

Abolish.

Gone. Energy?

Abolish.
I'll accept that energyties in with the military.

Health and human services?
There is room for some public healthactivities to prevent contagion.
We'll eliminate half of the Departmentof Health, okay one half, there we go.
Department of Justice?

Yes.
Keep that one?

Keep that one. Labor?

No. >> Peter Robinson
State?
Keep. Keep it.
Transportation?
Gone.

The Treasury?

You have to keep it to collect taxes.

All right.
[MUSIC]

>> Bill Whalen (00:49):
it's Friday, November 22, 2024, and welcome back to GoodFellows,
a Hoover Institution broadcast examiningsocial, economic, political and
geopolitical concerns.
I'm Bill Whalen,I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow,
I'll be your moderator today.
Glad to announce that I'm joined byHoover's three wise men, our GoodFellows,
as we call them.
And that would be the historian NiallFerguson, the grumpy economist himself,
John Cochrane.

(01:10):
And former presidential national securityadviser and bestselling author, Lt Gen.
H.R. McMaster.
Niall, John andH.R are Hoover senior fellows gentlemen,
we're going to talk aboutthe change going on in Washington.
The last days of the Biden administrationand the nascent Trump administration.
We're going to focus onsome appointments and
also a surprise policy choice bythe Biden administration last week.

(01:31):
And joining us for this conversation isa gentleman who served in the first Trump
administration, former US Secretaryof State, former Director of the CIA.
And former Congressman fromthe great state of Kansas making
his GoodFellows debut, Mike Pompeo.
Secretary Pompeo, welcome to GoodFellows.

>> Mike Pompeo (01:46):
Great to be with you, Love the poster over your shoulder,
I grew up in Southern California,Nixon historian extraordinaire.

Thank you very much.
So one thing about your remarkablebiography that we have to mention is that
you were first in yourclass at West Point.
You graduated in 1986, that would putyou two years behind one H.R. McMaster.
And here I want you to set the recordstraight, Secretary Pompeo,
we've been doing this show foralmost five years.
And we've been laboring underthe assumption that HR McMaster
is a warrior with a heart of gold,you won't find a nicer guy.

(02:14):
Let's go back 40 years to West Point, andif you want to tear the mask off this
guy and explain what HR McMasteris really like, please go ahead.

That's for another day,
he was a great colleague in the Trumpadministration an amazing soldier.

But we all have our shortcomings and someday at a bar,
I'll let you know what they all are.

Okay, let's get on with the show here, Secretary Pompeo, and
I want to focus ona couple of appointments.
I want to get your thoughts onMarco Rubio doing the job you once had.
It strikes me that it is a great challengeto be the lead diplomat with a president
who shall I say, not always diplomatic.
But let's first focus on the Pentagon andTrump's choice of Pete Hegseth.

(02:56):
I look at this position and
I see at least five matters thatthe Secretary of Defense has to address.
One, he or
she has to have the ability to managea vast bureaucracy in a global operation.
He or she has to have the judgmentregarding America's quasi involvement in
two hot wars andwhatever is to come with China.
The Secretary of Defense has to understandthe changing nature of warfare given

(03:18):
what we're seeing in Ukraine and Israel.
The Secretary has to have a vision as tohow we should modernize the military and
the political chops to deal withCongress that maybe doesn't want to
spend the money.
And then finally the Secretary has todeal with DEI within the Pentagon,
within the branches.
Now you look at Trump's choice of hex thathe clearly is interested in that last
matter DEI, so let's bendthe conversation with this question.

(03:40):
Do you like the choice of Hegseth andall of those matters,
all those qualities I mentioned the secdef, which one do you think matters most?

Goodness,
I think what in the end mattersmost is the capacity to lead.
When I became CIA director, it was thelargest organization I'd ever run by far,
I'd been a small business guy,four or five hundred people.

>> H.R. McMaster (04:02):
[INAUDIBLE] Platoon leader man, don't say.

Platoon leader with 16 scalpel to leader when I had 30 or
40, and then,this was a step up in class for me.
I went to State Department, 70,000 people, a massive step up in class in
organizational requirements andleadership.
And Pete has very little experiencedoing that, there's no doubt about that.

(04:24):
He hasn't run a big organization,certainly not a big governmental
organization, which I think adds andHR, you'd agree with us.
I think a half twist to the triple gainerin terms of leadership challenge, right.
This is even greater difficulty, and
it will require Pete to puttogether a really good team.
It's what I tried to do at the agency,

(04:45):
I brought in a career professional tohelp me understand the building and lead.
I brought in a great West Point buddyof mine who was a great executive
leader guy named Brian Bulatao toround out that ability to drive that.
And then to your point,there are many lakes to the stool,
the other one is this idea of what shouldthe military look like, 25 years from now?

(05:09):
How is it you put inplace those structures?
And Pete will need a bunch of help,I guess as we all do,
to think through those strategic,complex issues.
And I hope he's up to that challenge,I'll stop my comments there.
At some point a lot of folks were talkingabout me potentially in that role,
press andchose to go a different direction.

(05:29):
I intend to try and help whoever it isends up occupying that seat be successful.
It matters an awful lot to my family and
to everyone who'slistening to this podcast.

Mike, can I do a follow up with you on this?
On the last issue the lastsort of focus for
the Secretary of defense,that bill, that bill mentioned.
There has been this attempt by the Bidenadministration to push a social agenda.

I guess the self described progressive political agenda in
the military,I don't think they've succeeded, Mike.
I don't believe that the military is wokeand certainly I don't believe the far left
narrative that the military isextremist or something, it's crazy.
So I've seen this tendency though right,in recent years.
I think taken to a new level inthe Biden administration to try to suck

(06:20):
the military in to partisan politicswould be so destructive to our military.
What advice would yougive Secretary Hegseth or
whoever becomes a secretary on howto transcend the partisan politics?
Because I have a big concern Mike, thatwhatever is administered as a corrective,
could be just as bad as whatthe Biden administration was doing.

Yeah, no HR, I think that's a really important thought,
my wisdom would be focus on mission.
When you see institutions thatbegin to falter or come unwound,
it's almost always because there'sa political agenda being pushed.
But it's almost always driven by the factthere's a secondary mission that is

(07:04):
different from the core obligation andresponsibility, and
I'd say the same thing forthe United States military.
I hope you're right,I worry that some of the leaders,
maybe it was because of the climatethey were operating in.
But you've got big departments workingon climate change, okay sign me up for
clean air, safe drinking water,protecting the next generation.
But goodness gracious, we're supposedto break stuff and kill people and

(07:28):
deter our adversaries.
And when you spend a disproportionateamount of time on things unrelated to
that, you see lots of challenges.
The recruiting problemsthat they're facing today,
shortfalls that will be with us fordecades, right.
HR you know this to growan E6 right to grow at E8,
these are 10 15 year propositions.
And sothis will move through the military for

(07:50):
quite a while, this recruiting challenge.
And if you go back to mission youngmen and women across America,
I think they're just as patriotic todayas they were 5, 10, 25 years ago.
40 years ago when you and I signed up,I think we'll see them come back and say,
yep, that's what I wanna go do.
I wanna go serve,I wanna go gain skills, and
we can get this thing backin the right direction.

(08:12):
I don't want it to be conservative,I don't want it to be liberal,
I don't want it to be libertarian,I don't want it to be progressive.
I want the military to be focused onits mission set, and when it does that,
we get great leaders and
presidents get the capacity to deteraggression around the world as well.

Yeah, I agree completely Mike, I mean, that's so well said,
thank you.

>> Niall Ferguson (08:33):
Can I ask a historical question?
Sometimes when these bigjobs are under discussion,
it helps to ask,who's done it really well in the past?
I've been reading Max Boot'srevisionist biography of Ronald Reagan,
and I've been struck quite forciblyby the parallels between the election
we just saw and the election of 1980.

(08:54):
And if you think back tothe early Reagan years,
they were characterized by a reallysignificant events buildup, a successful
reassertion of American deterrenceafter a period of perceived weakness.
And a key role was played inall that by Caspar Weinberger,
as Secretary of Defense.
Now I wonder how you assess him,Mr. Secretary,

(09:20):
and also who else in the pantheonof Secretaries of Defense
should we look to for inspiration, ideas?
Who did this best?
I don't think,with all due respect to him,
Lloyd Austin is gonna be near the topof great secretaries of defense without

(09:40):
wanting to put too fine a point on it,but who would you put up there?

Goodness, it's a great question.
I'd probably put Weinbergerfrom modern times,
at least I put Weinberger at ornear the top.
Think about too, the team that he hadaround him, and it moved, not as much
as the team moved during the Trumpadministration, but lots changed then too.
But you add Bud McFarland,John Poindexter, you had some legendary

(10:06):
figures, George Schultz,hanging around the hoop, right always.
You had people who had a deep setof experiences and understandings,
by the way,from different backgrounds, right?
Schultz had spent time in the commercialsector, but people who brought
organizational knowledge, some historicalgrounding and a deep focus on mission set.
And understood whereAmerica's place in the world,

(10:29):
the responsibility thatAmerica had to lead.
Not, by the way, when I say thatsometimes people think, you do that so
that the people ofBangladesh can be happier.
No, America has to lead so that Americanscan be more prosperous and secure [LAUGH].
And then the corollary benefit flowsto people around the world as well.
And Cap Weinberger understood that,Dick Cheney,

(10:51):
everybody's got their own views on him,but he canceled some big programs,
politically difficult programs tocancel early on in that administration,
I think that was important.
Maybe the programs,I don't want to get into the pluses or
minuses of the particular programs, buthis willingness to go oxes [LAUGH] and

(11:13):
to say, no,the resource allocation is wrong.

We're gonna go focus it for
the things that we need moving forward,
is something that this next Secretaryof Defense is gonna have to do.
We've got huge programs that in myjudgment need really strong analysis.
And I don't think they're supportablegiven where we are today, but
smarter people than me on militarystrategy should evaluate that.
And I hope that whoever's in chargewill have the political temerity and

(11:39):
the support of president Trump to say,nope, we're gonna cancel it.
And watch whomever it is,Boeing, Lockheed, GD,
all the downstream supplier base,watch them scream because they will,
and make sure that we get that right.
Not only should we not be woke,we shouldn't be wedded to an industrial
complex that's not serving the trueneeds of the next generation war.

>> John Cochrane (12:03):
Let me ask the economist question then [LAUGH],
since Niall asked the historian question,I'm fascinated by this discussion [COUGH].
I'm an economist, I have,as they said once of a Chicago politician,
never run anything but my mouth.
So, how one runs a large organizationlike this is something I'm fascinated by.
And most of our listeners have notrun anything particularly big either,

(12:26):
particularly withthe challenges of Washington.
So you go in, you're the new guy,not just defense, but
in many of these other agencies, you'rethe disruptor, you wanna change things.
What are you facing?
You're facing an entrenched bureaucracy,
maybe partisan of the other side, who'sgonna try to fight you at every step.
How do you get around that?
You're facing whole of governmentinitiatives, like you mentioned,

(12:47):
the military being toldto fix the climate.
You're facing what you just mentioned,an entrenched in the military's case,
industrial complex,the one that built things.
How in the world do yoube effective with that?
Then in Washington you're facingthe dispersion of 15 other agencies,
at defense, you gotta worry about state,NSC intelligence agencies,

(13:10):
15 others who have differentideas about what to do.
And you're either working as a team oryou're fighting each other for
the president's attention.
Wow, what a job.
And then finally, since you just broughtit up, would you be willing to name
a couple of those programs thatyou think you need scuttling?
Cuz that's gonna be the big leadership.
How does the person in charge ofa big organization not just put out

(13:35):
fires every day and then achieve thatstrategic motion he needs to do?

John, you ask an important question, and one that if you look back at
the four years of Mike Pompeo,you could argue he failed at epically.
And so I say this with enormous humility,because the challenge is really,
really tough, it's big,and you need time, and
time is something thatis not on your side.
When you talk to corporateCEOs about culture change,

(14:04):
they'll all talk about five, eight years.
And I had a year and a half at the CIA.
I had two anda half years at the State Department.
We were in our infancy andactually getting these things underway.
So I would say three thingsin response to this.
First, you have to prioritize.
When I came to the State Department,my colleague and I, Brian Bolto,

(14:25):
we had eight things we wanted to do.
And about week nine, he came in andsaid he was Under Secretary for
management was his title, coo.
Essentially hey which came in and said,
hey, which three ofthose do you wanna try?
With the reality hit us smack in the face,and we did.
We sort of cooled it down and prioritizedand tried to focus on those and

(14:48):
go deep rather than leave somethingthat was cursory, ephemeral, and broad.
So I would argue, pick a handful of thingswhere you think you can actually make step
change, difference andspend a lot of your political capital.
And that means really your time andenergy and attention on those things.
Second, these institutionalbarriers are real.
They are more difficult in the governmentthan they are in the private sector.

(15:11):
For example, the State Departmenthad 100% of its employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements,in addition to the civil service rules.
So we had a union mindset buried inside,you know,
the GS system,inside the United States government.
So the personnel issues are a bear.
Hard to promote, hard to reward,hard to incentivize,

(15:33):
hard to get people to take risk.
All those things are true.
And it doesn't mean youshouldn't go drive at them.
You still have to go try and instillthat I spoke about almost every day as
the secretary of State orrestoring swagger.
And you could, I was mocked,The New York Times mocked me.
But I wanted people to understand,like, we're, like, the mos.
We're, like,the baddest dudes in town in America.

(15:54):
And our culture should reflect that.
And I hope that I could then usethat to drive the organizational.
Essentially the ethosinside the organization.
We can argue about howmuch progress I made.
The last thing is, you're right,you're not on an island.
You're, by the way, you're notthe President of the United States,
you're a cabinet official andyou have many others,

(16:17):
including national security advisors whohave a vision for themselves as well.

And not me Mike, unless you are talking about somebody else, man.

Not only that, they are often in the West Wing, right?
The National Security Council,they're a repository of enormous wisdom.
Most of the people who work those placesare on loan from someplace else, right?
They're on loan from the CIA,they're on loan from State Department or
Department of Defense.
So they come with a bias that'sbuilt into that as well.

(16:48):
You should welcome that wisdom andyou should have the meanest, nastiest,
hardest conversationsyou can possibly have.
Because it's only in that way can you sortout how to get to good and deliver that
good, that best set of recommendationsto the President of the United States.
One of the things that happens, certainlyhappens at the deputies level and
I think HR would agree even beneath that,assistant secretaries and the like,

(17:12):
is they try to stovepipecome in their own.
They think they can hide,they can win this Washington turf war,
and I tried to remind my teamslike these are the friendlies.
And I know it doesn't feel like thatsome days, but these are the friendlies
like coerce, co-opt, negotiate,work with, don't try and crush them.

(17:34):
And I'm sure some of my team didn't adhereto that and we didn't accomplish it.
But in the end I always believed youcould get best outcomes by working
alongside those partners.
We were all in the Trump administrationbecause we shared a common vision.
The execution of that visionwasn't always shared perfectly.
But to try to drive to thosebest outcomes was an imperative.

(17:54):
And so I give those three thoughts for howto manage what is an incredibly unwieldy,
difficult challenge.
And despite all of that, 250 yearsof American success, how about that?

So meanwhile there is still a Biden presidency, and
he first of all surprised us this weekwith the decision to allow Ukraine to
deploy American made long range missiles,so called atacms.
It stands forArmy Tactical Missile Systems,
they can fire about 200miles to Russian territory.
And he is still busy in the Middle East.
And I'm gonna read to you a quotefrom a State Department spokesman.
Quote, we will continue to pursuean end to the war in Gaza,

(18:25):
an end to the war in Lebanon,the surge of humanitarian assistance, and
that is our duty to pursue those policiesright up until noon on January 20th.
Secretary Pompeo,
how is the last two months of the Bidenadministration going to play out?

It's remarkable, we're, we're coming on a half hour into this
podcast, and that's the firstmention of President Biden.
[LAUGH] By the way,that's not true of just this conversation.
It's true of every conversation in Europe,every conversation in the Middle east,
every conversation in Asia,no one's talking about President Biden.
The Trump administration is in effect,as a practical matter.

(19:01):
I got it, the levers of power still sit,
the nuclear keys still sitin President Biden's hands.
But as a practical matter,this thing's over, so what does that mean?
That means when Vladimir Putin launchesthe first intercontinental ballistic
missile ever fired against a sovereignnation in the history of civilization.

That was not an attempt to influence President Biden and
Secretary Blinken,
but rather to send a message toPresident Trump and his incoming team.
And we should just be mindful thatPresident Trump talks about ending
this war in 24 hours in Europe.
Well, we're already on [LAUGH] andso the clock is running.

(19:40):
That is these negotiations,these conversations,
these strategies are alreadypretty well developed.
Everyone's talking to everyone except,
folks that are in the Bidenadministration today.
And so when I see statements fromthe Biden administration about
the Middle East, I think,yeah, well, fantastic.
Nice press release.

(20:00):
But in the end, the drivers,the incentives,
the risks that nations are prepared totake to resolve that conflict are all
going to be sitting on top of the nextadministration and not this one.
I don't know,HR if you agree with that, and, Niall,
you may have experience where historyhas done this in transitions before, but
it's a risky moment when the guywith the power has none.

Yeah, hey, Mike, I do agree with that, and so I do, and
we've talked about this onthe show a couple of times,
that we are in a period of considerabledanger during this transition.
I think it would have been a lot worse,Mike,
if the election had been close, right?
If it wasn't a decisive Trump victory and
some Americans were doubtingthe legitimacy of the outcome.

(20:41):
So I think that's in our favor in termsof maybe not having another major
crisis between now and January 20th.
But I do worry about the sort of,the lack of leadership at this point,,
with a President who's been incognitive decline for some time.
And I think the perception ofweakness is what's provocative, Mike,

(21:02):
so I agree with you.

My concern is that we've been put in a situation,
where the Russians are incentivized,to pile on as much military
pressure as they possibly canbetween now and January 20th..
To exploit the obvious strainsthat Ukraine is under and

(21:25):
make the most of the veryvulnerable position
the Biden Harrisadministration put Ukraine in.
By prolonging the war by encouragingthem to undertake an unrealistic
counteroffensive last year, and leavingthem exposed by supplying weapons and
then imposing restraints on their use.

(21:46):
The Storm Shadows, I think, are the mostglaring example of this, when Britain and
France also supplied reallyquite powerful weapons.
They could have been used toprevent Russia's campaign against
Ukraine's electricalinfrastructure earlier this year.
But the Biden administration restrainedPresident Zelensky's government

(22:07):
from using those weapons, until just a fewdays ago, giving the Russians ample time,
of course, to get the mostvulnerable targets out of range.
So when I was in Kyiv in September,I was struck by the bitterness of
the not only President Zelensky's team,but of the Ukrainian soldiers I spoke to.

(22:28):
But it's a very periloussituation Ukraine is in right now.
January 20th seems a very long way away,especially if you're
a soldier at the front line,you're outmanned, you're outgunned.
How do you think about this injust the narrowly military sense?
Do you think Ukraine can hold upbetween now and Trump's inauguration?

I'm very concerned about it, to your point, Niall, look,
some in my party had a different view.
My view is that the right moment to haveallowed this kind of response was at leave
March of 22nd, I might even argue Octoberof 21, when we knew this was gonna happen.
And for years, we told the Russiansconstantly what we wouldn't do.

(23:16):
We spent all our time talkingabout the fear of escalation and
the restraints we wereputting on their adversaries.
If you're the Russian generals,that's a dream for you,
because you now know the limitsof your counterparty's response.
So it sets in place for you a clearway to think about your strategy and
this pressure over the next,what, almost exactly 60 days now.

Hey, Mike, I'm reminded of John Sullivan,
who we both know and love andrespect, who was your deputy and
then fantastic job as ambassador to Russiaunder very difficult circumstances.
He was asked the question, hey,
what advice would you givethe Biden administration.
You know what he said?
He said I would tell him to shut up.

(23:59):
Stop talking about whatyou're not gonna do.

Exactly, and, Niall, this brings me to another point.
Another Hoover guy, Victor Davis Hansen,wrote a piece yesterday or
maybe day before talking aboutthe challenges President Trump will face.
I think it is almost certain that you talkabout the pressure Putin will apply in
these next 60 days.
I think you'll see thatcontinue at the front end.
I think President Trump will be tested.

(24:22):
I think there's this idea that isfloating that President Trump won't
be tough on Russia.
And so I think it's going to requirea real response from this administration
early on.
Not sending the 82nd Airborne, not sendinga Marine Division, but a real response.
And this may also betrue in the Middle east,
where the bad guys will try and task.

(24:46):
Was Vice President Harris right?
Is he an isolationist?
Is that element of the Republican Partygoing to dominate President Trump's
thinking?
And so I think you'll see testingthat takes place, pressure for
the next 60 days and then testing early onagainst America during the beginning of
the Trump administration.
And I think it's a perfect opportunity forPresident Trump to establish what I think

(25:09):
we did pretty good work on HR was makingclear that that wasn't the model,
that we were Jacksonian in thinking andrealist in execution about how it is we
secure the things that matter an awfullot America's interests around the world.
I hope they'll get thatright in the first months
of the Trump administration as well.

And hey, Mike, I'd like to ask you just,
can I ask you just quickly?
There has been a tendency, Mike,among those who are advocating for
retrenchment, disengagement from thesecomplex challenges abroad, that,
hey, Ukraine's not a big deal,and why support Ukraine?
Could you talk a little bit about how yousee the connections between the fight in

(25:47):
Ukraine, the cascading crisis thatwe've seen across the Middle East, and
the looming crises, in the Indo-Pacific,associated with China becoming more and
more aggressive in some cases againsttreaty allies of the United States.

Yeah, that's an important question.
And, John,this begins to move into your world.
This has huge economic implications.
Often those of us who serve getasked about a particular theater.
We get asked about South America orChina or the Middle east or Asia or,
excuse me, or Europe.
These are all closely tied.
You can see, you can see symptoms of that,evidence of that.

(26:23):
You can see Iraniandrones flying in Ukraine.
You can see the Chinese buyingRussian crude oil at a deep discount.
You can draw actual physical connections.
But the ideological andmission commitments are even tighter.
That is, they have a shared objectiveof crushing our Western way of life.
And so to think for a moment thatyou can allow Vladimir Putin to be

(26:46):
victorious in Europe and believe thatyou're going to push back against
General Secretary Xi in Asia is,in my judgment, just hopelessly naive.
And as a practitioner,it's practically impossible because your
friends won't trust you andyour adversaries will think, I know how

(27:07):
to create fissures in the American system,and I know how to compartmentalize risk.
And they will begin to move inthe places that are more difficult for
America to respond.
And so you can't,you can't allow the result of this.
However, this ends in Europe.
The result of this cannotlook like a Putin victory.
And when I say that that's, that's forAmerica, it can't be a Putin victory for

(27:31):
the United States of America,because the second and
third order implications in think,think about this.
In South America, where the Chineseare building ports, in Mexico, where
the Chinese, like this is, this is closestuff with Russian ships off of Cuba.
Wait, this is,this is not some far away concept.
And they are all working together,the Venezuelans, the Iranians,

(27:52):
the North Koreans,the Chinese, the Russians.
I'm sure I missed someone inthat quick recounting, but
it's half a dozen folks working togetherto deliver really bad outcomes for
our kids and grandkids, and a loss inEurope will only accelerate that risk.

Looking back on the first Trump administration,
I would say that President Trumpwas rather good at deterrence and
certainly a lot better thanPresident Biden has proved to be.
You said something inLondon a few weeks ago that
might bear repeatingabout why our adversaries

(28:32):
find Donald Trump moreformidable than Joe Biden.
And I'll jog your memory byreferring to madman theory.

[LAUGH] Niall.
It's a variation of that.
And what I spoke to andwhat I deeply believe is you
need to be clear with your objectives.
But it is good to leave some room fordoubt in your adversary's mind.
To HR's point earlier, shut up.
Don't know if there's manythings you're not going to do.

(29:07):
Don't tell anybody, andyou don't certainly have to repeat them.
President Trump came intooffice as a big unknown,
certainly when it came to these matters.
He was a New York real estate guy.
President Biden came inwith every world leader,
having spent time with him at Munichsecurity conferences for 40 years, right?
They all knew him.
They knew how to play him, they knew whathis risk tolerance was they knew how he

(29:30):
would think about particular problem sets.
I had the advantage as the Secretary ofState for Donald Trump of walking into
rooms and world leaders saying,tell me about this guy.
And then I could tell them exactlywhat I wanted to tell them.
Always truthful, but I could pick andchoose about particular moments.
And he had delivered a modelwhich had sufficient variability.

(29:53):
An economist would call it volatility,John, right?

He had sufficient volatility or
unpredictability thatneither our adversaries nor
markets could predict precisely howhe would respond at any given time.
And so that created more space for
us to engage in conversations thatwere serious and meaningful and
I think caused a lot of secondguessing and delivered deterrence.

(30:19):
And then the last thing I'll say,Niall, is that we did take some high
level of risk making decisions thatwere thought to be politically and
geostrategically dangerous.
Maybe the first one was just move,just the simple statement on a piece of
paper and then the physics ofmoving an embassy in Israel, right?

(30:40):
Six or seven presidents beforesaid they would, World War three,
HRU in the meetings, right?

World War three, >> Mike Pompeo
over the Middle East.
They didn't.
When we took the strike on Soleimani,same thing, right?
Two previous administrations thatthought about taking out the senior
military political leader in Iran,they had decided risk was too high.
We were trying to restore deterrencethat we were losing, frankly.

(31:07):
Our embassy,
the American Embassy in Baghdad wasunder attack almost every night.
And we took the strike and, you know,
we reestablished Americanswillingness to take risk.
It's never permanent, it's never full,but it was pretty good.
And then the last thing I'll saygets into the economic model.
We've been talking about this inthe kinetic and military sense,

(31:28):
many tools of power.
President Trump was whollyprepared to use America's economic
power to achieve what he believedwere America's interests.
And I think oftentimes our friendsthought twice about that as well,
because not only would they potentiallyface a carrier parked off their coast,
but they would face economic sanctionsthat would actually be enforced,

(31:52):
potentially tariffs that would imposereal harm on their own economy.
Sometimes they cared about that, butcreate political risk For them, for sure.
And so that full scope of American powerwas brought to bear in a way that I
think did deliver that levelof risk perception among
our adversaries that gave us a bettershot at deterring the bad guys.

Let me add just a couple on all these, which has been fascinating.
First, you said Putin victory.
I think the danger is Putin doesn'teven have to have a victory.
If it's you grab what you can andthen we negotiate.
That message sent to Xi Jinping isjust as bad as you have to win.
He doesn't have to invade Kiev, he justhas to grab what he got this time we stop,

(32:35):
negotiate, ceasefire,get ready and do it again.
And that's just as bad for our deterrence.
This is different, and I wonder if youthink this thought might occur to Trump,
cuz Trump does change his mind.
And I think that's exactlythat volatility is.
If you study your game theory,the madman in the corner is always
excellent thing to have whenyou wanna negotiate things.

(32:59):
But we could win.
It's always struck me that in Ukraine,
we have never seena preponderance of ability.
In 1939, we didn't have the capabilitiesagainst Hitler that we have now.
We could win this, if NATO went in,we win this in a week.
And it's not like Iraq.
We would not be going into Ukraine andgoing into an insurgency who hates us.

(33:23):
This time they really would greetus with flowers and thank you.
And that possibility, I think is.
Should be at least something thata saber that Trump might rattle.
And I've also noticed forthe last year and
a half it's been,nuclear must not escalate.

(33:44):
But both the Russian change in theirnuclear doctrine and sending an ICBM and
everyone, even the Europeans.
Yeah,don't worry about that.
So in fact, that last piece ofRussian deterrence seems to be gone.
And a last thought the next,when we turn to Asia and
the economic battle, I think thatis something important to remember.

(34:08):
When we think about Taiwan, say an embargoagainst Taiwan or something sort.
We talk often about the shooting war andwhether we can win or not.
But the economic consequences ofthat are going to be tremendous.
World trade will fall off a cliff orworld financial crisis will erupt.
Really, that is what'sgonna happen in that war.

(34:30):
I worry about jumping too quickly.
HR and I have had all sorts of fun onthis question of geo economic strategy.
Using tariffs, for example,
to throw your weight around sometimes isone of those things like in the cartoons.
This is going to hurt memore than it hurts you.
Remember how we put in a 25%tariff on light trucks to

(34:51):
teach the Germans a lessonabout not buying our chickens?
That was 1964.
So be careful what you wish for in usingtariffs to try to influence people.

John, you have two thoughts that I think are relevant.
One, tariffs always have tocontemplate the game theory.
So lots of economists that I've read havedifferent views on who bears the cost of
tariffs.
I am not smart enough to know.
I think the incidence is hard topredict and shared most likely.
But what you have to account foris what the other guy's gonna do and

(35:25):
while they respond, what does that mean?
Which brings me, and so I think broadbased tariffs without an objective,
often to your point, miss their mark anddon't achieve the stated objective.
Targeted, harshly enforced, vigorouslyenforced make most sense with the idea of
getting something in exchange for

(35:46):
releasing those tariffs demandingreciprocity as the central thesis there.
I do want to talk about Taiwan when I'veheard some of my Republican colleagues
say, by the way, I think I'm stillthe only person who has said that
the United States ought to recognizeTaiwan as an independent, free nation.
We should just make that US policy.
Just create the claritythat comes with that.

(36:08):
Stop this silliness that's leftover from the early 1970s.
We still,we don't have haircuts from the 70s.
We should adopt a security policy thatworks for America, not wedded to the 70s.
But importantly, your point aboutthe economics in Asia are very real.
The two times I saw exercises in Asiawhere the Chinese had moved aggressively,

(36:30):
circling some island, not always the mainisland of Taiwan, but something.
And there was conflict.
Not a single car moves off an automobileline in Detroit in about three months.
[LAUGH] Think about what that means.
It means the bars in Detroitwill be wide open, right,
because nobody will be going to work.

(36:50):
It's just that the deep ramificationsof the economy seizing up in Asia,
I think are deeply underappreciated.
And so we all ought to be really smartabout how we think about responding
as the Chinese continue tobuild up their aggression and
we can't let them controlthis ladder of escalation.
We have to get on top of that.

(37:12):
And that is that has a cybercomponent as a space component.
It has a technology and energycomponent and a diplomatic component,
but most importantly hasan economic piece to it.
And we have to be out in front on this, or
you can get a spiral that ends up reallybad for ordinary Americans every day.

We usually agree about everything.
But can I disagree with you about Taiwan?
It strikes me, and
I based this partly on what wassaid when I was in Beijing in May,
that Xi Jinping might welcome our crossingthe red line of Taiwanese independence,
because it would give them a chanceto spring the blockade at a time when

(37:55):
I don't think we're capable ofa very effective military response.
Isn't there a danger that maybebetween now and January 20,
the Taiwan crisis happens andwe're not really ready?
This is a question that I worry a lotabout because it would be far more
consequential forthe global economy and indeed for

(38:17):
US Security than anything inEastern Europe or the Middle East.
How strong do you think our deterrence is?
It seems to me that we'requite a long way away from
effective deterrence againsta blockade strategy.

That may well be true.
I think this ambiguity aboutthe American response in this case,
net net creates increased risk.
That's why I've argued for clarity.
You have to sit across from and say,you're full of it, dude, this isn't yours.

(38:53):
It didn't used to be yours.
You can't gild the lily here andmake him feel good.
This is not about Xi Jinping'sown self perception of worth.
He's made clear, he wants that.
You need to make clear it's not yours.
And then after that,that doesn't mean everything.
And when we say we'll defend them,it doesn't mean we're gonna,

(39:14):
conscript Americans to go,land in Xian, right?
It says, no,we're serious about drawing these lines.
Where in the end, this is the argument inEurope, this is the one John just made.
Do we care about sovereignty?
Does it really matter?
Do borders matter?
Is it okay for us to actually close oursouthern border in the United States?

(39:34):
Is it okay for the Ukrainians say, no,
that's actually not the boundarythat the international system drew.
I actually think it is.
I think these things matter.
And soyou should just have clarity about them.
It doesn't mean there aren't disputes.
It doesn't mean there aren't arguments.
It doesn't mean some side doesn'thave a different position.
But the United States ought tobe pretty damn clear about this.
I'll give you another examplefrom just the last couple days.

(39:56):
The ICC now says thatPrime Minister Netanyahu.
Can't travel in many places in the world.
And apparently the Prime Minister ofCanada says he's not welcome in Toronto.
This is absurd on its face to havesome set of knuckleheads sitting
in the Hague driving the decreasein national sovereignty.
And the United States has thisresponsibility, just throw,

(40:20):
I use a global term to throw the flag orto use a European term,
to put the red card out, right?
These are from football.
These are lines that the United Statesjust can't sit back and
go, gosh darn it, and
issue a press release from Foggy Bottom onthat very day about transgender awareness.
That's actually what happened.

(40:44):
Our Middle Eastern friends see that,our Gulf State Air friends see that exact
response Netanyahu held inthe dock by the ICC and
the State Department pressrelease on transgenderism.
And they go to their huddle, andthey're like, what the hell?
This is pretty straightforward for
President Trump to getthese simple ideas back.

(41:05):
And that's the blessingof this last election.

I wanna follow up on both of the deterring China,
it's not just about military.
We have to remember you said eloquentlywhat happens in Detroit after
the blockade, but we need to emphasizeto the Chinese what happens in Beijing.
China is a very export-dependent economy.
So the minute they move against Taiwan,they don't export anything.
You wanna export solar panels and electriccars to Europe, that's not happening.

(41:31):
And we need to make sure we still haveallies so that everybody agrees on this.
That's not happening.
You wanna send stuff on boatsto Venezuela or whatever.
You don't get to send stuff on boats toVenezuela the minute you invade Taiwan.
I mean, that is, I think,even more credible and
really painful to the Chinese.
Now, you brought up the ICC,

(41:52):
which is a topic that I think it'sa good time to pivot to that one.
That really struck me asa moment of clarity that we keep
allowing these international institutions.
It's not so much about sovereignty.
We've known about the rot at the UN.
UNRWA has been funding Palestinianterrorism for 50 years, for 70 years.

(42:14):
The ICC is just an example ofthe international institutions
that are directly counter to UNRWA andIsrael's interests.
I remember in 1975, thinking to myself,I first learned that
Palestinian schools run by the UN werejust training grounds for terrorism.
Occurred to me, why don't they justtake over the schools and wait 25 years.

(42:35):
Well, it's 50 years later, and the schoolsare still training grounds for terrorism.
And we support this.
It's European money.
It's not just Saudi Arabia.
And these are not homegrownresistance fighters.
These are supported internationally by,yes, the Arab states, but
also a whole lot by the UN,by us, and by Europe.
How long do we just let this quietrot go on subverting our own and

(42:58):
Israel's interests?
Sorry, you brought up the ICC, andyou got the grumpy economist going.

No, I couldn't be more with you.
Remember, I sanctioneda woman named Fatou Ben Suda.
The State Department, under my leadership,sanctioned her, right?
She's totally corrupt.
So target.

And we cut off funding for UNRWA in 2017.

No, that's right. We had the right end of the stick.
We should have done more, too.
And I must say, my learning curvewhen I was at the CIA about these
international institutionsgrew dramatically.
I mean, if you look at the things I saidwhen I was in Congress in 2013, 14, 15,
are very different thanwhat I think today.

(43:43):
These are broken, they are unreformable.
We need to know whatthe other side looks like.
We need to come up with ideas aboutwhat it looks like when these things
are torn under.
And if we do that, we can rebuildsomething that actually matters,
not what we have today.

If Trump had won four years ago would any of this stuff have
happened?
I mean, I remember him saying,I think it was in 2022,
after the Russians had invaded Ukraine.
If I had been president, none of thiswould have happened because I said to
Putin, if you do this to Ukraine, watchout for those golden domes in Moscow.

(44:19):
And I said the same to Xi Jinping.
Now, I have no way of substantiating ifTrump ever said anything of the sort,
but I kind of agree with the idea thatthe world would have been a less dangerous
place if the second Trump term had beenconsecutive rather than non-consecutive.
What's your view of that?

Look, I think that piece is true.
It'd be less dangerous today.
I try not to do counterfactuals, so
I can't tell you exactly what wouldhave happened, but I do know the facts.
These things didn't happen on his watch,right?
We didn't bail on Afghanistan.
No one doubts that Donald Trumpwanted out of Afghanistan.

(44:59):
He tweeted it like 57 times.
But we didn't bail on Bagram.
We didn't bail on the whole thing.
And people were like Mike, but if it hadbeen four more years, he would have.
Again, I can't speak to that.
I can only say that there wasa rational plan to try to
move that forward that wasthoughtfully conducted.
HR was deep in the center of this as histime as National Security Advisor, and

(45:22):
we were trying to draw resourcesback to a place that made sense.
You could say the same thing forabout October 7th, the same thing for
February of 22 in Europe.
It would have been different.
And we can prove that those things didn'thappen on President Trump's watch.
And I'm, I, I'm confident thatthe world would have been safer.
And I hope,as President Trump retakes office,

(45:45):
the world will become less volatile andsafer again with a lot of the same
theories of deterrence that we triedto put in place for those four years.

Hey, Mike, I'd like to ask you a question here, right?
I mean, just about what you thinkabout the next Trump administration.
You know, President Trump isconsistent on a lot of things, right?
I mean, border security, reciprocity andtrade, burden sharing with allies,
deregulation and unleashing the Americaneconomy and America's energy potential.
But as we've kind of alluded to, he doeshave a certain dissonance where he holds

(46:18):
two opposing ideas in hishead at the same time.
Kind of this desire for retrenchmentis manifested in Afghanistan, but also,
he understands peace through strength, andwhat I'd like to, what I'd like to ask
you is, like, how do you think he's goingto reconcile on China in particular?
Because now, of course, Elon Musk isinfluential with President Trump.

(46:39):
And, hey, you live this, right, whereyou had differences of opinion between
the Secretary of the treasury and, yes,U.S. trade Representative, and always.
How do you see the trajectorywith China given that
President Trump loves a big deal, right?
And the Chinese tried to string him outwith the prospect of the phase two trade

(47:01):
deal last time.
So, we'd love to hear your thoughts onwhat do you think the trajectory is in
connection with this mostimportant competition with
the Chinese Communist Party?

So I think on, on this, it'll be a mixed bag.
I think you'll see on the economic side,real pressure, which I think makes sense.
I hope it's targeted appropriately.
I hope they get that piece right.
To John's point earlier, the Chineseeconomy is in a very difficult position.
And it is our most importantstrategic advantage to make sure that

(47:33):
the Western model continues to thrive.
So I hope they'll use that.
I think President Trump understands that,and we'll get that right.
And I think the team that he's gonna buildon the economic side will appreciate
that as well.
Look, treasury always is deeply connectedto Wall Street, massive investments there.
So there's always this resistanceabout the banking system,
the international financial system.
That'll be real.
It'll be in President Trump's head, too.

(47:54):
You know this.
He loves to watch the stockmarket every day, right?

He pays attention to those things.
And so he'll be.
Appropriately cautious, I think there.
And then the good news is too,in my judgment,
I think he understands that you needa modernized, powerful military.
I think he'll allow us to go back and
refresh our nuclear program inimportant ways as well that you and
I were arguing for when we were sittingthere and we didn't get far enough.

(48:20):
So I think there are deep strategicelements that will convince
the Chinese Communist Party that this isa different game and will put us back on
the right trajectory as a relative matterwith respect to the threats from the CCP.

I'd like to get your thoughts on Musk,
because here we have an innovatorcoming into government.
Lemme read you something thathe posted on X the other day.
He said this about the Departmentof Government Efficiency, quote,
we need super high IQ small governmentrevolutionaries willing to work 80
plus hours per week onunglamorous cost-cutting.
Indeed, this will be tedious work, makelots of enemies and compensation is zero.
And he added, what a great deal.

(48:55):
Well, will he get a great deal done.

He said $2 trillion a year of spending reduced,
I would take the under andpray for the over.
It's a bear, having served in Congress,I know when it comes to
spending reductions,I almost use a bad word, it's really hard.
But it will be creative,it's a set of fresh eyes.

(49:18):
It's not the first time thatoutsiders that come in to try and
sort of refocus and reallocate,in the end, it'll turn to President Trump.
Are you prepared to gobreak some things and
have some of your friendsreally pissed off?
[LAUGH] That's what it comes down to.
Are you prepared to say, no, I'm reallygonna go rethink how we deliver healthcare
to the United States of America, right?

(49:39):
What are healthcare costsincreasing at every year?
Inflation plus 4, inflation plus 5.
It's not as bad as NHS, Niall,but it's bad and we can do that.
But if you're just gonna move around theedges and say, gosh, we're gonna cut 10%
from the Department of Education budget,you're looking at interest well in excess

(50:01):
of interest expense well in excess ofmilitary spending for decades to come.

And Niall, what is your advice to Musk,
given that you have tried to builda university from the ground up?

Well, of course, it's very important
that as a consequence of the election,
higher education in the United Statesfeels a chill wind,
a wind blowing against the excesses of socalled progressivism.

(50:31):
Those excesses have deeply damaged thequality of the established universities
and that's what led us to foundthe University of Austin.
That was what motivated me,
a perception that nothing could be doneto remedy the state of the Ivy League.
And I hope that the part of the greatchange that has just happened in
the United States, let's not forgethow profound a shift this has been

(50:55):
that every demographic except whitewomen with college degrees swung to
Donald Trump relative to four years ago.
That is a massive political shift and
I hope it will affectthe higher education sector.
But it's not ultimately up to the federalgovernment how universities are run and

(51:15):
nor should it be.
One of the obvious things that Elon Muskand Vivek Ramaswamy can do is start
getting rid of federalagencies that we don't need.
And Department of Educationhas to be high up on the list.
Peter Thiel once said that rulenumber one is never bet against Elon,
and I've learned over the yearshow good that rule is.

(51:37):
If there's one person who really couldroll back the vast sprawling deep state,
it's Elon.
So yeah [CROSSTALK].

He better get a bigger sink this time,
he's gonna need a bigger sink.

By the way, Niall, I agree with that,
he is perfectly situated to do this.
He has the temperament,the capacity, the President's ear.
He is absolutely perfectlysituated to do this.
And I hope what actually happens is hegets political support from a broad base
to execute against this thatthe American people can see and feel.
If he does, maybe you get to the over ormaybe you get close to it.

(52:12):
And what a sea change that would be forthe United States for
the decades that follow.

And just one other point on this too, Mike, I think he's gonna need
reform minded smart people withineach of these departments and
agencies who can help him apply the ax orthe scalpel, whatever's appropriate.

John.

I'm enormously hopeful in part because as
an economist sort of myview is that the main
thing holding the US economy back hasbeen the extreme amount of regulation.
Not just the legal regulation,the executive orders,
the dear colleague letters,the endless amounts of time you spend.
It takes 10 years to get the permits toconnect a new solar panel to the grid.

(52:55):
So even the lefties are figuringout that this is a problem.
But this will be difficult, we don'twant to just do all the bad things
the government does efficiently [LAUGH].
You need to change whatthe government does,
even if it's a little less efficiently,you want it to be permanent.
And that's the big problem, we're gettinginto this thing where the Democrat

(53:16):
issues a bunch of executive orders,the Republican comes in, cancels those and
puts another bunch of executive orders,that isn't helpful.
So eliminating whole departments,yes, you gotta kill it [LAUGH],
that's exactly right.
It's like cockroaches,
just because you got three of themleft doesn't mean that you're done.
But eliminating whole departments,you need Congress.
And I would encourage marginalrevolution today at Great Economics had

(53:39):
a quote from Cass Sunstein,who tried to run a deregulation effort.
He said, look,you can't just go in and wax stuff,
you gotta understand how this works.
You have to know the difference betweenIFRS, TFRs, NPRMs, FRS, and RTIs.
I could name two of those butthere is an Administrative Procedures Act.
There's a whole bunch of peopleare gonna try to stop you legally.

(54:00):
So, yes, go in where possible,eliminate, but it's gonna need Congress,
it's gonna need understandinghow the system works.
I think the energy providedby Musk will be wonderful.
The amount of resistance he'sgonna face is gonna be large.
Let's hope for the best.
But it does require understandinghow the system works.

Secretary Pompeo, we appreciate your time.
Let's continue the conversation.
Come back soon.

Thank you, sir.
HR Great to see you, Dale, great.
Thank you, John.

Thank you, it's been great.

Take care, Mike.

Well, with that, we're gonna wrap up this episode of GoodFellows.
I do have a question forthe three of you, though, gentlemen.
The fourth Thursday inNovember approaches,
that is the Thanksgivingholiday here in America.
Neil is smirking because I think Nialldoesn't have to cook a turkey this year,
or maybe you're gonnacelebrate as an expat Niall.
Question for our two US GoodFellows,hw are you gonna spend your Thursday?

(54:50):
Healthy or gluttony?

Well,
I'm actually going to give thanksin a rather distinctive way.
Thanksgiving is not celebratedin the United Kingdom,
as I'm sure all GoodFellows fans know.
But I'm gonna give thanksby flying up to Glasgow and
giving a lecture at my old school,
the Glasgow Academy onScottish History in Global Context.

(55:15):
So that will be my thankyou to the school and
to Scotland, the country that I come from.
It's a rather unusualkind of Thanksgiving, but
it will be a very profound one for me.

HR what is Thanksgiving gonna be in your household?

Hey, well, we're gonna be with grandkids.
So there's gonna be a lot of playingin the backyard as well as eating.
So a combination of gluttony,I guess, and,
and exercise andfun with six grandkids all five and below.

Okay, and John Cochrane, you get the last word.

Well,
we only have one adorable grandchildproduced by that one there [LAUGH].
We are gonna go visit our daughter andher husband and grandchild.
Our family is heavier onthe exercise than on the overeating.
And we have many, many familytraditions involving Thanksgiving.

(56:14):
We're gonna remember my mother andher Thanksgiving dinners that we always
used to have and many traditions andpass those on to Artemisia [LAUGH].

Okay, gentlemen, with that,
we're gonna wrap up this conversation.
Great job, I enjoyed it very much.
Our next GoodFellows willbe in early December and
this is your episode coming up.
We are going to answer your questions.
So do us a favor, if you havea question for Niall or John or HR or
some combination of that,
send them to the following address,Hoover.org/AskGoodFellows.

(56:46):
Lemme repeat that again,Hoover.org/AskGoodFellows and
we'll do our best to get it on the air.
You can ask them anything you want to,I think I would ask Dr.
Cochrane, for example,what is that art on the wall behind Tim?
But definitely send them in, we'll dothat and have a great Thanksgiving.
On behalf of the GoodFellows, NiallFerguson, John Cochrane, HR McMaster,
our guest today,former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,

(57:08):
we hope you enjoyed the conversation.
We look forward to seeing you again.
Till next time, take care.
[MUSIC]

>> Presenter (57:17):
If you enjoyed this show and are interested in watching more content
featuring HR McMaster, watch Battlegroundsalso available at hoover.org.

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