February 28, 2025 • 57 mins
A one-week window into the Trump administration’s worldview—the president blaming Ukraine for Russia’s invasion; his vice president taking to social media to accuse a Hoover scholar of “historical illiteracy”; the US then refusing to join other UN members in condemning Russian aggression—raises the question: Is the Trump brand of confusion and controversy mere happenstance or a calculated means to an end?
American Enterprise Institute scholar, author, and columnist Matthew Continetti joins Hoover senior fellows John Cochrane, H.R. McMaster, and Niall Ferguson (the subject of the vice president’s lashing on X) to discuss Trump’s unorthodox style, the showcasing of executive orders, and his chances of success at home and overseas. Also discussed: the significance of Trump’s firing top military brass, a $5 million “gold card” for US residency, the Washington Post’s editorial shift to “personal liberties and free markets,” Scotland’s rugby disappointment at the hands (and legs) of England, plus the late Gene Hackman’s best performances.
Recorded on February 27, 2025.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
>> Speaker 1 (00:00):
President, do you still think that Mr. Zelensky is a dictator?
>> Donald Trump (00:05):
Did I say that?
I can't believe I said that.
Next question.
[MUSIC]
>> Bill Whalen (00:14):
It's Thursday, February 27th, 2025.
And welcome back to Goodfellows, a HooverInstitution broadcast examining social,
economic, political andgeopolitical concerns.
I'm Bill Whelan,I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow.
I'll be your moderator today, joinedby our full complement of Goodfellows,
as we like to call them.
That would include the historian Sir NiallFerguson, the Economist John Cochran, and
Former Presidential National SecurityAdvisor, Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster.
(00:38):
And joining us today from the swamp orsomewhere outside the swamp, I think,
I believe he resides in Northern Virginia,our friend Matthew Continetti.
Matt Continetti is the Directorof Domestic Studies at
the American Enterprise Institute.
He's a FOX News contributor.
If you're a podcast maniac like me,you listen to him every morning
on the Always EntertainingCommentary Magazine podcast.
Matt, thanks for joining us.
>> Matthew Continetti (00:57):
Thanks for having me, Bill.
And let me just say it's a realpleasure to be with the Goodfellows.
I've been a fan from the beginning.
I never miss an episode.
>> Bill Whalen (01:05):
Well, we will do our best to meet your expectations today, Matt.
Donald Trump is not a drinker.
He famously does not care for alcohol.
It's a very personal thingregarding his brother.
But if we were to concocta Trump cocktail, Matt,
I might call it the method andthe madness in this regard.
Anytime we talk about somethingthat Trump does, something he says,
something he suggests, we always kind offall back to this fundamental question
(01:28):
that does he know what he's doing?
Is he thinking about what is he doing?
Or is this just all kind of happenstance?
In other words, if he's playing cards,Matt, is he playing poker?
Is he playing 52 card pickup?
Now, I'd like to start this conversationtoday, Matt, by focusing on Trump and
foreign policy andthe events of the past nine days.
Let's go back to February 18th, Matt.
You have the president, United Statesat the White House blaming Ukraine's
(01:49):
president, Mr. Zelensky, forstarting the war in Russia and
then also trashing him fornot cutting a deal to end the war.
>> Donald Trump (01:55):
And I think I have the power to end this war.
And I think it's going very well.
But today I heard, well,we weren't invited.
Well, you've been there for three years.
You should have ended it three years.
You should have never started it.
You could have made a deal.
>> Bill Whalen (02:07):
The next day, our own Sir Niall Ferguson goes on social media and
he post on X that, well,the President's history is not correct,
but he does think the Presidentis noble in trying to find peace.
But he tries to remind the Presidentthere's such a thing as peace through
strength.
The next day, the Vice President,United States enters the fray.
He goes on exit.
He responds to Sir Niall by calling ourfriend, accusing our friend of, quote,
(02:29):
moralistic garbage and also sayingthat Niall is guilty of, quote,
historical illiteracy.
I think that's probably the first timethe international man of history has been
accused of being historically illiterate.
We then go to the next dayin Munich [CROSSTALK].
>> H.R. McMaster (02:41):
Matt, don't forget,
don't forget he calledhim a globalist too.
>> Bill Whalen (02:46):
We'll let Sir Niall respond to that and more.
Back to our timeline.
The following day in Munich, the VicePresident gives a speech in which he
accuses Europe of suppressing free speech.
>> JD Vance (02:55):
I believe that dismissing people, dismissing their concerns, or
worse yet, shutting down media,shutting down elections or
shutting people out of the politicalprocess protects nothing.
In fact, it is the most surefireway to destroy democracy.
>> Bill Whalen (03:13):
We get a couple days off to the weekend map, but
we pick it up on Monday wherewe go to the United nations and
there is a resolution condemningRussia for the war in Ukraine.
Voting against the resolution would beRussia, North Korea, Belarus, Hungary and
the United States of America.
So, Matt,you look at all of these events and
even more I didn't mention the presidentsof the heads of states of France and
England and tomorrow the President Ukrainecoming to the White House.
(03:37):
But Matt,you look at all of these events and
we back to the questionof the Trump cocktail.
If you're making this cocktail of methodand madness, what blend method and
what blend madness.
>> Matthew Continetti (03:46):
Well, I would begin by positing a few base
rules I use to follow Donald Trump.
The first is Trump is a zero sum thinker.
President Trump believesthat there is a winner and
a loser to every transaction andevery relationship.
(04:07):
And there are very fewpositive sum relationships.
The second base case I have withPresident Trump is since 1987,
since he put that ad inthe New York Times ahead of his visit to
New Hampshire when he was firsttoying with running for president.
(04:27):
President Trump has made it clear thathe views the post war international
order as a liability on the United States.
Our allies cheat us.
Free trade is erodingour mercantile power.
Our allies are too dependent on us.
And so these, this combination Ithink of zero sum thinking and
(04:50):
liberal world order is a cost,not a benefit,
shapes how he's going into Ukraine.
The third thing in mypersonal Trump cocktail is
Trump is a believer inpersonalist diplomacy.
Everything depends on how hegets along with the person on
(05:13):
the other side of the table.
Famously, we had very good US-Japanrelations during the first term because
of his relationship with Abe Shinzo,the Japanese prime minister.
On the other hand, we had verypoor US German relations during
the first term because of his hatred, Ithink it's fair to say, of Angela Merkel.
(05:37):
So when I see what's happened withUkraine over the past week or
so, I see all three things at work.
One is Trump has looked at Europe asnot doing enough for its defense.
We're the loser in that relationshipbecause we're providing defense for
Europe, which is free riding on us.
(05:57):
He looks and he sees this liberalworld order, open borders, free trade,
American internationalism assomething he wants to revise, and
now he's in a position to revise it.
And lastly, I don't think he's interactedvery well with Zelensky, where
Zelensky has not behaved as leaders whohave been studying Trump whispering for
(06:21):
the past four years try to behave,try to get into Trump's good graces,
try to kind of put ideas in his headthat are favorable to their power,
to their own states and their powers.
And that has led to the breakdown,I think,
that we saw in US-Ukrainianrelations last week.
Just final thought.
(06:41):
The other thing to keep in mind withTrump is he'll state an end goal,
an end state he wants, but he rarelydescribes the means of how to get there.
And because he rarely describesthe means of how to get there,
the path we take to any desired endstate can often be viewed as madness.
(07:02):
Like you say, Bill, it can often be crazy.
It can be two steps forward,one step back.
It can be some digression intoNiall Ferguson's globalist mentality.
But when Trump succeeds,he reaches that end state.
And I think in the case of Ukraine,the end state is an end to the war,
(07:23):
some type of ceasefire.
And the means of achievingthat end are very messy.
And they include thisUS-Ukrainian mineral agreement,
which is scheduled to besigned on February 28th.
>> Bill Whalen (07:35):
So, Niall.
>> Niall Ferguson (07:37):
Well, I tried to make the point, in response to some
of the things President Trumpsaid about Ukraine,
that in the beginning of a negotiation,it seemed unwise to
concede at least two of the thingsthat the Russian government wants.
(07:58):
One of them is To ensure thatUkraine does not join NATO.
Another of them is to ensurethat President Zelensky
is delegitimized andideally for Russia, replaced.
And so my comments were directed atthe President's remarks about Ukraine,
(08:20):
which seemed to me counterproductiveahead of the negotiation with Russia.
Now, I've been a prettysupportive commentator on
President Trump by the standardsof most academics and historians.
So I was a little surprisedwhen vice president Vance came
(08:42):
after me with those somewhatunflattering descriptions.
But I think we then had a gooddebate about the strategy.
I agree with much that Matthas said about Donald Trump.
But Donald Trump's not king,he's president of the United States.
And there are other people,including people that he's appointed,
(09:04):
who are trying to manage the foreignpolicy of the United States.
And they must all be somewhatstretched when they're approaching
a negotiation like the one Marco Rubiohad with his Russian counterpart,
that the president sayssomething that doesn't,
at least to my eyes, seem helpful.
(09:27):
So the discussion that we hadI thought was constructive and
ended on a positive note.
Vice President Vance said noconcessions were being made to Russia.
I said great and good luck because it'san enormously important negotiation,
the war needs to end.
The longer it goes on, the worse,ultimately for Ukraine,
(09:48):
which is of course substantiallyoutmanned and out gunned.
But the question is,how do you get a war like this to end?
Now, one thing that is interesting,and Mark Continetti
alluded to it there,is the end state that Trump wants.
(10:09):
I don't think that Trump is a warpresident, he's a trade war president.
That became obvious inthe first Trump term, and
I do think it's importantto understand him that way.
In fact, he's been verydovish since his re election,
not only with respect to Russia, butalso with respect to China and even Iran.
(10:31):
The odd thing is, andhere I'm queuing the one and only HR,
there are very many hawkish peoplein his administration already.
And it's odd that the presidentgoes in one direction,
which you could characterize as det.
With the authoritarian axis, while othermembers of the administration seem to be
(10:53):
going in a quite different direction.
As I see it, Matt, I'd be interestedin your thoughts on this too.
There are at least threedifferent tendencies within
this emergent national security team,one is the president.
But then there are more hawkish figuresin the NSC who are ready to take on
the axis of authoritarians everywhere,including Eastern Europe,
(11:16):
including the Middle East, and includingcrucially, in Taiwan, in the Far East.
Then there are the people like,say, Elbridge Colby,
who's been on this show and looks likelyto be in the DoD, who really want to focus
on the Taiwan issue and are less botheredabout Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
And it's not quite clear who'sreally dominant at this point.
(11:40):
One can assume that it's Trumpbecause he is, after all, president.
But there are these other elementsin the administration who don't seem
entirely aligned withwhat he's doing anyway.
HR you're no stranger tothe experience of trying to
make national security strategywith Donald Trump as president.
Does this all seem familiar to you, and
(12:01):
is Mike Waltz experiencing somethinglike what you experienced?
>> H.R. McMaster (12:05):
I think he is.
And I think in both of your essays, Matt'sessay and Neil's essay, you draw out,
I think, some of the dissonancethat Donald Trump carries with him.
He'll say peace through strength,he believes in peace through strength.
But also at the same time,he's vulnerable.
He's vulnerable to being manipulated bysomebody like Vladimir Putin who holds
(12:26):
out the prospect of a grand deallike an entente with Putin.
Putin also will play as wellas others who are, I think,
useful idiots for Putin who are in sortof the neo isolationist camp within
the administration or the retrenchmentcamp within the administration.
Who, they'll play to Trump'ssense of aggrievement,
(12:47):
that the world's taken advantage of us,especially allies,
as Matt mentioned, have been free ridingon the largesse of American taxpayers.
And this sense of aggrievement makesTrump like reflexively contrarian.
So if the consensus among those whowrite and think about foreign policy and
(13:09):
national security is thatPutin must be stopped,
he must be stopped by recognizingthat he's losing the war.
That Putin's in a real position ofweakness that could allow us to begin
negotiations from thatposition of strength.
And therefore we should makeno concessions up front,
maybe increase pressure on him, make clearour intention with a low interest loan or
(13:33):
something to sustain support for Ukraine.
And go into the negotiationfrom a position of strength,
much as what you were arguing,Neil, Trump will,
he'll reflexively reject that andsay nice things about Putin.
I don't think it was a coincidence.
And Matt, I'd love to hearwhat you think about this is,
I don't think it was a coincidencethat the national security advisor and
(13:56):
the Secretary of State were in Munich andthen Saudi Arabia when Trump made
the statements that Zelensky is a dictatorand is somehow responsible for the war.
I don't think there were people aroundhim to say, as the role that [LAUGH]
I happily provided for 13 months, hey, Mr.President, that's not right.
I think that when you countersort of his predilections,
(14:21):
you get chewed up a little bit.
But you have to be willing to do that forhim, for his own good and
the good of the country, obviously.
But I think what we're seeingis Donald Trump's dissonance.
I mean, he's very consistenton a lot of things, right?
Energy dominance,deregulation, border security.
But in the area of foreign policy andnational security,
(14:44):
he carries these opposedideas in his head.
>> Bill Whalen (14:47):
Let's get John in here, too.
And, John, I'm curious, on economics, doyou see the same thing in Trump economics?
Is there consensus ordo you see a difference in the ranks?
>> John H. Cochrane (14:54):
I was gonna let Matt get a word in edgewise, but then, yes,
I do have a.
>> H.R. McMaster (14:59):
We do tend to go.
>> Matthew Continetti (15:01):
Let me just say one thing In answer to Neil's observation
about the staff.
I do think there are fewer people inthis administration who have both
the stature and kind of the backgroundto say to President Trump,
Mr. President,think twice about saying x, y and z.
(15:21):
And that is a very important changebetween Trump 1 and Trump 2.
I think the way that Trump 2, is evolvingis that this is Donald Trump's presidency,
is we're going to see what Donald Trumpwants to make of this office.
He's already changingthe office in ways to suit him.
There is the statistic that came out thatthroughout the four years of Biden's
(15:45):
presidency, he answered something like300 questions or so from the press.
And one month intoDonald Trump's presidency,
he's answered more than 1400questions [LAUGH] from the press.
He's again changing that office to.
Suit himself as a communicator.
And I also think becauseof the Cabinet selections,
because of the staff selections.
(16:06):
These staff are being selected forcommunication skills and for
loyalty and for the presence ofmind to say, yes, Mr. President,
if that's what you want, we're gonnafigure out a way to carry it out.
And just finally, I do think that thisadministration, unlike Trump, won, has
more critics of the liberal internationalorder in important positions.
(16:31):
More people in the national securityspace who are emerging from this MAGA
institutional network that has been setup since Donald Trump first took office.
And really grew in strengthduring his four years of exile.
And they're gonna be in a position to say,all right,
you want to achieve a ceasefire,Mr President, we'll let you do your thing.
(16:53):
We'll start this negotiation.
We're gonna try to, if we want topreserve American interests in Ukraine,
we're gonna have to formulate somethingthat appeals to your instincts.
And we're seeing it played on Ukraine.
We're seeing mixed signalswhen it comes to China.
And my question is, too,how is this gonna look when we
(17:15):
turn to the growing threat fromIran in the coming months?
>> John H. Cochrane (17:20):
Let me just pivot a little bit.
It's too much fun to try todiagnose Donald Trump and
what's he thinking and how does he work?
I'd like to get back a littleto the policy itself.
I was really sad when it was announcedbecause my view was Russia was kind of on
the edge of collapse.
And one more turn of the screw andwe could have achieved a Bush one,
(17:42):
roll them right back to the border.
And we don't live in a world anymorewhere you grab what you want.
Well, it's not happening.
So the rhetoric is interesting, and
I think we want to geta little bit past it.
Talking hawkish and acting dovish as thepast administration is a lot worse than
(18:04):
talking dovish and then acting hawkish.
So there's some hope that thiscomes out with something good.
But I am a little worried aboutthe rhetoric in two aspects.
One, it's really sad when you're sayingthings that are blatantly untrue and
that you require people around you tosay things that are blatantly untrue,
which is what the lastadministration does, too.
(18:27):
Ukraine started it.
No, Ukraine didn't start it and that'sa test of loyalty is something worrisome.
And this is a question which eventually,
when I stop Talking HR can get around to,too.
JD Vance said in that interviewthis was an unwinnable war.
No, it wasn't.
NATO and Europe could have won this war inabout three weeks to three days if they
(18:47):
had wanted to.
Russia is not too big.
Russia's GDP is the size of Italy.
Never before has the overwhelmingpreponderance of force been on our side
if we wanted to use it.
So there's another one that strikesme as is basing it on things that
are just fundamentally Andrew,which is very dangerous rhetorically.
But let's get to action.
So I want to be economists.
(19:07):
Suppose we get to the way Ilike to think about things,
get to the point that seemslike where they want to go.
Some sort of messy ceasefire with somesort of promises that no one intends
to keep.
Just like the last three times we wentthrough this and we've blown up NATO.
Europeans can defend it if they want to.
We're not gonna defend it.
So that kind of blows up NATO.
(19:29):
How do other people react?
So if you're European, I'll just doEurope and then you guys can do.
How does Xi Jinping react andhow does the Iranians react?
If you're European,what do you do in this circumstance?
Now, option one,start taking Russian lessons.
Option two, you need a European DefenseForce, and you need it like yesterday and
that European Defense Forceincludes your own nuclear umbrella.
(19:51):
So UK andFrance can start providing that and
move that on out to Poland and Latvia,Lithuania and Estonia if you want it.
The European Defense Force, then as Trumphas said,you guys go fight in Ukraine.
Maybe Ukraine should be part ofthe European Defense Force, and
we're gonna make this reallyseriously ready to actually fight.
If you want to defend Ukraine and thenLatvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and so
(20:14):
forth, what else do you doif you're the Europeans?
Well, if you're European, you don't reallygive a damn so much about what happens in
Taiwan and you're kind of pissedoff by these 25% tariffs anyway.
So I would say Europe,you cozy up to China, and
Europe still has allsorts of green fantasies.
They want to import, let Chinese usetheir coal to make electric cars and
windmills to import them to Europe.
(20:35):
Well, great.
We'll, China,we don't need ports in Taiwan to do that.
We got rail networks to bring our stuff.
So you cozy up to China, you're not gonnasign up for the war to face Taiwan.
Middle East Europe has a verydifferent view of the Middle east,
they kind of like the Hamas end of this,not the Israel end of this.
So you stop cooperatingwith the US on that.
(20:56):
This sin of sort of howdo our friends react?
Doesn't seem like a very good way to go.
So you guys can fill in.
I've talked too long, soyou know how it's kind of obvious.
How does Xi Jinping react?
How do our allies in Asia react ifwe're slapping them with tariffs?
How does South America reactif the choice is cheap
(21:20):
stuff from China ormore trade war from us?
That set of outcomes doesn'tlook very promising.
So I wonder,is this really four dimensional chess or
am I wrong on the outcomesthat are likely to come?
>> Niall Ferguson (21:35):
So one of the benefits of a system of free speech where a mere
history professor can get into a publicdebate with the Vice President, is that.
The historian is forced to do a littlethinking about his own assumptions.
And I must say that in the last few days,
two things have struck me that followon from what John has just said.
(21:58):
The first is that for 50 years, Americanpresidents have tried to get the Europeans
to pay a larger share of their own defensebill and they've all failed until now.
And finally, by the shockingtactics that he adopted last week,
President Trump has got the Europeansto start thinking seriously
(22:20):
about strategic autonomy insteadof just talking about it.
>> John H. Cochrane (22:25):
He's got them to start actually,
we're gonna have to pay for this.
But my saying, he who pays picks the bill,chooses the restaurant.
We may look back fondly at the dayswhere we were the world's policemen for
a mere 3% of GDP if I could.
>> Bill Whalen (22:40):
[CROSSTALK] But in. Neil, what does Germany's incoming
chancellor mean when he suggests thatEurope should achieve independence from
the United States?
>> Niall Ferguson (22:47):
Well, I spoke with Friedrich Merz back in July when he
invited me to Berlin to give a lecturearguing for German rearmament.
And at that time, there were all kinds ofreasons that Christian Democrats would
give for not being able tospend more in defense, for
example, their constitutional debt break.
But it's amazing how minds have beenfocused by President Trump's re
(23:10):
election and his recent comments.
Suddenly the Germans are gonna increasetheir defense spending even to relax
the debt break andthere's gonna be European defense funds.
And I think things are gonna move muchfaster than we've been used to seeing
in Europe.
Because suddenly, suddenly,suddenly hit home that the commitment in
the NATO treaty Article 5 of formutual defense is a contingent commitment.
(23:34):
The United States might choose notto honor that focuses the mind.
So I'm gonna take the otherside of this from you, John.
I think it's probably been a good exampleof how, going back to Matt's point,
how Trump's way of doingthings produces shock and
then outcomes that are,in fact, desirable.
(23:56):
So point one, I don't think the Europeanshave a bunch of alternatives here,
they're not about to,as you put it, learn Russian.
They might attempt to improverelations with China, but
they were already doing that anyway.
So I begin to think that this wasa going back to the cocktail metaphor,
one of these drinks that when Ifirst tasted it was disgusting.
(24:21):
But on the third sip itbegan to taste quite good.
And soI'm gonna be somewhat self critical and
say, you know what,you know, Vance is right.
It's not 1990, and Ukraine is not Kuwait.
It wasn't realistic of me to suggest thatthat's how we should think about this
(24:44):
problem.
>> John H. Cochrane (24:44):
No, but I wanna just say I agree with you entirely.
This has very good outcome thatthe Europeans are finally gonna take it
seriously.
But them taking it seriously meansthey take it in the direction they
wanna take it.
So be it.
>> Niall Ferguson (24:58):
But that's great, Matt.
Here's a question for Matt.
>> John H. Cochrane (25:01):
Maybe it is, maybe it isn't.
>> Niall Ferguson (25:02):
My epiphany of the last few days was,
although the world sees President Trump asthe big I am, the emperor, or the king.
That's how he's characterized inthe Financial Times, Der Spiegel,
the Economist.
I'm beginning to think that what liesbehind this facade of braggadocio is
a sense of American weakness.
(25:23):
My argument in the Wall Street Journalthat there's a debt problem because we're
spending more on interest payments thanon defense is part of the weakness that
Donald Trump is conscious of.
And the people advising him are sayingwe can't afford to be supplying
wars in Ukraine, conflicts inthe Middle east and be ready to cope if
the Chinese take the initiative andpush the envelope over Taiwan.
(25:47):
So I've begun to think that whatwe're really seeing here is realism.
That is a realistic assessment of thevulnerability of the American position.
And when Vance snaps at me forbeing a globalist,
what he's really trying to convey isif you could know what we know about
our state of military readiness globally,
(26:09):
you'd be a lot more circumspect aboutwhat you said to Putin and Xi Jinping.
So, Matt, I mean,is that how I should think about Trump?
That behind the big I am,there's a sense of American weakness?
>> Matthew Continetti (26:21):
There is always a Wizard of Oz quality to President Trump.
And, I thought one telling tweet thatoccurred over the past week was this
from Laura Ingram, who said, we don'thave the money, we don't have the troops,
we don't have the defense industrial base,we don't have the political will.
(26:42):
So how are we going tocontinue the Ukraine war now?
Again, it's not something that you wantto say going into negotiations with
Vladimir Putin [LAUGH].
Because one thing we all know is thatevery president since Putin took power
has set out in their new administrationto reset relationships with him and
with his Russia, and they have all failed.
(27:04):
And that will probably be the casewith Donald Trump's second term.
But there is a sense thatAmerica just simply doesn't have
the capacity to continue inits world leadership role.
And this has been growing oversome time on the American right.
And it's now been in a position where Ithink it can exert some influence over
(27:24):
the administration.
One what one way to think aboutthis Trump administration is to
say this is the moment to restorewhat power America had before,
to restore what leverage wehave had over states like Iran,
North Korea, China, Russia,the axis of aggressors.
(27:45):
And that's why I think it's revealing tosee where Trump sees the United States as
having leverage.
And that's particularly our economy.
You called him a trade war president,he is, he loves it, why?
Because the American market is sohuge, so vast, so important,
then we can lord it over not justour enemies, but also our allies.
(28:06):
And so if you think aboutthe Trump presidency as ways to re
establish leverage over the world,he's trying to do that,
I think first by bringingZelensky to the table and
then moving to trying tobring Putin to the table.
>> John H. Cochrane (28:23):
But I wanna do the economic end and
then I want HR to do the militaryend on that's just not true.
That America does not have the abilityto do this just isn't true.
So 300 billion forUkraine is 1% of one year's GDP.
It's less than Biden gave away instudent loan defaults in one sneeze
on a Sunday afternoon.
(28:44):
Defense is cheap, I think I've told Neilhe needs to make the new Ferguson's law,
which is not about defense versusinterest payments on the debt, but
defense versus social programswhich are defense 3% of GDP.
Our social programs more like 30% of GDP,France's social programs like 50% of GDP.
That's where the money's going, and in theUS it's going to abominable cost bloat.
(29:08):
There is plenty of money,there isn't will.
And something I learned last week wasthe is the polling on foreign adventures.
And interestingly, people like threeout of the four of us who live through
the end of the Cold War,see Ukraine as yeah, roll it back.
Young people younger than that who haveonly seen Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,
(29:29):
one snafu after another,are the ones who say,
we're not getting involved withthis again, no matter how.
So will may be an issue, buteconomic strength, and you just said it,
our greatest asset isthe strength of our economy.
Well, duh, then we can afford 5%of GDP if that's what it takes,
we just have to wanna do it.
And HR, we've got the military,if we wanted to do it,
(29:51):
we have certainly the military strength toprevail in Ukraine in about three days.
And Taiwan's gonna be harder, but we havethe military strength if we want it,
to be the world's leader, policeman,whatever you wanna call it.
>> H.R. McMaster (30:05):
Yeah, I just disagree fundamentally that America's weak,
especially if you look at America,
relative to what I wouldcall the axis of aggressors.
The two revisionist or revanchist powerson the Eurasian landmass of China and
Russia and the others that they'vepulled into their enterprise and
are supporting Iran and North Korea.
(30:26):
And what I'm afraid of is that PresidentTrump is going to actually get them up
off the mat in a way that is reminiscentof the way that Barack Obama salvaged
the Supreme Leader in Iran in 2014-15with the Iran Nuclear deal and
the massive payoffs andthe lifting of sanctions.
(30:46):
Trump is doing that, I mean,
Trump was elected to makethe American economy great again.
He's doing wonders for the Russianeconomy at the moment in terms of
its stock market, the revaluing ofthe ruble, resurgence of confidence there.
And so I really think that he'sprojecting weakness at this stage when he
would be much better served to comein from a position of strength.
(31:10):
I don't think it's in any way virtuousthat he put pressure on Zelensky,
that he's picking on Zelensky, really.
And then, of course,from the will perspective, it shouldn't be
surprising that Americans maybe don't havethe will to continue to support Ukraine.
Because the president of the United Statesjust blamed the victim and
(31:31):
has given Russia a free pass after theheinous crimes that have been committed.
With children kidnapped andthe mass murder of civilians,
the destruction of the country.
And then the president,even in the Cabinet meeting, said,
we kind of caused this withthe expansion of NATO.
I mean, really, I just think that,
I've been through this withPresident Trump multiple times.
(31:56):
The people who are in his ear,I think, are.
Are just wrong.
I believe that they sharea degree of self loathing
that you typically seeonly on the far left.
They believe that America can't do goodin the world, but what I do agree with
is that many of them are motivatedto retrench because they think, hey,
(32:18):
we've got our own problems here.
Why the hell are we dealingwith these problems abroad?
And, of course, this is the legacy oftransitions in the global economy in
the 2000s, the financial crisis,I mean, opioid epidemic,
but I think all magnified by social media.
And a lot of the people who are inthis administration are advising them.
(32:39):
They buy into kind of what I wouldregard as crazy conspiracy theories.
So I believe that Donald Trump has a lotof potential because of his disruptive
nature.
There's a lot that needs to be disruptedbut actually, again, this is one of these
situations where he's so disruptivethat he's disrupting his own agenda.
And I think potentially undermining,
(33:01):
rather than advancing US Interests,especially in connection with Ukraine, but
also more broadly withthe axis of aggressors.
John, you laid it out well.
I mean, a lot of his behavior andstatements and so forth are undermining
our ability to work with Europe againstthe broader axis of aggressors, and
especially at a time when theyare profoundly weak from an economic
(33:24):
perspective, look at Iran's economy,China's economy, and Russia's economy.
So the president has been involvedin professional wrestling,
instead of getting off the mat,it's time for the elbow drop,
I think off the third rope.
I mean,that's what I would advise him to do, and
(33:44):
I hope some peopleare giving him that advice.
>> Bill Whalen (33:47):
Pro wrestling is a great analogy because Trump just loves to
be both the hero andthe heel at the same time, but
I want to shift tothe domestic side of things.
But first, let's go around the hornquickly with this exit question.
Do you think that Trump isgoing to get a deal on Ukraine?
And getting back toNeil's original premise,
is it gonna be a peace deal that you like?
So, Neil.
>> Niall Ferguson (34:04):
It's very hard for me to imagine a quick peace deal,
you might get a ceasefire.
But I think the sticking pointsare really considerable on both sides.
The Russians haven't madeany concession whatsoever.
They want Zelensky out,they basically want to disarm Ukraine.
They want to come back fora third bite, that's clear.
(34:25):
And the Ukrainiansare not gonna settle for
anything that doesn't havemeaningful security guarantees.
So I can see a ceasefire,I can't see a peace deal.
It would be remarkable if the two sidescould suddenly be brought together when
they're still so far apart.
>> Matthew Continetti (34:39):
My most optimistic case is that there is a ceasefire along
the lines, current lines of control, but
I don't see anything more promisingthan that, and even that,
of course, is subject to boththe Ukrainian and a Russian veto.
And if neither side wants to settle for
what Trump promises,I don't think they will.
>> H.R. McMaster (35:03):
I agree, I think ceasefire, no enduring peace.
Russia will use the ceasefire to recoverits economy, to rebuild its power.
That'll be much like the Minsk agreement,
it's just going to be an interimbetween a continuation of the war,
unless Vladimir Putin isconvinced that he's been defeated.
And unless there are adequate securityguarantees to prevent the war from
(35:25):
restarting.
>> Bill Whalen (35:26):
And, John, you get the last word.
>> John H. Cochrane (35:28):
Yeah, ceasefire, and the peace agreement I want starts at
the Russian border and ends at the Russianborder, that's certainly not happening.
And we left at economics, too, when onething that's coming off is sanctions,
which Russia is stillselling a lot of oil.
European exports to Kyrgyzstanhave suddenly skyrocketed, hm-mm,
I wonder how that happened.
(35:50):
Getting the Europeans to take the economicaspect of this seriously would,
would help a lot to havingthat Russian collapse.
So ceasefire lasts about four weeks,and then the Ukrainians say,
well, I still want to fight formy country.
>> Bill Whalen (36:05):
All right, John, let's stay with you,
let's go to the domestic side of things.
Tomorrow is day 40 ofthe Trump presidency.
I know of, Matt Continetti,it must feel like 40 weeks or 40 months.
Matt, a journalist friend of mine said,it's like you have not worked out for
four years, and then suddenly you have togo to the gym and work out all day, and
God, does my body hurt,now trying to keep up with this pace.
But, John, 40 days and40 nights of a Trump presidency, and
(36:27):
the Bible has been raining executiveorders for 40 days and 40 nights.
By my account,he has done about 72 so far,
which is triple the 24 he did in 2017.
To put this in historical context,
Franklin Roosevelt issued 99 executiveorders in his first 100 days in office.
But, John, you sent us a note the otherday expressing some concern about where
(36:47):
the President is going with this useof power, and you alluded to checks and
balances.
Would you like to explainwhat is on your mind?
>> John H. Cochrane (36:54):
Well, it's difficult when you like the outcome, but
you don't like the method.
And I think we who call ourselves,among other things,
conservatives have long said, well,there's too much presidential power.
Now, there's, there's differentkinds of executive orders.
There's one where he tellsexecutive agencies what to do,
it's kind of whatthe President's supposed to do.
There's this big question of canthe President fire the heads of supposedly
(37:17):
independent agencies andtell them what to do?
I especially don't likerule by national emergency.
The next Democrat is sure to come in and
declare a national emergency on climateand gender equity and start issuing
executive orders on what we all have todo, Dear colleague letters about that.
So the method is worrisome because wedon't elect a king every four years,
(37:41):
the frameworks were very clear about this.
We have checks and balances,a system designed to move slowly,
to wait to make big changesuntil not 51% voted in, and
shove it down the other 49% throat fora while, but substantial things.
So that system work well now.
It's trouble, it's not easy, there'sthis movement which is very satisfying,
(38:04):
the constitutional purity movement.
Look, we have three branches of governmentand the executive branch is run by
the President, and so he should beable to tell everybody what to do.
And that feels good in principle,
you're kind of reading the originaltext and that legal thing.
But is that really realistic?
(38:26):
Congress shouldn't bewriting the requirements for
a pilot's license,we have independent agencies for a reason.
And we sort of have evolved to a system of
letting the agencies move slowly,
the heads of agencies whoare only removable slowly.
(38:49):
It's kind of a checks and balance,and they're not accountable to anyone,
which is the real problem.
But on the other hand,just forget about constitutional niceties.
Is it desirable that a president comesin and immediately fires everybody,
puts in his own guys, cancels all the lastexecutive orders and puts in new ones?
So I'm hungering for a way that hasadministrative agencies, has checks and
(39:15):
balances and accountability of thosecuz right now they are unto themselves,
but not just the President goes anddoes everything.
So I'm on the fence on this one, andMatt, you've written about this,
you probably have clearer ideas than I do.
Where are we going?
>> Matthew Continetti (39:34):
Well, I think we're going for more American clujocracy is
the term that has come to be todescribe American government
mishmash of legislation,bureaucratic rulings,
executive orders, and then finally,judicial interpretations.
I do think that this conversationis complementary to our foreign
(39:58):
policy conversation, because when I.
Look at the right that has come to powerwith President Trump in his second term.
I see a right that is very confident andvery much interested
in overturning what they see asthe progressive revolution by any means.
That has a foreign policy dimension,which we talked about, but
(40:20):
also has a domestic policy dimension.
And the right, over the past decade orso has come to believe that America,
Americans no longer exercisedemocratic rule over their government.
That, instead, America is being run ormanaged by a series of
unelected bureaucrats throughoutthis vast administrative state.
(40:43):
And then Trump adds the conspiratorialtwist of a deep state within that
administrative state.
And so when I see him come back to powerand I see him issue all these executive
orders, they're intended to orto empower Doge, right there.
It's all intended to rip up thisadministrative state that has been layered
(41:04):
on going back a century, beginningwith the Wilson presidency, right.
And then each additionalDemocratic president,
progressive president,builds more and more.
So what's going to come of that iseventually very critical supreme
Court cases, one focusing more onthe President's authority over
(41:24):
these independent agencies,like you say, John, and
another over the president'sauthority to impound spending.
That is,
how much authority does the presidenthave over what Congress appropriates?
Can he choose not to spendall of the money, right?
And that again harkens back to an earlierpresidency that has a connection
(41:47):
to foreign policy as well.
We, we were speaking on foreign policyabout how many of Trump's moves may,
to Neil and me at least, seem motivatedby a sense of American weakness.
Well, that was, as Neil Ferguson knows,that was the inspiration
behind Kissingerian detente,which is America as a declining power,
(42:09):
had to make these moves vis a visChina and the Soviet Union.
Well, the other part of Nixon Kissingeradministration was Nixon's
desire to gain control over thebureaucracy that he inherited from lbj.
And that set up, of course, a seriesof crises and judicial rulings that
(42:30):
eventually helped create the governmentwe now have half a century later.
So in some ways, not only is thiswar against progressivism happening,
but we also have a return to kindof Nixon era views of the world and
of the federal government andthe President's place in it.
>> Niall Ferguson (42:48):
I completely agree with you, Matt.
I've been callingTrump Richard Nixon's revenge and
point out to people that very early onthere was a meeting of minds between
those two gentlemen, Richard Nixon,Donald Trump in New York City.
Their correspondence is very interesting.
And I think Nixon is oftenin Trump's mind, as you say,
(43:09):
there's the foreignpolicy dimension to it.
America is overstretch stretch,so we are gonna be realists, and
I'm gonna go to Beijing anddo a great big beautiful deal.
Well, that's straight outof the Nixon playbook.
And secondly, restore the imperialpresidency, Arthur Schlesinger had
the Imperial Presidency as a book atthe height of Nixon's power in 72.
(43:32):
And Donald Trump's vision is to get thepresidency back to where it was in 1972,
before the fall,before Watergate, which allowed,
which was really a victory forthe administrative state as well as for
the Democrats and their allies inthe media and the Department of Justice.
So there's a lot of kind of paybackhere for the mid-1970s going on.
(43:54):
And I think that's absolutelythe right way to think about this,
Richard Nixon's revenge.
>> H.R. McMaster (43:59):
And I think it carries over,
as Matt already alluded to the triangulardiplomacy with Beijing and Moscow.
The problem is the situationis fundamentally different.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin havedeclared their undying love for
each other andthe partnership with no limits.
They're talking jointly about changeswe haven't seen in a century.
(44:20):
And Xi Jinping turns and says, Vladimir,you and I are driving those changes.
And what they're talking about isrewriting the rules of international
discourse in favor of their authoritarianforms of government, and in China's case,
it's Mercantil's statist economic model.
And I think what would bemuch more effective for
advancing our interests would beto glue them together, you know,
(44:42):
recognize you're notgoing to separate them.
And the most important way to competewith China in the near term is to ensure
that Russia is defeated in Ukraine,these are connected.
What's happening is really kind ofa myopic view of these competitions in
many ways in which they're looked atas discrete competitions that are not
(45:03):
intertwined with one another,
when in fact this axis is quiteintertwined with one another.
And it's really only through seeing itholistically that you can really take
advantage of some of ourcompetitive advantages.
And when I say our, I meanthe United States, Europe, Japan and
other minded countries.
>> John H. Cochrane (45:24):
Back to what you had said.
So I'm all for the results,
I'm gonna actually think the politicizedbureaucracy was way too big.
And what we saw in USAID money goingstraight to political advocacy.
Our government doesn't actually doanything, it just writes checks to various
groups who then go on and do stuffthat we have no idea what's going on.
(45:47):
So, blowing all that up was great andthe dozers are amazing.
There have been, there's transparencywebsites, there's inspectors generals,
there are congressional investigations,there are committees.
The knowledge this was going on was,was common, but nothing was able to do it.
So I'm torn because I love the result,but I'm worried about the method and
what you describe the clue across.
(46:09):
Well, that's called common law,that's not the end of the world.
But what we need, we can't have noadministrative agencies unless we go
to libertarian nirvana andtake the federal government back to 1903,
which I wouldn't mind, butthat's not where it's going.
To have the courts decide this based on anoriginalism reading of the Constitution.
Well, framers had no idea that wewould be spending half a GDP on all
(46:31):
these agencies and there would bea National Environmental Quality act and
all the rest of it.
So, reading their original text to decidehow this should be done is probably not
going to get what we need is an effectivesystem of accountability and checks and
balances for administrative agenciesthat combine legislative rulemaking and,
(46:52):
and executive judge, jury,prosecution, executioner, all in one.
So they combine those functions, butthey, they need some set of checks and
balances and doing that through the courtsdoesn't seem the right way around it.
And I'm surprised at our right we'readvocating this as a wonderful new
principle because Democrats willeventually win an election and
all of a sudden the imperial presidencyconservatives will go back to,
(47:16):
it's terrible to have the imperialpresidency ruling by decree.
Well, you were up there saying how greata principle this was for four years.
>> Bill Whalen (47:23):
Well, John, welcome to the moral revolism of Washington and Democrats
ending the filibuster for judges and thenhaving a backfire in their face, so forth.
Our time is running out for the segment,
let me close it out with thisquick question to the four of you.
Presidency has four years to play out,
it also has 613 days to play out becauseMatt, that's when the midterm election is.
(47:45):
And there's a distinct possibility hewill lose the House, which means there'll
probably be another run in impeachmentin the second last two years.
So in the next 613 days, gentlemen,name one policy thing you're looking for
out of Trump in terms of what you wouldsay is a metric for his success, is it?
The big beautiful bill or something else?
Niall, what are you looking at?
>> Niall Ferguson (48:03):
Well, he's not King of Mar-a-Lago anymore.
He's President of the United States.
And legislation is a lot more important inthe final analysis than executive orders.
And it's going to be very challenging.
We can already see that.
To get the really big billthat does everything,
including extending the 2017tax cuts through this Congress.
(48:24):
I think that's the key test.
If that doesn't work,if they can't do major legislation,
then all you're left with is a greatpile of executive orders, which,
as John says, can be undone just as soonas the Democrats win the White House.
So that's the key.
It's what happens in Congress that counts.
That's the nature of the Americansystem of governance,
(48:45):
even if everybody focusesobsessively on the present.
>> Matthew Continetti (48:48):
Well, President Trump was re elected on the basis of
Americans disappointment withthe Biden economy and inflation and
the southern border.
I do think the most important policieshe has for the next four years is to
continue closing the southern border andfighting illegal immigration.
The way in which public opinion hasshifted on the issue of immigration as
(49:11):
a result of Biden's immigrationpolicies is extraordinary.
And a lot of Trump's legacy dependson his ability to prove that we
can control migration at thispoint in the 21st century.
>> H.R. McMaster (49:24):
I'm looking for reforms and investments that strengthen
national defense and strengthen it in abroad sense, not only in the capacity and
the capabilities,the modernization of our armed forces.
But also in our defense industrialbase and the supply chains that are so
critical to manufacturing andthe weapons and
munitions we need under the theory that,hey, it's a heck of a lot cheaper to
(49:47):
prevent a war through strength andhave to fight one.
And I think we do have somesignificant vulnerabilities.
I'm worried aboutthe kind of budget hawks,
others who may impede an effortto strengthen defense.
And as John said,the problem with our deficit,
with our debt overall is not the defensebudget, it's all the other spending.
>> Bill Whalen (50:11):
Okay, John, you get the last word.
>> John H. Cochrane (50:13):
My God, I'm so happy.
>> Bill Whalen (50:14):
Christmas comes early.
>> John H. Cochrane (50:15):
[LAUGH] So, as you said,
not much is going to get through Congress.
So let's just not much isgoing to get through Congress.
The big beautiful bill is gonna be onebig beautiful stew of various pork,
the way it always is.
Don't look for fundamental reforms there.
I think actually the hopeis the executive orders.
And my hope is blow it up with executiveorders, have the economy boom,
(50:38):
all sorts of horrible rot exposed,do well in the midterms, and
then you have a chance to pivot andcement what you've done with legislation,
fundamental institutional reform, so thatit can't all be done and done next time.
What he has to avoid issomething bad happening,
which isn't not just your own things,but there's other people out there.
(50:58):
So avoid losing a war.
That would be really good if you wantto keep building on your successes.
Events, my dear boy,as Niall keeps reminding us,
is the story of every administration.
>> Bill Whalen (51:09):
Matt, would you like to stick around for our final segment?
>> Matthew Continetti (51:12):
Absolutely.
>> Bill Whalen (51:12):
All right, and a game that we like to call Big Deal,
Little Deal or no Deal at All.
[MUSIC]
Okay, we have only about five minutes to lightning round.
I have four questions.
John, you're not going to like this.
I'm gonna ask a question.
Only one fellow gets a crack at it, buteach of you will get a tailored topic.
So here we go.
Question one,HR Trump fires air Force General CQ Brown,
(51:35):
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Big deal, little deal, no deal at all.
>> H.R. McMaster (51:42):
Yeah, I think it's a big deal.
I mean, it's not unprecedented.
I know it's lighting around.
Let me be quick about this.
I think there's a fundamentalmisunderstanding that your generals don't
make policy.
I mean,I think it's important to understand that.
And it was the civilian leadership inthe Department of Defense that was pushing
a lot of these reified philosophies thatwere inimical to combat effectiveness and
(52:04):
the warrior ethos.
I'm more concerned as concerned at least,
the firing of allthe Judge Advocate Generals.
Again, a misunderstanding.
Judge Advocate Generals giveadvice to commanders and
leaders who are free to disregard it.
And I think that there's amisunderstanding of really what it's going
(52:25):
to take in the department to keepthe military out of partisan politics and
reverse some of the damage thatthe Biden administration did.
>> Bill Whalen (52:35):
Right, John, the president wants to pitch a $5 million gold card for
permanent US residencylike American Express.
He wants to upgrade fromthe green card to the gold card.
Big deal, little deal, no deal at all.
>> John H. Cochrane (52:48):
Nice deal could be a much better deal.
So economists have long advocatedthe right way to handle immigration is
charge 10 grand, 20 grand at the border,and speak English.
20 grand at the border andno social services for five years.
Come on in.
We want people who come to the US work,pay taxes, bail out our Social Security.
(53:08):
And rationing it by money is a lot betterthan rationing it by the years it takes to
stand in line.
Now, there's not that manypeople with 5 million bucks,
and that brings in wealthyolder people with money.
I want younger people who can work andpay taxes.
People with 5 million bucksdon't pay Social Security taxes,
(53:28):
[LAUGH], because they're not working.
They're living off their investments.
So nice thing and a step in.
Trump gets a lot of badpress about immigration,
but he has said, staple a green cardto every STEM degree in the US.
That's another step in this direction.
So date but not marry yet.
I think it's a good stepin the right direction.
>> Bill Whalen (53:49):
Okay, so a nice deal.
>> John H. Cochrane (53:52):
Nice, but small.
>> Bill Whalen (53:53):
Matt Continetti, media vibe shift, the Washington Post parts ways
with its editorial page editor, JeffBezos, saying he wants his paper to focus
on, and I quote,personal liberties and free markets.
Big deal, little deal, no deal at all?
>> Matthew Continetti (54:05):
Big deal.
Let freedom ring.
I haven't heard news that's made me soexcited in a long while.
The idea that the defense of freedom andfree markets won't be consigned to
the Wall Street Journal editorial page andthe New York Post, but
we'll have another champion inthe national debate is exhilarating to me.
So very big deal.
>> John H. Cochrane (54:25):
[INAUDIBLE], Sign up to be editor,
they're looking for an editor.
>> Matthew Continetti (54:28):
The application is in the mail.
>> Donald Trump (54:30):
I was about to say Sir Niall Ferguson's media plate is pretty
full, but HR McMaster is a board memberof the Los Angeles Grumpy Economist.
Apply for the job.
>> H.R. McMaster (54:39):
[LAUGH] >> Bill Whalen
>> John H. Cochrane (54:44):
I'm an economist, I'm not a journalist.
And I value people for their expertise.
>> Bill Whalen (54:49):
Matt, that has hardly stopped a lot of people from posing as
journalists.
>> H.R. McMaster (54:52):
No, I thought economists were experts on everything, John.
>> John H. Cochrane (54:55):
[LAUGH] Let me play play them on TV.
I'm also very slow at writing.
>> Bill Whalen (54:59):
And our final question goes to Sir Niall Ferguson.
He's not gonna like this one,but it goes anyway.
This week in Six Nations Rugby action,England 16, Scotland 15.
>> Niall Ferguson (55:10):
Well, this is the essence of a moral victory.
Something that we Scots ofsomething of a specialty in.
Of course, Scotland won the game morallyby scoring three tries to England's one.
But our kicker, Finn Russell,had an off day.
Missed every single conversion.
Only one of them wouldhave been enough to win.
(55:30):
I was there actually with Thomas andCampbell.
Campbell's first ever experienceof international rugby.
He took it very personally.
He said I came as and they lost.
I said it wasn't your fault.
We have to let them win occasionally.
It's only fair.
>> Bill Whalen (55:44):
Sports is personal at that age,
Niall, my eight year old grand nephew isa Philadelphia Field Eagles zealot and
he could not have been more over the moonthan the super bowl, if you will.
We do have a couple minutes left,so quick question, gentlemen.
Anybody have a favorite hackman rolethat they'd like to share with us?
>> Niall Ferguson (55:58):
Gotta be French Connection.
>> Bill Whalen (55:59):
French Connection?
>> Matthew Continetti (56:00):
Crimson Tide, more recent with Denzel Washington.
Real battle of the Giants in that movie.
>> H.R. McMaster (56:07):
How about Hoosiers?
>> Bill Whalen (56:08):
I was gonna say Hoosiers.
You took that for me, John.
>> John H. Cochrane (56:11):
Conversation.
>> Bill Whalen (56:12):
Conversation, well done.
Speaking of conversation, gentlemen,that is it for this conversation.
I want to thank our guest,Matt Continetti for joining us today.
By all means, check out the excellentcommentary magazine podcast that Matt is
always a part of.
And we'll be back with the newgoodfellows in early March, so
keep an eye out for that.
On behalf of the goodfellows, Sir, NiallFerguson, John Cochrane, and HR McMaster,
our guest today, Matt Continetti,we hope you enjoyed the show.
(56:33):
Till next time, take care.
Thanks for watching.
>> Gene Hackman (56:38):
We didn't ask you to fight for us, but damn it,
don't fight against us.
Leave us alone.
How many more sacrifices?
How much more blood?
(56:59):
How many more lives?
President, do you still think that Mr. Zelensky is a dictator?
>> Donald Trump (00:05):
Did I say that?
I can't believe I said that.
Next question.
[MUSIC]
>> Bill Whalen (00:14):
It's Thursday, February 27th, 2025.
And welcome back to Goodfellows, a HooverInstitution broadcast examining social,
economic, political andgeopolitical concerns.
I'm Bill Whelan,I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow.
I'll be your moderator today, joinedby our full complement of Goodfellows,
as we like to call them.
That would include the historian Sir NiallFerguson, the Economist John Cochran, and
Former Presidential National SecurityAdvisor, Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster.
(00:38):
And joining us today from the swamp orsomewhere outside the swamp, I think,
I believe he resides in Northern Virginia,our friend Matthew Continetti.
Matt Continetti is the Directorof Domestic Studies at
the American Enterprise Institute.
He's a FOX News contributor.
If you're a podcast maniac like me,you listen to him every morning
on the Always EntertainingCommentary Magazine podcast.
Matt, thanks for joining us.
>> Matthew Continetti (00:57):
Thanks for having me, Bill.
And let me just say it's a realpleasure to be with the Goodfellows.
I've been a fan from the beginning.
I never miss an episode.
>> Bill Whalen (01:05):
Well, we will do our best to meet your expectations today, Matt.
Donald Trump is not a drinker.
He famously does not care for alcohol.
It's a very personal thingregarding his brother.
But if we were to concocta Trump cocktail, Matt,
I might call it the method andthe madness in this regard.
Anytime we talk about somethingthat Trump does, something he says,
something he suggests, we always kind offall back to this fundamental question
(01:28):
that does he know what he's doing?
Is he thinking about what is he doing?
Or is this just all kind of happenstance?
In other words, if he's playing cards,Matt, is he playing poker?
Is he playing 52 card pickup?
Now, I'd like to start this conversationtoday, Matt, by focusing on Trump and
foreign policy andthe events of the past nine days.
Let's go back to February 18th, Matt.
You have the president, United Statesat the White House blaming Ukraine's
(01:49):
president, Mr. Zelensky, forstarting the war in Russia and
then also trashing him fornot cutting a deal to end the war.
>> Donald Trump (01:55):
And I think I have the power to end this war.
And I think it's going very well.
But today I heard, well,we weren't invited.
Well, you've been there for three years.
You should have ended it three years.
You should have never started it.
You could have made a deal.
>> Bill Whalen (02:07):
The next day, our own Sir Niall Ferguson goes on social media and
he post on X that, well,the President's history is not correct,
but he does think the Presidentis noble in trying to find peace.
But he tries to remind the Presidentthere's such a thing as peace through
strength.
The next day, the Vice President,United States enters the fray.
He goes on exit.
He responds to Sir Niall by calling ourfriend, accusing our friend of, quote,
(02:29):
moralistic garbage and also sayingthat Niall is guilty of, quote,
historical illiteracy.
I think that's probably the first timethe international man of history has been
accused of being historically illiterate.
We then go to the next dayin Munich [CROSSTALK].
>> H.R. McMaster (02:41):
Matt, don't forget,
don't forget he calledhim a globalist too.
>> Bill Whalen (02:46):
We'll let Sir Niall respond to that and more.
Back to our timeline.
The following day in Munich, the VicePresident gives a speech in which he
accuses Europe of suppressing free speech.
>> JD Vance (02:55):
I believe that dismissing people, dismissing their concerns, or
worse yet, shutting down media,shutting down elections or
shutting people out of the politicalprocess protects nothing.
In fact, it is the most surefireway to destroy democracy.
>> Bill Whalen (03:13):
We get a couple days off to the weekend map, but
we pick it up on Monday wherewe go to the United nations and
there is a resolution condemningRussia for the war in Ukraine.
Voting against the resolution would beRussia, North Korea, Belarus, Hungary and
the United States of America.
So, Matt,you look at all of these events and
even more I didn't mention the presidentsof the heads of states of France and
England and tomorrow the President Ukrainecoming to the White House.
(03:37):
But Matt,you look at all of these events and
we back to the questionof the Trump cocktail.
If you're making this cocktail of methodand madness, what blend method and
what blend madness.
>> Matthew Continetti (03:46):
Well, I would begin by positing a few base
rules I use to follow Donald Trump.
The first is Trump is a zero sum thinker.
President Trump believesthat there is a winner and
a loser to every transaction andevery relationship.
(04:07):
And there are very fewpositive sum relationships.
The second base case I have withPresident Trump is since 1987,
since he put that ad inthe New York Times ahead of his visit to
New Hampshire when he was firsttoying with running for president.
(04:27):
President Trump has made it clear thathe views the post war international
order as a liability on the United States.
Our allies cheat us.
Free trade is erodingour mercantile power.
Our allies are too dependent on us.
And so these, this combination Ithink of zero sum thinking and
(04:50):
liberal world order is a cost,not a benefit,
shapes how he's going into Ukraine.
The third thing in mypersonal Trump cocktail is
Trump is a believer inpersonalist diplomacy.
Everything depends on how hegets along with the person on
(05:13):
the other side of the table.
Famously, we had very good US-Japanrelations during the first term because
of his relationship with Abe Shinzo,the Japanese prime minister.
On the other hand, we had verypoor US German relations during
the first term because of his hatred, Ithink it's fair to say, of Angela Merkel.
(05:37):
So when I see what's happened withUkraine over the past week or
so, I see all three things at work.
One is Trump has looked at Europe asnot doing enough for its defense.
We're the loser in that relationshipbecause we're providing defense for
Europe, which is free riding on us.
(05:57):
He looks and he sees this liberalworld order, open borders, free trade,
American internationalism assomething he wants to revise, and
now he's in a position to revise it.
And lastly, I don't think he's interactedvery well with Zelensky, where
Zelensky has not behaved as leaders whohave been studying Trump whispering for
(06:21):
the past four years try to behave,try to get into Trump's good graces,
try to kind of put ideas in his headthat are favorable to their power,
to their own states and their powers.
And that has led to the breakdown,I think,
that we saw in US-Ukrainianrelations last week.
Just final thought.
(06:41):
The other thing to keep in mind withTrump is he'll state an end goal,
an end state he wants, but he rarelydescribes the means of how to get there.
And because he rarely describesthe means of how to get there,
the path we take to any desired endstate can often be viewed as madness.
(07:02):
Like you say, Bill, it can often be crazy.
It can be two steps forward,one step back.
It can be some digression intoNiall Ferguson's globalist mentality.
But when Trump succeeds,he reaches that end state.
And I think in the case of Ukraine,the end state is an end to the war,
(07:23):
some type of ceasefire.
And the means of achievingthat end are very messy.
And they include thisUS-Ukrainian mineral agreement,
which is scheduled to besigned on February 28th.
>> Bill Whalen (07:35):
So, Niall.
>> Niall Ferguson (07:37):
Well, I tried to make the point, in response to some
of the things President Trumpsaid about Ukraine,
that in the beginning of a negotiation,it seemed unwise to
concede at least two of the thingsthat the Russian government wants.
(07:58):
One of them is To ensure thatUkraine does not join NATO.
Another of them is to ensurethat President Zelensky
is delegitimized andideally for Russia, replaced.
And so my comments were directed atthe President's remarks about Ukraine,
(08:20):
which seemed to me counterproductiveahead of the negotiation with Russia.
Now, I've been a prettysupportive commentator on
President Trump by the standardsof most academics and historians.
So I was a little surprisedwhen vice president Vance came
(08:42):
after me with those somewhatunflattering descriptions.
But I think we then had a gooddebate about the strategy.
I agree with much that Matthas said about Donald Trump.
But Donald Trump's not king,he's president of the United States.
And there are other people,including people that he's appointed,
(09:04):
who are trying to manage the foreignpolicy of the United States.
And they must all be somewhatstretched when they're approaching
a negotiation like the one Marco Rubiohad with his Russian counterpart,
that the president sayssomething that doesn't,
at least to my eyes, seem helpful.
(09:27):
So the discussion that we hadI thought was constructive and
ended on a positive note.
Vice President Vance said noconcessions were being made to Russia.
I said great and good luck because it'san enormously important negotiation,
the war needs to end.
The longer it goes on, the worse,ultimately for Ukraine,
(09:48):
which is of course substantiallyoutmanned and out gunned.
But the question is,how do you get a war like this to end?
Now, one thing that is interesting,and Mark Continetti
alluded to it there,is the end state that Trump wants.
(10:09):
I don't think that Trump is a warpresident, he's a trade war president.
That became obvious inthe first Trump term, and
I do think it's importantto understand him that way.
In fact, he's been verydovish since his re election,
not only with respect to Russia, butalso with respect to China and even Iran.
(10:31):
The odd thing is, andhere I'm queuing the one and only HR,
there are very many hawkish peoplein his administration already.
And it's odd that the presidentgoes in one direction,
which you could characterize as det.
With the authoritarian axis, while othermembers of the administration seem to be
(10:53):
going in a quite different direction.
As I see it, Matt, I'd be interestedin your thoughts on this too.
There are at least threedifferent tendencies within
this emergent national security team,one is the president.
But then there are more hawkish figuresin the NSC who are ready to take on
the axis of authoritarians everywhere,including Eastern Europe,
(11:16):
including the Middle East, and includingcrucially, in Taiwan, in the Far East.
Then there are the people like,say, Elbridge Colby,
who's been on this show and looks likelyto be in the DoD, who really want to focus
on the Taiwan issue and are less botheredabout Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
And it's not quite clear who'sreally dominant at this point.
(11:40):
One can assume that it's Trumpbecause he is, after all, president.
But there are these other elementsin the administration who don't seem
entirely aligned withwhat he's doing anyway.
HR you're no stranger tothe experience of trying to
make national security strategywith Donald Trump as president.
Does this all seem familiar to you, and
(12:01):
is Mike Waltz experiencing somethinglike what you experienced?
>> H.R. McMaster (12:05):
I think he is.
And I think in both of your essays, Matt'sessay and Neil's essay, you draw out,
I think, some of the dissonancethat Donald Trump carries with him.
He'll say peace through strength,he believes in peace through strength.
But also at the same time,he's vulnerable.
He's vulnerable to being manipulated bysomebody like Vladimir Putin who holds
(12:26):
out the prospect of a grand deallike an entente with Putin.
Putin also will play as wellas others who are, I think,
useful idiots for Putin who are in sortof the neo isolationist camp within
the administration or the retrenchmentcamp within the administration.
Who, they'll play to Trump'ssense of aggrievement,
(12:47):
that the world's taken advantage of us,especially allies,
as Matt mentioned, have been free ridingon the largesse of American taxpayers.
And this sense of aggrievement makesTrump like reflexively contrarian.
So if the consensus among those whowrite and think about foreign policy and
(13:09):
national security is thatPutin must be stopped,
he must be stopped by recognizingthat he's losing the war.
That Putin's in a real position ofweakness that could allow us to begin
negotiations from thatposition of strength.
And therefore we should makeno concessions up front,
maybe increase pressure on him, make clearour intention with a low interest loan or
(13:33):
something to sustain support for Ukraine.
And go into the negotiationfrom a position of strength,
much as what you were arguing,Neil, Trump will,
he'll reflexively reject that andsay nice things about Putin.
I don't think it was a coincidence.
And Matt, I'd love to hearwhat you think about this is,
I don't think it was a coincidencethat the national security advisor and
(13:56):
the Secretary of State were in Munich andthen Saudi Arabia when Trump made
the statements that Zelensky is a dictatorand is somehow responsible for the war.
I don't think there were people aroundhim to say, as the role that [LAUGH]
I happily provided for 13 months, hey, Mr.President, that's not right.
I think that when you countersort of his predilections,
(14:21):
you get chewed up a little bit.
But you have to be willing to do that forhim, for his own good and
the good of the country, obviously.
But I think what we're seeingis Donald Trump's dissonance.
I mean, he's very consistenton a lot of things, right?
Energy dominance,deregulation, border security.
But in the area of foreign policy andnational security,
(14:44):
he carries these opposedideas in his head.
>> Bill Whalen (14:47):
Let's get John in here, too.
And, John, I'm curious, on economics, doyou see the same thing in Trump economics?
Is there consensus ordo you see a difference in the ranks?
>> John H. Cochrane (14:54):
I was gonna let Matt get a word in edgewise, but then, yes,
I do have a.
>> H.R. McMaster (14:59):
We do tend to go.
>> Matthew Continetti (15:01):
Let me just say one thing In answer to Neil's observation
about the staff.
I do think there are fewer people inthis administration who have both
the stature and kind of the backgroundto say to President Trump,
Mr. President,think twice about saying x, y and z.
(15:21):
And that is a very important changebetween Trump 1 and Trump 2.
I think the way that Trump 2, is evolvingis that this is Donald Trump's presidency,
is we're going to see what Donald Trumpwants to make of this office.
He's already changingthe office in ways to suit him.
There is the statistic that came out thatthroughout the four years of Biden's
(15:45):
presidency, he answered something like300 questions or so from the press.
And one month intoDonald Trump's presidency,
he's answered more than 1400questions [LAUGH] from the press.
He's again changing that office to.
Suit himself as a communicator.
And I also think becauseof the Cabinet selections,
because of the staff selections.
(16:06):
These staff are being selected forcommunication skills and for
loyalty and for the presence ofmind to say, yes, Mr. President,
if that's what you want, we're gonnafigure out a way to carry it out.
And just finally, I do think that thisadministration, unlike Trump, won, has
more critics of the liberal internationalorder in important positions.
(16:31):
More people in the national securityspace who are emerging from this MAGA
institutional network that has been setup since Donald Trump first took office.
And really grew in strengthduring his four years of exile.
And they're gonna be in a position to say,all right,
you want to achieve a ceasefire,Mr President, we'll let you do your thing.
(16:53):
We'll start this negotiation.
We're gonna try to, if we want topreserve American interests in Ukraine,
we're gonna have to formulate somethingthat appeals to your instincts.
And we're seeing it played on Ukraine.
We're seeing mixed signalswhen it comes to China.
And my question is, too,how is this gonna look when we
(17:15):
turn to the growing threat fromIran in the coming months?
>> John H. Cochrane (17:20):
Let me just pivot a little bit.
It's too much fun to try todiagnose Donald Trump and
what's he thinking and how does he work?
I'd like to get back a littleto the policy itself.
I was really sad when it was announcedbecause my view was Russia was kind of on
the edge of collapse.
And one more turn of the screw andwe could have achieved a Bush one,
(17:42):
roll them right back to the border.
And we don't live in a world anymorewhere you grab what you want.
Well, it's not happening.
So the rhetoric is interesting, and
I think we want to geta little bit past it.
Talking hawkish and acting dovish as thepast administration is a lot worse than
(18:04):
talking dovish and then acting hawkish.
So there's some hope that thiscomes out with something good.
But I am a little worried aboutthe rhetoric in two aspects.
One, it's really sad when you're sayingthings that are blatantly untrue and
that you require people around you tosay things that are blatantly untrue,
which is what the lastadministration does, too.
(18:27):
Ukraine started it.
No, Ukraine didn't start it and that'sa test of loyalty is something worrisome.
And this is a question which eventually,
when I stop Talking HR can get around to,too.
JD Vance said in that interviewthis was an unwinnable war.
No, it wasn't.
NATO and Europe could have won this war inabout three weeks to three days if they
(18:47):
had wanted to.
Russia is not too big.
Russia's GDP is the size of Italy.
Never before has the overwhelmingpreponderance of force been on our side
if we wanted to use it.
So there's another one that strikesme as is basing it on things that
are just fundamentally Andrew,which is very dangerous rhetorically.
But let's get to action.
So I want to be economists.
(19:07):
Suppose we get to the way Ilike to think about things,
get to the point that seemslike where they want to go.
Some sort of messy ceasefire with somesort of promises that no one intends
to keep.
Just like the last three times we wentthrough this and we've blown up NATO.
Europeans can defend it if they want to.
We're not gonna defend it.
So that kind of blows up NATO.
(19:29):
How do other people react?
So if you're European, I'll just doEurope and then you guys can do.
How does Xi Jinping react andhow does the Iranians react?
If you're European,what do you do in this circumstance?
Now, option one,start taking Russian lessons.
Option two, you need a European DefenseForce, and you need it like yesterday and
that European Defense Forceincludes your own nuclear umbrella.
(19:51):
So UK andFrance can start providing that and
move that on out to Poland and Latvia,Lithuania and Estonia if you want it.
The European Defense Force, then as Trumphas said,you guys go fight in Ukraine.
Maybe Ukraine should be part ofthe European Defense Force, and
we're gonna make this reallyseriously ready to actually fight.
If you want to defend Ukraine and thenLatvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and so
(20:14):
forth, what else do you doif you're the Europeans?
Well, if you're European, you don't reallygive a damn so much about what happens in
Taiwan and you're kind of pissedoff by these 25% tariffs anyway.
So I would say Europe,you cozy up to China, and
Europe still has allsorts of green fantasies.
They want to import, let Chinese usetheir coal to make electric cars and
windmills to import them to Europe.
(20:35):
Well, great.
We'll, China,we don't need ports in Taiwan to do that.
We got rail networks to bring our stuff.
So you cozy up to China, you're not gonnasign up for the war to face Taiwan.
Middle East Europe has a verydifferent view of the Middle east,
they kind of like the Hamas end of this,not the Israel end of this.
So you stop cooperatingwith the US on that.
(20:56):
This sin of sort of howdo our friends react?
Doesn't seem like a very good way to go.
So you guys can fill in.
I've talked too long, soyou know how it's kind of obvious.
How does Xi Jinping react?
How do our allies in Asia react ifwe're slapping them with tariffs?
How does South America reactif the choice is cheap
(21:20):
stuff from China ormore trade war from us?
That set of outcomes doesn'tlook very promising.
So I wonder,is this really four dimensional chess or
am I wrong on the outcomesthat are likely to come?
>> Niall Ferguson (21:35):
So one of the benefits of a system of free speech where a mere
history professor can get into a publicdebate with the Vice President, is that.
The historian is forced to do a littlethinking about his own assumptions.
And I must say that in the last few days,
two things have struck me that followon from what John has just said.
(21:58):
The first is that for 50 years, Americanpresidents have tried to get the Europeans
to pay a larger share of their own defensebill and they've all failed until now.
And finally, by the shockingtactics that he adopted last week,
President Trump has got the Europeansto start thinking seriously
(22:20):
about strategic autonomy insteadof just talking about it.
>> John H. Cochrane (22:25):
He's got them to start actually,
we're gonna have to pay for this.
But my saying, he who pays picks the bill,chooses the restaurant.
We may look back fondly at the dayswhere we were the world's policemen for
a mere 3% of GDP if I could.
>> Bill Whalen (22:40):
[CROSSTALK] But in. Neil, what does Germany's incoming
chancellor mean when he suggests thatEurope should achieve independence from
the United States?
>> Niall Ferguson (22:47):
Well, I spoke with Friedrich Merz back in July when he
invited me to Berlin to give a lecturearguing for German rearmament.
And at that time, there were all kinds ofreasons that Christian Democrats would
give for not being able tospend more in defense, for
example, their constitutional debt break.
But it's amazing how minds have beenfocused by President Trump's re
(23:10):
election and his recent comments.
Suddenly the Germans are gonna increasetheir defense spending even to relax
the debt break andthere's gonna be European defense funds.
And I think things are gonna move muchfaster than we've been used to seeing
in Europe.
Because suddenly, suddenly,suddenly hit home that the commitment in
the NATO treaty Article 5 of formutual defense is a contingent commitment.
(23:34):
The United States might choose notto honor that focuses the mind.
So I'm gonna take the otherside of this from you, John.
I think it's probably been a good exampleof how, going back to Matt's point,
how Trump's way of doingthings produces shock and
then outcomes that are,in fact, desirable.
(23:56):
So point one, I don't think the Europeanshave a bunch of alternatives here,
they're not about to,as you put it, learn Russian.
They might attempt to improverelations with China, but
they were already doing that anyway.
So I begin to think that this wasa going back to the cocktail metaphor,
one of these drinks that when Ifirst tasted it was disgusting.
(24:21):
But on the third sip itbegan to taste quite good.
And soI'm gonna be somewhat self critical and
say, you know what,you know, Vance is right.
It's not 1990, and Ukraine is not Kuwait.
It wasn't realistic of me to suggest thatthat's how we should think about this
(24:44):
problem.
>> John H. Cochrane (24:44):
No, but I wanna just say I agree with you entirely.
This has very good outcome thatthe Europeans are finally gonna take it
seriously.
But them taking it seriously meansthey take it in the direction they
wanna take it.
So be it.
>> Niall Ferguson (24:58):
But that's great, Matt.
Here's a question for Matt.
>> John H. Cochrane (25:01):
Maybe it is, maybe it isn't.
>> Niall Ferguson (25:02):
My epiphany of the last few days was,
although the world sees President Trump asthe big I am, the emperor, or the king.
That's how he's characterized inthe Financial Times, Der Spiegel,
the Economist.
I'm beginning to think that what liesbehind this facade of braggadocio is
a sense of American weakness.
(25:23):
My argument in the Wall Street Journalthat there's a debt problem because we're
spending more on interest payments thanon defense is part of the weakness that
Donald Trump is conscious of.
And the people advising him are sayingwe can't afford to be supplying
wars in Ukraine, conflicts inthe Middle east and be ready to cope if
the Chinese take the initiative andpush the envelope over Taiwan.
(25:47):
So I've begun to think that whatwe're really seeing here is realism.
That is a realistic assessment of thevulnerability of the American position.
And when Vance snaps at me forbeing a globalist,
what he's really trying to convey isif you could know what we know about
our state of military readiness globally,
(26:09):
you'd be a lot more circumspect aboutwhat you said to Putin and Xi Jinping.
So, Matt, I mean,is that how I should think about Trump?
That behind the big I am,there's a sense of American weakness?
>> Matthew Continetti (26:21):
There is always a Wizard of Oz quality to President Trump.
And, I thought one telling tweet thatoccurred over the past week was this
from Laura Ingram, who said, we don'thave the money, we don't have the troops,
we don't have the defense industrial base,we don't have the political will.
(26:42):
So how are we going tocontinue the Ukraine war now?
Again, it's not something that you wantto say going into negotiations with
Vladimir Putin [LAUGH].
Because one thing we all know is thatevery president since Putin took power
has set out in their new administrationto reset relationships with him and
with his Russia, and they have all failed.
(27:04):
And that will probably be the casewith Donald Trump's second term.
But there is a sense thatAmerica just simply doesn't have
the capacity to continue inits world leadership role.
And this has been growing oversome time on the American right.
And it's now been in a position where Ithink it can exert some influence over
(27:24):
the administration.
One what one way to think aboutthis Trump administration is to
say this is the moment to restorewhat power America had before,
to restore what leverage wehave had over states like Iran,
North Korea, China, Russia,the axis of aggressors.
(27:45):
And that's why I think it's revealing tosee where Trump sees the United States as
having leverage.
And that's particularly our economy.
You called him a trade war president,he is, he loves it, why?
Because the American market is sohuge, so vast, so important,
then we can lord it over not justour enemies, but also our allies.
(28:06):
And so if you think aboutthe Trump presidency as ways to re
establish leverage over the world,he's trying to do that,
I think first by bringingZelensky to the table and
then moving to trying tobring Putin to the table.
>> John H. Cochrane (28:23):
But I wanna do the economic end and
then I want HR to do the militaryend on that's just not true.
That America does not have the abilityto do this just isn't true.
So 300 billion forUkraine is 1% of one year's GDP.
It's less than Biden gave away instudent loan defaults in one sneeze
on a Sunday afternoon.
(28:44):
Defense is cheap, I think I've told Neilhe needs to make the new Ferguson's law,
which is not about defense versusinterest payments on the debt, but
defense versus social programswhich are defense 3% of GDP.
Our social programs more like 30% of GDP,France's social programs like 50% of GDP.
That's where the money's going, and in theUS it's going to abominable cost bloat.
(29:08):
There is plenty of money,there isn't will.
And something I learned last week wasthe is the polling on foreign adventures.
And interestingly, people like threeout of the four of us who live through
the end of the Cold War,see Ukraine as yeah, roll it back.
Young people younger than that who haveonly seen Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria,
(29:29):
one snafu after another,are the ones who say,
we're not getting involved withthis again, no matter how.
So will may be an issue, buteconomic strength, and you just said it,
our greatest asset isthe strength of our economy.
Well, duh, then we can afford 5%of GDP if that's what it takes,
we just have to wanna do it.
And HR, we've got the military,if we wanted to do it,
(29:51):
we have certainly the military strength toprevail in Ukraine in about three days.
And Taiwan's gonna be harder, but we havethe military strength if we want it,
to be the world's leader, policeman,whatever you wanna call it.
>> H.R. McMaster (30:05):
Yeah, I just disagree fundamentally that America's weak,
especially if you look at America,
relative to what I wouldcall the axis of aggressors.
The two revisionist or revanchist powerson the Eurasian landmass of China and
Russia and the others that they'vepulled into their enterprise and
are supporting Iran and North Korea.
(30:26):
And what I'm afraid of is that PresidentTrump is going to actually get them up
off the mat in a way that is reminiscentof the way that Barack Obama salvaged
the Supreme Leader in Iran in 2014-15with the Iran Nuclear deal and
the massive payoffs andthe lifting of sanctions.
(30:46):
Trump is doing that, I mean,
Trump was elected to makethe American economy great again.
He's doing wonders for the Russianeconomy at the moment in terms of
its stock market, the revaluing ofthe ruble, resurgence of confidence there.
And so I really think that he'sprojecting weakness at this stage when he
would be much better served to comein from a position of strength.
(31:10):
I don't think it's in any way virtuousthat he put pressure on Zelensky,
that he's picking on Zelensky, really.
And then, of course,from the will perspective, it shouldn't be
surprising that Americans maybe don't havethe will to continue to support Ukraine.
Because the president of the United Statesjust blamed the victim and
(31:31):
has given Russia a free pass after theheinous crimes that have been committed.
With children kidnapped andthe mass murder of civilians,
the destruction of the country.
And then the president,even in the Cabinet meeting, said,
we kind of caused this withthe expansion of NATO.
I mean, really, I just think that,
I've been through this withPresident Trump multiple times.
(31:56):
The people who are in his ear,I think, are.
Are just wrong.
I believe that they sharea degree of self loathing
that you typically seeonly on the far left.
They believe that America can't do goodin the world, but what I do agree with
is that many of them are motivatedto retrench because they think, hey,
(32:18):
we've got our own problems here.
Why the hell are we dealingwith these problems abroad?
And, of course, this is the legacy oftransitions in the global economy in
the 2000s, the financial crisis,I mean, opioid epidemic,
but I think all magnified by social media.
And a lot of the people who are inthis administration are advising them.
(32:39):
They buy into kind of what I wouldregard as crazy conspiracy theories.
So I believe that Donald Trump has a lotof potential because of his disruptive
nature.
There's a lot that needs to be disruptedbut actually, again, this is one of these
situations where he's so disruptivethat he's disrupting his own agenda.
And I think potentially undermining,
(33:01):
rather than advancing US Interests,especially in connection with Ukraine, but
also more broadly withthe axis of aggressors.
John, you laid it out well.
I mean, a lot of his behavior andstatements and so forth are undermining
our ability to work with Europe againstthe broader axis of aggressors, and
especially at a time when theyare profoundly weak from an economic
(33:24):
perspective, look at Iran's economy,China's economy, and Russia's economy.
So the president has been involvedin professional wrestling,
instead of getting off the mat,it's time for the elbow drop,
I think off the third rope.
I mean,that's what I would advise him to do, and
(33:44):
I hope some peopleare giving him that advice.
>> Bill Whalen (33:47):
Pro wrestling is a great analogy because Trump just loves to
be both the hero andthe heel at the same time, but
I want to shift tothe domestic side of things.
But first, let's go around the hornquickly with this exit question.
Do you think that Trump isgoing to get a deal on Ukraine?
And getting back toNeil's original premise,
is it gonna be a peace deal that you like?
So, Neil.
>> Niall Ferguson (34:04):
It's very hard for me to imagine a quick peace deal,
you might get a ceasefire.
But I think the sticking pointsare really considerable on both sides.
The Russians haven't madeany concession whatsoever.
They want Zelensky out,they basically want to disarm Ukraine.
They want to come back fora third bite, that's clear.
(34:25):
And the Ukrainiansare not gonna settle for
anything that doesn't havemeaningful security guarantees.
So I can see a ceasefire,I can't see a peace deal.
It would be remarkable if the two sidescould suddenly be brought together when
they're still so far apart.
>> Matthew Continetti (34:39):
My most optimistic case is that there is a ceasefire along
the lines, current lines of control, but
I don't see anything more promisingthan that, and even that,
of course, is subject to boththe Ukrainian and a Russian veto.
And if neither side wants to settle for
what Trump promises,I don't think they will.
>> H.R. McMaster (35:03):
I agree, I think ceasefire, no enduring peace.
Russia will use the ceasefire to recoverits economy, to rebuild its power.
That'll be much like the Minsk agreement,
it's just going to be an interimbetween a continuation of the war,
unless Vladimir Putin isconvinced that he's been defeated.
And unless there are adequate securityguarantees to prevent the war from
(35:25):
restarting.
>> Bill Whalen (35:26):
And, John, you get the last word.
>> John H. Cochrane (35:28):
Yeah, ceasefire, and the peace agreement I want starts at
the Russian border and ends at the Russianborder, that's certainly not happening.
And we left at economics, too, when onething that's coming off is sanctions,
which Russia is stillselling a lot of oil.
European exports to Kyrgyzstanhave suddenly skyrocketed, hm-mm,
I wonder how that happened.
(35:50):
Getting the Europeans to take the economicaspect of this seriously would,
would help a lot to havingthat Russian collapse.
So ceasefire lasts about four weeks,and then the Ukrainians say,
well, I still want to fight formy country.
>> Bill Whalen (36:05):
All right, John, let's stay with you,
let's go to the domestic side of things.
Tomorrow is day 40 ofthe Trump presidency.
I know of, Matt Continetti,it must feel like 40 weeks or 40 months.
Matt, a journalist friend of mine said,it's like you have not worked out for
four years, and then suddenly you have togo to the gym and work out all day, and
God, does my body hurt,now trying to keep up with this pace.
But, John, 40 days and40 nights of a Trump presidency, and
(36:27):
the Bible has been raining executiveorders for 40 days and 40 nights.
By my account,he has done about 72 so far,
which is triple the 24 he did in 2017.
To put this in historical context,
Franklin Roosevelt issued 99 executiveorders in his first 100 days in office.
But, John, you sent us a note the otherday expressing some concern about where
(36:47):
the President is going with this useof power, and you alluded to checks and
balances.
Would you like to explainwhat is on your mind?
>> John H. Cochrane (36:54):
Well, it's difficult when you like the outcome, but
you don't like the method.
And I think we who call ourselves,among other things,
conservatives have long said, well,there's too much presidential power.
Now, there's, there's differentkinds of executive orders.
There's one where he tellsexecutive agencies what to do,
it's kind of whatthe President's supposed to do.
There's this big question of canthe President fire the heads of supposedly
(37:17):
independent agencies andtell them what to do?
I especially don't likerule by national emergency.
The next Democrat is sure to come in and
declare a national emergency on climateand gender equity and start issuing
executive orders on what we all have todo, Dear colleague letters about that.
So the method is worrisome because wedon't elect a king every four years,
(37:41):
the frameworks were very clear about this.
We have checks and balances,a system designed to move slowly,
to wait to make big changesuntil not 51% voted in, and
shove it down the other 49% throat fora while, but substantial things.
So that system work well now.
It's trouble, it's not easy, there'sthis movement which is very satisfying,
(38:04):
the constitutional purity movement.
Look, we have three branches of governmentand the executive branch is run by
the President, and so he should beable to tell everybody what to do.
And that feels good in principle,
you're kind of reading the originaltext and that legal thing.
But is that really realistic?
(38:26):
Congress shouldn't bewriting the requirements for
a pilot's license,we have independent agencies for a reason.
And we sort of have evolved to a system of
letting the agencies move slowly,
the heads of agencies whoare only removable slowly.
(38:49):
It's kind of a checks and balance,and they're not accountable to anyone,
which is the real problem.
But on the other hand,just forget about constitutional niceties.
Is it desirable that a president comesin and immediately fires everybody,
puts in his own guys, cancels all the lastexecutive orders and puts in new ones?
So I'm hungering for a way that hasadministrative agencies, has checks and
(39:15):
balances and accountability of thosecuz right now they are unto themselves,
but not just the President goes anddoes everything.
So I'm on the fence on this one, andMatt, you've written about this,
you probably have clearer ideas than I do.
Where are we going?
>> Matthew Continetti (39:34):
Well, I think we're going for more American clujocracy is
the term that has come to be todescribe American government
mishmash of legislation,bureaucratic rulings,
executive orders, and then finally,judicial interpretations.
I do think that this conversationis complementary to our foreign
(39:58):
policy conversation, because when I.
Look at the right that has come to powerwith President Trump in his second term.
I see a right that is very confident andvery much interested
in overturning what they see asthe progressive revolution by any means.
That has a foreign policy dimension,which we talked about, but
(40:20):
also has a domestic policy dimension.
And the right, over the past decade orso has come to believe that America,
Americans no longer exercisedemocratic rule over their government.
That, instead, America is being run ormanaged by a series of
unelected bureaucrats throughoutthis vast administrative state.
(40:43):
And then Trump adds the conspiratorialtwist of a deep state within that
administrative state.
And so when I see him come back to powerand I see him issue all these executive
orders, they're intended to orto empower Doge, right there.
It's all intended to rip up thisadministrative state that has been layered
(41:04):
on going back a century, beginningwith the Wilson presidency, right.
And then each additionalDemocratic president,
progressive president,builds more and more.
So what's going to come of that iseventually very critical supreme
Court cases, one focusing more onthe President's authority over
(41:24):
these independent agencies,like you say, John, and
another over the president'sauthority to impound spending.
That is,
how much authority does the presidenthave over what Congress appropriates?
Can he choose not to spendall of the money, right?
And that again harkens back to an earlierpresidency that has a connection
(41:47):
to foreign policy as well.
We, we were speaking on foreign policyabout how many of Trump's moves may,
to Neil and me at least, seem motivatedby a sense of American weakness.
Well, that was, as Neil Ferguson knows,that was the inspiration
behind Kissingerian detente,which is America as a declining power,
(42:09):
had to make these moves vis a visChina and the Soviet Union.
Well, the other part of Nixon Kissingeradministration was Nixon's
desire to gain control over thebureaucracy that he inherited from lbj.
And that set up, of course, a seriesof crises and judicial rulings that
(42:30):
eventually helped create the governmentwe now have half a century later.
So in some ways, not only is thiswar against progressivism happening,
but we also have a return to kindof Nixon era views of the world and
of the federal government andthe President's place in it.
>> Niall Ferguson (42:48):
I completely agree with you, Matt.
I've been callingTrump Richard Nixon's revenge and
point out to people that very early onthere was a meeting of minds between
those two gentlemen, Richard Nixon,Donald Trump in New York City.
Their correspondence is very interesting.
And I think Nixon is oftenin Trump's mind, as you say,
(43:09):
there's the foreignpolicy dimension to it.
America is overstretch stretch,so we are gonna be realists, and
I'm gonna go to Beijing anddo a great big beautiful deal.
Well, that's straight outof the Nixon playbook.
And secondly, restore the imperialpresidency, Arthur Schlesinger had
the Imperial Presidency as a book atthe height of Nixon's power in 72.
(43:32):
And Donald Trump's vision is to get thepresidency back to where it was in 1972,
before the fall,before Watergate, which allowed,
which was really a victory forthe administrative state as well as for
the Democrats and their allies inthe media and the Department of Justice.
So there's a lot of kind of paybackhere for the mid-1970s going on.
(43:54):
And I think that's absolutelythe right way to think about this,
Richard Nixon's revenge.
>> H.R. McMaster (43:59):
And I think it carries over,
as Matt already alluded to the triangulardiplomacy with Beijing and Moscow.
The problem is the situationis fundamentally different.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin havedeclared their undying love for
each other andthe partnership with no limits.
They're talking jointly about changeswe haven't seen in a century.
(44:20):
And Xi Jinping turns and says, Vladimir,you and I are driving those changes.
And what they're talking about isrewriting the rules of international
discourse in favor of their authoritarianforms of government, and in China's case,
it's Mercantil's statist economic model.
And I think what would bemuch more effective for
advancing our interests would beto glue them together, you know,
(44:42):
recognize you're notgoing to separate them.
And the most important way to competewith China in the near term is to ensure
that Russia is defeated in Ukraine,these are connected.
What's happening is really kind ofa myopic view of these competitions in
many ways in which they're looked atas discrete competitions that are not
(45:03):
intertwined with one another,
when in fact this axis is quiteintertwined with one another.
And it's really only through seeing itholistically that you can really take
advantage of some of ourcompetitive advantages.
And when I say our, I meanthe United States, Europe, Japan and
other minded countries.
>> John H. Cochrane (45:24):
Back to what you had said.
So I'm all for the results,
I'm gonna actually think the politicizedbureaucracy was way too big.
And what we saw in USAID money goingstraight to political advocacy.
Our government doesn't actually doanything, it just writes checks to various
groups who then go on and do stuffthat we have no idea what's going on.
(45:47):
So, blowing all that up was great andthe dozers are amazing.
There have been, there's transparencywebsites, there's inspectors generals,
there are congressional investigations,there are committees.
The knowledge this was going on was,was common, but nothing was able to do it.
So I'm torn because I love the result,but I'm worried about the method and
what you describe the clue across.
(46:09):
Well, that's called common law,that's not the end of the world.
But what we need, we can't have noadministrative agencies unless we go
to libertarian nirvana andtake the federal government back to 1903,
which I wouldn't mind, butthat's not where it's going.
To have the courts decide this based on anoriginalism reading of the Constitution.
Well, framers had no idea that wewould be spending half a GDP on all
(46:31):
these agencies and there would bea National Environmental Quality act and
all the rest of it.
So, reading their original text to decidehow this should be done is probably not
going to get what we need is an effectivesystem of accountability and checks and
balances for administrative agenciesthat combine legislative rulemaking and,
(46:52):
and executive judge, jury,prosecution, executioner, all in one.
So they combine those functions, butthey, they need some set of checks and
balances and doing that through the courtsdoesn't seem the right way around it.
And I'm surprised at our right we'readvocating this as a wonderful new
principle because Democrats willeventually win an election and
all of a sudden the imperial presidencyconservatives will go back to,
(47:16):
it's terrible to have the imperialpresidency ruling by decree.
Well, you were up there saying how greata principle this was for four years.
>> Bill Whalen (47:23):
Well, John, welcome to the moral revolism of Washington and Democrats
ending the filibuster for judges and thenhaving a backfire in their face, so forth.
Our time is running out for the segment,
let me close it out with thisquick question to the four of you.
Presidency has four years to play out,
it also has 613 days to play out becauseMatt, that's when the midterm election is.
(47:45):
And there's a distinct possibility hewill lose the House, which means there'll
probably be another run in impeachmentin the second last two years.
So in the next 613 days, gentlemen,name one policy thing you're looking for
out of Trump in terms of what you wouldsay is a metric for his success, is it?
The big beautiful bill or something else?
Niall, what are you looking at?
>> Niall Ferguson (48:03):
Well, he's not King of Mar-a-Lago anymore.
He's President of the United States.
And legislation is a lot more important inthe final analysis than executive orders.
And it's going to be very challenging.
We can already see that.
To get the really big billthat does everything,
including extending the 2017tax cuts through this Congress.
(48:24):
I think that's the key test.
If that doesn't work,if they can't do major legislation,
then all you're left with is a greatpile of executive orders, which,
as John says, can be undone just as soonas the Democrats win the White House.
So that's the key.
It's what happens in Congress that counts.
That's the nature of the Americansystem of governance,
(48:45):
even if everybody focusesobsessively on the present.
>> Matthew Continetti (48:48):
Well, President Trump was re elected on the basis of
Americans disappointment withthe Biden economy and inflation and
the southern border.
I do think the most important policieshe has for the next four years is to
continue closing the southern border andfighting illegal immigration.
The way in which public opinion hasshifted on the issue of immigration as
(49:11):
a result of Biden's immigrationpolicies is extraordinary.
And a lot of Trump's legacy dependson his ability to prove that we
can control migration at thispoint in the 21st century.
>> H.R. McMaster (49:24):
I'm looking for reforms and investments that strengthen
national defense and strengthen it in abroad sense, not only in the capacity and
the capabilities,the modernization of our armed forces.
But also in our defense industrialbase and the supply chains that are so
critical to manufacturing andthe weapons and
munitions we need under the theory that,hey, it's a heck of a lot cheaper to
(49:47):
prevent a war through strength andhave to fight one.
And I think we do have somesignificant vulnerabilities.
I'm worried aboutthe kind of budget hawks,
others who may impede an effortto strengthen defense.
And as John said,the problem with our deficit,
with our debt overall is not the defensebudget, it's all the other spending.
>> Bill Whalen (50:11):
Okay, John, you get the last word.
>> John H. Cochrane (50:13):
My God, I'm so happy.
>> Bill Whalen (50:14):
Christmas comes early.
>> John H. Cochrane (50:15):
[LAUGH] So, as you said,
not much is going to get through Congress.
So let's just not much isgoing to get through Congress.
The big beautiful bill is gonna be onebig beautiful stew of various pork,
the way it always is.
Don't look for fundamental reforms there.
I think actually the hopeis the executive orders.
And my hope is blow it up with executiveorders, have the economy boom,
(50:38):
all sorts of horrible rot exposed,do well in the midterms, and
then you have a chance to pivot andcement what you've done with legislation,
fundamental institutional reform, so thatit can't all be done and done next time.
What he has to avoid issomething bad happening,
which isn't not just your own things,but there's other people out there.
(50:58):
So avoid losing a war.
That would be really good if you wantto keep building on your successes.
Events, my dear boy,as Niall keeps reminding us,
is the story of every administration.
>> Bill Whalen (51:09):
Matt, would you like to stick around for our final segment?
>> Matthew Continetti (51:12):
Absolutely.
>> Bill Whalen (51:12):
All right, and a game that we like to call Big Deal,
Little Deal or no Deal at All.
[MUSIC]
Okay, we have only about five minutes to lightning round.
I have four questions.
John, you're not going to like this.
I'm gonna ask a question.
Only one fellow gets a crack at it, buteach of you will get a tailored topic.
So here we go.
Question one,HR Trump fires air Force General CQ Brown,
(51:35):
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Big deal, little deal, no deal at all.
>> H.R. McMaster (51:42):
Yeah, I think it's a big deal.
I mean, it's not unprecedented.
I know it's lighting around.
Let me be quick about this.
I think there's a fundamentalmisunderstanding that your generals don't
make policy.
I mean,I think it's important to understand that.
And it was the civilian leadership inthe Department of Defense that was pushing
a lot of these reified philosophies thatwere inimical to combat effectiveness and
(52:04):
the warrior ethos.
I'm more concerned as concerned at least,
the firing of allthe Judge Advocate Generals.
Again, a misunderstanding.
Judge Advocate Generals giveadvice to commanders and
leaders who are free to disregard it.
And I think that there's amisunderstanding of really what it's going
(52:25):
to take in the department to keepthe military out of partisan politics and
reverse some of the damage thatthe Biden administration did.
>> Bill Whalen (52:35):
Right, John, the president wants to pitch a $5 million gold card for
permanent US residencylike American Express.
He wants to upgrade fromthe green card to the gold card.
Big deal, little deal, no deal at all.
>> John H. Cochrane (52:48):
Nice deal could be a much better deal.
So economists have long advocatedthe right way to handle immigration is
charge 10 grand, 20 grand at the border,and speak English.
20 grand at the border andno social services for five years.
Come on in.
We want people who come to the US work,pay taxes, bail out our Social Security.
(53:08):
And rationing it by money is a lot betterthan rationing it by the years it takes to
stand in line.
Now, there's not that manypeople with 5 million bucks,
and that brings in wealthyolder people with money.
I want younger people who can work andpay taxes.
People with 5 million bucksdon't pay Social Security taxes,
(53:28):
[LAUGH], because they're not working.
They're living off their investments.
So nice thing and a step in.
Trump gets a lot of badpress about immigration,
but he has said, staple a green cardto every STEM degree in the US.
That's another step in this direction.
So date but not marry yet.
I think it's a good stepin the right direction.
>> Bill Whalen (53:49):
Okay, so a nice deal.
>> John H. Cochrane (53:52):
Nice, but small.
>> Bill Whalen (53:53):
Matt Continetti, media vibe shift, the Washington Post parts ways
with its editorial page editor, JeffBezos, saying he wants his paper to focus
on, and I quote,personal liberties and free markets.
Big deal, little deal, no deal at all?
>> Matthew Continetti (54:05):
Big deal.
Let freedom ring.
I haven't heard news that's made me soexcited in a long while.
The idea that the defense of freedom andfree markets won't be consigned to
the Wall Street Journal editorial page andthe New York Post, but
we'll have another champion inthe national debate is exhilarating to me.
So very big deal.
>> John H. Cochrane (54:25):
[INAUDIBLE], Sign up to be editor,
they're looking for an editor.
>> Matthew Continetti (54:28):
The application is in the mail.
>> Donald Trump (54:30):
I was about to say Sir Niall Ferguson's media plate is pretty
full, but HR McMaster is a board memberof the Los Angeles Grumpy Economist.
Apply for the job.
>> H.R. McMaster (54:39):
[LAUGH] >> Bill Whalen
>> John H. Cochrane (54:44):
I'm an economist, I'm not a journalist.
And I value people for their expertise.
>> Bill Whalen (54:49):
Matt, that has hardly stopped a lot of people from posing as
journalists.
>> H.R. McMaster (54:52):
No, I thought economists were experts on everything, John.
>> John H. Cochrane (54:55):
[LAUGH] Let me play play them on TV.
I'm also very slow at writing.
>> Bill Whalen (54:59):
And our final question goes to Sir Niall Ferguson.
He's not gonna like this one,but it goes anyway.
This week in Six Nations Rugby action,England 16, Scotland 15.
>> Niall Ferguson (55:10):
Well, this is the essence of a moral victory.
Something that we Scots ofsomething of a specialty in.
Of course, Scotland won the game morallyby scoring three tries to England's one.
But our kicker, Finn Russell,had an off day.
Missed every single conversion.
Only one of them wouldhave been enough to win.
(55:30):
I was there actually with Thomas andCampbell.
Campbell's first ever experienceof international rugby.
He took it very personally.
He said I came as and they lost.
I said it wasn't your fault.
We have to let them win occasionally.
It's only fair.
>> Bill Whalen (55:44):
Sports is personal at that age,
Niall, my eight year old grand nephew isa Philadelphia Field Eagles zealot and
he could not have been more over the moonthan the super bowl, if you will.
We do have a couple minutes left,so quick question, gentlemen.
Anybody have a favorite hackman rolethat they'd like to share with us?
>> Niall Ferguson (55:58):
Gotta be French Connection.
>> Bill Whalen (55:59):
French Connection?
>> Matthew Continetti (56:00):
Crimson Tide, more recent with Denzel Washington.
Real battle of the Giants in that movie.
>> H.R. McMaster (56:07):
How about Hoosiers?
>> Bill Whalen (56:08):
I was gonna say Hoosiers.
You took that for me, John.
>> John H. Cochrane (56:11):
Conversation.
>> Bill Whalen (56:12):
Conversation, well done.
Speaking of conversation, gentlemen,that is it for this conversation.
I want to thank our guest,Matt Continetti for joining us today.
By all means, check out the excellentcommentary magazine podcast that Matt is
always a part of.
And we'll be back with the newgoodfellows in early March, so
keep an eye out for that.
On behalf of the goodfellows, Sir, NiallFerguson, John Cochrane, and HR McMaster,
our guest today, Matt Continetti,we hope you enjoyed the show.
(56:33):
Till next time, take care.
Thanks for watching.
>> Gene Hackman (56:38):
We didn't ask you to fight for us, but damn it,
don't fight against us.
Leave us alone.
How many more sacrifices?
How much more blood?
(56:59):
How many more lives?
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