We Win, They Lose, with Matthew Kroenig | GoodFellows: John H. Cochrane, Niall Ferguson, H.R. McMaster, and Bill Whalen | Hoover Institution - GoodFellows: Conversations from the Hoover Institution

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>> Ronald Reagan (00:00):
Now, let's set the record straight.

(00:01):
There's no argument over the choicebetween peace and war, but
there's only one guaranteedway you can have peace, and
you can have it in the next second,surrender.
Admittedly, there's a risk in anycourse we follow other than this.
But every lesson of history tells us thatthe greater risk lies in appeasement.
And this is the specter our well-meaningliberal friends refuse to face,

(00:24):
that their policy ofaccommodation is appeasement, and
it gives no choice between peace andwar, only between fight or surrender.
[MUSIC]

>> Bill Whalen (00:37):
It's Tuesday, August 6, 2024, and welcome back to GoodFellows,
a Hoover Institution Broadcast examiningsocial, economic, political, and
geopolitical concerns.
I'm Bill Whalen.
I'm a Hoover distinguished policy fellow.
I'll be your moderator today, joinedby two of the three stars of our show,
our GoodFellows, as we like to call them.
In the house today,we have the economist John Cochrane and
former presidential nationalsecurity advisor HR McMaster.

(00:59):
They're both Hoover senior fellows.
Not joining us today,we think he's somewhere on the high seas,
maybe singing sea shanties or HMS Pinaforeis the historian Niall Ferguson.
But we'll have Niall back onour next show in September, and
I'll tell you more aboutthat at the end of the show.
Joining us today to talk about worldpolitics, making his GoodFellows debut,
is Matthew Kroenig.
Mister Kroenig is vice president and

(01:19):
senior director of the Atlantic CouncilScowcroft Center for Strategy and
Security.
His research focuses on US nationalsecurity strategy, strategic competition
with China and Russia, and strategicdeterrence and weapons non-proliferation.
Matthew Kroenig is here todiscuss his latest book.
It's titled We Win They Lose, RepublicanForeign Policy & the New Cold War.
The book's title comes from a quoteby Ronald Reagan regarding his

(01:40):
Soviet Cold War policy, the authorarguing that this should be the goal for
America and its allies andpartners in the new struggle with China.
Matt, welcome to GoodFellows.

>> Matthew Kroenig (01:49):
Thanks, it's an honor to be here.

Thank you. We hope you feel the way after we're
done with you.
Let's get into your book.
But first, let's talk about somebreaking news around the world.
Earlier today,Israel Defense forces, the IDF,
announced that it carried outan airstrike in southern Lebanon,
reportedly killing fourHezbollah operatives.
That comes one day after Hezbollahreportedly launched a rocket and
drone attack in northern Israel.
And soit goes in that corner of the world,

(02:12):
the two sides exchanging daily strikes forten months now,
this week being the ten-monthanniversary of Hamas attack on Israel.
Matt, we know that Israel is ona defense footing right now,
expecting an attack from Israel.
I want you to pull out your crystalball and tell us exactly how this goes.
Is Iran going to attack Israel?
Is Israel going to do somethingproactively against Iran?
Does Hezbollah fire first?

(02:33):
Does Israel fire first at Hezbollah?
Do we see Hezbollah andIran tagging up on Israel or vice versa?
Or am I missing something here?
Is there an exit ramp thatwe're all overlooking?

Yeah, well,
my fear is that we can expect a bigattack from Iran against Israel.
And if you think back to the last roundof exchanges, several months ago, Iran
launched this unprecedented attack againstIsrael, hundreds of drones and missiles.
Fortunately, the United States andits allies were able to shoot and

(03:03):
Israel were able to shootalmost all of them down.
But then the Biden administrationrestrained Israel from responding, and
I think that was a mistake.
And I think the lesson that Iran mighttake from this is that now it can get away
with large scale attacks onIsrael without a response.
And so that's my fear.
Well, we'll see if I'm right.
And then I think the solution isto recognize that Iran is the head

(03:26):
of the snake behind all of this.
We have to end the fiction thatHezbollah somehow acting on its own and
to make that clear in our policy thatthe United States and Israel will
hold Iran responsible for theseHezbollah and other attacks on Israel.
And I think essentially we havea deterrence failure problem that needs to
be addressed.

H.R. >> H.R. McMaster
hey, Matt, I'd like to justexpound on that a little bit.
Hey, first of all, I'm a huge fanof the book We Win, They Lose,
as well as your previous book onThe Return of Great Power Competition.
So congratulations on it.
And I think it deserves readingby all Americans because I think
you lay out the importance of really,Reagan has peace through strength.
But also how us engagement with thesedifficult challenges abroad can help

(04:11):
prevent them from growing even moredangerous and prevent us from having to
deal with them at an exorbitantcost once they reach our shores.
So great job on that.
I'd just like to ask you about howdo you view the Biden administration
policy overall towards Iran andthe Middle East?
Maybe before and then after October 7?

(04:33):
And what is the degree to which thosepolicies, which I think we agree were
wrong-headed, have contributed to whatI think all of us recognize is almost
certainly to be a conflict that escalates,to use the word that they like to use
when they're talking about theircontinuous efforts to de-escalate.

Well, thanks a lot, General McMaster, and thanks for
mentioning the book,which is available on Amazon.
I think, and I have a chapter onMiddle East policy in the book, but
I think you andthe Trump administration had it right.
And traditionally, US strategy in theMiddle East has been to support Israel,
support other traditional partnerslike the Gulf states, and

(05:16):
to organize the region against Iran andterrorist groups.
And I think, unfortunately, Middle Eaststrategy has become more partisan.
And I think the Democrats and the Bidenadministration have had a different idea,
that they can negotiate with Iran,that maybe our traditional allies
are part of the problem,calling Saudi Arabia pariah state.

(05:39):
And I think that hasn't worked.
I think that the Trump administrationapproach worked better.
And fortunately, right after October 7, Ithink Biden had a moment of moral clarity.
He said that he would support Israel,had Israel's back, and
that was the policy early on andthen has changed over time.
I think because of criticism fromthe progressive left and others.

(06:00):
He's trying to have it both ways,and it's not satisfying anyone.
And I think it is a failing policy.
And so what I advocate for in the book isa return to something like what you did in
the Trump administration of workingwith traditional allies to contain Iran.
But I'd love your viewon the issue as well.

>> H.R. McMaster (06:22):
Yeah, I just think overall, it goes to the tone of your book.
I think that this idea ofescalation management,
we've talked about this quitea bit on GoodFellows, John.
I think what that does is it gives theIranians license to escalate on their own
terms with impunity because I think theyare willing to pursue their objectives
down to the last Arab, down to the lastPalestinian because we act like we

(06:46):
don't know what the return address is.
And, John, I know you've got somestrong thoughts on this, and
as we see this conflictcontinue to evolve.
Well, what questions do you have forMatt, or what's on your mind?

>> John H. Cochrane (06:56):
Yeah, I got, so let me ask questions.
I get to play every man here andask the idiot question.
One thing I noticed is that what we seemto be doing, to some extent, Israel too.
Well, Israel taking outcommanders of Hamas,
that's actually a militarything that helps.
There is a tendency to, you do something,and then I show you I'm tough.

(07:17):
It's like the pushing stageof a bar fight as opposed to
the actual fighting stage of a bar fight.
And I'm curious at what point you stoptrying to respond to show how tough you
are and instead do somethingthat has a military advantage.
I think of the Houthis.
Instead of shooting down missiles,they come in.
Why don't we shoot down the rocketlaunchers or the supply of rockets instead

(07:39):
of treating those as inviolate andthen try to shoot them as they come in, or
have a really stern denunciationwhen they do stuff?
And I'm just curious,is that not militarily feasible?
Why are we not actually to fight the war?
And the larger question?
Yes, we seem to think thatthe answer is to deescalate,
which means to appease andthat there's something to negotiate about.

(08:00):
About whereas when the other side says,well, are you going to commit suicide
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow,that's what we want to know.
[LAUGH] But when do we apply,We Win They Lose?
I mean, what is the end game with Iran?
The only end game I cansee is regime change,
which most of the people inside Iranwould love dearly to have happen.
They're not particularly fondof this business either.

(08:22):
Why do we pretend we're hereto negotiate with them?
And I'll stop there for the moment, but
when we got to add the nukequestion into this, and
that's the larger questionwith our strategic policy.

I think HR, you're gonna respond?

No, I was gonna ask you, Matt, to respond.
I mean, I think part of the reason forJohn's, for our behavior this way and
the belief that Iran's gonnachange his behavior is a myth that
the Iranians have deliberately createdhere and fostered in the United States.
That there's this competition withinIran between the Republicans and
the revolutionaries.
But, hey, that competition is over,the revolutionaries won.

(09:04):
But, Matt, what's your view on that?

Isn't it the regime versus the people?
I didn't think in the regimethere was much competition.

Well, I mean, what they try to do is get the United States to
welcome them back into the internationalorder, alleviate sanctions,
just not enforce sanctions,make other concessions.
Under the belief that doing so
reinforces kind of the Republicanswithin the Iranian government.
And I think this has been a deliberatesort of information operation that they've

(09:31):
been running on us throughcertain agents and
useful idiots who they've cultivatedin academia and the think tanks, and
across the western world, butespecially in the United States.
But, Matt, I know there are otherdimensions of this as well.
What are your thoughts on John's question?
Why the heck don't we realize [LAUGH] thata tougher approach in favor of the Iranian

(09:52):
people and against the theocraticdictatorship is really what's called for?

Yes, well, I think we agree that this constant search for
the moderates within the Iranian regimehas led to a lot of failures in US policy
toward Iran.
And even this last presidential electionthe western media was talking about how
the successful candidate is a moderate.
And there really are nomoderates in the Iranian regime.
And, John, I think you're absolutelyright, we should be shooting the archers,

(10:21):
not the arrows, in the region,when it comes to the Houthis and others.
But I think there's essentially twodifferent kind of theories about what's
driving the conflict in the region.
And I think the Biden administrationhas this idea of accidental escalation,
that we're gonna do somethingthat's gonna provoke Iran.
They're gonna have to retaliate,Israel's gonna retaliate,
it's gonna spiral out of control.

(10:41):
Therefore, we need to manage theescalation and respond, but not too hard.
And I have a different theoryof what's driving the conflict.
I think it's a deterrence failure thatIran has learned that it can get away with
this aggression withoutsuffering serious consequences.
And so I think the way to stop it is tocommunicate very clearly to Tehran that

(11:02):
if they cross certain lines,including proxy attacks on Israel or
international shipping,that there will be severe consequences.
That could be things like sinkingtheir navy or killing Soleimani,
something that coming backto the book that Reagan and
Trump were willing to do andmore of a peace through strength approach.
But I think the Biden administrationhas been unwilling to do it.

(11:25):
And then, John, ultimately,I do think that the problem,
the only way to solve this long-term iswith a different government in Iran that
respects the human rights of its people,that's more cooperative internationally.
And I do think this regime is weak,but we're gonna have to deal
with challenges in the near term,probably before that happens.
Including the nuclear program,

(11:46):
which Secretary Blinken says now is one totwo weeks breakout time till game over.
So serious challenges indeed.

Matt, can I ask you a more general question?
Cuz John and I have been engaged withthese discussions with Niall about
kind of an internationalist approachto foreign policy versus kind
of the retrenchers these days.
Especially those in the Republican Partyand with the narrow Republican majority
in the House,they've been super empowered in many ways.

(12:16):
And there are reasons why a lotof Americans are skeptical about
our ability to run an effectiveforeign policy and
have an approach ofinternational engagement.
What is your argument?
What is your argument in the book?
And then what do you say tothe retrenchers in the Republican Party?
And those who are arguing for usdisengagement from some of these complex

(12:38):
competitions, like maybe support forUkraine, for example, or
those who have viewed the Middle eastmainly as just a mess to be avoided.
What is the argument for an internationalapproach to foreign policy,
for the Republican Party in particular?

Yes, well, I do have a section on this in the book, and
I think even if you have an Americafirst foreign policy and
your purpose is to look afterthe interest of the American people.
We live in an interconnected world andthe peace and prosperity and freedom of
the American people directly depends onwhether you have peace and stability,
especially in the three primary theatersof Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

(13:17):
And so we went to war twice in the past100 years to restore peace to Europe.
And so maintaining peace andstability there is important,
Europe is still our numberone trading partner.
Middle East, we saw in 911 that notdealing with threats in the Middle East
can come and have direct consequences forthe United States.

(13:38):
Even though the United States is moreenergy independent than it used to be,
energy is a global market.
So disruptions to energy supplies inthe Middle East hurts the pocketbooks of
Americans sitting at the kitchentable in Ohio and everywhere else.
And these adversaries, Russia,China, Iran, North Korea,
are increasingly working together.

(13:59):
They don't see these theaters as separate,they see them as interconnected.
They're messing around in our democracywith disinformation and other things.
And so I think being engaged andworking with our allies to counter
these revisionist autocraciesis not some globalist crusade.
It's about making the average personin Missouri, where I grew up, safer,

(14:21):
richer, and freer.

Let me channel the JD Vance's of the world.
I believe you, and I think most of usbelieve you as a matter of desirability.
But you look at how Iraq turned out,Afghanistan,
Syria, Libya, our retreat in Ukraine.
They look and say, well,you're sending my kids off, and-

Afghanistan, John,
right, Afghanistan.

Sorry, I left out the big one, Afghanistan.
How many wars are you gonna lose?
So I think there's a distrust ofthe competence of our foreign policy
establishment to see anything through,rather than wouldn't it be nice if the US
became strong and determined and able tosee things through and get things done.

Yeah, so I'm working on a new book now, actually
called force for how American power makesthe world safer, richer, and freer.
So I think that you're right, John, a lotof people focus on the mistakes in US
foreign policy, andthere have been mistakes.
But they're selecting on the dependentvariable, to use a social science term.
They're not looking at the full range ofUS foreign policy actions and the results.

(15:26):
And if you look at just the empiricaldata from 1945 to the present,
the world is a lot safer, richer, andfreer than it was before the dawn of
the American era,Zero Great Power Wars in 70 years.
Average standard of livingin the United States and
globally five times todaywhat it was in 1945.
We often forget in 1945, there were onlyabout a dozen democracies in the world.

(15:50):
Today, there are nearly 100 democraticcountries in the world, and
it's a direct result of US leadershipin the world in creating alliances.
And establishing peace in Europe andAsia, a remarkable accomplishment.
2500 years of wars in Europe cameto an end because of NATO and
US engagement there.

(16:12):
United States advocating for
free markets globally that hashelped to make the world richer.
And then I think the United States alsopromoting its values has made the world
and ultimately the American people freer.
So, yes, I think we've mademistakes in Iraq and elsewhere, but
I think the overall record is that usengagement has been good for the world and

(16:33):
good for the American people.

Matt, let's look at another country and ask the question of
what would Reagan do and what you call theTrump Reagan fusion and foreign policy.
That would be Venezuela.
Now, the United States has recognizedthe opposition candidate as the winner of
that election, but our government is notdoing much in the way of really kind of
making a lot of noise on this matter.
You contrast that to the Reaganyears where he went into Grenada,

(16:57):
the Bush years where we took out Noriega.
There is somebody who's been veryvocal about the results, and
that is John's friendJavier Malay at Argentina,
who has been very loudly denouncingthe treatment of the opposition.
What is the card to play in Venezuela?
What should we be doing here?

Yeah, I don't think that we have a lot of great options, but
I think we should at least be clearabout what we're trying to achieve.
But I think we do want a better governmentin Venezuela for a variety of reasons,
because it's becoming a foothold forRussia and China in our own backyard.
And so the Chinese, for example, haveset up a ground satellite station there

(17:39):
that probably can be used tospy on the United States,
the Russians providing arms andmilitary advisors.
And so I think we don't want that kind ofadversarial influence in our own region.
And so working to push Maduro out andget a better government in,
I think, would advance US interests.
How exactly to do that?

(18:00):
I don't have great ideas andwe cover a lot of ground in the book, but
we don't have a Latin America chapter.
So I don't know, maybe HR Johnhave the solution to, to that one.

Well, one of my dear friends, Leopoldo Lopez,
who's just a fantastic guy who runsthe world Liberty Congress now and
was an opposition politician.
And a fantastic mayor of Caracasuntil he was imprisoned by Maduro and
then escaped after sevenyears of imprisonment.
It's just a dramatic, fantastic story, hebelieves that we have to do everything we
can to support the oppositionat this stage.

(18:31):
He laments the fact that the Bidenadministration lifted the sanctions
on Venezuela to try to incentivizea return to the constitution,
a return to representative governmentthat has utterly failed now.
So I think now it's time to impose costson the regime as well as I think go after
some of these relationships.
You mentioned, the Chinese andthe Russians to try to maybe insulate or

(18:54):
disrupt their support forthis oppressive regime,
which is now imprisoning and killing andwounding hundreds of Venezuelans.
And you're right,it's not getting much attention, John, and
then also the Cubans as well,who are actually quite weak now.
I mean, this is something thatalso hasn't been covered.
There have been more Cuban refugeesfleeing the disaster that is Cuba than

(19:19):
really at any time inrecent memory as well.
So again, these authoritarian regimes,
they look really strongsometimes from the outside.
And Maduro with his uniform, hey,theyre actually quite brittle.
So I think we should be doing everythingwe can to support the Venezuelan people in
this case and also to support the Cubanpeople, the Nicaraguan people, for

(19:40):
example, as well.
So the pink wave that has hit,
I think the hemisphere is gonna reversebecause of these failed models.
I don`t know how Petro can advocate this,is the leader of Colombia for
this move to the left when he sees theutter failure, obviously, of Venezuela.
And John, I mean,I don't know what you think,

(20:01):
what seems to be an apparentsuccess in Argentina, right?
Is that what we're seeing is, andMelee has a long way to go, but
is it working in Argentina?

You haven't been reading your New York Times lately,
Venezuela is an example ofbrutal capitalism, which may.

No, that was crazy, I saw that piece, that was crazy.

It explains a lot of what Washington thinks and
why they willing to go along with people.
Malay is so far,inflation is way, way down.
And by removing rent controls in BuenosAires, there are now apartments to rent
and rents went down 20% whenthey removed the rent controls.
Something that San Franciscomight wanna learn,

(20:43):
a lot of interesting stuff going on.
I'd like to pivot if I can, Bill,will you let me to nuclear questions cuz.

Right ahead.

It's something you're an expert on here, but this is something,
as an economist, I think,about game theory, nuclear and so forth.
We had something that we sort ofunderstood with us versus the Russians,
massive nuclear exchanges and deterrence,but now the situation is much different.
So what I see is the Biden doctrine,let's call it in Ukraine,
which basically goes, if you rattle yournukes, you can grab anything you want,

(21:15):
and we won't do anything about it.
We will certainly not allow evenUkraine to do conventional attacks
on supply lines in Russia.
You get what you want ifyou rattle your nukes,
certainly with Iran,Iran is going to have nukes soon.
And is the Biden doctrinegoing to extend to Iran?

(21:38):
So in the case of where the threat is nota massive exchange, this is a new thing.
But the threat is one tacticalnuclear weapon might go off,
what is our credible plan?
But you need in game theory to deter,
you need a credible plan b thatyou can and will actually use.
The only one I can think of is a massiveconventional response to a small nuclear

(22:01):
attack, because that has to be one thatyou can do and one that you will do.
We are not gonna murder hundred millionRussians over one tactical nuclear weapon
likewise the Iranians.
Is it suddenly hands off oncethey get a nuclear weapon and
we keep talking about China and how we'regonna go in and go take Taiwan back.

(22:22):
I cannot believe that ifwe're not gonna let Ukraine,
Ukraine use weapons in Russiacuz Russia has some nukes,
that we are gonna go attack Taiwan, giventhat China has God knows how many nukes.
So help us out on whereis nuclear deterrence,
nuclear strategy in this new world thatisn't just massive exchange with Russia.
But either small states with one ortwo weapons, a state that can

(22:47):
threaten a tactical nuclear weapon,and no clearly stated plan.
I mean, the plan b, I think, forIran has to be, you do anything and
we will replay Gulf war one.
You sit off any nuclear weapon, it'sa conventional invasion and regime change.
That's possible,it's credible if you wanna do it.

(23:07):
But what else is the credible responsethat puts this back in the bottle?
Sorry for the lecture, you're the expert,and this is something on my mind.

No, great, you set it up perfectly.
And I think the nuclear threat environmentwe face in some ways is worse than in
the Cold War, because in the Cold War, wehad a kind of one nuclear peer adversary.
And now with, with China's massivenuclear buildup, for the first time,
we have to deal with two nearpeer nuclear adversaries.
And in fact, I was appointed byCongress to a congressional commission,

(23:37):
a strategic posture commission,to study this issue.
And we delivered our reportto Congress in October.
It was bad timing,it came out October 13 or something.
And so all the attention was onthe attacks of October 7 but
I guess I'd say a few things.
One, I think we need to relearn someof the things that we forgot during
the Cold War.

(23:57):
Because during the Cold War, it wasn'tjust the adversaries that rattled.
The nuclear saber we did as well,and I direct the Scowcroft center.
And so the 1973 Arab Israeli crisis,
the Soviet Union was thinking aboutintervening militarily in the crisis.
United States put its nuclear weaponson high alert, Brent Scowcroft and
Henry Kissinger made a number of publicstatements that if the Soviet Union were

(24:19):
to intervene, the consequenceswould be incalculable, and
the Soviet Union decided not to intervene.
So going to Ukraine first, imagine inFebruary 2022, if Biden, instead of saying
a minor incursion, might be okay, if heput nuclear weapons on high alert and
said Russia would neverthink of invading Ukraine,
the consequences would be incalculable.

(24:39):
I don't know I think Putin might havebeen deterred we might have avoided
this conflict.

Can you stop you right there?
Let me just stop here because I teed uptoo many, but let's think about Ukraine.
But it's not credible that the US is gonnalaunch a nuclear attack on Russia if
Russia invades Ukraine, what is credibleis that the US will allow NATO and HR and
his tank buddies to roll Russia backconventionally and call the bluff.

(25:04):
No, you are not gonna launch nuclearweapons in response to a conventional
defense of Ukraine,which we could do in a week.
Isn't that the more credibledeterrence for Russia in Ukraine?

Well, I think I ultimately agree, but let me go ahead and
fight the premise anyway.
What was it really crediblethat Ford would have, or
in the 1970s that we would havelaunched a nuclear war with
the Soviet Union if theysent forces into Egypt?
Probably not but the consequences are highenough that if the Soviets think there's

(25:35):
even a little bit of a chance,they might rethink it and so
I think that's what Putin's doing to us,essentially.
Is he really going tolaunch a nuclear war?
Maybe not, but we think the risk is highenough and the consequences great enough,
that Biden's going togreat lengths to avoid it.
So I think we should relearn some ofthose lost lessons of deterrence.
But the United States andNATO have thought through,

(25:58):
cuz Russia has this kindof scary nuclear doctrine,
escalate to de escalate, pop off a nuke or2 or 12 to get NATO to back down.
And so if it happened in a NATO country,say Russia invaded Estonia, I think we do
have a pretty good strategy, which isto essentially have flexible options.
And so it's not suicide or surrenderthat we could retaliate with limited

(26:21):
nuclear options of our own andso Putin doesn't win.
He just gets into a limited nuclear warwith the United States, which is in his
interest and thanks to HR and the Trumpadministration for developing two new low
yield nuclear weapons,essentially deal with this problem.
What makes Ukraine harderis it's not a NATO ally and
Biden has essentially said thathe's not gonna get involved at all.

(26:43):
And so it is really incredible then thatif Putin used a nuclear weapon in Ukraine,
that suddenly Biden woulduse nuclear weapons.
So I do think that if Russia were to usenuclear weapons in Ukraine, you're right,
that the way to deter that andrespond if deterrence fails would be for
a conventional action that imposes a coston Russia sinking the Black Sea fleet or

(27:06):
something like that.
But, hr, I see you nodding, how are you?

No, I just think in general terms that you shouldn't
take things off the table, right?
You shouldn't rule out courses ofaction and thats really what the Biden
administration has done is said hereare all the things were not going to do.
And, of course,that removes ambiguity for Putin and
I think in many ways like greenlighted the invasion of Ukraine.
John, on your suggestion that wecould do with conventional forces,

(27:30):
I'll tell you the army isnot big enough anymore.
I mean, it's a much smallerarmy it's getting smaller.
And also it's important to look at thedifference in scale between Iraq and Iran,
not only in terms of geographic area andcomplexity, but also based on population.
So it's a much tougher task to invade,for example, Iran.

(27:56):
And I think, obviously, the change in thenature of the regime there has got to come
from the Iranian people ultimately.
But you can set conditions forthat and you can place obviously,
a lot of assets of value to Iran at risk.
And you can weaken the regime through morelimited military operations, not just
strikes, but also maybe some raids and soforth or operations along certain areas,

(28:18):
like Natanz, for example, if you wantto dismantle the nuclear capabilities.
So, I mean, I think all of theseoptions should be on the table for
employing all elements of national powerto remove what I think the Israelis
recognize through the beginning doctrine[LAUGH] is an unacceptable risk.
I mean, how do you allow a countrythat has vowed to destroy you and

(28:40):
to destroy you with the most destructiveweapons on earth to get those most
destructive weapons?
So, John, I think the, Matt, I'd love toknow what both of you think about this.
I think Israel's going to act,
I would say, maybe even within the yearagainst Iran's nuclear capabilities.
I think after they deal with Hezbollah andSouthern Lebanon, which is next up,

(29:03):
I think that they're already planning andmay have already green lighted and
are developing the plans andrefining the plans and
the capabilities to strike at Iran'snuclear and missile capabilities.
And obviously to do everything between nowand then short of that, they can do it and
they've demonstrated a significantcapability with the Haniyeh assassination,

(29:25):
for example.
So, Matt, what are your thoughts on allthis about what happens next in terms of
the threat that you've highlighted here,which is Iran with a nuclear weapon?

Yeah, well, John posited that they'll get nuclear weapons
soon, and I fear that he's right, but I'mnot willing to acquiesce to that yet and
I do think that we have a military option.
Several presidents have said thatmilitary options on the table and
that a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable.
And years ago, people would say,well, the United States or

(29:56):
Israel shouldn't take militaryaction because Israel would respond.
They'd ask Hezbollah and Hamas to attackthat the region would be in crisis.
Well, that argument doesn't really workanymore the region's already in crisis and
it seems like, I mean, if I were in aposition like you had before HR, I'd say,
mister president,this may be an opportunity.

(30:18):
If Iran hits Israel, this is an invitationfor us to destroy the nuclear facilities
and solve what's really the majorchallenge because this is bad enough,
but imagine if Iran had nuclear weapons,this would be much, much worse.

I think the opportunity was in April, Matt,
with the massive 500 or soprojectiles headed in Iran,
instead of saying take the win,I think you're right.
That was a tremendous opportunity tosignificantly degrade Iran's capabilities.

John, do you feel better now.

Direct attacks on Israel by missile are not acceptable from
conventional or nuclear andwe've kind of said, no, that's fine, so
long as you can shoot them down.

Matt, can I ask one more question from your book you talk about,
you wrote an article forforeign policy, actually,
you talked about the Trump ReaganForeign Policy unifying Republicans.
My question, if there is a Trump-VanceAdministration a year from now,
what is their policy in termsof boots on the ground?
It seems to me, Matt,
that technology allows us to doa lot of killing from distance.

(31:22):
We can target people with drones andmissiles and we can drop bombs from above
but there's always a thorny questionof when do you put us troops in?
You argue that United Republicansare united on Foreign Policy, but
it seems to me, Matt, that if you sendtroops into Harm's Way somewhere,
people are going to scream fromthe raptors, no more forever wars.

Yes well, so I do argue that the Republican Party is
more united than many peopleappreciate in the book.
And yes, there are real differences overUkraine and elsewhere, but I think when it
comes to the big issues, the party isstill largely united and one of them,
I think, is on this piece throughstrength idea, which was something that.

(32:01):
Reagan talked about somethingthat Trump also talks about.
And I think, essentially, the idea is bothparts are important, peace and strength,
that the United States should be so strongthat no adversary dare challenge us.
But if they do challenge us, I think thereis a willingness to punch back hard and
mention the example of Reagan sinking theIranian navy or Trump killing Soleimani.

(32:23):
But I think that their piece is important,I think there is a skepticism
towards of longer drawn out militaryactivities with no clear end in sight.
And Reagan withdrew marines from Lebanon.
Trump was wanting to wind downthe conflict in Afghanistan.

(32:43):
And I think that's part ofthe reason Republicans are wary with
Ukraine right now.
When Biden says that we're gonnado this as long as it takes and
can't really articulate whetherthe goal is to win or not.
I think, many Republicans are saying,well, is this just another Vietnam or
Afghanistan?
What are we actually doing here?

(33:04):
So, in short,
I guess I do think there is unity aroundthis peace through strength idea.
And yes, I think there is a hesitancyto do something like Iraq or
Afghanistan again but.

Did you think that the doubtful wing of the Republican party
wants to hear, we wanna win, [LAUGH]America wins and would support a war,
if the goal was we win, you lose,I love how you quoted Reagan on that.
Not, well, we're going to negotiate andwe're gonna waste a whole lot of time.

Have a responsible end, right?
Whatever the hell that means, right?

[LAUGH] And push them back to the negotiating.
So certainly,I think there's an attraction.
I mean, asking for verification ofpeople who are quite skeptical based on
the history of, well, here's how it'sgonna be different from this time.
The objective is win, period, [LAUGH]that seems like it's gonna go somewhere.
I am worried, though,as I listen to Republican Party and

(34:03):
Democratic too,that a lot of what we're planning to do in
this cold war is going to hurtus more than it hurts them.
Big tariffs, cutting off our allies,getting out of trade agreements with
our allies, tariffs against Europeans,protectionism, subsidies.
We were strong and a great manufacturingpower in the 1950s because we

(34:27):
were better than everybody else,not because we had walled fortresses to
defend inefficient ways ofsubsidized ways of doing things.
And peace through strength hasto be strength and freedom and
being better than everyone else.
Not protection, subsidies, retreat, and
I just worry that that's gonnabe a very ineffective way.

(34:51):
We build 5 ships a year,China builds 300 ships a year.
Raising the costs ofmaking ships in the US and
protective barriers is notgonna turn that around.

Yeah, that's what I'd like to maybe ask Matt,
what is your assessmentof John's position here.
You follow this pretty closely.
You're in Washington, man, we're out herein California trying not to go soft and
enjoy life, man.
So what are your predictions aboutif it is a Trump administration,
what trade policy looks like,but also what foreign policy,

(35:22):
national security policy looks like?
What do you think is most likelyto be President Trump's agenda and
the agenda of those who heassembles in a new administration?

Yes, well, we do have a chapter in the book on trade and
economic policy.
So we do argue that when it comes toa country like China that's not playing by
free and fair market principles, that'ssystematically stealing intellectual
property, etc., that these moreprotectionist measures do make sense.
We argue that we need a hard decouplingin areas of national security and

(35:59):
that we should push back with tariffs and
other counter prevailingmeasures where they're cheating.
But to allow, if they wanna buy soybeans,I think that's fine.
If Americans wanna buy made-in-Chinat shirts, I think that's fine.
So I'd be interested in John's view onthat does he think that even with China,
we shouldn't be using tariffs?

(36:20):
What we argue in the book is that,though, when it comes to allies,
we should be expanding trade andinvestment there, consistent with free and
fair market principles.
So as we kind of secure supply chains andmove them out of China,
reshoring and fringe shoring,we argue, does make sense.
And in terms of Trump'sthreats on tariffs and NHR,
you maybe have better insights intohis psychology than anyone but

(36:44):
my sense is this is the negotiatingtactic he laid out in art of the deal.
He starts with the big threat, 10% acrossthe board, tariffs on everyone, but
if you don't like it,let's have a conversation and France,
let's talk about youragricultural subsidies.
I'm skeptical that he's actuallygoing to put that in place and
the first day, I think it's partof his negotiating strategy.

Yeah,
as much as it's my job as an economistto say tariff is always bad,
even a 10% tariff if it happened and if itwas net and you got credit for exports.
Compared to national rent control andraising taxes on everyone to 90%,
yeah, it's not the smartestthing in the world, but
there's worse things [LAUGH]>> H.R. McMaster: Hey, Matt,

(37:28):
it's a great book,I just maybe give you the last word.
So what would you sum up asthe argument in the book?
What is your pitch, right?
What is your pitch to not just the bookitself but the argument in the book for
an international, reasonable approach toforeign policy that prioritizes American
interests, that recognizes, hey, we'renot gonna solve all the world's problems.

(37:52):
But if we disengage, those problems getworse and we're down to our disbenefit.
What's your overall argument tocounter the kind of argument of
the retrenchers ofthe Quincy Institute and others?

Yeah, well, cover a lot of ground in the book, and
the title is We Win, They Lose, so thereis a focus on the competition with China.
We say the Biden administration approachof just saying we're gonna manage their
competition with China, we don't thinkreally makes sense, manage to what end?
We think we should declarevictory is the goal.
But on your point about the retrenchers,

(38:30):
I think the argumentjust doesn't make sense.
We've seen what an isolationistUnited States looks like in history,
it led to two major wars in Europe.
We've seen what an engaged United Stateslooks like over the past 70 years,
70 years of peace, prosperity and freedom.
And soI think pulling back would be a mistake,
there's a lot of evidence for that.

(38:52):
And I guess one concrete recommendation,
when is the last time a US president hasmade the case to the American people?
This is why we're in Europe.
This is why we're in Asia.
This is why we're in the Middle east.
This is how it affects you at yourkitchen table in Missouri or Ohio.
And so I think there has beena failure of leadership here.
And I think my number one recommendationto a new president, whether it's Harris or

(39:17):
Trump, would be to give that speech andexplain to the American people why they
benefit from an engaged United States andthe world.

Matt, our time is up, but you need to come back on Goodfellows
because John Cochrane andNiall Ferguson and
HR have been having a very gentlemanlyconversation about economics and
foreign policy for, well,a better part of 150 shows now.
So we need you back to either participateor referee, I don't know what,
but do come back.
We enjoy the conversation.
The book, again, is We Win They Lose,Republican Foreign Policy and

(39:45):
the New Cold War,you can get it now on Amazon.
Matt, thanks for joining Goodfellas today.

Thanks, Matt.

My pleasure, thanks for having me.
Happy to come back anytime.

Under our B block, and that is gonna be talking about the markets
and the world financial, well,is panic too strong of a word?
It certainly was a panic on Monday.
Today is Tuesday.
Things are a little calmer.
I think it's a good opportunity to turn tothe author of the Grumpy Economist to talk
about what is a decidedlygrumpy world economy.
John->> H.R. McMaster: I'm telling you,
I think he's huggy.
I think it should be the huggy economist.

[LAUGH] >> Bill Whalen
Okay, John,walk us through what's going on.
So we saw just abject slaughter on Monday.
The Nikkei went down, I think about 12%.
The Nasdaq when the 100 got slaughtered.
The next day things come down,I think the Nikkei goes up 10%.

(40:34):
The Dallas bends bouncing back as well.
I'm a political hack, so I keephearing the word recession tossed in
the conversation nowas it's election year.
But you said something interestingbefore the show, that recessions,
quote in your words, require a spark.
Well, John Crocker, when the world marketsare melting down, isn't that a spark?
Not necessarily.
Now, I wanna say here,I've been studying this for 50 years.

(40:56):
I don't really know why markets go up ordown.
And I know forsure nobody else does either.
I don't really know whena recession has come, but
the one thing I know isnobody else does either.
So we can evaluate some stories andsee if they make sense, but
don't expect certainty.
And if someone else tells you certainty,they're lying now.
So the market meltdown, there's an oldjoke that markets have predicted nine

(41:19):
out of the last five recessions andsometimes 1929, there's a market meltdown.
And that's a sign of bad things to come.
Sometimes like 1987, it goes kaboomdown and then comes back up again.
[COUGH] So which is this?
I don't know.
There's this technical thing involvinga bunch of people who were playing
this carry trade with the yen andthen they got in trouble and so

(41:42):
they started selling in a hurry.
Sort of something technical happened in87 as well, and it bounced back again.
A stock market plunge by itself isreally not that bad for the economy.
The economy goes down 2008, it wasn'tstocks that went down, it was bankruptcy.
[LAUGH] So as long as people canpay their debts, you're okay.
So I still think that the bets out, we'rekinda at the top of the business cycle,

(42:05):
that people have been waiting for arecession for like three, four years now.
So one will come sooner or later.
It does take a spark but as you said, thespark can be something that goes along.
Our economy is fragile, soI don't think I like 87,
the stock market meltdown itself willnot necessarily cause a recession.
It isn't necessarily a signof a recession to come.

(42:25):
Some of it is, people are seeing thosetech stocks were way overvalued.
Come on, guys, that game's got to end.
But the whole point of stocks isthe price can go down and you get up
the next morning and the economy'shumming along, unlike a financial crisis.
So it's not yeta financial crisis on its own.
So, could be bad stuff,could be one little technical bubble and

(42:49):
we keep blowing along.
Something fragile has to happento turn it into recession,
if not a spark, something along the way,some big bankruptcy turns out
all the banks have lost toomuch on commercial real estate.
Something has to blow up furthermore,
to turn this from a technicalthing into a big recession.

HR, I know you're not economists, but it does kind of strike me
as surprising just what a dominoeffect these matters have.
And just, you see Japan, then Europe,and then the United States just boom,
boom, boom.

Yeah.
Well, I mean, obviously yousee how interconnected we are.
And economic strengthis national security.
[LAUGH] It's vital for national security.
And John, I know we've talkedabout this a little bit, but
there are more discussions I'm hearing nowabout the debt and service on the debt and

(43:39):
the degree to which that'sconsuming federal spending and
putting a squeeze on non discretionaryspending, especially the military budget.
How concerned are you about that?
And like,what ideas do you have about how we-

Hugely,
glad you're bringing this up.
I think economic policy is way too focusedon is there gonna be a recession or not?
Whereas it's these longer term thingsthat matter a whole lot more because,
of course, a recession is gonna leadto all sorts of spending and stimulus.
And so that's it, we are, I think,headed to some sort of a slowdown.
Is it a big one or a small one thatdepends on the amplifications or not?

(44:11):
Yeah, but the key to economic policy isget out of the fed and recessions and
so forth andget these one run fundamentals right.
Eventually we got a budget problem, and
just raising a ton of taxesis gonna kill the economy.
So that's not gonna be the answer to it.
And we got to spend wisely on stuffwe need, like military stuff,
[LAUGH] well bought military stuff.

(44:33):
Let's not just throw moneydown rat holes there either.
But, yeah, you got to reorient,economics isn't hard.
It's everything your grandmother told you,but
it's kind of like hard,take your medicine and do the right thing,
but I think much more focused on the longrun fiscal situation, long run structure,
our social programs, the incentivesto innovate, to grow businesses.

(44:55):
That kind of stuff is just much easier,
much bigger payoff than worrying a lotabout whether Jay Powell sneezes.

Well, let's spend a minute on the Fed, though, John.
I mean, if there's such a thing asa Pinata in the nation's capital,
it's the Federal Reserve, andyou've heard people screaming,
the Fed should have cut rates,this would not have happened.

Well, I think the Fed needs to get out of the business of
propping up the stock market.
[LAUGH] And isn't that a little bit how wegot into this business in the first place?
And I think the Fed is properly tryingto distance itself from the stock.
Now when there's a crash 87,
the Fed did the right thing bymaking sure banks didn't fail.

(45:33):
And maybe we should ask why the banksare so sensitive to stuff anyway.
So you wanna provide liquidityin these situations, but
preemptively lowering interest ratesto keep stock market booms going is
a terrible way to run a central bank.
So I would say no on that one.
And the Fed still needsto buy credibility.
Their number one thing is inflation.
And with a 2% target,inflation hit 8% or 9%.

(45:54):
Let's buy ourselves some credibility andinflation get the first thing done right
before you go on topropping up stock markets.

So, John, you're in Chicago today, but HR and
I are back in Californiain the land of earthquakes.
And there are two kinds ofearthquakes in California.
There are tremors that are justone offs and don't happen again.
Then there are tremors thatare precursors to something bigger and
better coming down the road.
John, soyou look at what happened on Monday.
Is that a one off or is that a precursorof something bigger to come?

Let me prove to you why no one knows,
because if I could tell you,the stock market would go down tomorrow,
then wed all go out and sell and the stockmarket would have gone out today.
We know something really good aboutthe stock market, which is unpredictable.
[LAUGH] Half of the time you look back andsay, boy, I wish I had sold yesterday.
And half of the time like 87,it bounces right back and
this was a buying opportunity.
Buy on the dip and go back in.

(46:42):
Which is it?
I don't know, we'll see.

To be continued.
If you guys wouldn't mind,I'd like to take a detour for a second.
There are two anniversaries coming up thisweek that I think we should touch on.
The first is August 8th,
that is the 50th anniversary ofRichard Nixon resigning from office.
And HR, here's what I'm curious about.
The Pew Research center at all times isstudying the public's trust in government.
They've been doing thisgoing back to 1958.

(47:05):
I looked up the numbers in 1974, HR, 36%of the government at the time of Nixon's
resignation had trusted the government.
You know what the numbers are for 2024?
24%.
So, HR,what's happened over the last 50 years?
Why is one third fewer the public,less trustful of government?

Yeah, I've been looking into this for several years now,
trying to understand kindathe lack of confidence, right?
Lack of confidence in our democraticprinciples, institutions, processes.
And we have a great program at Hoovernow on American institutions and
revitalizing, it's called RAI,Revitalizing American Institutions.
And I think it's because ofthe over optimism of the 90s,

(47:45):
followed by kind of the pessimism anddisappointment of the 2000s,
including, as we were alluding to earlier,Bill,
the unanticipated length and difficultyof the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Especially in contrast to these ideas offast, cheap efficient wars waged from
standoff range kind of the nonsense ofthe revolution in military affairs.

(48:07):
We're also been talking aboutthe financial crisis, right, 2008/2009,
toss in an opioid epidemic.
[LAUGH] And then the transitions inthe global economy associated with
the loss of manufacturingjobs to China and
the numbers of Americansthat were left behind.
So I think that all of thiscombined with social media and

(48:29):
the degree to which social mediakind of feeds into that discontent
by showing people more andmore extreme and negative content.
Now, after that, a pandemic,
[LAUGH] the violence in our citiesthat followed George Floyd's murder,
and the vitriolic natureof our political discourse.

(48:52):
I mean, it just goes on and on, right?
I think Americans have experiencedthese kind of traumas and
have lost confidence in their government.
And really want a leader,I think, at this stage,
who can disrupt what needs to bedisrupted in Washington, but not be so
disruptive that theydisrupt their own agenda.

(49:12):
And somebody who can get to the politicsof addition, bring more Americans together
around strengthening our common identityas Americans and a common agenda for
building a better future.
I mean, with both presidential candidates,[LAUGH] man,
I just don't think either one ofthem really fit that bill, I'm not.
In terms of getting to the politics ofaddition, they seem to both be inclined to

(49:33):
double down on their most loyal andrelatively narrow political base.
But, John, I'm out of my area now,talking about US domestic experience and
the economy and how that'screated this lack of confidence.

Being out of our areas has never stopped us before.
That's the whole pointof this show [LAUGH].

[LAUGH] What do you think, John?
What do you think?>> John H. Cochrane: I have a different
view, somewhat grumpier view of the samething, you're always grumpy, okay?
Trust has to be earned.
And I think what you pointed out was themassive ways in which the institutions of
our government,
not just the leaders, have shownthemselves to be horrendously incompetent.

(50:13):
And people see that and they don't trustthem for reasons that the people lost or
social media or something of the sort.
Yeah, you mentioned the financialcrisis where we learned, hey,
the people in charge of the financialsystem don't know what they're doing.
Yeah. >> John H. Cochrane
just more recently thatthe Hunter Biden laptop story,
when a bunch of national security bigwigsshowed themselves happily lying in public.

(50:36):
And they did not lie, COVID,the average person has seen.
Wait, the lab leak,that's a horrible misinformation,
you're not allowed to believethat it's censored, oops.
[LAUGH] >> John H. Cochrane
after all.
Masked, everybody's got to go grab masks.
Close down the schools,turns out absolutely no evidence for
closed down the schools, not even stay2ft apart from each other at any basis.
So the amount of incompetence andpoliticized lying to us that's going on,

(51:01):
Biden's just fine until,whoops, no, he wasn't after all.
Yeah, not secure in the southern border, right, I mean the whole,
I mean, you could, yeah,go on and on about this.

Yeah, so the trust is, and it's not just about leaders,
it's about institutions.
It wasn't Trump running the CDC,it was Anthony Fauci and
Deborah Birx running the CDC.
And they turned out to be politicized andincompetent.
So people have lost trust in the CDC,it just is just crying wolf,
you cry wolf three times and theydon't listen to you next time and all.

(51:31):
So I think it really means you have tobring back competence in the institutions,
which means bringing back tryingto do your basic job right and
be honest with the American people.
There's some hope, I mean, don't justlook at the bloviation from the leaders,
but I certainly know that there's somethought among the Republicans to really

(51:54):
reform what goes on inside the agencies.
And if that is to depoliticize them,let's hope so and
make them honest and more trustworthy.
That could help bring back trust, butyou got to earn the trust, hard to earn.
And it comes from behavingby respecting norms.
This agency is, the securities andExchange Commission, is here to make

(52:15):
markets good, not to affect climatechange, as one tiny example.
Obey the norms, obey the limitson your agency, be competent,
be honest with the American people andearn back their trust.
And it's in the institutions,not just in the character of the leaders.

Now, the Gallup organization doesn't look at public trust,
they look at what they call confidence.
And they find the least confidenceexpressed in Congress, which John is
speaking to the media, which John mayhave spoken to, and criminal justice.
But there are three entities thathave a majority plus confidence in
the United States, and they are smallbusiness, police, and the military.

(52:51):
HR do you see any thread there betweenthose three institutions, small business,
police, and military?

Well, I think that these are people who make a difference in their
local communities in termsof small businesses.
And I think that's where you canbecome more optimistic about America.
[LAUGH] You look at us at the macrolevel from the outside, I mean,
it's pretty ugly, I mean, I don't knowhow to, and I'm the optimist in the crew.

(53:17):
But when you look at the local level,you see a lot of vitality.
And it turns out to be reallysuper hard to screw up America and
our federal system and
our relative decentralized natureof governance and so forth.
And our free market economy andentrepreneurship and everything else.

(53:38):
And then for police and the military,these are people who are sworn
to serve the country andto protect their fellow citizens.
And I think that that ethic ofservice is what people respect, and
we have to, in all institutions,earn that respect.
And I'm concerned about the degree towhich both political parties have tried to
politicize the military.

(53:59):
I mean, the headline is, the military isnot woke, the military is not extremist.
Although there are people who are tryingto push it in different directions,
the military in different directions forpartisan political gain.
And I would just say, hands off, damn it.
[LAUGH] We don't want to infect ourmilitary with the same kind of orthodoxy

(54:20):
that has destroyed communities oncollege campuses, for example.
Anyway, I'm concerned, I don'tthink we should be complacent about
relatively high numbersin those institutions.
And we have to really double downon our efforts to strengthen even
the institutions that have a relativelyhigh degree of confidence to the American
people.

John?

Well, I'll put in a plug for the one I like this.
I think the Supreme Court'sdoing a tremendous job, and
they get a lot of guff about it.
But you look carefully andthere's a lot of 90 decisions on capping
the craziness that's coming andthat they stop Trump as much as Biden.
I'll signal one, which I thought was veryinteresting, is the Trump immunity case.

(55:04):
And of course, the Democrats instantlywent, you're enhancing the dictator.
They just saved, Joe Bidenbecause the first thing the Trump
administration is gonna do is sendthe Justice Department out after Biden.
For, let's see,you spent $300 billion on student loans,
even though the Supreme Courtsaid it was inconstitutional,
we're gonna send you to jail for it.

(55:24):
And you know what?
Whoops, sorry,you're not allowed to do that.
This was,
Madison was really clear about why youdon't persecute presidential candidates.
The founders were very good,they really cleaned up one of the,
that's just one of manythings they're doing.
So I don't know, of course,I don't agree with all their decisions.
But that is an institution that seemsto be functioning quite well right now.

(55:47):
Even though, speaking of norm busting,we now have a tradition that every state
of the Union address, the presidenthas to say, mean to the Supreme Court,
which is the sort ofthing we used not to do.

Yeah, I mean, it's a great example of,
Prioritizing partisan interests overan institution, I mean, the degree to
which the Biden administrationhas come after the Supreme Court.
And this recommended revisions to theSupreme Court to weaken the third branch
of government and throw checks andbalances out of balance.
I mean, I think this is,just because you don't like their rulings,

(56:23):
it doesn't mean that you shouldundermine another branch of government.
That's a threat to democracy, I think.

And that's an example of the kind of norms
that used to be enforced andthat are no longer in force.
Anyway, there's oneinstitution that I like still.

The other anniversary this week is the 150th birthday of
Herbert Hoover and let's makethis a very quick exit question.
If there is no Herbert Hoover, gentlemen,then there is no Hoover Institution, so,
HR McMaster, without a Hoover Institution,what are you doing these days?

[LAUGH] I'll tell you, I'd be trying to do what I'm doing
somewhere else andprobably not do it very effectively.
And both books that I finished, I wrotein the acknowledgments, I cannot imagine
writing these books anywhere else butat the Hoover Institution.
Because I have, as you see on this show,fantastic colleagues,
extraordinary studentswho I get to work with.

(57:17):
I mean, if you wanna restore yourconfidence in the younger generation, hey,
meet some of my research assistants andsome of my students,
they're fantastic young people.
And I don't think I wouldhave the platform, I mean,
we have a tremendous team, like,the Hoover staff is fantastic.
I mean, Shana Farley, who came up withthe idea for the show, for example.
So, I think I've mentioned to viewers,[LAUGH] I particularly

(57:38):
made a mission statement for myself whenI retired from the army after 34 years.
Which was, to contribute to a deeper, morefull understanding of the most significant
challenges and opportunities weface internationally as a way to
bring Americans together formeaningful, respectful discussions.
And to generate ideas about how we canbuild a better future, more secure,
more prosperous future.
And so, I could not do that, I don'tthink, effectively, anywhere but Hoover.

(58:03):
I mean, it's just a fantastic place to be.
And Herbert Hoover, if Americansare looking for an example of somebody to
emulate, I wish more Americans werefamiliar with his personal story.
He's orphaned,he moves to Washington state,
he studies and prepares for entry tosome university he hopes he can go to.
He hears about this new University,Stanford, and

(58:25):
applies cuz he hears the tuition is free,he's in the inaugural class of Stanford.
He becomes a very successful engineer,and that logistics and
engineering expertise is what leadsWoodrow Wilson to ask him to lead
a humanitarian reliefeffort after World War I.
He saves millions of people fromstarvation, and then President Roosevelt

(58:45):
and then Truman asked him to dothe same thing after world War II.
He was an advocate forindividual rights, small but
effective government,I mean, he was a visionary,
but also he was kind of an exampleof what you can achieve in America.
And he was also a humanitarian,I mean, the more I learn about him and
read what he's written,I think he actually wrote like 14 books,

(59:08):
I forget what the exact number is.
But it's just a phenomenal person, and so
we're lucky to be an organizationthat bears his name as well.

To which I'd add, after World War I,
he scooped up a whole bunch of documentshanging out around the Versailles and
said, boy,this World War I thing wasn't that great.
Why don't I take all these documents andgive Hoover a bunch of money to storm, and
maybe scholars can figure outhow we cannot do this again,
which is howthe Hoover Institution started.
So in addition to what HR said about howit's benefited me tremendously, thanks,

(59:41):
Herbert Hoover, for that,a clear eye thing of,
it's kind of a strange thing to do.
I'm gonna Hoover up all thesedocuments and make an archive so
we can figure out how to notdo this war again, nice idea.

Where would you be, John, still in Chicago?
Or, I assume you'll not be in Palo Alto.

[LAUGH] Yeah, I had a great job, I would be teaching classes at
the University of Chicago,writing papers, but nowhere near able
to do the larger integrative projectsthat I've been able to do at Hoover.
Nowhere near able to have the time to dothe outreach and things like this show,
and think seriously aboutpublic policy programs.

(01:00:19):
There's just only somany hours in the day,
and I wouldn't have had this wonderfulset of colleagues that I've had.
So, it's just beena wonderful adventure for me,
I'm thankful every day thatI happen to get this job.
I know from inside how ourhiring process works, and boy,
am I lucky that I made it through.
[LAUGH]>> Bill Whalen: Let me just piggyback on

(01:00:40):
what all you said, andhappy birthday to President Hoover, and
many regards to Hoover family, who willbe gathering at West Branch, Iowa,
for the celebrations on the 10th.
And with that, gentlemen,onto the lightning round.
[SOUND]>> Bill Whalen: Lightning round.
Okay, gentlemen, we have two questions,
one begins with a question from BillImpalo, Alto, who wants to ask John at HR,

(01:01:02):
what do you make of Kamala Harris'sselection of Vice President, HR?

>> H.R. McMaster (01:01:06):
Hey, I don't really know enough yet, I mean, I know that he does
seem to be the more left of thosewho were under consideration.
So it seems, like President Trump,the selection was to double down on
Vice President Harris's base rather thanget to these politics of addition that
she might have been able to get towith somebody like Josh Shapiro.

(01:01:27):
Who doesn't have the same kind ofextreme ideological views on energy,
for example, [LAUGH] that she does.
Or as more sympathetic,maybe to the effort to counter Iran, and
recognize Iran as the threat in the Middleeast, from a foreign policy perspective.
I mean I guess it's kind ofhashtag predictable these days,

(01:01:48):
[LAUGH] that both political partiesare doubled down on their base instead of
trying to be more inclusive.

>> Bill Whalen (01:01:54):
John.

>> John H. Cochrane (01:01:56):
Trump said hilariously, Vince, don't worry about it,
you're voting for me, not for him.
[LAUGH] I wanna say somethingnice about VP Harris,
I am really admiring herability to keep her mouth shut,
something that Trump showed himselfunable to do at the Republican race.
The moment where what youwant to do is the, hey,

(01:02:18):
geography machine is going, peopleare projecting onto you all sorts of
wonderful things that have no basisin actual policy or past or whatever.
Just keep your mouth shut andlet them do that project, and she's doing
an amazing job of just that forthe moment, we'll see how long that lasts.

>> Bill Whalen (01:02:37):
Let me point out what a change in politics we've seen now in
the last 24 years in America.
If you go back to the firstelection in the 21st century,
who does Al Gore pick as his running mate?
An orthodox Jewish senatorfrom Connecticut, and
who does George W Bush pick?
His father's defense secretary[LAUGH] during Desert Storm.
In other words, they balance what they sawas kind of weaknesses for their ticket.

(01:02:58):
And here we are 204 years later,and the two nominees did what,
they doubled down on ideology.
So, interesting times we live in.
Second Lightning Round questioncomes from Edward in New Jersey,
who writes the following.
Given Biden's infirmity, who do you thinkis actually running the United States?
Burns, Blinken, and Sullivan?
Others?Vice President Harris?
He's referring, by the way,to CIA Director Bill Burns, Secretary of

(01:03:19):
State Antony Blinken, and DirectorJake Sullivan, who holds HR's old job.
HR, who's running the government?

>> H.R. McMaster (01:03:25):
We don't really know, do we, Bill, and I think this is pretty
significant issue and it deservesattention from the American people.
I think,who were the people who were covering
up the president's condition andinfirmities for so long?
I mean, this is not unprecedentedin American history,
I'm thinking of the Woodrow Wilsonadministration in particular.

(01:03:45):
And it was his wife, actually,[LAUGH] who was running the show for
quite some time inthe Wilson administration.
Yeah, I think in terms of accountability,in terms of the rights of the American
people to understand who is runningthe show within the executive branch.
That there's been a huge failureon the part of a lot of people,

(01:04:05):
around the president.
But I say in parts of the media as well,who were too willing to just buy into
the narrative that the president's fine,and vibrant, and so forth.

>> Bill Whalen (01:04:19):
John, our viewer didn't mention Janet Yellen, or Jerome Powell?

>> John H. Cochrane (01:04:22):
[LAUGH] They're doing lots of stuff on their own, but
there is, I think Hautaine knowsthe inside more than I do.
When there's something going on in themiddle East, and you're saying, Israel,
go to it or Israel, don't you dare,that comes down to the president's desk.
And so you can't just have Janet Yellen,Jerome Powell and

(01:04:45):
the defense secretary running that kind ofstuff quietly while the president sleeps.

>> Bill Whalen (01:04:50):
Hr, maybe I watch too many bad movies, but
you've worked in the White House,you've run NSC.
To what extent could a rogue actor, aplayer, really kind of get out of his lane
and run the government, for example,how far could you have pushed in your job?

>> H.R. McMaster (01:05:04):
[LAUGH] Well, that wasn't my job, and I knew what my job was,
it was to give the president options.
And give the elected presidentthe ability to determine his agenda and
to make his own decisions.
But there are people who come intoan administration with their own narrow
agenda, that they want to get through, andthey'll try different ways to do it, but
hopefully there's a process.
And what we would try to do is wheneverthere was one of those kinda animals

(01:05:26):
roaming the plane.
[LAUGH] to try to bring them into the herdof not to suppress their idea, but
to put their idea into the process.
So it wasn't just tryingto do an end run for
example,so I think a lot of it dependson the White House chief of staff.
And national security advisor, thosewho are really staffing the president.
And hopefully,with an eye toward giving the president,

(01:05:48):
not restricting the president'saccess to his advisors, and
different points of view andoptions, but expanding it.
And really the role that I think, forthe national security advisor is to be
the guardian of the president'sindependence of judgment.
And I think that's the attitude youwanna bring into those kind of jobs.

>> Bill Whalen (01:06:05):
Okay, gentlemen, we leave it there for this episode, thanks for
coming on today, we missed Niall, andwe do wonder where he is somewhere.
We need to get a visual of Niall,like in one of those, like,
british sailors outfits or something.
[MUSIC]
Good show, gentlemen, a viewer's note,
this is our last episode for August, butfear not, we will have three what we call

(01:06:25):
mini episodes coming yourway in the weeks ahead.
I got one on one time with John,HR and Niall Ferguson,
we call them any episodes solook for them as well.
We'll be back in early September,
our first show will be actuallyfeaturing HR Mc Master's,
stellar book at war with ourselves,my tour of duty in the Trump White House.
It's available on August 28, so go buy itnow and read it before we do the show,

(01:06:46):
do yourself a favor,it's going to be a great book.
HR John, thanks for coming on today,enjoy the conversation, by the way,
if you have questions for the good fellas,don't forget to send them in.
You do that by going toHoover.org/AskGoodFellows,
what else can we plug, the Hooverinstitution is on X at Hooverinst.
John's on X, Niall's on X,HR's on X, so go there as well.

(01:07:07):
On behalf of my colleaguesJohn Cochrane and HR McMaster,
the absent Niall Ferguson,the very talented men and
women behind the sceneswho make this show happen.
We hope you enjoyed the conversation, andwe'll see you back here in September,
till then, take care, thanks for watching.
[MUSIC]

>> Narrator (01:07:24):
If you enjoyed this show, and
are interested in watching morecontent featuring HR McMaster,
watch Battlegrounds,also available at hoover.org.

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We Win, They Lose, with Matthew Kroenig | GoodFellows: John H. Cochrane, Niall Ferguson, H.R. McMaster, and Bill Whalen | Hoover Institution

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.css-14f5ked{margin:0;word-break:break-word;display:-webkit-box;-webkit-box-orient:vertical;box-orient:vertical;-webkit-line-clamp:2;overflow:hidden;}We Win, They Lose, with Matthew Kroenig | GoodFellows: John H. Cochrane, Niall Ferguson, H.R. McMaster, and Bill Whalen | Hoover Institution