March 13, 2025 • 45 mins
Ukraine’s acceptance of a 30-day ceasefire, since rejected by Russia, shows the challenge in bringing an end to Eastern Europe’s three-year war of attrition. Meanwhile, Germany’s national election delivers a new chancellor (once a coalition government is brokered) who’s both a “transatlanticist” and a believer in a more independent Europe ramping up its self-defense. Russell Berman, a Hoover Institution senior fellow and Stanford University German studies professor, discusses the intricacies of a Ukraine-Russia peace deal (is Turkey the key as a potential peacekeeper?); NATO’s future; whether Britain and France will share nuclear weapons with Germany; plus the odds of an “alpha male” (or is it an Italian female?) emerging among European’s officeholders.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
>> Bill Whalen (00:00):
It's March 12, 2025 and welcome back to Matters of Policy and
Politics, a Hoover Institutionpodcast devoted to governance and
balance of power here in America andaround the world.
I'm Bill Whalen.
I'm the Virginia Hobbs CarpenterDistinguished Policy Fellow in Journalism
here at the Hoover Institution.
I'll be the moderator in today's show.
(00:20):
I'm not the only fellow, by the way,who is in the podcasting trade.
If you don't believe me, you should goto our website, which is hoover.org,
actually go to hoover.org forward/podcast.
There you'll find podcasts and commentary.
We also put out every month what we calla pod blast, which comes to your inbox and
it gives you the best ofthe Hoover Institution.
And hopefully, this podcast makes the cutbecause I'm gonna have a good talk today.
(00:41):
I want to focus today on Europe,two things in particular.
First were a peace negotiation standregarding Russia, Ukraine, and
a war that's soon tocomplete its 38th month,
which makes it about oneyear shy now of World War I.
Second, I want to talk about the changingface of European political leadership,
specifically what to make ofGermany's recent election.
Helping me to unpack allof this is Russell Berman.
(01:04):
Russell isa Hoover Institution Senior Fellow and
the Walter A Haas professor inthe Humanities at Stanford University.
He's also the co-chair of Hoover'sWorking Group on the Middle East and
the Islamic World.
At Stanford, he's a member of boththe Department of German Studies and
the Department of Comparative Literature.
He specializes in politics and culturein Europe as well as the Middle East.
Russell, thanks for coming on the podcast.
>> Russell Berman (01:24):
Happy to be here, Bill.
Thanks for having me.
>> Bill Whalen (01:26):
So we were complaining before I went on the air about
the weather today.
We're both doing this onthe Stanford University campus, and
we're in the midst of what theycall here an atmospheric river,
which is climate talk for a lot of rain.
It's raining in about threedifferent directions.
It is windy, it's gusting.
And Russell,the one thing about the Stanford campus,
it stands out when it rains like this.
It's a flat campus,there's water everywhere.
>> Russell Berman (01:50):
I'm glad I'm one floor up.
>> Bill Whalen (01:52):
Okay, so how does your life get complicated
when it rains like this?
I live just off campus.
I like to walk back and forth to work ortake a bicycle that's obviously out, but
how does the rain affect you?
>> Russell Berman (02:02):
It affects me the same way I walk a lot, both here and
in San Francisco, where I live.
And the a heavy rainy day confrontsme with the moral quandary as to
whether I should man up andgo out there with an umbrella or
whether I should just stay at home andstay warm and dry.
>> Bill Whalen (02:19):
But we shouldn't complain too much because California
needs the rain.
Those who are familiar with how Californiaworks know the ecosystem as such.
The rain comes in,it turns into snow up in the mountains and
the snow melts off in the summertime,which gives us water.
So yay, rain even as inconvenient today.
So Russell, let's talk aboutfirst of all Ukraine and Russia.
What's going on there?
The news this week out of Saudi Arabia onTuesday was that Ukraine has agreed to
(02:42):
a 30 day ceasefire.
The ball is now in Moscow's court.
It's up to Russia to decide ifit wants to go along with this.
Secretary of State Marco Rubiointerviewed leaving Saudi Arabia.
He said both sides are going to haveto give up land, be part of the deal.
Still to be decided if indeed we'regonna have peace negotiations, Russell,
contentious matters like POW swaps andthe very contentious matter of Ukrainian
(03:06):
children were abducted and taken to Russiaand being returned to their homeland.
So this much I think we'd agree,Russell, we all want peace.
Even the Russians, I assume,want peace in this regard.
It's hard to find numbers on this.
The numbers dance all over the place.
But I've seen figures of the Russians havelost something on the order of 800,000
(03:26):
troops in this war now, which is doublethe number of service American service
members who lost theirlives in World War II.
And consider that was a longer war andtwo theaters.
So the Russians are simplygetting slaughtered here.
I could not really find reliable numberson how many Ukrainian casualties they are,
but let's just call it a catastrophe,Russell, in this regard,
not just the number of people dead orinjured, the destruction to the country.
(03:51):
You're talking about a nation that verymuch like A World War I country is losing,
seeing a generation of men to combat.
So who knows how thatcountry comes out of it.
Let's begin with this, Russell.
I was thinking abouthistory coming in today and
I specifically thought About Munichin 1938, September 30, 1938,
particular, the Munich Agreementis signed.
(04:12):
The Czechs are forced togive up the Sudetenland.
In return, Western Europe rejoices becausethey think they have now avoided an all
out war with Germany.
And guess what, 11 months later, Germanyis getting ready to pour into Poland.
So let's say, Russell, that there isa peace agreement that includes Russia
getting a portion of eastern Ukraine thatit currently occupies, and let's assume
(04:33):
that it's some sort of armistice likeKorea, where the fighting stops.
What assurances are going tobe baked into this, Russell,
that Putin is not going to go back andfight again?
>> Russell Berman (04:43):
There are absolutely no assurances that Putin won't go back and
fight again.
This issue emerges inthe pending negotiations.
With regard to the question of guarantees,
let us say that there's a ceasefirealong the current front lines.
When that ceasefire is over,or if an agreement is reached,
(05:03):
when that agreement is in place,he may decide,
just take another big chunk out ofUkraine and keep on moving along the way.
Putin and
the Russians have said that their positionis that they want all of Ukraine.
I spoke with a Russian ambassador a coupleof years ago who said, I proposed,
well, I proposed in a kindof conciliatory move.
(05:24):
Could we think of an Austriansolution that is like Austria
after the Second World War,was occupied, like Germany until 1955,
but then there wasan agreement on neutrality.
Would the Russians accept a neutralUkraine and everybody pulls out?
Absolutely not, ambassador replied.
We want to get all of Ukraine.
We want to put Zelensky on trial.
There's an argument that says they wantto have the Black Sea coast, period.
(05:48):
There's no guarantee.
I'm not sure, though, that the Munichanalogy is absolutely compelling.
It is the pessimistic version, obviously.
On the other hand, we should look atthe reality of what has transpired.
There is no doubt that Ukraine hasa moral, a normative, as we say,
(06:13):
deontological claim on retrievingterritorial integrity, including Crimea.
>> Bill Whalen (06:20):
Right.
>> Russell Berman (06:21):
And full sovereignty.
And full sovereignty would include theright to enter into treaties such as to
apply for NATO membership.
There's no doubt in my mind thatUkraine has a moral claim on that.
It also has troops occupyinga lot of its territory.
And although sincethe Russian invasion of 2022,
the second invasion cuz the firstinvasion was the Invasion of Crimea.
>> Bill Whalen (06:45):
2014, right?
>> Russell Berman (06:47):
Ever since 2022, there's been initially reluctantly, but
then robustly cheerleading from Europeancapitalists and from Washington.
But the Europeans and the Americans underthe Biden administration, while they have,
yes, given lots of funds and arms,never gave Zelensky enough to win the war.
(07:09):
There was never an agenda to win the war.
There was never a plan tobring the war to a conclusion.
I think this was not intentional.
A conspiracy theorist might disagree.
I think this is a matter of incompetenceand anxiety about fighting to win.
(07:29):
So now what, almost three years later,with so many dead.
President Trump arrives and says,let's bring this catastrophe to an end.
Bring it to an end,presumably by some kind of compromise.
This is not good.
There has never been a will in Washingtonor in Europe to fight to a Russian defeat.
(07:53):
One could say a Russian defeat wouldbe great for American interests, but
that is not what has transpired.
So we have to look thisgrim reality in the face.
And say, like it or not,there will be some compromise.
It's not up to me to negotiateaway Ukrainian positions.
And I have consistently written thatthe Ukrainians have a right to it all.
But let's face it, they,they've put up a great fight,
(08:16):
they've fought valiantly,they've inspired people around the world.
They've put the Europeans to shame.
We know that the European populations,at least in, in, in old Europe aren't
willing to fight for their countries,but the Ukrainians are good for them.
But a lot of killing has taken place.
(08:38):
Now when the, how should I put it,altercation took
place in the Oval Officebetween President Zelensky and
President Trump and Vice President Vance,
this not only rattled U.S.Ukraine relations,
this rattled U.S, European relations.
(09:02):
And the Europeans, always inclinedto think the worst of North America,
decided that this was the indication thatthe US Was giving up on its alliances,
on NATO and
on the security umbrella that the UnitedStates has provided to Europe for so
many years with so little participation bythe Europeans in their own self defense.
(09:24):
It seemed as if, or the Europeansread this as this proves Russiagate.
This proves that Putin andTrump are together.
Now suddenly this wonderfulnews from Saudi Arabia,
that whole situationseems to have flipped.
Zelensky, who in the Oval Officeprobably would have been,
(09:45):
would have done better to keep hismouth shut at a certain point,
has indicated some kind of regret forwhat happened.
They're apparently signing a mineral deal,and
deals is what the world isabout moving forward now.
And as Secretary Rubio put it,it is now in Russia's court.
(10:08):
Will Russia say let's have a ceasefire andtry to move it on.
So far there's no indication.
And all of a sudden Zelensky looks like
the compliant partner here willing to work
with the White House andPutin is hidden away.
>> Bill Whalen (10:31):
We'll see what happens.
Let's look at another court, Russell,
which is the court of the United Statesand our friends in Western Europe.
We're going to move many steps ahead hereand it would be peace process to the point
where let's say Russia agrees andUkraine agrees.
And so we have a situation where Ukraineis still a sovereign country, but
Russia has been placated bygetting a piece of Ukrainian land.
(10:53):
And in between the two is goingto be a dmz, Russell, and
sitting in that DMZ is goingto be a lot of peacekeepers.
So which nation is gonna step forward andput in peacekeepers, nations,
plural I should say, because I don't know?
Throw out a number, 10, 20, 30,000 peopleare gonna have to sit in that DMZ.
>> Russell Berman (11:09):
DMZ is exactly the right word, you're proposing a model that
is something like what wehave in the Korean Peninsula.
President Trump's made it clearthat those troops on the ground
won't be American troops.
In the wake of the Oval Office theater,
the Europeans finally seemto get the message that
(11:32):
they should do something fortheir own self defense.
They finally began to realize that whatthe Ukrainians have been doing all along
actually is not only fighting forUkrainian sovereignty,
they've been fighting forthe security and freedom of Europe.
The Europeans have,yes, paid for this, but
(11:53):
there's been no contemplationof putting European
troops there to fight, or,I mean, perish the thought.
Imagine the Europeans havingdecided to open up a second front.
If Russia is going for Kyiv,the Europeans should go for Kaliningrad.
This could have been on the table as a wayto pressure Moscow to act with restraint.
(12:23):
This is my take on the world, both withregard to the European theater and
with regard to East Asia.
We're just waiting forour adversary to go on the offensive and
they imagine that allwe'll do is play defense.
They should have to calculate in, well,
what kind of offense are theygoing to face as well.
The price is too low for Putin.
(12:49):
So the Europeans are nowbeginning to think about,
could they put troops in, I don't know.
Germans, French, Poles, who knows?
I think an interesting solutionwould be if we're Turks.
Turkey is a NATO partner,Turkey has the second largest, or
(13:09):
maybe now third-largest military in NATO.
And Erdogan, forall of his faults, bless his soul,
he has been consistent on sayingthat Ukraine should regain
full territorial sovereignty,including for Crimea,
where President Erdogan of Turkeyhas a particular affection for
(13:31):
the Crimean Tartars, so there are lotsof local stories here as well.
Turkey is the key actor inmaritime law in the Black Sea,
going back to the Montreux Conventionof 1930, whatever.
And Ukraine is the other side ofthe Black Sea, or will it be Ukraine?
(13:55):
Maybe it'll be Russia.
Turkey and Russia have a long,troubled history together.
There's no plan at this point asto who those peacekeepers will be.
Putin has expressed hisopposition to NATO troops.
He also expresses opposition totroops from NATO member states,
(14:18):
even if they're not under a NATO command.
So it could maybe someone else, butmaybe Putin doesn't get his way.
>> Bill Whalen (14:28):
Right.
So the Korean model is A good one inthis regard, Russell, that war has been
stopped, halted, and armistice reached,what, 72 years ago, I believe, 1953.
So there hasn't beenanother war since then.
So you can say good model.
But here's where I thinkthe model doesn't work out.
I'm not privy to the mindset of Pyongyang,but what I'm led to believe is this,
(14:49):
that they would not start a war for
the simple reason that they understand ifthey did so, they would be obliterated
very quickly by a superior militaryforce from the United States.
So why sweep into South Korea?
You might destroy a great part of Seoul,but in the end,
you will be wiped off the planet.
But the problem with this analogy,Russell,
as you now put this in the context ofUkraine and Russia, would Vladimir Putin
(15:11):
be of the mindset that if he were to starta war again, he'd be wiped off the planet?
In other words, it seems to me that ifyou're going to have this armistice and
tell Putin no more,
he has to think that it's not worthmy while to begin the war again.
So the question would be, what threat orthreats, plural, would you put in front of
him to show him that it's not worth hiswhile to try to gobble up all of Ukraine?
>> Russell Berman (15:32):
It's very difficult to imagine what the menu of threats would be.
The difference between North Korea and
Russia to nuclear powersis the order of magnitude.
North Korea, the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea, has some nuclear arms.
(15:53):
Russia has a whole lot.
And that's the reason why wehave to take Russia seriously.
It's not its economy.
It's not its ideological appeal,it's the nuclear arms that it has, which
include some arms that were stationedin Ukraine but were sent back to.
Sent back.
Sent over to Russia afterthe collapse of the Soviet Union at
(16:16):
the behest of the international agreement,the so
called Budapest Accord in whichthe United States and I believe
the United Kingdom committed themselvesto Ukrainian territorial integrity.
So that's what guaranteeson paper are worth.
(16:38):
I don't know what kind ofthreat they'd have to be.
Maybe massive sanctions, butthe Europeans have a hard
time enforcing those sanctions,I don't know.
I frankly don't know.
>> Bill Whalen (16:53):
What if you brought Ukraine into NATO and said, Mr.
Putin, we're serious about Article 5 andif you attack again,
it's game on with all of NATO,not just Ukraine.
But now this begs the question,do the NATO countries want to go there?
>> Russell Berman (17:05):
I don't think NATO countries want to go.
The NATO countries for a while were makingthe argument that they did not want
to admit a country that is currentlyat war because that would trigger
their own immediate participation in war.
Unless NATO and the United Stateswere prepared to go to war.
This is, this is a non starter.
(17:26):
Unless there's a devastating militarydefeat of Russia, it's not unimaginable.
I'm not advocating this,it's not unimaginable.
That rather than contemplating Europeanpeacekeeping troops along the DMZ in,
in Ukraine, that the Europeans man up,get the weapons, get the troops and
(17:49):
go on a counteroffensive andyou know, really defeat Russia.
But I don't think the Europeanshave that in them.
>> Bill Whalen (17:57):
What are your thoughts, Russell, on NATO's future?
The organization turns 76 on April 4th.
Do you think NATO, is NATO gonnachange in the next few years?
Is the United Statesgoing to stay in NATO?
>> Russell Berman (18:08):
It's a question that's been posed very dramatically again since
the Oval Office event with, with Zelensky,which the Europeans read as a.
Well, that and Vice President Vance'sspeech in Munich read them both
as indications of US Hesitation about itscommitment to European European security.
(18:29):
I think that both NATO andthe EU for that matter,
face significant internalpressures because of centripetal
forces of different nationshaving different interests.
I'm not sure if NATO would collapse,but we could see European
(18:49):
security architectures developingoutside of NATO alongside NATO and
gradually European defenseresources flowing more toward
the organizations of their own,to use Macron's term,
Strategic Autonomy, rather than to NATO.
(19:10):
I could imagine a,a networked security structure
that would include at least Poland andthe Baltics.
And the Nordic states, which wouldcover the key vulnerabilities on
NATO's Eastern Front, butalso more importantly, the Arctic,
(19:32):
which is likely to become a theaterof competition in the future,
which is why the Greenland discussion is,in fact, really important.
>> Bill Whalen (19:43):
You recently penned a column for the website 1945.
For our listeners who are not familiarwith that, that's the numbers 1 and 9,
19, but then alphabetically 45, 1945.com.
The headline of that was what will Happenif America Stops Supporting Ukraine.
And what caught my attention, Russell, wasthis passage deep in the article where he
wrote, and I quote, if Europe is rebuffedby Washington, it has other options.
(20:07):
It might choose to deepen itstrade dependence on China.
>> Russell Berman (20:10):
I think we're at a moment where the great powers, and
I guess I'll include Europe inthat as an economic great power,
are exploring flexibilityof their global relations.
Heretofore, we've hada transatlantic architecture
(20:31):
that has served us well, andI hope it could remain strong.
But it has been severely testedin this past couple of weeks.
At the meantime, Russia andChina have moved close together.
They're not always on the same page.
I think Russia smarts at beingthe junior partner to Beijing, but
(20:53):
that's the way it is with population andtechnology.
At the same time,Washington is seeing China as the really
important threat to, to U.S.economy and U.S. security.
2017, National Security Strategyshifted the United States away from
counterterrorism togreat power competition.
(21:15):
But the only and with great power,that means China and
Russia maybe as subsidiary, North Koreaand Iran, but China is the real issue.
A big difference betweenthe United States and
our friends in Europe is that our friendsin Europe don't have a Pacific coast.
(21:35):
I'm leaving aside a few, a few Frenchislands in the South Pacific, but
that's not going to be whatworld history depends on.
We have to, the United States, forsecurity reasons and for economic reasons,
should worry about China.
If, if China takes Taiwan in 2027,as some predict, US credibility in
(21:55):
the island chain that includes Japan and,and the Philippines will, will plummet.
The United States will no longer appear tobe a guarantor of security in the region.
And the U.S Sphere ofinfluence in the Pacific will
be pushed back to drumroll Pearl harbor,that's where we are.
(22:18):
And the western Pacificwill become a Chinese lake.
That's why we worry about China.
And that's why, listen,in the Trump administration right now,
there are those who say yes,great power competition.
There are others who say,it's only about China, therefore,
we can't do Ukraine in the Middle East.
And then there are those who are just,you know, how should I put it, consistent
(22:40):
isolationists and say, you know,at best we do the Western Hemisphere or
we do the Western Hemispherenorth of the Rio Grande.
That's the debate.
And I think that's thoseseveral different but
contiguous positions explainssometimes the inconsistencies
that appear from the outside interms of current foreign policy.
(23:05):
But I have to say that betweenwhen I wrote that 1945 piece and
the news from Saudi Arabia,it looks like the Trump
negotiating agenda has infact pulled off a coup
here in flipping the scripton Zelensky and Russia.
>> Bill Whalen (23:26):
It is hard at the age of Trump 2.0 to do these sorts of columns,
Russell, because things happen very fast.
I do a show for Hoover called Goodfellows,we record it, comes out about two or
days later after the show.
Something has completely changed fromwhat we talked about two days before.
So unless you are doing this day in andday out, it's a struggle.
But let's turn our attention to Germany,Russell, and
(23:46):
the the results of the February23rd national election.
Interesting election in this regard.
The turnout, turnout was monstrous.
I think about 82 and a half percent,largest turnout since the 1980s.
It's a nation,about 60 million voters, I believe.
They had nine televised debates, comparethat to the US Election where there were
two debates and all just, just not good.
(24:08):
Let's talk about the winner,the Chancellor in waiting,
Friedrich MERTZ, who is Mr. Mertz Russell?
And put him in the context of Europe.
What does he stand for?
And also tell us a little bit aboutwhat the CDU and the CSU are.
So I'm gonna get the alphabetsoup that is German politics.
>> Russell Berman (24:22):
Yeah. Okay, so the CDU, CSU,
this is the Christian Democratic Unions,Christian Social Union.
This is the center right party,it's their Republican Party.
You could say it's the, the.
The CDU is the party in most of Germany.
The CSU is its sister party inthe southern state of Bavaria.
(24:46):
That is indicative of a, of a longerhistory of Bavarian relative autonomy.
But it's in effect, one party, and
Friedrich Merz is the head of this party.
He is, one could say,the successor to Angela Merkel.
Although they represent very differentpositions in terms of their politics
(25:09):
within the center right, center rightfield, his party won the most votes.
Therefore, it is up to him to takethe lead in coalition negotiations.
Let's see.
I guess they got around 28 or29%, so by no way a majority.
And they have to negotiate with some other
(25:30):
party in order to forma governing coalition.
This is the way German politics work.
You mentioned that they had what,seven or eight or nine debates?
We only had two German politics.
In the good old days of West Germany,there's a politics of two and
a half parties.
The center right, the center left, and
(25:50):
a small liberal party thatwould switch back and forth.
Now we have, I guess, seven partiesthat are in play in any election.
There's been a fragmentation of the partypolitical landscape, as the Germans say.
And this is causing difficulty,it's going to be harder and
harder to form a stable coalition.
(26:11):
You know, frankly, I think that we mayend up seeing minority governments
where the lead party forms ad hoccoalitions for different bills,
but we're not quite there yet.
Mats is negotiating now with the SocialDemocrats, the center left party,
together with which he couldform a governing coalition.
(26:33):
German Social Democrats are the oldestparty, they go back into the 19th century.
>> Bill Whalen (26:36):
Is that the SPD?
>> Russell Berman (26:37):
The SPD, they go back to the 19th century.
Some of the listeners mayremember Willy Brandt or
Helmut Schmidt,legendary leaders of the SPD.
They were plummeted, they were devastated.
Their results werethe worst ones since 1887,
>> Bill Whalen (26:59):
16.4%.
But you know,who had a Good night, Russell.
Alternative for Germany orAfD, which got about 20.8%,
almost 21%,it's doubled its support over the years.
So what is going on there?
As I understand it,this is a party that likes to call itself
Libertarian Conservative,talks about remigration.
>> Russell Berman (27:19):
AfD began as a classical liberal economic party.
Skeptical of the European Unionwas very quickly
taken over by anti-immigrationnationalists.
Immigration has emerged as a keyquestion across Europe and
of course we have the same topichere in the United States.
(27:43):
It's particularly acute though in Germany.
The AFD, Alternative for Deutschland,the alternative for Germany.
The name name comes from a linguistictick of former Chancellor Angela Merkel
who would often say there isno alternative in order to,
to explain the necessity ofpeople adopting her position.
(28:05):
And they're saying yes,there are alternatives.
There is this alternative,they're a populist party,
they impute to the mainstream partiesa kind of uniparty homogeneity.
They just prior to this electionthere was a three party coalition.
The Social Democrats, the Greens, theEnvironmentalist Party and the Liberals.
(28:29):
Their color coded red, green,
yellow therefore is calledthe Traffic Light Coalition.
Mats and the CDU campaigned against them,campaigned against their
inability to act on immigration orenergy or recession, but so did the FDA.
The AfD accused the threeparties of the traffic light but
(28:50):
also the CDU of just doing the same thing.
And only the AfD wouldoffer an alternative.
Now there's a range of positions the AfD,
some are center very right,I should put it that way all the way
over to some that are regardedas feeding in, in Nazi waters.
(29:13):
I, I don't, I, I,I think it's wrong to call all of the AfD,
all the 20% of German voters, Nazis.
This is just a misreading ofGerman society and culture.
But, and we're also living in an era allyou know, in the United States as well in
Europe as where there's an extraordinarilyinflationary use of the epithet Nazi.
Anybody I don't likeis pretty much a Nazi.
(29:35):
But the AfD is,is out of the European mainstream.
It is comparable to the far rightparty in France, the Le Pen Party,
the Rassemble national,the brothers of Italy of Meloni.
But both the brothers of Italy and
the French rassemblement see the AFDas further to the right than they.
(29:57):
And that gives you a sense of what theissue is because in the German discussion,
given this perception of the AfD,there was the expectation that there
would be a Brandmauer, a firewall and thatno one would participate with the AfD and
would not, certainly not forma coalition with the AfD.
(30:18):
And Matz has been very adamant that hewould not form a coalition with the AFD.
He's a Christian Democrat,he's a conservative.
He's not a radical right winger,as which he sees the AfD.
>> Bill Whalen (30:30):
Russell,
if you look at the United States mapafter the Trump Harris election,
we assign colors to tough states,red states, blue states.
Red states are conservative Republican,blue states are liberal Democrat.
If you look at the map of the US Russell,it's streaks of blue on the two coasts and
a lot of red in between.
Now, that's misleading because whilethe red dominates the geography,
it's not the population necessarily.
(30:52):
So the two kind of balance out.
But the point is, when you look at theUnited States, you see blue on one side,
blue on the other side and red in between.
You look at a map of Germany right now.
I saw this the other day.
It's fascinating.
And that if you look at the mapof Germany right now and
assigned politicalidentity in this election,
the western half of Germany is CDU, CSU,and the eastern half is not, it's AFD.
(31:16):
It looks almost like the Cold War is stillgoing on with the Western Germany and
East Germany.
Why, why does it split that way?
>> Russell Berman (31:22):
Of course, that's a map of who won the, so
you lose all the SPD votes orthe green votes who are only
clustered in a couple ofmetropolitan centers.
That West Germany is allCDU is not surprising,
this is a recognized conservative party.
(31:45):
In the maps, it's black.
That's the clerical black because ofthe religious origin of the party.
But in the former East Germany,it's all blue,
which is the color that'sbeen attributed to the AfD.
Why.
The AfD appeals to East Germansentiment successfully
(32:06):
in part because this is the populationthat came out of communism and
they don't have the same sensibility aboutthe importance of liberal democracy.
They have much less experience withimmigration than Western Germany.
(32:27):
An interesting problem has todo with work I did earlier
on anti Americanism in Europe after 1989,
after the fall of the Soviet bloc,collapse of the Warsaw Pact.
Pretty much in all East European,
Central European states,you saw a bonus, a pro American bonus.
(32:50):
People were pro America becauseAmerica is who defeated the.
The occupying power, Russia.
The only place where thatdoesn't work is in East Germany.
You don't get a more proAmerican stance there.
And I think a lot about why this is.
It could be because forthat population, for that culture,
the United States was the enemybasically in three wars.
(33:11):
First World War, Second World War,Cold War, for, for the Poles, for
the Hungarians.
You know, the United Stateswas sort of on their side in,
in some of this andrepresentative force of liberation.
There's also an economic divide betweenWest Germany and the former East Germany.
The East Germans are doing lesswell than the West Germans.
(33:34):
Why that is the case isa whole other podcast.
But what we have seen is that the AfDdoes well in poorer electorates.
The AfD, and not the SPD,is attracting the working class vote.
>> Bill Whalen (33:50):
Wel, Mr. Metz has said that he would like to reach out to France
and Britain to discussthe sharing of nuclear weapons.
He has clarified it, saying it would be.
I think his word he chose was it would bea compliment to the US Nuclear shield.
He has also said, in the aftermath ofthe unfortunate Zelensky Trump meeting in
the Oval Office, he said thatEurope needs to be independent.
That's a word he chose,independent in the United States.
(34:12):
But he's also been described, Russell,as a transatlanticist at the same time.
So can you kind of explain, well,
at least the contradiction ofindependent versus transatlanticist, but
also where you think he's going withthe idea of sharing nuclear weapons?
>> Russell Berman (34:25):
A lot of this phrasing is squishy, I'll put it that way.
He has a history as a transatlanticist.
The CDU is a transatlantic party.
Transatlantic means that theylook to the United States,
the alliance with the United States, and
they count on the United Statesto provide a security umbrella.
Fun fact, Ben Hooker,a member of the far right wing of the AfD,
(34:50):
denounces the CDU as a vassal party,
that is a vassals of the United States.
So MATS can indeed claim to bepaying the price for support for
an alliance with The United States,on the other hand, for
years, various Europeanleaders have called for
(35:12):
greater European capability interms of providing security.
So it's not only been American presidents.
President Obama called them,what, free riders.
That's Obama,let alone what Trump has called them.
And you know, the United Stateshas limited budget resources.
(35:33):
And why on earth should we be paying for
European defense if they'renot paying it for themselves?
Because they have a comparable andperhaps even larger economy than ours.
So de Gaulle called forEuropean independence.
Chancellor Merkel, remember her?
She was the leader of the free world.
She said, we have to do more.
We have responsibility to do more forourselves.
(35:53):
Chancellor Schultz, the outgoingChancellor, talked about a [FOREIGN],
a change of era, that Germany hasto step up and do more for itself.
And so Matt is not out of line in claim.
And of course, Macron andhis calls for strategic autonomy.
Matt isn't out of line,this is a consistent position.
(36:15):
He can call for the Europeans to havegreater capability of their own and
nonetheless remain in the alliance.
Now, the nuclear questionis super interesting.
France and England are the twonuclear powers inside Europe.
Russia is obviously a major nuclearpower who could threaten Europe,
just as the Europeans for years havefretted over the question of how valid
(36:38):
is the nuclear weapons umbrellaprovided by the United States.
Will the United States saveChicago in order to defend Munich?
The Germans can say, well,
will the UK endanger Londonin order to save Frankfurt?
So he'd be looking forsome kind of European nuclear umbrella.
(37:04):
I don't think he's calling fora German nuclear armament,
although that is, there's no reasonwhy that couldn't come up as well.
Except forpretty terrible 20th century history.
This is the result ofthe European distress
that the United Statesmight be less reliable.
(37:29):
That sense orless liability is in part, I think,
a result of maybe loose rhetoriccoming out of Washington.
That's a subjective problem,that could be solved with a speech coach.
But there's also an objective problem.
As I said before,Europe doesn't have a Pacific coast.
(37:50):
Europe doesn't face China as a threat inthe same way that the United States does.
And if the United States has to bepaying for defense against China,
Europe should really face itsown responsibilities in Europe,
including in Ukraine.
That doesn't mean that the United Stateswon't be there at all.
(38:12):
But not making it to 2% is not enough.
>> Bill Whalen (38:16):
Final question for you, Russell.
When the European leaders get together, isthere an alpha in the room in this regard?
We have a new German chancellor.
We have a relatively newBritish prime minister.
Macron's been around for a while.
I'm not sure any of themhave a dominant personality,
the kind of personalitieswho wanna take over Rome.
But is there a leader that you see amongthis group who could sort of stand
(38:37):
among the others and shepherd them along?
>> Russell Berman (38:40):
Well, Macron will want that role, but he's getting a little
tired and his domestic politicalsituation is not strong.
Starmer might play a role maybe inbuilding a bridge between Europe and
the United States, but he does not seemto me to be your term alpha in the room.
(39:00):
Potentially the alpha inthe room is Meloni from Italy,
who also could build a bridge and
who would open up the possibility ofdiscussion among these right wing parties.
Although not the far right parties.
Mertz is not yet Chancellor,this is not a done deal.
Coming back to that fractured politicallandscape in, in Germany right now.
(39:26):
We're going now intothe weeds of German politics.
But we had the electiona couple of weeks ago.
Now the new legislature,the new Bundestag,
the new Congress doesn't conveneuntil the end of the month.
In the meantime, we have the oldCongress having legislative capacity.
This is sort of a lame duck phase,if you will.
(39:48):
This is important because in the incomingCongress and the incoming Bundestag,
the AfD and the FAR left party,the left together have.
A third of the seats and a third of theseats is enough to block certain actions,
including the proposed constitutionalamendment, which would allow Germany,
(40:12):
along with other nations tospend much more on its military.
Mats and Scholz for that matter,have to be working together right
now to get that constitutional changethrough before the new Bundestag convenes.
Some might say that this is undemocraticbecause the current Bundestag,
(40:34):
although formally legislatively empowered,has obviously lost its electoral base.
And there may be cases brought tothe Constitutional Court to prevent
this from happening.
But the new Bundestag won't bethe same as the old Bundestag because
the new Bundestag, presumably witha cdu SPD that is center right,
(40:58):
center left coalition, is going to facea collaboration of the far left and
the far right that can not onlyblock constitutional amendments, but
can block all sorts of appointments and,and other other mischief.
>> Bill Whalen (41:13):
Russell, did you see the movie look who's, look who's Back?
I think it's 20.
I think it came out in 2015.
>> Russell Berman (41:19):
Is this the Hitler movie?
>> Bill Whalen (41:21):
It's a dark comedy and the premise is that Adolf Hitler comes back to
modern day Berlin and he's walking aroundmodern day Berlin wearing Hitler's outfit
and people think he's just a Hitlerimpersonator, but he starts talking and
the joke of the film is actually hehas a message that people listen to.
I mention this, Russell,
because May is the 80th anniversaryof the end of World War II.
(41:44):
Is there an appetite in modern Germany formilitary rebuild?
>> Russell Berman (41:48):
No, there's no appetite or
there's little appetite fora military rebuild.
>> Bill Whalen (41:55):
Is that because of the cost involved or
does it bring back bad memories orcombination thereof?
>> Russell Berman (42:00):
I do think there's an awareness in Germany that they have to
contribute more to their own security.
>> Bill Whalen (42:05):
Right.
>> Russell Berman (42:06):
Ideally with the United States holding their hand.
I think Germany in general is Atlanticist,transatlanticist, and
after years of being being hammeredon by Obama and by Trump and by
Ambassador Grinnell during the first Trumpadministration, that you've gotta do more.
(42:26):
And having seen what happened in the OvalOffice, there's an appetite to build up.
But I think you're asking me,is there an appetite to build up
as an independent military power,an appetite for militarism?
There's not an appetite.
The United States, the Allies, includingthe Red army, hammered Germany so
(42:48):
hard during the Second World that they'vebecome a country inclined toward pacifism.
And that's better than militarism.
But there's considerable trust inthe Democratic character of Germany today.
And there's considerable concern thatGermany isn't pulling its weight in
(43:08):
the collective defense architecture.
There's a far right party there, the AfD,
that is still considerably smallerthan the far right party in, in.
In France.
Marie Le Pen has a shot at becomingthe next president in France.
Alice Weidel doesn't have a shot atbecoming the next chancellor in Germany.
>> Bill Whalen (43:30):
All right, Russell, we'll leave it there.
You have a student to meet with,I have raindrops to dodge, and
so we have things to go on to.
But for someone who follows Europe,these are interesting times, aren't they?.
>> Russell Berman (43:40):
Interesting times and
sometimes we wish theywere less interesting.
>> Bill Whalen (43:43):
Okay, Russell, thanks again for coming on the podcast.
I sure enjoyed it.
>> Russell Berman (43:47):
My pleasure.
>> Bill Whalen (43:48):
You've been listening to Matters of Policy and Politics,
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If you've been enjoying this podcast,please don't forget to rate, review, and
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Tell your friends about us.
Russell Berman is on X.
He's not the Atlantic writer, by the way.
How many times you get confused withthe guy in the Atlantic, Russell?
It must drive you crazy.
>> Russell Berman (44:08):
It doesn't drive me crazy and not that often.
>> Bill Whalen (44:10):
Okay, good news.
Russell is on X,his X handle is @Russell Berman.
That's R-U-S-S-E-L-L-B-E-R-M-A-N-S-F,@RussellBermanSF.
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(44:32):
you updated on what Russell Berman andhis Hoover colleagues are up to.
And that is emailed to yourinbox weekday afternoons.
For the Hoover Institution,this is Bill Whalen.
We'll be back soon with new conversationsand matters of policy and politics.
We're going to be talking economic,economic, statecraft,
and also what next foreducation in America.
Till then, take care.
Thanks for joining us today.
>> Presenter (44:51):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
It's March 12, 2025 and welcome back to Matters of Policy and
Politics, a Hoover Institutionpodcast devoted to governance and
balance of power here in America andaround the world.
I'm Bill Whalen.
I'm the Virginia Hobbs CarpenterDistinguished Policy Fellow in Journalism
here at the Hoover Institution.
I'll be the moderator in today's show.
(00:20):
I'm not the only fellow, by the way,who is in the podcasting trade.
If you don't believe me, you should goto our website, which is hoover.org,
actually go to hoover.org forward/podcast.
There you'll find podcasts and commentary.
We also put out every month what we calla pod blast, which comes to your inbox and
it gives you the best ofthe Hoover Institution.
And hopefully, this podcast makes the cutbecause I'm gonna have a good talk today.
(00:41):
I want to focus today on Europe,two things in particular.
First were a peace negotiation standregarding Russia, Ukraine, and
a war that's soon tocomplete its 38th month,
which makes it about oneyear shy now of World War I.
Second, I want to talk about the changingface of European political leadership,
specifically what to make ofGermany's recent election.
Helping me to unpack allof this is Russell Berman.
(01:04):
Russell isa Hoover Institution Senior Fellow and
the Walter A Haas professor inthe Humanities at Stanford University.
He's also the co-chair of Hoover'sWorking Group on the Middle East and
the Islamic World.
At Stanford, he's a member of boththe Department of German Studies and
the Department of Comparative Literature.
He specializes in politics and culturein Europe as well as the Middle East.
Russell, thanks for coming on the podcast.
>> Russell Berman (01:24):
Happy to be here, Bill.
Thanks for having me.
>> Bill Whalen (01:26):
So we were complaining before I went on the air about
the weather today.
We're both doing this onthe Stanford University campus, and
we're in the midst of what theycall here an atmospheric river,
which is climate talk for a lot of rain.
It's raining in about threedifferent directions.
It is windy, it's gusting.
And Russell,the one thing about the Stanford campus,
it stands out when it rains like this.
It's a flat campus,there's water everywhere.
>> Russell Berman (01:50):
I'm glad I'm one floor up.
>> Bill Whalen (01:52):
Okay, so how does your life get complicated
when it rains like this?
I live just off campus.
I like to walk back and forth to work ortake a bicycle that's obviously out, but
how does the rain affect you?
>> Russell Berman (02:02):
It affects me the same way I walk a lot, both here and
in San Francisco, where I live.
And the a heavy rainy day confrontsme with the moral quandary as to
whether I should man up andgo out there with an umbrella or
whether I should just stay at home andstay warm and dry.
>> Bill Whalen (02:19):
But we shouldn't complain too much because California
needs the rain.
Those who are familiar with how Californiaworks know the ecosystem as such.
The rain comes in,it turns into snow up in the mountains and
the snow melts off in the summertime,which gives us water.
So yay, rain even as inconvenient today.
So Russell, let's talk aboutfirst of all Ukraine and Russia.
What's going on there?
The news this week out of Saudi Arabia onTuesday was that Ukraine has agreed to
(02:42):
a 30 day ceasefire.
The ball is now in Moscow's court.
It's up to Russia to decide ifit wants to go along with this.
Secretary of State Marco Rubiointerviewed leaving Saudi Arabia.
He said both sides are going to haveto give up land, be part of the deal.
Still to be decided if indeed we'regonna have peace negotiations, Russell,
contentious matters like POW swaps andthe very contentious matter of Ukrainian
(03:06):
children were abducted and taken to Russiaand being returned to their homeland.
So this much I think we'd agree,Russell, we all want peace.
Even the Russians, I assume,want peace in this regard.
It's hard to find numbers on this.
The numbers dance all over the place.
But I've seen figures of the Russians havelost something on the order of 800,000
(03:26):
troops in this war now, which is doublethe number of service American service
members who lost theirlives in World War II.
And consider that was a longer war andtwo theaters.
So the Russians are simplygetting slaughtered here.
I could not really find reliable numberson how many Ukrainian casualties they are,
but let's just call it a catastrophe,Russell, in this regard,
not just the number of people dead orinjured, the destruction to the country.
(03:51):
You're talking about a nation that verymuch like A World War I country is losing,
seeing a generation of men to combat.
So who knows how thatcountry comes out of it.
Let's begin with this, Russell.
I was thinking abouthistory coming in today and
I specifically thought About Munichin 1938, September 30, 1938,
particular, the Munich Agreementis signed.
(04:12):
The Czechs are forced togive up the Sudetenland.
In return, Western Europe rejoices becausethey think they have now avoided an all
out war with Germany.
And guess what, 11 months later, Germanyis getting ready to pour into Poland.
So let's say, Russell, that there isa peace agreement that includes Russia
getting a portion of eastern Ukraine thatit currently occupies, and let's assume
(04:33):
that it's some sort of armistice likeKorea, where the fighting stops.
What assurances are going tobe baked into this, Russell,
that Putin is not going to go back andfight again?
>> Russell Berman (04:43):
There are absolutely no assurances that Putin won't go back and
fight again.
This issue emerges inthe pending negotiations.
With regard to the question of guarantees,
let us say that there's a ceasefirealong the current front lines.
When that ceasefire is over,or if an agreement is reached,
(05:03):
when that agreement is in place,he may decide,
just take another big chunk out ofUkraine and keep on moving along the way.
Putin and
the Russians have said that their positionis that they want all of Ukraine.
I spoke with a Russian ambassador a coupleof years ago who said, I proposed,
well, I proposed in a kindof conciliatory move.
(05:24):
Could we think of an Austriansolution that is like Austria
after the Second World War,was occupied, like Germany until 1955,
but then there wasan agreement on neutrality.
Would the Russians accept a neutralUkraine and everybody pulls out?
Absolutely not, ambassador replied.
We want to get all of Ukraine.
We want to put Zelensky on trial.
There's an argument that says they wantto have the Black Sea coast, period.
(05:48):
There's no guarantee.
I'm not sure, though, that the Munichanalogy is absolutely compelling.
It is the pessimistic version, obviously.
On the other hand, we should look atthe reality of what has transpired.
There is no doubt that Ukraine hasa moral, a normative, as we say,
(06:13):
deontological claim on retrievingterritorial integrity, including Crimea.
>> Bill Whalen (06:20):
Right.
>> Russell Berman (06:21):
And full sovereignty.
And full sovereignty would include theright to enter into treaties such as to
apply for NATO membership.
There's no doubt in my mind thatUkraine has a moral claim on that.
It also has troops occupyinga lot of its territory.
And although sincethe Russian invasion of 2022,
the second invasion cuz the firstinvasion was the Invasion of Crimea.
>> Bill Whalen (06:45):
2014, right?
>> Russell Berman (06:47):
Ever since 2022, there's been initially reluctantly, but
then robustly cheerleading from Europeancapitalists and from Washington.
But the Europeans and the Americans underthe Biden administration, while they have,
yes, given lots of funds and arms,never gave Zelensky enough to win the war.
(07:09):
There was never an agenda to win the war.
There was never a plan tobring the war to a conclusion.
I think this was not intentional.
A conspiracy theorist might disagree.
I think this is a matter of incompetenceand anxiety about fighting to win.
(07:29):
So now what, almost three years later,with so many dead.
President Trump arrives and says,let's bring this catastrophe to an end.
Bring it to an end,presumably by some kind of compromise.
This is not good.
There has never been a will in Washingtonor in Europe to fight to a Russian defeat.
(07:53):
One could say a Russian defeat wouldbe great for American interests, but
that is not what has transpired.
So we have to look thisgrim reality in the face.
And say, like it or not,there will be some compromise.
It's not up to me to negotiateaway Ukrainian positions.
And I have consistently written thatthe Ukrainians have a right to it all.
But let's face it, they,they've put up a great fight,
(08:16):
they've fought valiantly,they've inspired people around the world.
They've put the Europeans to shame.
We know that the European populations,at least in, in, in old Europe aren't
willing to fight for their countries,but the Ukrainians are good for them.
But a lot of killing has taken place.
(08:38):
Now when the, how should I put it,altercation took
place in the Oval Officebetween President Zelensky and
President Trump and Vice President Vance,
this not only rattled U.S.Ukraine relations,
this rattled U.S, European relations.
(09:02):
And the Europeans, always inclinedto think the worst of North America,
decided that this was the indication thatthe US Was giving up on its alliances,
on NATO and
on the security umbrella that the UnitedStates has provided to Europe for so
many years with so little participation bythe Europeans in their own self defense.
(09:24):
It seemed as if, or the Europeansread this as this proves Russiagate.
This proves that Putin andTrump are together.
Now suddenly this wonderfulnews from Saudi Arabia,
that whole situationseems to have flipped.
Zelensky, who in the Oval Officeprobably would have been,
(09:45):
would have done better to keep hismouth shut at a certain point,
has indicated some kind of regret forwhat happened.
They're apparently signing a mineral deal,and
deals is what the world isabout moving forward now.
And as Secretary Rubio put it,it is now in Russia's court.
(10:08):
Will Russia say let's have a ceasefire andtry to move it on.
So far there's no indication.
And all of a sudden Zelensky looks like
the compliant partner here willing to work
with the White House andPutin is hidden away.
>> Bill Whalen (10:31):
We'll see what happens.
Let's look at another court, Russell,
which is the court of the United Statesand our friends in Western Europe.
We're going to move many steps ahead hereand it would be peace process to the point
where let's say Russia agrees andUkraine agrees.
And so we have a situation where Ukraineis still a sovereign country, but
Russia has been placated bygetting a piece of Ukrainian land.
(10:53):
And in between the two is goingto be a dmz, Russell, and
sitting in that DMZ is goingto be a lot of peacekeepers.
So which nation is gonna step forward andput in peacekeepers, nations,
plural I should say, because I don't know?
Throw out a number, 10, 20, 30,000 peopleare gonna have to sit in that DMZ.
>> Russell Berman (11:09):
DMZ is exactly the right word, you're proposing a model that
is something like what wehave in the Korean Peninsula.
President Trump's made it clearthat those troops on the ground
won't be American troops.
In the wake of the Oval Office theater,
the Europeans finally seemto get the message that
(11:32):
they should do something fortheir own self defense.
They finally began to realize that whatthe Ukrainians have been doing all along
actually is not only fighting forUkrainian sovereignty,
they've been fighting forthe security and freedom of Europe.
The Europeans have,yes, paid for this, but
(11:53):
there's been no contemplationof putting European
troops there to fight, or,I mean, perish the thought.
Imagine the Europeans havingdecided to open up a second front.
If Russia is going for Kyiv,the Europeans should go for Kaliningrad.
This could have been on the table as a wayto pressure Moscow to act with restraint.
(12:23):
This is my take on the world, both withregard to the European theater and
with regard to East Asia.
We're just waiting forour adversary to go on the offensive and
they imagine that allwe'll do is play defense.
They should have to calculate in, well,
what kind of offense are theygoing to face as well.
The price is too low for Putin.
(12:49):
So the Europeans are nowbeginning to think about,
could they put troops in, I don't know.
Germans, French, Poles, who knows?
I think an interesting solutionwould be if we're Turks.
Turkey is a NATO partner,Turkey has the second largest, or
(13:09):
maybe now third-largest military in NATO.
And Erdogan, forall of his faults, bless his soul,
he has been consistent on sayingthat Ukraine should regain
full territorial sovereignty,including for Crimea,
where President Erdogan of Turkeyhas a particular affection for
(13:31):
the Crimean Tartars, so there are lotsof local stories here as well.
Turkey is the key actor inmaritime law in the Black Sea,
going back to the Montreux Conventionof 1930, whatever.
And Ukraine is the other side ofthe Black Sea, or will it be Ukraine?
(13:55):
Maybe it'll be Russia.
Turkey and Russia have a long,troubled history together.
There's no plan at this point asto who those peacekeepers will be.
Putin has expressed hisopposition to NATO troops.
He also expresses opposition totroops from NATO member states,
(14:18):
even if they're not under a NATO command.
So it could maybe someone else, butmaybe Putin doesn't get his way.
>> Bill Whalen (14:28):
Right.
So the Korean model is A good one inthis regard, Russell, that war has been
stopped, halted, and armistice reached,what, 72 years ago, I believe, 1953.
So there hasn't beenanother war since then.
So you can say good model.
But here's where I thinkthe model doesn't work out.
I'm not privy to the mindset of Pyongyang,but what I'm led to believe is this,
(14:49):
that they would not start a war for
the simple reason that they understand ifthey did so, they would be obliterated
very quickly by a superior militaryforce from the United States.
So why sweep into South Korea?
You might destroy a great part of Seoul,but in the end,
you will be wiped off the planet.
But the problem with this analogy,Russell,
as you now put this in the context ofUkraine and Russia, would Vladimir Putin
(15:11):
be of the mindset that if he were to starta war again, he'd be wiped off the planet?
In other words, it seems to me that ifyou're going to have this armistice and
tell Putin no more,
he has to think that it's not worthmy while to begin the war again.
So the question would be, what threat orthreats, plural, would you put in front of
him to show him that it's not worth hiswhile to try to gobble up all of Ukraine?
>> Russell Berman (15:32):
It's very difficult to imagine what the menu of threats would be.
The difference between North Korea and
Russia to nuclear powersis the order of magnitude.
North Korea, the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea, has some nuclear arms.
(15:53):
Russia has a whole lot.
And that's the reason why wehave to take Russia seriously.
It's not its economy.
It's not its ideological appeal,it's the nuclear arms that it has, which
include some arms that were stationedin Ukraine but were sent back to.
Sent back.
Sent over to Russia afterthe collapse of the Soviet Union at
(16:16):
the behest of the international agreement,the so
called Budapest Accord in whichthe United States and I believe
the United Kingdom committed themselvesto Ukrainian territorial integrity.
So that's what guaranteeson paper are worth.
(16:38):
I don't know what kind ofthreat they'd have to be.
Maybe massive sanctions, butthe Europeans have a hard
time enforcing those sanctions,I don't know.
I frankly don't know.
>> Bill Whalen (16:53):
What if you brought Ukraine into NATO and said, Mr.
Putin, we're serious about Article 5 andif you attack again,
it's game on with all of NATO,not just Ukraine.
But now this begs the question,do the NATO countries want to go there?
>> Russell Berman (17:05):
I don't think NATO countries want to go.
The NATO countries for a while were makingthe argument that they did not want
to admit a country that is currentlyat war because that would trigger
their own immediate participation in war.
Unless NATO and the United Stateswere prepared to go to war.
This is, this is a non starter.
(17:26):
Unless there's a devastating militarydefeat of Russia, it's not unimaginable.
I'm not advocating this,it's not unimaginable.
That rather than contemplating Europeanpeacekeeping troops along the DMZ in,
in Ukraine, that the Europeans man up,get the weapons, get the troops and
(17:49):
go on a counteroffensive andyou know, really defeat Russia.
But I don't think the Europeanshave that in them.
>> Bill Whalen (17:57):
What are your thoughts, Russell, on NATO's future?
The organization turns 76 on April 4th.
Do you think NATO, is NATO gonnachange in the next few years?
Is the United Statesgoing to stay in NATO?
>> Russell Berman (18:08):
It's a question that's been posed very dramatically again since
the Oval Office event with, with Zelensky,which the Europeans read as a.
Well, that and Vice President Vance'sspeech in Munich read them both
as indications of US Hesitation about itscommitment to European European security.
(18:29):
I think that both NATO andthe EU for that matter,
face significant internalpressures because of centripetal
forces of different nationshaving different interests.
I'm not sure if NATO would collapse,but we could see European
(18:49):
security architectures developingoutside of NATO alongside NATO and
gradually European defenseresources flowing more toward
the organizations of their own,to use Macron's term,
Strategic Autonomy, rather than to NATO.
(19:10):
I could imagine a,a networked security structure
that would include at least Poland andthe Baltics.
And the Nordic states, which wouldcover the key vulnerabilities on
NATO's Eastern Front, butalso more importantly, the Arctic,
(19:32):
which is likely to become a theaterof competition in the future,
which is why the Greenland discussion is,in fact, really important.
>> Bill Whalen (19:43):
You recently penned a column for the website 1945.
For our listeners who are not familiarwith that, that's the numbers 1 and 9,
19, but then alphabetically 45, 1945.com.
The headline of that was what will Happenif America Stops Supporting Ukraine.
And what caught my attention, Russell, wasthis passage deep in the article where he
wrote, and I quote, if Europe is rebuffedby Washington, it has other options.
(20:07):
It might choose to deepen itstrade dependence on China.
>> Russell Berman (20:10):
I think we're at a moment where the great powers, and
I guess I'll include Europe inthat as an economic great power,
are exploring flexibilityof their global relations.
Heretofore, we've hada transatlantic architecture
(20:31):
that has served us well, andI hope it could remain strong.
But it has been severely testedin this past couple of weeks.
At the meantime, Russia andChina have moved close together.
They're not always on the same page.
I think Russia smarts at beingthe junior partner to Beijing, but
(20:53):
that's the way it is with population andtechnology.
At the same time,Washington is seeing China as the really
important threat to, to U.S.economy and U.S. security.
2017, National Security Strategyshifted the United States away from
counterterrorism togreat power competition.
(21:15):
But the only and with great power,that means China and
Russia maybe as subsidiary, North Koreaand Iran, but China is the real issue.
A big difference betweenthe United States and
our friends in Europe is that our friendsin Europe don't have a Pacific coast.
(21:35):
I'm leaving aside a few, a few Frenchislands in the South Pacific, but
that's not going to be whatworld history depends on.
We have to, the United States, forsecurity reasons and for economic reasons,
should worry about China.
If, if China takes Taiwan in 2027,as some predict, US credibility in
(21:55):
the island chain that includes Japan and,and the Philippines will, will plummet.
The United States will no longer appear tobe a guarantor of security in the region.
And the U.S Sphere ofinfluence in the Pacific will
be pushed back to drumroll Pearl harbor,that's where we are.
(22:18):
And the western Pacificwill become a Chinese lake.
That's why we worry about China.
And that's why, listen,in the Trump administration right now,
there are those who say yes,great power competition.
There are others who say,it's only about China, therefore,
we can't do Ukraine in the Middle East.
And then there are those who are just,you know, how should I put it, consistent
(22:40):
isolationists and say, you know,at best we do the Western Hemisphere or
we do the Western Hemispherenorth of the Rio Grande.
That's the debate.
And I think that's thoseseveral different but
contiguous positions explainssometimes the inconsistencies
that appear from the outside interms of current foreign policy.
(23:05):
But I have to say that betweenwhen I wrote that 1945 piece and
the news from Saudi Arabia,it looks like the Trump
negotiating agenda has infact pulled off a coup
here in flipping the scripton Zelensky and Russia.
>> Bill Whalen (23:26):
It is hard at the age of Trump 2.0 to do these sorts of columns,
Russell, because things happen very fast.
I do a show for Hoover called Goodfellows,we record it, comes out about two or
days later after the show.
Something has completely changed fromwhat we talked about two days before.
So unless you are doing this day in andday out, it's a struggle.
But let's turn our attention to Germany,Russell, and
(23:46):
the the results of the February23rd national election.
Interesting election in this regard.
The turnout, turnout was monstrous.
I think about 82 and a half percent,largest turnout since the 1980s.
It's a nation,about 60 million voters, I believe.
They had nine televised debates, comparethat to the US Election where there were
two debates and all just, just not good.
(24:08):
Let's talk about the winner,the Chancellor in waiting,
Friedrich MERTZ, who is Mr. Mertz Russell?
And put him in the context of Europe.
What does he stand for?
And also tell us a little bit aboutwhat the CDU and the CSU are.
So I'm gonna get the alphabetsoup that is German politics.
>> Russell Berman (24:22):
Yeah. Okay, so the CDU, CSU,
this is the Christian Democratic Unions,Christian Social Union.
This is the center right party,it's their Republican Party.
You could say it's the, the.
The CDU is the party in most of Germany.
The CSU is its sister party inthe southern state of Bavaria.
(24:46):
That is indicative of a, of a longerhistory of Bavarian relative autonomy.
But it's in effect, one party, and
Friedrich Merz is the head of this party.
He is, one could say,the successor to Angela Merkel.
Although they represent very differentpositions in terms of their politics
(25:09):
within the center right, center rightfield, his party won the most votes.
Therefore, it is up to him to takethe lead in coalition negotiations.
Let's see.
I guess they got around 28 or29%, so by no way a majority.
And they have to negotiate with some other
(25:30):
party in order to forma governing coalition.
This is the way German politics work.
You mentioned that they had what,seven or eight or nine debates?
We only had two German politics.
In the good old days of West Germany,there's a politics of two and
a half parties.
The center right, the center left, and
(25:50):
a small liberal party thatwould switch back and forth.
Now we have, I guess, seven partiesthat are in play in any election.
There's been a fragmentation of the partypolitical landscape, as the Germans say.
And this is causing difficulty,it's going to be harder and
harder to form a stable coalition.
(26:11):
You know, frankly, I think that we mayend up seeing minority governments
where the lead party forms ad hoccoalitions for different bills,
but we're not quite there yet.
Mats is negotiating now with the SocialDemocrats, the center left party,
together with which he couldform a governing coalition.
(26:33):
German Social Democrats are the oldestparty, they go back into the 19th century.
>> Bill Whalen (26:36):
Is that the SPD?
>> Russell Berman (26:37):
The SPD, they go back to the 19th century.
Some of the listeners mayremember Willy Brandt or
Helmut Schmidt,legendary leaders of the SPD.
They were plummeted, they were devastated.
Their results werethe worst ones since 1887,
>> Bill Whalen (26:59):
16.4%.
But you know,who had a Good night, Russell.
Alternative for Germany orAfD, which got about 20.8%,
almost 21%,it's doubled its support over the years.
So what is going on there?
As I understand it,this is a party that likes to call itself
Libertarian Conservative,talks about remigration.
>> Russell Berman (27:19):
AfD began as a classical liberal economic party.
Skeptical of the European Unionwas very quickly
taken over by anti-immigrationnationalists.
Immigration has emerged as a keyquestion across Europe and
of course we have the same topichere in the United States.
(27:43):
It's particularly acute though in Germany.
The AFD, Alternative for Deutschland,the alternative for Germany.
The name name comes from a linguistictick of former Chancellor Angela Merkel
who would often say there isno alternative in order to,
to explain the necessity ofpeople adopting her position.
(28:05):
And they're saying yes,there are alternatives.
There is this alternative,they're a populist party,
they impute to the mainstream partiesa kind of uniparty homogeneity.
They just prior to this electionthere was a three party coalition.
The Social Democrats, the Greens, theEnvironmentalist Party and the Liberals.
(28:29):
Their color coded red, green,
yellow therefore is calledthe Traffic Light Coalition.
Mats and the CDU campaigned against them,campaigned against their
inability to act on immigration orenergy or recession, but so did the FDA.
The AfD accused the threeparties of the traffic light but
(28:50):
also the CDU of just doing the same thing.
And only the AfD wouldoffer an alternative.
Now there's a range of positions the AfD,
some are center very right,I should put it that way all the way
over to some that are regardedas feeding in, in Nazi waters.
(29:13):
I, I don't, I, I,I think it's wrong to call all of the AfD,
all the 20% of German voters, Nazis.
This is just a misreading ofGerman society and culture.
But, and we're also living in an era allyou know, in the United States as well in
Europe as where there's an extraordinarilyinflationary use of the epithet Nazi.
Anybody I don't likeis pretty much a Nazi.
(29:35):
But the AfD is,is out of the European mainstream.
It is comparable to the far rightparty in France, the Le Pen Party,
the Rassemble national,the brothers of Italy of Meloni.
But both the brothers of Italy and
the French rassemblement see the AFDas further to the right than they.
(29:57):
And that gives you a sense of what theissue is because in the German discussion,
given this perception of the AfD,there was the expectation that there
would be a Brandmauer, a firewall and thatno one would participate with the AfD and
would not, certainly not forma coalition with the AfD.
(30:18):
And Matz has been very adamant that hewould not form a coalition with the AFD.
He's a Christian Democrat,he's a conservative.
He's not a radical right winger,as which he sees the AfD.
>> Bill Whalen (30:30):
Russell,
if you look at the United States mapafter the Trump Harris election,
we assign colors to tough states,red states, blue states.
Red states are conservative Republican,blue states are liberal Democrat.
If you look at the map of the US Russell,it's streaks of blue on the two coasts and
a lot of red in between.
Now, that's misleading because whilethe red dominates the geography,
it's not the population necessarily.
(30:52):
So the two kind of balance out.
But the point is, when you look at theUnited States, you see blue on one side,
blue on the other side and red in between.
You look at a map of Germany right now.
I saw this the other day.
It's fascinating.
And that if you look at the mapof Germany right now and
assigned politicalidentity in this election,
the western half of Germany is CDU, CSU,and the eastern half is not, it's AFD.
(31:16):
It looks almost like the Cold War is stillgoing on with the Western Germany and
East Germany.
Why, why does it split that way?
>> Russell Berman (31:22):
Of course, that's a map of who won the, so
you lose all the SPD votes orthe green votes who are only
clustered in a couple ofmetropolitan centers.
That West Germany is allCDU is not surprising,
this is a recognized conservative party.
(31:45):
In the maps, it's black.
That's the clerical black because ofthe religious origin of the party.
But in the former East Germany,it's all blue,
which is the color that'sbeen attributed to the AfD.
Why.
The AfD appeals to East Germansentiment successfully
(32:06):
in part because this is the populationthat came out of communism and
they don't have the same sensibility aboutthe importance of liberal democracy.
They have much less experience withimmigration than Western Germany.
(32:27):
An interesting problem has todo with work I did earlier
on anti Americanism in Europe after 1989,
after the fall of the Soviet bloc,collapse of the Warsaw Pact.
Pretty much in all East European,
Central European states,you saw a bonus, a pro American bonus.
(32:50):
People were pro America becauseAmerica is who defeated the.
The occupying power, Russia.
The only place where thatdoesn't work is in East Germany.
You don't get a more proAmerican stance there.
And I think a lot about why this is.
It could be because forthat population, for that culture,
the United States was the enemybasically in three wars.
(33:11):
First World War, Second World War,Cold War, for, for the Poles, for
the Hungarians.
You know, the United Stateswas sort of on their side in,
in some of this andrepresentative force of liberation.
There's also an economic divide betweenWest Germany and the former East Germany.
The East Germans are doing lesswell than the West Germans.
(33:34):
Why that is the case isa whole other podcast.
But what we have seen is that the AfDdoes well in poorer electorates.
The AfD, and not the SPD,is attracting the working class vote.
>> Bill Whalen (33:50):
Wel, Mr. Metz has said that he would like to reach out to France
and Britain to discussthe sharing of nuclear weapons.
He has clarified it, saying it would be.
I think his word he chose was it would bea compliment to the US Nuclear shield.
He has also said, in the aftermath ofthe unfortunate Zelensky Trump meeting in
the Oval Office, he said thatEurope needs to be independent.
That's a word he chose,independent in the United States.
(34:12):
But he's also been described, Russell,as a transatlanticist at the same time.
So can you kind of explain, well,
at least the contradiction ofindependent versus transatlanticist, but
also where you think he's going withthe idea of sharing nuclear weapons?
>> Russell Berman (34:25):
A lot of this phrasing is squishy, I'll put it that way.
He has a history as a transatlanticist.
The CDU is a transatlantic party.
Transatlantic means that theylook to the United States,
the alliance with the United States, and
they count on the United Statesto provide a security umbrella.
Fun fact, Ben Hooker,a member of the far right wing of the AfD,
(34:50):
denounces the CDU as a vassal party,
that is a vassals of the United States.
So MATS can indeed claim to bepaying the price for support for
an alliance with The United States,on the other hand, for
years, various Europeanleaders have called for
(35:12):
greater European capability interms of providing security.
So it's not only been American presidents.
President Obama called them,what, free riders.
That's Obama,let alone what Trump has called them.
And you know, the United Stateshas limited budget resources.
(35:33):
And why on earth should we be paying for
European defense if they'renot paying it for themselves?
Because they have a comparable andperhaps even larger economy than ours.
So de Gaulle called forEuropean independence.
Chancellor Merkel, remember her?
She was the leader of the free world.
She said, we have to do more.
We have responsibility to do more forourselves.
(35:53):
Chancellor Schultz, the outgoingChancellor, talked about a [FOREIGN],
a change of era, that Germany hasto step up and do more for itself.
And so Matt is not out of line in claim.
And of course, Macron andhis calls for strategic autonomy.
Matt isn't out of line,this is a consistent position.
(36:15):
He can call for the Europeans to havegreater capability of their own and
nonetheless remain in the alliance.
Now, the nuclear questionis super interesting.
France and England are the twonuclear powers inside Europe.
Russia is obviously a major nuclearpower who could threaten Europe,
just as the Europeans for years havefretted over the question of how valid
(36:38):
is the nuclear weapons umbrellaprovided by the United States.
Will the United States saveChicago in order to defend Munich?
The Germans can say, well,
will the UK endanger Londonin order to save Frankfurt?
So he'd be looking forsome kind of European nuclear umbrella.
(37:04):
I don't think he's calling fora German nuclear armament,
although that is, there's no reasonwhy that couldn't come up as well.
Except forpretty terrible 20th century history.
This is the result ofthe European distress
that the United Statesmight be less reliable.
(37:29):
That sense orless liability is in part, I think,
a result of maybe loose rhetoriccoming out of Washington.
That's a subjective problem,that could be solved with a speech coach.
But there's also an objective problem.
As I said before,Europe doesn't have a Pacific coast.
(37:50):
Europe doesn't face China as a threat inthe same way that the United States does.
And if the United States has to bepaying for defense against China,
Europe should really face itsown responsibilities in Europe,
including in Ukraine.
That doesn't mean that the United Stateswon't be there at all.
(38:12):
But not making it to 2% is not enough.
>> Bill Whalen (38:16):
Final question for you, Russell.
When the European leaders get together, isthere an alpha in the room in this regard?
We have a new German chancellor.
We have a relatively newBritish prime minister.
Macron's been around for a while.
I'm not sure any of themhave a dominant personality,
the kind of personalitieswho wanna take over Rome.
But is there a leader that you see amongthis group who could sort of stand
(38:37):
among the others and shepherd them along?
>> Russell Berman (38:40):
Well, Macron will want that role, but he's getting a little
tired and his domestic politicalsituation is not strong.
Starmer might play a role maybe inbuilding a bridge between Europe and
the United States, but he does not seemto me to be your term alpha in the room.
(39:00):
Potentially the alpha inthe room is Meloni from Italy,
who also could build a bridge and
who would open up the possibility ofdiscussion among these right wing parties.
Although not the far right parties.
Mertz is not yet Chancellor,this is not a done deal.
Coming back to that fractured politicallandscape in, in Germany right now.
(39:26):
We're going now intothe weeds of German politics.
But we had the electiona couple of weeks ago.
Now the new legislature,the new Bundestag,
the new Congress doesn't conveneuntil the end of the month.
In the meantime, we have the oldCongress having legislative capacity.
This is sort of a lame duck phase,if you will.
(39:48):
This is important because in the incomingCongress and the incoming Bundestag,
the AfD and the FAR left party,the left together have.
A third of the seats and a third of theseats is enough to block certain actions,
including the proposed constitutionalamendment, which would allow Germany,
(40:12):
along with other nations tospend much more on its military.
Mats and Scholz for that matter,have to be working together right
now to get that constitutional changethrough before the new Bundestag convenes.
Some might say that this is undemocraticbecause the current Bundestag,
(40:34):
although formally legislatively empowered,has obviously lost its electoral base.
And there may be cases brought tothe Constitutional Court to prevent
this from happening.
But the new Bundestag won't bethe same as the old Bundestag because
the new Bundestag, presumably witha cdu SPD that is center right,
(40:58):
center left coalition, is going to facea collaboration of the far left and
the far right that can not onlyblock constitutional amendments, but
can block all sorts of appointments and,and other other mischief.
>> Bill Whalen (41:13):
Russell, did you see the movie look who's, look who's Back?
I think it's 20.
I think it came out in 2015.
>> Russell Berman (41:19):
Is this the Hitler movie?
>> Bill Whalen (41:21):
It's a dark comedy and the premise is that Adolf Hitler comes back to
modern day Berlin and he's walking aroundmodern day Berlin wearing Hitler's outfit
and people think he's just a Hitlerimpersonator, but he starts talking and
the joke of the film is actually hehas a message that people listen to.
I mention this, Russell,
because May is the 80th anniversaryof the end of World War II.
(41:44):
Is there an appetite in modern Germany formilitary rebuild?
>> Russell Berman (41:48):
No, there's no appetite or
there's little appetite fora military rebuild.
>> Bill Whalen (41:55):
Is that because of the cost involved or
does it bring back bad memories orcombination thereof?
>> Russell Berman (42:00):
I do think there's an awareness in Germany that they have to
contribute more to their own security.
>> Bill Whalen (42:05):
Right.
>> Russell Berman (42:06):
Ideally with the United States holding their hand.
I think Germany in general is Atlanticist,transatlanticist, and
after years of being being hammeredon by Obama and by Trump and by
Ambassador Grinnell during the first Trumpadministration, that you've gotta do more.
(42:26):
And having seen what happened in the OvalOffice, there's an appetite to build up.
But I think you're asking me,is there an appetite to build up
as an independent military power,an appetite for militarism?
There's not an appetite.
The United States, the Allies, includingthe Red army, hammered Germany so
(42:48):
hard during the Second World that they'vebecome a country inclined toward pacifism.
And that's better than militarism.
But there's considerable trust inthe Democratic character of Germany today.
And there's considerable concern thatGermany isn't pulling its weight in
(43:08):
the collective defense architecture.
There's a far right party there, the AfD,
that is still considerably smallerthan the far right party in, in.
In France.
Marie Le Pen has a shot at becomingthe next president in France.
Alice Weidel doesn't have a shot atbecoming the next chancellor in Germany.
>> Bill Whalen (43:30):
All right, Russell, we'll leave it there.
You have a student to meet with,I have raindrops to dodge, and
so we have things to go on to.
But for someone who follows Europe,these are interesting times, aren't they?.
>> Russell Berman (43:40):
Interesting times and
sometimes we wish theywere less interesting.
>> Bill Whalen (43:43):
Okay, Russell, thanks again for coming on the podcast.
I sure enjoyed it.
>> Russell Berman (43:47):
My pleasure.
>> Bill Whalen (43:48):
You've been listening to Matters of Policy and Politics,
a Hoover Institution podcastdevoted to governance and
balance of power here in America andaround the world.
If you've been enjoying this podcast,please don't forget to rate, review, and
subscribe to our show.
And if you wouldn't mind, spread the word.
Tell your friends about us.
Russell Berman is on X.
He's not the Atlantic writer, by the way.
How many times you get confused withthe guy in the Atlantic, Russell?
It must drive you crazy.
>> Russell Berman (44:08):
It doesn't drive me crazy and not that often.
>> Bill Whalen (44:10):
Okay, good news.
Russell is on X,his X handle is @Russell Berman.
That's R-U-S-S-E-L-L-B-E-R-M-A-N-S-F,@RussellBermanSF.
The Hoover Institution is on X,we have X, Instagram and Facebook feeds.
Our X handle is @HooverInst,that's spelled H-O-O-V-E-R-I-N-S-T.
And while you're there, you should sign upfor the Hoover Daily Report, which keeps
(44:32):
you updated on what Russell Berman andhis Hoover colleagues are up to.
And that is emailed to yourinbox weekday afternoons.
For the Hoover Institution,this is Bill Whalen.
We'll be back soon with new conversationsand matters of policy and politics.
We're going to be talking economic,economic, statecraft,
and also what next foreducation in America.
Till then, take care.
Thanks for joining us today.
>> Presenter (44:51):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
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