Critical Issues In The US-China Science And Technology Relationship

Episode Transcript
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(00:00):
[MUSIC]

>> Frances Hisgen (00:09):
Thank you so much to our audience for
joining us this afternoon.
I'm Frances Hisgen.
I'm a senior research program managerhere at the Hoover Institution.
And you're all here for Critical Issuesin the US China Science and
Technology Relationship, a program hostedby the Hoover Institutions Project
on the US China and the world.
And I'm really delighted today to bemoderating a panel of distinguished

(00:31):
scientists and China scholars tospeak to these important issues.
I'll begin by introducingour guests on the panel.
I'll offer some brief framing remarks.
We'll have a discussion among the fiveof us for about half of the time.
And then as soon as I can, I want to turnto audience questions because I'm sure
there will be many to start us off.
Zhenan Bao is the K.K Lee Professorof Chemical Engineering at

(00:53):
Stanford University.
She is known forher work on artificial electronic skin,
which has applications inneuroprosthetics, human friendly robots,
human machine interfaces, andhealth monitoring devices.
Sitting next to her is Yasheng Huang,the Epoch Foundation Professor of
Global Economics and Management atthe MIT Sloan School of Management.

(01:15):
And Professor Huang is alsoserving as the President of
the Asian-American Scholar Forum, anon-governmental organization dedicated to
promoting open science and protecting thecivil rights of Asian-American scientists.
He was further the author of MIT'scomprehensive report on the University's
engagements withthe People's Republic of China.

(01:36):
Peter Michelson is the Luke Blossomprofessor in the School of Humanities and
Sciences, as well as Professor ofPhysics at Stanford University.
And for the past 15 years, ProfessorMichelson's research has been focused
on observations of the universe withthe Fermi Gamma Ray Space Telescope,
launched by NASA in 2008.
He leads the international collaborationthat designed, built, and operates

(02:00):
the Large Area Telescope, the primaryinstrument on Fermi, which includes
members from more than 20 nations,including the People's Republic of China.
And lastly, sitting next to me, GlennTiffert is a Distinguished Research Fellow
at the Hoover Institution anda historian of modern China.
He co-chairs Hoover'sprogram on the US-China and

(02:20):
the World andalso leads Stanford's participation.
In the National Science Foundation'sSecure Program, which I'm sure we'll
hear a lot about today, a $67 millioneffort authorized by the Chips and
Science act to enhance the security andintegrity of the US Research enterprise.
And we've assembled this conversationtoday at a critical juncture where,

(02:43):
to our view, the practice of scienceis changing in an increasingly complex
geopolitical environment.
Many great powers,including the United States and China,
see Leadership in Science and technologyas core to strategic interests and
the global scientificlandscape has diversified.
The top research partners ofthe United States are no longer limited to

(03:04):
traditional allies andpartners in the global North.
And I'll say,
speaking for myself, that I find thatan immensely positive development, but
it's also a development that requires newhabits of practice and methods of working.
It's further clear that no country hasa monopoly on scientific talent or
innovative ideas, and that the UnitedStates cannot rest on the comforting

(03:27):
assumption that our past leadershipin this realm and our historic
investments and our old methods ofpractice guarantee future success.
At the same time, American scientificecosystems face and have faced legitimate
concerns about misappropriationof research technology transfer,
violations of research integrity, andmalign foreign government interference.

(03:52):
Past attempts to grapple with this issue,
including attempts that have leanedheavily on a law enforcement side,
may have been counterproductive and leftus in a place that we don't want to be in.
And I'll just brief gesture towhat happened late on Tuesday.
The recent election I think has left us ina little bit of policy uncertainty around
these issues, but I do believe thatthe research sector right now has a robust

(04:15):
chance to build an affirmative vision fortackling these issues as a community.
And in this conversation today, the panelwill be touching on core issues including
thorny topics like the US Chinascience and technology agreement,
the utility of concepts likefundamental research, dual use, NSD189,
the urgent need to both promote andprotect science, and

(04:36):
as well a topic that is core tomy own research here at Hoover.
Doing this in a way that rejectsdiscrimination and stigmatization in
particular of Chinese andChinese American students and scholars.
And so I wanna open this upwith our working scientists.
First to Zhenan and then to Peter.
Could you give us a ground level viewof how you see the current environment?

(04:57):
What is it like right nowto practice in your field?
How's the environment forinternational collaboration and
how have you been impacted byresearch security policies?

>> Zhenan Bao (05:08):
Maybe I'll start.
First, thanks everyone for joining.
I think this is a really important topic,not only affect
just Chinese born orChinese-American scientists, but
I think this topic will reallyimpact the capability of science and

(05:29):
technology development in the US forthe long run.
Maybe to give a little bitof context about myself,
I came to the United Stateswhen I was 19 years old.
I've been here for almost 30 years,
became a citizen right after PhD and

(05:50):
voted immediately afterI became a citizen and
to enjoy the rights of voting.
Really.
I feel that I myself is example ofthe openness of the US culture and
the immigration culture toprovide opportunity for

(06:15):
everyone comes to this country withnothing can do anything they want.
So the current situation or
I think the climate I wouldsummarize in a few words.

(06:35):
First I think it's confusion confusion
about what are exactly the rules for
engagement, for collaboration,
what's allowed, what's not allowed.
The confusion mainly comes from,previously,

(06:58):
there were a lot of thingsallowed then suddenly they
became even illegal or people,scientists were charged and
then even put in jail,some wrongfully charged.
And then also the rules fordisclosure changes all the time,

(07:21):
so it was very confusing forscientists as for
what to report orwhat do I put in my current and pending.
And if I forget something,then am I going to be charged?
So that confusion of course,leads to a lot of stress.

(07:46):
Not only the stress of just reporting, but
I have colleagues and also even graduate
students being visited by FBI unannounced.
Now, we have learned what are theprocedures to handle this situation.

(08:08):
But a few years ago,nobody knew that this could happen.
And even more recently,I think there were or
I heard examples ofstudents born in the US but
they were descendant of Chinese,
but they were born here andvisited by FBI.

(08:32):
They had no idea why,that was the case and
what they should do as a result.
So there are kind of the environment also,
there is kind of hostile environment.
There were colleagues whowalk around campus and

(08:56):
people would say, go back to your country.
But we have been here for
just as long as anyone else, and
we are just as US Citizenas everybody else.
Sorry, I was very angry when I hear that.

(09:26):
I think that's probably enough.

Thank you very much Shannon.
So now I want to bring Peter in onthis to give us your perspective.

>> Peter F. Michelson (09:33):
Well, thank you.
So, the impact on myself and my research,
I actually have to say, has been minimal.
But I see what happens to my colleagues,particularly those who are of
Chinese origin orwho grew up in this country even.
And I think there's,some of the practices and

(09:54):
programs that government put in place, theChina Initiative being the primary one,
just did incredible damage, andwe have not recovered from that, I think.
And Shannon mentioned this aboutthe rules are not always clear,
and they're still not clear,they're still evolving.

(10:15):
And I think I would characterize my,that's had an impact on me, and
I would refer to it as compliance fatigue.
There's just been a growth ofbureaucracy to implement much of this,
and I think that puts additional burden,
let alone just the risk ofnot being in compliance.
And I think that's something thatdoesn't get that much attenten,and I

(10:40):
still have concerns about that.
That just keeps growing.
So that's had an impact not onlyon my colleagues, but on me.
Well, I think I've said enough.

Thanks Peter,
I think we'll definitely comeback to some of these things.
Compliance burden, the China Initiative,recovery from the China Initiative.
But I want to turn now to Yasheng,
who I think can speak tothis from two perspectives.
One, as a scholar of the PRC,a social scientist of the PRC, and
two, to give us a vision of whathe's learned from your work at AASF.

>> Yasheng Huang (11:23):
Yeah, thank you, Francis and Glenn, for
organizing this discussion,it is incredibly
important topic, both forthe country as well as for
the individuals andpracticing scientists involved.
In terms of what we have seensince the China Initiative,

(11:50):
which was put in place in 2018,
is this incredible climateof fear exclusively
among the Chinese Americanscientific community.
And our organization did a survey in 2021,

(12:15):
it was publishing Penis in 2023that shows that more than 70,
nearly 80% of the Chinese American
faculty expressed fear about working and
basically doing sciencein the United States.

(12:39):
And the other findingis really remarkable,
which is that eventhe freshly minted PhDs,
many of them said toour survey that they do
not consider US as the first,the place of choice for

(13:02):
doing their work, scientific work.
So this finding is extremely importantbecause these are young people,
they represent future of the science.
And we are losing the future of sciencewhen these people don't want to stay.
And the other is that the veryfact that these are freshly

(13:23):
minted PhD and yetthey have expressed this fear,
means that the psychologicaleffect is incredible, right?
So these are not what we call PiS,these are not principal investigators.
By definition,they don't have a history of applying to
grants from the federal agencies and

(13:45):
they don't have the complicatedrelationships as compared
with maybe their advisors andestablished professors.
And yet they don't consider usas their choice, first choice.
Other data show that UShas been losing scientific

(14:08):
talents to Europe, to China, the net.
So there are people coming in, butthere are more people leaving,
so the net losses are quite substantial.
The other thing that we havefound both in our survey and

(14:29):
in our conversations, is thatthe compliance burdens are such that and
the fear is such that many scientistsdecide not to apply for federal grants.
Just think throughthe implication of that decision.

(14:50):
The truly breakthrough scientificdiscoveries are supported by
the federal government.
You can what is known ineconomics as a private science,
there is private science, but privatescience has many conditions attached.
Some of it is proprietary rather than forpublic.
So, the private scienceis not able to replace

(15:13):
public funding of scientific research.
So if more and more peopleare gravitating toward private science,
away from public science,
we're losing the public nature ofthe entire scientific enterprise.
So let me just close withone more observation.

(15:34):
There has been research bypolitical scientists and
economists that have shown systematically,
the impact of China Initiative onthe productivity of American scientists.
There's a paper which I reviewed for
peanuts that shows that afterthe China Initiative was initiated,

(15:57):
there was a loss of somethingbetween the age to 11% of
the productivity on the part of lifescientists in the United States.
And the laws of productivityis especially prominent
among the most productive scientists,right?
So let me end with a larger observation.

(16:21):
We can say we are protectingnational security and all of that.
One national security that we are failingto protect is the future of science,
which is going to produce benefits,not just for the Americans, but
for the entire humankind in the future.
If there are drugs thatfail to be discovered,

(16:43):
that is a cost of thisparticular approach.
We hope to have more conversations somore people will know that
there are substantial damageswith the kind of a law and
this legal approach,criminalization approach.

Thank you very much for that context, Yasheng.
I wanna turn to Glenn now and ask Glennto reflect on a couple threads that have
been put on the table,both by Peter Yasheng and Zhenan.
Which is, Glenn,
it's clear that we have challengeswhen it comes to talent promotion,
when it comes to pipelines, when itcomes to the promote side of science.

(17:22):
And I know that some of your research atHoover has attempted to speak to these.
So it'd be great if you couldoffer reflections on that for
our audience today.

>> Glenn Tiffert (17:30):
Sure, thank you, Francis.
First, I wanna say thank you very much toour guests because it's critical to have
these multi-stakeholderperspectives in this conversation.
If there's one thing that's been apparentin the way that this field is developed
and the policy level decisions that havebeen made in the last several years,
it's that too often peopleare not speaking to one another,

(17:51):
they're speaking past oneanother about these topics.
And so it's critical to have, I think,the perspectives on the table so
that we can move forward together.
I'm really conscious that I occupya very different position in this panel.
I'm neither a scientist norof Chinese origin.
I came to this field really as a subjectof empirical study because it was

(18:13):
affecting the research that I do,not on the US side, but
on the Chinese side about 15 years ago.
I began seeing the conditions of researchchanging, affecting the choices that were
made, affecting the safety of scholars,and students, and so forth.
So I became very interested in the subjectof how do we bridge the kind of chasm
that has progressively opened up overthe last 15 years between the US and

(18:38):
China with regard tothe conduct of research.
Not just in the sciences, butalso the social sciences and humanities.
But it is clear to Francis's question thatthe things and decisions that we do and
adopt to ensure that we conduct researchthat's consistent with our interests and

(18:59):
values that we protect the research thatwe do is only valuable if we promote it.
Promote research as well, becausethe research, the future of the country,
the future of the US Economy, theadvancement of the frontiers of knowledge,
the solving of global problems iscontingent on our ability to continue to
execute science atan extremely high level.

(19:21):
And only then do we have anything that isworth protecting and is worth sharing.
So this is, I think,
what we need to especially pay attentionto in the years going forward.
As someone recently said in the CHIPS andScience act, which funded the Secure
program that I'm participating in,Congress forgot the science part.

(19:41):
And so, there's a lot of moneyauthorized that was not appropriated.
We need to reinvest in our scienceecosystem to ensure that fundamental
research is well funded so that scientistshave the resources that they need.
We are no longer buildingbig science infrastructure,
which brings global collaborationto the United States and

(20:02):
keeps the United States as a centerof international scientific activity.
We are no longer funding the students ata level that they can actually survive
as students on the postdocwages that they get.
The administrative burdens are growing.
And in particular, we need to solvethe visa and immigration problem as well,
simply from a national interestperspective, let alone values.

(20:26):
If we are training the world's people andnot retaining that talent,
but shipping it back out of the country,that does not help the United States.
And so we need a multidimensionalapproach to this problem to ensure that
the US Science ecosystem remains healthy,that it grows, that it is vibrant,
that it continues to execute andbuild on the history of

(20:48):
immense productivity that it has,rather than coast on it.
And so we have to attack this from avariety of angles, really, and do that in
concert with the best talent from aroundthe world, bring them to our shores,
find ways to collaborate with them,and not simply to build walls.
I think that would bea tremendous mistake.

There's the risk of building walls,
there's the risk of insufficientlypromoting science in this country.
But there are also real risksto national security and
economic security from maligninternational partners or
from behavior from internationalpartners that is malign.
And so I wanna ensure that that's put onthe table because I think it's crucial to

(21:29):
today's conversation.
I saw Yasheng nodding on this, andI know that in your Nature article and
in the MIT China Report, you've written ingreat detail about what you see are some
of the risks, and I wonder if youwould comment on that for us.

Yeah, so I think we shouldn't be naive about the geopolitical
complexities andthe challenges from China.
And I understand Xi Jinping Chinais a different country
as compared with China before.
So I think it's not wrongto revise the policy and

(22:06):
to take it seriously the threat from,not just from China,
but from other countries dueto some of the leakages.
But just before I get tothe nature of the challenges,
I just want to mention thatas Zhenan pointed out,

(22:28):
before roughly 2017,2018, universities and
the US federal government were encouragingthe faculty to engage with China, right?
So the rules were not clear becauseit was not viewed as important
to make it very clear what you can do,what you cannot do,

(22:50):
because the overall collaborationwas supported by the US Government.
Now the situations havechanged in China and
possibly in the US, and therefore,policies should also change.
But we shouldn't go retroactivelyto go after the faculty,
and the scientists, andothers who collaborated with their

(23:14):
Chinese colleagues underthe previous policy regime, right?
So the basic principle of ruleof law is that you don't invoke
a law to punish people beforethe law was established.
So I think that should bea basic operating principle.

(23:35):
And going forward, then,we have hopefully more clear rules and
disclosure requirements andthings like that.
In terms of the nature of the threat,
China has always been a verystrong technological power,
and the emphasis on science andtechnology has always

(23:57):
been among the top Parityof the Chinese government,
but I will say, before Xi Jinping,not that effort was
not directed toward forgeopolitical purposes, and for
it didn't really factor interms of the geopolitical

(24:19):
relationship between China and the West.
Now it's a bigger factor, in 2017,
there was a central governmentcommission that explicitly
combines technology withmilitary applications.
So even without the commission,you could still do the integration, but

(24:41):
the commission puts that integration atone of the highest government priorities.
And the commission is personally headedby the president of the country,
so [LAUGH] you can'tsay it's low priority.
So definitely there's that,so we need to think about
the ways to deal with that particularconfiguration of challenges.

(25:07):
And I want to be very clear,it is not an easy challenge to deal with,
it's very complex, it's very complicated.
It probably should case by case,field by field,
product by product, and lab by lab,it should operate at that level.

(25:29):
But the approach that weare seeing now on the part of
the US Government is at a veryaggregate level, right.
I have a friend who isa conductor of an orchestra, and
he has invited some Chinese musicians, and
one of the musicians from Chinawanted to use AI to generate music.

(25:52):
And he was stopped at the border [LAUGH],and he couldn't come
to the US to perform his music becausehe has AI in his musical creativity.
And so, I mean, do we want to go that far,right, and quantum, right,
that's another area.
So if I see effort, serious efforton the part of the US Government

(26:17):
to convene panels of scientists,panels of technologists,
panels of people like Glenn,panel of geopolitical thinkers to
think through these issues andthen issue guidelines and policy.
Then I have more confidencein getting this issue, right,

(26:37):
one of the difficulties is that scienceis a very difficult subject matter.
[LAUGH] And I knew personally mostlyon the more humble side, and so
it's a very difficult subject matter.
And now you are putting the burden onthe Justice Department to enforce this

(26:59):
severance of collaboration betweenChina and the United States.
They don't know science, and
they are not in a position to know it,they are not trained as scientists.
So what do they use, they use
racial profiling, right.

(27:20):
If you just assume the best onthe part of the Justice Department,
they don't know science,then they have to use something, right.
Then the racial features,
racial backgrounds becomethe natural deciding factor, right.
Some people will go further, they saythey purposely go after the Chinese,
I think it's more becausethey don't know science.

(27:41):
But then they observe Chinese scientists,Chinese American scientists,
then they go after them, right.
That has all sorts of implications for
civil rights, forour values for democracy, and
in addition to the damage on science andtechnology.

I want to throw it to Glenn now to talk about
the Secure Initiative funded bythe National Science foundation.
Because spoiler alert,much of what Yasheng,
you just described aboutwanting a targeted approach,
a field specific approach, a data drivenapproach to operate from a stronger
posture of knowledge is I think,at the core of that program, Glenn.

Thank you, Yashung, Well,
first let me say it's a great honor to beable to partner with you personally, but
also ASF as we try toget this balance right.
And it's a hard problem to solve, not onlyjust empirically as a subject of study,
but also because of decisions that havebeen made in the last several years and
choices, unfortunatechoices that were made.
There's a lot of pain andmistrust to overcome that.

(28:46):
We have to work very hard to earnback from the scientific community,
from the Asian American community,
to be a trusted partner as we worktogether to try to get this right.
Partly for that reason, I think the NSFwas extremely wise in turning to a group
of non governmental entities to tryto take this as a community building

(29:07):
approach anda subject of serious empirical research.
So that we could begin to solvethe problem for ourselves and
do better to devise solutionsthat made sense to academics and
researchers from a variety of disciplines.
Each discipline will have its own culture,its own conventions, what works in AI
doesn't necessarily work in high energyphysics, which is massively collaborative.

(29:30):
And then there are other fields likecomputational biology which have
different practices.
You really have to get this right in a waythat speaks to the discrete experiences
of doing different subfields anddifferent disciplines and
practices, from medicine tocomputer science to engineering.
And so it's critical to have allof those voices represented,

(29:52):
the Secure program has two components.
It has the Secure center which willbe focused on really establishing
a mechanism forthe community to sit there and
co- generate solutions that make sense forthem.
That respect the diversity ofinstitutional governance conventions that
are operative acrossdifferent universities and

(30:13):
small and medium sized businesses to findsolutions that work for all of them and
to build trust and products andbest practices that make sense for them.
That is being led bythe University of Washington and
involves a large number of institutions,Francis and I are also on the team.
And then the second pillaris secure analytics and
this is really the data science,the really granular.

(30:34):
Let's figure out exactly where the riskis and isn't in international research,
and this is not looking atany one particular country.
Because it is critical that as the UnitedStates goes out and does science on a more
global basis and reaches beyondits traditional research partners.
Which have been largely fromthe world of liberal democratic
nations that in many respectsresemble our own practices,

(30:57):
our own conventions,our own systems, ideologies.
As we go out to the larger world, as wemust, we need tools to help us figure
out how to do this safely in ways thatare consistent with our values and
national interests.
And so we need to develop data sets,
methodologies that can go down to thelevel of the institution, down to the lab,
the subfield of science, the individual.

(31:18):
To help researchers keep the academicfreedom that they enjoy, but give them
the information that they need to makebetter decisions about what a risk and
opportunity calculus looks like.
Because every engagement with a partner,no matter whether it's a trusted partner
or a new partner who has yetto earn trust,
involves a kind of opportunity cost,benefit, opportunity risk, trade off.

(31:41):
That's just life, what we need right nowis the data to help people make those
decisions in a better way, andwe have not given them that data.
So they've been operating in the dark andthen being liable for
the consequences of that.
And there was a time a few years ago wheresuddenly our policymakers woke up in
a panic that actually.
Actually, long simmering but

(32:01):
neglected problems had finally reacheda point where they felt that they needed
to act, but they were acting notnecessarily from a position of knowledge.
And so they adopted policies andovercorrected and caused harm,
we don't want to do that.
And so I think now it's step back,let's build the knowledge,
let's build the data sothat we can make the right choices.

(32:22):
And that is exactly whatthe Secure Program is aiming to do.
And we're going to do it to ensurethat we get the risk right, but
we also get the science right.
And for that, partners andthe scientific community are essential,
because I understandcertain things about China.
I'm not a quantum scientist, I'm nota computational biologist, but I need to
know who is so that I can turn to them andsay, help me be smart about this.

(32:46):
So that's part of what this panel,
what this series of meetingsthat we're building is about.
So that science is too importantto leave to the politicians, but
it is also true that the politics is tooimportant to leave to the scientists.
And so we've gotta bringeveryone together to solve this.

I wanna turn now then to the chemical engineer and
the physicist on the panel and say,as Glenn and Yasheng have laid out,
we're in a rapidly changingpolicy environment.
We're in a space where new initiativeslike the Secure Program are nascent and
where those who are running themare actively looking for feedback and

(33:26):
suggestions and advice from the scientificcommunity about how to overcome some
of the problems that we've laid out andhow to maybe move in a positive direction.
So, Zhenan and Peter, you've got two ofthe Secure Program people at the table.
I count at least a dozen of them online.
What would you say?

Well, first, I think this is great to have
such a program to understandthe situation and
design some rules and guidance.
I think, actually,while you were talking, and

(34:07):
then I started thinking,actually, for academics,
collaboration is somethingactually takes a lot of effort.
And funding agencies in the past20 years have been trying
to promote people to collaborate sothat we can do better science.

(34:32):
It's not that we're collaboratingwith another country just for
the sake of collaboration, butrather it's because when we collaborate,
we can do better work.
We actually spend more time andmore effort and
try to understand each otherin order to collaborate.
So I think that seemedto maybe have been lost

(34:55):
somehow in kind of justthinking about our policy and
what we need to set to setthe wars between countries.
But actually the reason for collaborationis really to do better science and

(35:17):
also when thinking about which areasto set, certain rules and regulations.
The other thing I want topoint out is us is leading
many fields, butwe are not the best in all fields.
So we are also learning from othercountries, from our colleagues.

(35:41):
So that's why we are collaborating.
So this kind of interactionis really important.
And while we set up certain guidelines,also I think it's
important for us to think about,especially in areas.
So maybe us is not the leading player.

(36:04):
How do we help us to collaborate,
even if the area mayhave security concerns,
but how do we help us tobe the leader in the area?

Thank you for that, Zhenan, Peter.

Well, thanks, so I think, first of all, just thank Glenn for
the work you're doing andFrancis on this secure analysis.
I think it's actually important.
My main concern about it is it'll be morebureaucracy, but you're aware of that.
>> [LAUGH]>> Peter F. Michelson: But
I do think getting feedback and
interacting with the scientificcommunity at the people actually

(36:47):
engaged in internationalresearch is incredibly important.
And I just reiterate what Zhenan said,my own experience with collaboration.
The reason you collaborateis you get to know somebody.
And I'm talking about a scale that's sortof peer to peer, maybe somewhat larger,

(37:08):
rather than thinking institutional toinstitutional or nation to nation.
And I realize that's in the background,but scientists typically wanna collaborate
with people, that there's a benefit andthe benefit should be mutual.
And I think developing an understandingof what the goals of the research are,

(37:29):
and there's shared goals andan understanding and an agreement.
Sometimes it's informal, but depending onthe scale, it may have to be more formal.
And I think that's something thatscientists have to really be engaged in
and including with scientists from China,from anywhere.
And that's something I'vehad some experience with,

(37:50):
growing a largeinternational collaboration.
And I think that thread shouldn't be lost.
I think it's that personal trust that getsdeveloped that's incredibly important.
And I don't know how you factor that intosomething like this secure analysis,
but I think developing that kind of trust,even with people who

(38:10):
live in a country where geopoliticallywe don't share the same ideologies,
I think it's very importantto have those bridges.

So let me address that, Peter, because I think maybe Yasheng and
I might share this on this panel,actually.
And that is, unlike scientists, thesubjects of our study are not portable in
the way that they are for you, forexample, let's say a wall goes up and it
becomes impossible to work with partnersfrom China, and we don't want that.

(38:44):
Let's just say, hypothetically,it is possible to do work in biology,
AI physics.
Elsewhere, we'd lose a lot,but it is possible.
Your identity as a scientistis not at stake, right?
But for Yasheng and me,China is not just the site of study,
it is the subject of our study, in a way.

(39:04):
And so our identity as historians orpolitical economists and so forth,
it is literally impossible forus to do the work that we do.
And so, just speaking for myself,it is critical to get this balance right,
because we don't want to lose,I think, the importance of having
international collaborators on both sides,despite all of the troubles.

(39:28):
We've got to figure out a way to navigatearound this and navigate in a smart way.
But I think it's valuable and critical forthe people who do this work to,
I think,come from the perspective of there's so
much to be gained and somuch to be lost if we don't do it right.

No, I agree with you entirely.
In fact, I would say once westart building walls that
don't have doors, we're in big trouble.
And particularly,with a global power like China.

Yeah. >> Peter F. Michelson
to be committed to keeping thosedoors open in a responsible way.

So, by the way, my solution to that problem is that I have
now begun to do more research on history.
And you are moving [LAUGH]in the other direction.

Talk to me about closed archives one day.

Yes, come on in.
You're welcome.

Anyway, so then, but I think there's a sort of
broader discussion that wealso need to have secure.
Those activities are at the verydownstream end of this question.
At the top end, at the upstream end,

(40:45):
I have troubles with a policy orientationthat restricts collaboration and
restricts funding at the same time and
gave tax breaks to rich people andall of that.
And so, as you pointed out,the CHIPS and Science act,

(41:08):
the science part has not been appropriatedin the current budget.Okay The funding for
National Science foundation is reduced,is decreased.
Right, so it is remarkable fora political system
that restricts collaborationswhile its own policies

(41:30):
are reducing funds availableto do scientific research.
One thing we know about the evolutionof science is that science
has become more labor intensive andcapital intensive over time.
There's a paper that shows that today,
if you replicate the Moore's law,you need 17 times as

(41:55):
much as scientificmanpower as in the 1970s.
So essentially,we need more people to do science and
we need more money to do science.
It is okay if you cut off thecollaborations, if you yourself increase
funding of science, if you yourselfincrease funding of education,

(42:16):
both at the basic level,all the way to the tertiary level.
But we're witnessing a government, and
that may increase after January 20,
the tendency to cut federal spending and
undercut the bureaucracies thathave been supportive of science.

(42:39):
That combination worries me tremendously.

I'm going to take moderators privilege to editorialize
myself a little bit on this point.
And I think it's crucial to think aboutthis in the historical context of
the post 2008 financial crisis,
when it is clear that many statesacross this country cut budgets for
their flagship universities significantly,which also impacted scientific budgets.

(43:05):
And at the same time,
places like the People's Republic ofChina were investing heavily in talent
recruitment programs in fundingscientists who may face a gap on one end.
And so it seems a simple incentivestructure that if I were sitting in
Dunan's shoes in 2009 as a chemicalengineer in a department that

(43:28):
was losing funding, and I got a call fromthe PRC offering to build me a lab and
help me get grad students,that seems like a natural choice to make.
And Yashang is right to point outthat those kinds of collaborations
were incentivized and celebrated fora long Time before the moment in the 2017,
2018 reach.

(43:49):
I see that we have quitea few questions online.
I know that the in person audience.
This is not a room ofpeople without opinions and
without the desire to state them.
So I want to move to that now.
So if those could just raise hands.
I'll try my best to take downa list of the in person group.
But while that percolates,I want to ask an online question first.

(44:13):
And that is we have somebody who hasasked, who wants to point out that China
no longer fosters an open andmutually beneficial academic environment.
The CCP is tightening its control over theadministration of Chinese universities.
The Data Security Law impacts disclosuresof data sets that may be sensitive
individually or in the aggregate.

(44:35):
The Anti Espionage law can be weaponizedor used as a barrier to conduct research
on topics deemed as toosensitive in any fields.
Shouldn't this all requirea substantial recalibration of our
academic engagements orour habits of science?
I'll throw that to the panel,whoever wants to weigh in on this one.

I have a view, but I want to defer.

Yeah, I would, I'm very concerned about that and
I would say we shouldn'tdo the same thing.

Go on.

Yeah, so I think we, we need to study China as it is and
adapt to it as it is.
I think the danger is if weremain radically open and
treat China the same as we treatour other more open partners.
China is not the same as Canada.
China is not the same as Germany.
If someday it behaves inways that are comparable,

(45:28):
then we should treat it like them.
It's simply behavioral.
And so to the extent that,I'll give you an example,
recently a paper was published in Cell,which is a major journal in biology,
in which the authorssaid that they would not,
as is the standard practice in thesepublications, submit the data on which
their research was based because it wasgoverned by China's data security laws.

(45:51):
And yet the paper was published.
Why do we compromise our standardswhen we wouldn't do that for
probably anyone else simplyto publish that paper?
So I think it is really important forus to be clear and
make intentional decisions about howyou manage the discrepancy of these two
really divergent systems of science.
You can't pretend that they're identicalbecause then I think what you end up doing

(46:15):
is sleepwalking into serious problemsthat, well, then will provoke a crisis.
So the key thing is, I think,being honest and then figuring out things,
being what they are,how do we make this work?

In person.
Questions, anybody?
Yes, sir.
Over there.
And if you could briefly introduceyourself before you ask your question.

>> Alex (46:36):
Citizen, I work for a brokerage industry company and
came here on happenstance today.
Happy to be here.
My name's Alex.
I have a question.
We're talking about sortof what's happening.
What do we do?
Who's getting traction in companies andenterprises.

(46:59):
How many people in China wantto work on this the right way?
What do we know about that?
What are we doing to promote those things?
Obviously the tech companies here.
Stanford, unbelievable.
My dad andmy wife's dad went to school here.

(47:20):
But we're just talking about stuff.
We're not talking about who's succeeding,what are we doing?
I mean, companies are succeeding,bureaucracies get in the way.
The government today, I mean,I'm an editorializer.

I think we'll keep it to the question, but
I want to ensure that the panelgets in on this to give us a view.

>> Alex (47:41):
Thank you.

I think we need to draw a sharp line between companies and
universities.
This discussion is mostlyabout universities.
So there's a fundamental differencebetween fundamental research,
which is open to the public,and the proposal.
Prior to research that isundertaken by the companies.

(48:04):
That's the prerogative ofthe companies whether or
not they want to collaborate withChinese companies, Indian companies.
Many of them probably don'twant to do that, right?
So the issue facing them is actually muchmore simple as compared with the issue
that's facing the university community,right?
Because everything that we do,Stanford, is, is the same.

(48:27):
We do not undertake classified research.
MIT does only in one part of the mit,which is called Lincoln Lab.
And I, as an MIT professor,
cannot get into the Lincoln Lab becauseI don't have security clearance.
So the issue here is that howdo you treat public knowledge as
a source of national security threat,right?

(48:51):
So that's the nature of the discussion and
we shouldn't confuse that with what'sgoing on the corporate sector.

I wanna take moderator's privilege here to ask
a question that was triggered by yourcomment, Yasheng, about public knowledge.
I know that many on this panel might havedisparate views of the line that we've
historically used in the United States tomake determinations like this and SDD189,
which established the fundamental andopen distinction.
That on one side, it's open research and

(49:21):
you're free to collaborate with whoyou want, and on the other side,
we have a landscape of export controls,classifications and so on.
I throw it to the panel.
Do you feel that this isa useful distinction for
the environment that we're in right now?

Yes, I think, in fact, NSDD189,
which defines fundamental research back
from the Reagan administration,
I actually think that'sa very valuable position.
And I also understand why it'schallenging and it's become increasingly

(50:01):
challenging because of things likedual use of technology and so forth.
But I think in the university environment,I think the openness and
the welcoming environment that anystudent admitted, for example,
at Stanford, assuming they havea research advisor who agrees.
That student can work on whatever researchthat advisor is hosting in their lab,

(50:24):
independent of their citizenship ornational origin.
And I think we can't cross that line.
Now there are areas, andI've experienced this myself,
when you build a satellite, there'sall kinds of this stuff to deal with.
It is possible andI think it takes work, but

(50:45):
it is possible to put lines aroundthings that are export controlled.
And at the same time, the core fundamentalresearch is open to any student.
And if you cross that line,it's a little bit fuzzy, but
I think it requires judgment onthe part of the university and
the principal investigator that haveto take responsibility for that.

(51:09):
But I think involvingstudents from any background,
any part of the world that are talented,they have to learn to collaborate.
And I think that is something that's ofincredible value to the United States and
that's something that universitiesshould take a leadership role in.
So I really think we have to, but we alsohave to recognize some restrictions.

(51:31):
And I think there are policies inplace that have to be tuned up, but
I wouldn't see any radical change.

I also agree with what Peter just said and
I think it's important to draw that line.
And it has been working pretty wellbecause the rule is very clear.
And there is decision tree that Ican go through to determine what's
fundamental research,what's export controlled and

(52:03):
under what situation fundamentalresearch becomes export controlled?
So I think as long as the rule is clear,there's no problem and no problem for
engagement.

So this is good because I think we have a divergence of views now.
[LAUGH] And that is I sharethe values that you've articulated.
I want clarity and I also want faculty andindividual scientists and
students to have the freedom to workon whatever topics they feel it's
most appropriate and fruitful to work on.

(52:36):
I wanna preserve that spacethat NSD189 has walled off.
I think everyone lovesthe clarity of a bright line.
But I also spend a very large part ofmy day studying what happens in this
protected zone of open and
fundamental research that isnonetheless deeply worrying?
Because it is really just one ortwo steps away from applications

(53:00):
that are adverse to either our values orour national interests.
And in fact, it is the openness ofthat space that is exploited by actors
who see it as a pantry they can raidwithout any restrictions put on them.
And in order to preserve that,
I encourage the academic community,we have this moment now.

(53:24):
And the secure program, I think isa gift that actually resources us
to step up to take a more active roleat the level of the institution and
the individual bench scientists.
The PI, to do more in this space,to be good citizens in science,
to think beyond just the sort ofoptimization of research result that

(53:45):
they're rewarded for in their careers andsay, what are the bigger stakes here?
So that I can not justhave a compliance mindset.
Here's an export control, short of that,
I can kind of do whatever I want withwhomever I want is not good enough in
a world in which the geopoliticalconsiderations are changing.
It's not a stable solution and

(54:05):
it will invite heavy handed interventionin that open space that we don't want.
So it's incumbent on us to fillthat with our solutions and
to come up with better ways.
And that's partly what secure is about.
It's about giving you the data to go,maybe I should do this in a slightly
different way,possibly with this partner, but

(54:25):
adopt particular mitigation measures sothat the choice is, yes, you can do this.
No one's going to say you can't do it.
It's not illegal, andwe wanna preserve that.
So let's make sure you do it safely so
people don't say,this is too unsafe to allow you to do it.

Peter, do you wanna jump in on this?

Yeah, well, I think, going back to some of the earlier
discussion, I think to make that judgment,you said there's some
areas that are just two steps awayfrom a dual use that could be harmful.
I think it's important to look atthose in a very, very granular way.

(55:05):
And I think this is a challenge andthis is where the scientific community,
quote Yasheng, they can't ignore politics.

[LAUGH] Yeah, yeah,
that's why we have to do it together,right?

Yeah, no, I think that's right.
But an area where, just an examplewhere I think a term gets used that
you use the word quantum in Washington andeverybody says national security,
quantum information.
My God, I think that is just absolutelythe political establishment in Washington.
I'm not saying people in the executivebranch don't understand this,

(55:39):
but I don't think verymany other people do.
And the scientific communityhas to be involved in that.

I saw Melissa's hand.

>> Speaker 7 (55:49):
Yasheng had a- >> Frances Hisgen

So very quickly.
I think that the differencebetween Glenn's view and
Peter's view is not as big asAs probably first appeared.
I think the issue is whether or
not we still consider fundamentalopen research as a first principle.
I don't think you woulddisagree with that, right?

(56:12):
So then the issue is there are specificareas that we have to think
carefully about restriction andcollaborations, right?
And then Peter's point is that wehave to operate that principle at
a very granular level.
The analogy that I see is free speech,right?

(56:33):
In a democracy, we protect free speech,
but there are situations in whichfree speech is not protected.
You are held liable for free speech ifyou shout fire in a crowded theater.
But that judgment hasto be made at a very,
very specific activity levelrather than at a very high level.

(56:55):
It has to be made by people who understandwhat the nature of the activity is.

>> Melissa (57:02):
[INAUDIBLE] Questions to the panel, if we flipped it on the other side,
if you looked at the PRC government'sperspective, and they asked for
cooperation in areas that Americanscientists would not be able to do,
how do we find a Venn diagramwhere we can cooperate?
We don't have a science andtech agreement anymore,
so there's no clarity therefrom the Chinese side.

(57:23):
And they were often usingthat as a blueprint for
what they could collaboratewith on the US.

So it's important to define what collaboration means, right?
So there could be Stanford collaboratingwith a Chinese university.
But another form of collaborationis that Stanford collaborates
with Chinese talents at the studentlevel and the postdoc level and
at the level of the faculty that havebeen trained at our institution.

(57:55):
That's also a form of collaboration.
The danger now is that we are restrictingeven that form of collaboration.
We are not allowing Chinese studentsto come, we are denying their visas,
and we are turning themaway at the border, right?
So in terms of institutionalcollaboration, I think that's case

(58:19):
by case, and we should be carefulabout the concern that you raised.

>> Melissa (58:24):
And if I may just add to that, so just a little data,
empirically speaking, we approveover 90% of the visa applications.
But what I would also say is that there'sa self-selection process on the PRC
government side.
Those are very self-selecting students whoare getting through the wickets just to
get into the application line.
There is a line of PAP guardsaround every embassy and consulate,

(58:48):
US embassy and consulate in China,
and they are the first line beforethose applicants can even get to us.

People's Armed Police.

>> Melissa (58:56):
Yes, thank you.

Melissa, could you introduce yourself to those
in the room who don't know you andyour background?

>> Melissa (59:01):
A happy visiting scholar at CSAC who happens to have a government
background [LAUGH].
[LAUGH]>> Frances Hisgen: Sir,
in the Patagonia vest.

>> Kevin Fong (59:11):
My name is Kevin Fong.
I have a question for [INAUDIBLE],I have a practical question.
I have a medical company hires probablyabout 20 Russian scientists in the past.
And some of them some of our technology,start another company.
And I talked to my lawyer,and then we talk about,

(59:33):
discuss about it,we found it's not worth it pursuing it.
Because they probably tookaway 10% our technology,
particularly about 9% ofthe value in our company.
So my question is this, in this exchange,academic technology between China and
US, probably we're gonna losesome technology to China?

(59:57):
But most of them are created in thiscountry also by the scientists.
So the question is why bother?

>> Yasheng Huang (01:00:06):
So I can give you a specific example.

>> Kevin Fong (01:00:08):
But this is my example, yeah.

Okay.
>> [LAUGH]>> Yasheng Huang: Let me supplement your
example with another example.
>> [LAUGH]>> Yasheng Huang: The Chinese EVs now
are dominating the world andall of that, right?
The battery technology was firstinvented in the United States.

(01:00:34):
There's a company called A123,
which was a technologypioneered by MIT professor, but
we have systematically failed to scalethat technology in the United States.
A123 was first sold to Americancompanies and automobile companies,

(01:00:55):
and they couldn't scale anddevelop and deploy that technology.
It was sold fair market value to a Chinesecompany, they scaled the technology.
So in this case,we cannot possibly blame the Chinese for
our failure to scale the technologyin the first place, right?

(01:01:16):
And the government supportis incredibly important,
the Inflation Reduction Actis incredibly important,
and Chips andScience Act is incredibly important.
Let's make sure that the newadministration is not going to cancel
these legislation.

>> Frances Hisgen (01:01:35):
Glenn.

>> Glenn Tiffert (01:01:37):
Yashung, I applaud your point because if we focus purely on
the science that is donein the university lab,
I think we're missingthe bigger play here.
Because I speak to scientistseverywhere who say,
I've invented something that potentiallyhas market-changing applications.
And I wanna take it out of my lab and

(01:01:58):
I wanna begin buildinga demonstration manufacturing site,
[COUGH] trying to scale up my technology,bring it to market.
I can't do that in the United States.
Either I cannot get the capitalthat is willing to wait it out for
me to actually make this thing efficientand start bringing in money, or I can't
build it in the United States becausewe've lost the manufacturing ability, and

(01:02:22):
it can be done cheaply in Asia,particularly China.
And so even if you protectthe technology in all kinds of ways,
ultimately, if someone wants toconvert it into a tangible product,
they may have no choice butto manufacture it in China.
And then the technology willleak to local competitors and
you'll have IP control issues andso forth as well.

(01:02:44):
And so let's focus again on the technologypromotion side about not just funding
the fundamental science, but fixingthe problems with our capital markets,
with our depreciation schedules andinvestment.
With ensuring that permittinggoes more quickly,
with doing training ofthe workforce that is required for
basic engineering people who can staff andrun manufacturing lines.

(01:03:07):
So that when people invent reallycool things in the United States,
we can maximize that potential andcreate jobs and
entire industrial ecosystems around that.
We need to be thinkingin those holistic terms.

And I'll add to that, to reap the rewards of process innovation,
because manufacturing isn'tjust about manufacturing.

[COUGH] That's right, they're virtuous cycles, yeah.

I had Steve Koonin.

>> Steven Koonin (01:03:30):
I'm Steve Koonin, I'm a senior fellow here at Hoover.
And over the course of five decadesof career, I've seen this issue
from many different dimensions asa working academic, scientist,
as an academic administrator,government administrator,
giving money out in the private sector tolabs in China to do some interesting work.

(01:03:54):
And just one reaction towhat I've heard so far,
you can Put the burden of determiningwhere the line is on the PI.
It's got to come from the funding agency.
And one thing we did at Caltech whereI was provost for almost a decade,

(01:04:14):
is if there are any controls onthe research, it doesn't belong on campus.
And that's a responsibility the sponsoredresearch office or the funders.
Now, I don't know if the same thingapplies here on Stanford, but
it's a pretty simpleprinciple on Brightline.

Steve, I might flip that comment into a question.
How do we feel about that proposalthat it should be up to the funding
agencies panel?

>> Zhenan Bao (01:04:41):
I completely agree, cuz funding agencies, they are the funders.
They should make the rule clear.
And also the underground level,when the first time I
had to approach a problem of whethera project has asphalt control or

(01:05:02):
whether a student with certainnationality can work on the project.
I felt so relieved that I wastold by Stanford that, well,
Stanford is not going toaccept any contract that has
a restriction on the nationalityof the student or
postdoc working on the project,cuz I do not have to to draw a line or

(01:05:27):
make a wall in my own research groupto keep certain things confidential.
I think that's so.

>> Steven Koonin (01:05:34):
And there should be a place you can go to ask that question if
it's not directly coming from the fund.

>> Zhenan Bao (01:05:40):
Right.

I'll just note, I know Glenn, you might wanna come in on this.
That that is true for Stanford, that istrue for MIT, that is true for Caltech.
But there are hundreds of academicinstitutions across this country that do
take classified research that doaccept export control restrictions.

I'll say one consequence of that choice, Steve,
might be that the world of NSD 189becomes radically restricted then.
And so a great amount of the freedomthat PIs currently enjoy to do
research in particular lines ofinquiry will then be on the wrong side
of the fence if you put it inthe hands of the funding agencies.

(01:06:20):
The funding agencies understandthe science very well, but
I'm not sure that they understandthe risk side of the equation either.
And so you get sort of the mirror image orthe flip side of the problem as if you
handed it to the FBI andasked them to make decisions.
So I trust, let's say, DOE Office ofScience more than I would trust the FBI.
But the government folks orthe funders bring one other factor.

(01:06:44):
They understand the broader context.
PIs generally don't know whatgoes on behind the fence,
whereas the government folks do or should.

>> Zhenan Bao (01:06:55):
And also, another, sorry, another example,
there was a project in orderto receive the funding
I was told to follow certain guidelines,
including reporting on visits by malign,
maybe visitors from maligncountry with malign intentions or

(01:07:21):
behavior andI have no idea what that means.
>> [LAUGH]>> Zhenan Bao: What's considered that kind
of behavior?

The gentleman in the blue jacket.

>> Joel Wong (01:07:34):
My name is Joel Wong, I classify myself as a community activist.
I'm retiree ofLawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
I want to bring out the case of Tesla.
A few years ago,Elon Musk went to China and said,
I wanna build a plant in China andChina waived all the regulations.

(01:07:56):
They didn't even want tohave 50% of the state, and
say, you can do whatever you want.
A year later, they build a Tesla factoryin Shanghai, and that's very successful.
A few months before this, Elon Muskwent to see Xi Jinping opened the door,
I want to test of my navigationsystem in China using your satellite.

(01:08:20):
And Xi Jinping said, yes, you can do that.

Sir, do you have a question?

>> Joel Wong (01:08:24):
My question is I want to ask any of
the panelists to comment on the attitude
of China versus the United States.
So I wouldn't trust the political

(01:08:45):
judgment by Elon Musk- [LAUGH]>> Yasheng Huang: Just my personal.
>> [LAUGH]>> Yasheng Huang: But
one of the things he didwas from the very start
he made the software ofhis company open source.
And he had the belief that nobodyelse could produce on the same scale,

(01:09:10):
same sophistications as he would, andhe was totally wrong about China, right?
The Chinese engineers, Chinese companiesare extremely good at scaling.
And this is what we have known fora long, long, long time.
Relative to inventions,they're much better at innovations,

(01:09:32):
deployment, and scaling the technologies.
And now the Chinese EVcompanies are catching up and
in terms of scaling andthey are occupying the markets,
not just in China, butalso in other countries, right?
So in terms ofthe regulatory restrictions,

(01:09:54):
one of the key issues thatthe current administration
has discussed is permitting, right?
So if you look at the IRA,
it has allocated a lot ofthe investment money to red states.
There could be a politicalcalculation behind it, but

(01:10:16):
mostly because those states had a morefriendly regulatory regime, right?
So the current administrationrecognizes that issue,
permitting reformsare a very important reform.
I mean we can never go the way the Chinesegovernment, that's just too much.
And also, they treat Elon Musk very well,
they may not treat otherentrepreneurs very well.

(01:10:38):
They can be very, very selective.
We cannot possibly replicatethe Chinese method.

I'll say the example of Tesla though is instructive.
It's particularly so for US policymakers,
because Tesla was admitted to China andwelcomed to China as a very strategic
choice to bring worldleading technology to China.
To train a workforce to catalyzethe development of an indigenous
capability in this area sothat home grown national champions would

(01:11:07):
then be able to challenge Tesla inthe Chinese market and in the world.
US policymakers are takingthe opposite decision.
We're building walls trying to keep outthe world leading technology that's coming
from China, because we're afraid of it.
Instead, what we should be doing isbringing it in and challenging our

(01:11:27):
firms to beat it, because otherwise,we're gonna lose the global marketplace.

In the back and the sport coat.

>> Speaker 12 (01:11:35):
I wanted to build on Glenn's earlier comment about the need to
reinvest in the US innovationecosystem by asking a question about
the role of a talentacquisition strategy for
the United States just commented about theneed to bring in technology from abroad.
But if the US had an effective immigrationstrategy of seeking to proactively

(01:11:58):
recruit like the The world's topscientists, including from the PRC,
and then make the US a really attractiveplace for those people to settle,
and then also had clarity andefficient kinda compliance systems.
Would that benefit technologyresearch in the US?

(01:12:19):
Or does collaboration really requirekind of cross-border research
collaboration where US universitiesare partnering with universities in China,
which I think would introducegreater risks of technology leakage?
So does talent acquisitionalso play a role in fostering
collaboration in a way that couldprotect the resulting technology?

I wanna give you all an opportunity, please.

>> Zhenan Bao (01:12:45):
Yeah, actually there is a recent National Academy
of Science study andreport about foreign talent
programs andin comparison with the status in US.
And the finding is that US isthe only country that does not have
talent program to actively attracttalents from foreign country,

(01:13:10):
while other countries, including China,but many other countries,
develop their own talent program toattract people from US to their countries.
So the recommendation is for
US to design some level of talent program.

I just want to add to that observation.
The reason why every othercountry has a talent program is
because US used to be so attractive.
>> [LAUGH]>> Yasheng Huang: So essentially,
these countries had toget their act together.
And if they just leave it to the market,
they are not going to able toattract one single person, right?

(01:13:52):
So here's the issue, right?
Are we willing to destroy this open freeresearch environment to put ourselves
in that position where we have to designspecific recruitment programs, right?
The beauty of our system is,we actually don't need to do that.
And everybody wants to come here.

I do, even though I am the moderator, wanna come in on that.
Yeah, sure.>> [LAUGH]
Which is, yes,
it's true that we have been thebeneficiary of not needing to have talent
programs, of attracting tremendous flowsof people over the past several decades.
I would not exist in this chair ifthe United States were not a beacon for

(01:14:36):
scholars from China.
But I wonder though,
even without affirmative policy actionto put up walls in this country,
to clip at the way at the edges ofthe open system, we also have to think
affirmatively about building thesekinds of talent acquisition strategies.

(01:14:56):
Other countries are climbingup economic value chains.
It's more and more common for students andscholars in China to stay in their country
and not come to the United States forgraduate school.
India, the United Kingdom,
all of these places are the recipientsof students staying at home.
Glenn and I were having a conversationwith a scientist from Taiwan

(01:15:19):
recently who mentioned that in the 70s and80s, the entire class of
Taida would move to the United States,probably to Stanford or Berkeley.
And we've been the beneficiary of that.
And I think even in the absence ofour changing scientific practice,
we have to grapple withan affirmative talent strategy, too.

I'm not prone to sports metaphors, but there was a time where
the US men's Olympic basketball teamjust had to show up and they would win.
That's not good enough anymore.
They have to play as a team,they have to train,
because the world has gotten better.

But I think the issue here is, using the economic language,
whether that is a complement orsubstitute, right?
I would rather see this asa complement to a free,
open research environmentrather than as a substitute.
China needs these recruitment programsbecause otherwise nobody will go there,

(01:16:17):
right?
Now, I was offered many,many things in China.
I will never go there, no matter howmuch money they pay me, because I know,
first of all, I may not be able to speakfreely and I may be in jail by now.
So->> [LAUGH]
Through these
calculations, right?
So the very reason it's actuallya sign of weakness, right?

(01:16:39):
And Singapore used to go out andhave a systematic program,
precisely because Singaporewas not an obvious place for
technologists and scientists to go there.
They need this program to putthe country on the map, right?
We are a beacon of democracy, we'rea beacon of scientific enterprise, right?

(01:17:02):
We should preserve that, and then on topof that, design and recruitment program.

>> Speaker 13 (01:17:06):
Thanks for the very interesting discussion.
My question is about the action item.
I think the national security issue we'rediscussing here is like the security check
at airport.
I think we probably all agreethat we need the security check,
we're not going to remove it, but also weneed a good X-ray machine rather than some
machine that just randomly alarms,which is sort of what we have now.

(01:17:27):
So the question is,what are the concrete action items,
especially for the university professor?
What can we do to makethis mechanism better,
to reduce this information barrier sothat there is a good balance?
We all can feel this is not a barrier for
research if I'm just doing allthe open fundamental research,

(01:17:52):
but if there's actual research,then there is a mechanism.
So what is the->> Frances Hisgen: I wanna supplement that
question with one from our onlineaudience, which is complimentary and
asks about, if I can rephrase it,action items for other constituencies,
federal agencies, university leadership,for who owns what subset of this risk.

I love your question because it's, if I may rephrase it,
what can I do to help?
And for every individual researcherwho feels that way, please contact us.
Because this is exactly what we'rebuilding here in the SECURE Program,
inviting the community to participatein the construction of solutions and

(01:18:34):
to tell us when we're getting it wrong sothat we can preemptively get it right.
This is critical.
So it's too big of a questionto answer here, and
I hope the phone will ring off the hook,but please call us.

Peter. >> Peter F. Michelson
something I'd just add that I becameaware of several years ago, that I think
would contribute to talent recruitment andretention in the United States,
is if Congress would pass legislationthat had been introduced, I think,
the first time about five, six years ago,called the Keep STEM Talent Act.

(01:19:12):
And it never gets to the finish line.
And I think that kind of legislationfocused in this area of science and
technology to allow immigrants withadvanced degrees in particular fields,
broadly STEM fields, to get permanentresidence in the United States and

(01:19:33):
for their immediatefamily members as well.
And I think that would doa lot to encourage people who
wanna come here to actually come here.
That, I think,
complements a question that we havefrom the online audience, which is,

(01:19:55):
we've spoken today about how STEMis important for national security.
We've spoken Spoken about funding gapsin the Chips and Science Act funding
act funding gaps for our scientificfunding agencies, immigration reform.
To the panel, what information or actiondo you think is needed to effectively
move the needle to convince policymakersto make these sorts of changes?

(01:20:19):
And then if I may add onto the online question,
what other Say if you were monarch fora day or you know,
Senate Majority leader for a day policyaction, would you introduce on the table?

So we need to match our actions with our rhetoric.
If our rhetoric is that Russia,
China represent a large loomingnational security threat,
that's the rhetoric many policymakershave, many politicians have.
We can debate whether that'saccurate rhetoric but nevertheless,

(01:20:57):
many of them have their rhetoric.
We need to match that withconcrete policy actions.
Compare with the Sputnikmoment which galvanized this
country to step up on science,mathematics,
physics, education,research across the board.
As a percentage share of the GDP,federal spending, R&D is multiples

(01:21:22):
of what the federal spending asa percentage share of the GDP is today.
And the Congress is still arguing forreducing R&D spending.
Reducing federal spending onNational Science Foundation.
By the way, the National Sciencefoundation has long ago

(01:21:42):
decided not to fund any socialscience research except very
narrow topics having to dowith the United States, right?
At the time when the internationalgeopolitics is becoming extremely complex,
the economic situationis changing rapidly.
We are both under investing in science andunder investing in social science.

(01:22:07):
I just don't get it, right?
I mean, maybe I'm just a stupid academic.
I just don't understand why our governmenttakes the action that it has and
at the same time systematicallygoing after American
scientists who did collaborativework with China at the time

(01:22:30):
when the US China relationshipswere amicable, right?
So I mean,if you put all these pieces together,
the picture is pretty,pretty depressing, I would argue.

Okay, >> Frances Hisgen
furiously there.
If I was monarch for the day.

I usually phrase it king for a day, but
I'm a big fan of inclusive andgender neutral language.

Exactly.
I would try to overcome the incrediblecoordination and misalignment problems
that we have across various stakeholderconstituencies in this problem set.
We've spoken a lot in this conversationabout policies, about rules,
about regulations, about government,about funding agencies.

(01:23:24):
Researchers don't like totalk about what they can do,
which is why I love that question.
It's always somebodyelse's problem to fix.
Not my responsibility, not my job.
So how do we solve thosecoordination problems and
bring people together in a structured waywhere their perspectives are represented?

(01:23:44):
Presented and we can build solutionsthat are, you know, Pareto optimal for
everybody.

Peter Monarch for a day, dictator for a day,
President for a day, pick your favorite.

>> Zhenan Bao (01:23:57):
Well, yeah, I completely agree.
As researcher, we need to do our part and
speak up about what are ourexperiences and what we encounter so
that the policymakers canmake the rules accordingly.
And I also want to say that it'sreally important that universities

(01:24:22):
being supportive to support theirfaculty members, their students,
because that's locally the environment foreveryone.
And having universities on our back,I think it's really important.
And that will be something impactwhether a colleague decides to leave or

(01:24:45):
stay or students when they think abouttheir next job, whether to go to China or
stay in the United States,it's their own personal experience
in their environment that helpsthem to make that decision.
So I also want to ask universities fortheir support.

After the China initiative, the one university
that has stepped out to protectits faculty, Professor Gang Chen,
arrested by the FBI on totallymade up charges, was MIT.
And many universities have not comeout and defended their faculty.

(01:25:34):
And we're not talkingabout minor universities,
we're talking about some majoruniversities, major research universities.
I think this is problematic.
Universities also need to step up.

I think we might have time for
a couple more questions ifthere's nothing else from.
Please.

>> Speaker 14 (01:25:52):
I watched this FBI witch hunt going on especially at Berkeley, and
it wasn't just the professors, it alsoimpacted the tech transfer office and
nobody was equipped to deal with it and
they really didn't havethe support they needed.
But I wanted to ask,are you also looking at that translation

(01:26:16):
into commercialization process aspart of this NSF secure program?

So the mandate for the secure program was defined in the Chips
and Science act and it includes small andmedium sized businesses.
And so very much the translationin particular of research that's
done in universities to the startupsector is very much in mission.
And so we understand that thatraises separate challenges, right?

(01:26:45):
Many technology transfer offices havetraditionally been focused on like who
signs the best licensing deal withoutregard to due diligence on those partners.
And so we need to adapt to a morecomplex geopolitical environment
without breaking the systemthat has worked so well.
And working with those officesto give them the res they

(01:27:06):
need to make the decisions that they needto make is part of what is a big part
of what we're going to do inthe last couple of minutes here.

I wanna end on a positive note and
I wanna do a little roundrobin of our panel.
So in a sentence or two,what gives you hope in this space?

>> Peter F. Michelson (01:27:25):
What did I what.

What gives you hope in this space?

>> Peter F. Michelson (01:27:29):
In the last two days?
>> [LAUGH]>> Peter F. Michelson: Be helpful.
I think we're going througha difficult time in this country,
and I think we have tokeep an eye on the future.
We have to think, how are we going toimprove the future in this country for
everyone?

(01:27:50):
And I also would say for the worldat large, because we are living on
a planet that has global challenges,pandemics, climate change and.
It's not just about national competition.
There's really global problemsthat we have to address and
we should not lose sight of that.

So first of all, I thank Hoover Institution for
convening this discussion.
We need to have more of thesediscussions rather than less.
I don't think I can end on a hopeful note,
but let me just point out onedifference between what I have seen.
The difference between the two parties,right?
The two parties are united on China.

(01:28:32):
There's a bipartisan agreement on China.
The difference is that one partybelieves that climate change is real,
public health issues are severe.
All these energy transitionsare very important.
And to do these things you needto collaborate with China.
So there's almost an economic andtechnological and scientific necessity,

(01:28:56):
if you recognize the importanceof dealing with these issues.
The other party doesn't even recognize theimportance of these issues and therefore
they don't recognize the importance andnecessity of collaborating in China.
So that's one big differencebetween the two parties.
The other difference that I have seenis that yes, they are united on China,

(01:29:20):
but one party has become more carefulabout balancing civil rights,
balancing openness ofscience with security.
And the other party, I would say, doesnot think too much about that trade off.
In Florida they have passed a lawthat restricts Chinese students from

(01:29:41):
working in their laboratories inthe state universities, right?
So that's the emerging scenario that we
have to think about asthe political change
in this country is going to happen.
I mean,I have a lot of worries about that.

>> Zhenan Bao (01:30:06):
Well, I think when my students encounter research challenges or
problems, I tend to tell them,well, step back and
think about what's the purposeof doing research.
So here I think I'm hopeful that ifwe think about what's the reason for

(01:30:29):
us to do science or for collaboration, and
I think we all have to goto make our world better,
to develop new knowledge andnew technology that benefit human.
So I hope that common goalwill bring us together.

(01:30:51):
And I'm hopeful that that's the goal foreveryone.

I'm the kind of person who kind of, when you encounter adversity,
you roll up your shirt sleeves andyou get to work.
And so I see this as an opportunity forus to manifest the change that we want.
Meetings like this are hopeful.
The meetings that comeout of this are hopeful.
We have a moment and the secure program,I hope will play a large role in this,

(01:31:19):
to begin to make these solutions forourselves before someone tries to do it
for us,because we won't like those solutions.
And so that is also helpful because we'vebeen given an opportunity that we should
not squander.

Thank you to our online audience and our in person audience for
your dedicated attention duringthis last hour and a half.
I hope you'll joining me in givingthese fantastic panelists a big hand.

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