October 15, 2025 • 53 mins
In this episode of the Conflict Tipping podcast, Laura May speaks with conflict scholar Joshua Akintayo, whose research explores how communities in Nigeria are rebuilding peace amid violent extremism. Josh’s work examines what “local peace” actually means—through both traditional mediation practices and deeply taboo issues that shape conflict and recovery. As a bonus, you'll hear some local Nigerian birds in the background.
HighlightsWhy Study Violent Extremism? Josh shares what first drew him to study terrorism and radicalisation in Nigeria, from early research into suicide bombings to the government’s uneven de-radicalisation programmes.
Taboos and Silence Sexual violence against men and boys remains one of the most silenced issues in Nigerian society. Josh discusses what it’s like to research a topic that’s both legally and culturally taboo, and how those taboos affect survivors’ access to help.
Sex Trafficking and Power Drawing on his earlier fieldwork, Josh reveals how conflict, poverty, and patriarchy combine in a hidden economy of sex trafficking involving men and boys—and how masculinity itself can be weaponised in war.
What’s the “Local” in Local Peace? Josh introduces Sulhu, a traditional Islamic-cultural approach to mediation and reconciliation in northern Nigeria. Through Sulhu, communities emphasise forgiveness, respect, and the authority of local leaders—offering an alternative to Western models of peacebuilding.
Top-Down vs. Ground-Up Peace How government “rehabilitation” programmes for extremists differ from community-led processes—and what this contrast tells us about who truly owns peace.
Where to Find Josh
LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/joshua-akintayo-a50074229
Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=JuIHLfEAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao
ResearchGate: Joshua Akintayo on ResearchGate
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:10):
Hello and welcome to the ConflictTipping podcast from Mediate.
com.
The podcast that explores socialconflict and what we can do about it.
I'm your host, Laura May.
And today I have withme Dr. Joshua Akintayo.
He did his PhD in internationalconflict analysis at the University
of Kent, where he was fortunately,or unfortunately my colleague,
(00:31):
and he's originally from Nigeria.
He's done research on counteringviolent extremism and sexual violence
in conflict, the use and misuseof WhatsApp in elections, and has
recently published a very excitingarticle on local mediation as a lens
for local peace building efforts.
So welcome Josh.
Thank you, Laura.
Thanks for having me again.
(00:51):
Or finally.
It is both again and finally, Ithink because for, for the listeners,
Josh and I actually recorded anepisode about 18 months ago, which
has not yet seen the light of day.
And so we're actually doing thistop up now that Josh has been
doing this fantastic new researchand hopefully you'll be hearing
this episode very, very soon.
(01:11):
Josh, you study things likeradicalization and violent extremism.
Why?
Why have you done this to yourself?
What's your motivation?
So I think it all started as anundergrad at the University of Ibadan
in Nigeria, where my undergrad thesiswas on terrorism and globalization.
So I sort of picked up on that.
(01:32):
I found it fascinating.
I mean, what really triggeredme was why would any rational
person want to blow up everybody?
Like, why would anybody,what, what's the motivation?
What's the basis and what premisewould you just want blow off anybody?
And then I did my undergrad thesis onterrorism and globalization in Nigeria.
And then so in Nigeria there'sthis National Youth Service Corps.
(01:52):
It's like a compulsory one year mandatoryscheme where you are to serve the
governments in a paramilitary status.
Yeah.
So you are posted outside your stateof origin, to a different region of
the country to go serve the government.
So fortunately for me, I was posted inthe northern part of Nigeria, northwestern
Nigeria, Kaduna state to be precise.
Which was has been known for overtwo decades for religious violence
(02:16):
ethnic violence and all sorts.
It's quite the niche for that area.
And I was posted there although Ididn't stay through my one year.
But then during my three weeks mandatoryservice in the, in the camp where I had
to stay with military men, I developedthis interest where I saw like the lived
experience of of dwellers in that region.
I saw how they were literally on theedge every day of their lives, where
(02:40):
they had to precisely be on the guard.
Like, oh there's asecurity report somewhere.
There may be possibly be abomb blast coming up somewhere.
And everybody had to like,live constantly on the edge.
So there was this constant state of fearthat everybody there had to live with.
I, myself, because I was there atthe point, and I mean, sort of,
sort of amazed me in some ways.
(03:00):
Like, so why do we do this to ourselves?
Why, why do we have toconstantly stay on the edge?
What's the motive?
So are we trying to understandwhy the, the suicide bomber
is also motivated to do this?
Is anybody trying to get into theirhead to know why are you interested
in blowing up your fellow person?
Particularly in Nigeria and why, why, why?
(03:21):
Particularly from the northern part of thecountry where it's more like the hotbed
of radicalization and violent extremism.
So I think those two episodes inmy life were like the main points
that triggered the whole interest ofradicalization, countering violent
extremism, preventing violent extremismand trying to understand the responses,
particularly from the Nigerian state.
(03:42):
'cause it seemed to me then, Imean, had very critical view.
It seemed to me then that theNigerian state was a little bit
incapable of nipping it in the bud.
I mean, I felt like there wasnot enough will on the part of
the government . Political eliteshad left it unfettered to grow for
whatever's sake, political expediency,economic gains, whatever it is.
(04:03):
But yeah, those two episodesencapsulated, shaped my worldview
on what I wanted to research on.
Okay.
And so, look, I know very,very little about Nigeria.
Suicide bombing as you've mentioned,is that a common problem in, it was the
northeastern region of Nigeria, you said?
So, terrorism had been a thing inNigeria since 2003, some decades ago.
(04:28):
Active suicide bombing becamewhat was constantly in our
faces in Nigeria beginning 2009.
And I think it, it peaked in 2011 withthe United Nations headquarters bombing
in Abuja and the police headquartersthat were blown up by a terrorist.
So I would say it became a commonphenomenon, a common feature in Nigeria
(04:50):
from 2009, although pockets of bombinghad been happening before then in
different aspects of the country.
Particularly the northernpart of the country.
What is your currentresearch focus would you say?
Okay.
So as an extension for my PhD,particularly for my fieldwork I
did come across the tenets of localpeace, how we can use local mechanisms
(05:14):
to resolve conflict and violencespecifically the context of violent
extremism, de radicalization in Nigeria.
So I wrote an article where I triedto develop a framework on local
mediation to resolve conflict tobuild peace in a sustainable way.
So I'm trying to make significantimpact rather than my work just
(05:35):
sitting in the ivory tower.
And of course my researchon conflict related sexual
violence is also still ongoing.
I just wrote an article reflectingon my experiences researching sexual
violence against men and boys inNigeria, where these things are
sort of constructed as a taboo.
Okay, so let's start with thisdiscussion of taboo then, because I
(05:56):
recall in when we recorded before wetalked actually quite a lot about this.
And so listeners, just a bitof a content warning for sexual
violence in this episode.
Um, Nothing very graphic, but yeah,let's talk about this idea of taboo then.
So what was the generaltenor of that paper?
I understand you wrote that with acouple of other researchers, right?
Yes, two of my colleagues.
(06:18):
And so what made you decide to write it?
So firstly we did realize the gapin the literature on Africans, by
Africans that have lived in Africareflecting on their experiences doing
research on sexual violence in Africa.
So that was the first motivator for us.
(06:40):
It was kind of interesting.
Um, Secondly, , we reflectedon our experiences.
So we we shared notes.
So because of comparing ournotes we realized that there was
a common theme that moved around.
And that was how ourparticipants perceived us.
The way they made sense of wedoing research, conflict, sexual
(07:00):
violence against men and boys.
So, we all share thesame national identity.
We're all Nigerians.
We realized that despite the fact thatwe are Nigerians, that didn't stop our
participants from perceiving what wewere doing as very strange and alien,
despite the fact that these thingswere occurring in the context, right?
Something from my side particularly,I, I conducted interviews in
(07:22):
Lagos and Abuja for the project.
I tried to recruit members from civilsociety network and particularly that
work around peace um, sexual violence.
And something that struck me particularlywas because of my reaching out to
these participant, having to attendworkshops, having to go to meet them
um, also my own research area um, I,I realized that they all, they all had
(07:44):
this very sympathetic view towards me.
So initially I say, oh, I wouldlove to speak to you about,
conflict related sexual violence.
So the general perception wouldbe, oh, against women and girls.
Oh, it's so rampant.
And then I would allow them to settlein, and then I'd change the tone.
I was like, well, not really againstwomen and girls, but against men and
boys in this, in this, in this context.
And you would just notice theswitch of demeanor um, right, the
(08:08):
behaviors, and they'd be like, oh, no.
And I, I noticed this kindof sympathy towards me.
I think most of them felt like I wasa victim or a survivor that needed
some kind of social care, right?
And I wanted to talk about it.
And they were like, Oh.
Oh, you should set up an NGO aboutit to talk about your experiences.
(08:28):
Um, So I allowed, I allowed them tofinish talking like, oh, well, yes.
Part of the research is to actuallygive survivors a voice, right?
I'm not a survivor.
I just want to give survivors a voice.
It's just passion for me.
And then.
Some of them were very reluctant, very,very reluctant, I think, because of,
because of the social, cultural contextthat we are in Nigeria um, of course,
(08:52):
first and foremost, these things areoutlawed in Nigeria, there's a law, same
sex practice law, signed into law in2014, sort of forbids that um, people
I don't want to talk about it, evenwhen you come to tell them and ask them
for how we can provide psychosocialsupport for survivors and victims.
(09:13):
Because of the very general climateof law, it seems to constrain people
from talking about it even in thecontext of providing help, right?
So you wouldn't find that inthe context of say sexual
violence against women and girls.
Where you have the most psychosocial care support um, advocacy,
and a lot of these things about it.
Um, So every, every aspect of oursociocultural context sort of forbids
(09:35):
in the event they come out talkingabout it, the laws forbids it um,
culturally it's seen as a taboo.
I mean, so for instance, one ofmy colleagues that spoke with
a police officer that had beenuh, at the war front for years.
I remember the police officer's firstresponse was, hey, that's a taboo.
Where would you hear a manhaving intercourse with a man?
I mean, it was strange to him, butwas it particularly strange to us?
(10:01):
I mean, we had, we had spoken with victimsand survivors on different contexts and
we've heard so many experiences, right?
So when we were reflecting ourexperience, that made sense to us
because it was interesting, likehow, the way, despite the fact that
you see you're in Nigeria, the factthat you're Nigerian didn't stop
them from seeing you as an outsider.
I'm an insider as an Nigerian, buttalking about conflict, sexual violence
(10:22):
against men and boys automatically justchanged my position as an outsider.
And then um, I was, I was, my safetybecame something that was very important
to me in that context, because Imean, anything could have happened.
, So we all, one of the things that cameup was, we also felt scared for our
safety because, I mean, this is outlawed.
So anybody could easily misrepresentor misconstrue you trying to do
(10:46):
research about it as actually covertly,I mean, perpetuating it, right?
So our safety, our security was somethingthat was very, very important for us.
And that formed part of ourreflections also, right?
I think the argument there was inthe article was that despite being of
shared national identity didn't stoppeople from actually constructing
(11:09):
an outsider image around you justbecause you're talking about same sex
relations in an heteronormative context.
And it's affecting the kind ofresponses that we have against
survivors and victims in Nigeria.
I mean, broadly, mostpart of Africa, actually.
Hearing all of this from Josh reallybrought me back to our first conversation.
Back then, he had just come outtadoing his field work and was still
(11:31):
processing the human stories behindthe research, and so the ways in which
taboos really play out in real life.
He described what happenswhen all these really strong
and rigid ideas about gender.
Meet the realities of conflict and howviolence, fear, and shame all get tangled
up with the power dynamics around that.
So I wanna share part of that earlierconversation here where Josh talks
(11:53):
about his work on sexual violenceand also sex trafficking against
men and boys in Nigeria, and whatthat reveals about how masculinity
itself can be weaponized in conflict.
So I worked on a project with a seniorcolleague where we tried to understand
masculinities in violent extremismcontexts . So, to understand the nature
of masculinity how we have different formsof masculinity, militarized, hegemonic
(12:18):
masculinity, fragile masculinity.
So we tried to understand natureof masculinity within the Nigerian
space, particularly withincontext of violent extremism.
How the state responds or projectsresponds to violence against men
and boys sexual violence and, andhow the victims see themselves.
How do they respond to these issues?
(12:40):
So, so we actually did find out thatthere is a very huge market, put it that
way, for sex trafficking for men andboys in Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin.
So the Lake Chad Basin is like, um,Niger, Chad Republic, and Nigeria.
So these three countriesconstitute the Lake Chad Basin.
So there's a market for sex traffickingof men and boys in this region and um,
(13:02):
the sex for money and sex for food.
So, whatever outcome of terrorism,poverty, economic deprivation
has led these victims to haveno choice but being involved in
transactional sex with perpetrators.
And then they're like a chain wherethe violent actors, non-state violent
groups the state security forces,and the economic elite are involved,
(13:25):
like a network of sex trafficking.
So men, boys, they're traffickedto these respective actors who
receive payments on their behalf.
They're promised better livelihood,food, dedication, and all of this, but
then get violated and nothing comes.
And then after trafficking them, they'redumped, left on their own on the streets.
(13:47):
Then we then did find out thatall of these actions actually
motivated by sexual pleasure.
I mean, yeah, probably you could,you could relate it to the weapon
of war argument where I mean,these things are said to be like
issues of war that would happen.
But then our research did find outthat, and the sexual desires, sexual
pleasures, of these actors were actuallythe real motivating desires that
(14:10):
pushed them into these different acts.
It was really, really,really interesting research.
Also, we did find out that thevictims rarely spoke about it because
of the issue of stigmatizationand re-stigmatization because of
the Nigerian patriarchal societies.
And so am I remembering correctly thatin Nigeria it's illegal to be homosexual?
(14:33):
Is that the case?
Yeah.
And yet, can I assume that theperpetrators in this sex trafficking
are largely men in terms of like clientsand in terms of people who are doing it?
So that's a really interesting tension...
So, very, very good question.
Thanks for that.
So, so my colleague that we worked onthe project did actually separately find
(14:55):
out that there is violent actors in asmuch as they claim to be religious and
syncretic, actually sexually fluid.
Because they claim to bereligious in nature and religion
motivates their actions.
But then we did find out thatthere's sexual fluidity behind their
actions that sort of negates theoriginal idea that criminalizes
(15:18):
homosexuality within their groups.
So, because of the precept of religion orreligious precepts that they claim to hold
onto, homosexuality is outlawed, right?
So one would expect that they arenot, or do not do these things, but
actually from the victims, how victimsmade sense of their experience and how
(15:40):
they perceived the actors to do, hedid find out that there is this issue
of sexual fluidity, amongst violentactors that sort of gives us the sense
that all of the posturing of theircreed and fit that they claim to the
profess is actually political in nature.
So going back to your question, in asmuch as homosexuality is outlawed legally
(16:00):
in Nigeria, I mean, you would still findit's being actively, actively done by
even the lawmakers that criminalized it,
Hmm,
right?
Which is hypocritical, right?
Hmm.
Sounds very complicated.
very, very.
Yeah.
(16:20):
And so tell me then about the victimsof this sex trafficking, because you were
talking about how they found it difficultto integrate with their identity as men.
So in what way?
I mean what were you researching?
Was it stories they were ableto tell themselves, or, I mean,
how did they describe theirexperience of their masculinity
in light of their victimization?
(16:42):
Yes.
So, I think one interesting thing thatcame out was the fact that they, most
of them said they felt less like, a man.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
I mean, so, in the context of thepatriarchal nature of Nigerian
society, it sort of impinges uponthe issue of hegemonic masculinity
in Nigeria where you are expectedto be very strong and very active.
(17:07):
But these victims, I mean, teenageboys largely said they felt
less like a man after the act.
They felt like a woman.
So these issues led tostigmatization within them where
they could not speak about it.
So they did not speak about theexperiences because of the fear of
stigmatization and re-stigmatization.
(17:27):
Mm-hmm.
They didn't want to be stigmatizedor stigmatized by the society
because, within Nigeria societies,particularly in northern part of
the country, where societally, youare not seen to be a man if it's
discovered that you are raped by man.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm
Or by a woman.
Because you are expected to bethe perpetrator, not the victim.
(17:49):
And with that additional context,let's come back to the present
and to Josh's recent paper.
So we see all of these social,political, cultural dynamics and norms
affecting the kind of responses thatvictims and survivors um, of sexual
violence against men and boys get.
In Nigeria, and I mean, broadlyin Africa, and I mean, apart from
the fact that researching in thiscontext, can be very, very difficult,
(18:13):
very, very, very challenging.
We also, we also showed that beyondall of the rhetorics and writing.
It's actually a need forreal on the ground advocates.
Real on the ground, becausethese norms are constraining
the survivors from talking.
Um, The boys and the men thathave been involved cannot talk.
They can't seek social, psychosocialsupport and help because of the fear
(18:34):
of being arrested, or being violated,or even being stigmatized in society.
So, I mean, broadly, that was,that was what motivated us
writing the article and I mean, thegeneral reflections on the paper.
mean, it sounds like a reallycomplicated area to research.
Because I mean, as you'vementioned, obviously, it's
(18:55):
illegal to be gay in Nigeria.
Uh, Then on the other hand, you know,there's a requirement to implement the
UN framework so that we'll actuallyneed to take care of uh, people who are
the victims of gender based violence.
Um, And then, you know, you go andmeet people and they think it's about
you and they're really sympathetic,which is again, a whole other element.
(19:16):
It's like, okay, well,you know, then we'll do.
And then suddenly they realize,oh, it's not about you.
It's about the research that you're doing.
And suddenly you're this.
outsider object who's lookingin, it has to be treated as
kind of different neutral blob.
And so I'm wondering, I mean, giventhat complicated context, what are
the things you actually did to helpmake people feel safe sharing their
stories and their perspectives?
(19:37):
Okay, so, um, the victims and thesurvivors that were in the IDP camps um,
that my second colleague, who is actuallyfrom the northeastern part of the country.
Speaks two languages Hausaand Fulfulde the language.
He was the one thatactually went on the ground.
So, also, another dynamicinteresting dynamic to it is this.
(19:58):
Despite the fact that I'm aNigerian, my other colleague
is a Nigerian, we all shared.
different ethnic dynamics.
I'm Yoruba from the southwesternpart of the country.
I'm a Christian.
The principal investigator is Igbo fromthe southeastern part of the country.
He's a Christian.
Um, The second research assistant is fromthe northwestern part of the country.
He's a Muslim.
(20:18):
And the research context was innortheastern part of the country.
So we needed somebody thatwould speak the language.
Understood the unique nuance dynamicsof that context, which is a completely
different discussion to go engage them.
So the most significant thingthat we did was actually to
get an in house psychologist.
So most of the interviews were donewithin the purview of a psychologist.
(20:41):
So, at situations when the boys werefeeling traumatized, they stopped the
interview, requested the interviewto be stopped, and then they had some
sessions, and after that, we come back.
So it took a long period of time, havingthem leave the IDP camps, come to the
hotels, to make them feel very safe.
They had to leave the context wherethey felt unsafe for a very long
period of time through the helpof NGOs and other gatekeepers.
(21:04):
We brought them to hotels, providedfor them, had psychologists talk to
them, debrief talk, debrief interview.
So, yeah.
mean, it makes me wonder whathappens to these stories now,
because obviously it sounds like it.
You know, cost the, the victims or thepeople who went through this quite a lot.
I mean, is there something that'sbeing done with the stories
(21:25):
that they shared with you all?
Yeah.
Well, something I've been doing interms of advocacy um, um, not to let
the cat out of the bag too much, that'ssomething I'm also working on to see how
advocacy can be improved significantly.
But um, in terms of framework,policy framework, honestly, nothing
substantial has been done within Nigeria.
(21:45):
Like I said, the, the overarchingframework in Nigeria doesn't really
address these concerns for the malevictims and survivors in any way.
Doesn't talk about it in any way.
So, I mean, we hopesomething will be done.
Um, I mean, that's one of the, that'sone of the importance of doing research.
Um, See those that are concerned,reading and making adjustments to us.
(22:08):
I mean, in our part, we're notgoing to stop in our part as a
research team um, making effortsto see advocacy is increased.
Okay.
So I want to ask you as wellabout this recent paper that
you wrote about mediation.
Well, a local form of mediation.
You told me how to say it.
I'm going to go with Sulhu.
Yeah.
(22:28):
All right.
What is that?
Like, tell me about it.
Okay.
Um, So start with uh, so sulhuis an Arabic word that means
mediation, reconciliation.
So let me give you like a general contextif I go to um, what I did in the article.
Um, So so to start with justsome of disclaimer, it's,
it's not a new concept, right?
(22:50):
That's the interesting part of it.
I mean, it's been used fordifferent forms of mediation in
the northern part of the country.
So it's not something that is, aradically new, right, in terms of
how we use it, but it's not beengiving the attention, which was
which I found very interesting.
Um, So when I was in my fieldwork, one ofthe very, very dominant thing issue that
(23:12):
came up was participants, particularlysurvivors in the communities that have
been affected by terrorism and that now,now being made to to address the issue of
community reintegration of ex combatants.
were particular about doing this in theirown way, their own contextual way, using
(23:33):
their norms to, to address this issue.
So most of them were against, oh, Imean, yeah, the Western way is, is
fine, but it doesn't really bring aboutkind of sustainable, lasting peace
that we need to address this issue.
So the ideas converge aroundusing our local norms and
traditions to address this.
And it was then about the issue offorgiveness, justice, reconciliation,
(23:58):
forgiveness, justice, reconciliation.
So we have to do it our way,use religion and use culture.
Um, So that was generally,However, Particular participants
then talked about Sulhu.
They would ask me, have you heardof Sulhu, the concept of Sulhu?
And then because I had heard it,I was like, yes, I know Sulhu, but
(24:18):
I don't know so much about it.
That's when, they now say that, sowhen we talk about our way, that's
one of the examples of our way oftalking about . So that's sort of.
Um, like, okay, I think theremight be something here that
we need to actually speak to.
There are ongoing efforts to uh,about community reintegration in
northeastern part of the country.
Um, But there have been accounts wherethese things are not really working.
I mean, the governmentmight not really see that.
(24:40):
The government might claim, give you bogusnumbers . But those that are experiencing
the conflicts, that have been affectedwill tell you it's not really working.
Because they've not done it our way.
So I had to go back, of course, I hadto go back to literature to go read.
Um, So what's that, what's, what's, what'sanybody saying about peace building?
What's being said aboutthe concept of local peace?
Seems to be like the new buzzword inboth academic and NGO practice now.
(25:04):
I mean, you brought peaceshifting to local peace, right?
Um, There's an old story about localpeace, local peace, local peace.
Well, what exactly is local peace?
It seems to be very abstract.
What exactly is the local in local peace?
It's not, everybody justkeeps talking about it.
We can't hold it.
You can't feel it.
It's just, it's just like, um, uh, maybe,
(25:25):
woo magic.
Wave a wand, local peace sorted.
yeah, exactly.
It's more like onceyou invoke local peace.
Um, Then this is activatedautomatically, right?
So the argument I made in thearticle was that while we know local
peace to be one of the ways thatliberal peace has been transformed.
We really don't know what andwho and where is local peace.
(25:48):
So I argue that one of the wayswe can understand what local peace
actually means in practice is tounderstand local peace as contextual
norms, values, and practices.
And I said, Sulhu, an Islamic Arabicconcept was one of the ways to
understand what really is localpeace in local peace building.
Like we know so much about localpeace, but Sulhu is a contextual
(26:10):
norm, so regional culture.
Both ideals, religion and culture,religion um, in context, Islamic
religion and cultural norms ofreconciliation and forgiveness.
However, there's been a mixturethat's happened there, a mixture of
religion and culture, culture andreligion in either context that could
help us really understand how peacecan be sustained, how mediation can
(26:35):
be done, drawing from participantsrealities and their realities in this
context in our culture and religionhas actually shaped, morphed, and
influenced how they construe this idea.
And so, I mean, I'm looking at yourarticle now and I think I'm understanding
the, some of the basic concepts of Sulhuas, you know, having those principles
of forgiveness, reconciliation.
(26:56):
So really supporting that idea of.
Well, things we would get to inother forms of mediation as well.
Does it say anything about the,the process, like beyond this idea
of incorporating cultural norms?
I mean, what does Sulhu actually saysubstantively about or prescribe
in some way about process?
(27:16):
Okay.
So, um, there is no winner orloser in the process of Sulhu.
Both from the adits of the Quranand both from participants responses.
So in the process of mediation,you have to call both warring
parties together and let them speak.
The point is to bring them together inthe same context and let them speak,
let them express their grievances.
(27:37):
So there is no winner or loser.
There is no body winning or losing.
It's not like a zero sum game , the pointis to actually see that our disagreements
are solved right in our presence.
So expressing your grievances withoutholding an extra grudge with the person.
I mean, people might say that wouldbe difficult to ascertain, but I
mean, bringing both parties togetherin that context with the aid and help
(28:00):
of either a religious leader or acultural, traditional, local leader.
So it's not just bringing them together.
It needs to be under the supervisionof a respected religious leaders and
a local or a local traditional leader.
Both are seen to be upholdersof justice and truth.
So having that kind of conversation,mediation where they are , it's seen as
(28:23):
being very respectable, because they arenot just ordinary say, in that . So there
are those ordinary people where you justbring in, say, say somebody from, say
Someone like
me.
I'm a normal person.
I do mediations.
No, but I, I, I see whatyou're talking about.
I think they have similar local mediationpractices in Turkey, for instance,
(28:44):
whether it be, yeah, like an elderor a religious leader or somebody.
And so, you know, it's a bit differentto this concept of a mediator.
It's some random Laura.
It's like, no, no, it's somebodywith respect specifically in the
community that supports the process.
yeah, exactly.
Exactly.
Exactly.
So doing that kind of a mediation ordiscussion, reconciliation on the auspices
(29:04):
of such a leader or a figure gives it moretraction and makes it more respectable.
So yeah,
Okay.
I guess what I'm really wondering isthe difference between this and other
types of mediation, I mean, in, in thepeace building field, generally, right?
(29:26):
Because I'm wondering about the differencebetween you know, this principle of Sulhu
and how it helps supports peace building.
And then, you know, the example I justgave in Turkey or you know, there's also
related processes they did throughoutreconciliation, for instance, in Rwanda.
I mean, it sounds like it has areally long history, which is awesome.
I'm just wondering, you know,like using this particular lens.
(29:47):
Like what, what doesit help us understand?
Why is it a particularlygood fit for Nigeria?
Okay, so I'm glad you mentionedRwanda because Rwanda, the post
genocide mediation and reconciliationthat happened Rwanda famously used
something called the Gacaca courts um,
There's a podcast episode about that.
So yeah, absolutely.
(30:08):
Yeah, so it was like, so the Gacacacourt was more like um, what it
means in Kinyan Rwanda terms ismore like lawn, a grass, Gacaca.
So the mediation happened in like anopen space where with the victims,
survivors, and perpetrators were broughttogether to talk and the perpetrators
are made to seek forgiveness.
(30:30):
Um, The survivors would accept, or rejectthe forgiveness of the perpetrators.
It's almost similar in Sulhu.
And it's almost the same thing, right?
It's almost the same thing.
Probably different contextand um, the tenets might not
really be completely similar.
For instance, in Northern Nigeria, themixture of religion and culture is so,
(30:52):
so strong in society, very, very strong.
I mean, all of Nigeria, actually,not only Islam, religion and
culture is also very, very stronginfluence on our society, right?
So more particularly in Northern contextwhere um, this community reintegration
effort and DDR process is happening.
So I think that sort ofmakes Sulhu more nuanced.
(31:14):
Um, I know in Kenya, particularly withinthe context of Gacaca I think um, the
Bible played a little part of that.
I remember reading Phil Clark's book onthat um, some chapters of his book where
he talked about um, religion playing apart, and some part of the Bible, mainly
some survivors actually making referencesto parts of the Bible where the Bible
(31:34):
says forgiveness, and all of that.
Same thing that happened in Suruwe.
I mean, Hadiths of the Prophetsum, were things that were actually
held in high esteem and context.
So I think it helps us understandwhy mediation and peace building
is not a one size fits all process.
I mean, I think most organizations,international non government
(31:56):
organizations, even civilsociety organizations, tend to
misconstrue or miss that part.
Although it's contestable,someone might say it's now hybrid
peace um, hybrid mediation.
I mean, but the fact still remainsthat even the concept of, the
whole concept of hybridity Stillneeds to be led by something.
So if you check it, well, it's stillbeing led by Western liberal practices.
(32:17):
It's not really the local practices,local tenets and norms that should be.
So I think one thing that would help usunderstand is the contextually nuanced
way that mediation, one, and even conflictdynamics actually happens in Nigeria.
Conflict dynamics areactually quite different.
Political violence, terrorism, violentextremism, they're quite different.
(32:37):
Right.
The factors that precipitatethem are quite different.
And so understanding the differencesin the conflict dynamics and which shall
remediate them is something that thearticle, I think, sheds important light
.Of course um, whoever wants to adopt the framework, it's free to adopt it
and tweak it whatever way they want to.
So I think it's more important tocenter the experiences of those that
(32:58):
are caught up in these processes.
Most of the time we tend todo these things um, top down.
We input our ideas and impinge on thesocieties, want them to do what we
want and then go out there and seeif it's working and we just don't
go back to actually ask if it's
many thoughts.
I have so many thoughts aboutwhat you're saying right now.
Um, yeah, sorry to interrupt.
(33:20):
I just, I was overwhelmed.
I guess I see it from twodifferent angles because obviously.
A lot of the guests that Ihave on this podcast are in
a more critical space, right?
You know, they're questioning what peacemeans and they talk about, you know,
like, is it right for us to go intodifferent places and declare exactly
as you've said, like that, you know,we'll bring peace or what have you.
And then, but then there's this sortof funding crisis in peace building
(33:44):
where it's like, well, you know, we'rebeholden to our funders and they don't
get that we're using local concepts andwe're always like localizing things.
And then they're like,why isn't it working out?
It's like, well, because we had to changethe process because things changed.
But then on the other hand of things.
Which might be the third hand, actually.
So we're having a lotof hands in this today.
So, but on the third hand, on the thirdhand, one of my frustrations is that I
(34:11):
think in some parts of that, whether it'sthe funders or sort of some of the, maybe
some people in peace building, right.
Had this conception of mediationas a field was established
in the seventies or eighties.
Especially, I mean, honestly, thiscomes more from a corporate side of
things about, you know, Getting toYes came out, we all read this, it's a
bestseller and suddenly we go, Oh, well,actually, now we can agree together.
(34:35):
Like, we can build something new,whereas in reality, there are, and
something you just highlighted,like, there are so many cultures
around the world where these similarconcepts exist and can be leveraged
and are culturally relevant and can becentralized in peace-building processes.
And so.
For that reason, and the reason I wantedto do this, this little top up recording
(34:56):
is because when I saw that you wrotethis paper, I was like, this is another
one that finally we're hearing about.
I mean, Ubuntu made it out of SouthAfrica and people are trying to be really
woke when they're teaching mediation.
They're like, oh yeah, but you canalso look at Ubuntu in South Africa.
Then we've got like in CentralAmerica as well and In Lakesh,
which is, you know, great.
And then here's another concept as well.
(35:16):
And I think for me, that is ahuge contribution of your work.
It's like, well, here is anotherframework that is used and has a
long history and cultural relevance.
Like it's not all about something thatwas written by some random American in the
seventies um, or whatever it was, right.
Like this is a, this is areal concept that can be used.
And I think, yeah, for me,that's really powerful.
(35:38):
Thank you.
So at this point, I wanna return to ourformer recording with Josh because I
mean, the idea of Sulhu and the way whichJosh talks about peace, as something
local, relational, and really deeplyhuman stands in contrast to how peace and
security are often handled in practice.
Now, in our first conversation,we talked about what the Nigerian
(36:00):
government actually does when it talksspecifically about deradicalizing
or reintegrating former extremists,post-conflict or during conflict, and
it can be quite a different story.
So before we wrap up for thisepisode, I wanna take you back to
that early discussion where Joshdescribes what those official programs
really look like, and what happenswhen the rhetoric of rehabilitation
(36:22):
meets the reality on the ground.
Yeah.
But at the master's level I was stillunable to get access to I mean terrorists.
'cause I, I, I don't think anybodywould try to just identify a terrorist
and say, oh yeah, I wanna speak to you.
Why do you blow up people?
And be like, oh yeah, I blowup people because of this.
So I'm just imagining youputting ads up somewhere.
(36:43):
Like "are you a terrorist?Talk to this researcher".
Like who would respond tothat ad? That makes no sense.
And so you moved on then tounderstanding radicalization and
deradicalization more broadly.
So can you tell me a bit about theradicalization factors, like why are
people getting radicalized in Nigeriaspecifically or beyond Nigeria,
(37:07):
if your work covers that as well?
Okay.
That's quite aninteresting and tricky one.
Yeah.
So for starters, there are no linear pathsto radicalization, to violent extremism.
In a real sense of it, if we were topick up radicalization as an issue
It's not completely a bad thing, right?
As long as it doesn'tlead to violent extremism.
(37:29):
So radicalization becomes negative whenit leads to violent extremism , of course.
So different studies academic andpolicy directed studies have tried to
understand the pathways that individualsget down to violent extremism,
radicalized to violent extremism, andbroadly they're like the push and pull
(37:49):
articles they identify like, people getpulled into it because of peer pressure
networking influence could be an issue.
But then there is also the pushfactor where the act of repression
by the states sort of pushes peopleradicalizing into violent extremism.
(38:11):
There's the, there's the povertythesis, there's the economic basis
of that where poverty, abjectpoverty, squallor could be a trigger
for people to pick up arms and getradicalized into violence or extremism.
But that's been countered, becausefor instance, the very first suicide
bomber, Nigerian suicide bomber that wasarrested by the United States government
2009, somebody called Abdulmutallab,was about to blow up a Detroit- bound
(38:36):
airplane had no record of poverty.
His father was a top member ofthe economic elite in Nigeria.
So, I mean, literally had no excuseof economic imbalance, poverty,
that pushed him into wantingto blow up himself and a plane.
So, the poverty argument has also beendemystified in that sense that poverty
(38:57):
doesn't really lead to violent extremism.
So, I would say there's a cross-cross offactors that sort of accounts for the, the
pull and the push to violent extremism.
There are different issuesthat might lead to it.
I mean, I, for one would personally saythat poverty, states responses, absence
of developmental projects, literacy,distorted religious motivations.
(39:20):
I mean, misinterpreting sacred texts ofthe early books, the Bible or the Quran.
A range of factors.
So it's really, really difficult toput it like in a stepwise arrangement.
I mean, having a linear progressionof it's sort of difficult.
There are different factors that accountfor these things that motivate people to
get in a radicalized violent extremism.
(39:43):
And so something that reallystrikes me is that when you started
talking about violent extremism,you talked about radicalization
as not necessarily being bad.
It's only bad when it becomes violent.
And so I'm just wondering what isthe difference between the violent
extremism that you research andthings like the French Revolution.
(40:06):
Is it because the French Revolution,the people who rose up won?
Like what is the differencebetween these different kinds
of violences, do you think?
So civil disobedience initself is not a crime, right?
It it, it transcends into violentextremism where civil disobedience stops.
So I would say where it becomesuncivil disobedience, uncivil
(40:29):
disobedience where you take up armsand you're going to destroy properties
and feel, feel entitled to I mean,violence in the real sense of it.
So, I mean I might find people that woulddisagree with me, but I think everybody's
entitled to be radical in a sense.
Not everybody will be comfortable withcertain issues, and you have a way of
expressing your displeasure towards it.
(40:51):
However, the way you expressyour displeasure matters a lot.
So expressing your displeasure wouldnot make sense when you go violent.
I think in that sense, you, youbegin the process of getting
radicalized to violent extremism,that's the beginning of that process.
So it's much more complex than just allsaying, oh, I just said that and I begin
to get violence in that sense, right?
(41:13):
You begin the process of gettingradicalized to violent extremism,
and then it becomes more complex.
You transcend into indoctrination,brainwashing and all of these things
that happen with different violencegroups now, the right wing, the jihadist
groups that they are all over the world.
The reason I ask is because if we dothink about the French Revolution and
(41:36):
people bringing out guillotine, oftenpeople speak about this as ultimately a
good thing, but from what I understand,that would also be violent extremism.
'cause there was firstly theradicalization and then it goes beyond
civil disobedience into violence.
The reason I bring this up isbecause there tends to be this
(41:57):
moralizing about violence in politics.
Where if it's done by some people insome places of some religion, it's
somehow different to how it's done byother people in other times and you
know, depending on the color of theirskin and what have you, and that, that's
why I wanted to bring that up because Imean, it does sound like then bringing
out guillotines is violent extremism.
(42:18):
It's very much beyond civil disobedience.
Yes, yes.
You're absolutely correct.
Laura.
Yeah.
So I I would say that ultimatelyit depends on whoever is in charge
of labeling issues as politicalviolence , as terrorism , as violent
extremism, as radicalization to violentextremism, as civil disobedience.
I mean, there's this subjective wayof defining it and ultimately to put
(42:42):
it in a very, very simple way, theState still has the power to decide
who they're labelling terrorists.
Or violent extremists, or whateveraction they feel is deemed to
amount to radicalization, toviolent extremism in that sense.
So there's still the contentiousissue of labeling one man terrorist,
(43:03):
another mans freedom fighter, thecommon theme in politics policy world.
So yeah, I mean, all of this largelydepends on how we see issues where,
what side of the divide we are on.
I take a very critical stancetowards the states and its actions.
So I think the actions need to bequestioned as much as we also question
ourselves, reflecting on ourselves.
(43:25):
Absolutely.
Okay, so tell me thenabout your PhD research.
What are you trying to find out?
Okay.
So, so my research was motivated bythe post 911 global war and terror
measures , and how it restricted thebalance and led to the shrinking of
civic spaces all over the world, inAfrica and Nigeria more specifically.
(43:49):
So during my master's thesis, I, Isought to understand how states and
communities engage within the rubric ofcommunity policing in violent extremism.
After my master's thesis uh, whichI published in some journal, I
realized that I had questionsthat were still left unanswered.
(44:09):
So one of those questions wasabout the Nigerian governments
terrorist rehabilitation program.
So I had read then on the news - theprogram had just started -that there
was an issue with the program, which wascosmetic in approach in the sense that
the engagement was problematic . Soterrorists are rehabilitated by the
government and then reintegrated intothe society and the community where
(44:34):
they're expected to carry on withtheir normal lives as though nothing
happened despite causing so much pain
. And then the communities that are supposed to be recipients of the terrorists to not
reject them because if governments hadnot done enough to prepare them, prepare
their minds for those who are coming tolive with them after causing so much harm.
(44:56):
So I went with the hunch that therewas a problematic relationship within
these Nigerian states and northerncommunities within the context of the
terrorist rehabilitation program andthe attempt to reintegrate ex-combatants
or ex terrorists into the society.
So, my thesis tries to understandfirstly, what's the nature of the program?
(45:19):
What does it look like?
How does Nigerian stateengage these communities?
How do the communities respond tothe engagement of Nigerian states?
And, in all of this , how do weunderstand state society relations
? I just concluded my field work and the findings are very, very interesting.
There are different layers to unpackthat I'm still trying to open, but
yeah, I think, I think what I'velearned so far is that whatever we
(45:42):
call deradicalization or rehabilitationof terrorists is context based.
So there's these attempts to,from an African perspective, a
Nigerian perspective, to do whatis done in the Western circle.
So to do radicalization, to dorehabilitation the way it's done, say
with the prevent program in the UnitedKingdom or with a program in Singapore
(46:05):
or in Southeast Asia or something.
And then we find out that, I mean,it's completely different dynamics
in terms of the economic dynamics,the political dynamics, the nature
of society in general, and even howthese programs develop and evolve.
Program just started in Nigeria under10 years in comparison to United Kingdom
where it has been there for decades
(46:25):
.So, some of the interesting findings that I've seen so far, and I'm working
on articles to publish and share myfindings with the general public.
And I mean, what does aterrorist rehabilitation
program in Nigeria look like?
What does that actually involve?
So, I'll give you, I'll answer thequestion by telling you what the
(46:46):
government says it looked like and what Ihave found out what it really looks like.
So the government says theyde radicalize terrorists.
So deradicalization is simply trying toideologically reprogram the terrorists.
We're trying to probably wipe offthe wrong ideologies, doctrines that
(47:07):
motivated these actions and givethem the correct way of thinking.
So presenting them with the correctnarratives that would help them grow.
And then there is the other side torehabilitation, which is disengagement.
So disengagement is the behavioralchange that is expected of a terrorist.
(47:28):
In a disengagement, you are not hopingto reprogram the terrorist ideologically,
you are just hoping to make him seethat he drops the violence behavior
and stop taking up arms and thengets back to his normal way of life.
And there's the reintegrationaspect of it, where after you
deradicalize and disengage um, theperson is expected to transit, to
(47:50):
living a normal life in the society.
That's what the Nigerian government saysit does with each rehabilitation program.
And what I've found out so far, whichI, which I'll push out very soon, is
that the Nigerian government does notde radicalize terrorists, the Nigerian
government disengages terrorists,
(48:12):
the Nigerian government claims toderadicalize terrorists because
of what has been said to be avery, very, very fertile counter
terrorism economy in Nigeria.
So there's this very vague narrativethat national security trumps all.
So national security has been usedas leverage to foster corruption,
(48:34):
patrimonialism and all sorts.
So under this rubric it's claimedthat they deradicalize just to get
out these economic motives, benefits.
While in the real sense of it,terrorists are just disengaged
and reintegrated to the societies.
(48:54):
And then there is the seriousunder reportage of recidivism.
So terrorists go back to its actions.
After going through all of these fromthe states, a very louy welcome economic
and voluntary reintegration, givingthem stipends to start their lives,
vocational reintegration, making them,I mean, start having something to do.
(49:15):
But then all of these things ceaseafter three months, and then it's
back to square zero, and thenthey go back to the trenches.
It kind of sounds like being a terroristin Nigeria is a pretty good deal, so you
get a whole bunch of resources thrownat you, and you get to continue being
a terrorist at the end of the day.
(49:36):
I mean, that's my argument.
Oh my goodness.
Wowza.
And I'm sure you would've seen that inthe news where bandits, as they call
them, they call them bandits, wherethey are repaid huge sums of money
as ransoms for kidnapping people.
And then they go back to kidnapbecause they know they would always
be the ransom paid and then continue
(49:57):
.So I mean, you could say in that sense that being a terrorist in Nigeria pays.
Yeah, it's like a job where you get tohave occasional leave and study money.
I mean, especially I guess, as you'vedescribed a lot of the time there's
the economic poverty as well, Iguess it becomes easy to understand
where this would be attractive,even beyond the sort of narratives
(50:20):
you've got going on internally.
You're like, actually this isa good opportunity for me, for
my future, which is not ideal.
It's, it's quite far from ideal.
And so if you had a magic wandand you could do one thing to fix
the de radicalization process inNigeria, what would that thing be?
(50:41):
That's a very, very, very tricky question.
I like tricky questions.
Yeah.
One thing I think I would for now, fornow at this hour, at this moment, I
think I would change the focus of theinstitution or the agency responsible.
I think the program is in the wrong hands.
(51:04):
It's been driven by this logic ofcommand and control, which sort of
contravenes contradictory to thewhole idea of de radicalization.
I think the program should be handledby a separate agency of the government
that recognizes the importance ofcivility and relations between non-state
(51:30):
actors.
So more, I'm gonna continue being cheesy.
It's like more loving and reachingout as opposed to, you will do this.
You're wrong, you're broken.
We'll fix you.
Yes, because the agency responsiblefor fixing, it's not fixing,
Mm-hmm.
it's rather more contributing to thegradual hardening of these people.
(51:51):
So they, they've seen it as aprocess of, well, get those,
extract information from those, putthose somewhere after some months.
We go through programs, wego through seminars, and
then we're out and that's it.
So if you really do speak withthese combatants , one would realize
and see that's more contributingto them getting hardened.
(52:14):
And it's problematic.
Great Okay.
Well look, Josh, thank you somuch for joining me today despite
thunderstorms, internet outage,power outage, and me delaying.
Like we've, I think we've overcomea lot to have this conversation.
Yes, I'm excited.
And for those who are interestedin learning more about your work,
(52:35):
Google Joshua Akintayo, and everythingyou need to know about him comes up.
Google Scholar, Google, everything youneed to know is there for you to see.
Super.
The most findable guy.
All right, well thank you again, and untilnext time, this is Laura May with the
Conflict Tipping Podcast from Mediate.com.
Hello and welcome to the ConflictTipping podcast from Mediate.
com.
The podcast that explores socialconflict and what we can do about it.
I'm your host, Laura May.
And today I have withme Dr. Joshua Akintayo.
He did his PhD in internationalconflict analysis at the University
of Kent, where he was fortunately,or unfortunately my colleague,
(00:31):
and he's originally from Nigeria.
He's done research on counteringviolent extremism and sexual violence
in conflict, the use and misuseof WhatsApp in elections, and has
recently published a very excitingarticle on local mediation as a lens
for local peace building efforts.
So welcome Josh.
Thank you, Laura.
Thanks for having me again.
(00:51):
Or finally.
It is both again and finally, Ithink because for, for the listeners,
Josh and I actually recorded anepisode about 18 months ago, which
has not yet seen the light of day.
And so we're actually doing thistop up now that Josh has been
doing this fantastic new researchand hopefully you'll be hearing
this episode very, very soon.
(01:11):
Josh, you study things likeradicalization and violent extremism.
Why?
Why have you done this to yourself?
What's your motivation?
So I think it all started as anundergrad at the University of Ibadan
in Nigeria, where my undergrad thesiswas on terrorism and globalization.
So I sort of picked up on that.
(01:32):
I found it fascinating.
I mean, what really triggeredme was why would any rational
person want to blow up everybody?
Like, why would anybody,what, what's the motivation?
What's the basis and what premisewould you just want blow off anybody?
And then I did my undergrad thesis onterrorism and globalization in Nigeria.
And then so in Nigeria there'sthis National Youth Service Corps.
(01:52):
It's like a compulsory one year mandatoryscheme where you are to serve the
governments in a paramilitary status.
Yeah.
So you are posted outside your stateof origin, to a different region of
the country to go serve the government.
So fortunately for me, I was posted inthe northern part of Nigeria, northwestern
Nigeria, Kaduna state to be precise.
Which was has been known for overtwo decades for religious violence
(02:16):
ethnic violence and all sorts.
It's quite the niche for that area.
And I was posted there although Ididn't stay through my one year.
But then during my three weeks mandatoryservice in the, in the camp where I had
to stay with military men, I developedthis interest where I saw like the lived
experience of of dwellers in that region.
I saw how they were literally on theedge every day of their lives, where
(02:40):
they had to precisely be on the guard.
Like, oh there's asecurity report somewhere.
There may be possibly be abomb blast coming up somewhere.
And everybody had to like,live constantly on the edge.
So there was this constant state of fearthat everybody there had to live with.
I, myself, because I was there atthe point, and I mean, sort of,
sort of amazed me in some ways.
(03:00):
Like, so why do we do this to ourselves?
Why, why do we have toconstantly stay on the edge?
What's the motive?
So are we trying to understandwhy the, the suicide bomber
is also motivated to do this?
Is anybody trying to get into theirhead to know why are you interested
in blowing up your fellow person?
Particularly in Nigeria and why, why, why?
(03:21):
Particularly from the northern part of thecountry where it's more like the hotbed
of radicalization and violent extremism.
So I think those two episodes inmy life were like the main points
that triggered the whole interest ofradicalization, countering violent
extremism, preventing violent extremismand trying to understand the responses,
particularly from the Nigerian state.
(03:42):
'cause it seemed to me then, Imean, had very critical view.
It seemed to me then that theNigerian state was a little bit
incapable of nipping it in the bud.
I mean, I felt like there wasnot enough will on the part of
the government . Political eliteshad left it unfettered to grow for
whatever's sake, political expediency,economic gains, whatever it is.
(04:03):
But yeah, those two episodesencapsulated, shaped my worldview
on what I wanted to research on.
Okay.
And so, look, I know very,very little about Nigeria.
Suicide bombing as you've mentioned,is that a common problem in, it was the
northeastern region of Nigeria, you said?
So, terrorism had been a thing inNigeria since 2003, some decades ago.
(04:28):
Active suicide bombing becamewhat was constantly in our
faces in Nigeria beginning 2009.
And I think it, it peaked in 2011 withthe United Nations headquarters bombing
in Abuja and the police headquartersthat were blown up by a terrorist.
So I would say it became a commonphenomenon, a common feature in Nigeria
(04:50):
from 2009, although pockets of bombinghad been happening before then in
different aspects of the country.
Particularly the northernpart of the country.
What is your currentresearch focus would you say?
Okay.
So as an extension for my PhD,particularly for my fieldwork I
did come across the tenets of localpeace, how we can use local mechanisms
(05:14):
to resolve conflict and violencespecifically the context of violent
extremism, de radicalization in Nigeria.
So I wrote an article where I triedto develop a framework on local
mediation to resolve conflict tobuild peace in a sustainable way.
So I'm trying to make significantimpact rather than my work just
(05:35):
sitting in the ivory tower.
And of course my researchon conflict related sexual
violence is also still ongoing.
I just wrote an article reflectingon my experiences researching sexual
violence against men and boys inNigeria, where these things are
sort of constructed as a taboo.
Okay, so let's start with thisdiscussion of taboo then, because I
(05:56):
recall in when we recorded before wetalked actually quite a lot about this.
And so listeners, just a bitof a content warning for sexual
violence in this episode.
Um, Nothing very graphic, but yeah,let's talk about this idea of taboo then.
So what was the generaltenor of that paper?
I understand you wrote that with acouple of other researchers, right?
Yes, two of my colleagues.
(06:18):
And so what made you decide to write it?
So firstly we did realize the gapin the literature on Africans, by
Africans that have lived in Africareflecting on their experiences doing
research on sexual violence in Africa.
So that was the first motivator for us.
(06:40):
It was kind of interesting.
Um, Secondly, , we reflectedon our experiences.
So we we shared notes.
So because of comparing ournotes we realized that there was
a common theme that moved around.
And that was how ourparticipants perceived us.
The way they made sense of wedoing research, conflict, sexual
(07:00):
violence against men and boys.
So, we all share thesame national identity.
We're all Nigerians.
We realized that despite the fact thatwe are Nigerians, that didn't stop our
participants from perceiving what wewere doing as very strange and alien,
despite the fact that these thingswere occurring in the context, right?
Something from my side particularly,I, I conducted interviews in
(07:22):
Lagos and Abuja for the project.
I tried to recruit members from civilsociety network and particularly that
work around peace um, sexual violence.
And something that struck me particularlywas because of my reaching out to
these participant, having to attendworkshops, having to go to meet them
um, also my own research area um, I,I realized that they all, they all had
(07:44):
this very sympathetic view towards me.
So initially I say, oh, I wouldlove to speak to you about,
conflict related sexual violence.
So the general perception wouldbe, oh, against women and girls.
Oh, it's so rampant.
And then I would allow them to settlein, and then I'd change the tone.
I was like, well, not really againstwomen and girls, but against men and
boys in this, in this, in this context.
And you would just notice theswitch of demeanor um, right, the
(08:08):
behaviors, and they'd be like, oh, no.
And I, I noticed this kindof sympathy towards me.
I think most of them felt like I wasa victim or a survivor that needed
some kind of social care, right?
And I wanted to talk about it.
And they were like, Oh.
Oh, you should set up an NGO aboutit to talk about your experiences.
(08:28):
Um, So I allowed, I allowed them tofinish talking like, oh, well, yes.
Part of the research is to actuallygive survivors a voice, right?
I'm not a survivor.
I just want to give survivors a voice.
It's just passion for me.
And then.
Some of them were very reluctant, very,very reluctant, I think, because of,
because of the social, cultural contextthat we are in Nigeria um, of course,
(08:52):
first and foremost, these things areoutlawed in Nigeria, there's a law, same
sex practice law, signed into law in2014, sort of forbids that um, people
I don't want to talk about it, evenwhen you come to tell them and ask them
for how we can provide psychosocialsupport for survivors and victims.
(09:13):
Because of the very general climateof law, it seems to constrain people
from talking about it even in thecontext of providing help, right?
So you wouldn't find that inthe context of say sexual
violence against women and girls.
Where you have the most psychosocial care support um, advocacy,
and a lot of these things about it.
Um, So every, every aspect of oursociocultural context sort of forbids
(09:35):
in the event they come out talkingabout it, the laws forbids it um,
culturally it's seen as a taboo.
I mean, so for instance, one ofmy colleagues that spoke with
a police officer that had beenuh, at the war front for years.
I remember the police officer's firstresponse was, hey, that's a taboo.
Where would you hear a manhaving intercourse with a man?
I mean, it was strange to him, butwas it particularly strange to us?
(10:01):
I mean, we had, we had spoken with victimsand survivors on different contexts and
we've heard so many experiences, right?
So when we were reflecting ourexperience, that made sense to us
because it was interesting, likehow, the way, despite the fact that
you see you're in Nigeria, the factthat you're Nigerian didn't stop
them from seeing you as an outsider.
I'm an insider as an Nigerian, buttalking about conflict, sexual violence
(10:22):
against men and boys automatically justchanged my position as an outsider.
And then um, I was, I was, my safetybecame something that was very important
to me in that context, because Imean, anything could have happened.
, So we all, one of the things that cameup was, we also felt scared for our
safety because, I mean, this is outlawed.
So anybody could easily misrepresentor misconstrue you trying to do
(10:46):
research about it as actually covertly,I mean, perpetuating it, right?
So our safety, our security was somethingthat was very, very important for us.
And that formed part of ourreflections also, right?
I think the argument there was inthe article was that despite being of
shared national identity didn't stoppeople from actually constructing
(11:09):
an outsider image around you justbecause you're talking about same sex
relations in an heteronormative context.
And it's affecting the kind ofresponses that we have against
survivors and victims in Nigeria.
I mean, broadly, mostpart of Africa, actually.
Hearing all of this from Josh reallybrought me back to our first conversation.
Back then, he had just come outtadoing his field work and was still
(11:31):
processing the human stories behindthe research, and so the ways in which
taboos really play out in real life.
He described what happenswhen all these really strong
and rigid ideas about gender.
Meet the realities of conflict and howviolence, fear, and shame all get tangled
up with the power dynamics around that.
So I wanna share part of that earlierconversation here where Josh talks
(11:53):
about his work on sexual violenceand also sex trafficking against
men and boys in Nigeria, and whatthat reveals about how masculinity
itself can be weaponized in conflict.
So I worked on a project with a seniorcolleague where we tried to understand
masculinities in violent extremismcontexts . So, to understand the nature
of masculinity how we have different formsof masculinity, militarized, hegemonic
(12:18):
masculinity, fragile masculinity.
So we tried to understand natureof masculinity within the Nigerian
space, particularly withincontext of violent extremism.
How the state responds or projectsresponds to violence against men
and boys sexual violence and, andhow the victims see themselves.
How do they respond to these issues?
(12:40):
So, so we actually did find out thatthere is a very huge market, put it that
way, for sex trafficking for men andboys in Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin.
So the Lake Chad Basin is like, um,Niger, Chad Republic, and Nigeria.
So these three countriesconstitute the Lake Chad Basin.
So there's a market for sex traffickingof men and boys in this region and um,
(13:02):
the sex for money and sex for food.
So, whatever outcome of terrorism,poverty, economic deprivation
has led these victims to haveno choice but being involved in
transactional sex with perpetrators.
And then they're like a chain wherethe violent actors, non-state violent
groups the state security forces,and the economic elite are involved,
(13:25):
like a network of sex trafficking.
So men, boys, they're traffickedto these respective actors who
receive payments on their behalf.
They're promised better livelihood,food, dedication, and all of this, but
then get violated and nothing comes.
And then after trafficking them, they'redumped, left on their own on the streets.
(13:47):
Then we then did find out thatall of these actions actually
motivated by sexual pleasure.
I mean, yeah, probably you could,you could relate it to the weapon
of war argument where I mean,these things are said to be like
issues of war that would happen.
But then our research did find outthat, and the sexual desires, sexual
pleasures, of these actors were actuallythe real motivating desires that
(14:10):
pushed them into these different acts.
It was really, really,really interesting research.
Also, we did find out that thevictims rarely spoke about it because
of the issue of stigmatizationand re-stigmatization because of
the Nigerian patriarchal societies.
And so am I remembering correctly thatin Nigeria it's illegal to be homosexual?
(14:33):
Is that the case?
Yeah.
And yet, can I assume that theperpetrators in this sex trafficking
are largely men in terms of like clientsand in terms of people who are doing it?
So that's a really interesting tension...
So, very, very good question.
Thanks for that.
So, so my colleague that we worked onthe project did actually separately find
(14:55):
out that there is violent actors in asmuch as they claim to be religious and
syncretic, actually sexually fluid.
Because they claim to bereligious in nature and religion
motivates their actions.
But then we did find out thatthere's sexual fluidity behind their
actions that sort of negates theoriginal idea that criminalizes
(15:18):
homosexuality within their groups.
So, because of the precept of religion orreligious precepts that they claim to hold
onto, homosexuality is outlawed, right?
So one would expect that they arenot, or do not do these things, but
actually from the victims, how victimsmade sense of their experience and how
(15:40):
they perceived the actors to do, hedid find out that there is this issue
of sexual fluidity, amongst violentactors that sort of gives us the sense
that all of the posturing of theircreed and fit that they claim to the
profess is actually political in nature.
So going back to your question, in asmuch as homosexuality is outlawed legally
(16:00):
in Nigeria, I mean, you would still findit's being actively, actively done by
even the lawmakers that criminalized it,
Hmm,
right?
Which is hypocritical, right?
Hmm.
Sounds very complicated.
very, very.
Yeah.
(16:20):
And so tell me then about the victimsof this sex trafficking, because you were
talking about how they found it difficultto integrate with their identity as men.
So in what way?
I mean what were you researching?
Was it stories they were ableto tell themselves, or, I mean,
how did they describe theirexperience of their masculinity
in light of their victimization?
(16:42):
Yes.
So, I think one interesting thing thatcame out was the fact that they, most
of them said they felt less like, a man.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm.
I mean, so, in the context of thepatriarchal nature of Nigerian
society, it sort of impinges uponthe issue of hegemonic masculinity
in Nigeria where you are expectedto be very strong and very active.
(17:07):
But these victims, I mean, teenageboys largely said they felt
less like a man after the act.
They felt like a woman.
So these issues led tostigmatization within them where
they could not speak about it.
So they did not speak about theexperiences because of the fear of
stigmatization and re-stigmatization.
(17:27):
Mm-hmm.
They didn't want to be stigmatizedor stigmatized by the society
because, within Nigeria societies,particularly in northern part of
the country, where societally, youare not seen to be a man if it's
discovered that you are raped by man.
Mm-hmm.
Mm-hmm
Or by a woman.
Because you are expected to bethe perpetrator, not the victim.
(17:49):
And with that additional context,let's come back to the present
and to Josh's recent paper.
So we see all of these social,political, cultural dynamics and norms
affecting the kind of responses thatvictims and survivors um, of sexual
violence against men and boys get.
In Nigeria, and I mean, broadlyin Africa, and I mean, apart from
the fact that researching in thiscontext, can be very, very difficult,
(18:13):
very, very, very challenging.
We also, we also showed that beyondall of the rhetorics and writing.
It's actually a need forreal on the ground advocates.
Real on the ground, becausethese norms are constraining
the survivors from talking.
Um, The boys and the men thathave been involved cannot talk.
They can't seek social, psychosocialsupport and help because of the fear
(18:34):
of being arrested, or being violated,or even being stigmatized in society.
So, I mean, broadly, that was,that was what motivated us
writing the article and I mean, thegeneral reflections on the paper.
mean, it sounds like a reallycomplicated area to research.
Because I mean, as you'vementioned, obviously, it's
(18:55):
illegal to be gay in Nigeria.
Uh, Then on the other hand, you know,there's a requirement to implement the
UN framework so that we'll actuallyneed to take care of uh, people who are
the victims of gender based violence.
Um, And then, you know, you go andmeet people and they think it's about
you and they're really sympathetic,which is again, a whole other element.
(19:16):
It's like, okay, well,you know, then we'll do.
And then suddenly they realize,oh, it's not about you.
It's about the research that you're doing.
And suddenly you're this.
outsider object who's lookingin, it has to be treated as
kind of different neutral blob.
And so I'm wondering, I mean, giventhat complicated context, what are
the things you actually did to helpmake people feel safe sharing their
stories and their perspectives?
(19:37):
Okay, so, um, the victims and thesurvivors that were in the IDP camps um,
that my second colleague, who is actuallyfrom the northeastern part of the country.
Speaks two languages Hausaand Fulfulde the language.
He was the one thatactually went on the ground.
So, also, another dynamicinteresting dynamic to it is this.
(19:58):
Despite the fact that I'm aNigerian, my other colleague
is a Nigerian, we all shared.
different ethnic dynamics.
I'm Yoruba from the southwesternpart of the country.
I'm a Christian.
The principal investigator is Igbo fromthe southeastern part of the country.
He's a Christian.
Um, The second research assistant is fromthe northwestern part of the country.
He's a Muslim.
(20:18):
And the research context was innortheastern part of the country.
So we needed somebody thatwould speak the language.
Understood the unique nuance dynamicsof that context, which is a completely
different discussion to go engage them.
So the most significant thingthat we did was actually to
get an in house psychologist.
So most of the interviews were donewithin the purview of a psychologist.
(20:41):
So, at situations when the boys werefeeling traumatized, they stopped the
interview, requested the interviewto be stopped, and then they had some
sessions, and after that, we come back.
So it took a long period of time, havingthem leave the IDP camps, come to the
hotels, to make them feel very safe.
They had to leave the context wherethey felt unsafe for a very long
period of time through the helpof NGOs and other gatekeepers.
(21:04):
We brought them to hotels, providedfor them, had psychologists talk to
them, debrief talk, debrief interview.
So, yeah.
mean, it makes me wonder whathappens to these stories now,
because obviously it sounds like it.
You know, cost the, the victims or thepeople who went through this quite a lot.
I mean, is there something that'sbeing done with the stories
(21:25):
that they shared with you all?
Yeah.
Well, something I've been doing interms of advocacy um, um, not to let
the cat out of the bag too much, that'ssomething I'm also working on to see how
advocacy can be improved significantly.
But um, in terms of framework,policy framework, honestly, nothing
substantial has been done within Nigeria.
(21:45):
Like I said, the, the overarchingframework in Nigeria doesn't really
address these concerns for the malevictims and survivors in any way.
Doesn't talk about it in any way.
So, I mean, we hopesomething will be done.
Um, I mean, that's one of the, that'sone of the importance of doing research.
Um, See those that are concerned,reading and making adjustments to us.
(22:08):
I mean, in our part, we're notgoing to stop in our part as a
research team um, making effortsto see advocacy is increased.
Okay.
So I want to ask you as wellabout this recent paper that
you wrote about mediation.
Well, a local form of mediation.
You told me how to say it.
I'm going to go with Sulhu.
Yeah.
(22:28):
All right.
What is that?
Like, tell me about it.
Okay.
Um, So start with uh, so sulhuis an Arabic word that means
mediation, reconciliation.
So let me give you like a general contextif I go to um, what I did in the article.
Um, So so to start with justsome of disclaimer, it's,
it's not a new concept, right?
(22:50):
That's the interesting part of it.
I mean, it's been used fordifferent forms of mediation in
the northern part of the country.
So it's not something that is, aradically new, right, in terms of
how we use it, but it's not beengiving the attention, which was
which I found very interesting.
Um, So when I was in my fieldwork, one ofthe very, very dominant thing issue that
(23:12):
came up was participants, particularlysurvivors in the communities that have
been affected by terrorism and that now,now being made to to address the issue of
community reintegration of ex combatants.
were particular about doing this in theirown way, their own contextual way, using
(23:33):
their norms to, to address this issue.
So most of them were against, oh, Imean, yeah, the Western way is, is
fine, but it doesn't really bring aboutkind of sustainable, lasting peace
that we need to address this issue.
So the ideas converge aroundusing our local norms and
traditions to address this.
And it was then about the issue offorgiveness, justice, reconciliation,
(23:58):
forgiveness, justice, reconciliation.
So we have to do it our way,use religion and use culture.
Um, So that was generally,However, Particular participants
then talked about Sulhu.
They would ask me, have you heardof Sulhu, the concept of Sulhu?
And then because I had heard it,I was like, yes, I know Sulhu, but
(24:18):
I don't know so much about it.
That's when, they now say that, sowhen we talk about our way, that's
one of the examples of our way oftalking about . So that's sort of.
Um, like, okay, I think theremight be something here that
we need to actually speak to.
There are ongoing efforts to uh,about community reintegration in
northeastern part of the country.
Um, But there have been accounts wherethese things are not really working.
I mean, the governmentmight not really see that.
(24:40):
The government might claim, give you bogusnumbers . But those that are experiencing
the conflicts, that have been affectedwill tell you it's not really working.
Because they've not done it our way.
So I had to go back, of course, I hadto go back to literature to go read.
Um, So what's that, what's, what's, what'sanybody saying about peace building?
What's being said aboutthe concept of local peace?
Seems to be like the new buzzword inboth academic and NGO practice now.
(25:04):
I mean, you brought peaceshifting to local peace, right?
Um, There's an old story about localpeace, local peace, local peace.
Well, what exactly is local peace?
It seems to be very abstract.
What exactly is the local in local peace?
It's not, everybody justkeeps talking about it.
We can't hold it.
You can't feel it.
It's just, it's just like, um, uh, maybe,
(25:25):
woo magic.
Wave a wand, local peace sorted.
yeah, exactly.
It's more like onceyou invoke local peace.
Um, Then this is activatedautomatically, right?
So the argument I made in thearticle was that while we know local
peace to be one of the ways thatliberal peace has been transformed.
We really don't know what andwho and where is local peace.
(25:48):
So I argue that one of the wayswe can understand what local peace
actually means in practice is tounderstand local peace as contextual
norms, values, and practices.
And I said, Sulhu, an Islamic Arabicconcept was one of the ways to
understand what really is localpeace in local peace building.
Like we know so much about localpeace, but Sulhu is a contextual
(26:10):
norm, so regional culture.
Both ideals, religion and culture,religion um, in context, Islamic
religion and cultural norms ofreconciliation and forgiveness.
However, there's been a mixturethat's happened there, a mixture of
religion and culture, culture andreligion in either context that could
help us really understand how peacecan be sustained, how mediation can
(26:35):
be done, drawing from participantsrealities and their realities in this
context in our culture and religionhas actually shaped, morphed, and
influenced how they construe this idea.
And so, I mean, I'm looking at yourarticle now and I think I'm understanding
the, some of the basic concepts of Sulhuas, you know, having those principles
of forgiveness, reconciliation.
(26:56):
So really supporting that idea of.
Well, things we would get to inother forms of mediation as well.
Does it say anything about the,the process, like beyond this idea
of incorporating cultural norms?
I mean, what does Sulhu actually saysubstantively about or prescribe
in some way about process?
(27:16):
Okay.
So, um, there is no winner orloser in the process of Sulhu.
Both from the adits of the Quranand both from participants responses.
So in the process of mediation,you have to call both warring
parties together and let them speak.
The point is to bring them together inthe same context and let them speak,
let them express their grievances.
(27:37):
So there is no winner or loser.
There is no body winning or losing.
It's not like a zero sum game , the pointis to actually see that our disagreements
are solved right in our presence.
So expressing your grievances withoutholding an extra grudge with the person.
I mean, people might say that wouldbe difficult to ascertain, but I
mean, bringing both parties togetherin that context with the aid and help
(28:00):
of either a religious leader or acultural, traditional, local leader.
So it's not just bringing them together.
It needs to be under the supervisionof a respected religious leaders and
a local or a local traditional leader.
Both are seen to be upholdersof justice and truth.
So having that kind of conversation,mediation where they are , it's seen as
(28:23):
being very respectable, because they arenot just ordinary say, in that . So there
are those ordinary people where you justbring in, say, say somebody from, say
Someone like
me.
I'm a normal person.
I do mediations.
No, but I, I, I see whatyou're talking about.
I think they have similar local mediationpractices in Turkey, for instance,
(28:44):
whether it be, yeah, like an elderor a religious leader or somebody.
And so, you know, it's a bit differentto this concept of a mediator.
It's some random Laura.
It's like, no, no, it's somebodywith respect specifically in the
community that supports the process.
yeah, exactly.
Exactly.
Exactly.
So doing that kind of a mediation ordiscussion, reconciliation on the auspices
(29:04):
of such a leader or a figure gives it moretraction and makes it more respectable.
So yeah,
Okay.
I guess what I'm really wondering isthe difference between this and other
types of mediation, I mean, in, in thepeace building field, generally, right?
(29:26):
Because I'm wondering about the differencebetween you know, this principle of Sulhu
and how it helps supports peace building.
And then, you know, the example I justgave in Turkey or you know, there's also
related processes they did throughoutreconciliation, for instance, in Rwanda.
I mean, it sounds like it has areally long history, which is awesome.
I'm just wondering, you know,like using this particular lens.
(29:47):
Like what, what doesit help us understand?
Why is it a particularlygood fit for Nigeria?
Okay, so I'm glad you mentionedRwanda because Rwanda, the post
genocide mediation and reconciliationthat happened Rwanda famously used
something called the Gacaca courts um,
There's a podcast episode about that.
So yeah, absolutely.
(30:08):
Yeah, so it was like, so the Gacacacourt was more like um, what it
means in Kinyan Rwanda terms ismore like lawn, a grass, Gacaca.
So the mediation happened in like anopen space where with the victims,
survivors, and perpetrators were broughttogether to talk and the perpetrators
are made to seek forgiveness.
(30:30):
Um, The survivors would accept, or rejectthe forgiveness of the perpetrators.
It's almost similar in Sulhu.
And it's almost the same thing, right?
It's almost the same thing.
Probably different contextand um, the tenets might not
really be completely similar.
For instance, in Northern Nigeria, themixture of religion and culture is so,
(30:52):
so strong in society, very, very strong.
I mean, all of Nigeria, actually,not only Islam, religion and
culture is also very, very stronginfluence on our society, right?
So more particularly in Northern contextwhere um, this community reintegration
effort and DDR process is happening.
So I think that sort ofmakes Sulhu more nuanced.
(31:14):
Um, I know in Kenya, particularly withinthe context of Gacaca I think um, the
Bible played a little part of that.
I remember reading Phil Clark's book onthat um, some chapters of his book where
he talked about um, religion playing apart, and some part of the Bible, mainly
some survivors actually making referencesto parts of the Bible where the Bible
(31:34):
says forgiveness, and all of that.
Same thing that happened in Suruwe.
I mean, Hadiths of the Prophetsum, were things that were actually
held in high esteem and context.
So I think it helps us understandwhy mediation and peace building
is not a one size fits all process.
I mean, I think most organizations,international non government
(31:56):
organizations, even civilsociety organizations, tend to
misconstrue or miss that part.
Although it's contestable,someone might say it's now hybrid
peace um, hybrid mediation.
I mean, but the fact still remainsthat even the concept of, the
whole concept of hybridity Stillneeds to be led by something.
So if you check it, well, it's stillbeing led by Western liberal practices.
(32:17):
It's not really the local practices,local tenets and norms that should be.
So I think one thing that would help usunderstand is the contextually nuanced
way that mediation, one, and even conflictdynamics actually happens in Nigeria.
Conflict dynamics areactually quite different.
Political violence, terrorism, violentextremism, they're quite different.
(32:37):
Right.
The factors that precipitatethem are quite different.
And so understanding the differencesin the conflict dynamics and which shall
remediate them is something that thearticle, I think, sheds important light
.Of course um, whoever wants to adopt the framework, it's free to adopt it
and tweak it whatever way they want to.
So I think it's more important tocenter the experiences of those that
(32:58):
are caught up in these processes.
Most of the time we tend todo these things um, top down.
We input our ideas and impinge on thesocieties, want them to do what we
want and then go out there and seeif it's working and we just don't
go back to actually ask if it's
many thoughts.
I have so many thoughts aboutwhat you're saying right now.
Um, yeah, sorry to interrupt.
(33:20):
I just, I was overwhelmed.
I guess I see it from twodifferent angles because obviously.
A lot of the guests that Ihave on this podcast are in
a more critical space, right?
You know, they're questioning what peacemeans and they talk about, you know,
like, is it right for us to go intodifferent places and declare exactly
as you've said, like that, you know,we'll bring peace or what have you.
And then, but then there's this sortof funding crisis in peace building
(33:44):
where it's like, well, you know, we'rebeholden to our funders and they don't
get that we're using local concepts andwe're always like localizing things.
And then they're like,why isn't it working out?
It's like, well, because we had to changethe process because things changed.
But then on the other hand of things.
Which might be the third hand, actually.
So we're having a lotof hands in this today.
So, but on the third hand, on the thirdhand, one of my frustrations is that I
(34:11):
think in some parts of that, whether it'sthe funders or sort of some of the, maybe
some people in peace building, right.
Had this conception of mediationas a field was established
in the seventies or eighties.
Especially, I mean, honestly, thiscomes more from a corporate side of
things about, you know, Getting toYes came out, we all read this, it's a
bestseller and suddenly we go, Oh, well,actually, now we can agree together.
(34:35):
Like, we can build something new,whereas in reality, there are, and
something you just highlighted,like, there are so many cultures
around the world where these similarconcepts exist and can be leveraged
and are culturally relevant and can becentralized in peace-building processes.
And so.
For that reason, and the reason I wantedto do this, this little top up recording
(34:56):
is because when I saw that you wrotethis paper, I was like, this is another
one that finally we're hearing about.
I mean, Ubuntu made it out of SouthAfrica and people are trying to be really
woke when they're teaching mediation.
They're like, oh yeah, but you canalso look at Ubuntu in South Africa.
Then we've got like in CentralAmerica as well and In Lakesh,
which is, you know, great.
And then here's another concept as well.
(35:16):
And I think for me, that is ahuge contribution of your work.
It's like, well, here is anotherframework that is used and has a
long history and cultural relevance.
Like it's not all about something thatwas written by some random American in the
seventies um, or whatever it was, right.
Like this is a, this is areal concept that can be used.
And I think, yeah, for me,that's really powerful.
(35:38):
Thank you.
So at this point, I wanna return to ourformer recording with Josh because I
mean, the idea of Sulhu and the way whichJosh talks about peace, as something
local, relational, and really deeplyhuman stands in contrast to how peace and
security are often handled in practice.
Now, in our first conversation,we talked about what the Nigerian
(36:00):
government actually does when it talksspecifically about deradicalizing
or reintegrating former extremists,post-conflict or during conflict, and
it can be quite a different story.
So before we wrap up for thisepisode, I wanna take you back to
that early discussion where Joshdescribes what those official programs
really look like, and what happenswhen the rhetoric of rehabilitation
(36:22):
meets the reality on the ground.
Yeah.
But at the master's level I was stillunable to get access to I mean terrorists.
'cause I, I, I don't think anybodywould try to just identify a terrorist
and say, oh yeah, I wanna speak to you.
Why do you blow up people?
And be like, oh yeah, I blowup people because of this.
So I'm just imagining youputting ads up somewhere.
(36:43):
Like "are you a terrorist?Talk to this researcher".
Like who would respond tothat ad? That makes no sense.
And so you moved on then tounderstanding radicalization and
deradicalization more broadly.
So can you tell me a bit about theradicalization factors, like why are
people getting radicalized in Nigeriaspecifically or beyond Nigeria,
(37:07):
if your work covers that as well?
Okay.
That's quite aninteresting and tricky one.
Yeah.
So for starters, there are no linear pathsto radicalization, to violent extremism.
In a real sense of it, if we were topick up radicalization as an issue
It's not completely a bad thing, right?
As long as it doesn'tlead to violent extremism.
(37:29):
So radicalization becomes negative whenit leads to violent extremism , of course.
So different studies academic andpolicy directed studies have tried to
understand the pathways that individualsget down to violent extremism,
radicalized to violent extremism, andbroadly they're like the push and pull
(37:49):
articles they identify like, people getpulled into it because of peer pressure
networking influence could be an issue.
But then there is also the pushfactor where the act of repression
by the states sort of pushes peopleradicalizing into violent extremism.
(38:11):
There's the, there's the povertythesis, there's the economic basis
of that where poverty, abjectpoverty, squallor could be a trigger
for people to pick up arms and getradicalized into violence or extremism.
But that's been countered, becausefor instance, the very first suicide
bomber, Nigerian suicide bomber that wasarrested by the United States government
2009, somebody called Abdulmutallab,was about to blow up a Detroit- bound
(38:36):
airplane had no record of poverty.
His father was a top member ofthe economic elite in Nigeria.
So, I mean, literally had no excuseof economic imbalance, poverty,
that pushed him into wantingto blow up himself and a plane.
So, the poverty argument has also beendemystified in that sense that poverty
(38:57):
doesn't really lead to violent extremism.
So, I would say there's a cross-cross offactors that sort of accounts for the, the
pull and the push to violent extremism.
There are different issuesthat might lead to it.
I mean, I, for one would personally saythat poverty, states responses, absence
of developmental projects, literacy,distorted religious motivations.
(39:20):
I mean, misinterpreting sacred texts ofthe early books, the Bible or the Quran.
A range of factors.
So it's really, really difficult toput it like in a stepwise arrangement.
I mean, having a linear progressionof it's sort of difficult.
There are different factors that accountfor these things that motivate people to
get in a radicalized violent extremism.
(39:43):
And so something that reallystrikes me is that when you started
talking about violent extremism,you talked about radicalization
as not necessarily being bad.
It's only bad when it becomes violent.
And so I'm just wondering what isthe difference between the violent
extremism that you research andthings like the French Revolution.
(40:06):
Is it because the French Revolution,the people who rose up won?
Like what is the differencebetween these different kinds
of violences, do you think?
So civil disobedience initself is not a crime, right?
It it, it transcends into violentextremism where civil disobedience stops.
So I would say where it becomesuncivil disobedience, uncivil
(40:29):
disobedience where you take up armsand you're going to destroy properties
and feel, feel entitled to I mean,violence in the real sense of it.
So, I mean I might find people that woulddisagree with me, but I think everybody's
entitled to be radical in a sense.
Not everybody will be comfortable withcertain issues, and you have a way of
expressing your displeasure towards it.
(40:51):
However, the way you expressyour displeasure matters a lot.
So expressing your displeasure wouldnot make sense when you go violent.
I think in that sense, you, youbegin the process of getting
radicalized to violent extremism,that's the beginning of that process.
So it's much more complex than just allsaying, oh, I just said that and I begin
to get violence in that sense, right?
(41:13):
You begin the process of gettingradicalized to violent extremism,
and then it becomes more complex.
You transcend into indoctrination,brainwashing and all of these things
that happen with different violencegroups now, the right wing, the jihadist
groups that they are all over the world.
The reason I ask is because if we dothink about the French Revolution and
(41:36):
people bringing out guillotine, oftenpeople speak about this as ultimately a
good thing, but from what I understand,that would also be violent extremism.
'cause there was firstly theradicalization and then it goes beyond
civil disobedience into violence.
The reason I bring this up isbecause there tends to be this
(41:57):
moralizing about violence in politics.
Where if it's done by some people insome places of some religion, it's
somehow different to how it's done byother people in other times and you
know, depending on the color of theirskin and what have you, and that, that's
why I wanted to bring that up because Imean, it does sound like then bringing
out guillotines is violent extremism.
(42:18):
It's very much beyond civil disobedience.
Yes, yes.
You're absolutely correct.
Laura.
Yeah.
So I I would say that ultimatelyit depends on whoever is in charge
of labeling issues as politicalviolence , as terrorism , as violent
extremism, as radicalization to violentextremism, as civil disobedience.
I mean, there's this subjective wayof defining it and ultimately to put
(42:42):
it in a very, very simple way, theState still has the power to decide
who they're labelling terrorists.
Or violent extremists, or whateveraction they feel is deemed to
amount to radicalization, toviolent extremism in that sense.
So there's still the contentiousissue of labeling one man terrorist,
(43:03):
another mans freedom fighter, thecommon theme in politics policy world.
So yeah, I mean, all of this largelydepends on how we see issues where,
what side of the divide we are on.
I take a very critical stancetowards the states and its actions.
So I think the actions need to bequestioned as much as we also question
ourselves, reflecting on ourselves.
(43:25):
Absolutely.
Okay, so tell me thenabout your PhD research.
What are you trying to find out?
Okay.
So, so my research was motivated bythe post 911 global war and terror
measures , and how it restricted thebalance and led to the shrinking of
civic spaces all over the world, inAfrica and Nigeria more specifically.
(43:49):
So during my master's thesis, I, Isought to understand how states and
communities engage within the rubric ofcommunity policing in violent extremism.
After my master's thesis uh, whichI published in some journal, I
realized that I had questionsthat were still left unanswered.
(44:09):
So one of those questions wasabout the Nigerian governments
terrorist rehabilitation program.
So I had read then on the news - theprogram had just started -that there
was an issue with the program, which wascosmetic in approach in the sense that
the engagement was problematic . Soterrorists are rehabilitated by the
government and then reintegrated intothe society and the community where
(44:34):
they're expected to carry on withtheir normal lives as though nothing
happened despite causing so much pain
. And then the communities that are supposed to be recipients of the terrorists to not
reject them because if governments hadnot done enough to prepare them, prepare
their minds for those who are coming tolive with them after causing so much harm.
(44:56):
So I went with the hunch that therewas a problematic relationship within
these Nigerian states and northerncommunities within the context of the
terrorist rehabilitation program andthe attempt to reintegrate ex-combatants
or ex terrorists into the society.
So, my thesis tries to understandfirstly, what's the nature of the program?
(45:19):
What does it look like?
How does Nigerian stateengage these communities?
How do the communities respond tothe engagement of Nigerian states?
And, in all of this , how do weunderstand state society relations
? I just concluded my field work and the findings are very, very interesting.
There are different layers to unpackthat I'm still trying to open, but
yeah, I think, I think what I'velearned so far is that whatever we
(45:42):
call deradicalization or rehabilitationof terrorists is context based.
So there's these attempts to,from an African perspective, a
Nigerian perspective, to do whatis done in the Western circle.
So to do radicalization, to dorehabilitation the way it's done, say
with the prevent program in the UnitedKingdom or with a program in Singapore
(46:05):
or in Southeast Asia or something.
And then we find out that, I mean,it's completely different dynamics
in terms of the economic dynamics,the political dynamics, the nature
of society in general, and even howthese programs develop and evolve.
Program just started in Nigeria under10 years in comparison to United Kingdom
where it has been there for decades
(46:25):
.So, some of the interesting findings that I've seen so far, and I'm working
on articles to publish and share myfindings with the general public.
And I mean, what does aterrorist rehabilitation
program in Nigeria look like?
What does that actually involve?
So, I'll give you, I'll answer thequestion by telling you what the
(46:46):
government says it looked like and what Ihave found out what it really looks like.
So the government says theyde radicalize terrorists.
So deradicalization is simply trying toideologically reprogram the terrorists.
We're trying to probably wipe offthe wrong ideologies, doctrines that
(47:07):
motivated these actions and givethem the correct way of thinking.
So presenting them with the correctnarratives that would help them grow.
And then there is the other side torehabilitation, which is disengagement.
So disengagement is the behavioralchange that is expected of a terrorist.
(47:28):
In a disengagement, you are not hopingto reprogram the terrorist ideologically,
you are just hoping to make him seethat he drops the violence behavior
and stop taking up arms and thengets back to his normal way of life.
And there's the reintegrationaspect of it, where after you
deradicalize and disengage um, theperson is expected to transit, to
(47:50):
living a normal life in the society.
That's what the Nigerian government saysit does with each rehabilitation program.
And what I've found out so far, whichI, which I'll push out very soon, is
that the Nigerian government does notde radicalize terrorists, the Nigerian
government disengages terrorists,
(48:12):
the Nigerian government claims toderadicalize terrorists because
of what has been said to be avery, very, very fertile counter
terrorism economy in Nigeria.
So there's this very vague narrativethat national security trumps all.
So national security has been usedas leverage to foster corruption,
(48:34):
patrimonialism and all sorts.
So under this rubric it's claimedthat they deradicalize just to get
out these economic motives, benefits.
While in the real sense of it,terrorists are just disengaged
and reintegrated to the societies.
(48:54):
And then there is the seriousunder reportage of recidivism.
So terrorists go back to its actions.
After going through all of these fromthe states, a very louy welcome economic
and voluntary reintegration, givingthem stipends to start their lives,
vocational reintegration, making them,I mean, start having something to do.
(49:15):
But then all of these things ceaseafter three months, and then it's
back to square zero, and thenthey go back to the trenches.
It kind of sounds like being a terroristin Nigeria is a pretty good deal, so you
get a whole bunch of resources thrownat you, and you get to continue being
a terrorist at the end of the day.
(49:36):
I mean, that's my argument.
Oh my goodness.
Wowza.
And I'm sure you would've seen that inthe news where bandits, as they call
them, they call them bandits, wherethey are repaid huge sums of money
as ransoms for kidnapping people.
And then they go back to kidnapbecause they know they would always
be the ransom paid and then continue
(49:57):
.So I mean, you could say in that sense that being a terrorist in Nigeria pays.
Yeah, it's like a job where you get tohave occasional leave and study money.
I mean, especially I guess, as you'vedescribed a lot of the time there's
the economic poverty as well, Iguess it becomes easy to understand
where this would be attractive,even beyond the sort of narratives
(50:20):
you've got going on internally.
You're like, actually this isa good opportunity for me, for
my future, which is not ideal.
It's, it's quite far from ideal.
And so if you had a magic wandand you could do one thing to fix
the de radicalization process inNigeria, what would that thing be?
(50:41):
That's a very, very, very tricky question.
I like tricky questions.
Yeah.
One thing I think I would for now, fornow at this hour, at this moment, I
think I would change the focus of theinstitution or the agency responsible.
I think the program is in the wrong hands.
(51:04):
It's been driven by this logic ofcommand and control, which sort of
contravenes contradictory to thewhole idea of de radicalization.
I think the program should be handledby a separate agency of the government
that recognizes the importance ofcivility and relations between non-state
(51:30):
actors.
So more, I'm gonna continue being cheesy.
It's like more loving and reachingout as opposed to, you will do this.
You're wrong, you're broken.
We'll fix you.
Yes, because the agency responsiblefor fixing, it's not fixing,
Mm-hmm.
it's rather more contributing to thegradual hardening of these people.
(51:51):
So they, they've seen it as aprocess of, well, get those,
extract information from those, putthose somewhere after some months.
We go through programs, wego through seminars, and
then we're out and that's it.
So if you really do speak withthese combatants , one would realize
and see that's more contributingto them getting hardened.
(52:14):
And it's problematic.
Great Okay.
Well look, Josh, thank you somuch for joining me today despite
thunderstorms, internet outage,power outage, and me delaying.
Like we've, I think we've overcomea lot to have this conversation.
Yes, I'm excited.
And for those who are interestedin learning more about your work,
(52:35):
Google Joshua Akintayo, and everythingyou need to know about him comes up.
Google Scholar, Google, everything youneed to know is there for you to see.
Super.
The most findable guy.
All right, well thank you again, and untilnext time, this is Laura May with the
Conflict Tipping Podcast from Mediate.com.
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