August 7, 2023 • 58 mins
Admiral Sir Ben Key, First Sea Lord, talks about his life on the sea, the Royal Navy around the globe, and its growing role in the Indo-Pacific.
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>> Michael Auslin (00:09):
Welcome back to the Pacific Century, a Hoover Institution
podcast on China, America and the fateof the Indo Pacific in the 21st century.
I am Michael Ausiln, your host.
It's been a while.
We've been on a bit of a hiatus, though.
There's been a lot going on andwe've been keeping our eyes on it.
(00:29):
But we're happy to welcome you toa special mid summer edition of
the Pacific Century.
And we are particularly pleased tohave as our guest Admiral Sir Ben Key,
the first sea lord of the Royal Navy.
Now, longtime listeners may rememberthat we had Admiral Key's predecessor,
(00:50):
Admiral Sir Tony Radakin,the first sea lord, a few years ago.
And Admiral Radakin has now become chiefof the defense staff, senior uniformed
officer in the British armed forces, andAdmiral Sir Ben Key has replaced him.
So we are thrilled to be able to have anupdate on things that have happened since
we last talked to the Royal Navy andabout the Royal Navy broadly, but
(01:13):
also in the Indo Pacific.
For those of you who are notfamiliar with the first Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Ben Key,he joined the Royal Navy in 1984.
He studied physics at Royal Hollow,which is part of the University of London.
He has commanded various ships inthe Royal Navy, but perhaps most
(01:37):
significantly, he was commander ofone of Britain's aircraft carriers,
HMS Illustrious, andthen has worked at key staff positions and
has also been involved in Britain'smilitary activities in Afghanistan and
of course, has experience aroundthe world, including in the Indo Pacific.
(01:58):
He became first Sea Lordin November of 2021.
So it's about a year and a half, andwe are thrilled to have him join us.
And welcome to the Pacific Centuryfirst Sea Lord.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (02:13):
Thank you very much.
Great to have the opportunity to join you.
>> Michael Auslin (02:16):
Well, sir, thanks so much for taking time.
And you are, I should say, the second1st Sea Lord, not the second Sea Lord,
which there is one, but the second 1st SeaLord to join us on the Pacific century.
Admiral Radakin, your predecessor,who now heads up the defense staff,
the top uniform position in the UK,joined us a few years ago, and
(02:36):
we had a great conversation, but
there's a lot that's actually changedsince then, and I'd like to get to that.
I think you've inherited a lot of piecesthat were beginning to move when he
joined us.
But before we get intoany of the specifics,
we always like to let the audienceget to know you a little bit and
(02:57):
ask how did you get tobecome the first sea lord?
How did you get into the navy?
Are you from a naval family.
Was this a dream to span the oceans,or was it all serendipity?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (03:10):
I think the 18 year old Ben Key would be rather surprised
if he knew that a decisionto join the navy for
a few years whilst I worked out what Iwas going to do with my life actually
turned into the only career I have had fornow in my 39th year.
And my maternal grandfather servedin the Navy for many years.
(03:38):
He effectively went to the Royal NavalCollege, Dartmouth, when it was a school.
So he went to the age of 13.
He was mobilized from there at the ageof 16 when the first World War began.
>> Michael Auslin (03:49):
Wow.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (03:50):
Fought at the Battle of Jutland as a 17 and
a half year old in HMS Collingwood.
>> Michael Auslin (03:54):
That's some history.
That's amazing.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (03:56):
Well,
he served in the ship with then hisRoyal Highness the Duke of York,
who went on to become King George VIduring the second world War.
So there's kind of a connection there
that endured for the rest of their lives.
I think if you fought alongside someone asa young person, you kind of stay in touch.
(04:21):
Not necessarily closely, butthey stayed in touch until the king died.
And so I was always had thisinfluence of my grandfather,
who was an engineer captain.
But I didn't grow upanywhere near the sea.
I didn't grow up learning how tosail dinghies or anything like this.
And it was just that when I was 18,my parents were living in Australia,
(04:46):
and we might touch on mykind of Pacific connections.
>> Michael Auslin (04:50):
Absolutely.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (04:51):
And I needed someone to help fund my way through
university.
A challenge that we well knownto many of your listeners.
And at the time, the Royal Navy were,and the Army and
the Air Force were offering kindascholarships in support cadetships.
And I opted for the naval one,I think, on the basis that that was
(05:15):
the service I knew the least most about,or the most least about.
I'd been an army cadet at school, but.
Yeah, so I knew I enjoyed militarylife and I thought, well,
I'll do that for five or six years,having got my degree, and
by then I'll have given myself someshape as to what I really want to do.
And the answer actuallybecame providentially,
(05:36):
I landed in the career that was to shapeand it never occurred to me to leave.
I just forgot to have thatconversation with myself.
>> Michael Auslin (05:43):
Well, I guess there's still time eventually.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (05:48):
So, no, I was very, very fortunate.
I'm not the only person who joins the navyout of sort of slightly idle curiosity and
then finds it's a great place.
The value sets, the sense of community.
I really enjoy life on board a ship at seathat was, you know, really important, but
I wouldn't say it was because I really,really have to be at sea.
I don't own a yacht.
I can't think of anything worse thangetting back from a six month deployment
(06:10):
and going sailing again.
You've just been looking at the stuff.
I mean, I have learned now how to sailbecause I don't go to sea very often.
But in my earlier life,
I couldn't understand my colleagues whogot back from a long deployment and were
just talking about pushing their yachtdown the slipway and going back out there.
I'd rather run up a mountain.
So but then the career has just provideda whole range of professional challenges,
(06:33):
personal experiences,opportunities that I've relished.
And I suppose in enjoying them, you sortof tend to be okay at doing them and
that just keeps you moving up the system.
So I've been very lucky.
>> Michael Auslin (06:47):
Well, I'm glad you cleared up one question I had,
which is readingthe Patrick O'Brien novels,
I couldn't understand why Jack Aubreywanted a home in the country.
I would have assumed he wanted to be onthe sea, but no, he has a country estate.
And I thought, well, does that ring true?
And I think you've just put anotherdata point to the fact that
(07:09):
the Patrick O'Brien novels are brilliantand as close to life as possible.
Let me ask, though,I just wanted to check.
So when you joined, you were commissioned,you weren't enlisted?
You didn't have the enlistedexperience in the Navy?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (07:26):
No, I joined as an 18 year old midshipman,
did my initial training atthe Naval College Dartmouth, which,
unlike Annapolis, does not offera multi-year degree program.
It's a number of monthscontained within 12,
left from there, joined the fleetas a midshipman ensign for
(07:47):
a few months andthen from there went to university.
So I sort of did it the other wayaround to how a lot do it today.
And then during my three yearsat university, which was just,
it was one of the collegesin London University.
In my summers,
I was then required to go back tosea to sort of maintain my currency.
(08:10):
And then once I'd graduated, I then pickedup, finished my training, and resumed.
And the idea of that program, and
we're going back to the 1980s now,
was to bring more graduates intothe non-technical branches of the Navy.
(08:32):
So I'm a warfare officer by background.
And so it was just to createthese opportunities to try and
pull more people in.
And the way to do itwas to sponsor them so
that you had a bit more money thanyour average student, basically,
because you were still being paid,albeit as a reduced salary.
(08:53):
And, no, it worked very well.
And my tuition fees were met,and that was a key element.
>> Michael Auslin (09:02):
Absolutely.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:04):
Of the endeavor.
>> Michael Auslin (09:05):
No question.
So before we get to the serious stuff,let me ask you,
just cuz I don't wannaforget it at the end,
what's your most memorableRoyal Navy experience?
Was it almost getting washed off-board?
Was it a sunset in Bali?
What's the most memorablethat when you look back and
(09:28):
those are the ones you wantto keep with you, what is it?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:32):
Yeah, so, I mean, some of them are memorable, but
not necessarily.
So I've been very lucky tosurvive a helicopter ditching.
>> Michael Auslin (09:40):
Wow. >> Admiral Sir Ben Key
but perhaps not for the right reasons.
Right.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:43):
But that means that I'm a member of the Goldfish Club,
for which one of the former presidents ofthe United States is also eligible for
membership.
>> Michael Auslin (09:54):
President Bush, I assume you're talking about.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:55):
Yeah. >> Michael Auslin
And he was awarded honorary membership of the Goldfish Club.
It's a club that you never set out tojoin, [LAUGH] but you become eligible for
membership.
And actually, what you find isthat some of the people who,
they tend to be military, butnot all military aviators,
cuz anyone who ditches inthe water is eligible to join.
But some of the stories of the aviationduring the Second World War,
(10:19):
in the early years after that,when they were really quiet,
should we say that aviation safetywasn't as profound as it is today?
A lot of it was really innovativeengineering, the rate of change and
development of aircraft fromaircraft carriers in particular, and
then the arrival of those earlyhelicopters, all of that.
(10:39):
You found that the men and women who wereinvolved in that sort of aviation had
phenomenal stories to tell, or you wouldfind out about those who had ditched and
spent two or three days in a liferaft in really cold conditions.
Not quite sure whether they were gonnabe picked up by their own side or
the other side and things like that.
So it was always humbling to go to thosereunions, whereas we ditched in a part of
(11:02):
the world where the water was warm andthe ship wasn't that far away.
[LAUGH] But anyway, so that would be it.
Now, I mean, command is always one ofthe great privileges and obligations.
And I think the bits that I've felthave been the greatest memories for
(11:23):
me is when you're partof an organization or
team that has done something,and you realize that kind of,
as the commander,you've set a direction of travel.
And then this amazing group of men andwomen have kind of turn that into
something and made something ofan opportunity or an obligation,
often under considerable pressure orrequiring real innovation.
(11:47):
And when you're part of that,then that really feels quite special.
And it's those things, I think,that I'll take the most satisfaction from.
And that's not because itwas my wisdom in command.
It was the delight at seeing the thingsthat I kind of thought might be a good
idea turned into something, really,because of the people that did it, and
(12:12):
being part of those sorts of teams, yeah.
>> Michael Auslin (12:15):
That's great.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (12:15):
And I've been [INAUDIBLE] couple of those, anyway.
>> Michael Auslin (12:17):
Well, I appreciate that.
And I think it would be helpful,before we get again to the Asia part,
maybe if you could do a really sortof brief 101 on the Royal Navy for
our listeners, some of whom may haveheard when Admiral Radakin came on.
And I think I asked him the same question.
But especially those of us in Washington,
(12:40):
it's a sort of skewed dataset ofthinking about the US Navy and
thinking about its size and its role.
Even if there's a robust argumenton whether its size is enough,
it certainly dwarfs mostof the other navies.
And that's something that Americans havebeen so used to for so long that they
(13:01):
don't really think about a lot of thetradeoffs, the questions, the difficulties
in many ways of operating globallyas you do, but with a smaller force.
And so maybe, if you wouldn't mindjust sort of walking us through as if
we were parliamentarians,asking, why do you need this?
What does the Royal Navy look like today?
(13:22):
The number of your capital ships,the number of those both in
uniform as well as on shore,the bases you have around the world?
Just give us a one-on-one, if you could.
And then we'll move over to the Pacific.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (13:37):
Yeah, of course, so, I mean, I would say this anyway, but I
think the Royal Navy tries to be profoundvalue for money for the British taxpayer.
And as one of the leading navies inthe world, and I say that not based upon
our size, I'm curious that you saythe US Navy now has this factor of size.
(13:58):
I come from a navy where, 150 years ago,the basic policy of the Royal Navy was
to be the size of the nexttwo biggest navies combined.
That was the benchmark by which we were.
And not surprisingly, therefore,we were disproportionately large and
the nation couldn't affordthat going through.
But what I take enormous pride of isthat we're one of the very few navies
(14:22):
in the world that covers the range ofmajor maritime capabilities we do.
And we offer both conventional andnuclear strategic deterrence capabilities.
So at the heart of the fleet,clearly, are the four strategic
missile-carrying submarines whichcarry the Trident missile system.
(14:43):
And they then take withthem another seven SSNs.
So we're a nuclear operating navy thatoperates an independent nuclear deterrent,
very closely shared with the USthrough extraordinary treaties set in
the 1950s and the 1960s aroundthe mutual defense agreement and
(15:05):
then the Polaris sales agreement.
And we might come back to that inthe context of what's happened in
the Pacific now.
We're the only navy in the worldthat operates two aircraft carriers
specifically designed to support the F-35,a fifth generation aircraft.
And I say that with all due respect to theUSS Gerald R Ford, which is at sea today.
(15:27):
But that's an evolution of a designthat's been going on for many years,
whereas we were essentially givena blank piece of paper to start again.
So that's HMS Queen Elizabeth andHMS Prince of Wales.
And then supporting that,we have a range of destroyers and
frigates providing the kindof standard escort force, but
also able to operate on their own acrossNATO or other individual partnerships.
(15:51):
And then a series of smaller offshorepatrol vessels which actually are globally
deployed, including two that we keeppermanently operating across Across
the Indo-Pacific region,which we'll come back to.
Not big, only 90 meters long, but they'reon five year deployments into the region.
And so that allows us to achievea considerable number of linkages and for
(16:13):
us to regrow some of our kindof operating partnerships and
a part of the world weused to know very well.
But have tended over the last few decadesto not be involved with quite so much.
And then we clearly operateour own organic aviation.
But the other thing I'm tremendouslyproud of is that within the navy sit
(16:35):
the Royal Marines.
So they're not a separate service, they'redefinitely not part of the army, they're
part of the Royal Navy and they bring withthem all of that considerable history and
partnership and really give usour literal strike capability.
So we offer these three main pillarsaround the continuous sea deterrent,
which is the nuclear aspect,and then carrier strike and
(16:58):
literal strike withthe supporting enablement.
We operate out of three navalbases in a dockyard around the UK,
plus air stations and commando bases.
We don't have any navy,only bases that we own around the world,
though clearly we have permanentpresence in the Falklands,
(17:21):
in Bahrain and one ortwo other places such as that.
But actually the great thing thatwe've done in the last few years,
particularly reflecting the government'sIndo-Pacific tilt as it gets called.
Is that in the last 18 monthswe've operated with confidence
across every line of longitude andin both polar oceans.
(17:43):
So we've definitely gone back to notjust the navy that can operate globally,
but one that is operating globally.
The carrier strike group deploymentin 2021 into the Indo-Pacific region,
of which the US Marine Corpsput a squadron of F35 and
(18:04):
also the US Navy,one of their destroyers, the Sullivans.
That was that first major reach back intothe region and has recently been announced
we'll be doing another majordeployment into the region in 2025,
plus raising our levels of presence.
So the joy for me is that I see a navythat is going back to operating globally.
(18:27):
Clearly the Euro Atlantic is ourprincipal area of activity and
NATO remains at the bedrock of everythingwe do, but we're not constrained to that.
We recognize we have a number of globalpartnerships in a world that is globally
connected and we'll probablyexplore some of that as we move on.
And sorry, in the final bit.
(18:47):
So we're about 36,000 in total.
That's about 30,000 sailors andmarines, 3000 reserves,
and then about 3000 brilliant civilservants who are part of the navy.
And then clearly there's the broaderindustrial partnerships without which we
would not be able to do our business?
>> Michael Auslin (19:07):
Well, you mentioned the, and
rightfully starting off with theillustrious history of the Royal Navy and
its size and outsized influence onthe world, and as you point out,
coming back to that,operating around the world.
But you have this,such an interesting mix, right,
in terms of the nuclear capability,aircraft capability, and
(19:30):
then the sort of more standardcapabilities that many navies have.
Who, if anyone, do you see as sort ofthe closest peer naval force that you
say that looks a little bit like us,they operate a little bit like us.
Is there anyone?
Or do you occupy just a reallyunique niche that, of course,
allows you in many ways to be the singlemost important naval partner of
(19:54):
the United States and certainlyof great value to other partners.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (19:58):
So the navy closest to us in that kind of peer style
is also geographically our closestas well, which is the French Navy.
But to say [LAUGH] that we've always beenthe closest of allies would be a slight
misreading of history.
>> Michael Auslin (20:14):
[LAUGH] Right.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (20:14):
[LAUGH] And I think it's fair to say that on a number of
occasions in the last few hundred years,
we've resolved our differencesat sea by the use of cannons.
Admiral Pierre Vandier ofthe French Navy today,
wrote to me when I was appointedthe most delightful letter in
which he reflected a thousandyears of shared history.
(20:39):
The majority of which hasbeen more peaceful than less.
And they are verydefinitely across Europe.
We are the closest in capabilities becausewe're the only two navies that operate
nuclear submarines, both of whichobviously, both of us obviously operate
also from that, nuclear weapons or carrynuclear weapons on behalf of the nation.
(21:03):
There are other navies inthe Italians are building
their F35 capable carrier force as well.
But actually, if you did the kind ofthe Venn diagram, who are we closest to?
It's undoubtedly the French, but
I think it's also fair to saythat sometimes and usefully.
(21:25):
We see the world throughdifferent perspectives and
in a constructive and collaborative sense,
that then becomes very productivebecause it prevents groupthink.
And Pierre Vandier and I'm surethe same will be with his successor,
who takes over at the end of this month,Nicolas Vojoure.
We want to see that as a strength,that we can have really creative
(21:50):
conversations about how we dothings together well and better.
But recognizing that our constructs are,for
very understandable reasons,slightly different.
But we need to turn that intoa partnership rather than some of
the challenges we've done in the past,I see that's really important to us.
(22:12):
And actually, when you then look furtherafield, there are a number of other
navies where we've got very similarkind of scales or approach.
So we're doing increasinglymore with the Japanese navy,
who are getting used to their orderof battle is extremely modern.
(22:34):
It's well invested inthat kind of technical
understanding is really profound.
There's a lot of opportunity and in manyways, over the last few hundred years,
we've had a really quiteclose relationship.
By dint of history, they're beginningto find their kind of more regional and
global capabilities and operational.
(22:55):
So there's a lot that we can learn andshare with them.
And then clearly there's kind ofthe Australia, Canada, New Zealand through
the Five Eyes partnerships, which alsois the straight historic linkages.
But I think it would be a mistake topresume that just because all four of
those, Australia, New Zealand, ourselves,all share the same monarch and
(23:18):
very considerable history,that our navies are in the same place.
That's not the sense, because eachoccupies a different geographical
position, each responds todifferent geopolitical pressures.
The trick forus all is to double down and invest and
magnify in the strengths thatpartnership and collaboration bring.
(23:39):
And look for those areas where by doingthings together, we can do them better.
But that would be it.
I admire the way the Indiannavy is growing at the moment.
I admire hugely whatthe Brazilians are doing.
The head of the Colombian Navyhas got great ambition to grow.
We've got long partnershipswith the Chileans.
(24:00):
So I can't help but recognize that throughour history, a number of our admirals,
sometimes the ones that have been kickedout of UK have then gone on to have very
successful careers in othernavies around the world.
[LAUGH] That has given us kindof a historically-bounded
network that we don't take for granted.
(24:21):
But the shared narrativecan be quite profound.
>> Michael Auslin (24:25):
Well, it's actually a perfect segue into the Pacific.
And let me actually startnot with a gotcha question,
but just for the sake of role playing,
as if this were a parliamentaryhearing from someone
who represents a constituencythat's inland,
(24:46):
that doesn't think aboutthe world much necessarily,
and asks you rather bluntly.
We understand you don't make policy,but you represent the navy, obviously.
What interests does the Royal Navy, orfor that matter, Britain more broadly,
have in Asia?
(25:06):
Why, as you mentioned,your core area is the Euro-Atlantic.
You're a European nation oran Atlantic nation.
We have a special relationshipbetween the US and Britain.
All that makes sense.
Why should you ever be sofar afield as in the Pacific?
And what do you get out of it?
And maybe that's a way to get into whatyou do do and where you might be going.
(25:27):
And then we'll get more specific.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (25:29):
So the Indo-Asia Pacific region is the fastest growing
economic region of the world.
40% of our economic interestsare already bound up with the region.
So the idea that in some sensewe would have an economic
partnership relationship withthat part of the world, and
(25:51):
then not tie that in with the otherarms of national influence and
power would seem to me tobe an incomplete solution.
And if you then look at those, whatare those aspects of a kind of national
framework that then brings inthe diplomatic, the economic trade, but
also the security aspect?
(26:11):
And we're very much partof that security piece.
And when you consider just how much of thetrade that flows in the Indo-Asia Pacific
region goes by sea or by undersea cable,when one looks at data movements.
Then for us to not want to play a part inensuring some of that freedom of movement,
(26:31):
security forall that should pass upon the high seas,
to quote a long-established piece, wouldseem to me to be both slightly bizarre.
In terms of why wouldn't we want to usethat to reflect some of the kind of
alliances and partnerships and
relationships, butalso actually as part of an obligation?
(26:52):
We shouldn't assume that onlythe Indo-Asia Pacific regions will look
after our trade.
We've got to play that part as well.
Now, the preponderance of our effort willalways keep us in the Euro-Atlantic,
because that's the kindageophysical nature.
But the globally collectedcharacteristics of what are going on in
the world now mean that in that sense,you can't keep it all at range.
(27:15):
And I think there are many examplesthrough the history of the last
150 years or so where nations havetried to keep stuff at range,
and that has proved to be an impossiblelong-term policy position.
And I don't say that as a reflection upon
arguments going on in the USin the last ten years.
(27:38):
It is true of the world today, I think.
That it is very difficult to beisolated from the rest of the world,
regardless of whether or not you happen tobe sharing your most connected things to,
say, northern European countrieslike Norway, Sweden, and Finland,
who we see much more of than we mightnecessarily Malaysia or Indonesia.
(28:02):
But you can't be exclusive about that.
>> Michael Auslin (28:06):
So then working from that, and the really interesting way that
you laid out, this is an elementof all national power and
national interests, andyou're tying it to trade.
What specifically then,from the Royal Navy's perspective,
in terms of the Indo-Pacific, oras you termed it, the Indo-Asia Pacific.
(28:26):
If you could come up with a hierarchy ofinterests, meaning these are the most
critical things that we have to do,and then we flow downwards, and
ultimately that may then be just upholdinggeneral norms of freedom of the seas, what
would that hierarchy of specific RoyalNavy interests look like from your desk?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (28:47):
I think the most important thing we can do is demonstrate
to the nations across the regionthat they matter to us.
And we're doing that as partof a national endeavor.
We're not doing that alone.
But if I look at the two offshorepatrol vests, the two sort
of 90-meters Corvettes that we've gotin the region, HMS Bay and HMS Tamar.
(29:08):
The fact that they are deployedto the region over five years,
that they can go and visit a numberof nations where we've not been for
many years ourselves and then revisit andstart to say, okay, where can we help?
Where can we contribute?
Not with the arrogance of turning upsaying, this is what you need to do, but
turning up and saying,are there things that we can do to help?
(29:31):
Have we got some skill sets orsome insights from our own experiences?
Some good, some not so good.
Are there areas where as a navy,
we can help invest in thosepartnerships and alliances?
That's really important.
And also, because we can kind of showcasea British commitment into the region,
(29:53):
whether that's in support ofthe regional ambassador or
trade, and then in rebuildingthat network and saying,
look, we matter, because the region is sovastly covered in ocean.
It then allows us to start to play a part,a small part,
alongside the other navies in the world.
And some of the really big challenges,transnational crime, illegal fishing,
(30:18):
seabed security, we're not gonna solve iton our own, but showing the willingness.
We are showing a willingness tobe part of the solution space.
And that actually, the internationalsystem, the rule set that apply there,
and that we kind of extol very clearly asthe United Kingdom and are committed to,
(30:39):
that we're prepared to put in some effortaround the world to engage on that.
And that seems to me to bethe most important thing.
And then second after that is, becauseyou can't predict how the future will go,
also is to demonstrate that we can alsodeploy hard power into the region.
(31:03):
That is not to preempt or to predict or
to sort of say that we knowthat something is gonna happen.
But to indicate that we have an ability,should the government of the day,
should the events of the day and all therest of it require that the United Kingdom
will commit into maintaining peace andsecurity, that we're prepared to do that.
(31:25):
And we have a traditionin the United Kingdom of
being willing to commitalongside our friends.
Well, if you're gonna have that narrative,then you've got to rehearse and
practice it.
And I think those elements and
showing that we have a competentcapability that is genuinely,
(31:49):
globally capable is the secondpart of the narrative.
>> Michael Auslin (31:54):
Can I ask actually one thing that Americans, and
we've talked about it on this podcast,but Americans don't Often remember or
maybe don't even know is, of course,you do have territory in the region and
you have the commonwealth.
And how important are those?
And as you're talking about them,
could you also talk a little bit aboutwhat may happen with Diego Garcia?
(32:14):
Because that's a critical node forus and for you.
But maybe you could start justby you do have territory.
It's not that you don'thave passport holders and
citizens out there in the Britishoverseas, well, Indian Ocean territory,
Bayat, which is Diego Garcia,but also the Commonwealth.
How does that figure into orfactor into your hierarchy of interests?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (32:37):
We clearly have some overseas territories and
dependencies across the region and
we need to ensure that we're playing ourpart as one part of the British linkage.
And the offshore patrol vessels have beenvery useful actually recently in visiting
some of the more isolatedones in the Pacific and
delivering stores and capabilities.
(32:59):
And in one case we actually took a dentistto one of the isolated islands so
they could do some sort ofbasic post-COVID healthcare.
So those sorts of things are partof being kind of part of being
part of that sort ofbroader government effort.
The Commonwealth isa phenomenal organization,
(33:23):
and if you think about it,
because its roots werein the British Empire,
the British Empire wasfounded on a trading basis.
But clearly empire is a verydifficult concept in many ways.
Some of the history associatedwith empire is far from great.
(33:45):
And yet in the way that the British Empirecame to an end, out of it was born this
Commonwealth, this sort of organizationof partnership of nations.
And whilst one could argue about justhow effective it is or not, what it does
do is it creates partnerships andalliances where it gives us opportunity.
And providing we, andI'm really clear to all of my teams,
(34:10):
we've got to be humble in howwe approach these relationships.
We're not masters of anythingout in the Indo-Pacific.
In many ways we're the guest, butwe do have history in the region.
We do have long-termrelationships often founded or
sort of built throughquite unusual lenses.
(34:33):
So part of the relationshipwith Fiji is through rugby.
This sort of, it's through sport.
And actually if you want to createa relationship with a Fijian,
talking rugby forthe first 20 minutes is a really good way
of getting a dialogue goingalongside kind of understanding.
>> Michael Auslin (34:53):
We finally have rugby in DC now, we've got a rugby league.
So hopefully you'll be able to takein a game when you come and visit.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (34:59):
It's a fantastic game.
So you get those kind of things whichbuild on the Commonwealth network.
But as we've seen, the Commonwealth isa kind of a voluntary organization.
Countries are not obligated to stay.
In many ways, there are many peoplewho say that the Commonwealth,
its great strength was her lateMajesty Queen Elizabeth II.
(35:19):
But I think what we've seen since herdeath last year is actually it has
continued and it will remain a strength,I think, going into the future.
In terms of some of the independent.
I mean,clearly there are challenges in a lot of
areas around some of these territories.
(35:39):
And I know it's not in the Indo-Pacific,but
the Argentinians continue to laysignificant claim to the Falkland Islands.
And there is clearly ongoing dialoguearound the British Indian overseas
territories, otherwise known as the DiegoGarcia, and the Chagos Islanders, and in
(36:01):
that particular position, and I wouldn'twant to preempt where that will end up.
I'm just pleased that there is ongoingdialogue because we recognize that
actually these islands have significance,that we want to continue to invest in and
sustain, andthat's very much our government position.
But we're not closed to the factthat there are others who feel
(36:25):
that they should also have somesort of rights to the islands.
And that is a matter of significantpolitical and diplomatic dialogue at
the moment, which is not something Iwould want to preempt how that will land.
>> Michael Auslin (36:40):
Well, I understand.
Sometimes I just pointout the third rails.
We definitely don't anticipate thatyou're gonna grab them with both hands,
so no pressure there.
But maybe we could talk aboutanother intensive diplomatic and
military initiative,which is AUKUS, which is a new and
(37:03):
very innovative andapproach to security, collaboration.
And yet also one that haschallenges associated with it,
quite rightly,because of how ambitious it is.
Can you talk a little bit about AUKUS andwhere you've sat now in the chair for
a little while and so thinking about howwe've gone through the first 18 months.
(37:27):
How we go forward on it,any worries you might have on it, or
things you'd want an American audienceto know that you're keeping an eye on,
where does it stand,from your perspective?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (37:39):
So I think AUKUS is one of the most profound trilateral
agreements that has beenreached in a security sense and
probably more broadly,but particularly, I think,
for many decades at its heart,or its founding thing,
was the transfer of nuclear propulsiontechnology from one nation to another.
(38:04):
And the last time the United Statesdid that, of course,
was with us as a resultof the 1958 agreement.
So these things do notcome around very often.
And one of the things that I am very,very aware of and has been for
the last few years, andI'm not a submariner,
my background, so it's really onlywhen I've got in senior position.
Just how seriously the United Statestakes its obligations to
(38:27):
the United Kingdom underthe mutual defense Agreement and
that stewardship of nuclearpropulsion technology.
And now the Australiansare being brought into
this to turn it intoa three way partnership.
No one underestimates just howchallenging that is going to be,
(38:50):
not just over the next few years,but over the next 20, 30, 40 years.
I mean, this is a multi-decade commitment.
It's deeply profound for the Australians,
who it's not that long ago thatthey wouldn't even allow nuclear
powered warships from othernations into their waters.
(39:14):
Very profound for Australia,I think very strategic.
The whole process they wentthrough in order to undertake
the analysis that led to the conclusionsthat they needed to shift to
nuclear powered submarines inorder to consider their security.
And the whole nature of theirstrategic review that took place and
(39:39):
provided that kind ofconceptual framework I
really admire,because it is a huge commitment.
The challenge is that somehow youneed to take two nations that
have considerable nuclear capabilities,but which are also.
(40:00):
Not full of spare capacity.
And the image I'd like togive to the listeners of
the podcast is if you canimagine a very large bucket,
which is called United Statesnuclear submarine capability.
Into which you can putindustry as well as the Navy,
as well as nuclear reactors,and all of that.
(40:22):
And that's pulled to the brimwith stuff and it's busy.
And then you've got a smaller bucket,which is the UK's equivalent, and
then you've got an Australian bucket,which is currently empty.
And somehow we have to fill the Australianbucket without emptying the UK or
the us ones, because the simplistic one,if you ever wanted to do that,
was to take our two buckets and
(40:43):
slop a bit into the Australian one andkind of even it all out.
But actually, that's not an optionwhen there are the role of those.
The reason why you have thisnuclear submarine technology is for
fundamental security issues forour two nations and for
(41:04):
the United Kingdom,our deterrent is allocated to NATO.
The nuclear submarines that we have haveroles of their own, and in each country,
we are going through majorrecapitalization programs as we build new
submarines to replace the olderclasses as they come out.
So, as if that wasn't enough,
we now need to help Australiadevelop its own capabilities.
(41:27):
And as you'll be aware, that's a kind of,as the leaders announced
earlier this year,when the three leaders met in San Diego.
Which I was privileged enough to bethere alongside Admiral Mike Gilday,
the head of the US Navy, and Admiral MarkHammond, the head of the Australian Navy.
There was this kind of phased approachwhere phase one is to see more US and
(41:51):
UK nuclear submarinesoperating out of Australia.
The second is forthe Australians to operate Virginia class,
American Virginia class,under their own flag.
And then the third is the building,along with the United Kingdom,
of what has become known as SSN-AUKUS.
And that is multi-decade commitment.
(42:15):
To pretend that that's not gonna bea massive challenge is to miss the point.
But the strategic opportunity is really,really great.
And that is where I think AUKUSis the kind of visionary thing
that has become in pillar one.
Because it's committed three nations tosomething which the outcome of which is
(42:35):
the ability to contribute to a globallyoperated nuclear submarine force with
everything that that can offer intothe security framework of the world.
As well as driving greater resilience andprosperity and
economic benefit into the supplychains that support it.
But AUKUS isn't just about,
although the headline is around nuclearsubmarine propulsion technology.
(43:02):
The pillar two work is also looking at anumber of other areas where investment can
be made.
Electronic warfare, hypersonics wouldbe a couple of the areas that have been
mentioned and a number of others.
And of course that then leadsus to a mindset about how we're
going to operate together,mutually support each other,
what are the things wewant to do together?
And I think it's very interestingto me to see how other nations
(43:25):
in the Indo-Pacific regionhave responded to AUKUS.
Where clearly, they have had to respecttheir own national sensitivities and
all the rest of it.
But in the main, it has been broadlywelcomed as a positive contribution,
and I think that is a really importantrecognition of what this framework is
(43:46):
going to offer us in the longer run.
>> Michael Auslin (43:49):
So that's actually a great point, and
I appreciate the detail in which youtalked about AUKUS and why it makes sense,
but your last comments are a great pointto ask just a couple more questions
before we wrap up about someof those other nations.
And while there are manynations we could talk about,
I'd like to single out two, Japan andChina, and ask the Royal Navy's
(44:13):
perspective about the partnershipthat's been developing with Japan.
And is it valuable, why?
Do you want it to continue?
Do you want it to continue?
And if so, where could it go?
And then you can't have a podcast onAsia without talking about China, so
maybe you could talk aboutJapan first a little bit, and
then we'll shift over to China and try toget, again the view from the bridge on,
(44:38):
you know, what you face in terms ofdealing with China, but Japan first.
Another one, by the way, with you, you'vehad some interesting history in the past,
and it's actually, as a historianwho started by working on Japan and
Japan and the world, it is,how would I put this?
It is wonderful, it's a blessing,
(45:00):
it's a privilege to live in a timewhere we don't have to deal with so
many of the problems that our twocountries dealt with for generations.
We get to talk about it ina totally different manner.
So maybe you could talk a little bitabout Japan from that perspective.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (45:15):
So a few years ago,
I met a previous head of the Japanese Navyat a fleet review in India.
And this was just at the time, I think,under the late prime Minister Abe,
where they were reallybeginning to open up again and
think about kind of becoming moreglobally engaged in a military sense.
(45:40):
And he said to me, look,the royal Navy and
the Japanese navy have a historystretching over several
hundred years, andwe have operated together.
Much of the Japanese Navy's Constructwas taken from the way that
the Royal Navy's approach.
(46:01):
He said, and then we had a difficultperiod, which has lasted for
a few decades.
In the middle of the last century,he said, but I want to look.
His point was,we've moved beyond that now.
And what I want to do is toget back to how it used to be,
because that actually is howwe're going to define the future.
And he didn't mean that in a kind of.
(46:21):
It's not as good as it used to be.
Can we go back?
What he said was, that's the level ofpartnership we should be aspiring for.
And I thought that was a reallyinteresting and positive comment,
because how can you ignore, not ignore,when you've got a country of Japan's size,
its economic heft, the way thatthe Japanese Navy has been developing.
They've got to be a key regional partnerif we're going to engage in that part of
(46:44):
the world.
And so there is clearly so
much that we can start to dotogether much more closely.
And I'll be delighted that actually,this month,
my Japanese opposite numberis coming over to London and
Portsmouth to spend some time talkingabout how we can invest in all of that.
(47:05):
So great, and Japan matters tothe United Kingdom across a whole range,
not just in an economic basis.
But I look at the global combataircraft program, which the UK and
Japan have set up.
I mean, that might not have quite the kindof the nuclear aspect associated with it,
but it's still a multi-decade programinvesting in modern technologies that will
(47:27):
develop the next generation of fighteraircraft, both crewed and uncrewed.
That is a really profoundpartnership as well.
And so Japan, as I said, I think Iused the phrase at the beginning,
it would be bizarre for us not wantingto get as close a partnership as
possible with Japan becauseof what it represents.
(47:47):
It's a member of the Quad,and so it brings heft and
perspective that seems tous to be really important.
So that's, I see them as a keypartner just as, in the same way,
and you didn't ask me about it, butthe Republic of Korea Navy is also
(48:08):
someone that we would wish to haveas close a tie with as we can.
They're at different stages oftheir development, but, you know,
it's also an importantregional security partner.
And then China.
And I think we're really clearwhat we want is a productive
relationship with China.
But that doesn't comeall on Chinese terms.
(48:33):
And I think at its heart,this is what we would.
I look at the way that Chinais developing its navy and
is clearly developingsome key capabilities.
And President Xi has made nosecret of his ambition for
what he expects to see out ofthe PLA Navy and elsewhere.
(48:57):
We're not framing them inadversarial terms, but
they need to recognize that there are anumber of other people around the world.
Nations who have got views andwho have got setups and
who have absolutely the fundamental rightenshrined in the United Nations charter
to go about their businesswith freedom and choice.
And providing that that's howChina wishes to respond to and
(49:19):
the way that the Chinese Navy wantsto act at sea and all the rest of it,
then I'm very happy towork alongside them.
But they need to understand thatthis is a relationship that
needs to be done on the basis ofmutual respect and equality and
not some of the kind ofmore bellicose language and
(49:40):
threatening language thatwe've heard in the past.
>> Michael Auslin (49:45):
Have you been able to work with them?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (49:46):
So I would refer back.
I mean, I remember back in 2014, I thinkit was, we had a delegation of senior
Chinese admirals who ran the Chinese Navyeducation process came over for
two days to see how we did training andeducation in the Royal Navy.
And there were some veryproductive conversations.
(50:09):
You know, you could actually talk aboutthose areas where investing in human
capital and making the most of thepotential of the young men and women that
join our respective services was a reallyinteresting, really interesting dialogue.
The first sea lord of the day,Admiral Zambellas, visited China and
was able to have similar conversationswith his opposite number.
(50:30):
So we've done this in the past.
We know we can do it, andwe want to do it again in the future, but
it needs to be done, as I said,on the basis of mutual respect.
>> Michael Auslin (50:41):
So, Admiral Key, before we let you go,
I just thought of a wrap up question.
Now had a lot of Air force officerson the program at different times, or
at least a couple orI've met a lot of air force officers,
certainly working in DC, andI always ask them one question.
I always ask them, if you could flyany fighter jet throughout history,
(51:05):
what would you have chosen?
And 99% of them all say the same jet,which is the P 51 Mustang.
But we have the head of a navy here,one of the great navies of the world,
one of the greatest in world history.
So, first, sealord, let me ask you,if you could have sailed on or
(51:28):
better commanded any warship in history,any time,
any country, any place,which worship would it have been?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (51:41):
That is a really unfair question,
because the reason why I'm gonna slightlydodge it, well, I think is cuz, of course,
the thing about the airplane was thatthat was just the pilot and the airplane.
Whereas a warship requires you to go tosea with several hundred other people.
It's a community sense, andso actually, some of that.
(52:03):
But if you wanted a set of senseof excitement to be part of
something that felt different,I suppose you would look for
one of those moments whichwere generational, changing.
So for me, it would be the sortof ships like HMS Dreadnought,
the first of the new battleships.
(52:23):
That was kind of a paradigm change thatcame out in the early 20th century.
I mean, I'm sure there were bits oftechnology about it that were frankly
awful, butit represented a real conceptual shift.
And the people that were on board servingin those ships at the time knew they were
going through something very,very different.
Actually, the same could probablybe said of the ships like
(52:46):
the German pocket battlecruisersof the second World War,
the Graf Spee, the Tirpitz,very fast, very agile,
designed to operate on their own,some phenomenal technology in them.
Yes, they were on the other side, andwe were very glad when they had sank, but
(53:07):
they represented something really quiteprofound in thinking generational ships.
And then, of course, the next generationalship for us was into the aircraft carrier,
and I was lucky enough to command, albeita smaller one than today's generation,
one of those.
So I think at those moments,you would go for
those moments when you've gota kind of a technology ship.
And of course, the thing I'm saying,there'll be someone to go, well,
(53:30):
he hasn't mentioned HMS Victory.
I haven't mentioned HMS Victory.
There's all the historyin the world there,
and that would just be presumptuous.
If I was to talk about what she was,she was one of the finest battleships
of her day and full of technologythat was very applicable to them,
except a lot of that technologywas in the use of wood and sail.
(53:52):
Rather than in the use of metal,steam, and now gas turbine,
nuclear propulsion technology.
So, yeah,that's a bit of a hedgy question.
Hedgy answer to, actually,a very good question.
>> Michael Auslin (54:06):
Well, I've never asked it before, but actually,
it's actually a fascinatinganswer that you gave.
Not one I expected, but actually one thatI think perfectly reflects the challenges
that you and your peers face,because we are at a transitional period.
We're at a transitional periodwith autonomous technology.
We're at a transitional period in terms ofother nations now coming up to the level
(54:30):
of capabilities that we've had for solong that we take them for granted.
And I'm really, actually fascinatedthat you put it that way, and
I'm glad you put it that way.
But I think the very fact that youput it that way reveals how important
this moment is,because it will set the tenor for
the next generation ortwo generations of fighting on the sea and
(54:52):
patrolling on the sea as wellas in the air and on the land.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (54:58):
You are reflecting something I say to my own team,
that if you track through naviesused to propel themselves by awe,
that was the principal way.
And then they recognizedthat was quite limiting.
So the Peloponnesian wars werefought at sea by city states, but
that was about paying people to row.
(55:20):
Then they moved and they found a way of,sailing ships were developed
which became ever faster,greater acreage of sail, sleeker hulls.
But you've also gotta balance the kindof firepower that goes into them and
to show how wedded people were.
The early ships all around the worldthat started to have engines,
didn't get rid of their masts and sails.
(55:42):
And Jackie Fisher, my predecessor, who wascaught up in the Dreadnought, actually,
although he's most known for theDreadnought, the thing that he really did
was he said to the Navy,we're out of sail and we're out of coal.
Oil is the way to go.
And the other thing that he profoundlychanged was the kind of a lot of
the personnel structures within the Navyto move away from a very hierarchical,
(56:07):
and I don't mean Austrian rating.
But you either, if you're an engineer,you wore colored stripes between
your gold stripes to demonstrate youweren't quite a proper naval officer.
You were an engineer, actually.
He said, no, remove all of that color.
My grandfather was one of those earlyones, because that was a recognition.
We are a technical service that is movingto a different way of thinking, and
(56:30):
we're going through another one ofthose now, which is around a digital.
So we become a navythat has to be digital.
So this isn't a change ofshift around propulsion now.
This is a change of shift around the waythat we are gonna engage and fight and
operate in an autonomous,semi autonomous, fully crewed.
Talk it how you will, butthe foundation of what maritime power or
(56:51):
naval power feels like now is going to beprofoundly different over the next ten to
15 to 20 years than it wasthrough the 20th century.
So it does feel to me like one ofthose kind of Dreadnought moments that
we're living in, andthat is extraordinarily exciting.
And it's something that, frankly,
we will only do if we do it with ourpartners allies around the world
(57:14):
because of the nature of the connectedplanet in which we live.
>> Michael Auslin (57:17):
Well, that is a wonderfully upbeat note on which to end.
We don't always get that on this podcast.
Often it's a sort of semi somber or
fully somber note, butit's nice to end on vision and
a thought of what we can do together andwhere we're going.
And so, Admiral Ben Key,first sea lord of the Royal Navy,
(57:40):
thank you so much forjoining us on the Pacific century.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (57:44):
It's been an absolute pleasure.
Thank you very much forgiving me your time.
>> Michael Auslin (57:47):
Well, for the Pacific Century podcast, I'm Michael Auslin.
Thank you so much for joining us,and we will see you again soon.
Bye bye.
[MUSIC]
>> Hoover Representative (58:03):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
[MUSIC]
Welcome back to the Pacific Century, a Hoover Institution
podcast on China, America and the fateof the Indo Pacific in the 21st century.
I am Michael Ausiln, your host.
It's been a while.
We've been on a bit of a hiatus, though.
There's been a lot going on andwe've been keeping our eyes on it.
(00:29):
But we're happy to welcome you toa special mid summer edition of
the Pacific Century.
And we are particularly pleased tohave as our guest Admiral Sir Ben Key,
the first sea lord of the Royal Navy.
Now, longtime listeners may rememberthat we had Admiral Key's predecessor,
(00:50):
Admiral Sir Tony Radakin,the first sea lord, a few years ago.
And Admiral Radakin has now become chiefof the defense staff, senior uniformed
officer in the British armed forces, andAdmiral Sir Ben Key has replaced him.
So we are thrilled to be able to have anupdate on things that have happened since
we last talked to the Royal Navy andabout the Royal Navy broadly, but
(01:13):
also in the Indo Pacific.
For those of you who are notfamiliar with the first Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Ben Key,he joined the Royal Navy in 1984.
He studied physics at Royal Hollow,which is part of the University of London.
He has commanded various ships inthe Royal Navy, but perhaps most
(01:37):
significantly, he was commander ofone of Britain's aircraft carriers,
HMS Illustrious, andthen has worked at key staff positions and
has also been involved in Britain'smilitary activities in Afghanistan and
of course, has experience aroundthe world, including in the Indo Pacific.
(01:58):
He became first Sea Lordin November of 2021.
So it's about a year and a half, andwe are thrilled to have him join us.
And welcome to the Pacific Centuryfirst Sea Lord.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (02:13):
Thank you very much.
Great to have the opportunity to join you.
>> Michael Auslin (02:16):
Well, sir, thanks so much for taking time.
And you are, I should say, the second1st Sea Lord, not the second Sea Lord,
which there is one, but the second 1st SeaLord to join us on the Pacific century.
Admiral Radakin, your predecessor,who now heads up the defense staff,
the top uniform position in the UK,joined us a few years ago, and
(02:36):
we had a great conversation, but
there's a lot that's actually changedsince then, and I'd like to get to that.
I think you've inherited a lot of piecesthat were beginning to move when he
joined us.
But before we get intoany of the specifics,
we always like to let the audienceget to know you a little bit and
(02:57):
ask how did you get tobecome the first sea lord?
How did you get into the navy?
Are you from a naval family.
Was this a dream to span the oceans,or was it all serendipity?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (03:10):
I think the 18 year old Ben Key would be rather surprised
if he knew that a decisionto join the navy for
a few years whilst I worked out what Iwas going to do with my life actually
turned into the only career I have had fornow in my 39th year.
And my maternal grandfather servedin the Navy for many years.
(03:38):
He effectively went to the Royal NavalCollege, Dartmouth, when it was a school.
So he went to the age of 13.
He was mobilized from there at the ageof 16 when the first World War began.
>> Michael Auslin (03:49):
Wow.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (03:50):
Fought at the Battle of Jutland as a 17 and
a half year old in HMS Collingwood.
>> Michael Auslin (03:54):
That's some history.
That's amazing.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (03:56):
Well,
he served in the ship with then hisRoyal Highness the Duke of York,
who went on to become King George VIduring the second world War.
So there's kind of a connection there
that endured for the rest of their lives.
I think if you fought alongside someone asa young person, you kind of stay in touch.
(04:21):
Not necessarily closely, butthey stayed in touch until the king died.
And so I was always had thisinfluence of my grandfather,
who was an engineer captain.
But I didn't grow upanywhere near the sea.
I didn't grow up learning how tosail dinghies or anything like this.
And it was just that when I was 18,my parents were living in Australia,
(04:46):
and we might touch on mykind of Pacific connections.
>> Michael Auslin (04:50):
Absolutely.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (04:51):
And I needed someone to help fund my way through
university.
A challenge that we well knownto many of your listeners.
And at the time, the Royal Navy were,and the Army and
the Air Force were offering kindascholarships in support cadetships.
And I opted for the naval one,I think, on the basis that that was
(05:15):
the service I knew the least most about,or the most least about.
I'd been an army cadet at school, but.
Yeah, so I knew I enjoyed militarylife and I thought, well,
I'll do that for five or six years,having got my degree, and
by then I'll have given myself someshape as to what I really want to do.
And the answer actuallybecame providentially,
(05:36):
I landed in the career that was to shapeand it never occurred to me to leave.
I just forgot to have thatconversation with myself.
>> Michael Auslin (05:43):
Well, I guess there's still time eventually.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (05:48):
So, no, I was very, very fortunate.
I'm not the only person who joins the navyout of sort of slightly idle curiosity and
then finds it's a great place.
The value sets, the sense of community.
I really enjoy life on board a ship at seathat was, you know, really important, but
I wouldn't say it was because I really,really have to be at sea.
I don't own a yacht.
I can't think of anything worse thangetting back from a six month deployment
(06:10):
and going sailing again.
You've just been looking at the stuff.
I mean, I have learned now how to sailbecause I don't go to sea very often.
But in my earlier life,
I couldn't understand my colleagues whogot back from a long deployment and were
just talking about pushing their yachtdown the slipway and going back out there.
I'd rather run up a mountain.
So but then the career has just provideda whole range of professional challenges,
(06:33):
personal experiences,opportunities that I've relished.
And I suppose in enjoying them, you sortof tend to be okay at doing them and
that just keeps you moving up the system.
So I've been very lucky.
>> Michael Auslin (06:47):
Well, I'm glad you cleared up one question I had,
which is readingthe Patrick O'Brien novels,
I couldn't understand why Jack Aubreywanted a home in the country.
I would have assumed he wanted to be onthe sea, but no, he has a country estate.
And I thought, well, does that ring true?
And I think you've just put anotherdata point to the fact that
(07:09):
the Patrick O'Brien novels are brilliantand as close to life as possible.
Let me ask, though,I just wanted to check.
So when you joined, you were commissioned,you weren't enlisted?
You didn't have the enlistedexperience in the Navy?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (07:26):
No, I joined as an 18 year old midshipman,
did my initial training atthe Naval College Dartmouth, which,
unlike Annapolis, does not offera multi-year degree program.
It's a number of monthscontained within 12,
left from there, joined the fleetas a midshipman ensign for
(07:47):
a few months andthen from there went to university.
So I sort of did it the other wayaround to how a lot do it today.
And then during my three yearsat university, which was just,
it was one of the collegesin London University.
In my summers,
I was then required to go back tosea to sort of maintain my currency.
(08:10):
And then once I'd graduated, I then pickedup, finished my training, and resumed.
And the idea of that program, and
we're going back to the 1980s now,
was to bring more graduates intothe non-technical branches of the Navy.
(08:32):
So I'm a warfare officer by background.
And so it was just to createthese opportunities to try and
pull more people in.
And the way to do itwas to sponsor them so
that you had a bit more money thanyour average student, basically,
because you were still being paid,albeit as a reduced salary.
(08:53):
And, no, it worked very well.
And my tuition fees were met,and that was a key element.
>> Michael Auslin (09:02):
Absolutely.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:04):
Of the endeavor.
>> Michael Auslin (09:05):
No question.
So before we get to the serious stuff,let me ask you,
just cuz I don't wannaforget it at the end,
what's your most memorableRoyal Navy experience?
Was it almost getting washed off-board?
Was it a sunset in Bali?
What's the most memorablethat when you look back and
(09:28):
those are the ones you wantto keep with you, what is it?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:32):
Yeah, so, I mean, some of them are memorable, but
not necessarily.
So I've been very lucky tosurvive a helicopter ditching.
>> Michael Auslin (09:40):
Wow. >> Admiral Sir Ben Key
but perhaps not for the right reasons.
Right.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:43):
But that means that I'm a member of the Goldfish Club,
for which one of the former presidents ofthe United States is also eligible for
membership.
>> Michael Auslin (09:54):
President Bush, I assume you're talking about.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (09:55):
Yeah. >> Michael Auslin
And he was awarded honorary membership of the Goldfish Club.
It's a club that you never set out tojoin, [LAUGH] but you become eligible for
membership.
And actually, what you find isthat some of the people who,
they tend to be military, butnot all military aviators,
cuz anyone who ditches inthe water is eligible to join.
But some of the stories of the aviationduring the Second World War,
(10:19):
in the early years after that,when they were really quiet,
should we say that aviation safetywasn't as profound as it is today?
A lot of it was really innovativeengineering, the rate of change and
development of aircraft fromaircraft carriers in particular, and
then the arrival of those earlyhelicopters, all of that.
(10:39):
You found that the men and women who wereinvolved in that sort of aviation had
phenomenal stories to tell, or you wouldfind out about those who had ditched and
spent two or three days in a liferaft in really cold conditions.
Not quite sure whether they were gonnabe picked up by their own side or
the other side and things like that.
So it was always humbling to go to thosereunions, whereas we ditched in a part of
(11:02):
the world where the water was warm andthe ship wasn't that far away.
[LAUGH] But anyway, so that would be it.
Now, I mean, command is always one ofthe great privileges and obligations.
And I think the bits that I've felthave been the greatest memories for
(11:23):
me is when you're partof an organization or
team that has done something,and you realize that kind of,
as the commander,you've set a direction of travel.
And then this amazing group of men andwomen have kind of turn that into
something and made something ofan opportunity or an obligation,
often under considerable pressure orrequiring real innovation.
(11:47):
And when you're part of that,then that really feels quite special.
And it's those things, I think,that I'll take the most satisfaction from.
And that's not because itwas my wisdom in command.
It was the delight at seeing the thingsthat I kind of thought might be a good
idea turned into something, really,because of the people that did it, and
(12:12):
being part of those sorts of teams, yeah.
>> Michael Auslin (12:15):
That's great.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (12:15):
And I've been [INAUDIBLE] couple of those, anyway.
>> Michael Auslin (12:17):
Well, I appreciate that.
And I think it would be helpful,before we get again to the Asia part,
maybe if you could do a really sortof brief 101 on the Royal Navy for
our listeners, some of whom may haveheard when Admiral Radakin came on.
And I think I asked him the same question.
But especially those of us in Washington,
(12:40):
it's a sort of skewed dataset ofthinking about the US Navy and
thinking about its size and its role.
Even if there's a robust argumenton whether its size is enough,
it certainly dwarfs mostof the other navies.
And that's something that Americans havebeen so used to for so long that they
(13:01):
don't really think about a lot of thetradeoffs, the questions, the difficulties
in many ways of operating globallyas you do, but with a smaller force.
And so maybe, if you wouldn't mindjust sort of walking us through as if
we were parliamentarians,asking, why do you need this?
What does the Royal Navy look like today?
(13:22):
The number of your capital ships,the number of those both in
uniform as well as on shore,the bases you have around the world?
Just give us a one-on-one, if you could.
And then we'll move over to the Pacific.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (13:37):
Yeah, of course, so, I mean, I would say this anyway, but I
think the Royal Navy tries to be profoundvalue for money for the British taxpayer.
And as one of the leading navies inthe world, and I say that not based upon
our size, I'm curious that you saythe US Navy now has this factor of size.
(13:58):
I come from a navy where, 150 years ago,the basic policy of the Royal Navy was
to be the size of the nexttwo biggest navies combined.
That was the benchmark by which we were.
And not surprisingly, therefore,we were disproportionately large and
the nation couldn't affordthat going through.
But what I take enormous pride of isthat we're one of the very few navies
(14:22):
in the world that covers the range ofmajor maritime capabilities we do.
And we offer both conventional andnuclear strategic deterrence capabilities.
So at the heart of the fleet,clearly, are the four strategic
missile-carrying submarines whichcarry the Trident missile system.
(14:43):
And they then take withthem another seven SSNs.
So we're a nuclear operating navy thatoperates an independent nuclear deterrent,
very closely shared with the USthrough extraordinary treaties set in
the 1950s and the 1960s aroundthe mutual defense agreement and
(15:05):
then the Polaris sales agreement.
And we might come back to that inthe context of what's happened in
the Pacific now.
We're the only navy in the worldthat operates two aircraft carriers
specifically designed to support the F-35,a fifth generation aircraft.
And I say that with all due respect to theUSS Gerald R Ford, which is at sea today.
(15:27):
But that's an evolution of a designthat's been going on for many years,
whereas we were essentially givena blank piece of paper to start again.
So that's HMS Queen Elizabeth andHMS Prince of Wales.
And then supporting that,we have a range of destroyers and
frigates providing the kindof standard escort force, but
also able to operate on their own acrossNATO or other individual partnerships.
(15:51):
And then a series of smaller offshorepatrol vessels which actually are globally
deployed, including two that we keeppermanently operating across Across
the Indo-Pacific region,which we'll come back to.
Not big, only 90 meters long, but they'reon five year deployments into the region.
And so that allows us to achievea considerable number of linkages and for
(16:13):
us to regrow some of our kindof operating partnerships and
a part of the world weused to know very well.
But have tended over the last few decadesto not be involved with quite so much.
And then we clearly operateour own organic aviation.
But the other thing I'm tremendouslyproud of is that within the navy sit
(16:35):
the Royal Marines.
So they're not a separate service, they'redefinitely not part of the army, they're
part of the Royal Navy and they bring withthem all of that considerable history and
partnership and really give usour literal strike capability.
So we offer these three main pillarsaround the continuous sea deterrent,
which is the nuclear aspect,and then carrier strike and
(16:58):
literal strike withthe supporting enablement.
We operate out of three navalbases in a dockyard around the UK,
plus air stations and commando bases.
We don't have any navy,only bases that we own around the world,
though clearly we have permanentpresence in the Falklands,
(17:21):
in Bahrain and one ortwo other places such as that.
But actually the great thing thatwe've done in the last few years,
particularly reflecting the government'sIndo-Pacific tilt as it gets called.
Is that in the last 18 monthswe've operated with confidence
across every line of longitude andin both polar oceans.
(17:43):
So we've definitely gone back to notjust the navy that can operate globally,
but one that is operating globally.
The carrier strike group deploymentin 2021 into the Indo-Pacific region,
of which the US Marine Corpsput a squadron of F35 and
(18:04):
also the US Navy,one of their destroyers, the Sullivans.
That was that first major reach back intothe region and has recently been announced
we'll be doing another majordeployment into the region in 2025,
plus raising our levels of presence.
So the joy for me is that I see a navythat is going back to operating globally.
(18:27):
Clearly the Euro Atlantic is ourprincipal area of activity and
NATO remains at the bedrock of everythingwe do, but we're not constrained to that.
We recognize we have a number of globalpartnerships in a world that is globally
connected and we'll probablyexplore some of that as we move on.
And sorry, in the final bit.
(18:47):
So we're about 36,000 in total.
That's about 30,000 sailors andmarines, 3000 reserves,
and then about 3000 brilliant civilservants who are part of the navy.
And then clearly there's the broaderindustrial partnerships without which we
would not be able to do our business?
>> Michael Auslin (19:07):
Well, you mentioned the, and
rightfully starting off with theillustrious history of the Royal Navy and
its size and outsized influence onthe world, and as you point out,
coming back to that,operating around the world.
But you have this,such an interesting mix, right,
in terms of the nuclear capability,aircraft capability, and
(19:30):
then the sort of more standardcapabilities that many navies have.
Who, if anyone, do you see as sort ofthe closest peer naval force that you
say that looks a little bit like us,they operate a little bit like us.
Is there anyone?
Or do you occupy just a reallyunique niche that, of course,
allows you in many ways to be the singlemost important naval partner of
(19:54):
the United States and certainlyof great value to other partners.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (19:58):
So the navy closest to us in that kind of peer style
is also geographically our closestas well, which is the French Navy.
But to say [LAUGH] that we've always beenthe closest of allies would be a slight
misreading of history.
>> Michael Auslin (20:14):
[LAUGH] Right.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (20:14):
[LAUGH] And I think it's fair to say that on a number of
occasions in the last few hundred years,
we've resolved our differencesat sea by the use of cannons.
Admiral Pierre Vandier ofthe French Navy today,
wrote to me when I was appointedthe most delightful letter in
which he reflected a thousandyears of shared history.
(20:39):
The majority of which hasbeen more peaceful than less.
And they are verydefinitely across Europe.
We are the closest in capabilities becausewe're the only two navies that operate
nuclear submarines, both of whichobviously, both of us obviously operate
also from that, nuclear weapons or carrynuclear weapons on behalf of the nation.
(21:03):
There are other navies inthe Italians are building
their F35 capable carrier force as well.
But actually, if you did the kind ofthe Venn diagram, who are we closest to?
It's undoubtedly the French, but
I think it's also fair to saythat sometimes and usefully.
(21:25):
We see the world throughdifferent perspectives and
in a constructive and collaborative sense,
that then becomes very productivebecause it prevents groupthink.
And Pierre Vandier and I'm surethe same will be with his successor,
who takes over at the end of this month,Nicolas Vojoure.
We want to see that as a strength,that we can have really creative
(21:50):
conversations about how we dothings together well and better.
But recognizing that our constructs are,for
very understandable reasons,slightly different.
But we need to turn that intoa partnership rather than some of
the challenges we've done in the past,I see that's really important to us.
(22:12):
And actually, when you then look furtherafield, there are a number of other
navies where we've got very similarkind of scales or approach.
So we're doing increasinglymore with the Japanese navy,
who are getting used to their orderof battle is extremely modern.
(22:34):
It's well invested inthat kind of technical
understanding is really profound.
There's a lot of opportunity and in manyways, over the last few hundred years,
we've had a really quiteclose relationship.
By dint of history, they're beginningto find their kind of more regional and
global capabilities and operational.
(22:55):
So there's a lot that we can learn andshare with them.
And then clearly there's kind ofthe Australia, Canada, New Zealand through
the Five Eyes partnerships, which alsois the straight historic linkages.
But I think it would be a mistake topresume that just because all four of
those, Australia, New Zealand, ourselves,all share the same monarch and
(23:18):
very considerable history,that our navies are in the same place.
That's not the sense, because eachoccupies a different geographical
position, each responds todifferent geopolitical pressures.
The trick forus all is to double down and invest and
magnify in the strengths thatpartnership and collaboration bring.
(23:39):
And look for those areas where by doingthings together, we can do them better.
But that would be it.
I admire the way the Indiannavy is growing at the moment.
I admire hugely whatthe Brazilians are doing.
The head of the Colombian Navyhas got great ambition to grow.
We've got long partnershipswith the Chileans.
(24:00):
So I can't help but recognize that throughour history, a number of our admirals,
sometimes the ones that have been kickedout of UK have then gone on to have very
successful careers in othernavies around the world.
[LAUGH] That has given us kindof a historically-bounded
network that we don't take for granted.
(24:21):
But the shared narrativecan be quite profound.
>> Michael Auslin (24:25):
Well, it's actually a perfect segue into the Pacific.
And let me actually startnot with a gotcha question,
but just for the sake of role playing,
as if this were a parliamentaryhearing from someone
who represents a constituencythat's inland,
(24:46):
that doesn't think aboutthe world much necessarily,
and asks you rather bluntly.
We understand you don't make policy,but you represent the navy, obviously.
What interests does the Royal Navy, orfor that matter, Britain more broadly,
have in Asia?
(25:06):
Why, as you mentioned,your core area is the Euro-Atlantic.
You're a European nation oran Atlantic nation.
We have a special relationshipbetween the US and Britain.
All that makes sense.
Why should you ever be sofar afield as in the Pacific?
And what do you get out of it?
And maybe that's a way to get into whatyou do do and where you might be going.
(25:27):
And then we'll get more specific.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (25:29):
So the Indo-Asia Pacific region is the fastest growing
economic region of the world.
40% of our economic interestsare already bound up with the region.
So the idea that in some sensewe would have an economic
partnership relationship withthat part of the world, and
(25:51):
then not tie that in with the otherarms of national influence and
power would seem to me tobe an incomplete solution.
And if you then look at those, whatare those aspects of a kind of national
framework that then brings inthe diplomatic, the economic trade, but
also the security aspect?
(26:11):
And we're very much partof that security piece.
And when you consider just how much of thetrade that flows in the Indo-Asia Pacific
region goes by sea or by undersea cable,when one looks at data movements.
Then for us to not want to play a part inensuring some of that freedom of movement,
(26:31):
security forall that should pass upon the high seas,
to quote a long-established piece, wouldseem to me to be both slightly bizarre.
In terms of why wouldn't we want to usethat to reflect some of the kind of
alliances and partnerships and
relationships, butalso actually as part of an obligation?
(26:52):
We shouldn't assume that onlythe Indo-Asia Pacific regions will look
after our trade.
We've got to play that part as well.
Now, the preponderance of our effort willalways keep us in the Euro-Atlantic,
because that's the kindageophysical nature.
But the globally collectedcharacteristics of what are going on in
the world now mean that in that sense,you can't keep it all at range.
(27:15):
And I think there are many examplesthrough the history of the last
150 years or so where nations havetried to keep stuff at range,
and that has proved to be an impossiblelong-term policy position.
And I don't say that as a reflection upon
arguments going on in the USin the last ten years.
(27:38):
It is true of the world today, I think.
That it is very difficult to beisolated from the rest of the world,
regardless of whether or not you happen tobe sharing your most connected things to,
say, northern European countrieslike Norway, Sweden, and Finland,
who we see much more of than we mightnecessarily Malaysia or Indonesia.
(28:02):
But you can't be exclusive about that.
>> Michael Auslin (28:06):
So then working from that, and the really interesting way that
you laid out, this is an elementof all national power and
national interests, andyou're tying it to trade.
What specifically then,from the Royal Navy's perspective,
in terms of the Indo-Pacific, oras you termed it, the Indo-Asia Pacific.
(28:26):
If you could come up with a hierarchy ofinterests, meaning these are the most
critical things that we have to do,and then we flow downwards, and
ultimately that may then be just upholdinggeneral norms of freedom of the seas, what
would that hierarchy of specific RoyalNavy interests look like from your desk?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (28:47):
I think the most important thing we can do is demonstrate
to the nations across the regionthat they matter to us.
And we're doing that as partof a national endeavor.
We're not doing that alone.
But if I look at the two offshorepatrol vests, the two sort
of 90-meters Corvettes that we've gotin the region, HMS Bay and HMS Tamar.
(29:08):
The fact that they are deployedto the region over five years,
that they can go and visit a numberof nations where we've not been for
many years ourselves and then revisit andstart to say, okay, where can we help?
Where can we contribute?
Not with the arrogance of turning upsaying, this is what you need to do, but
turning up and saying,are there things that we can do to help?
(29:31):
Have we got some skill sets orsome insights from our own experiences?
Some good, some not so good.
Are there areas where as a navy,
we can help invest in thosepartnerships and alliances?
That's really important.
And also, because we can kind of showcasea British commitment into the region,
(29:53):
whether that's in support ofthe regional ambassador or
trade, and then in rebuildingthat network and saying,
look, we matter, because the region is sovastly covered in ocean.
It then allows us to start to play a part,a small part,
alongside the other navies in the world.
And some of the really big challenges,transnational crime, illegal fishing,
(30:18):
seabed security, we're not gonna solve iton our own, but showing the willingness.
We are showing a willingness tobe part of the solution space.
And that actually, the internationalsystem, the rule set that apply there,
and that we kind of extol very clearly asthe United Kingdom and are committed to,
(30:39):
that we're prepared to put in some effortaround the world to engage on that.
And that seems to me to bethe most important thing.
And then second after that is, becauseyou can't predict how the future will go,
also is to demonstrate that we can alsodeploy hard power into the region.
(31:03):
That is not to preempt or to predict or
to sort of say that we knowthat something is gonna happen.
But to indicate that we have an ability,should the government of the day,
should the events of the day and all therest of it require that the United Kingdom
will commit into maintaining peace andsecurity, that we're prepared to do that.
(31:25):
And we have a traditionin the United Kingdom of
being willing to commitalongside our friends.
Well, if you're gonna have that narrative,then you've got to rehearse and
practice it.
And I think those elements and
showing that we have a competentcapability that is genuinely,
(31:49):
globally capable is the secondpart of the narrative.
>> Michael Auslin (31:54):
Can I ask actually one thing that Americans, and
we've talked about it on this podcast,but Americans don't Often remember or
maybe don't even know is, of course,you do have territory in the region and
you have the commonwealth.
And how important are those?
And as you're talking about them,
could you also talk a little bit aboutwhat may happen with Diego Garcia?
(32:14):
Because that's a critical node forus and for you.
But maybe you could start justby you do have territory.
It's not that you don'thave passport holders and
citizens out there in the Britishoverseas, well, Indian Ocean territory,
Bayat, which is Diego Garcia,but also the Commonwealth.
How does that figure into orfactor into your hierarchy of interests?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (32:37):
We clearly have some overseas territories and
dependencies across the region and
we need to ensure that we're playing ourpart as one part of the British linkage.
And the offshore patrol vessels have beenvery useful actually recently in visiting
some of the more isolatedones in the Pacific and
delivering stores and capabilities.
(32:59):
And in one case we actually took a dentistto one of the isolated islands so
they could do some sort ofbasic post-COVID healthcare.
So those sorts of things are partof being kind of part of being
part of that sort ofbroader government effort.
The Commonwealth isa phenomenal organization,
(33:23):
and if you think about it,
because its roots werein the British Empire,
the British Empire wasfounded on a trading basis.
But clearly empire is a verydifficult concept in many ways.
Some of the history associatedwith empire is far from great.
(33:45):
And yet in the way that the British Empirecame to an end, out of it was born this
Commonwealth, this sort of organizationof partnership of nations.
And whilst one could argue about justhow effective it is or not, what it does
do is it creates partnerships andalliances where it gives us opportunity.
And providing we, andI'm really clear to all of my teams,
(34:10):
we've got to be humble in howwe approach these relationships.
We're not masters of anythingout in the Indo-Pacific.
In many ways we're the guest, butwe do have history in the region.
We do have long-termrelationships often founded or
sort of built throughquite unusual lenses.
(34:33):
So part of the relationshipwith Fiji is through rugby.
This sort of, it's through sport.
And actually if you want to createa relationship with a Fijian,
talking rugby forthe first 20 minutes is a really good way
of getting a dialogue goingalongside kind of understanding.
>> Michael Auslin (34:53):
We finally have rugby in DC now, we've got a rugby league.
So hopefully you'll be able to takein a game when you come and visit.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (34:59):
It's a fantastic game.
So you get those kind of things whichbuild on the Commonwealth network.
But as we've seen, the Commonwealth isa kind of a voluntary organization.
Countries are not obligated to stay.
In many ways, there are many peoplewho say that the Commonwealth,
its great strength was her lateMajesty Queen Elizabeth II.
(35:19):
But I think what we've seen since herdeath last year is actually it has
continued and it will remain a strength,I think, going into the future.
In terms of some of the independent.
I mean,clearly there are challenges in a lot of
areas around some of these territories.
(35:39):
And I know it's not in the Indo-Pacific,but
the Argentinians continue to laysignificant claim to the Falkland Islands.
And there is clearly ongoing dialoguearound the British Indian overseas
territories, otherwise known as the DiegoGarcia, and the Chagos Islanders, and in
(36:01):
that particular position, and I wouldn'twant to preempt where that will end up.
I'm just pleased that there is ongoingdialogue because we recognize that
actually these islands have significance,that we want to continue to invest in and
sustain, andthat's very much our government position.
But we're not closed to the factthat there are others who feel
(36:25):
that they should also have somesort of rights to the islands.
And that is a matter of significantpolitical and diplomatic dialogue at
the moment, which is not something Iwould want to preempt how that will land.
>> Michael Auslin (36:40):
Well, I understand.
Sometimes I just pointout the third rails.
We definitely don't anticipate thatyou're gonna grab them with both hands,
so no pressure there.
But maybe we could talk aboutanother intensive diplomatic and
military initiative,which is AUKUS, which is a new and
(37:03):
very innovative andapproach to security, collaboration.
And yet also one that haschallenges associated with it,
quite rightly,because of how ambitious it is.
Can you talk a little bit about AUKUS andwhere you've sat now in the chair for
a little while and so thinking about howwe've gone through the first 18 months.
(37:27):
How we go forward on it,any worries you might have on it, or
things you'd want an American audienceto know that you're keeping an eye on,
where does it stand,from your perspective?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (37:39):
So I think AUKUS is one of the most profound trilateral
agreements that has beenreached in a security sense and
probably more broadly,but particularly, I think,
for many decades at its heart,or its founding thing,
was the transfer of nuclear propulsiontechnology from one nation to another.
(38:04):
And the last time the United Statesdid that, of course,
was with us as a resultof the 1958 agreement.
So these things do notcome around very often.
And one of the things that I am very,very aware of and has been for
the last few years, andI'm not a submariner,
my background, so it's really onlywhen I've got in senior position.
Just how seriously the United Statestakes its obligations to
(38:27):
the United Kingdom underthe mutual defense Agreement and
that stewardship of nuclearpropulsion technology.
And now the Australiansare being brought into
this to turn it intoa three way partnership.
No one underestimates just howchallenging that is going to be,
(38:50):
not just over the next few years,but over the next 20, 30, 40 years.
I mean, this is a multi-decade commitment.
It's deeply profound for the Australians,
who it's not that long ago thatthey wouldn't even allow nuclear
powered warships from othernations into their waters.
(39:14):
Very profound for Australia,I think very strategic.
The whole process they wentthrough in order to undertake
the analysis that led to the conclusionsthat they needed to shift to
nuclear powered submarines inorder to consider their security.
And the whole nature of theirstrategic review that took place and
(39:39):
provided that kind ofconceptual framework I
really admire,because it is a huge commitment.
The challenge is that somehow youneed to take two nations that
have considerable nuclear capabilities,but which are also.
(40:00):
Not full of spare capacity.
And the image I'd like togive to the listeners of
the podcast is if you canimagine a very large bucket,
which is called United Statesnuclear submarine capability.
Into which you can putindustry as well as the Navy,
as well as nuclear reactors,and all of that.
(40:22):
And that's pulled to the brimwith stuff and it's busy.
And then you've got a smaller bucket,which is the UK's equivalent, and
then you've got an Australian bucket,which is currently empty.
And somehow we have to fill the Australianbucket without emptying the UK or
the us ones, because the simplistic one,if you ever wanted to do that,
was to take our two buckets and
(40:43):
slop a bit into the Australian one andkind of even it all out.
But actually, that's not an optionwhen there are the role of those.
The reason why you have thisnuclear submarine technology is for
fundamental security issues forour two nations and for
(41:04):
the United Kingdom,our deterrent is allocated to NATO.
The nuclear submarines that we have haveroles of their own, and in each country,
we are going through majorrecapitalization programs as we build new
submarines to replace the olderclasses as they come out.
So, as if that wasn't enough,
we now need to help Australiadevelop its own capabilities.
(41:27):
And as you'll be aware, that's a kind of,as the leaders announced
earlier this year,when the three leaders met in San Diego.
Which I was privileged enough to bethere alongside Admiral Mike Gilday,
the head of the US Navy, and Admiral MarkHammond, the head of the Australian Navy.
There was this kind of phased approachwhere phase one is to see more US and
(41:51):
UK nuclear submarinesoperating out of Australia.
The second is forthe Australians to operate Virginia class,
American Virginia class,under their own flag.
And then the third is the building,along with the United Kingdom,
of what has become known as SSN-AUKUS.
And that is multi-decade commitment.
(42:15):
To pretend that that's not gonna bea massive challenge is to miss the point.
But the strategic opportunity is really,really great.
And that is where I think AUKUSis the kind of visionary thing
that has become in pillar one.
Because it's committed three nations tosomething which the outcome of which is
(42:35):
the ability to contribute to a globallyoperated nuclear submarine force with
everything that that can offer intothe security framework of the world.
As well as driving greater resilience andprosperity and
economic benefit into the supplychains that support it.
But AUKUS isn't just about,
although the headline is around nuclearsubmarine propulsion technology.
(43:02):
The pillar two work is also looking at anumber of other areas where investment can
be made.
Electronic warfare, hypersonics wouldbe a couple of the areas that have been
mentioned and a number of others.
And of course that then leadsus to a mindset about how we're
going to operate together,mutually support each other,
what are the things wewant to do together?
And I think it's very interestingto me to see how other nations
(43:25):
in the Indo-Pacific regionhave responded to AUKUS.
Where clearly, they have had to respecttheir own national sensitivities and
all the rest of it.
But in the main, it has been broadlywelcomed as a positive contribution,
and I think that is a really importantrecognition of what this framework is
(43:46):
going to offer us in the longer run.
>> Michael Auslin (43:49):
So that's actually a great point, and
I appreciate the detail in which youtalked about AUKUS and why it makes sense,
but your last comments are a great pointto ask just a couple more questions
before we wrap up about someof those other nations.
And while there are manynations we could talk about,
I'd like to single out two, Japan andChina, and ask the Royal Navy's
(44:13):
perspective about the partnershipthat's been developing with Japan.
And is it valuable, why?
Do you want it to continue?
Do you want it to continue?
And if so, where could it go?
And then you can't have a podcast onAsia without talking about China, so
maybe you could talk aboutJapan first a little bit, and
then we'll shift over to China and try toget, again the view from the bridge on,
(44:38):
you know, what you face in terms ofdealing with China, but Japan first.
Another one, by the way, with you, you'vehad some interesting history in the past,
and it's actually, as a historianwho started by working on Japan and
Japan and the world, it is,how would I put this?
It is wonderful, it's a blessing,
(45:00):
it's a privilege to live in a timewhere we don't have to deal with so
many of the problems that our twocountries dealt with for generations.
We get to talk about it ina totally different manner.
So maybe you could talk a little bitabout Japan from that perspective.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (45:15):
So a few years ago,
I met a previous head of the Japanese Navyat a fleet review in India.
And this was just at the time, I think,under the late prime Minister Abe,
where they were reallybeginning to open up again and
think about kind of becoming moreglobally engaged in a military sense.
(45:40):
And he said to me, look,the royal Navy and
the Japanese navy have a historystretching over several
hundred years, andwe have operated together.
Much of the Japanese Navy's Constructwas taken from the way that
the Royal Navy's approach.
(46:01):
He said, and then we had a difficultperiod, which has lasted for
a few decades.
In the middle of the last century,he said, but I want to look.
His point was,we've moved beyond that now.
And what I want to do is toget back to how it used to be,
because that actually is howwe're going to define the future.
And he didn't mean that in a kind of.
(46:21):
It's not as good as it used to be.
Can we go back?
What he said was, that's the level ofpartnership we should be aspiring for.
And I thought that was a reallyinteresting and positive comment,
because how can you ignore, not ignore,when you've got a country of Japan's size,
its economic heft, the way thatthe Japanese Navy has been developing.
They've got to be a key regional partnerif we're going to engage in that part of
(46:44):
the world.
And so there is clearly so
much that we can start to dotogether much more closely.
And I'll be delighted that actually,this month,
my Japanese opposite numberis coming over to London and
Portsmouth to spend some time talkingabout how we can invest in all of that.
(47:05):
So great, and Japan matters tothe United Kingdom across a whole range,
not just in an economic basis.
But I look at the global combataircraft program, which the UK and
Japan have set up.
I mean, that might not have quite the kindof the nuclear aspect associated with it,
but it's still a multi-decade programinvesting in modern technologies that will
(47:27):
develop the next generation of fighteraircraft, both crewed and uncrewed.
That is a really profoundpartnership as well.
And so Japan, as I said, I think Iused the phrase at the beginning,
it would be bizarre for us not wantingto get as close a partnership as
possible with Japan becauseof what it represents.
(47:47):
It's a member of the Quad,and so it brings heft and
perspective that seems tous to be really important.
So that's, I see them as a keypartner just as, in the same way,
and you didn't ask me about it, butthe Republic of Korea Navy is also
(48:08):
someone that we would wish to haveas close a tie with as we can.
They're at different stages oftheir development, but, you know,
it's also an importantregional security partner.
And then China.
And I think we're really clearwhat we want is a productive
relationship with China.
But that doesn't comeall on Chinese terms.
(48:33):
And I think at its heart,this is what we would.
I look at the way that Chinais developing its navy and
is clearly developingsome key capabilities.
And President Xi has made nosecret of his ambition for
what he expects to see out ofthe PLA Navy and elsewhere.
(48:57):
We're not framing them inadversarial terms, but
they need to recognize that there are anumber of other people around the world.
Nations who have got views andwho have got setups and
who have absolutely the fundamental rightenshrined in the United Nations charter
to go about their businesswith freedom and choice.
And providing that that's howChina wishes to respond to and
(49:19):
the way that the Chinese Navy wantsto act at sea and all the rest of it,
then I'm very happy towork alongside them.
But they need to understand thatthis is a relationship that
needs to be done on the basis ofmutual respect and equality and
not some of the kind ofmore bellicose language and
(49:40):
threatening language thatwe've heard in the past.
>> Michael Auslin (49:45):
Have you been able to work with them?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (49:46):
So I would refer back.
I mean, I remember back in 2014, I thinkit was, we had a delegation of senior
Chinese admirals who ran the Chinese Navyeducation process came over for
two days to see how we did training andeducation in the Royal Navy.
And there were some veryproductive conversations.
(50:09):
You know, you could actually talk aboutthose areas where investing in human
capital and making the most of thepotential of the young men and women that
join our respective services was a reallyinteresting, really interesting dialogue.
The first sea lord of the day,Admiral Zambellas, visited China and
was able to have similar conversationswith his opposite number.
(50:30):
So we've done this in the past.
We know we can do it, andwe want to do it again in the future, but
it needs to be done, as I said,on the basis of mutual respect.
>> Michael Auslin (50:41):
So, Admiral Key, before we let you go,
I just thought of a wrap up question.
Now had a lot of Air force officerson the program at different times, or
at least a couple orI've met a lot of air force officers,
certainly working in DC, andI always ask them one question.
I always ask them, if you could flyany fighter jet throughout history,
(51:05):
what would you have chosen?
And 99% of them all say the same jet,which is the P 51 Mustang.
But we have the head of a navy here,one of the great navies of the world,
one of the greatest in world history.
So, first, sealord, let me ask you,if you could have sailed on or
(51:28):
better commanded any warship in history,any time,
any country, any place,which worship would it have been?
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (51:41):
That is a really unfair question,
because the reason why I'm gonna slightlydodge it, well, I think is cuz, of course,
the thing about the airplane was thatthat was just the pilot and the airplane.
Whereas a warship requires you to go tosea with several hundred other people.
It's a community sense, andso actually, some of that.
(52:03):
But if you wanted a set of senseof excitement to be part of
something that felt different,I suppose you would look for
one of those moments whichwere generational, changing.
So for me, it would be the sortof ships like HMS Dreadnought,
the first of the new battleships.
(52:23):
That was kind of a paradigm change thatcame out in the early 20th century.
I mean, I'm sure there were bits oftechnology about it that were frankly
awful, butit represented a real conceptual shift.
And the people that were on board servingin those ships at the time knew they were
going through something very,very different.
Actually, the same could probablybe said of the ships like
(52:46):
the German pocket battlecruisersof the second World War,
the Graf Spee, the Tirpitz,very fast, very agile,
designed to operate on their own,some phenomenal technology in them.
Yes, they were on the other side, andwe were very glad when they had sank, but
(53:07):
they represented something really quiteprofound in thinking generational ships.
And then, of course, the next generationalship for us was into the aircraft carrier,
and I was lucky enough to command, albeita smaller one than today's generation,
one of those.
So I think at those moments,you would go for
those moments when you've gota kind of a technology ship.
And of course, the thing I'm saying,there'll be someone to go, well,
(53:30):
he hasn't mentioned HMS Victory.
I haven't mentioned HMS Victory.
There's all the historyin the world there,
and that would just be presumptuous.
If I was to talk about what she was,she was one of the finest battleships
of her day and full of technologythat was very applicable to them,
except a lot of that technologywas in the use of wood and sail.
(53:52):
Rather than in the use of metal,steam, and now gas turbine,
nuclear propulsion technology.
So, yeah,that's a bit of a hedgy question.
Hedgy answer to, actually,a very good question.
>> Michael Auslin (54:06):
Well, I've never asked it before, but actually,
it's actually a fascinatinganswer that you gave.
Not one I expected, but actually one thatI think perfectly reflects the challenges
that you and your peers face,because we are at a transitional period.
We're at a transitional periodwith autonomous technology.
We're at a transitional period in terms ofother nations now coming up to the level
(54:30):
of capabilities that we've had for solong that we take them for granted.
And I'm really, actually fascinatedthat you put it that way, and
I'm glad you put it that way.
But I think the very fact that youput it that way reveals how important
this moment is,because it will set the tenor for
the next generation ortwo generations of fighting on the sea and
(54:52):
patrolling on the sea as wellas in the air and on the land.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (54:58):
You are reflecting something I say to my own team,
that if you track through naviesused to propel themselves by awe,
that was the principal way.
And then they recognizedthat was quite limiting.
So the Peloponnesian wars werefought at sea by city states, but
that was about paying people to row.
(55:20):
Then they moved and they found a way of,sailing ships were developed
which became ever faster,greater acreage of sail, sleeker hulls.
But you've also gotta balance the kindof firepower that goes into them and
to show how wedded people were.
The early ships all around the worldthat started to have engines,
didn't get rid of their masts and sails.
(55:42):
And Jackie Fisher, my predecessor, who wascaught up in the Dreadnought, actually,
although he's most known for theDreadnought, the thing that he really did
was he said to the Navy,we're out of sail and we're out of coal.
Oil is the way to go.
And the other thing that he profoundlychanged was the kind of a lot of
the personnel structures within the Navyto move away from a very hierarchical,
(56:07):
and I don't mean Austrian rating.
But you either, if you're an engineer,you wore colored stripes between
your gold stripes to demonstrate youweren't quite a proper naval officer.
You were an engineer, actually.
He said, no, remove all of that color.
My grandfather was one of those earlyones, because that was a recognition.
We are a technical service that is movingto a different way of thinking, and
(56:30):
we're going through another one ofthose now, which is around a digital.
So we become a navythat has to be digital.
So this isn't a change ofshift around propulsion now.
This is a change of shift around the waythat we are gonna engage and fight and
operate in an autonomous,semi autonomous, fully crewed.
Talk it how you will, butthe foundation of what maritime power or
(56:51):
naval power feels like now is going to beprofoundly different over the next ten to
15 to 20 years than it wasthrough the 20th century.
So it does feel to me like one ofthose kind of Dreadnought moments that
we're living in, andthat is extraordinarily exciting.
And it's something that, frankly,
we will only do if we do it with ourpartners allies around the world
(57:14):
because of the nature of the connectedplanet in which we live.
>> Michael Auslin (57:17):
Well, that is a wonderfully upbeat note on which to end.
We don't always get that on this podcast.
Often it's a sort of semi somber or
fully somber note, butit's nice to end on vision and
a thought of what we can do together andwhere we're going.
And so, Admiral Ben Key,first sea lord of the Royal Navy,
(57:40):
thank you so much forjoining us on the Pacific century.
>> Admiral Sir Ben Key (57:44):
It's been an absolute pleasure.
Thank you very much forgiving me your time.
>> Michael Auslin (57:47):
Well, for the Pacific Century podcast, I'm Michael Auslin.
Thank you so much for joining us,and we will see you again soon.
Bye bye.
[MUSIC]
>> Hoover Representative (58:03):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
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