December 8, 2023 • 49 mins
US-China Commission Chair Carolyn Bartholomew and Vice-Chair Alex Wong discuss the annual US-China Commission report to Congress and its recommendations.
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[MUSIC]
>> Michael Auslin (00:09):
Welcome back to the Pacific Century,
a Hoover Institution podcast on China,America and the fate of the 21st century.
I'm your host, Michael Auslin.
And today I'm very happy to be joinedby two long time Asia experts and
folks deeply involved inthe policy world here in DC,
(00:29):
which is Carolyn Bartholomew andAlex Wong.
Now, if you're wondering whyit's both Carolyn and Alex.
Those of you who are regular devotees ofthe work of the US China commission, or
more formally, the US China Commission,US China Economic and
Security Review Commission, you of course,
will know that Carolyn is the chairpersonof that and Alex is the vice chair.
(00:53):
And so,
having the dynamic duo on to talk aboutthe annual report from the commission,
we'll just call it the commission, whichmost people in Washington eagerly await.
To see what the commission has covered andwhat its recommendations are,
we thought would be a greatway to begin winding up 2023.
So let me do some brief introductions.
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Carolyn Bartholomew, as I mentioned,is the chair of the commission.
She's been on the commission since 2003.
She's been the chairman forfive report cycles and vice chair for
six report cycles.
She is a longtime Washingtonianworking on the Hill.
She was chief of staff for thenHouse Speaker Nancy Pelosi, served for
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a very long time with Speaker Pelosi,and was also a professional staff member
on the House permanent selectcommittee on intelligence.
She is an expert in US China relations,including issues related to trade,
human rights, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, and
all other important issues.
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Alex Wong, as I mentioned,is the vice chair of the commission,
recently joining the commission afterhaving served as the deputy special
representative from North Korea and
the deputy assistant secretary fromNorth Korea at the State Department.
He also served duringthe Trump administration
as the deputy assistant secretary forregional and
(02:18):
security affairs inthe State Department's East Asia Bureau.
Previously, he was a foreignpolicy advisor and
general counsel to Senator Tom Cotton andalso the foreign and
legal policy director for the Romney-Ryan2012 presidential campaign.
And those are just brief bios of bothof these extremely experienced and
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distinguished members of the foreignpolicy world here in DC.
So, Carolyn and Alex,welcome to the Pacific Century.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (02:46):
Thanks very much, Misha.
Thank you for having us on.
>> Alex Wong (02:48):
Yeah, great to be here.
>> Michael Auslin (02:49):
Well, it's great to see you both.
Obviously, we've met in person andwe've talked.
I've actually testifiedbefore the commission.
But what I thought we'd do todayis have a discussion mostly on
the 2023 report, butthen expand it as we get into talking
with each other on the sort ofbroad state of US China relations.
(03:11):
But before we did that,I thought, Carolyn,
just in case anybody's not completelyfamiliar with the commission,
having 20 years of experience on it,maybe you'd explain just briefly what
the commission is,why it's unique in Washington.
And quite honestly,what it does every year.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (03:29):
Great, thanks again, Michael.
Thanks for having us on.
It's always a pleasure to participatein discussions with Alex, too,
my colleague andcollaborator on the commission.
So the commission was established in2000 when Congress was considering
China's accession tothe World Trade Organization and
had to pass permanentnormal trade relations.
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And there were two commissionsestablished by Congress at the time.
One, the other commission, the CECC,the congressional Executive Commission on
China, whose mandate was to focuson China human rights issues, ours,
the USCC mandate to focus on the nationalsecurity implications of the US China
economic relationship.
And I think that the establishment ofthe commission really reflected lingering
(04:16):
concern, which, of course, has onlygrown over the course of the past 2025
years about what was going onin the US China relationship,
the impact of China's growth,its aggressiveness, all of those things.
So we do.
There are 12 commissioners,6 Democrats, 6 Republicans.
We are proudly bipartisan.
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In one year, when we have a democraticchair, we have a republican vice chair,
and the next year we switch around.
So we have a Republican chair anda Democratic vice chair.
Three.Each of us are appointed by the House and
Senate, democratic andrepublican leadership.
Two year terms.
Some of us get reappointedperiodically every two years and
have the opportunity to serve.
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I think we're unique in the sense thatwe really were developed by Congress to
advise Congress on US-China issues, andit's become a very interactive process.
We have tried over the years to really beforward leaning and identify issues that
we think that Congress reallyneeds to be thinking about and
focusing on in the US China relationship.
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And as the work has unfolded, we geta lot more input from people on the Hill,
things they want us to be looking at,issues that are coming up.
One example, of course, is fentanyl.
I remember it was a number of years ago,we had a senator contact us and say,
we'd really like to know more aboutwhat's going on with fentanyl.
So we have been forwardleaning on a number of issues.
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Cyber, we were one of the firstplaces in town talking about cyber.
China in Africa is another example.
So there are a numberof things that we do.
As I've said,we've really tried to identify issues that
not everybody is paying attention to,but issues that need to be focused on.
We do a series of hearings, usually six orseven hearings during the year, and
then we do this annual report to Congress,which comes out in November.
>> Michael Auslin (06:01):
Right, and the annual report is a real report,
it's several hundred pages long.
It's not a brief report, like a 20 or
30 page thing that mightcome out of a think tank.
It's a serious, you know,it's a serious effort.
I was just gonna ask, do you,I'm sure you'll say complimentary, but
I just wanted to ask, do you seeyourself in a, how are you different?
(06:23):
For example, when you talked aboutyour relationship with Congress from,
let's say, congressional research service,where Congress also tests them and says,
hey, we want to know more about this, andthey continuously write an update reports.
Why and how are you different?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (06:38):
That's an excellent question, Michael.
I think one of the main ways is wehave a lot of freedom to identify.
I'm not saying that CR's doesn't havefreedom, but a lot of freedom and
opportunity to identify, again, emergingissues that we really are focused on,
and then to focus on those indepth through our hearing process.
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One of the things I really like about ourcommission and our commission hearings and
you've participated,is that there are opportunities for
the members of the commission toreally interact with our witnesses.
We don't have a situation where peopleare just sitting there saying, you know,
we have, of course,over the years had some people who do say,
this is what I believe,tell me why I'm wrong.
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But it's a really interactive processbetween us, the commissioners, and
our witnesses, andthe witnesses with each other.
And so I find that there's a,a really good intellectual foment that
takes place as we try tocome to some consensus.
And that's another thing thatreally characterizes us,
is that we are a consensus body.
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The report that you mentioned has30 recommendations this year.
We have a terrific staff whoworks on initial drafts for us.
And then we sit in a room together,sometimes twelve of us,
hashing it out page by page,paragraph by paragraph.
Sometimes it's line by line andword by word.
So it becomes a really true bipartisanconsensus product with a lot more input,
(08:03):
I think, than from a lot of differentviewpoints than CRS actually does.
>> Alex Wong (08:07):
Yeah, I think that's where a lot of the influence and
perhaps credibility ofthe commission comes from.
It's the fact that appointees fromacross the political spectrum and
across the policy world of Washingtonare coming together and putting forth, for
the most part, consensus recommendationsthat have that credibility.
>> Michael Auslin (08:26):
So, Alex, actually, it's a good segue to ask you about this
year's report, butif I seem to remember, I may be wrong.
Correct me, as I'm usually corrected onthis podcast, because I'm often wrong.
But I seem to remember,Carolyn mentioned the bipartisan nature,
six Democrats, six Republicans.
And yet I seem to remember the commissionbeing labeled as a hawkish commission and
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the reports as being hawkish reportsbecause they often take a very sober,
realistic, andsomewhat forward-leaning view on China.
That might not be what we wouldexpect from a bipartisan commission,
which often is lowest common denominator.
>> Alex Wong (09:11):
Right, I mean, some might say hawkish, others might say Prussian.
I think from the beginning, the focus ofthe commission, and I've only been on
it fairly recently, but the focus ofthe commission has been to scrutinize our
policy with China and China'sstrategy outwardly toward the world.
And how that's connected to its owndomestic internal policies and strategies.
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So it's with that kind of skeptical eye,that bringing high scrutiny to it,
that's been the missionfrom the beginning.
And as Carolyn mentioned,
I think the commission's beenahead of the curve in some ways.
But interestingly, Washington,as you know, Misha, and
the wider policy world in here andamong our allies and partners has,
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I think, come around more towardsthe view of the commission,
understanding thatthe relationship with China and
the Communist Party is competitive andin some aspects adversarial.
And then we have to makecorresponding policy changes.
>> Michael Auslin (10:11):
So perfect segue then into talking about the report, Alex,
if you might, start us off, and
then we'll get into some more ofthe specifics of the different chapters.
But what's the takeaway?
What do we need to know aswe're beginning to prepare for
a presidential election next year?
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So the season will be wrapped upin all sorts of different issues.
But what's the takeaway,if you can boil it down for us?
>> Alex Wong (10:40):
Right, I think stepping back,
the approach of our report this yearis to look at the deep structural
aspects of China's strategy towardthe United States and the world.
And what we should do in response.
In the news, when people talk about China,there's a lot of focus on summits and
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meetings, freezes and thaws andhigh level contacts between the US and
China andbetween our european allies in China.
That's not the focus of the report.
And to draw from an analogy,watching that type of diplomatic back and
forth is kinda like standingon the beachfront and
trying to understand the character ofthe ocean by watching the tidal currents,
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the ebbs andflows of the waves right in front of you.
That's not unimportant.
You need to understand the tidal currentsto navigate, perhaps in the day to day.
But to truly understand the ocean,
you have to get at the deepocean currents animating it.
So we're trying to get at the deepcurrents animating the US China
relationship.
So if you look at the report this year,number one,
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we look at the economic kind ofstructural situation of China.
Their current debt challenges,
their challenges moving toa consumption led economy.
And what does that mean forChina's strategy?
What does it mean forour responses in the economic realm?
We look at China's educational system andhow the weakness in its ability to produce
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human capital might hamper or at leastpresent challenges for its attempt to move
its economy up the value chain andachieve its economic security strategy.
Then we move to overallinfluence operations.
What is China's strategy globallyto their influence in the media or
in the political space in media?
How are they using lawfare?
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What is their legal strategy to affect andpush out their vision of not just
international law, but domestic law,and the use of chinese domestic law
extraterritorially to expand itsinfluence and exert its designs?
And then last, we look atthe technological and military realm,
starting with what are China'smilitary relationships,
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its mil-to-mil cooperativeprogram programs?
How are they using thatto advance its interests?
And how are they investing in technologyin the military realm, not just to fast
follow or be a peer competitor inthe military space with the United States?
So how are they trying to leapfrog us?
Everything from AI to undersea warfarecapabilities to space-based nuclear
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weapons.
These are all things we're looking at,because these will affect where
China's strategy is going in the immediateterm as well as the long term,
and then what our responses should be.
>> Michael Auslin (13:22):
So, Carolyn, that is a great overview, Alex, and I appreciate it.
I would mention on the tides that as muchas you have to understand the deep ocean
currents, you also have to watch out forthe riptides sometimes.
Of course, that's what we alwaysget focused on because that's
the immediate crisis andthe immediate danger.
But obviously, as someone who's just spenta lot of time in terms of Asia in general
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looking at what I hopeare deeper structural issues.
I've always admired thatabout the commission and
appreciate that you stress that it'snot always something that happens in
Washington because youget caught up in a cycle.
That said, Carolyn, you have sucha longitudinal perspective on this.
I thought for a second maybe to turn toyou and ask you on the economic side.
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When you joined the commission in 2003,those were the go go days for China.
It was two years after ithad gotten into the WTO.
It was igniting a decade of growth.
It was actually hard to think back thatfar, but it was only barely ten years
since Deng Xiaoping had reignited China'sreforms with his famous southern tour.
(14:33):
So you've seen the growth,you've been there through
the growth of China duringthis extraordinary period.
Now that we're 20 years out andyou've completed 20 cycles of this,
what's your assessment,as the commission notes,
the headwinds that China's economy faces,what does that really mean?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (14:57):
Misha, that's an excellent question.
I just want to loop back intothe question you were asking or
mentioned that we were consideredhawkish in the early years.
And it's been interesting to watch over20 years the transition in the policy
debate and how things have changed,because, as Alex said, what we,
we have not changed our policy positions,but the whole debate has shifted in DC.
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And when this commission wasstarted to tie into the economics,
there were thousands of cheerleaders forthe US China economic relationship.
The business community believed thatthey were going to make a fortune
both producing in China andmarketing to the chinese people.
So we were one of the only places thatwas looking at some of the downsides of
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the relationship economically andnational security.
As Alex mentioned,sort of as we were looking at this year,
there really are two dynamicsthat we were focusing on.
One is the serious economic challengesthat the Chinese Communist Party
is facing.
There are structural problems theireconomy that they are either unwilling or
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incapable of addressing, including, ofcourse, this massive debt that they have.
Moody has just downgraded China's debtrating, I think, to negative, and
that has certainly changedthe environment as people are looking at,
is it a good place to invest?
We have pension fundsthat are investing there.
Is that wise investment?
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The people understand whattheir investments are,
where their investments are going,fueling, for example, research that might
be helping China's military that couldeventually take us on, so there's that.
And at the same time, that's coupled withincreasing Chinese aggressiveness, both
military aggressiveness in the South ChinaSea, but its promotion through the Belt
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and Road initiative, the propagandathat it's doing, its interest and
its desire to sort of recreatethe global system in its own image.
And that I think those are the biggerdynamics that we definitely have been
focusing on over the years.
Another thing that I think is interestingagain with the perspective of 20 years on
this commission, is in the early years,we had people, the military people,
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the security people who came onthe commission were pretty traditional
national security people.
What you would think ofas military strength and
the economics people were prettytraditional economics people.
And what has happened overthe years is those areas,
those sectors have sortof meshed together.
And I think,particularly when it comes to technology,
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they both have economic consequences,right?
The future of our economy is basedon our technological innovation and
the national security implications of whatChina might be doing with that technology.
So it's been a veryinteresting thing to see.
I remember one time,probably about ten years ago now,
I was at a group discussion about this,and somebody, I won't name him Misha, but
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it's certainly somebody, you know, whowas from the traditional military side,
started talking about the economics,and I was just floored.
I mean, it was great, but it's that kindof merging those two issues together
to come to some sort of understandingof what are the consequences,
both militarily andeconomically for the US.
>> Michael Auslin (18:12):
So before turning to the military and the tech side,
Carolyn, let me ask you first,what specifically does
the commission believe thatthe US should be doing to.
I think these terms of art always change.
I think the current term is de-risk.
It used to be decoupled andit used to be whatever the things were.
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What is it specificallythat we need to do?
Do we need to have our sneakersstop being made in China?
Or is it something a littlebit more sophisticated?
And if so,are we getting any closer to that?
What is the commissionrecommending to Congress?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (18:55):
So I'm gonna say right up front that because we
are a consensus institute.
Consensus organization, there are someissues that, much to the chagrin of some
people, we actually just reallydon't take on like international,
the international trade agreements.
We have a little bit ofconversation about that.
We don't have anyrecommendations about that.
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But we have been concerned both atthe micro level in terms of the economics
issues with the investments.
Again, for example, andthe PCAOB was making sure that Americans
who are investing in China have accessto independent auditing information so
that they can understandthe risks that are being faced.
(19:39):
So that's one of the->> Michael Auslin: And the PCAOB for
those not familiar.
The PC, what does it stand for?
I'm gonna have to look that one up,I'm so used to throwing.
So PBOC, of course,is the People's Bank of China,
it's an accounting oversight board.
>> Michael Auslin (19:55):
Okay, it's the Chinese accounting board.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (19:57):
No, no, no, no, it's ours, it's ours.
It's ours.
>> Alex Wong (20:00):
I think it's Public Committee for Accountability and
Oversight Board,if I"m [CROSSTALK] the PCAOB.
>> Michael Auslin (20:05):
Okay. >> Carolyn Bartholomew
that's one of the issues becausecertainly as the Chinese
government has clampeddown on information,
both statistical information,right, we've seen that as an issue.
They have over a 21% youthunemployment rate and what do they do?
Instead of figuring out howto address that successfully,
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they just stop reporting those numbers.
So there's that kind of information, butthere's also the risk analysis that should
be taking place whenAmericans are investing.
So that's one of the issuesthat we've done.
We did recommend this year thatthe congressional Joint Economic Committee
used to do, used to produce an annualunclassified report on the state of
the chinese economy andeconomic policy decisions.
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One of the things we've recommended toCongress is that they re institute that
report, which they haven't done fora while.
We recommend that Congress considerlegislation requiring federal
financial authorities here,including the Federal Reserve,
to seek specific information from bank and
investment institutions regarding theirexposure to and involvement in the PRC.
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We have steps that we sayto combat tariff evasion.
There's an obviously ongoing discussionabout supply chain resilience.
Some people support friendshoring,some people support just onshoring.
But we need to make sure that as companiesare leaving China to manufacture
elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia,it is often Chinese companies
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that are establishing themselvesin Southeast Asia and
they are doing that in a way to evade anytariffs that we have put on products.
So that's an issue that we think thatCongress needs to be looking at.
And again this year, a lot of it wasabout corporate disclosure requirements,
making sure that people in this countryhave access to the kind of information
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that they need to do, need to have inorder to make sound investment decisions.
Those are some of the micro thingsthat we've talked about, yeah.
And one more quick one, since it's the topic du jour,
it's on everybody's lips,which is semiconductors.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (22:10):
Yes, we actually recommend that the Congress ask the GAO,
the General Accountability Office,
to do a report within 180days of the effectiveness of
the recently imposedsemiconductor export controls.
Are they working effectively?
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What's working,what isn't working along those lines?
And I certainly will defer to Alexwhen we talk about the tech issues.
I also just want to note thatwe are recommending here,
it's one of my favorite recommendations.
It didn't make it up into the top ten, butthat we recommend that Congress consider
evaluating the potential for establishinga single export licensing system.
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Export licenses,right now it's complicated process,
fifferent agencies are involved.
It really needs to be redone.
First established exportcontrols in the 1940s,
updated in the 1970s,updated again relatively recently.
But there needs to bea comprehensive look at this and
to see whether we can have a moreefficient system for business and
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that we can have staffing in theseagencies that can address the challenges.
I always say government moves slowly,technology moves quickly.
By the time the government has madedecisions, issues have moved on,
on technology, and we are losing them.
We're losing the ability to controlsome of the things that, again,
might have national securityimplications for us.
>> Michael Auslin (23:36):
That is, again, export restrictions.
Just the, the question, of course,there's dual use technology.
There's all of these issues,probably some of the most arcane issues.
For those who are not specialists and
trying to understand it fromthe outside or weigh in.
Alex, let me shift,instead of continuing on the econ though,
(24:00):
let me shift To the question ofchinese influence operations,
which is an entire chapteressentially in the report,
China's efforts to subvert norms andexploit open societies.
What does that mean?
I mean, we are an open society.
(24:21):
Do we want to become a closed society?
What are we doing in vis,what do we need to do vis a vis China?
What's the threat?
>> Alex Wong (24:28):
Yeah. Well, let me be clear.
We're not recommending at all that wematch China by closing our society.
That's not the openness of our societyas a source of our strength, but it does
present certain openings and weaknessesthat China's attempting to exploit.
Now, I'll cover a number of them.
I mean, first of all, we talk aboutthe educational system here, the higher
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educational system in the United States,and the amount of funding and
donations coming from chinese entitiesto the US higher education system.
Now, not all of those are legitimate, notall of those are for influence purposes.
But what we do recommend is servicing moreinformation about, a, the scale of those
donations, b, to what research areas theyare going to, and c, ensuring that that
(25:13):
information is coming out in a timelymanner so that it's available publicly.
But as well as to our intelligence andlaw enforcement agencies to determine
if there is an attempt here toinfluence higher education and
also extract the type of research,particularly in the technological realm,
that China is attempting to build andleapfrog the United States.
(25:34):
So there's a connection there between bothinfluence as well as its technological
strategy.
But I wanna talk a little aboutthe lawfare aspect of this.
As many of your listeners know,the term lawfare is a term of art, but
essentially trying to use andleverage the US and the free world's
commitment to the rule of law, butto political ends or security ends.
(25:58):
So one item I wanna highlight isthe use by Chinese front groups,
the United Front Department andothers to silence critics
in the United States by subjectingthem to defamation lawsuits.
Now, there's no merit to these suits, but
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they're strategic in that itimposes costs on the dissident,
if you wanna call them that, orthe person with a company making or
saying things about the Chinese andthe CCP, legal fees, discovery fees.
So we make a recommendation to counteractthat, that at the federal level,
(26:40):
we should have what are termedanti-slap lawsuits or
anti-strategic lawsuitsagainst public participation.
Which shifts fees tothe lawsuit bringer and
moves up in the process an evaluationof whether the suit is meritorious or
not, but that this is an attemptto insulate our open society and
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our rule of law from abuse by the Chinese.
>> Michael Auslin (27:04):
In addition to, I should mention there is a segue here,
in addition to the annual report,
we should mention that the commissionputs out various different reports.
And I've always found one ofthe most interesting report and
one that you just updated on tocontinue this theme of open societies,
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China using international organizations byplacing their own personnel in them and
then often shifting the focus orthe goals of some of those organizations.
I mean, probably one of the best knownones, thanks to Covid, would be the WHO,
the World Health Organization.
(27:45):
But it's happened in the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization,
of course, in the InternationalTelecommunications Union,
attempted in the World, was itIntellectual Property Organization, WIPO.
But Alex,can you talk a little bit about that?
Now, those, of course,are not american institutions.
(28:07):
Your recommendations to Congress cannotchange how who does its business.
But can you talk a littlebit along the lines of,
of the United Front Work Organization,the others, about this use
of international organizations,which we all think is just a great thing?
We have more international organizations,there's gonna be more cooperation.
>> Alex Wong (28:24):
Yeah, look, the Chinese were ahead of the curve of, really, the rest of
the world in seeing these internationalorganizations as arenas for competition.
And the terms of the competition are,can you get, as you were mentioning,
can you get your nationals in leadershippositions to push your nation's interests.
Or in the Chinese, whether it's isolatingTaiwan from these international
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organizations, or trying to pullthe standards technologically,
trade wise, that go through theseinternational organizations,
pulling it towards moreof a chinese character.
And the United States andour partners relate to the game.
We didn't treat these as arenas forkind of politicking.
(29:10):
International organizations are inlarge part less like diplomacy and
more like unruly legislatures.
You need to log roll,you need to pressure,
you need to win votesto win these positions.
And I think the United Statesnow has woken up to this.
And when I was inthe Trump administration,
we empowered an ambassadoriallevel special advisor to head up
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international organizationelections to compete with China.
To marshal our partners in the free world,to identify the meritorious candidates,
push them, and look, make deals inlaw rule to try to get the right
people in the right positionsto blunt this strategy by China.
So we're a little late to the game, butI think people have woken up to it.
>> Michael Auslin (29:57):
And one of those successes was
the World Intellectual PropertyOrganization, where China.
>> Alex Wong (30:01):
That's right.
>> Michael Auslin (30:02):
I mean, it's ironic, let's put it that way, that China,
perhaps one of the larger abusersof intellectual property,
wanted to have their their person,a national, head up that organization.
I recently had it explained to me, orargued to me by a State Department
official that you could look at this andsay, well, so what?
(30:26):
So you've got a Chinese person, Chinesenational, heading up X organization,
World Intellectual Property Organization.
Why does it matter?
You've got French and you've gotItalians and you've got Angolans and
Indians and Japanese.
Why does it matter?
And the argument that was made tome was that if you look at how, and
I'm interested in both of your reactions,if you look at how Americans,
(30:49):
let's say, act when they are put asofficials and responsible directors of
these organizations, they act inthe interests of the organizations, and
often they even act contraryto Washington's interests.
They fully are agents of thoseinstitutions and organizations.
On the other hand, when Chineseare heads of those organizations,
(31:13):
they act as agents of Beijing.
They don't act as agentsof the organizations, but
they're pushing Beijing's strategies andgoals.
Is that an accurate or fair assessment?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (31:24):
Yes, I think that that is actually an accurate assessment,
and it is.
As China's role in the world has grown,we are seeing that many of their actions,
most of their actions are aboutpromoting themselves.
And everything that the CCP does,of course,
is designed to try tokeep the CCP in power.
(31:44):
I wanna loop back on the internationalorganizations briefly to just say that it
is not just, I think people havea tendency to think about things
like the WHO and the UN, butit's also the international
standard setting bodies thatthe Chinese have been very active.
Actively engaged in.
And that has consequences forus economically and
(32:04):
consequences forus both in national security.
Because when they are essentially incharge of standard-setting bodies,
they are making sure that the standardsthat are being set are for
Chinese-developed products.
>> Michael Auslin (32:17):
Could you give an example, maybe,
just a quick example just for the layman?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (32:21):
Let me give an example of that.
It would be even somethinglike a telecommunications,
right, I mean, a standard for5G or something like that.
When the Chinese are involved or
controlling the standardsetting bodies on these things,
they are making sure that the technicalstandards advantage their products and
(32:43):
their companies, which in exchange,in turn, actually disadvantage ours.
And there's so much that flowsfrom this technology about apps.
There's sort of an economic frameworkwhere you can have one technology,
but so many things build on thattechnology that if we are shut out of one
of these technologies,then we are losing all of the downstream
(33:06):
advantages of things thatwould support that technology.
So that was one thing I wanted to mention.
The other thing, I think, when we look atinternational organizations is that you
have to put it in the context of China'spropaganda work around the world, right?
It is not just us that theyare trying to influence.
It is the stuff that they are doingthrough the Belt and Road Initiative,
(33:27):
the stuff that they are doing investingin access for natural resources.
Many of those things are being done incountries where they are using their
investments to getthe responses that they want,
the votes that they want inan organization like the United Nations.
Another implication of that, of course,
is that they are shutting Taiwanout everywhere they possibly can.
(33:48):
And that even goes down to notallowing people from Taiwan to work
in something like who it is about bothparticipating in it as an institution,
but it is also about who theyare allowing to staff these things.
And that has serious implications both forthe effectiveness, I think,
(34:09):
of the organizations themselves and also,of course, for Taiwan space in the world.
>> Michael Auslin (34:14):
Absolutely, I hope we can turn to Taiwan, but I know we're doing
sort of a romp through the world of Chinaand the world of America-China relations.
But given time, I wanted to turn,Carolyn, and actually ask you,
because you have such extensiveexperience, and this was clearly something
that was very important to Speaker Pelosi,which is a question of human rights.
(34:38):
And where we stand today,the world has watched, and
some would argue, watched silentlywhat's happened in Xinjiang.
It has watched, I would argue,
largely silently what's happenedin Hong Kong to bring in Taiwan.
That is sort of the ultimate orone of the ultimate goals of the party
(35:02):
is to do to Taiwan what it's done to thoseother potentially rogue/breakaway areas.
[COUGH] How does the commission handle it?
And as you mentioned, there isthe congressional executive commission,
which deals with human rights.
But how does your commission handlethe question of human rights?
What have you looked at?
What do you recommend?
What do you worry about?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (35:23):
Yeah, that's also an excellent question.
I think there are two places that I can,well, three areas that I can think of, but
not necessarily geographic.
One, of course, is the Uyghurs and
things like the Uyghur Forced Laborprotection Act.
We have talked about the de minimisexclusion, which is that anything
under $800 doesn't need to gothrough our whole customs process.
(35:48):
So companies like Shein and Temu are justflooding the United States with products.
It's having seriouseconomic implications for
what remains of our textile andgarment industry in this country.
So that's one thing.
So it's trade related, butit is also human rights related.
Hong Kong, we spent time looking atHong Kong, what's happening in Hong Kong.
(36:12):
The Hong Kong legal systemis being destroyed, frankly,
by the Chinese government.
And that has implications also forthe business community,
the international business community,the us business community.
They're naive if they think what'shappening with Hong Kong's legal system
will not eventually catch up with them.
(36:32):
So those are two specificareas where we do that.
I think a third area that we look at is welook at surveillance technology, right,
which has fundamental human rights issues.
So it's data gathering, it's, again,the surveillance technology that
the Chinese government, Chinese companiesare selling to other countries.
(36:54):
Things like smart cities, even here.
We need to make sure that when ourcommunities are investing in smart cities,
that they are thinking aboutthe consequences of what having Chinese
participation in smart citiesinfrastructure would do and would do it.
So it's really three areas, as I said,Uyghur Forced Labor protection,
Hong Kong judiciary, in particular, and
(37:15):
then this issue of surveillance andsurveillance technology.
>> Michael Auslin (37:20):
That's great.
Obviously, there's a lotmore to talk about,
especially that last one inthe surveillance technology.
And it gets to all the questionsabout tech competition and the like.
But again, just in the interest of time,
cuz we could just do entirehours on each one of these.
But, Alex, I'd like to turn, if I could,to the military question, which is,
(37:42):
in many cases, and whether warranted ornot, it's something that gets an enormous
amount of attention in DC cuz there'san enormous amount of money involved.
What is the state of the military balance,what does the commission find,
should we be worried, really?
I mean, look, we got 11 aircraft carriers,they've got, what, 2, maybe 3.
(38:03):
What is really the story of the challengethat we have on the military side?
And is it getting worse,is it getting better?
>> Alex Wong (38:13):
Yeah,
I do think we have a serious challengeon our hands with China militarily.
And I think that's not a secret and
that's a consensus opinion acrossour military and our policymakers.
Let me focus on two areas.
What we're seeing is China's making heavyinvestments, not just in terms of money,
(38:34):
but in reforming and modifying itsbureaucracy and its procurement to pursue
advantage and leapfrog the United Statesin two main areas that concern me.
Number one is in the nuclear realm.
Now, we've over the years tracked China'snuclear development, and not just in terms
of the number of warheads, but in themodernization and the diversification of
its nuclear capabilities,both in delivery systems and in the yield.
(38:56):
So what we're seeing and
what we talk about in the report thisyear is the possible development of
the capability of China to producelow-yield nuclear weapons.
Which may indicate a change in its nucleardoctrine and how it would fight a war,
whether in the spectrum betweenconventional and nuclear, but
also looking at delivery systems.
I wanna highlight one item, which isChina's already a leader in hypersonics
(39:21):
and space-based capabilities, andto the extent that they add and
are pursuing a space-based, what's calleda fractional orbital bombardment system,
which would basicallyobviate our missile defenses.
That introduces a new realm ofinstability at the nuclear level.
It will force us to rethink ourown doctrine of deterrence,
(39:45):
and it's forcing us, andwe should pursue our own
technological innovations tocounteract that and to deter that.
That's a new set of thinking,and it's not a secret,
but we talk about it in our report.
Furthermore, the US has long hadan In undersea warfare capabilities,
which is particularly importantin the Indo-Pacific and for
deterrence instabilityin the Indo-Pacific.
(40:07):
China is trying to lead progress there.
They're trying to neutralizeour advantage by pursuing and
improving their own undersea capabilitiesas far as quieting their systems,
but having to detect our submarines,our undersea platforms.
And one worry there is thatthey're able to improve and
(40:30):
speed up that innovation becauseof its relationship with Russia.
Russia has very advancedundersea capabilities.
And right now, Russia is verydependent on China, at least for
economic support in its waron invasion of Ukraine.
Now, we don't have evidence that Russiais proliferating undersea technology or
giving it to the Chinese, butit's definitely something that the Chinese
(40:52):
would want from Russia, andthey have some leverage now.
So key worries for us andkey threats that might affect
negatively the militarybalance in the Indo Pacific.
>> Michael Auslin (41:04):
So that's also just a great overview and something we could,
of course, continue to talk about fora long time.
But as we begin to wrap up, I'd like toask sort of a cultural question, if I can.
I know we're not really getting,unfortunately, to Taiwan right now.
I think it's an area that probablyneeds its own discussion, but
(41:25):
ask you a bit of a culturalquestion to both of you.
But Carolyn, again,you've been in Washington a long time.
You've done this for a long time,been on the commission for 20 years.
I guess the first question is,are you confident that we really
are where we're,that we're getting to where we need to be?
(41:50):
I mean, should we take hope, take heart?
Or are the pathways that we've seendevelop over the past 20 years,
let's say so ingrained now,so developed, so
advanced that we can talk all we want andtry to tweak here and
there, but we're really,we're really not going to be able
(42:12):
to respond how we need to, orare we getting to where we are?
It's a broader than justan area-specific or issue-specific.
It's more about the culture of howthe United States is approaching
the relationship with China.
Let me start with you,Carolyn, then ask Alex.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (42:29):
It's a really interesting question, and
I guess I would answer whenyou raise the issue of hope,
it would sort of be hope forwhat we want, right?
I mean, hope,what is it that we're looking for?
So in the bigger relationship, again, I'vebeen actually doing this since June 4,
1989, since the Tiananmen Square massacre.
We have certainly seen, as Alex started,ebbs and flows in what is going on.
(42:55):
I don't think that we are doingeverything that we could be doing both to
ensure of our own economic vitality goingforward, our own economic competitiveness,
and making sure that we are focusedwhere we need to be on the military,
technology acquisition,all of these things.
(43:16):
I think we could and must do more onensuring that chinese acquisitions of
us companies are not improvingtheir military capability.
I think we have to face the realitythat we may be in a conflict with them,
a hard conflict with them.
My hope would be that we all figureout a way not to have that happen.
(43:41):
I've always been concerned about the factthat somehow the onus of trying to
improve the relationship isalways put on the United States.
Somehow the Chinese, they alwaysblame us for when things are bad.
And a lot of people pickup that narrative and
somehow think that the improvementhas to come from us.
The improvement has to comefrom both sides, right?
There are things that the Chinesegovernment needs to do,
(44:03):
there are things that the USgovernment needs to do.
So, I mean, I'm always hopeful inthe sense that you just don't know where
things are going to go andwhat's going to happen.
We've seen that certainly this year, buthopeful in the sense that I think that
there are certainly a number of peoplewho are looking at these ideas.
There's one strain that I always payattention to and I'm concerned about, and
(44:23):
that is the economic interests, right?
That when there are people in thiscountry, investment banks, for
example, fund managers, who seetheir big returns coming from China.
They have, I think, too much of aninfluence in terms of what's going on with
the policy discussion.
But we have seen successes, andI think that, again, the fact that this
(44:44):
is generally a bipartisan response, boththe commission and China policy generally,
I'm hopeful that we will be able to figureout ways to work through all of this.
>> Michael Auslin (44:53):
Alex, should we take heart?
Are we on the right track?
Or is it a foregone conclusion that wewill slip into permanent second place?
>> Alex Wong (45:05):
Well, look, I'm an optimist, number one, but also a strong believer in
the free world and the United States andour friends and allies.
What I will say is, I think in recentyears, past three to five years,
which is a pretty shorttime in world history,
there has been a strong change in theposture, not just in the United States,
(45:26):
but among our partners and allies acrossthe world, in instituting more balance
in the relationship with China,economically, militarily, politically.
Now, let me start with our friends andpartners in the Indo-Pacific.
Now, I will argue that they're notnew to this China competition idea.
I mean, for hundreds if not thousands ofyears, their strategic cultures have been
(45:49):
how do we balance, whether individually ortogether, a powerful china, a large china.
But we're seeing, I think,the start of major muscle movements,
particularly in the security realmfrom our partners like Japan,
our continued or renewed cooperationin military posture in the Philippines.
But other partners,we're looking at the quad, for instance,
(46:12):
as at least a discussion group for how tobring balance in the Indo Pacific region.
Let's move to the Europeans.
During my time in the administrationjust a few short years ago,
the conversations withEuropeans were very different.
We were there,the commission was there this past spring.
And these new terms,whether it's de risking or the term that I
(46:32):
like that was coined by the Europeansof China as a systemic rival,
that's a public realizationthat China's strategy and
the character of the EU andeuropean nations are systemically
incompatible andthat there need to be policy changes.
Now, I think we're still waiting for thosebig policy changes on the european side,
(46:55):
but the fact that they talk about itin this way, that the concept is there,
that this is a competition, I think isa big move for our european partners.
But then here in the United States,we've all been in policy circles.
I think even five years ago, there wasa live debate between kind of traditional
engagement with China versusa competitive posture towards China.
(47:15):
I think today that debate is over.
I think its consensus now of notwhether were in a competition,
but how do we execute that competitionto advance our interest and
our ideals together with our partners andallies.
And that's a sea change in DC.
So I think were on the right track.
And I do think we have inherent strengthsas the United States together with
the rest of the free world in thiscompetition with a communist China.
>> Michael Auslin (47:38):
Well, it's always good, especially in this season,
to end on an optimistic note.
We don't always do on this podcast,but this is one of those times,
clearly with both of youexpressing some guarded,
cautious optimism, which I appreciate.
I mean, we could have gone on for a lotlonger talking about all of these issues.
This really was a really quick survey.
(48:02):
And so I encourage everyone to go touscc.gov, that's the commission's site,
to get the annual report,but get the other reports.
You can also readthe testimony of the hearings.
It is really, I would argue,one of the most important organizations,
groups in Washington looking at probablythe most critical issue we face.
(48:26):
So, always great to talk with you,Carolyn Bartholomew, Alex Wong,
the chair and vice chair of the US China'sEconomic and Security Review Commission.
Thank you so much forjoining us on the Pacific century.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (48:40):
Great, thanks so much, Misha, for having us on.
>> Alex Wong (48:42):
Thank you, great to be with you.
>> Michael Auslin (48:44):
So for the Pacific Century, I'm Michael Austin, thank you for
tuning in, and we will see you next time.
[MUSIC]
>> Speaker 4 (48:58):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts, or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
[MUSIC]
[MUSIC]
>> Michael Auslin (00:09):
Welcome back to the Pacific Century,
a Hoover Institution podcast on China,America and the fate of the 21st century.
I'm your host, Michael Auslin.
And today I'm very happy to be joinedby two long time Asia experts and
folks deeply involved inthe policy world here in DC,
(00:29):
which is Carolyn Bartholomew andAlex Wong.
Now, if you're wondering whyit's both Carolyn and Alex.
Those of you who are regular devotees ofthe work of the US China commission, or
more formally, the US China Commission,US China Economic and
Security Review Commission, you of course,
will know that Carolyn is the chairpersonof that and Alex is the vice chair.
(00:53):
And so,
having the dynamic duo on to talk aboutthe annual report from the commission,
we'll just call it the commission, whichmost people in Washington eagerly await.
To see what the commission has covered andwhat its recommendations are,
we thought would be a greatway to begin winding up 2023.
So let me do some brief introductions.
(01:15):
Carolyn Bartholomew, as I mentioned,is the chair of the commission.
She's been on the commission since 2003.
She's been the chairman forfive report cycles and vice chair for
six report cycles.
She is a longtime Washingtonianworking on the Hill.
She was chief of staff for thenHouse Speaker Nancy Pelosi, served for
(01:36):
a very long time with Speaker Pelosi,and was also a professional staff member
on the House permanent selectcommittee on intelligence.
She is an expert in US China relations,including issues related to trade,
human rights, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, and
all other important issues.
(01:57):
Alex Wong, as I mentioned,is the vice chair of the commission,
recently joining the commission afterhaving served as the deputy special
representative from North Korea and
the deputy assistant secretary fromNorth Korea at the State Department.
He also served duringthe Trump administration
as the deputy assistant secretary forregional and
(02:18):
security affairs inthe State Department's East Asia Bureau.
Previously, he was a foreignpolicy advisor and
general counsel to Senator Tom Cotton andalso the foreign and
legal policy director for the Romney-Ryan2012 presidential campaign.
And those are just brief bios of bothof these extremely experienced and
(02:38):
distinguished members of the foreignpolicy world here in DC.
So, Carolyn and Alex,welcome to the Pacific Century.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (02:46):
Thanks very much, Misha.
Thank you for having us on.
>> Alex Wong (02:48):
Yeah, great to be here.
>> Michael Auslin (02:49):
Well, it's great to see you both.
Obviously, we've met in person andwe've talked.
I've actually testifiedbefore the commission.
But what I thought we'd do todayis have a discussion mostly on
the 2023 report, butthen expand it as we get into talking
with each other on the sort ofbroad state of US China relations.
(03:11):
But before we did that,I thought, Carolyn,
just in case anybody's not completelyfamiliar with the commission,
having 20 years of experience on it,maybe you'd explain just briefly what
the commission is,why it's unique in Washington.
And quite honestly,what it does every year.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (03:29):
Great, thanks again, Michael.
Thanks for having us on.
It's always a pleasure to participatein discussions with Alex, too,
my colleague andcollaborator on the commission.
So the commission was established in2000 when Congress was considering
China's accession tothe World Trade Organization and
had to pass permanentnormal trade relations.
(03:52):
And there were two commissionsestablished by Congress at the time.
One, the other commission, the CECC,the congressional Executive Commission on
China, whose mandate was to focuson China human rights issues, ours,
the USCC mandate to focus on the nationalsecurity implications of the US China
economic relationship.
And I think that the establishment ofthe commission really reflected lingering
(04:16):
concern, which, of course, has onlygrown over the course of the past 2025
years about what was going onin the US China relationship,
the impact of China's growth,its aggressiveness, all of those things.
So we do.
There are 12 commissioners,6 Democrats, 6 Republicans.
We are proudly bipartisan.
(04:36):
In one year, when we have a democraticchair, we have a republican vice chair,
and the next year we switch around.
So we have a Republican chair anda Democratic vice chair.
Three.Each of us are appointed by the House and
Senate, democratic andrepublican leadership.
Two year terms.
Some of us get reappointedperiodically every two years and
have the opportunity to serve.
(04:58):
I think we're unique in the sense thatwe really were developed by Congress to
advise Congress on US-China issues, andit's become a very interactive process.
We have tried over the years to really beforward leaning and identify issues that
we think that Congress reallyneeds to be thinking about and
focusing on in the US China relationship.
(05:19):
And as the work has unfolded, we geta lot more input from people on the Hill,
things they want us to be looking at,issues that are coming up.
One example, of course, is fentanyl.
I remember it was a number of years ago,we had a senator contact us and say,
we'd really like to know more aboutwhat's going on with fentanyl.
So we have been forwardleaning on a number of issues.
(05:39):
Cyber, we were one of the firstplaces in town talking about cyber.
China in Africa is another example.
So there are a numberof things that we do.
As I've said,we've really tried to identify issues that
not everybody is paying attention to,but issues that need to be focused on.
We do a series of hearings, usually six orseven hearings during the year, and
then we do this annual report to Congress,which comes out in November.
>> Michael Auslin (06:01):
Right, and the annual report is a real report,
it's several hundred pages long.
It's not a brief report, like a 20 or
30 page thing that mightcome out of a think tank.
It's a serious, you know,it's a serious effort.
I was just gonna ask, do you,I'm sure you'll say complimentary, but
I just wanted to ask, do you seeyourself in a, how are you different?
(06:23):
For example, when you talked aboutyour relationship with Congress from,
let's say, congressional research service,where Congress also tests them and says,
hey, we want to know more about this, andthey continuously write an update reports.
Why and how are you different?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (06:38):
That's an excellent question, Michael.
I think one of the main ways is wehave a lot of freedom to identify.
I'm not saying that CR's doesn't havefreedom, but a lot of freedom and
opportunity to identify, again, emergingissues that we really are focused on,
and then to focus on those indepth through our hearing process.
(06:59):
One of the things I really like about ourcommission and our commission hearings and
you've participated,is that there are opportunities for
the members of the commission toreally interact with our witnesses.
We don't have a situation where peopleare just sitting there saying, you know,
we have, of course,over the years had some people who do say,
this is what I believe,tell me why I'm wrong.
(07:20):
But it's a really interactive processbetween us, the commissioners, and
our witnesses, andthe witnesses with each other.
And so I find that there's a,a really good intellectual foment that
takes place as we try tocome to some consensus.
And that's another thing thatreally characterizes us,
is that we are a consensus body.
(07:41):
The report that you mentioned has30 recommendations this year.
We have a terrific staff whoworks on initial drafts for us.
And then we sit in a room together,sometimes twelve of us,
hashing it out page by page,paragraph by paragraph.
Sometimes it's line by line andword by word.
So it becomes a really true bipartisanconsensus product with a lot more input,
(08:03):
I think, than from a lot of differentviewpoints than CRS actually does.
>> Alex Wong (08:07):
Yeah, I think that's where a lot of the influence and
perhaps credibility ofthe commission comes from.
It's the fact that appointees fromacross the political spectrum and
across the policy world of Washingtonare coming together and putting forth, for
the most part, consensus recommendationsthat have that credibility.
>> Michael Auslin (08:26):
So, Alex, actually, it's a good segue to ask you about this
year's report, butif I seem to remember, I may be wrong.
Correct me, as I'm usually corrected onthis podcast, because I'm often wrong.
But I seem to remember,Carolyn mentioned the bipartisan nature,
six Democrats, six Republicans.
And yet I seem to remember the commissionbeing labeled as a hawkish commission and
(08:52):
the reports as being hawkish reportsbecause they often take a very sober,
realistic, andsomewhat forward-leaning view on China.
That might not be what we wouldexpect from a bipartisan commission,
which often is lowest common denominator.
>> Alex Wong (09:11):
Right, I mean, some might say hawkish, others might say Prussian.
I think from the beginning, the focus ofthe commission, and I've only been on
it fairly recently, but the focus ofthe commission has been to scrutinize our
policy with China and China'sstrategy outwardly toward the world.
And how that's connected to its owndomestic internal policies and strategies.
(09:32):
So it's with that kind of skeptical eye,that bringing high scrutiny to it,
that's been the missionfrom the beginning.
And as Carolyn mentioned,
I think the commission's beenahead of the curve in some ways.
But interestingly, Washington,as you know, Misha, and
the wider policy world in here andamong our allies and partners has,
(09:55):
I think, come around more towardsthe view of the commission,
understanding thatthe relationship with China and
the Communist Party is competitive andin some aspects adversarial.
And then we have to makecorresponding policy changes.
>> Michael Auslin (10:11):
So perfect segue then into talking about the report, Alex,
if you might, start us off, and
then we'll get into some more ofthe specifics of the different chapters.
But what's the takeaway?
What do we need to know aswe're beginning to prepare for
a presidential election next year?
(10:32):
So the season will be wrapped upin all sorts of different issues.
But what's the takeaway,if you can boil it down for us?
>> Alex Wong (10:40):
Right, I think stepping back,
the approach of our report this yearis to look at the deep structural
aspects of China's strategy towardthe United States and the world.
And what we should do in response.
In the news, when people talk about China,there's a lot of focus on summits and
(11:01):
meetings, freezes and thaws andhigh level contacts between the US and
China andbetween our european allies in China.
That's not the focus of the report.
And to draw from an analogy,watching that type of diplomatic back and
forth is kinda like standingon the beachfront and
trying to understand the character ofthe ocean by watching the tidal currents,
(11:23):
the ebbs andflows of the waves right in front of you.
That's not unimportant.
You need to understand the tidal currentsto navigate, perhaps in the day to day.
But to truly understand the ocean,
you have to get at the deepocean currents animating it.
So we're trying to get at the deepcurrents animating the US China
relationship.
So if you look at the report this year,number one,
(11:45):
we look at the economic kind ofstructural situation of China.
Their current debt challenges,
their challenges moving toa consumption led economy.
And what does that mean forChina's strategy?
What does it mean forour responses in the economic realm?
We look at China's educational system andhow the weakness in its ability to produce
(12:06):
human capital might hamper or at leastpresent challenges for its attempt to move
its economy up the value chain andachieve its economic security strategy.
Then we move to overallinfluence operations.
What is China's strategy globallyto their influence in the media or
in the political space in media?
How are they using lawfare?
(12:27):
What is their legal strategy to affect andpush out their vision of not just
international law, but domestic law,and the use of chinese domestic law
extraterritorially to expand itsinfluence and exert its designs?
And then last, we look atthe technological and military realm,
starting with what are China'smilitary relationships,
(12:50):
its mil-to-mil cooperativeprogram programs?
How are they using thatto advance its interests?
And how are they investing in technologyin the military realm, not just to fast
follow or be a peer competitor inthe military space with the United States?
So how are they trying to leapfrog us?
Everything from AI to undersea warfarecapabilities to space-based nuclear
(13:11):
weapons.
These are all things we're looking at,because these will affect where
China's strategy is going in the immediateterm as well as the long term,
and then what our responses should be.
>> Michael Auslin (13:22):
So, Carolyn, that is a great overview, Alex, and I appreciate it.
I would mention on the tides that as muchas you have to understand the deep ocean
currents, you also have to watch out forthe riptides sometimes.
Of course, that's what we alwaysget focused on because that's
the immediate crisis andthe immediate danger.
But obviously, as someone who's just spenta lot of time in terms of Asia in general
(13:45):
looking at what I hopeare deeper structural issues.
I've always admired thatabout the commission and
appreciate that you stress that it'snot always something that happens in
Washington because youget caught up in a cycle.
That said, Carolyn, you have sucha longitudinal perspective on this.
I thought for a second maybe to turn toyou and ask you on the economic side.
(14:10):
When you joined the commission in 2003,those were the go go days for China.
It was two years after ithad gotten into the WTO.
It was igniting a decade of growth.
It was actually hard to think back thatfar, but it was only barely ten years
since Deng Xiaoping had reignited China'sreforms with his famous southern tour.
(14:33):
So you've seen the growth,you've been there through
the growth of China duringthis extraordinary period.
Now that we're 20 years out andyou've completed 20 cycles of this,
what's your assessment,as the commission notes,
the headwinds that China's economy faces,what does that really mean?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (14:57):
Misha, that's an excellent question.
I just want to loop back intothe question you were asking or
mentioned that we were consideredhawkish in the early years.
And it's been interesting to watch over20 years the transition in the policy
debate and how things have changed,because, as Alex said, what we,
we have not changed our policy positions,but the whole debate has shifted in DC.
(15:21):
And when this commission wasstarted to tie into the economics,
there were thousands of cheerleaders forthe US China economic relationship.
The business community believed thatthey were going to make a fortune
both producing in China andmarketing to the chinese people.
So we were one of the only places thatwas looking at some of the downsides of
(15:41):
the relationship economically andnational security.
As Alex mentioned,sort of as we were looking at this year,
there really are two dynamicsthat we were focusing on.
One is the serious economic challengesthat the Chinese Communist Party
is facing.
There are structural problems theireconomy that they are either unwilling or
(16:03):
incapable of addressing, including, ofcourse, this massive debt that they have.
Moody has just downgraded China's debtrating, I think, to negative, and
that has certainly changedthe environment as people are looking at,
is it a good place to invest?
We have pension fundsthat are investing there.
Is that wise investment?
(16:23):
The people understand whattheir investments are,
where their investments are going,fueling, for example, research that might
be helping China's military that couldeventually take us on, so there's that.
And at the same time, that's coupled withincreasing Chinese aggressiveness, both
military aggressiveness in the South ChinaSea, but its promotion through the Belt
(16:45):
and Road initiative, the propagandathat it's doing, its interest and
its desire to sort of recreatethe global system in its own image.
And that I think those are the biggerdynamics that we definitely have been
focusing on over the years.
Another thing that I think is interestingagain with the perspective of 20 years on
this commission, is in the early years,we had people, the military people,
(17:07):
the security people who came onthe commission were pretty traditional
national security people.
What you would think ofas military strength and
the economics people were prettytraditional economics people.
And what has happened overthe years is those areas,
those sectors have sortof meshed together.
And I think,particularly when it comes to technology,
(17:29):
they both have economic consequences,right?
The future of our economy is basedon our technological innovation and
the national security implications of whatChina might be doing with that technology.
So it's been a veryinteresting thing to see.
I remember one time,probably about ten years ago now,
I was at a group discussion about this,and somebody, I won't name him Misha, but
(17:53):
it's certainly somebody, you know, whowas from the traditional military side,
started talking about the economics,and I was just floored.
I mean, it was great, but it's that kindof merging those two issues together
to come to some sort of understandingof what are the consequences,
both militarily andeconomically for the US.
>> Michael Auslin (18:12):
So before turning to the military and the tech side,
Carolyn, let me ask you first,what specifically does
the commission believe thatthe US should be doing to.
I think these terms of art always change.
I think the current term is de-risk.
It used to be decoupled andit used to be whatever the things were.
(18:37):
What is it specificallythat we need to do?
Do we need to have our sneakersstop being made in China?
Or is it something a littlebit more sophisticated?
And if so,are we getting any closer to that?
What is the commissionrecommending to Congress?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (18:55):
So I'm gonna say right up front that because we
are a consensus institute.
Consensus organization, there are someissues that, much to the chagrin of some
people, we actually just reallydon't take on like international,
the international trade agreements.
We have a little bit ofconversation about that.
We don't have anyrecommendations about that.
(19:17):
But we have been concerned both atthe micro level in terms of the economics
issues with the investments.
Again, for example, andthe PCAOB was making sure that Americans
who are investing in China have accessto independent auditing information so
that they can understandthe risks that are being faced.
(19:39):
So that's one of the->> Michael Auslin: And the PCAOB for
those not familiar.
The PC, what does it stand for?
I'm gonna have to look that one up,I'm so used to throwing.
So PBOC, of course,is the People's Bank of China,
it's an accounting oversight board.
>> Michael Auslin (19:55):
Okay, it's the Chinese accounting board.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (19:57):
No, no, no, no, it's ours, it's ours.
It's ours.
>> Alex Wong (20:00):
I think it's Public Committee for Accountability and
Oversight Board,if I"m [CROSSTALK] the PCAOB.
>> Michael Auslin (20:05):
Okay. >> Carolyn Bartholomew
that's one of the issues becausecertainly as the Chinese
government has clampeddown on information,
both statistical information,right, we've seen that as an issue.
They have over a 21% youthunemployment rate and what do they do?
Instead of figuring out howto address that successfully,
(20:26):
they just stop reporting those numbers.
So there's that kind of information, butthere's also the risk analysis that should
be taking place whenAmericans are investing.
So that's one of the issuesthat we've done.
We did recommend this year thatthe congressional Joint Economic Committee
used to do, used to produce an annualunclassified report on the state of
the chinese economy andeconomic policy decisions.
(20:49):
One of the things we've recommended toCongress is that they re institute that
report, which they haven't done fora while.
We recommend that Congress considerlegislation requiring federal
financial authorities here,including the Federal Reserve,
to seek specific information from bank and
investment institutions regarding theirexposure to and involvement in the PRC.
(21:13):
We have steps that we sayto combat tariff evasion.
There's an obviously ongoing discussionabout supply chain resilience.
Some people support friendshoring,some people support just onshoring.
But we need to make sure that as companiesare leaving China to manufacture
elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia,it is often Chinese companies
(21:34):
that are establishing themselvesin Southeast Asia and
they are doing that in a way to evade anytariffs that we have put on products.
So that's an issue that we think thatCongress needs to be looking at.
And again this year, a lot of it wasabout corporate disclosure requirements,
making sure that people in this countryhave access to the kind of information
(21:55):
that they need to do, need to have inorder to make sound investment decisions.
Those are some of the micro thingsthat we've talked about, yeah.
And one more quick one, since it's the topic du jour,
it's on everybody's lips,which is semiconductors.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (22:10):
Yes, we actually recommend that the Congress ask the GAO,
the General Accountability Office,
to do a report within 180days of the effectiveness of
the recently imposedsemiconductor export controls.
Are they working effectively?
(22:31):
What's working,what isn't working along those lines?
And I certainly will defer to Alexwhen we talk about the tech issues.
I also just want to note thatwe are recommending here,
it's one of my favorite recommendations.
It didn't make it up into the top ten, butthat we recommend that Congress consider
evaluating the potential for establishinga single export licensing system.
(22:53):
Export licenses,right now it's complicated process,
fifferent agencies are involved.
It really needs to be redone.
First established exportcontrols in the 1940s,
updated in the 1970s,updated again relatively recently.
But there needs to bea comprehensive look at this and
to see whether we can have a moreefficient system for business and
(23:15):
that we can have staffing in theseagencies that can address the challenges.
I always say government moves slowly,technology moves quickly.
By the time the government has madedecisions, issues have moved on,
on technology, and we are losing them.
We're losing the ability to controlsome of the things that, again,
might have national securityimplications for us.
>> Michael Auslin (23:36):
That is, again, export restrictions.
Just the, the question, of course,there's dual use technology.
There's all of these issues,probably some of the most arcane issues.
For those who are not specialists and
trying to understand it fromthe outside or weigh in.
Alex, let me shift,instead of continuing on the econ though,
(24:00):
let me shift To the question ofchinese influence operations,
which is an entire chapteressentially in the report,
China's efforts to subvert norms andexploit open societies.
What does that mean?
I mean, we are an open society.
(24:21):
Do we want to become a closed society?
What are we doing in vis,what do we need to do vis a vis China?
What's the threat?
>> Alex Wong (24:28):
Yeah. Well, let me be clear.
We're not recommending at all that wematch China by closing our society.
That's not the openness of our societyas a source of our strength, but it does
present certain openings and weaknessesthat China's attempting to exploit.
Now, I'll cover a number of them.
I mean, first of all, we talk aboutthe educational system here, the higher
(24:49):
educational system in the United States,and the amount of funding and
donations coming from chinese entitiesto the US higher education system.
Now, not all of those are legitimate, notall of those are for influence purposes.
But what we do recommend is servicing moreinformation about, a, the scale of those
donations, b, to what research areas theyare going to, and c, ensuring that that
(25:13):
information is coming out in a timelymanner so that it's available publicly.
But as well as to our intelligence andlaw enforcement agencies to determine
if there is an attempt here toinfluence higher education and
also extract the type of research,particularly in the technological realm,
that China is attempting to build andleapfrog the United States.
(25:34):
So there's a connection there between bothinfluence as well as its technological
strategy.
But I wanna talk a little aboutthe lawfare aspect of this.
As many of your listeners know,the term lawfare is a term of art, but
essentially trying to use andleverage the US and the free world's
commitment to the rule of law, butto political ends or security ends.
(25:58):
So one item I wanna highlight isthe use by Chinese front groups,
the United Front Department andothers to silence critics
in the United States by subjectingthem to defamation lawsuits.
Now, there's no merit to these suits, but
(26:18):
they're strategic in that itimposes costs on the dissident,
if you wanna call them that, orthe person with a company making or
saying things about the Chinese andthe CCP, legal fees, discovery fees.
So we make a recommendation to counteractthat, that at the federal level,
(26:40):
we should have what are termedanti-slap lawsuits or
anti-strategic lawsuitsagainst public participation.
Which shifts fees tothe lawsuit bringer and
moves up in the process an evaluationof whether the suit is meritorious or
not, but that this is an attemptto insulate our open society and
(27:00):
our rule of law from abuse by the Chinese.
>> Michael Auslin (27:04):
In addition to, I should mention there is a segue here,
in addition to the annual report,
we should mention that the commissionputs out various different reports.
And I've always found one ofthe most interesting report and
one that you just updated on tocontinue this theme of open societies,
(27:25):
China using international organizations byplacing their own personnel in them and
then often shifting the focus orthe goals of some of those organizations.
I mean, probably one of the best knownones, thanks to Covid, would be the WHO,
the World Health Organization.
(27:45):
But it's happened in the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization,
of course, in the InternationalTelecommunications Union,
attempted in the World, was itIntellectual Property Organization, WIPO.
But Alex,can you talk a little bit about that?
Now, those, of course,are not american institutions.
(28:07):
Your recommendations to Congress cannotchange how who does its business.
But can you talk a littlebit along the lines of,
of the United Front Work Organization,the others, about this use
of international organizations,which we all think is just a great thing?
We have more international organizations,there's gonna be more cooperation.
>> Alex Wong (28:24):
Yeah, look, the Chinese were ahead of the curve of, really, the rest of
the world in seeing these internationalorganizations as arenas for competition.
And the terms of the competition are,can you get, as you were mentioning,
can you get your nationals in leadershippositions to push your nation's interests.
Or in the Chinese, whether it's isolatingTaiwan from these international
(28:49):
organizations, or trying to pullthe standards technologically,
trade wise, that go through theseinternational organizations,
pulling it towards moreof a chinese character.
And the United States andour partners relate to the game.
We didn't treat these as arenas forkind of politicking.
(29:10):
International organizations are inlarge part less like diplomacy and
more like unruly legislatures.
You need to log roll,you need to pressure,
you need to win votesto win these positions.
And I think the United Statesnow has woken up to this.
And when I was inthe Trump administration,
we empowered an ambassadoriallevel special advisor to head up
(29:32):
international organizationelections to compete with China.
To marshal our partners in the free world,to identify the meritorious candidates,
push them, and look, make deals inlaw rule to try to get the right
people in the right positionsto blunt this strategy by China.
So we're a little late to the game, butI think people have woken up to it.
>> Michael Auslin (29:57):
And one of those successes was
the World Intellectual PropertyOrganization, where China.
>> Alex Wong (30:01):
That's right.
>> Michael Auslin (30:02):
I mean, it's ironic, let's put it that way, that China,
perhaps one of the larger abusersof intellectual property,
wanted to have their their person,a national, head up that organization.
I recently had it explained to me, orargued to me by a State Department
official that you could look at this andsay, well, so what?
(30:26):
So you've got a Chinese person, Chinesenational, heading up X organization,
World Intellectual Property Organization.
Why does it matter?
You've got French and you've gotItalians and you've got Angolans and
Indians and Japanese.
Why does it matter?
And the argument that was made tome was that if you look at how, and
I'm interested in both of your reactions,if you look at how Americans,
(30:49):
let's say, act when they are put asofficials and responsible directors of
these organizations, they act inthe interests of the organizations, and
often they even act contraryto Washington's interests.
They fully are agents of thoseinstitutions and organizations.
On the other hand, when Chineseare heads of those organizations,
(31:13):
they act as agents of Beijing.
They don't act as agentsof the organizations, but
they're pushing Beijing's strategies andgoals.
Is that an accurate or fair assessment?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (31:24):
Yes, I think that that is actually an accurate assessment,
and it is.
As China's role in the world has grown,we are seeing that many of their actions,
most of their actions are aboutpromoting themselves.
And everything that the CCP does,of course,
is designed to try tokeep the CCP in power.
(31:44):
I wanna loop back on the internationalorganizations briefly to just say that it
is not just, I think people havea tendency to think about things
like the WHO and the UN, butit's also the international
standard setting bodies thatthe Chinese have been very active.
Actively engaged in.
And that has consequences forus economically and
(32:04):
consequences forus both in national security.
Because when they are essentially incharge of standard-setting bodies,
they are making sure that the standardsthat are being set are for
Chinese-developed products.
>> Michael Auslin (32:17):
Could you give an example, maybe,
just a quick example just for the layman?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (32:21):
Let me give an example of that.
It would be even somethinglike a telecommunications,
right, I mean, a standard for5G or something like that.
When the Chinese are involved or
controlling the standardsetting bodies on these things,
they are making sure that the technicalstandards advantage their products and
(32:43):
their companies, which in exchange,in turn, actually disadvantage ours.
And there's so much that flowsfrom this technology about apps.
There's sort of an economic frameworkwhere you can have one technology,
but so many things build on thattechnology that if we are shut out of one
of these technologies,then we are losing all of the downstream
(33:06):
advantages of things thatwould support that technology.
So that was one thing I wanted to mention.
The other thing, I think, when we look atinternational organizations is that you
have to put it in the context of China'spropaganda work around the world, right?
It is not just us that theyare trying to influence.
It is the stuff that they are doingthrough the Belt and Road Initiative,
(33:27):
the stuff that they are doing investingin access for natural resources.
Many of those things are being done incountries where they are using their
investments to getthe responses that they want,
the votes that they want inan organization like the United Nations.
Another implication of that, of course,
is that they are shutting Taiwanout everywhere they possibly can.
(33:48):
And that even goes down to notallowing people from Taiwan to work
in something like who it is about bothparticipating in it as an institution,
but it is also about who theyare allowing to staff these things.
And that has serious implications both forthe effectiveness, I think,
(34:09):
of the organizations themselves and also,of course, for Taiwan space in the world.
>> Michael Auslin (34:14):
Absolutely, I hope we can turn to Taiwan, but I know we're doing
sort of a romp through the world of Chinaand the world of America-China relations.
But given time, I wanted to turn,Carolyn, and actually ask you,
because you have such extensiveexperience, and this was clearly something
that was very important to Speaker Pelosi,which is a question of human rights.
(34:38):
And where we stand today,the world has watched, and
some would argue, watched silentlywhat's happened in Xinjiang.
It has watched, I would argue,
largely silently what's happenedin Hong Kong to bring in Taiwan.
That is sort of the ultimate orone of the ultimate goals of the party
(35:02):
is to do to Taiwan what it's done to thoseother potentially rogue/breakaway areas.
[COUGH] How does the commission handle it?
And as you mentioned, there isthe congressional executive commission,
which deals with human rights.
But how does your commission handlethe question of human rights?
What have you looked at?
What do you recommend?
What do you worry about?
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (35:23):
Yeah, that's also an excellent question.
I think there are two places that I can,well, three areas that I can think of, but
not necessarily geographic.
One, of course, is the Uyghurs and
things like the Uyghur Forced Laborprotection Act.
We have talked about the de minimisexclusion, which is that anything
under $800 doesn't need to gothrough our whole customs process.
(35:48):
So companies like Shein and Temu are justflooding the United States with products.
It's having seriouseconomic implications for
what remains of our textile andgarment industry in this country.
So that's one thing.
So it's trade related, butit is also human rights related.
Hong Kong, we spent time looking atHong Kong, what's happening in Hong Kong.
(36:12):
The Hong Kong legal systemis being destroyed, frankly,
by the Chinese government.
And that has implications also forthe business community,
the international business community,the us business community.
They're naive if they think what'shappening with Hong Kong's legal system
will not eventually catch up with them.
(36:32):
So those are two specificareas where we do that.
I think a third area that we look at is welook at surveillance technology, right,
which has fundamental human rights issues.
So it's data gathering, it's, again,the surveillance technology that
the Chinese government, Chinese companiesare selling to other countries.
(36:54):
Things like smart cities, even here.
We need to make sure that when ourcommunities are investing in smart cities,
that they are thinking aboutthe consequences of what having Chinese
participation in smart citiesinfrastructure would do and would do it.
So it's really three areas, as I said,Uyghur Forced Labor protection,
Hong Kong judiciary, in particular, and
(37:15):
then this issue of surveillance andsurveillance technology.
>> Michael Auslin (37:20):
That's great.
Obviously, there's a lotmore to talk about,
especially that last one inthe surveillance technology.
And it gets to all the questionsabout tech competition and the like.
But again, just in the interest of time,
cuz we could just do entirehours on each one of these.
But, Alex, I'd like to turn, if I could,to the military question, which is,
(37:42):
in many cases, and whether warranted ornot, it's something that gets an enormous
amount of attention in DC cuz there'san enormous amount of money involved.
What is the state of the military balance,what does the commission find,
should we be worried, really?
I mean, look, we got 11 aircraft carriers,they've got, what, 2, maybe 3.
(38:03):
What is really the story of the challengethat we have on the military side?
And is it getting worse,is it getting better?
>> Alex Wong (38:13):
Yeah,
I do think we have a serious challengeon our hands with China militarily.
And I think that's not a secret and
that's a consensus opinion acrossour military and our policymakers.
Let me focus on two areas.
What we're seeing is China's making heavyinvestments, not just in terms of money,
(38:34):
but in reforming and modifying itsbureaucracy and its procurement to pursue
advantage and leapfrog the United Statesin two main areas that concern me.
Number one is in the nuclear realm.
Now, we've over the years tracked China'snuclear development, and not just in terms
of the number of warheads, but in themodernization and the diversification of
its nuclear capabilities,both in delivery systems and in the yield.
(38:56):
So what we're seeing and
what we talk about in the report thisyear is the possible development of
the capability of China to producelow-yield nuclear weapons.
Which may indicate a change in its nucleardoctrine and how it would fight a war,
whether in the spectrum betweenconventional and nuclear, but
also looking at delivery systems.
I wanna highlight one item, which isChina's already a leader in hypersonics
(39:21):
and space-based capabilities, andto the extent that they add and
are pursuing a space-based, what's calleda fractional orbital bombardment system,
which would basicallyobviate our missile defenses.
That introduces a new realm ofinstability at the nuclear level.
It will force us to rethink ourown doctrine of deterrence,
(39:45):
and it's forcing us, andwe should pursue our own
technological innovations tocounteract that and to deter that.
That's a new set of thinking,and it's not a secret,
but we talk about it in our report.
Furthermore, the US has long hadan In undersea warfare capabilities,
which is particularly importantin the Indo-Pacific and for
deterrence instabilityin the Indo-Pacific.
(40:07):
China is trying to lead progress there.
They're trying to neutralizeour advantage by pursuing and
improving their own undersea capabilitiesas far as quieting their systems,
but having to detect our submarines,our undersea platforms.
And one worry there is thatthey're able to improve and
(40:30):
speed up that innovation becauseof its relationship with Russia.
Russia has very advancedundersea capabilities.
And right now, Russia is verydependent on China, at least for
economic support in its waron invasion of Ukraine.
Now, we don't have evidence that Russiais proliferating undersea technology or
giving it to the Chinese, butit's definitely something that the Chinese
(40:52):
would want from Russia, andthey have some leverage now.
So key worries for us andkey threats that might affect
negatively the militarybalance in the Indo Pacific.
>> Michael Auslin (41:04):
So that's also just a great overview and something we could,
of course, continue to talk about fora long time.
But as we begin to wrap up, I'd like toask sort of a cultural question, if I can.
I know we're not really getting,unfortunately, to Taiwan right now.
I think it's an area that probablyneeds its own discussion, but
(41:25):
ask you a bit of a culturalquestion to both of you.
But Carolyn, again,you've been in Washington a long time.
You've done this for a long time,been on the commission for 20 years.
I guess the first question is,are you confident that we really
are where we're,that we're getting to where we need to be?
(41:50):
I mean, should we take hope, take heart?
Or are the pathways that we've seendevelop over the past 20 years,
let's say so ingrained now,so developed, so
advanced that we can talk all we want andtry to tweak here and
there, but we're really,we're really not going to be able
(42:12):
to respond how we need to, orare we getting to where we are?
It's a broader than justan area-specific or issue-specific.
It's more about the culture of howthe United States is approaching
the relationship with China.
Let me start with you,Carolyn, then ask Alex.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (42:29):
It's a really interesting question, and
I guess I would answer whenyou raise the issue of hope,
it would sort of be hope forwhat we want, right?
I mean, hope,what is it that we're looking for?
So in the bigger relationship, again, I'vebeen actually doing this since June 4,
1989, since the Tiananmen Square massacre.
We have certainly seen, as Alex started,ebbs and flows in what is going on.
(42:55):
I don't think that we are doingeverything that we could be doing both to
ensure of our own economic vitality goingforward, our own economic competitiveness,
and making sure that we are focusedwhere we need to be on the military,
technology acquisition,all of these things.
(43:16):
I think we could and must do more onensuring that chinese acquisitions of
us companies are not improvingtheir military capability.
I think we have to face the realitythat we may be in a conflict with them,
a hard conflict with them.
My hope would be that we all figureout a way not to have that happen.
(43:41):
I've always been concerned about the factthat somehow the onus of trying to
improve the relationship isalways put on the United States.
Somehow the Chinese, they alwaysblame us for when things are bad.
And a lot of people pickup that narrative and
somehow think that the improvementhas to come from us.
The improvement has to comefrom both sides, right?
There are things that the Chinesegovernment needs to do,
(44:03):
there are things that the USgovernment needs to do.
So, I mean, I'm always hopeful inthe sense that you just don't know where
things are going to go andwhat's going to happen.
We've seen that certainly this year, buthopeful in the sense that I think that
there are certainly a number of peoplewho are looking at these ideas.
There's one strain that I always payattention to and I'm concerned about, and
(44:23):
that is the economic interests, right?
That when there are people in thiscountry, investment banks, for
example, fund managers, who seetheir big returns coming from China.
They have, I think, too much of aninfluence in terms of what's going on with
the policy discussion.
But we have seen successes, andI think that, again, the fact that this
(44:44):
is generally a bipartisan response, boththe commission and China policy generally,
I'm hopeful that we will be able to figureout ways to work through all of this.
>> Michael Auslin (44:53):
Alex, should we take heart?
Are we on the right track?
Or is it a foregone conclusion that wewill slip into permanent second place?
>> Alex Wong (45:05):
Well, look, I'm an optimist, number one, but also a strong believer in
the free world and the United States andour friends and allies.
What I will say is, I think in recentyears, past three to five years,
which is a pretty shorttime in world history,
there has been a strong change in theposture, not just in the United States,
(45:26):
but among our partners and allies acrossthe world, in instituting more balance
in the relationship with China,economically, militarily, politically.
Now, let me start with our friends andpartners in the Indo-Pacific.
Now, I will argue that they're notnew to this China competition idea.
I mean, for hundreds if not thousands ofyears, their strategic cultures have been
(45:49):
how do we balance, whether individually ortogether, a powerful china, a large china.
But we're seeing, I think,the start of major muscle movements,
particularly in the security realmfrom our partners like Japan,
our continued or renewed cooperationin military posture in the Philippines.
But other partners,we're looking at the quad, for instance,
(46:12):
as at least a discussion group for how tobring balance in the Indo Pacific region.
Let's move to the Europeans.
During my time in the administrationjust a few short years ago,
the conversations withEuropeans were very different.
We were there,the commission was there this past spring.
And these new terms,whether it's de risking or the term that I
(46:32):
like that was coined by the Europeansof China as a systemic rival,
that's a public realizationthat China's strategy and
the character of the EU andeuropean nations are systemically
incompatible andthat there need to be policy changes.
Now, I think we're still waiting for thosebig policy changes on the european side,
(46:55):
but the fact that they talk about itin this way, that the concept is there,
that this is a competition, I think isa big move for our european partners.
But then here in the United States,we've all been in policy circles.
I think even five years ago, there wasa live debate between kind of traditional
engagement with China versusa competitive posture towards China.
(47:15):
I think today that debate is over.
I think its consensus now of notwhether were in a competition,
but how do we execute that competitionto advance our interest and
our ideals together with our partners andallies.
And that's a sea change in DC.
So I think were on the right track.
And I do think we have inherent strengthsas the United States together with
the rest of the free world in thiscompetition with a communist China.
>> Michael Auslin (47:38):
Well, it's always good, especially in this season,
to end on an optimistic note.
We don't always do on this podcast,but this is one of those times,
clearly with both of youexpressing some guarded,
cautious optimism, which I appreciate.
I mean, we could have gone on for a lotlonger talking about all of these issues.
This really was a really quick survey.
(48:02):
And so I encourage everyone to go touscc.gov, that's the commission's site,
to get the annual report,but get the other reports.
You can also readthe testimony of the hearings.
It is really, I would argue,one of the most important organizations,
groups in Washington looking at probablythe most critical issue we face.
(48:26):
So, always great to talk with you,Carolyn Bartholomew, Alex Wong,
the chair and vice chair of the US China'sEconomic and Security Review Commission.
Thank you so much forjoining us on the Pacific century.
>> Carolyn Bartholomew (48:40):
Great, thanks so much, Misha, for having us on.
>> Alex Wong (48:42):
Thank you, great to be with you.
>> Michael Auslin (48:44):
So for the Pacific Century, I'm Michael Austin, thank you for
tuning in, and we will see you next time.
[MUSIC]
>> Speaker 4 (48:58):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts, or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
[MUSIC]
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