Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
The Michael Berry Show. What a week It's been, Right,
what a week? Welcome to the Weekend Podcast. Honored you
would choose to spend some of your time, whether it's
the weekend or well endo the week when you give
this a listen. We had planned to play clips of
this audio on Thursday, but with the assassination of Charlie Kirk,
(00:22):
we decided to make it a bonus podcast. So here
we are. Catherine Herridge, who was a long time, very
well respected reporter with the major networks on issues of
national intelligence, sat down with the former director of the
(00:46):
National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Bill Avanina to discuss new
information on the nine to eleven terrorist attack, and with
nine to eleven just a couple of days ago, it
seemed perfect to have this conversation. Now, newly classified reports
(01:07):
from the FBI and CIA reveal that two Saudi government
employees quote may have served as an advance team end
quote for the nine to eleven hijackers. Two Saudi government
employees h under whose direction starts to sound less like
(01:30):
a rogue group of terrorists and an orchestrated, organized effort which,
by the way, people have been ridiculed and marginalized over
supposed conspiracy theories, suggesting that this was far too sophisticated
(01:50):
for nineteen rag tag dudes. These new records challenge the
nine to eleven narrative, and they shift the timeline back
to December of ninety eight. It's almost three years before
al Qaeda terrorists killed nearly three thousand Americans on September eleventh,
(02:13):
two thousand and one. Now this is a reminder that
just because someone is reporting something, and just because the
media outlet that is reporting it is well respected typically,
and just because the guest who is saying it might
seem to be or the reports that are being called
on might seem to be beyond reproach. I don't necessarily
(02:35):
endorse everything that we air on this program. I believe
that you deserve transparency, and as new information becomes available,
we provide it. Is it a fact beyond doubt? No,
it's not. It's a position, it's a data point. Sometimes
(03:00):
get frustrated and they basically add, tell me how to think, Michael,
That's not what I do. I will tell you that
you should think for yourself. I have biases, you might
not share those biases. I have prejudices you might not
share those prejudices. I might be willing to assess this
risk in this way and accept this amount of risk.
(03:21):
I smoke cigars and drink bourbon. You may say, I'm
not willing to do that, So why would you have
me tell you what to do if you're not willing
to take that risk? All that by way of saying, look,
we're going to put things on the air that doesn't
make them true, but we want you to think because
they may turn out to be true, and we're not
(03:43):
going to stifle information.
Speaker 2 (03:45):
As someone who investigated nine to eleven, do these records
move the timeline?
Speaker 3 (03:51):
They do? I think that really moves the timeline back
significantly two to three years to win. The support network
actually got on the ground here in the United States.
Speaker 4 (04:00):
Bill Evanina is the former director of the National counter
Intelligence and Security Center. He spent twenty four years at
the FBI and investigated nine to eleven.
Speaker 2 (04:10):
The FBI says they may have served as an advanced
team for the nine eleven hijackers.
Speaker 3 (04:17):
I think based upon these documents and the videos, I
think it's pretty clear that they were here for that
particular reason. The question would be at whose behestd was
it from the Saudi government or were they working for
al Qaeda directly just happened to be Saudi employees.
Speaker 4 (04:31):
Filmed two years before the nine to eleven terrorist attacks,
The video shows these Saudi government employees mutaib El Sudiri
behind the wheel, the other adult, Muhammad al Sadan, hiding
behind a roadmap. Along with the third Saudi. They filmed Washington,
d C landmarks later identified by al Qaeda terrorists as
potential nine to eleven targets.
Speaker 2 (04:51):
The classified record states the FBI assesses that the two
Saudis may still maintain ties to al Qaeda. Sounds like
the two Saudis had long standing ties to al Qaida.
Speaker 3 (05:04):
Sounds very clear to me that they still possess, which
means they once did possess.
Speaker 4 (05:08):
Exclusive reporting and declassified intelligence and law enforcement records reveal
the Saudi government employees Saddan and Sudiri may have served
as an advanced team to vent those who would later
assist hijackers in southern California. The explosive lead was buried
in thousands of pages of once secret government records.
Speaker 2 (05:27):
We asked you to review these declassified documents. Are they
significant documents?
Speaker 3 (05:32):
I think they are. I think they really pre date
what we've known about nine to eleven and the support
networks domestically here in the US for the hijackers.
Speaker 2 (05:40):
Based on these new records and some of the video evidence,
is there enough here to draw a direct connection between
nine to eleven and the Saudi government?
Speaker 3 (05:51):
I think we're closer. I think it's clear that we
now have individuals who came here Pride nine to eleven
who were official Saudi employees, Now where they official slow
SOUD employees working on behalf of this plot, or they
were also of Saudi employees and also serving the needs
of al Qaeda.
Speaker 2 (06:07):
Are the two Saudis overlooked key players in the nine
to eleven plot?
Speaker 3 (06:12):
I think that's a good question. I think these two
individuals who are now named provide new investigative leads for
the FBI and our intelligence services to go back and
put some more pieces together in this really complicated puzzle.
Speaker 4 (06:25):
It took nearly two decades and pressure from the nine
to eleven families who were suing Saudi Arabia over the
terrorist attacks, for these highly secretive government records to be declassified.
Investigators for the families found evidence Saddan and Sudiri arrived
in southern California in December nineteen ninety eight, thirteen months
before the first two hijackers also landed in Los Angeles,
(06:47):
later receiving financial assistance, obtaining driver's licenses, living quarters, spiritual guidance,
and locating flight schools.
Speaker 2 (06:54):
Based on the declassified records, what did the alleged Saudi
Advanced Team do?
Speaker 3 (07:00):
I think these records clearly depict not only the advanced
team coming here in United States, but setting up shop,
coordinating with emms on the West Coast and on the
East Coast, facilitating the care and feeding and housing of
the hijackers.
Speaker 2 (07:14):
The hijackers, many of them did not speak English, had
never been to the United States before. Could they have
lived under the radar without this support network?
Speaker 3 (07:25):
I highly doubt it. If you were going to initiate
this type of sophisticated plot, you don't even want to
take that chance. So they was critically needed to have
a support network here.
Speaker 4 (07:35):
The intelligence reports include phone and financial analysis, interviews, and
travel patterns, concluding so Don and Sudari lived at the
same address in San Diego where the hijackers would later stay.
Other common links include Fahad Althu Mar, a well known
figure at the King five Mosque in Los Angeles, reputed
to be an Islamic fundamentalist American cleric on war Alaalaki.
(07:59):
He became a major al Qaeda leader after nine to
eleven and was killed in a CIA drone strike. As
well as this Saudi. The FBI said there's a fifty
to fifty chance he had advance knowledge of nine to eleven.
Speaker 2 (08:11):
Omar al Bayoumi, what was his role?
Speaker 3 (08:13):
I think he was clearly the fixer of the facilitator,
of the leader of this potential surveillance cell. And I
think that two Saudis came here to vet him.
Speaker 4 (08:22):
After helping Saddan and Sudari in southern California, Bayoumi sent
letters to Saudi government officials. Bayomi said of the men,
there is complete cooperation and advance coordination.
Speaker 2 (08:33):
What does that tell you?
Speaker 3 (08:35):
I think they are exactly what they say they are.
I think they send those messages back to the leaders
who need to know that the facilitation of the support
network in California is strong and it's workable and there's coordination.
Are the key people that need to make this work.
Speaker 4 (08:49):
Byumi was arrested about ten days after nine to eleven
in Birmingham, England. His records and videos were seized, including
a February two thousand welcome party for two hijackers in
San Diego. Some of the most compelling evidence that challenges
the official nine to eleven narrative was shared by British
authorities with the nine to eleven families, not by the
(09:09):
US government.
Speaker 3 (09:10):
Or any hijackers.
Speaker 2 (09:11):
In this video, there are two hijackers appear in this video.
Speaker 4 (09:14):
One hijacker can be seen in the kitchen. Bayoumi instructs
the videographer not to film one side of the room.
This caught Evanina's attention. You see, don't yeah, don't film here,
and he's motioning to the side of the room.
Speaker 2 (09:27):
So as an investigator, what does that tell you?
Speaker 3 (09:32):
He wants these people saying in the video for sure
and absolutely nobody on that side of the video.
Speaker 4 (09:37):
Later, the videographer slips out and captures the other side
of the room.
Speaker 2 (09:41):
So they're having the meal, and then the videographer pulls
up at one point and gets the other side of the.
Speaker 4 (09:48):
Room by accident.
Speaker 3 (09:52):
Okay, oh, look at that right.
Speaker 4 (09:53):
This man is identified in court records as a Saudi
government religious official Mohammad al Katani was the significance very significant.
Speaker 3 (10:02):
It's another direct tie to an actual employee of the
Saudi government in the welcoming party for two soon to
be hijackers. That's a big deal.
Speaker 2 (10:11):
That's information that would have been relevant to the nine
to eleven Commission.
Speaker 3 (10:15):
These videos were obtained in the fall of two thousand
and one. Those videos should have been provided to the
nine to eleven Commission.
Speaker 4 (10:22):
In April two thousand and one, five months before the
attacks that killed nearly three thousand Americans in New York
City at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, two hijackers
traveled from Arizona to Virginia. Investigators for the nine to
eleven Families developed this map and alleged the hijackers passed
through Oklahoma and Missouri, where the same two Saudi government
(10:43):
employees were assigned. In Missouri, Suderi had lived with a
known key communications specialist for al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
Speaker 3 (10:51):
I believe those two locations in Oklahoma and Missouri were
checking spots where they had to check in with trusted
people who helped facilitate their arrival to make sure they're
on the right path and going in the right direction
if they needed any more assistance on the way.
Speaker 4 (11:05):
And there is another nine to eleven connection. These Saundi
government employees videotaped Washington, DC landmarks in June nineteen ninety nine.
Speaker 2 (11:13):
Does that look like a tourist video?
Speaker 3 (11:15):
Clearing out of tourist video. It was very specific with
intent of not only the visualization on multiple sides of
the building, but also the security detail.
Speaker 4 (11:23):
About the same time, Osama bin Laden developed an initial
list of targets for the plot, including the White House
and US Capital, the same sites filmed by the Saudis.
Speaker 2 (11:34):
As a trained investigator, what significance to place on the video?
Speaker 3 (11:38):
I think the video really adds value to the fact
that there was thought and mindset of potential targets years
ahead of the actual event in nine to eleven. I
think that really elongates the timeframe.
Speaker 2 (11:51):
We've got new leadership now here in Washington. What can
the new director of the FBI do.
Speaker 3 (11:57):
I think this is an opportunity for the FBI, the CIA,
and the administration for that matter, to go and be
the most stallworth supporters and element families and then deal
directly with the Saudi government for access to these individuals,
and I think this is a once in a lifetime opportunity.
It might not come again, but I think all the
stars have aligned to be able to put that request
(12:20):
into the Saudi government.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
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(12:43):
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(13:10):
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(13:31):
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Speaker 2 (14:00):
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