April 16, 2024 • 17 mins
On this episode of Our American Stories, our next story from Stephen Ambrose begins in early 1943—With America's first major defeat during the Second World War.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:10):
This is Lee Habib and this is Our American Stories,
the show where America is the star and the American
people his search for the Our American Stories podcast go
to the iHeartRadio app or wherever you get your podcasts.
Stephen Ambrose was one of America's leading biographers and historians.
(00:30):
At the core of Ambrose's phenomenal success was his simple
but straightforward belief that history is biography. History, he always said,
is about people. Steven Ambrose passed away in two thousand
and two, but his epic storytelling accounts can now be
heard here on Our American Stories, thanks to those who
(00:52):
run as his state. Our next story begins in early
nineteen forty three during the Second World War. Here's Stephen
amber with the story.
Speaker 2 (01:02):
The first battle of the United States Army fought in
the Second World War began on Saint Valentine's Day of
nineteen forty three at a place called casser And Pass
in North Africa. And the way that battle went. All
this unconditional surrender business that we had been demanding a
(01:22):
month before was just talk. Because the US Army did
not do well at the Battle of casser and Pass.
There were a lot of reasons why it didn't do well.
First of all, the training hadn't been rigorous enough the
army and the men in the army officers who were
(01:43):
doing the training, the old regular army officers who were
the cadre around which this miracle took place to transformed
the American Army from less than two hundred thousand men
in nineteen forty to an army of eight million men
in nineteen forty three. This cadre of officers who trained
these guys, they thought they were putting them through the
(02:04):
toughest training that you could put somebody through. And indeed
they thought it was up to the standards of the
SS or the Red Army. And the men thought that
they were at the absolute peak of physical condition, and
that they had been very well trained, and they were
ready to take on the behrymach And they all found
out they weren't. They were not well trained, they were
(02:26):
not in good shape. They didn't know their weapons, they
didn't know their tactics. There their fire control was miserable,
their communications between units was sadly lacking. Even their knowledge
of the equipment was short of of of what was required.
The battle thus provided a lot of lessons some of
(02:47):
which were on the need for training and more of it,
and more realistic training, and twice as hard as it
had been in three times, and even four times as hard.
A lot of what was learned was in terms of techniques.
A lot of what was learned was about the shortcomings
(03:10):
of intelligence, and thereby hangs a bit of a tale.
In nineteen thirty nine, as Poland was falling, some Polish
mathematicians managed to get an Enigma machine out of Poland. Now,
the Enigma was a coding machine that had been developed
(03:31):
in the nineteen twenties and used in some European businesses.
Taken over by the Nazis the patent for it in
nineteen thirty three when they took power and it became
their encrypting machine for World War Two. They were certain
that it was the best encoding machine in the world,
and they were right. They were sure that it was unbreakable,
and they were wrong. The British, with the help of
(03:53):
this machine that the Poles had got and with the
help of Polish mathematicians, managed to break the Enigma code
in the same way that the Americans had broken the
Japanese Purple code, and so through the war the Allies
were listening in on all German radio traffic, which meant
(04:13):
that whenever the Germans were in a situation they didn't
have secure telephone lines and had to use the radio,
we knew what they were saying to each other. Sometimes
he only got a part of the message. Sometimes the
decoding of the message took so long that by the
time it had been accomplished, the information was useless. Sometimes
the information hurt rather than helped. And that's the story
(04:38):
of Castroine Pass. As Raml retreated from Alamin all the
way across Libya, he finally got into Tunisia in January
of nineteen forty three. Meanwhile, Eisenhower's forces British, an American
coming in as Cassabaco, Iran and Algiera's were driving on Tunisia.
(04:58):
The Germans had feried troops from Italy down through Sicily
into tunis and it established a front line. Ronald, coming
up from Libya, encountered the Americans for the first time.
Ronmeld was as much psychologist as he was general officer.
(05:19):
He thought it was if Germany was going to win
this war, it was going to have to impose an
inferiority complex on the American army, and we're going to
have to do it right now in this first encounter.
So he proposed to launch an attack spearheaded by what
was left of his African Corps armor, at a place
(05:39):
called Castro and pass. It would break through the American
lines and then go all the way up to Algiers
and take Algiers and thus cut all of these British
and American forces off from their supplies and force a
general surrender. But more importantly, even from Ronald's point of view,
imposed this inferiority complex on the American troops, but that
(06:00):
it would be relatively easy to do because he liked
many German officers thought of the Americans as soft, effeminate,
even an attitude that was very much strengthened when his
patrols began coming back and said, my god, boss, they
delivered that. Can you believe this? They delivered turkeys for
Christmas dinner for these guys in the front lines. They
(06:23):
once somebody came back and brought in a box and
it had a chocolate cake in it that had been
baked in Georgia and sent over seas, and the Americans
had given it space on planes and brought it over
to North Africa and delivered it to a kid in
the front lines. And from the point of view of
Ramo and his officers, these guys ain't ready for war
at all.
Speaker 1 (06:43):
And you've been listening to the great Steven Ambrose telling
stories like no one else can tell. Our first battle,
it didn't go well. We weren't prepared, we were humiliated.
We had a lot to learn about almost everything. The
more superior Tree forces a Rammel thought they were well,
giving us a beat down and getting inside our heads
(07:05):
and thinking we could not fight. Moreover, they gleaned some
perhaps wrong conclusions by seeing how we treated our soldiers,
flying in turkeys and flying in good food from overseas
when we come back. More of this remarkable story of
American resilience, and so much more here on Our American Stories.
(07:31):
Liehbibe here the host of our American Stories. Every day
on this show, we're bringing inspiring stories from across this
great country, stories from our big cities and small towns.
But we truly can't do the show without you. Our
stories are free to listen to, but they're not free
to make. If you love what you hear, go to
Olamericanstories dot com. And click the donate button. Give a little,
(07:54):
give a lot. Go to Alamericanstories dot com and give.
And we continue with our American stories and with the
Great Steve Ambrose, and he's bringing us back to nineteen
(08:15):
forty three into Northern Africa, the earliest campaign the American
soldiers had with the great Nazi general and tank commander,
General Ramel. Let's pick up where we last left off.
Speaker 2 (08:28):
And from the point of view of Ramel and his officers,
these guys ain't ready for war at all. So he
proposed to launch his attack. But Heitler thought, no, that's
not right. Ronald doesn't have the fuel supplies that will
carry him all the way to Algiers. He's going for
too big a solution, and the Americans down here are
(08:49):
two week and too ill organized. In any case, the
threat is the British up here in the northern part
of Tunisia, threatening Bizerta and the city of tunis They
need to be driven back, and so hit Her decided,
we'll have an offensive up here in the north, commanded
by General von Arnham, and radio messages came from Rome
(09:10):
to Ronald in Tunisia ordering him to send his troops
up north. Those messages were intercepted, decoded, came to the
Allied intelligence headquarters, and there a British general who is
the G two, the head of intelligence. His name was
Mackler Fareman. Wonderful British name. Mickler Fairman read these intercepts
(09:33):
and said to Eisenhower, General, they're going to be attacking
in the north. We'd better move our strength up there.
I said, well, I don't know. He said, you know
the reports that we're getting from our patrols, don Aron Casserine,
is that Ronald's building up down there. I think we
ought to leave this strength down here in the south. Noe.
Michael Fareman said absolutely, I've got the message right here.
(09:53):
Ronald's going to be moving those men up north, and
von Arnam's going to attack, and you'd better get your
strength up north. And Eisnower did. And Ronald just disobeyed orders.
And right there is the trouble with intelligence. It can
be absolutely accurate right up to the date. The real
(10:14):
thing this is the order that Ronald gets. What are
you gonna do with the guide disobeys the order, the
intelligence is worthless, It's worse than worthless. Causes you to
make bad dispositions which Eisenhower did. Ronald's initial successes in
Cassroine were staggering. An entire armored regiment is gone, trucks, abandoned, tanks,
(10:39):
abandoned tanks, blown up, men, shot up, men taken prisoner.
The commanding general of the American Forces, the Second Corps,
it was. His name was Fredendahl. Lloyd Fredendahl had before
the battle been digging in his headquarters behind the front lines.
He had all of his engineers working on blasting holes
(11:00):
the rock and getting way down, way way down, deep
into the earth so you'd have a secure headquarters. People
were embarrassed when they saw it. Saw it, and he said, Lloyd,
you got to get out into the front lines once
in a while. And he said, let me remind you, Lloyd,
generals are expendable, just like anything else in this war
if it leads to victory. Fred Dall kept digging, and
(11:26):
when the attack came he cracked under the pressure, and
within the first twelve hours he turned the battle over
to his regimental commanders and went down into his cot,
deep into the bowels of the earth, and took a
twenty four hour nap. We were discussing whether a nineteen
(11:47):
forty three invasion of France would have worked or not?
Could round Up have happened. It's always seemed to me
that the answer has to come down finally no, because
that is it wouldn't have worked because the commander of
the American forces and what would have been in nineteen
forty three Operation Overlord would not have been Dwight Eisenharer,
would have been Lloyd Fredendall. He was a wonderful officer.
(12:08):
General Marshall thought the world of him. It was assumed
he was going to be one of the American stars,
if not the Eisenhower the Second World War. But when
the test came, he cracked. And there's no way of
ever knowing in advance who's going to crack and who's
going to be able to handle the strain. As I've said,
it wasn't just Fredendall who did badly in this. Catherine
(12:30):
pass and Eisnar himself has a lot to answer for
because he was, after all the responsible officer. He realized that,
and he realized the value of what had been learned.
Our soldiers are learning rapidly. He wrote to Marshall at
the heights of the battle, and while I still believe
that many of the lessons we are forced to learn
at the cost of lives should have been learned at home.
(12:53):
It was absolutely right about that. The training should have
been a lot tougher. I assure you that the troops
that come out of this campaign are going to be
battle and tactically efficient. He said. The men are now
so mad, they're ready to fight. They didn't like getting
kicked around by the Germans. All our people, he went on,
(13:14):
from the very highest to the very lowest, have learned
that this is not a child's game, and we are
ready to get down to business now. Some might have
said this is a little late in the game to
be getting down into business. This is January or February
of nineteen forty three. The Russians have been getting down
to business for a long time, as well as of
course of the Germans. Anyway, now we're ready to get
(13:36):
down to business. He called George Patten from Morocco to
come out and take command of the second Court. That
he dismissed friend all and sent him home in disgrace,
and he brought George Patten in from Morocco. And when
Patten arrived, I gave him advice that he might well
better have given to himself, because he had had doubts
(13:59):
about and all when he saw him digging in the
ground like that. And well, here's his own analysis. You
must not retain for one instant, he told Patton, any
man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful
of his ability to do the job. This matter frequently
calls for more courage than any other thing you will
(14:20):
have to do. But I expect you to be perfectly
cold blood about it. And here he is referring to
something that did hurt the US Army in the Second
World War, and the user car before the war was
so tiny. You know, of senior officers. Everybody knew everybody,
and they were all friends, and they'd all been to
parties together and gone hunting together, and serve together in
(14:40):
the Panama or the Philippines, or Fort Bragg or wherever.
And they hated to have to dismiss and disgrace they're friends.
But I said, this matter calls were more courage than
(15:00):
any other thing you'll have to do. But you have
to be perfectly cold blutted about it. Officers that failed
must be ruthlessly weeded out. Considerations of friendship, family, kindliness,
and nice personality have nothing whatsoever to do with this problem.
You must be tough and get rid of the lazy,
the sloth will, the indifferent or the complacent. Those were
very valuable lessons that were learned, and at a relatively
(15:23):
small cost. And we did stop finally Romo's advance, although
the truth of the matter is it was more a
case of his running out of supplies, especially gasoline, than
anything else that stopped his casser and pass advance. And
now the weight of materiel began to make itself feel
(15:44):
written off. North Africa. Rama wasn't getting anything, and the
United States was pouring the goods into North Africa. A
general offensive was undertaken against the von Arnaen forces in
the Northronod's forces in the south are recognizing that that
it was going to go under pretty soon and realizing
(16:06):
that he had with Ronald a tremendous national asset because
of Ronald's incredible popularity in Germany, pulled Romel out. Ronald
also had a high blood pressure on other problems. That
Ronald was pulled out so that he wouldn't be there
for the humiliation of the final surrender, and so that
he would be available for the defense of France when
the time came, and in May May eighth of nineteen
(16:29):
forty three, Tunis fell to General Bradley's forces, and the
Axis had now been cleared out of North Africa.
Speaker 1 (16:37):
And you've been listening to Steven Ambrose tell the story
of the Casser and pass the early difficulties and then
ultimately the victory that led to our victory in North
Africa and on to bigger things and harder things in
Northern Europe. And great job on the production is always
by Greg Hengler, And my goodness, what we learned about intelligence.
(16:58):
They thought they had good intelligence until they found out
they didn't. And that can happen to all of us.
Speaker 2 (17:04):
Right.
Speaker 1 (17:04):
We were certain about things we think we know until everything, well,
it is different than what we know. And there was
a humiliating defeat, but they miscalculated. The Nazis did how
Americans would bear defeat, and that was we got angry,
and we got better, and we got tougher, and then
incame Patent and incame a person who could do the job.
(17:27):
And my goodness, did he the story of our first victory,
our first loss, and so much more. The Northern Africa campaign,
as told by Steven Ambrose here on our American Stories
This is Lee Habib and this is Our American Stories,
the show where America is the star and the American
people his search for the Our American Stories podcast go
to the iHeartRadio app or wherever you get your podcasts.
Stephen Ambrose was one of America's leading biographers and historians.
(00:30):
At the core of Ambrose's phenomenal success was his simple
but straightforward belief that history is biography. History, he always said,
is about people. Steven Ambrose passed away in two thousand
and two, but his epic storytelling accounts can now be
heard here on Our American Stories, thanks to those who
(00:52):
run as his state. Our next story begins in early
nineteen forty three during the Second World War. Here's Stephen
amber with the story.
Speaker 2 (01:02):
The first battle of the United States Army fought in
the Second World War began on Saint Valentine's Day of
nineteen forty three at a place called casser And Pass
in North Africa. And the way that battle went. All
this unconditional surrender business that we had been demanding a
(01:22):
month before was just talk. Because the US Army did
not do well at the Battle of casser and Pass.
There were a lot of reasons why it didn't do well.
First of all, the training hadn't been rigorous enough the
army and the men in the army officers who were
(01:43):
doing the training, the old regular army officers who were
the cadre around which this miracle took place to transformed
the American Army from less than two hundred thousand men
in nineteen forty to an army of eight million men
in nineteen forty three. This cadre of officers who trained
these guys, they thought they were putting them through the
(02:04):
toughest training that you could put somebody through. And indeed
they thought it was up to the standards of the
SS or the Red Army. And the men thought that
they were at the absolute peak of physical condition, and
that they had been very well trained, and they were
ready to take on the behrymach And they all found
out they weren't. They were not well trained, they were
(02:26):
not in good shape. They didn't know their weapons, they
didn't know their tactics. There their fire control was miserable,
their communications between units was sadly lacking. Even their knowledge
of the equipment was short of of of what was required.
The battle thus provided a lot of lessons some of
(02:47):
which were on the need for training and more of it,
and more realistic training, and twice as hard as it
had been in three times, and even four times as hard.
A lot of what was learned was in terms of techniques.
A lot of what was learned was about the shortcomings
(03:10):
of intelligence, and thereby hangs a bit of a tale.
In nineteen thirty nine, as Poland was falling, some Polish
mathematicians managed to get an Enigma machine out of Poland. Now,
the Enigma was a coding machine that had been developed
(03:31):
in the nineteen twenties and used in some European businesses.
Taken over by the Nazis the patent for it in
nineteen thirty three when they took power and it became
their encrypting machine for World War Two. They were certain
that it was the best encoding machine in the world,
and they were right. They were sure that it was unbreakable,
and they were wrong. The British, with the help of
(03:53):
this machine that the Poles had got and with the
help of Polish mathematicians, managed to break the Enigma code
in the same way that the Americans had broken the
Japanese Purple code, and so through the war the Allies
were listening in on all German radio traffic, which meant
(04:13):
that whenever the Germans were in a situation they didn't
have secure telephone lines and had to use the radio,
we knew what they were saying to each other. Sometimes
he only got a part of the message. Sometimes the
decoding of the message took so long that by the
time it had been accomplished, the information was useless. Sometimes
the information hurt rather than helped. And that's the story
(04:38):
of Castroine Pass. As Raml retreated from Alamin all the
way across Libya, he finally got into Tunisia in January
of nineteen forty three. Meanwhile, Eisenhower's forces British, an American
coming in as Cassabaco, Iran and Algiera's were driving on Tunisia.
(04:58):
The Germans had feried troops from Italy down through Sicily
into tunis and it established a front line. Ronald, coming
up from Libya, encountered the Americans for the first time.
Ronmeld was as much psychologist as he was general officer.
(05:19):
He thought it was if Germany was going to win
this war, it was going to have to impose an
inferiority complex on the American army, and we're going to
have to do it right now in this first encounter.
So he proposed to launch an attack spearheaded by what
was left of his African Corps armor, at a place
(05:39):
called Castro and pass. It would break through the American
lines and then go all the way up to Algiers
and take Algiers and thus cut all of these British
and American forces off from their supplies and force a
general surrender. But more importantly, even from Ronald's point of view,
imposed this inferiority complex on the American troops, but that
(06:00):
it would be relatively easy to do because he liked
many German officers thought of the Americans as soft, effeminate,
even an attitude that was very much strengthened when his
patrols began coming back and said, my god, boss, they
delivered that. Can you believe this? They delivered turkeys for
Christmas dinner for these guys in the front lines. They
(06:23):
once somebody came back and brought in a box and
it had a chocolate cake in it that had been
baked in Georgia and sent over seas, and the Americans
had given it space on planes and brought it over
to North Africa and delivered it to a kid in
the front lines. And from the point of view of
Ramo and his officers, these guys ain't ready for war
at all.
Speaker 1 (06:43):
And you've been listening to the great Steven Ambrose telling
stories like no one else can tell. Our first battle,
it didn't go well. We weren't prepared, we were humiliated.
We had a lot to learn about almost everything. The
more superior Tree forces a Rammel thought they were well,
giving us a beat down and getting inside our heads
(07:05):
and thinking we could not fight. Moreover, they gleaned some
perhaps wrong conclusions by seeing how we treated our soldiers,
flying in turkeys and flying in good food from overseas
when we come back. More of this remarkable story of
American resilience, and so much more here on Our American Stories.
(07:31):
Liehbibe here the host of our American Stories. Every day
on this show, we're bringing inspiring stories from across this
great country, stories from our big cities and small towns.
But we truly can't do the show without you. Our
stories are free to listen to, but they're not free
to make. If you love what you hear, go to
Olamericanstories dot com. And click the donate button. Give a little,
(07:54):
give a lot. Go to Alamericanstories dot com and give.
And we continue with our American stories and with the
Great Steve Ambrose, and he's bringing us back to nineteen
(08:15):
forty three into Northern Africa, the earliest campaign the American
soldiers had with the great Nazi general and tank commander,
General Ramel. Let's pick up where we last left off.
Speaker 2 (08:28):
And from the point of view of Ramel and his officers,
these guys ain't ready for war at all. So he
proposed to launch his attack. But Heitler thought, no, that's
not right. Ronald doesn't have the fuel supplies that will
carry him all the way to Algiers. He's going for
too big a solution, and the Americans down here are
(08:49):
two week and too ill organized. In any case, the
threat is the British up here in the northern part
of Tunisia, threatening Bizerta and the city of tunis They
need to be driven back, and so hit Her decided,
we'll have an offensive up here in the north, commanded
by General von Arnham, and radio messages came from Rome
(09:10):
to Ronald in Tunisia ordering him to send his troops
up north. Those messages were intercepted, decoded, came to the
Allied intelligence headquarters, and there a British general who is
the G two, the head of intelligence. His name was
Mackler Fareman. Wonderful British name. Mickler Fairman read these intercepts
(09:33):
and said to Eisenhower, General, they're going to be attacking
in the north. We'd better move our strength up there.
I said, well, I don't know. He said, you know
the reports that we're getting from our patrols, don Aron Casserine,
is that Ronald's building up down there. I think we
ought to leave this strength down here in the south. Noe.
Michael Fareman said absolutely, I've got the message right here.
(09:53):
Ronald's going to be moving those men up north, and
von Arnam's going to attack, and you'd better get your
strength up north. And Eisnower did. And Ronald just disobeyed orders.
And right there is the trouble with intelligence. It can
be absolutely accurate right up to the date. The real
(10:14):
thing this is the order that Ronald gets. What are
you gonna do with the guide disobeys the order, the
intelligence is worthless, It's worse than worthless. Causes you to
make bad dispositions which Eisenhower did. Ronald's initial successes in
Cassroine were staggering. An entire armored regiment is gone, trucks, abandoned, tanks,
(10:39):
abandoned tanks, blown up, men, shot up, men taken prisoner.
The commanding general of the American Forces, the Second Corps,
it was. His name was Fredendahl. Lloyd Fredendahl had before
the battle been digging in his headquarters behind the front lines.
He had all of his engineers working on blasting holes
(11:00):
the rock and getting way down, way way down, deep
into the earth so you'd have a secure headquarters. People
were embarrassed when they saw it. Saw it, and he said, Lloyd,
you got to get out into the front lines once
in a while. And he said, let me remind you, Lloyd,
generals are expendable, just like anything else in this war
if it leads to victory. Fred Dall kept digging, and
(11:26):
when the attack came he cracked under the pressure, and
within the first twelve hours he turned the battle over
to his regimental commanders and went down into his cot,
deep into the bowels of the earth, and took a
twenty four hour nap. We were discussing whether a nineteen
(11:47):
forty three invasion of France would have worked or not?
Could round Up have happened. It's always seemed to me
that the answer has to come down finally no, because
that is it wouldn't have worked because the commander of
the American forces and what would have been in nineteen
forty three Operation Overlord would not have been Dwight Eisenharer,
would have been Lloyd Fredendall. He was a wonderful officer.
(12:08):
General Marshall thought the world of him. It was assumed
he was going to be one of the American stars,
if not the Eisenhower the Second World War. But when
the test came, he cracked. And there's no way of
ever knowing in advance who's going to crack and who's
going to be able to handle the strain. As I've said,
it wasn't just Fredendall who did badly in this. Catherine
(12:30):
pass and Eisnar himself has a lot to answer for
because he was, after all the responsible officer. He realized that,
and he realized the value of what had been learned.
Our soldiers are learning rapidly. He wrote to Marshall at
the heights of the battle, and while I still believe
that many of the lessons we are forced to learn
at the cost of lives should have been learned at home.
(12:53):
It was absolutely right about that. The training should have
been a lot tougher. I assure you that the troops
that come out of this campaign are going to be
battle and tactically efficient. He said. The men are now
so mad, they're ready to fight. They didn't like getting
kicked around by the Germans. All our people, he went on,
(13:14):
from the very highest to the very lowest, have learned
that this is not a child's game, and we are
ready to get down to business now. Some might have
said this is a little late in the game to
be getting down into business. This is January or February
of nineteen forty three. The Russians have been getting down
to business for a long time, as well as of
course of the Germans. Anyway, now we're ready to get
(13:36):
down to business. He called George Patten from Morocco to
come out and take command of the second Court. That
he dismissed friend all and sent him home in disgrace,
and he brought George Patten in from Morocco. And when
Patten arrived, I gave him advice that he might well
better have given to himself, because he had had doubts
(13:59):
about and all when he saw him digging in the
ground like that. And well, here's his own analysis. You
must not retain for one instant, he told Patton, any
man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful
of his ability to do the job. This matter frequently
calls for more courage than any other thing you will
(14:20):
have to do. But I expect you to be perfectly
cold blood about it. And here he is referring to
something that did hurt the US Army in the Second
World War, and the user car before the war was
so tiny. You know, of senior officers. Everybody knew everybody,
and they were all friends, and they'd all been to
parties together and gone hunting together, and serve together in
(14:40):
the Panama or the Philippines, or Fort Bragg or wherever.
And they hated to have to dismiss and disgrace they're friends.
But I said, this matter calls were more courage than
(15:00):
any other thing you'll have to do. But you have
to be perfectly cold blutted about it. Officers that failed
must be ruthlessly weeded out. Considerations of friendship, family, kindliness,
and nice personality have nothing whatsoever to do with this problem.
You must be tough and get rid of the lazy,
the sloth will, the indifferent or the complacent. Those were
very valuable lessons that were learned, and at a relatively
(15:23):
small cost. And we did stop finally Romo's advance, although
the truth of the matter is it was more a
case of his running out of supplies, especially gasoline, than
anything else that stopped his casser and pass advance. And
now the weight of materiel began to make itself feel
(15:44):
written off. North Africa. Rama wasn't getting anything, and the
United States was pouring the goods into North Africa. A
general offensive was undertaken against the von Arnaen forces in
the Northronod's forces in the south are recognizing that that
it was going to go under pretty soon and realizing
(16:06):
that he had with Ronald a tremendous national asset because
of Ronald's incredible popularity in Germany, pulled Romel out. Ronald
also had a high blood pressure on other problems. That
Ronald was pulled out so that he wouldn't be there
for the humiliation of the final surrender, and so that
he would be available for the defense of France when
the time came, and in May May eighth of nineteen
(16:29):
forty three, Tunis fell to General Bradley's forces, and the
Axis had now been cleared out of North Africa.
Speaker 1 (16:37):
And you've been listening to Steven Ambrose tell the story
of the Casser and pass the early difficulties and then
ultimately the victory that led to our victory in North
Africa and on to bigger things and harder things in
Northern Europe. And great job on the production is always
by Greg Hengler, And my goodness, what we learned about intelligence.
(16:58):
They thought they had good intelligence until they found out
they didn't. And that can happen to all of us.
Speaker 2 (17:04):
Right.
Speaker 1 (17:04):
We were certain about things we think we know until everything, well,
it is different than what we know. And there was
a humiliating defeat, but they miscalculated. The Nazis did how
Americans would bear defeat, and that was we got angry,
and we got better, and we got tougher, and then
incame Patent and incame a person who could do the job.
(17:27):
And my goodness, did he the story of our first victory,
our first loss, and so much more. The Northern Africa campaign,
as told by Steven Ambrose here on our American Stories
Host
Lee Habeeb
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