August 4, 2025 • 25 mins
Explores post-disaster engineering, particularly focusing on the World Trade Center collapse of September 11, 2001, to illuminate broader lessons for the profession. It examines how engineers learn from structural failures like the Quebec Bridge and Hyatt Regency skywalks, and how these events reveal the inherent complexities and ethical dilemmas in engineering practice. The sources challenge the notion that engineering is solely technical, arguing for the integration of humanities and social sciences into curricula to foster a holistic understanding of public safety, responsibility, and the societal impact of design. Ultimately, the collection emphasizes that engineering success is intertwined with its failures, necessitating a balance of creativity, conservatism, and a deep appreciation for the human element in technological development.
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You can listen and download our episodes for free on more than 10 different platforms:
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Get the Book now from Amazon:
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Imagine staring at the ruins. What was once this monumental
building now just you twisted metal and dust when the
devastation finally settles. What does a moment like that really
tell us about the structures we create, the processes we trust,
and the people who design them. Because as terrible as
they are, disasters often end up being our most profound teachers,
(00:22):
even if they're tragic ones.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Absolutely, and in the face of such a men's loss,
there's always this powerful human drive to find answers right
and to understand why something happened. For engineers, that quest
isn't just about comprehension. It's deeply ingrained a drive to
reconstruct every mechanical detail, to learn and ultimately to prevent
future tragedies.
Speaker 1 (00:41):
And that pursuit of understanding is exactly what we're diving
into today. Our deep dive is into Sarah kaya Fat,
aator's incredibly insightful book, Lessons amid the Rubble, an introduction
to post disaster engineering and Ethics. This isn't just a
book we're counting failures. It takes us on this wellcinating
historical journey, asking profound questions about what it means to
(01:04):
be an engineer, how the profession grapples with its own imperfections,
and how it finds surprising lessons in the face of
unimaginable loss. Our mission is to unpack this evolution, particularly
through the lens of one of history's most dramatic collapses,
the World Trade Center Towers.
Speaker 2 (01:20):
It's a crucial exploration, definitely, especially in how it highlights
the often unseen ethical dimensions, you know, the ones woven
into the very fabric of engineering practice.
Speaker 1 (01:29):
Okay, let's start right there at ground zero after nine
to eleven. Firefighter Sam Laci described the immediate aftermath as
a confused and crowded bustle of activity, a free for all.
The initial focus, quite rightly was on rescue, criminal investigation, of.
Speaker 2 (01:41):
Course, the human element first, exactly.
Speaker 1 (01:45):
But amidst that overwhelming human drama, something else unique was unfolding.
For engineers. That horrific scene wasn't just chaos. It was,
as the book puts it, a pile of potential evidence.
Speaker 2 (01:57):
Yeah, and what's truly striking is how, for many in
the engineering field, focusing on those minute mechanical details offered
a profound respite from the overwhelming emotion of grief. It
was almost like a safe harbor from the immense human cost.
An Amazon reviewer, for instance, even praised in a motionless
documentary for being helpful in processing the event. Strange, but
(02:19):
maybe understandable.
Speaker 1 (02:20):
That psychological finding finding solace in the objective. It really resonates,
doesn't it. It makes sense then why Leslie Robertson, the
lead structural engineer for the World Trade Center, focused on
simply stating matters of fact when asked to explain the collapse.
Speaker 2 (02:33):
Right, keep it technical, keep it factual.
Speaker 1 (02:35):
Yeah, and The New York Times even suggested the engineering
response was more productive than just assigning blame. It was
a way to confront the unmanageable, maybe through a more
rational lens.
Speaker 2 (02:44):
Yet here's where it gets really complex. Despite initial awe
at how long the tower stood, the collapse revealed a
startling paradox. The tower seemed both stronger and weaker than
we imagined.
Speaker 1 (02:56):
Stronger and weaker, how so well stronger.
Speaker 2 (02:58):
In surviving the initial impact act for so long, weaker
in their ultimate vulnerability to the fires. And this opened
up a really troubling possibility for the investigation team, potentially
implicating the engineers themselves, not just the terrorists. In the
collapse that was a narrative many were understandably incredibly reluctant
to entertain.
Speaker 1 (03:17):
Wow, okay, that's a genuinely startling paradox. So how does
an engineer even begin to make sense of something as
enormous and chaotic as a structural collapse? Is there like
a standard way they approach problem solving in such a
high stakes environment.
Speaker 2 (03:32):
That's a great question, and yes, engineers often follow a
surprisingly orderly, almost iterative process. Think of it like a
multi step cycle. First, they need to truly recognize and
define the problem, get really specific about what they're trying
to solve.
Speaker 1 (03:45):
Okay, define the problem, got it.
Speaker 2 (03:46):
Then comes generating all sorts of ideas, testing and evaluating
those ideas, seeing what works best, and finally making decisions
and communicating the solution. But here's the kicker. It's never
just a straight line. They're constantly looping back, refining as
they go, multiple arrows, folding back to earlier steps.
Speaker 1 (04:05):
Right, iterative, and the study team assembled by FEMA, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, alongside ACE the American Society of
Civil Engineers, they certainly followed these faces for the WTC.
Their stated purpose it was clear, examine the damage, collect data,
develop an understanding, identify causes, identify studies. But as you mentioned,
(04:26):
beneath that methodical surface, those two unspoken questions loomed a
large didn't they? Oh?
Speaker 2 (04:31):
Absolutely, could another building have performed better? And maybe even
more sensitive, what responsibility for the building's performance lay with
the designers? Not easy questions to answer objectively, especially under
that kind of pressures.
Speaker 1 (04:42):
Not at all. The WTC investigation faced immense, almost unimaginable challenges.
Just getting access to ground zero was apparently a nightmare
amidst competing priorities, firefighters, FBI, the.
Speaker 2 (04:53):
EPA, everyone needing access, needing answers for different reasons.
Speaker 1 (04:57):
Exactly, and securing evidence from what was described as a
gargantuan bundle of steel wool. I mean just picturing that
is difficult, plus funding constraints, defining goals.
Speaker 2 (05:07):
Yeah. Gene Coraley, one of the lead engineers, later emphasized
the urgent need for selected individuals to be allowed on
site in the initial days after a catastrophic event to
gather critical data, something that you just didn't happen.
Speaker 1 (05:23):
Smoothly here, And this highlights a crucial limitation. Right even
the most methoughtable investigation is inherently shaped by what evidence survives,
what's captured on film, or what survivors recall. The book
calls this an inevitable rather than intentional bias, meaning a
purely objective analysis was well probably impossible from the outset.
Speaker 2 (05:42):
Definitely, and initially there was almost this kind of success
narrative that emerged. Gene Corley noted the team was fascinated
by how long the tower survived. He kept asking why
did they stay standing for so long? That perspective really
framed their initial findings.
Speaker 1 (05:56):
So what does this all mean for understanding the collapse?
The official report? While the famous report attributed the collapse
primarily to the impact and those extreme fires, stating there
was nothing that they termed a design flaw.
Speaker 2 (06:12):
Right, that was the official line, but the reality, as
the book explores, was far more complex. Designers had considered
a plane crash scenario. That much is true, but crucially
they had not taken into account what the fuel or
fires from such a plane would do. That was the
missing piece.
Speaker 1 (06:28):
Oh okay, so the fire aspect was the critical oversight exactly.
Speaker 2 (06:32):
There was also no analysis of what thickness of fireproofing
was required for that kind of intense jet fuel fire,
or even how to evacuate tens of thousands of people
under such extreme conditions. This led to significant controversy. Later on,
Some like structural engineer Charles Thornton, argued the towers were
not as successful as they could have been.
Speaker 1 (06:51):
It really shows how even the most advanced designs can
have these unforeseen vulnerabilities, doesn't it, especially when facing completely
unprecedented threats.
Speaker 2 (06:59):
That's a powerful point, and it leads us nicely into
a broader historical view, because while engineers naturally aim to
minimize failure, the history of engineering actually shows that, on
some level we have to expect that it will happen. Failure,
though obviously undesired, has actually been one of the profession's
greatest teachers. It's constantly shifting its understanding of what's an
(07:19):
acceptable outcome and importantly who bears responsibility, and the.
Speaker 1 (07:24):
Book traces this evolving narrative beautifully. Starting way back in
the nineteenth century. For example, failures were often seen through
this really narrow lens of individual incompetence. Think of the
Dixon Bridge in eighteen seventy three, a six hundred and
sixty foot bridge just fell into the river with a
quick crash, killing forty five. Horrifying, and this was part
of a whole series of alarming bridge failures at the time.
(07:45):
Scientific American quickly declared it improperly built and unsafe, simple.
Speaker 2 (07:49):
As that, well simple on the surface, the asse. The
American Society of Civil Engineers reacted swiftly. They saw an opportunity,
maybe to a certain control. They positioned them themselves as
the only competent authority proposing formal standards for design, construction inspection.
Their message was pretty clear, these failures, they're the result
(08:09):
of someone else's in competence, certainly not us, the true engineers.
Speaker 1 (08:13):
Protecting the profession's reputation exactly.
Speaker 2 (08:16):
Then came the Ashtabula Bridge in eighteen seventy six, another
terrible one, dramatic, deadly and problematic railroad bridge collapse killed
eighty people. The press just went after the designer, Amasa
Stone ferociously, but the ASEE Committee they staunchly defended Stone. Instead,
they deflected blame onto the poor qualifications of the inspector,
Charles Collins.
Speaker 1 (08:37):
Passing the buck. Essentially what happened to Collins, It's.
Speaker 2 (08:39):
A tragic story, despite being exonerated by other committees, Collins
resigned and sadly took his own life, and the ASSE, really,
determined to maintain its autonomy, resisted legislative proposals for federal oversight.
They were convinced their own internal standards, if applied by
qualified bridge engineers, would be enough.
Speaker 1 (08:56):
Wow, but that narrative couldn't hold forever, right, It.
Speaker 2 (09:00):
Really shifted dramatically in the early twentieth century with the
Beck Bridge. This was a huge project, a monumental task,
led by Theodore Cooper, a really renowned engineer and ASEE
leader himself.
Speaker 1 (09:11):
Okay, so one of their own this time.
Speaker 2 (09:13):
Exactly, Yeah, and it failed twice. The first time in
nineteen oh seven, on a snowy night, seventy five men died.
The Royal Commission investigating it attributed the collapse squarely to
errors in judgment on the part of these two engineers,
including Cooper.
Speaker 1 (09:28):
So how did asc he handle that? Must have been awkward.
Speaker 2 (09:31):
It was more than awkward, It was a crisis. What's
truly compelling here is how they reacted. Despite Cooper's prominence,
a society, for the first time in its fifty year existence,
opted not to investigate a report on the failure. Silence,
they just ignored it pretty much. It was a profound
crisis of faith. You see, how could a leading engineer,
one of theirs, be responsible for such a disaster. So
(09:53):
the narrative began to shift subtly from individual incompetence towards
something larger. Failures were now sort of ref aimed as
the price of progress. Yeah, pushing the bounds of the
profession's knowledge.
Speaker 1 (10:04):
Ah, So it becomes less about blaming one person and
more about the limits of collective knowledge.
Speaker 2 (10:09):
Precisely, it became less about singular blame and more about
collective learning, about expanding the very limits of what was
understood or even possible at the time.
Speaker 1 (10:18):
And this idea carried forward.
Speaker 2 (10:20):
It did. Look at the Tacoma Arrow's Bridge Galloping Gerdy
in nineteen forty famous footage of it twisting itself apart
just four months after completion. Engineers suddenly realized they had
less understanding of bridge aerodynamics than they had believed. It
was a shock. The ACE later concluded that it was
ignorance on the part of the entire engineering profession, not
(10:41):
solely on the part of ycif its designer. The blame
expanded again from one person to the collective knowledge or
lack thereof, of the entire field.
Speaker 1 (10:49):
Okay, so we're seeing a pattern from individual incompetence to
price progress to collective ignorance. Where did it go next?
Speaker 2 (10:56):
Well, fast forward to late twentieth century and things get
even more complex with systems thinking. Consider the Highest Regency
walkways collapse in nineteen eighty one, just horrific. The high
at horror, one hundred and fourteen people dead, nearly two
hundred injured when two suspended walkways just collapsed during a
crowded event.
Speaker 1 (11:15):
I remember that what was the cause?
Speaker 2 (11:16):
There?
Speaker 1 (11:16):
Was it complex?
Speaker 2 (11:18):
Surprisingly, the immediate cause was relatively simple. A design change
made during construction doubled the load on critical connections. And
it seems this has happened due to miscommunications between the
design team and the fabricators, a breakdown in.
Speaker 1 (11:32):
The process, a communication error with such devastating consequences.
Speaker 2 (11:36):
Exactly, the Missouri Licensing Board revoked the engineer's licenses for
gross negligence and misconduct. It was pretty clear cut blame
in that sense. But the ASSE, whose mission was historically
focused on promoting the profession, not policing, it really struggled
with how to respond. It wasn't just one person's obvious error.
It was also about the system of checks and communication.
Speaker 1 (11:55):
That struggle really brings us to a crucial broader insight,
doesn't it. Socio Charles Perrot, in his book Normal Accidents,
argue that complex systems like large engineering projects are inherently
not perfectible.
Speaker 2 (12:07):
Right Proro's argument was that failure in these really complex
systems is almost inherent. Why because the interactions within these
systems become too numerous and complicated to control, things can
go wrong in ways nobody predicted.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
So if failure is potentially inherent in the system itself,
we have to ask ourselves, how can one engineer truly
be held solely responsible for a failure, especially one that
might emerge from complexities beyond their individual control. This systemic
view really challenges that whole notion of singular blame, doesn't it?
Speaker 2 (12:40):
It absolutely does, and that question of how much an
individual engineer can truly be responsible in such complex systems,
like Pero suggested, really since the stage for how the
profession had to redefine itself after nine to eleven, Because
that day wasn't just a catastrophe, It truly signaled well
the beginning of a new era for engineering. So what
(13:00):
were the actual lessons learned, especially given the remarkably divergent
views among professionals right afterwards?
Speaker 1 (13:06):
You're right, The views were all over the place. Some
focused squarely on the fire, right this unprecedentedly huge fire.
They argued the lessons should be about fire detection, suppression, evacuation.
Their view was pretty direct, It's not the building's fault,
it's the plane's fault. This group even suggested rethinking that
old idea that exiting an entire high rise building is
not functional or feasible.
Speaker 2 (13:28):
Yeah, challenging long held assumptions. Then others, like Robert Preto
of Parsons Brinckerhoff, shifted the focus entirely upstream. They argued
the core lesson was to prevent these things from happening
in the first place. Pointing directly to airport security. He
basically said the security feeling was not at the World
Trade Center or the Pentagon, it was at an airport.
(13:48):
They felt it was just unrealistic to expect buildings to
withstand that kind of attack.
Speaker 1 (13:52):
Two very different takeaways. And then there was a third.
Speaker 2 (13:55):
Group, a small but notable group. Yeah. They even suggested
that the attack were rooted in much deeper issues, things
like international relations, US energy policy, the bigger geopolitical picture.
Speaker 1 (14:07):
Wow. So the profound question that emerges here is beyond
what was technically possible, what was morally appropriate to expect
of them of the engineers. Should engineers now be expected
to predict the malicious ways in which their designs might
be used? That's a vastly different ethical landscape for the profession,
isn't it.
Speaker 2 (14:25):
It's huge yea. And this brings us to a really
compelling analogy drawn by New York Times journalists Jim Dwyer
and Kevin Flynn the Titanic. They drew parallels between the
WTC and the supposedly unsinkable ship. They noted that for both,
little attention had been paid to evacuation or rescue because
so much faith had been placed in the infallibility of
(14:46):
the structure.
Speaker 1 (14:46):
That's chilling. So like the Titanic's limited lifeboats, the WTC's
design also limited escape.
Speaker 2 (14:53):
In some ways. Yes, Much like the Titanic's watertight compartments
were meant to contain damage but ultimately failed systemically. The
WTC's design, particularly its strong central core structure, while intended
for strength, significantly limited evacuation options once compromised, and communication
problems just compounded this terribly. One critical announcement actually told
(15:13):
a tower too occupants to return to their offices even
as the other tower burned. Meanwhile, a crucial stairwell stairwell
A apparently remained open but largely unknown to those desperately
trying to escape confusion rained.
Speaker 1 (15:26):
Just tragic miscommunications.
Speaker 2 (15:28):
Absolutely, the broader lesson from the Titanic applied to buildings
is profound. No matter how unsinkable you think a structure is,
you should still equip it with enough lifeboats, enough exits,
clear pathways, and have a clear, organized plan for efficient evacuation.
For buildings, this translates to fundamental questions, are there enough exits?
(15:48):
Do people know where they are and how to use them?
Is redundancy built into the structure. It's a fundamental shift
in thinking, moving from just design integrity to comprehensive human
centered safety.
Speaker 1 (16:00):
This brings us to that fascinating paradox of public safety
you mentioned earlier. Engineering ethics proudly states that engineers shall
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
It's right there in the code. Leslie Robertson after nine
to eleven echoed this, believing the sanctity of human life
rises far above all other values.
Speaker 2 (16:18):
That's the ideal. Yes, yet lessens amid the rubble makes
a really powerful, maybe even controversial point. Public safety is
in fact never the paramount consideration in real world design. Never.
Speaker 1 (16:29):
That sounds pretty stark.
Speaker 2 (16:30):
Well think about it. What's truly fascinating here is that
it's always a complex balance, right, a trade off between
many competing factors. Safety, sure, but also affordability, renderable floor space,
strength versus weight efficient construction. Maximizing safety in one area,
say strengthening the core like crazy, might inadvertently reduce it elsewhere,
(16:52):
maybe by forcing the use of lighter, less fire resistant
floor trust is to save weight and cost. There is
quite simply no perfect safety.
Speaker 1 (17:00):
It's always a compromise that makes sense, and even well
intentioned changes can have unintended consequences down the line. For example,
the book mentions the nineteen sixty eight New York City
building Code it actually eased fire resistance requirements compared to
older codes. This meant the WTC stairways were only clad
in a few inches of lightweight drywall not exactly robust
fire protection right.
Speaker 2 (17:20):
And another factor the shift away from asbestos fireproofing obviously
done for good health reasons, but the replacement material used
mid construction on the WTC turned out to be less
effective against intense fires. The takeaway we are always adapting
and updating our notions of what safe means. It's a
fluid target in a dynamic world, influenced by new knowledge,
(17:43):
new regulations, new materials.
Speaker 1 (17:44):
So it's not a static goalpost, not at all.
Speaker 2 (17:47):
Ultimately, the outcome on nine to eleven depended on the
interaction of the tower structure with the terrorist's actions. The
profound insight here is that safety is never the sole
domain of the engineer. They don't build the towers alone.
As the book says, it's a complex dance involving owners
pushing for cost savings, politicians setting codes, regulators enforcing them,
and even external actors with malicious intent. The nine to
(18:09):
eleven tragedy really underscores that engineering responsibility exists within this
messy ecosystem of shared accountability.
Speaker 1 (18:15):
This brings us back to the core of engineering itself
and a deeply human element. We touched on the grief
engineers can feel for material things. Leslie Robertson, the WTC
structural engineer, confessed he grieved for more than the people
who died, which sounds maybe odd at first, but he
felt the absence of the buildings in himself, describing it
(18:36):
as a part of his identity had collapsed with them.
Speaker 2 (18:39):
It's powerful, isn't it. Frank Lombardi, who was chief engineer
with the Port Authority, and Professor Ebel Hassen A stena
As also expressed this profound sense of loss. Astana Azel noted,
it's your product and they use it to kill people.
That connection, that passion for their creations, really highlights the
power that structures have to shape our lives. As the
(19:00):
architectural theorist Mark Wiggley put it, damaged buildings represent damaged bodies.
Buildings aren't just objects. They are witnesses that when they disappear,
take something of the reality of our life with them.
Speaker 1 (19:10):
That deep connection leads to another fascinating question raised in
the book from Langden Winter. Do artifacts have politics? Can
technological objects like buildings or bridges hold in themselves the
power to shape society?
Speaker 2 (19:22):
It's a great question. The book uses the striking example
of Robert Moses's bridges in New York. Apparently some were
intentionally built low, too low for buses to pass under.
This effectively restricted access for poorer communities, often people of color,
who relied on public transport to certain beaches on Long Island.
His political views became hardened in concrete and steel artifacts.
(19:44):
The design itself enforced social division.
Speaker 1 (19:47):
Wow, concrete and steel with embedded politics and the World
Trade Center did it have politics too?
Speaker 2 (19:53):
Oh? Absolutely? It wasn't just about office space. Envisioned as
a commanding presence, these beacons for revital Lower Manhattan. They
were absolutely status symbols. They were exclamation points on the
claim shattered worldwide that New York City still intended to
be the center of world trade. That immense symbolic power
tragically made them the perfect target for enemies of America.
(20:14):
Osama bin Laden himself specifically called them awesome symbolic towers.
Their symbolism was part of their vulnerability.
Speaker 1 (20:21):
This symbolism disturbingly led to Eric Darton's highly provocative claim
of architectural terrorism. What did he mean by that?
Speaker 2 (20:28):
Darton suggested a kind of kindred spirit linking the apparently
polar realms of skyscraper terrorist and skyscraper builder. It's a
challenging idea. Both, Darton argues, rely heavily on abstraction, a
radical distancing from the flesh and blood experience. They remove
people from their equations in a sense, to achieve either
(20:49):
immense creation or a month's destruction. It's a chilling thought
that Mohammed Adda, the lead hijacker, was actually trained in architecture.
Speaker 1 (20:57):
That is deeply unsettling abstraction as a tool for both
creation and destruction exactly.
Speaker 2 (21:04):
Civil engineer Samuel Foreman wrote about the existential pleasures of engineering,
that comfort that comes with total absorption in a mechanical environment,
but he also cautioned that this can become a destructive obsession.
Richard Feynman, reflecting on his work on the Manhattan Project
the atomic bomb, noted, you stop thinking, you know, you
just stop. You get lost in the technical problem. Darton
(21:24):
argued that abstraction itself isn't inherently good or evil. It's
all about its use. If creation produces buildings that intune
their occupants figuratively or literally, or simply to humanize them,
it truly is evil.
Speaker 1 (21:36):
That's a really profound thought. So how do we distinguish
a fervently held rational belief like an engineer's focus, from
one that leads to dreadful consequences like those of terrorists.
Terrorists who, as the book notes, are often highly educated
in technical fields but perhaps lack that broader humanity's understanding.
Speaker 2 (21:56):
That's the million dollar question, isn't it. Bill Wolfe, former
president of the National Academy of Engineering, argued strongly for
creativity and better solutions through diverse teams, diversity of thought,
background perspective, and.
Speaker 1 (22:08):
It seems the engineering profession itself is responding trying to
build in that broader perspective.
Speaker 2 (22:13):
Yes, definitely abet The Accreditation Board for Engineering Programs introduced
its Engineering Criteria two thousand. It now requires engineers to
have not just the technical skills, but also the broad
education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in
a global economic, environmental, and societal context. It's pushing for
a crucial balance technical knowledge alongside professional understanding including ethics
(22:38):
and societal impact. The core idea, as it book emphasizes,
is that people must take center stage among engineers concerns.
Engineers ultimately can offer only one piece of the solution
they need to work within that broader context.
Speaker 1 (22:51):
Dirton's caution resonates so deeply here. We humans are born
creatures of the earth and air, capable of functioning with
our heads in the clouds so long as our feet
remains on the ground. The enduring wisdom seems to be
that true engineering isn't just about technical brilliance. It's about
anchoring that brilliance and a profound understanding of human context
and societal impact, that essential balance between soaring innovation and
(23:13):
grounded responsibility.
Speaker 2 (23:15):
So wrapping up, what have we really learned from this
deep dive into the rubble through Figator's lens, Engineering, it
turns out, is deeply interconnected, incredibly complex, often ambiguous, definitely
passion filled, messy, people oriented, and ultimately hard. But hard
not just because of the complex equations, but because it
(23:35):
is filled with equivocations, with trade offs and uncertainties.
Speaker 1 (23:39):
Right. It's a field where theory speaks of certainty, but
practice constantly grapples with ambiguity. Where perfection is the goal
but mistakes are on some level expected or at least
need to be planned for. Where expertise is absolutely vital
but it's not sufficient on its own.
Speaker 2 (23:54):
Exactly public safety is held up as this paramount ideal,
but in practice it must always be balanced with other
real world needs. Dedication and focus are crucial, but they
need to be moderated by other influences and perspectives. And fundamentally,
design requires this constant, dynamic balance between creativity pushing boundaries
and conservatism ensuring safety and reliability.
Speaker 1 (24:15):
So for the future of engineering education and practice, what
does this mean? It seems to mean embracing failure, not
as taboo, but as a powerful learning tool, cultivating both
creativity and conservatism, fostering both deep technical knowledge and broad
social understanding. The book even suggests it calls for more
(24:35):
time for the dreaming, for that unstructured, undirected reflection that
sparks true insight beyond just the calculations.
Speaker 2 (24:41):
And maybe we end by considering that poignant reflection from
Leslie Robertson the WTC structural engineer. He thought about the
praise his design received for standing as long as it did,
but then said, had the tower stood up for just
one minute longer, it is hard and his powerful realization
looking back, yes, no doubt I could have made the
towers braver, more stalwart. The power to do so rested
almost solely with me.
Speaker 1 (25:02):
Wow, that really hits home. It leaves us and you
listening with a profound question to ponder. How do we
as a society collectively define and truly pursue that incredibly
difficult fine line between needless conservatism and appropriate increases in
structural integrity. How do we ensure that our grandest designs
truly serve the people who inhabit them and all their complexity,
(25:23):
and not just the abstract ideals or symbols they might represent.
Imagine staring at the ruins. What was once this monumental
building now just you twisted metal and dust when the
devastation finally settles. What does a moment like that really
tell us about the structures we create, the processes we trust,
and the people who design them. Because as terrible as
they are, disasters often end up being our most profound teachers,
(00:22):
even if they're tragic ones.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Absolutely, and in the face of such a men's loss,
there's always this powerful human drive to find answers right
and to understand why something happened. For engineers, that quest
isn't just about comprehension. It's deeply ingrained a drive to
reconstruct every mechanical detail, to learn and ultimately to prevent
future tragedies.
Speaker 1 (00:41):
And that pursuit of understanding is exactly what we're diving
into today. Our deep dive is into Sarah kaya Fat,
aator's incredibly insightful book, Lessons amid the Rubble, an introduction
to post disaster engineering and Ethics. This isn't just a
book we're counting failures. It takes us on this wellcinating
historical journey, asking profound questions about what it means to
(01:04):
be an engineer, how the profession grapples with its own imperfections,
and how it finds surprising lessons in the face of
unimaginable loss. Our mission is to unpack this evolution, particularly
through the lens of one of history's most dramatic collapses,
the World Trade Center Towers.
Speaker 2 (01:20):
It's a crucial exploration, definitely, especially in how it highlights
the often unseen ethical dimensions, you know, the ones woven
into the very fabric of engineering practice.
Speaker 1 (01:29):
Okay, let's start right there at ground zero after nine
to eleven. Firefighter Sam Laci described the immediate aftermath as
a confused and crowded bustle of activity, a free for all.
The initial focus, quite rightly was on rescue, criminal investigation, of.
Speaker 2 (01:41):
Course, the human element first, exactly.
Speaker 1 (01:45):
But amidst that overwhelming human drama, something else unique was unfolding.
For engineers. That horrific scene wasn't just chaos. It was,
as the book puts it, a pile of potential evidence.
Speaker 2 (01:57):
Yeah, and what's truly striking is how, for many in
the engineering field, focusing on those minute mechanical details offered
a profound respite from the overwhelming emotion of grief. It
was almost like a safe harbor from the immense human cost.
An Amazon reviewer, for instance, even praised in a motionless
documentary for being helpful in processing the event. Strange, but
(02:19):
maybe understandable.
Speaker 1 (02:20):
That psychological finding finding solace in the objective. It really resonates,
doesn't it. It makes sense then why Leslie Robertson, the
lead structural engineer for the World Trade Center, focused on
simply stating matters of fact when asked to explain the collapse.
Speaker 2 (02:33):
Right, keep it technical, keep it factual.
Speaker 1 (02:35):
Yeah, and The New York Times even suggested the engineering
response was more productive than just assigning blame. It was
a way to confront the unmanageable, maybe through a more
rational lens.
Speaker 2 (02:44):
Yet here's where it gets really complex. Despite initial awe
at how long the tower stood, the collapse revealed a
startling paradox. The tower seemed both stronger and weaker than
we imagined.
Speaker 1 (02:56):
Stronger and weaker, how so well stronger.
Speaker 2 (02:58):
In surviving the initial impact act for so long, weaker
in their ultimate vulnerability to the fires. And this opened
up a really troubling possibility for the investigation team, potentially
implicating the engineers themselves, not just the terrorists. In the
collapse that was a narrative many were understandably incredibly reluctant
to entertain.
Speaker 1 (03:17):
Wow, okay, that's a genuinely startling paradox. So how does
an engineer even begin to make sense of something as
enormous and chaotic as a structural collapse? Is there like
a standard way they approach problem solving in such a
high stakes environment.
Speaker 2 (03:32):
That's a great question, and yes, engineers often follow a
surprisingly orderly, almost iterative process. Think of it like a
multi step cycle. First, they need to truly recognize and
define the problem, get really specific about what they're trying
to solve.
Speaker 1 (03:45):
Okay, define the problem, got it.
Speaker 2 (03:46):
Then comes generating all sorts of ideas, testing and evaluating
those ideas, seeing what works best, and finally making decisions
and communicating the solution. But here's the kicker. It's never
just a straight line. They're constantly looping back, refining as
they go, multiple arrows, folding back to earlier steps.
Speaker 1 (04:05):
Right, iterative, and the study team assembled by FEMA, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, alongside ACE the American Society of
Civil Engineers, they certainly followed these faces for the WTC.
Their stated purpose it was clear, examine the damage, collect data,
develop an understanding, identify causes, identify studies. But as you mentioned,
(04:26):
beneath that methodical surface, those two unspoken questions loomed a
large didn't they? Oh?
Speaker 2 (04:31):
Absolutely, could another building have performed better? And maybe even
more sensitive, what responsibility for the building's performance lay with
the designers? Not easy questions to answer objectively, especially under
that kind of pressures.
Speaker 1 (04:42):
Not at all. The WTC investigation faced immense, almost unimaginable challenges.
Just getting access to ground zero was apparently a nightmare
amidst competing priorities, firefighters, FBI, the.
Speaker 2 (04:53):
EPA, everyone needing access, needing answers for different reasons.
Speaker 1 (04:57):
Exactly, and securing evidence from what was described as a
gargantuan bundle of steel wool. I mean just picturing that
is difficult, plus funding constraints, defining goals.
Speaker 2 (05:07):
Yeah. Gene Coraley, one of the lead engineers, later emphasized
the urgent need for selected individuals to be allowed on
site in the initial days after a catastrophic event to
gather critical data, something that you just didn't happen.
Speaker 1 (05:23):
Smoothly here, And this highlights a crucial limitation. Right even
the most methoughtable investigation is inherently shaped by what evidence survives,
what's captured on film, or what survivors recall. The book
calls this an inevitable rather than intentional bias, meaning a
purely objective analysis was well probably impossible from the outset.
Speaker 2 (05:42):
Definitely, and initially there was almost this kind of success
narrative that emerged. Gene Corley noted the team was fascinated
by how long the tower survived. He kept asking why
did they stay standing for so long? That perspective really
framed their initial findings.
Speaker 1 (05:56):
So what does this all mean for understanding the collapse?
The official report? While the famous report attributed the collapse
primarily to the impact and those extreme fires, stating there
was nothing that they termed a design flaw.
Speaker 2 (06:12):
Right, that was the official line, but the reality, as
the book explores, was far more complex. Designers had considered
a plane crash scenario. That much is true, but crucially
they had not taken into account what the fuel or
fires from such a plane would do. That was the
missing piece.
Speaker 1 (06:28):
Oh okay, so the fire aspect was the critical oversight exactly.
Speaker 2 (06:32):
There was also no analysis of what thickness of fireproofing
was required for that kind of intense jet fuel fire,
or even how to evacuate tens of thousands of people
under such extreme conditions. This led to significant controversy. Later on,
Some like structural engineer Charles Thornton, argued the towers were
not as successful as they could have been.
Speaker 1 (06:51):
It really shows how even the most advanced designs can
have these unforeseen vulnerabilities, doesn't it, especially when facing completely
unprecedented threats.
Speaker 2 (06:59):
That's a powerful point, and it leads us nicely into
a broader historical view, because while engineers naturally aim to
minimize failure, the history of engineering actually shows that, on
some level we have to expect that it will happen. Failure,
though obviously undesired, has actually been one of the profession's
greatest teachers. It's constantly shifting its understanding of what's an
(07:19):
acceptable outcome and importantly who bears responsibility, and the.
Speaker 1 (07:24):
Book traces this evolving narrative beautifully. Starting way back in
the nineteenth century. For example, failures were often seen through
this really narrow lens of individual incompetence. Think of the
Dixon Bridge in eighteen seventy three, a six hundred and
sixty foot bridge just fell into the river with a
quick crash, killing forty five. Horrifying, and this was part
of a whole series of alarming bridge failures at the time.
(07:45):
Scientific American quickly declared it improperly built and unsafe, simple.
Speaker 2 (07:49):
As that, well simple on the surface, the asse. The
American Society of Civil Engineers reacted swiftly. They saw an opportunity,
maybe to a certain control. They positioned them themselves as
the only competent authority proposing formal standards for design, construction inspection.
Their message was pretty clear, these failures, they're the result
(08:09):
of someone else's in competence, certainly not us, the true engineers.
Speaker 1 (08:13):
Protecting the profession's reputation exactly.
Speaker 2 (08:16):
Then came the Ashtabula Bridge in eighteen seventy six, another
terrible one, dramatic, deadly and problematic railroad bridge collapse killed
eighty people. The press just went after the designer, Amasa
Stone ferociously, but the ASEE Committee they staunchly defended Stone. Instead,
they deflected blame onto the poor qualifications of the inspector,
Charles Collins.
Speaker 1 (08:37):
Passing the buck. Essentially what happened to Collins, It's.
Speaker 2 (08:39):
A tragic story, despite being exonerated by other committees, Collins
resigned and sadly took his own life, and the ASSE, really,
determined to maintain its autonomy, resisted legislative proposals for federal oversight.
They were convinced their own internal standards, if applied by
qualified bridge engineers, would be enough.
Speaker 1 (08:56):
Wow, but that narrative couldn't hold forever, right, It.
Speaker 2 (09:00):
Really shifted dramatically in the early twentieth century with the
Beck Bridge. This was a huge project, a monumental task,
led by Theodore Cooper, a really renowned engineer and ASEE
leader himself.
Speaker 1 (09:11):
Okay, so one of their own this time.
Speaker 2 (09:13):
Exactly, Yeah, and it failed twice. The first time in
nineteen oh seven, on a snowy night, seventy five men died.
The Royal Commission investigating it attributed the collapse squarely to
errors in judgment on the part of these two engineers,
including Cooper.
Speaker 1 (09:28):
So how did asc he handle that? Must have been awkward.
Speaker 2 (09:31):
It was more than awkward, It was a crisis. What's
truly compelling here is how they reacted. Despite Cooper's prominence,
a society, for the first time in its fifty year existence,
opted not to investigate a report on the failure. Silence,
they just ignored it pretty much. It was a profound
crisis of faith. You see, how could a leading engineer,
one of theirs, be responsible for such a disaster. So
(09:53):
the narrative began to shift subtly from individual incompetence towards
something larger. Failures were now sort of ref aimed as
the price of progress. Yeah, pushing the bounds of the
profession's knowledge.
Speaker 1 (10:04):
Ah, So it becomes less about blaming one person and
more about the limits of collective knowledge.
Speaker 2 (10:09):
Precisely, it became less about singular blame and more about
collective learning, about expanding the very limits of what was
understood or even possible at the time.
Speaker 1 (10:18):
And this idea carried forward.
Speaker 2 (10:20):
It did. Look at the Tacoma Arrow's Bridge Galloping Gerdy
in nineteen forty famous footage of it twisting itself apart
just four months after completion. Engineers suddenly realized they had
less understanding of bridge aerodynamics than they had believed. It
was a shock. The ACE later concluded that it was
ignorance on the part of the entire engineering profession, not
(10:41):
solely on the part of ycif its designer. The blame
expanded again from one person to the collective knowledge or
lack thereof, of the entire field.
Speaker 1 (10:49):
Okay, so we're seeing a pattern from individual incompetence to
price progress to collective ignorance. Where did it go next?
Speaker 2 (10:56):
Well, fast forward to late twentieth century and things get
even more complex with systems thinking. Consider the Highest Regency
walkways collapse in nineteen eighty one, just horrific. The high
at horror, one hundred and fourteen people dead, nearly two
hundred injured when two suspended walkways just collapsed during a
crowded event.
Speaker 1 (11:15):
I remember that what was the cause?
Speaker 2 (11:16):
There?
Speaker 1 (11:16):
Was it complex?
Speaker 2 (11:18):
Surprisingly, the immediate cause was relatively simple. A design change
made during construction doubled the load on critical connections. And
it seems this has happened due to miscommunications between the
design team and the fabricators, a breakdown in.
Speaker 1 (11:32):
The process, a communication error with such devastating consequences.
Speaker 2 (11:36):
Exactly, the Missouri Licensing Board revoked the engineer's licenses for
gross negligence and misconduct. It was pretty clear cut blame
in that sense. But the ASSE, whose mission was historically
focused on promoting the profession, not policing, it really struggled
with how to respond. It wasn't just one person's obvious error.
It was also about the system of checks and communication.
Speaker 1 (11:55):
That struggle really brings us to a crucial broader insight,
doesn't it. Socio Charles Perrot, in his book Normal Accidents,
argue that complex systems like large engineering projects are inherently
not perfectible.
Speaker 2 (12:07):
Right Proro's argument was that failure in these really complex
systems is almost inherent. Why because the interactions within these
systems become too numerous and complicated to control, things can
go wrong in ways nobody predicted.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
So if failure is potentially inherent in the system itself,
we have to ask ourselves, how can one engineer truly
be held solely responsible for a failure, especially one that
might emerge from complexities beyond their individual control. This systemic
view really challenges that whole notion of singular blame, doesn't it?
Speaker 2 (12:40):
It absolutely does, and that question of how much an
individual engineer can truly be responsible in such complex systems,
like Pero suggested, really since the stage for how the
profession had to redefine itself after nine to eleven, Because
that day wasn't just a catastrophe, It truly signaled well
the beginning of a new era for engineering. So what
(13:00):
were the actual lessons learned, especially given the remarkably divergent
views among professionals right afterwards?
Speaker 1 (13:06):
You're right, The views were all over the place. Some
focused squarely on the fire, right this unprecedentedly huge fire.
They argued the lessons should be about fire detection, suppression, evacuation.
Their view was pretty direct, It's not the building's fault,
it's the plane's fault. This group even suggested rethinking that
old idea that exiting an entire high rise building is
not functional or feasible.
Speaker 2 (13:28):
Yeah, challenging long held assumptions. Then others, like Robert Preto
of Parsons Brinckerhoff, shifted the focus entirely upstream. They argued
the core lesson was to prevent these things from happening
in the first place. Pointing directly to airport security. He
basically said the security feeling was not at the World
Trade Center or the Pentagon, it was at an airport.
(13:48):
They felt it was just unrealistic to expect buildings to
withstand that kind of attack.
Speaker 1 (13:52):
Two very different takeaways. And then there was a third.
Speaker 2 (13:55):
Group, a small but notable group. Yeah. They even suggested
that the attack were rooted in much deeper issues, things
like international relations, US energy policy, the bigger geopolitical picture.
Speaker 1 (14:07):
Wow. So the profound question that emerges here is beyond
what was technically possible, what was morally appropriate to expect
of them of the engineers. Should engineers now be expected
to predict the malicious ways in which their designs might
be used? That's a vastly different ethical landscape for the profession,
isn't it.
Speaker 2 (14:25):
It's huge yea. And this brings us to a really
compelling analogy drawn by New York Times journalists Jim Dwyer
and Kevin Flynn the Titanic. They drew parallels between the
WTC and the supposedly unsinkable ship. They noted that for both,
little attention had been paid to evacuation or rescue because
so much faith had been placed in the infallibility of
(14:46):
the structure.
Speaker 1 (14:46):
That's chilling. So like the Titanic's limited lifeboats, the WTC's
design also limited escape.
Speaker 2 (14:53):
In some ways. Yes, Much like the Titanic's watertight compartments
were meant to contain damage but ultimately failed systemically. The
WTC's design, particularly its strong central core structure, while intended
for strength, significantly limited evacuation options once compromised, and communication
problems just compounded this terribly. One critical announcement actually told
(15:13):
a tower too occupants to return to their offices even
as the other tower burned. Meanwhile, a crucial stairwell stairwell
A apparently remained open but largely unknown to those desperately
trying to escape confusion rained.
Speaker 1 (15:26):
Just tragic miscommunications.
Speaker 2 (15:28):
Absolutely, the broader lesson from the Titanic applied to buildings
is profound. No matter how unsinkable you think a structure is,
you should still equip it with enough lifeboats, enough exits,
clear pathways, and have a clear, organized plan for efficient evacuation.
For buildings, this translates to fundamental questions, are there enough exits?
(15:48):
Do people know where they are and how to use them?
Is redundancy built into the structure. It's a fundamental shift
in thinking, moving from just design integrity to comprehensive human
centered safety.
Speaker 1 (16:00):
This brings us to that fascinating paradox of public safety
you mentioned earlier. Engineering ethics proudly states that engineers shall
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
It's right there in the code. Leslie Robertson after nine
to eleven echoed this, believing the sanctity of human life
rises far above all other values.
Speaker 2 (16:18):
That's the ideal. Yes, yet lessens amid the rubble makes
a really powerful, maybe even controversial point. Public safety is
in fact never the paramount consideration in real world design. Never.
Speaker 1 (16:29):
That sounds pretty stark.
Speaker 2 (16:30):
Well think about it. What's truly fascinating here is that
it's always a complex balance, right, a trade off between
many competing factors. Safety, sure, but also affordability, renderable floor space,
strength versus weight efficient construction. Maximizing safety in one area,
say strengthening the core like crazy, might inadvertently reduce it elsewhere,
(16:52):
maybe by forcing the use of lighter, less fire resistant
floor trust is to save weight and cost. There is
quite simply no perfect safety.
Speaker 1 (17:00):
It's always a compromise that makes sense, and even well
intentioned changes can have unintended consequences down the line. For example,
the book mentions the nineteen sixty eight New York City
building Code it actually eased fire resistance requirements compared to
older codes. This meant the WTC stairways were only clad
in a few inches of lightweight drywall not exactly robust
fire protection right.
Speaker 2 (17:20):
And another factor the shift away from asbestos fireproofing obviously
done for good health reasons, but the replacement material used
mid construction on the WTC turned out to be less
effective against intense fires. The takeaway we are always adapting
and updating our notions of what safe means. It's a
fluid target in a dynamic world, influenced by new knowledge,
(17:43):
new regulations, new materials.
Speaker 1 (17:44):
So it's not a static goalpost, not at all.
Speaker 2 (17:47):
Ultimately, the outcome on nine to eleven depended on the
interaction of the tower structure with the terrorist's actions. The
profound insight here is that safety is never the sole
domain of the engineer. They don't build the towers alone.
As the book says, it's a complex dance involving owners
pushing for cost savings, politicians setting codes, regulators enforcing them,
and even external actors with malicious intent. The nine to
(18:09):
eleven tragedy really underscores that engineering responsibility exists within this
messy ecosystem of shared accountability.
Speaker 1 (18:15):
This brings us back to the core of engineering itself
and a deeply human element. We touched on the grief
engineers can feel for material things. Leslie Robertson, the WTC
structural engineer, confessed he grieved for more than the people
who died, which sounds maybe odd at first, but he
felt the absence of the buildings in himself, describing it
(18:36):
as a part of his identity had collapsed with them.
Speaker 2 (18:39):
It's powerful, isn't it. Frank Lombardi, who was chief engineer
with the Port Authority, and Professor Ebel Hassen A stena
As also expressed this profound sense of loss. Astana Azel noted,
it's your product and they use it to kill people.
That connection, that passion for their creations, really highlights the
power that structures have to shape our lives. As the
(19:00):
architectural theorist Mark Wiggley put it, damaged buildings represent damaged bodies.
Buildings aren't just objects. They are witnesses that when they disappear,
take something of the reality of our life with them.
Speaker 1 (19:10):
That deep connection leads to another fascinating question raised in
the book from Langden Winter. Do artifacts have politics? Can
technological objects like buildings or bridges hold in themselves the
power to shape society?
Speaker 2 (19:22):
It's a great question. The book uses the striking example
of Robert Moses's bridges in New York. Apparently some were
intentionally built low, too low for buses to pass under.
This effectively restricted access for poorer communities, often people of color,
who relied on public transport to certain beaches on Long Island.
His political views became hardened in concrete and steel artifacts.
(19:44):
The design itself enforced social division.
Speaker 1 (19:47):
Wow, concrete and steel with embedded politics and the World
Trade Center did it have politics too?
Speaker 2 (19:53):
Oh? Absolutely? It wasn't just about office space. Envisioned as
a commanding presence, these beacons for revital Lower Manhattan. They
were absolutely status symbols. They were exclamation points on the
claim shattered worldwide that New York City still intended to
be the center of world trade. That immense symbolic power
tragically made them the perfect target for enemies of America.
(20:14):
Osama bin Laden himself specifically called them awesome symbolic towers.
Their symbolism was part of their vulnerability.
Speaker 1 (20:21):
This symbolism disturbingly led to Eric Darton's highly provocative claim
of architectural terrorism. What did he mean by that?
Speaker 2 (20:28):
Darton suggested a kind of kindred spirit linking the apparently
polar realms of skyscraper terrorist and skyscraper builder. It's a
challenging idea. Both, Darton argues, rely heavily on abstraction, a
radical distancing from the flesh and blood experience. They remove
people from their equations in a sense, to achieve either
(20:49):
immense creation or a month's destruction. It's a chilling thought
that Mohammed Adda, the lead hijacker, was actually trained in architecture.
Speaker 1 (20:57):
That is deeply unsettling abstraction as a tool for both
creation and destruction exactly.
Speaker 2 (21:04):
Civil engineer Samuel Foreman wrote about the existential pleasures of engineering,
that comfort that comes with total absorption in a mechanical environment,
but he also cautioned that this can become a destructive obsession.
Richard Feynman, reflecting on his work on the Manhattan Project
the atomic bomb, noted, you stop thinking, you know, you
just stop. You get lost in the technical problem. Darton
(21:24):
argued that abstraction itself isn't inherently good or evil. It's
all about its use. If creation produces buildings that intune
their occupants figuratively or literally, or simply to humanize them,
it truly is evil.
Speaker 1 (21:36):
That's a really profound thought. So how do we distinguish
a fervently held rational belief like an engineer's focus, from
one that leads to dreadful consequences like those of terrorists.
Terrorists who, as the book notes, are often highly educated
in technical fields but perhaps lack that broader humanity's understanding.
Speaker 2 (21:56):
That's the million dollar question, isn't it. Bill Wolfe, former
president of the National Academy of Engineering, argued strongly for
creativity and better solutions through diverse teams, diversity of thought,
background perspective, and.
Speaker 1 (22:08):
It seems the engineering profession itself is responding trying to
build in that broader perspective.
Speaker 2 (22:13):
Yes, definitely abet The Accreditation Board for Engineering Programs introduced
its Engineering Criteria two thousand. It now requires engineers to
have not just the technical skills, but also the broad
education necessary to understand the impact of engineering solutions in
a global economic, environmental, and societal context. It's pushing for
a crucial balance technical knowledge alongside professional understanding including ethics
(22:38):
and societal impact. The core idea, as it book emphasizes,
is that people must take center stage among engineers concerns.
Engineers ultimately can offer only one piece of the solution
they need to work within that broader context.
Speaker 1 (22:51):
Dirton's caution resonates so deeply here. We humans are born
creatures of the earth and air, capable of functioning with
our heads in the clouds so long as our feet
remains on the ground. The enduring wisdom seems to be
that true engineering isn't just about technical brilliance. It's about
anchoring that brilliance and a profound understanding of human context
and societal impact, that essential balance between soaring innovation and
(23:13):
grounded responsibility.
Speaker 2 (23:15):
So wrapping up, what have we really learned from this
deep dive into the rubble through Figator's lens, Engineering, it
turns out, is deeply interconnected, incredibly complex, often ambiguous, definitely
passion filled, messy, people oriented, and ultimately hard. But hard
not just because of the complex equations, but because it
(23:35):
is filled with equivocations, with trade offs and uncertainties.
Speaker 1 (23:39):
Right. It's a field where theory speaks of certainty, but
practice constantly grapples with ambiguity. Where perfection is the goal
but mistakes are on some level expected or at least
need to be planned for. Where expertise is absolutely vital
but it's not sufficient on its own.
Speaker 2 (23:54):
Exactly public safety is held up as this paramount ideal,
but in practice it must always be balanced with other
real world needs. Dedication and focus are crucial, but they
need to be moderated by other influences and perspectives. And fundamentally,
design requires this constant, dynamic balance between creativity pushing boundaries
and conservatism ensuring safety and reliability.
Speaker 1 (24:15):
So for the future of engineering education and practice, what
does this mean? It seems to mean embracing failure, not
as taboo, but as a powerful learning tool, cultivating both
creativity and conservatism, fostering both deep technical knowledge and broad
social understanding. The book even suggests it calls for more
(24:35):
time for the dreaming, for that unstructured, undirected reflection that
sparks true insight beyond just the calculations.
Speaker 2 (24:41):
And maybe we end by considering that poignant reflection from
Leslie Robertson the WTC structural engineer. He thought about the
praise his design received for standing as long as it did,
but then said, had the tower stood up for just
one minute longer, it is hard and his powerful realization
looking back, yes, no doubt I could have made the
towers braver, more stalwart. The power to do so rested
almost solely with me.
Speaker 1 (25:02):
Wow, that really hits home. It leaves us and you
listening with a profound question to ponder. How do we
as a society collectively define and truly pursue that incredibly
difficult fine line between needless conservatism and appropriate increases in
structural integrity. How do we ensure that our grandest designs
truly serve the people who inhabit them and all their complexity,
(25:23):
and not just the abstract ideals or symbols they might represent.
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