August 21, 2025 • 57 mins
India and China—two ancient civilizations and Asian giants—have a long history of friendship, conflict, and mistrust. With Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India and an invitation to Prime Minister Modi for the SCO Summit in Tianjin, is the relationship finally on the mend?
In this episode of the Chakravyuh Podcast, Ambassador Ashok Kantha, India’s former Ambassador to China, joins Gaurav to decode:
• The reality behind India-China “thaw” talks.
• Border issues post-Galwan 2020 and Doklam 2017.
• China’s military and intelligence support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor.
• The strategic mistrust between New Delhi, Beijing, and Washington.
• Economic vulnerabilities—rare earths, APIs, and supply chains.
Produced by Nikhil Khattar
Sound mixed by Rohan Bharti
In this episode of the Chakravyuh Podcast, Ambassador Ashok Kantha, India’s former Ambassador to China, joins Gaurav to decode:
• The reality behind India-China “thaw” talks.
• Border issues post-Galwan 2020 and Doklam 2017.
• China’s military and intelligence support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor.
• The strategic mistrust between New Delhi, Beijing, and Washington.
• Economic vulnerabilities—rare earths, APIs, and supply chains.
Produced by Nikhil Khattar
Sound mixed by Rohan Bharti
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:08):
India and China two very powerful countries, seen as amongst
the oldest civilizations of the world, two Asian giants.
Speaker 3 (00:21):
They've had good relations and they've had wars.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
But right now when we talk of India and China,
when we talk about the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister,
member of the Polar Bureau and Special Representative on the
Boundary Issue, Wangi's visit to India, his invitation to Prime
Minister Narramodi, the Prime Minister's likely visit to Tianjan for
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders summit, is the relationship on
(00:49):
the men the big question can India trust China, not
just after what happened in Galvan twenty twenty, but recently
during Operation Sindur, the Chinese assistance to the Pakistani security
forces not just in terms of supplies of military hardware,
but active intelligence support, satellite intelligence support during operations. These
(01:13):
are very disturbing questions. But then there are those who
say that the relationship has.
Speaker 3 (01:20):
To move forward. Is it moving forward in the right direction?
Speaker 2 (01:24):
With me on the special broadcast is someone who's not
just studied India China relations very closely, but has been
a practitioner of the art of diplomacy through good times
and bad. I want to welcome on the Chuck Review
podcast Ambassador, a show India's former ambassador to China.
Speaker 3 (01:46):
Welcome. It's such a privilege to have you on the show.
Speaker 2 (01:50):
Ambassador, can't if I want to tell our viewers and
listeners of this podcast. You've been involved in India China
relations right from the nineteen eighties as a young diplomat.
You've handled the Sundorong Chu issue, You've handled Chinese President
chijen things visit to India, former Prime Minister Doctor Manhun
Singh's visit to China, and the situations that we've had,
(02:14):
you know, with Chumar and Depth Sang, the tensions that
we've had with the Chinese. How do you look at
the Chinese Foreign Minister Wanghi's visit to India and all
that is being said right.
Speaker 4 (02:26):
Now, Sir, they'll got up.
Speaker 5 (02:30):
As you mentioned, relations are going through a period of rebuilding,
but there are serious challenges, no doubt about it. We
had a very sharp downturn in India Chinel relations after
Chinese transcreations in Stella Dak in twenty twenty and the
(02:55):
process of disengagement to quite some time, as you aware,
that carried on until October last year when Prime Minister
Mody met with Presidentia Ping at Kazan on twenty third
October twenty four A process of re engagement, the rebuilding
(03:17):
relationship comments and it has made some headway, no doubt
about it. The visitor for mister Wangi twin they up
and his discussions with the Minister External Affairs and with
Nacial Security Advisor and his call on Prime Minister Modi
has taken that process forward.
Speaker 4 (03:42):
But it will be premature.
Speaker 5 (03:47):
To say that the relations have come back to normal
track either a in.
Speaker 2 (03:55):
The relationship or it's too premature even to call it
a no.
Speaker 4 (03:58):
No, I think there is thought relationship.
Speaker 5 (04:01):
There is a greater stability both in relations as also
situations along the ground in boder areas, which is a
major no concern for us. But stability is one thing
re engagement is there no doubt about it. There is improvement,
(04:22):
that is also a fact, but we are still some
way away from a reset in ties. That will require
a lot of hard lifting on part of both countries
China and particular.
Speaker 3 (04:36):
China in particular, and that's a very interesting word you've said.
Speaker 2 (04:39):
Yes, there is a oh, but it's not a reset
in ties because many in India say, can we trust
the Chinese, especially after what they did? You know Dockland
twenty seventeen also took India by surprise in the sense
that the kind of tensions that we're building up. India's
entire effort has been to build ties with China Prime
(05:01):
Minister and when he invited the Chinese President Hijin Ping
to Gujrat, I was reporting from ground zero and there
was a lot of hope and enthusiasm the two Asian
giants can survive and flourish together. And then twenty seventeen
doc Lam the standoff, and then the Wuhan Spirit, then
the Mahabalipuram and I was reporting from Mahabalipuram again on
(05:24):
ground zero. So there was a lot of effort that
this relationship is on the men and suddenly twenty twenty standoff.
Speaker 5 (05:32):
Yes, so No, twenty twenty came as a surprise and
big setback to relationship. New refert to do Klam that
also lasted for seventy three seventy three days standoff. Then
when President Paying visited India in September twenty fourteen. I
(05:53):
was Ambassador in Paging at that time, so I was
also present years Adaba. In fact the visit, we got
the information that there has been escalation of Chinese transcrission
and in fact Prime Minister personally raised this matter quite
forcefully with the President pink.
Speaker 4 (06:11):
In Ahmadabad itself. That was resolved.
Speaker 5 (06:16):
We could persuade China to restore status quo ante as
of first September twenty fourteen.
Speaker 4 (06:23):
We insisted on that.
Speaker 5 (06:24):
In fact, as ambassador was starsts to discuss it in
Paging after visit was over, and brief given to me
was very simple that to tell them that they need
to go back where they came from and they agreed
to that.
Speaker 3 (06:39):
Why did they come in this time?
Speaker 5 (06:41):
Well, there has been, you know, this pattern of transgressions
by China. They have been standoff situations earlier as well.
But what happened in summer of twenty twenty or something
different because Chinese pla they transgressed line of actual control
(07:05):
at multiple locations, especially in Stallada. Also happened in the
Northern Sikkim.
Speaker 4 (07:13):
And they stayed put. We had a very.
Speaker 5 (07:17):
Large body of Chinese troops being amassed and they they
sort of moved inside on our site. They Indian did
counterdeployment very quickly, and the nature of bordels changed completely
(07:38):
from something which was relatively quiet, notwithstanding occasional stand up situations,
became live and they It was conveyed very categorically to
China that we cannot go back to normalcy in relations
(07:58):
as long as borders remained abnormal. And as you know,
that was a prolonged process, and.
Speaker 2 (08:04):
The Prime Minister reiterated that point even now when you
said peace and tranquility at the borders is essential for
the relationship to move forward.
Speaker 3 (08:12):
But we've been saying that, do Chinese understand that.
Speaker 5 (08:16):
I think this has been a common position in fact
in the past, reflected in our joint documents, that they
you know, if we wish this relationship to keep moving ahead,
first prerequisite is that status COO in border areas in
(08:38):
terms of an actual control or should not be disturbed.
And they by large two sites had abided by that understanding.
Speaker 4 (08:47):
But that.
Speaker 5 (08:50):
You know, basic paradigm collapsed. Yes in twenty twenty, has
that collapsed in your view forever? Well, that paradigm is
behind us, that's over. You can't you know, sort of
resurrect it. So we'll have to develop a new paradigm,
our new paradigm, which will have to factor in, uh,
(09:15):
you know, change situation along the borders, the fact that,
as you mentioned, there is a very acute deficit of
trust between two countries, and we had gone through the
most serious downturn and relations in nearly over four decades.
Speaker 4 (09:38):
So rebuilding ties.
Speaker 5 (09:41):
At a point of time when there's also deep strategic
distrust about each other. You know, they have concerns about
our policies, We have concerns about their policies. Uh, you know,
going back to earlier paradigm will.
Speaker 4 (09:59):
Be not feasible, So we have to rebuild a new eclubrium.
Speaker 5 (10:05):
So when Wangi says that the recent tensions were not
in the interests of the two people of India and
China and they want these two ancient civilizations to move
forward and not be rivals but partners, very sweet sounding words.
But behind those sweet sounding words, where is that sweet
(10:28):
action of let's say, de escalation.
Speaker 3 (10:32):
Disengagement has happened.
Speaker 2 (10:33):
To post the Kazan consensus. But beyond that disengagement, where
is the de escalation And do you think there will
ever be de induction or given that trust is gone,
fifty thousand troops on either side will remain at the
borders and the infrastructure.
Speaker 5 (10:51):
You know, we are moving into another winter where troops
will be deployed in very forbidding terrain in high numbers, say,
and backed up with all the military hardware.
Speaker 4 (11:13):
So this is a fraud situation. It's not their normal situation.
Speaker 5 (11:19):
Now you refer to disengagement, Yes, basically disengagement was completed,
but there is still some unfinished business. Chief Army Staff
the way they has referred to the need to go
back to STATUSCO as of April twenty twenty, before Chinese
(11:40):
transgressions took place. Because you know, there are certain areas
where what the Minister External Field, Doctor Shankar are described
in Parliament steps of limited and temporary nature have been
adopted popular parlance is owned buffer job. Now that has
(12:01):
affected their uh you know, line of actual control. Uh
in some pockets. We understand our troops are unable to
access areas they visited earlier. Our graziers are not able
to utilize partialants they were going to earlier. So I
think that also needs to be set right. If we
(12:23):
don't do.
Speaker 4 (12:24):
That the UH.
Speaker 5 (12:25):
It will amount to our leaving certain incremental gains or
transgressions with China that will not be desirable. This is
one second point I think you mentioned and doctor J.
Shankas raised it very forcefully. Is the escalation that the
(12:47):
you know, disengagement after that idea was that they will
be the escalation of troops and finally the induction of
troops on that from the theater, not.
Speaker 4 (12:58):
You know, the read out which came out.
Speaker 5 (13:00):
The standpoint understanding there's a friends that there will be
discussions on the escalation, starting with principles for the escalation.
Speaker 3 (13:11):
No.
Speaker 5 (13:11):
I understand that because the escalation is not the easy proposition.
I've been what a negotiator in the past negotiated military
CBM's agreement of normber Night ninety six, and one of
the provisions there is how do you discuss force limitation?
(13:36):
How do you agree on ceilings on deployment troops in
a partular area, And that will be very relevant now
and we could persuade the Chinese side to agree that
the ceilings will take to account the nature of terrain,
border infrastructure and most importantly time taken to induct and
(13:59):
the in duct troops it's a formal understanding because China
can quickly, but China can move in very quickly, we
take more because of terrain advantage they have, and also
their infrastructure is so much better even now though we
have you know, made some gains. So de escalation cannot
(14:20):
be on the basis any numerical equivalence, so it will
be a complex process. That's why I'm happy that the
reference to principles of the escalation, not the induction is
frankly a bridge too far at this point in time,
because that will require a much higher level of trust.
Because we were surprised once in summer of twenty twenty
(14:46):
what was assessed as a routine military exercise, they pivoted
and came to our side line autural control. So we
will be cautious in future.
Speaker 2 (14:58):
So the Prime Minister spoke stable, predictable and constructive ties
that will enable peace. The National Security Advisor he confirmed
not just the visit of the Prime Minister for the
Shanghai co Operation Organization leaders summit, but he also indicated
that the ties were on an upward trend and peace
(15:19):
along the LAC was holding.
Speaker 3 (15:22):
For the past you know, nine months or so. Is
that good?
Speaker 2 (15:27):
Enough to judge a country like China, who we believe
historically has repeatedly stabbed us in the back. And I
don't want to sound like that negative person, but you know,
look at Chaw and Lai and Hindi Chini Baibai and
nineteen sixty two. Of course they went back after sixty two,
but then sunduong Chu again, it took you know, you
(15:49):
negotiated the sunduong Chu peace which took I think.
Speaker 3 (15:54):
Nine years or ten years to establish the Yeah, and.
Speaker 2 (15:57):
Then again despite Mahabalipuram in Wuhan they did twenty twenty.
So is there a pattern that they lead us up
the garden path on Hindichini bye way and then stab
us in the milk. I'm not even coming to Pakistan.
The support to Pakistan in operations indur yet.
Speaker 5 (16:13):
You know, God, I will not like to sort of
characterize relationship in terms of you know, stabbing back.
Speaker 4 (16:22):
Et cetera. It's a relationship where both sides.
Speaker 5 (16:26):
Invested in building. There's no doubt about it. They on
the whole, I think we could make some very significant
achievements in relationship, but there has been set back, no
doubt about it.
Speaker 4 (16:41):
And they.
Speaker 5 (16:44):
Though a process started in Kazan. Even after that they
have been negative signals. You have made more than one
reference to Chinese behavior during you know that age seven
our operations conflict as part of Operations sind Uh.
Speaker 4 (17:06):
You know nature of Chinese support to Pakistan.
Speaker 5 (17:11):
UH, during that four day conflict there was qualitatively very
different from their support to Pakistan in previous in your
Pakistan conflicts. Now China has been providing strategic support to Pakistan,
no doubt about it.
Speaker 4 (17:32):
But for the first time.
Speaker 5 (17:35):
We saw battlefield collision between China and Pakistan.
Speaker 4 (17:42):
UH. You refer to no provision of.
Speaker 5 (17:46):
Real time you know intelligence by China to Pakistan, something
which was confirmed by Deputy Amy staff Uh. There is
information on China's Petro satellite navigation system being deployed and
China helping with the integration of weapons systems and other
(18:08):
things happening, which was very serious because what we are
looking at there is not just Pakistan theater, but an
extended theater with China as a major factor. So in future,
(18:29):
you know, conflict scenario will have to factor that in
at what kind of support China can provide even without
tipping its hand, without getting involved overtly explicitly any military operation,
because you know, the support can take many forms.
Speaker 2 (18:51):
I mean their satellite intelligence providing the PL fifteen's and
the best version of PL fifteen.
Speaker 3 (18:58):
From what I was able to gather from sources not officially.
Speaker 2 (19:01):
Is that our intelligence or our information was it has
an air to MSL range of one hundred and fifty
colover as apparently it had close to two hundred kilometers.
Speaker 4 (19:09):
I think from what I've.
Speaker 5 (19:11):
Also heard that we were thinking in terms of export
version of PL Yes, Sir PL fifteen missile which had
certain range, but what they had provided to Pakistan had
a longer range. Yes, So that came as a surprise.
And also integration, the integration of weapons systems that took place,
(19:37):
which led to as you know, are taking certain losses
on seventh May. So I think that will remain an
important concern for US. But that's not the only thing
which has happened. You had you know, China announcing on
twenty fifth December, you know, just two months after Kazan
(19:58):
meeting that deil taking construction of the largest had to
project on reaches of Yalongsangpo before it enters India and.
Speaker 4 (20:09):
Becomes u Xiang and part of a river system.
Speaker 5 (20:15):
Work on that project has started on nineteen July and
Chinese premier visited Tibet this time. I was happy to
note that they read out mentioned that we have taken
it up forcefully with China, but at ten point the
(20:36):
understanding which is there doesn't refer to this project, so
Chinese have not made any committed. In fact, so far
they have not even agreed to renew three mo o
US on transporter reverse.
Speaker 4 (20:49):
We have on their data provided fancy data.
Speaker 2 (20:52):
I believe they've only said only in humanitarian assistance, so
they will give information.
Speaker 5 (20:59):
A project of this magnitude, which your viewers would like
to know, will be three times the size of three
gorgeous project which is today the largest hydropower project.
Speaker 4 (21:11):
In the world.
Speaker 5 (21:12):
And this will be constructed just thirty thirty five kilometers from.
Speaker 4 (21:18):
Our borders.
Speaker 5 (21:20):
River Enters h Enters in a tree, so it will
have fair serious downstream impact on us. Also, it's a
project being undertaken in an area which is highly earthquake prone.
(21:41):
It will involve, you know, boring of four tunnels twenty
kilometers long, each of them in Himalayas. As you know,
Themalayas are relatively young mountains, not very stable, and especially
in this area which is known to be earthquake prone.
So there are serious concerns on our site. But without
(22:04):
consultation with us, they went ahead. They've started this project
and there are other developments including you know, what can
be described the economic questions.
Speaker 4 (22:16):
You know, they stop providing certain kind of fertilizer.
Speaker 2 (22:22):
Fertilizers, tunnel boarding machines and rare minerals.
Speaker 4 (22:27):
Minerals.
Speaker 3 (22:28):
Now they're saying they're going to provide this.
Speaker 5 (22:30):
You know, I got a point is that, yes, I
mean they may resume, but they have reminded us of
our vulnerability and their leverage, which will have to keep
in mind number one, number two in case of rare
earth magnets. Any resumed supply is based on fairly intrusive
(22:56):
end usual certification requirement documentations. So they will decide when
they want to, you know, turn off the pigott when
they want to turn it off, when to provide, when
not to provide.
Speaker 4 (23:12):
So I'm just giving you some examples that they are.
On the whole. There's positive trend in relationship, no doubt
about it.
Speaker 5 (23:22):
As Prime Minister mentioned, as you know, t external affairs
and Ncial Security advisor mentioned, but there are serious issues
in relationship.
Speaker 3 (23:36):
Which need to be addressed, and but how do we
address it?
Speaker 2 (23:40):
India has forever, you know, whether it's with the United
States or with China. And I'll come to you know
whether this thaw or this move towards reset is still
a you know long distance away is because of the
American pressure and so called American sanctions or twenty five
percent additional tariffs that are being imposed on India for
(24:03):
buying Russian oil. India has always tried to improve relations
with China. It's China that has You don't want us
to use the word stabbed us in the back repeatedly,
But isn't that exactly what China did? You know, whether
it comes to whatever happened post doc Lam or post
Mahabalipuram or even now the support to Pakistan during Absindur
(24:26):
or blocking the designation of terrorists at the United Nations
Security Council, so their double standards, does China still want
to move forward that they are the only Asian giants
and any other country will have to be subservent to
the Middle Kingdom, which we refuse to be.
Speaker 5 (24:43):
Well, it is an interest of both countries to move
towards say what Prime Minister called you refer to that stable, predictable,
constructive relationship.
Speaker 4 (24:58):
There's no doubt about it there and we are.
Speaker 5 (25:01):
Seeking it, not under durists, not under pressure from any country,
but because it's good for us and it's good for
for India channel relations and this process did start yesterday
started actually re engagement started after Prime Minister's meeting with
President she At Kazan. Uh.
Speaker 4 (25:22):
But they know there are.
Speaker 5 (25:26):
There is a certain backdrop to the relationship, with your
political backdrop which we have to bear in mind.
Speaker 2 (25:33):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (25:33):
There are also.
Speaker 5 (25:37):
Certain you know, outstanding issues which unless they are addressed,
will not the result in reconstruction of trust. Problem that
that we have.
Speaker 2 (25:54):
Issues for example, his holiness that Dalai Lama or the
issue of it or what they consider is their territory
and we insist, you know, our national for the istion
one hundred percent ours Ladak is one hundred percent ours Tibet.
They are in control of Tibet which was an autonomous
region or you know they came into tibetan nineteen fifty
(26:16):
to fifty one.
Speaker 5 (26:17):
Well, issues are many, you referred to some of them
you earlier mentioned h Chinese desired to be a sort
of pre eminent power in Asia. While they don't say
it publicly, clearly their preference is for unipolar Issia. This
(26:40):
is something which is not acceptable to us.
Speaker 4 (26:42):
You know, where you would like to.
Speaker 5 (26:45):
Have multipolar Asia, We like to have multipolar one word.
So there is no in terms of strategic objectives, there
is a major divergence. We also have no problems about
how they look at our relations to the USA, Ah,
(27:05):
how they are projecting our current differences with the USA.
Speaker 4 (27:11):
You would have noticed that.
Speaker 5 (27:14):
Coming from Chinese side there on Wangi's call on Prime
Minister referred to India and China agreeing to oppose, which
was obviously a reference to USA that is not reflected
in our statement. I don't think, uh, we will be
(27:36):
so crass as to discuss our relations with the USA,
which remains a very important strategic partner for us in
those terms, so they would like to project something which
we are not will not be comfortable with the and
other issues we can discuss boundary question, we can discuss,
(27:59):
you know, live nature of asymmetry in our economic engagement
with China.
Speaker 3 (28:08):
One hundred billion dollars trade SUPPLUS is what they have.
Speaker 2 (28:11):
But you know when we when they seek more access
to our markets, are we likely to get more access
to theirs?
Speaker 3 (28:18):
Or does this this continue? And why haven't we been
able to address this?
Speaker 2 (28:23):
That of that of that hundred billion dollars, is everything
essential or is a lot of it non essentials that
we continue to take from China?
Speaker 4 (28:33):
You know where we have.
Speaker 5 (28:38):
Got into a situation where trade deficity is unsustainable. It's unhealthy,
and it's unsafe. Unsustainable because you know, according to Chinese
data last year it costs one hundred two billion dollars
are exports to China actually are declining instead of increasing,
(29:01):
just about eighteen billion dollars, so last year that cannot
go on indefinitely. It's unsafe because you know kind of
dependencies we have developed on China in critical areas like
active pharmaceutical ingredients, bulk of sourcings from China or no
(29:24):
you look at we have emerged as a hub for
for manufacturing Apple iPhones, for instance, but most of components
and subcomponents are coming from China, and Chinese.
Speaker 4 (29:42):
Are not comfortable with that situation, where in fact, emerging.
Speaker 5 (29:47):
They sort of forced Fox Gone to withdraw Chinese nationals
working in their facilities in India.
Speaker 3 (29:58):
So that was the difference of the Mens eight.
Speaker 4 (30:01):
Not exactly, so, I mean it's it's no.
Speaker 5 (30:05):
You have a situation where they have just deployed very
successfully their stranglehold on supply chain of rare earth magnets
not only VISA WE India, but also a USA European countries.
(30:26):
One of the reasons, possibly the most important reason why
President Trump had to sort of backtrack on question of
tariffs was the leverage Chinese had required. No, when you
are faced with this situation where Chinese are quite prepared.
Speaker 4 (30:47):
To weaponize.
Speaker 5 (30:50):
You know these dependencies, clearly we would like that to
be addressed, and nally did so, it's not interest to
continue with this kind of unhealthy dependence on imports from China.
Speaker 3 (31:07):
What's the way out, Well.
Speaker 4 (31:10):
We are trying to do that.
Speaker 5 (31:11):
You know. Part of the answer lies in creating an
a domestic manufacturing capacities.
Speaker 4 (31:18):
It is happening in some areas.
Speaker 5 (31:20):
I believe some plant is coming up where API will
be produced to be quite strong in API. Earlier before
we seated ground to China.
Speaker 3 (31:31):
So why were we seeding ground to China?
Speaker 2 (31:33):
In more way than one, I'm told even in I
believe copper, we seeded ground to China.
Speaker 5 (31:38):
See what happened that the people bought this argument that
you're importing efficiency from China, that it's the most efficient
place for manufacturing, for sourcing commodities, components, subcomponents, disregarding the
fact that UH, resilience, security, safety of supply chain is
(32:06):
equally important because a refer to it, even in.
Speaker 4 (32:10):
This understanding was registered.
Speaker 5 (32:16):
Dawned on us more forcefully after COVID because we saw
that how difficult it is to source even medical supplies
from China.
Speaker 2 (32:25):
Then even pp kits we could not get, and then
we started manufacturing and exporting.
Speaker 5 (32:31):
So it's not that we cannot do it, but they
it's going to be a challenging proposition. Just to give
you an example, you know, we have very ambitious plans
for renewable energy. We are doing well.
Speaker 4 (32:47):
You know, we are setting up a whole lot of
capacity in solar power in particular or so wind energy.
Speaker 5 (32:55):
Uh. But you know, good part of our solar panels
modules they're still imported from China because China is controlling
something like ninety percent of supply chain of solar.
Speaker 4 (33:10):
Panels, and that's happening in different.
Speaker 5 (33:18):
Market segments. Electric vehicles sixty percent controlled by China. Cobalt,
which is another critical mineral, eighty percent controlled by China.
Speaker 4 (33:27):
So you know, so this is this is going to
be not an easy.
Speaker 5 (33:32):
Proposition because we'd like to have a green energy transition
for which we need to source from China. But in parallel,
we have to create our own capacities so that we
reduce our dependency on China. Okay, one would have thought
America would have learned some very important lessons post COVID
twenty twenty, and America would also want to and since
(33:55):
China was attempting and pardon my usage of the word
twisting America's stay and they could not impose additional tariffs
on China, including giving them this ninety day leven now
on Russian energy is because of those rare earth minerals.
So they would have wanted to move ahead with a
strategic partner that India is. How do you read Donald
(34:16):
Trump's behavior?
Speaker 2 (34:18):
Even though the first time when in his presidency, Quad
was upgraded to prime ministerial level interaction, India and US
did extremely well. And while they have been you know,
since the Cargio War of nineteen nineteen nine, the next
step of strategiing partnership during one more Hun Singh and
George Bush, then Prime Minister Modi and Obama, and then Biden,
(34:42):
and then Bush and Bush, Biden, Obama and again with the.
Speaker 3 (34:48):
Trump Why is it suddenly going downhill?
Speaker 5 (34:52):
Well, if you compare China policy your first Trump administration
with the China Polico second Trump admission, there is a
mark shift. In the first Trump administration, USA in fact
moved away from earlier policy of engagement with China. Instead
of that, they started calling China as a strategic rival
(35:16):
and you know it in some way called out China.
It was under the President Trump at that time. As
you mentioned, they also raised cod to summit level during
President Trump's you know upgrade it this time while Guard
(35:36):
meetings have taken place, two meetings at the level of
ministers taking place, one on the day that Trump, so
that the flagged their interest in God. But we are witnessing,
you know, a couple of developments which are disturbing. On
(35:58):
one side, we're aware of a level degree of turbulence
in India China India US strategic relationship which was on
upward trajectory for more than two decades under different you know, governments,
administrations on both sides. I think there are question marks
(36:20):
about it because we're getting these negative signals from Washington.
Speaker 4 (36:25):
D c Uh.
Speaker 5 (36:27):
We're also not sure to what extent the President Trump
attaches importance to India as a factor in US chinnel relations.
Speaker 4 (36:40):
This is one.
Speaker 5 (36:41):
Secondly, you know there's lack of clarity on what kind
of policy Trump is following visa v.
Speaker 4 (36:50):
China.
Speaker 5 (36:51):
You know, their strategic clarity is lacking. He seemed to
be more interested in some short term tomic gains, and
now he seemed to be more interested in his own
visit to China.
Speaker 4 (37:06):
Feeling one gets that USA and China they are.
Speaker 5 (37:14):
Engaged in a dialogue to see if they can work
out what Trump calls a beautiful deal. So that does
that beautiful deal for you mean that they're looking at
a G two. No, I will not call it G
two De Sally, We don't know what will be contours
of the deal.
Speaker 4 (37:32):
I don't think we can have G two any long longer.
But what has moved beyond G two?
Speaker 2 (37:39):
If I may, wouldn't America be shooting itself in the
foot Because ultimately China would continue to leverage America like
it did in the past four decades plus and then
become the supreme power, pushing USA down. And is America
still facilitating that?
Speaker 4 (37:58):
I think you have made a very important point. China has.
Speaker 5 (38:05):
Certain strategic objectives which have been articulated publicly, officially formally
by presentation Ping, including in his work report to twentieth
Congress of Commons Party of China in October twenty twenty two,
where he talked about you know how middle of the century,
you know, China's emergence as leading power in terms of
(38:32):
composite national interest strength, the fact that China would like
to emerge as the leading power in the world, begin
with the Nasia Pacific or what we call Into Pacific
and possibly lobally eventually with that's going to.
Speaker 4 (38:54):
Happen, But those ambitions are there now.
Speaker 5 (39:01):
USA has to decide whether it wish is to maintain
its primacy or would like to see ground to China.
As for India is concerned, our policy has been moving
towards a multipolar Asia, multipolar world, and I think I
don't think that policy had changed.
Speaker 2 (39:21):
We're in a very difficult situation, aren't we We want
a multi polar world, and we want to ensure that
we also rise in this world, and which is only natural.
At the same time, neither China nor America want India
to rise. Both China and America would want India to
be if I may remains, be subservient to them. You know,
(39:44):
isn't that exactly what Donald Trump is seeking? That India
should just attach itself to US economy and just he dictates,
and we say yes, sir, and that clearly I don't
see that happening.
Speaker 3 (39:56):
Do you see that happening?
Speaker 4 (39:57):
Well, when it comes to.
Speaker 5 (40:02):
US policy towards India, they have been until recently by
a large supportive of rise of India until Trump too.
Speaker 4 (40:13):
Yeah.
Speaker 5 (40:14):
Now, President Trump has his own way of dealing with
the world, and they he has treated both allies and partners,
and India comes in the second category. We're not a
lie somewhat shabbily in fact, people say that he is
(40:39):
being far more considerate enemy China and Russia, countries which
USA was until recently or perhaps even now engaged in
competition with. So it's a changed world we are looking at,
(41:00):
and very uncertain world. But my own feeling is that
there we should not be rushing to conclusions. President Trump
is also known to be to be somewhat fickle in
his policy position. So let's see that would trade with
(41:21):
chickens out in their use. Relations developed. Some damage has
been done to relationship, no doubt about it. But let's
see all things developed, because we have too.
Speaker 3 (41:32):
Many damaged relationships, don't we. I would think with China
post Galvan, it's damaged.
Speaker 2 (41:41):
I would think with America, even if you become friends again,
uh that comprehensive strategic partners and two powerful democracies moving forward,
I wouldn't. I don't think we would be buying military
hardware or critical military hardware from them because you would
remember some more than anybody else. You are right in
the middle of action that time post Pokrun, when they
(42:02):
put sanctions on us. Our entire fighter fleet for the
Navy and helicopter fleet was grounded because we didn't have
critical spares seeking sea harriers r G four or four
engines lacking our LCA could not take off.
Speaker 3 (42:15):
That problem remains even today.
Speaker 4 (42:17):
You know got in a way you answered your own question.
Speaker 5 (42:22):
If you go back to Ookrun two and the kind
of pressure which was brought to bear on India and
remember at that time we were in a more vulnerable position.
On were much smaller. We were subjected to very severe
sanctions un Security Council resolution. But within a matter a
(42:49):
few months, actually India US relations started, Yes, and they
had there was a reassessment until spent in USA and
they are both sides work to develop the relationship. I'm
not saying that the same thing will necessarily happen, but
(43:13):
they when we look at the you know, these relationships,
these key relationships.
Speaker 4 (43:21):
Uh, there is need for.
Speaker 5 (43:24):
Two things which are very important. One, there must be
strategic clarity. They should not be confusion like some people
arguing that no, no, we need to move closer to China, uh,
so that we can deal with USA in real world
things don't happen like of course Chinese just read that.
(43:47):
Look at their social media. Even what was appearing yesterday
after Wangi's visit. Their media essentially messages that we can't
trust India. You know, they are trying to come closer
to us because the problems they're facing with the USA.
(44:09):
We can't be too optimistic about this relationship. There are
parallel concerns on Indian side about China. So what I'm
saying that there should be clarity that they've been a
challenge for US, it will remain. China is our primary
strategic challenge. So if you think we can invoke China
(44:32):
to compensate for certain strategic deficit and our relations with USA,
clearly that's not going to happen, you know.
Speaker 2 (44:40):
But ideally, you know, our civilizational thinking is we'd like
to be friends with China and we'd like to be
friends with America.
Speaker 5 (44:48):
No, So I'll come to second point, need for strategic patients.
Strategic patients when you deal with their countries like China
or even USA, at this point time, you need to
be patient.
Speaker 4 (45:03):
You don't need to sort of.
Speaker 5 (45:07):
Keep reacting sometimes too forcefully or no, trying to to
say in their India Chinnel relations, uh, trying to restore
normalcy when facts the ground, facts of Chinese policy towards
(45:30):
in there, their behavior doesn't quite support that question.
Speaker 2 (45:34):
So if they don't give us more access to their markets,
why do we give them because we need their productions?
That why are you're giving them more access to our markets?
You know, this direct flight resuming India China? Does that
benefit us? Does that benefit them more?
Speaker 4 (45:49):
In your view?
Speaker 5 (45:50):
You know, I think it benefits both sides. I think
it's important to have connectivity. China is the second.
Speaker 4 (45:57):
Largest economy in the world.
Speaker 5 (45:59):
UH. It's the leading trading partner with more than one
twenty countries. Let's remember that it's the largest manufacturing nation
in the world, accounting for nearly one third of global
manufacturing value.
Speaker 4 (46:14):
Edition.
Speaker 5 (46:15):
It's a very critical part of global value chain. So
we need to deal with China, there's no doubt about it.
But when we engage with China, we need to also
keep in mind do limitations and a few risks. I'm
(46:36):
talking about economic domain here. Risks are we talked about,
you know, how dependencies can be weaponized and have been
weaponized by China, among others.
Speaker 4 (46:50):
Limitations will be you know, if we expect.
Speaker 5 (46:55):
That the Chinese investment will build up where manufacturing capabilities
in India or develop India as a as a major manufacturing.
Speaker 4 (47:09):
The China plus going to happen, that's not going to happen.
Speaker 2 (47:12):
UH.
Speaker 4 (47:13):
So we should be clear.
Speaker 5 (47:14):
Yes, I mean to the extent we can work with
China to develop ound capabilities, and we need to know
we need to source our material from China.
Speaker 3 (47:26):
UH.
Speaker 5 (47:26):
In certain areas they are such a huge part of
supply chain. There is no alternative, uh but going to China.
But we have to bear in mind these limitations and
also security concerns that they you know, in today's world, ah,
(47:48):
vulnerabilities have gone up. You have your critical infrastructure. Future
conflicts will not be fought just in body areas. They
will be my domain operation communications, everything will come in.
Why were we giving China access to our communication once
upon a time being a part that you know, did
(48:11):
we think that it's going to help improve I was
told they were trying to sell us some radars for
our post. Also, I mean, you know, I think India
before many other countries. In fact, they have decided not
to give entry to China. In rolling out of Chinese entities,
rolling out of five D telephony companies.
Speaker 4 (48:31):
Like Qabi and Tea, we were aird with the curve.
Speaker 5 (48:36):
Likewise, we were aird to a curve in banning Chinese
apps because you know these apps security concerns in the
USA is still debating on TikTok, but we banned India
banned TikTok. So it's not that we have not taken steps.
This comment has taken some forceful steps. But looking ahead
(49:03):
we must seek better relations with China. We must seek,
as Prime Minister said, you know, stable, predictable, constructive our
relationship with China. But we should do so without they're
harboring any uh, you know, excessive expectations. We should be
(49:25):
realistic and our approach. We should see problems, pitfalls and
possibilities in India channel relations, problems with falls and possibilities
in India channel relations and move accordingly. And it cannot
be it cannot be one side taking initiative. I think
(49:48):
China needs to to respond to our concerns.
Speaker 2 (49:53):
But if it doesn't so for example, you know, even
on border talks, there is some talk about you know,
China talking about deep delineation of the border.
Speaker 3 (50:03):
Is that middle sector? Is that Ladak? Is that northeast?
Do you see anything moving forward?
Speaker 2 (50:10):
Advanced border security, border management delimitation negotiations.
Speaker 3 (50:14):
How do you take them forward? And new CBMs?
Speaker 2 (50:16):
So you negotiated those CVMs from nineteen ninety six through
the BDCA, and they just threw them all out of
the window when they came in twenty twenty.
Speaker 4 (50:27):
You know what has been what does that great?
Speaker 5 (50:31):
The meeting between NSA and BANGI in their respective capacities
as special representatives of India and China.
Speaker 4 (50:39):
The boundary question.
Speaker 5 (50:41):
There are some key understandings, including one tasking WMCC expert
group under that to explore early.
Speaker 3 (50:53):
Harvest what does early harvest actually mean?
Speaker 5 (50:57):
Now? But this say needs to be to be sort
of explained a little bit because what was proposed earlier
and I had proposed that we can have early harvest
by having a separate understanding on Sikim sector.
Speaker 4 (51:18):
We pointed out that.
Speaker 5 (51:21):
In the Agreement on Pultural Parameters and Guiding Principles we
had signed of a boundary settlement in two thousand and five.
We have agreed on a package settlement which will cover
all sectors of the boundary. Will not be inclined to
have peace peel. Besides, you know Sikim, we don't have
(51:43):
any serious problems in terms we agree on the basic
watershed boundary. There may be some differences on the ground.
So we don't see much point in in ENOS undermining
two thousand and five agreement by moving our from Manor
Provisions agreement and going for piecemeal settlement for SICKM sector.
Speaker 4 (52:10):
Now, I don't know.
Speaker 5 (52:13):
What is the scope of early harvest this time, but
I have seen that the readout coming from the Chinese side.
Speaker 4 (52:24):
Refers to.
Speaker 5 (52:27):
Demarcation in pockets which are rife for settlement. Now that
is really puzzling. I happen to be the negotiated for
two thousand and five agreement. We have agreed on a
set of principles and parameters. A sequence sequence was that
(52:50):
first we have this agreement, then we'll agree on framework
for boundary settlement. Only after that will go on delineation
on ground and delineation on map and demarcation ground. Now
they're talking about demarcation without which is without framework without delineation.
So demarcation was supposed to be the last element. We
(53:14):
have to be careful because two five agreement provides a
good solid basis. In fact, I was happy to note
that both sides have retreated their commitment to this agreement yesterday,
but they we should be a little careful. I don't
(53:37):
want to pre judge your early harvest. I can only
say what was discussed earlier and why we didn't accept
it earlier. There was also some discussion on whether early
our west could include the sick middle sector. Chinese had
not agreed to that.
Speaker 4 (53:55):
I don't know. Frankly, I don't know at this point
of time, so this is one uh second to know.
Speaker 5 (54:01):
Likewise, on a de escalation, I think we already discussed that.
That also is a complex that.
Speaker 2 (54:08):
As we have framework in the sense of principles, they'll
have to be further back because they can move on
to discuss that actually to work it out. So I
also wanted to ask you briefly about Sundong Chu in
nineteen eighty six eighty seven.
Speaker 3 (54:25):
How was that ultimately worked out?
Speaker 2 (54:27):
I mean there, I believe when Jel Sundarji had put
in tanks and armored personal carriers in Sundroong Chu and
it took nine years to finally settle that.
Speaker 5 (54:37):
Well, you know, Sundurung Chu for your audience, you know
this is close to Tawang. It's a valley which is
uh you know, south of Taglar Ridge. Taglar Ridge is
(54:58):
then international boundary there and there we had a seagional
post uh in sumdurum Chu valley and they June sixth
when Indian personnel went back there because we used to
withdraw during winters, they found that Chinese were sitting there
and they were asked to vacate, which they didn't and
(55:21):
they started constructing a helipad there. They started reinforcing their presence.
It was after that that, you know, Indian army decided
to have a strong deployment, so they brought in troops.
They were located on the ridge line overlooking Sumdrum Chu Valley,
(55:44):
and that became what Chinese called closed close confrontation because
Indian Chinese troops were deployed in very close proximity each
other and tensions built up along the borders. In fact,
the tensions were brought down by middle of eighty seven,
(56:04):
but this situation of deployment and close proximity continued until
nineteen ninety five when finally we could agree on disengagement.
Speaker 3 (56:14):
Took nine years nine to.
Speaker 4 (56:16):
Work it out. Now that time, if you have to,
you know, learn certain lessons from that.
Speaker 5 (56:25):
One lesson is that our response was immediate and forceful,
and we refused to Chinese kept pushing us to withdraw.
We refused to withdraw, so we sort of showed the
staying power and in a way, that became the backdrop
(56:46):
to Raji Gandhi's visit to China in December eight because
that's how the so that crisis in fact created.
Speaker 4 (56:55):
An opportunity, an opportunity, so that that happened.
Speaker 2 (57:00):
Uh.
Speaker 5 (57:01):
Other thing which is important, which has relevance today, that
was discussed in an emparliament repeatedly, and I.
Speaker 4 (57:10):
Think there is need for greater transparency in what we do,
what is being.
Speaker 3 (57:19):
You know, you you should point that out. Strength is
something that China does respect.
Speaker 2 (57:23):
So if you show strength, military deployments, sustained diplomacy and
patience as you pointed out, uh, that perhaps gets you
your solutions.
Speaker 5 (57:33):
Uh.
Speaker 3 (57:33):
You know, we shall continue this conversation forward. And there's
so much that I want to talk to you about.
Speaker 2 (57:38):
But for joining me here on this Chuck Review podcast, Ambassador,
thank you for inviting me.
Speaker 1 (57:45):
This is En Today Podcasts
This is India Today podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:08):
India and China two very powerful countries, seen as amongst
the oldest civilizations of the world, two Asian giants.
Speaker 3 (00:21):
They've had good relations and they've had wars.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
But right now when we talk of India and China,
when we talk about the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister,
member of the Polar Bureau and Special Representative on the
Boundary Issue, Wangi's visit to India, his invitation to Prime
Minister Narramodi, the Prime Minister's likely visit to Tianjan for
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders summit, is the relationship on
(00:49):
the men the big question can India trust China, not
just after what happened in Galvan twenty twenty, but recently
during Operation Sindur, the Chinese assistance to the Pakistani security
forces not just in terms of supplies of military hardware,
but active intelligence support, satellite intelligence support during operations. These
(01:13):
are very disturbing questions. But then there are those who
say that the relationship has.
Speaker 3 (01:20):
To move forward. Is it moving forward in the right direction?
Speaker 2 (01:24):
With me on the special broadcast is someone who's not
just studied India China relations very closely, but has been
a practitioner of the art of diplomacy through good times
and bad. I want to welcome on the Chuck Review
podcast Ambassador, a show India's former ambassador to China.
Speaker 3 (01:46):
Welcome. It's such a privilege to have you on the show.
Speaker 2 (01:50):
Ambassador, can't if I want to tell our viewers and
listeners of this podcast. You've been involved in India China
relations right from the nineteen eighties as a young diplomat.
You've handled the Sundorong Chu issue, You've handled Chinese President
chijen things visit to India, former Prime Minister Doctor Manhun
Singh's visit to China, and the situations that we've had,
(02:14):
you know, with Chumar and Depth Sang, the tensions that
we've had with the Chinese. How do you look at
the Chinese Foreign Minister Wanghi's visit to India and all
that is being said right.
Speaker 4 (02:26):
Now, Sir, they'll got up.
Speaker 5 (02:30):
As you mentioned, relations are going through a period of rebuilding,
but there are serious challenges, no doubt about it. We
had a very sharp downturn in India Chinel relations after
Chinese transcreations in Stella Dak in twenty twenty and the
(02:55):
process of disengagement to quite some time, as you aware,
that carried on until October last year when Prime Minister
Mody met with Presidentia Ping at Kazan on twenty third
October twenty four A process of re engagement, the rebuilding
(03:17):
relationship comments and it has made some headway, no doubt
about it. The visitor for mister Wangi twin they up
and his discussions with the Minister External Affairs and with
Nacial Security Advisor and his call on Prime Minister Modi
has taken that process forward.
Speaker 4 (03:42):
But it will be premature.
Speaker 5 (03:47):
To say that the relations have come back to normal
track either a in.
Speaker 2 (03:55):
The relationship or it's too premature even to call it
a no.
Speaker 4 (03:58):
No, I think there is thought relationship.
Speaker 5 (04:01):
There is a greater stability both in relations as also
situations along the ground in boder areas, which is a
major no concern for us. But stability is one thing
re engagement is there no doubt about it. There is improvement,
(04:22):
that is also a fact, but we are still some
way away from a reset in ties. That will require
a lot of hard lifting on part of both countries
China and particular.
Speaker 3 (04:36):
China in particular, and that's a very interesting word you've said.
Speaker 2 (04:39):
Yes, there is a oh, but it's not a reset
in ties because many in India say, can we trust
the Chinese, especially after what they did? You know Dockland
twenty seventeen also took India by surprise in the sense
that the kind of tensions that we're building up. India's
entire effort has been to build ties with China Prime
(05:01):
Minister and when he invited the Chinese President Hijin Ping
to Gujrat, I was reporting from ground zero and there
was a lot of hope and enthusiasm the two Asian
giants can survive and flourish together. And then twenty seventeen
doc Lam the standoff, and then the Wuhan Spirit, then
the Mahabalipuram and I was reporting from Mahabalipuram again on
(05:24):
ground zero. So there was a lot of effort that
this relationship is on the men and suddenly twenty twenty standoff.
Speaker 5 (05:32):
Yes, so No, twenty twenty came as a surprise and
big setback to relationship. New refert to do Klam that
also lasted for seventy three seventy three days standoff. Then
when President Paying visited India in September twenty fourteen. I
(05:53):
was Ambassador in Paging at that time, so I was
also present years Adaba. In fact the visit, we got
the information that there has been escalation of Chinese transcrission
and in fact Prime Minister personally raised this matter quite
forcefully with the President pink.
Speaker 4 (06:11):
In Ahmadabad itself. That was resolved.
Speaker 5 (06:16):
We could persuade China to restore status quo ante as
of first September twenty fourteen.
Speaker 4 (06:23):
We insisted on that.
Speaker 5 (06:24):
In fact, as ambassador was starsts to discuss it in
Paging after visit was over, and brief given to me
was very simple that to tell them that they need
to go back where they came from and they agreed
to that.
Speaker 3 (06:39):
Why did they come in this time?
Speaker 5 (06:41):
Well, there has been, you know, this pattern of transgressions
by China. They have been standoff situations earlier as well.
But what happened in summer of twenty twenty or something
different because Chinese pla they transgressed line of actual control
(07:05):
at multiple locations, especially in Stallada. Also happened in the
Northern Sikkim.
Speaker 4 (07:13):
And they stayed put. We had a very.
Speaker 5 (07:17):
Large body of Chinese troops being amassed and they they
sort of moved inside on our site. They Indian did
counterdeployment very quickly, and the nature of bordels changed completely
(07:38):
from something which was relatively quiet, notwithstanding occasional stand up situations,
became live and they It was conveyed very categorically to
China that we cannot go back to normalcy in relations
(07:58):
as long as borders remained abnormal. And as you know,
that was a prolonged process, and.
Speaker 2 (08:04):
The Prime Minister reiterated that point even now when you
said peace and tranquility at the borders is essential for
the relationship to move forward.
Speaker 3 (08:12):
But we've been saying that, do Chinese understand that.
Speaker 5 (08:16):
I think this has been a common position in fact
in the past, reflected in our joint documents, that they
you know, if we wish this relationship to keep moving ahead,
first prerequisite is that status COO in border areas in
(08:38):
terms of an actual control or should not be disturbed.
And they by large two sites had abided by that understanding.
Speaker 4 (08:47):
But that.
Speaker 5 (08:50):
You know, basic paradigm collapsed. Yes in twenty twenty, has
that collapsed in your view forever? Well, that paradigm is
behind us, that's over. You can't you know, sort of
resurrect it. So we'll have to develop a new paradigm,
our new paradigm, which will have to factor in, uh,
(09:15):
you know, change situation along the borders, the fact that,
as you mentioned, there is a very acute deficit of
trust between two countries, and we had gone through the
most serious downturn and relations in nearly over four decades.
Speaker 4 (09:38):
So rebuilding ties.
Speaker 5 (09:41):
At a point of time when there's also deep strategic
distrust about each other. You know, they have concerns about
our policies, We have concerns about their policies. Uh, you know,
going back to earlier paradigm will.
Speaker 4 (09:59):
Be not feasible, So we have to rebuild a new eclubrium.
Speaker 5 (10:05):
So when Wangi says that the recent tensions were not
in the interests of the two people of India and
China and they want these two ancient civilizations to move
forward and not be rivals but partners, very sweet sounding words.
But behind those sweet sounding words, where is that sweet
(10:28):
action of let's say, de escalation.
Speaker 3 (10:32):
Disengagement has happened.
Speaker 2 (10:33):
To post the Kazan consensus. But beyond that disengagement, where
is the de escalation And do you think there will
ever be de induction or given that trust is gone,
fifty thousand troops on either side will remain at the
borders and the infrastructure.
Speaker 5 (10:51):
You know, we are moving into another winter where troops
will be deployed in very forbidding terrain in high numbers, say,
and backed up with all the military hardware.
Speaker 4 (11:13):
So this is a fraud situation. It's not their normal situation.
Speaker 5 (11:19):
Now you refer to disengagement, Yes, basically disengagement was completed,
but there is still some unfinished business. Chief Army Staff
the way they has referred to the need to go
back to STATUSCO as of April twenty twenty, before Chinese
(11:40):
transgressions took place. Because you know, there are certain areas
where what the Minister External Field, Doctor Shankar are described
in Parliament steps of limited and temporary nature have been
adopted popular parlance is owned buffer job. Now that has
(12:01):
affected their uh you know, line of actual control. Uh
in some pockets. We understand our troops are unable to
access areas they visited earlier. Our graziers are not able
to utilize partialants they were going to earlier. So I
think that also needs to be set right. If we
(12:23):
don't do.
Speaker 4 (12:24):
That the UH.
Speaker 5 (12:25):
It will amount to our leaving certain incremental gains or
transgressions with China that will not be desirable. This is
one second point I think you mentioned and doctor J.
Shankas raised it very forcefully. Is the escalation that the
(12:47):
you know, disengagement after that idea was that they will
be the escalation of troops and finally the induction of
troops on that from the theater, not.
Speaker 4 (12:58):
You know, the read out which came out.
Speaker 5 (13:00):
The standpoint understanding there's a friends that there will be
discussions on the escalation, starting with principles for the escalation.
Speaker 3 (13:11):
No.
Speaker 5 (13:11):
I understand that because the escalation is not the easy proposition.
I've been what a negotiator in the past negotiated military
CBM's agreement of normber Night ninety six, and one of
the provisions there is how do you discuss force limitation?
(13:36):
How do you agree on ceilings on deployment troops in
a partular area, And that will be very relevant now
and we could persuade the Chinese side to agree that
the ceilings will take to account the nature of terrain,
border infrastructure and most importantly time taken to induct and
(13:59):
the in duct troops it's a formal understanding because China
can quickly, but China can move in very quickly, we
take more because of terrain advantage they have, and also
their infrastructure is so much better even now though we
have you know, made some gains. So de escalation cannot
(14:20):
be on the basis any numerical equivalence, so it will
be a complex process. That's why I'm happy that the
reference to principles of the escalation, not the induction is
frankly a bridge too far at this point in time,
because that will require a much higher level of trust.
Because we were surprised once in summer of twenty twenty
(14:46):
what was assessed as a routine military exercise, they pivoted
and came to our side line autural control. So we
will be cautious in future.
Speaker 2 (14:58):
So the Prime Minister spoke stable, predictable and constructive ties
that will enable peace. The National Security Advisor he confirmed
not just the visit of the Prime Minister for the
Shanghai co Operation Organization leaders summit, but he also indicated
that the ties were on an upward trend and peace
(15:19):
along the LAC was holding.
Speaker 3 (15:22):
For the past you know, nine months or so. Is
that good?
Speaker 2 (15:27):
Enough to judge a country like China, who we believe
historically has repeatedly stabbed us in the back. And I
don't want to sound like that negative person, but you know,
look at Chaw and Lai and Hindi Chini Baibai and
nineteen sixty two. Of course they went back after sixty two,
but then sunduong Chu again, it took you know, you
(15:49):
negotiated the sunduong Chu peace which took I think.
Speaker 3 (15:54):
Nine years or ten years to establish the Yeah, and.
Speaker 2 (15:57):
Then again despite Mahabalipuram in Wuhan they did twenty twenty.
So is there a pattern that they lead us up
the garden path on Hindichini bye way and then stab
us in the milk. I'm not even coming to Pakistan.
The support to Pakistan in operations indur yet.
Speaker 5 (16:13):
You know, God, I will not like to sort of
characterize relationship in terms of you know, stabbing back.
Speaker 4 (16:22):
Et cetera. It's a relationship where both sides.
Speaker 5 (16:26):
Invested in building. There's no doubt about it. They on
the whole, I think we could make some very significant
achievements in relationship, but there has been set back, no
doubt about it.
Speaker 4 (16:41):
And they.
Speaker 5 (16:44):
Though a process started in Kazan. Even after that they
have been negative signals. You have made more than one
reference to Chinese behavior during you know that age seven
our operations conflict as part of Operations sind Uh.
Speaker 4 (17:06):
You know nature of Chinese support to Pakistan.
Speaker 5 (17:11):
UH, during that four day conflict there was qualitatively very
different from their support to Pakistan in previous in your
Pakistan conflicts. Now China has been providing strategic support to Pakistan,
no doubt about it.
Speaker 4 (17:32):
But for the first time.
Speaker 5 (17:35):
We saw battlefield collision between China and Pakistan.
Speaker 4 (17:42):
UH. You refer to no provision of.
Speaker 5 (17:46):
Real time you know intelligence by China to Pakistan, something
which was confirmed by Deputy Amy staff Uh. There is
information on China's Petro satellite navigation system being deployed and
China helping with the integration of weapons systems and other
(18:08):
things happening, which was very serious because what we are
looking at there is not just Pakistan theater, but an
extended theater with China as a major factor. So in future,
(18:29):
you know, conflict scenario will have to factor that in
at what kind of support China can provide even without
tipping its hand, without getting involved overtly explicitly any military operation,
because you know, the support can take many forms.
Speaker 2 (18:51):
I mean their satellite intelligence providing the PL fifteen's and
the best version of PL fifteen.
Speaker 3 (18:58):
From what I was able to gather from sources not officially.
Speaker 2 (19:01):
Is that our intelligence or our information was it has
an air to MSL range of one hundred and fifty
colover as apparently it had close to two hundred kilometers.
Speaker 4 (19:09):
I think from what I've.
Speaker 5 (19:11):
Also heard that we were thinking in terms of export
version of PL Yes, Sir PL fifteen missile which had
certain range, but what they had provided to Pakistan had
a longer range. Yes, So that came as a surprise.
And also integration, the integration of weapons systems that took place,
(19:37):
which led to as you know, are taking certain losses
on seventh May. So I think that will remain an
important concern for US. But that's not the only thing
which has happened. You had you know, China announcing on
twenty fifth December, you know, just two months after Kazan
(19:58):
meeting that deil taking construction of the largest had to
project on reaches of Yalongsangpo before it enters India and.
Speaker 4 (20:09):
Becomes u Xiang and part of a river system.
Speaker 5 (20:15):
Work on that project has started on nineteen July and
Chinese premier visited Tibet this time. I was happy to
note that they read out mentioned that we have taken
it up forcefully with China, but at ten point the
(20:36):
understanding which is there doesn't refer to this project, so
Chinese have not made any committed. In fact, so far
they have not even agreed to renew three mo o
US on transporter reverse.
Speaker 4 (20:49):
We have on their data provided fancy data.
Speaker 2 (20:52):
I believe they've only said only in humanitarian assistance, so
they will give information.
Speaker 5 (20:59):
A project of this magnitude, which your viewers would like
to know, will be three times the size of three
gorgeous project which is today the largest hydropower project.
Speaker 4 (21:11):
In the world.
Speaker 5 (21:12):
And this will be constructed just thirty thirty five kilometers from.
Speaker 4 (21:18):
Our borders.
Speaker 5 (21:20):
River Enters h Enters in a tree, so it will
have fair serious downstream impact on us. Also, it's a
project being undertaken in an area which is highly earthquake prone.
(21:41):
It will involve, you know, boring of four tunnels twenty
kilometers long, each of them in Himalayas. As you know,
Themalayas are relatively young mountains, not very stable, and especially
in this area which is known to be earthquake prone.
So there are serious concerns on our site. But without
(22:04):
consultation with us, they went ahead. They've started this project
and there are other developments including you know, what can
be described the economic questions.
Speaker 4 (22:16):
You know, they stop providing certain kind of fertilizer.
Speaker 2 (22:22):
Fertilizers, tunnel boarding machines and rare minerals.
Speaker 4 (22:27):
Minerals.
Speaker 3 (22:28):
Now they're saying they're going to provide this.
Speaker 5 (22:30):
You know, I got a point is that, yes, I
mean they may resume, but they have reminded us of
our vulnerability and their leverage, which will have to keep
in mind number one, number two in case of rare
earth magnets. Any resumed supply is based on fairly intrusive
(22:56):
end usual certification requirement documentations. So they will decide when
they want to, you know, turn off the pigott when
they want to turn it off, when to provide, when
not to provide.
Speaker 4 (23:12):
So I'm just giving you some examples that they are.
On the whole. There's positive trend in relationship, no doubt
about it.
Speaker 5 (23:22):
As Prime Minister mentioned, as you know, t external affairs
and Ncial Security advisor mentioned, but there are serious issues
in relationship.
Speaker 3 (23:36):
Which need to be addressed, and but how do we
address it?
Speaker 2 (23:40):
India has forever, you know, whether it's with the United
States or with China. And I'll come to you know
whether this thaw or this move towards reset is still
a you know long distance away is because of the
American pressure and so called American sanctions or twenty five
percent additional tariffs that are being imposed on India for
(24:03):
buying Russian oil. India has always tried to improve relations
with China. It's China that has You don't want us
to use the word stabbed us in the back repeatedly,
But isn't that exactly what China did? You know, whether
it comes to whatever happened post doc Lam or post
Mahabalipuram or even now the support to Pakistan during Absindur
(24:26):
or blocking the designation of terrorists at the United Nations
Security Council, so their double standards, does China still want
to move forward that they are the only Asian giants
and any other country will have to be subservent to
the Middle Kingdom, which we refuse to be.
Speaker 5 (24:43):
Well, it is an interest of both countries to move
towards say what Prime Minister called you refer to that stable, predictable,
constructive relationship.
Speaker 4 (24:58):
There's no doubt about it there and we are.
Speaker 5 (25:01):
Seeking it, not under durists, not under pressure from any country,
but because it's good for us and it's good for
for India channel relations and this process did start yesterday
started actually re engagement started after Prime Minister's meeting with
President she At Kazan. Uh.
Speaker 4 (25:22):
But they know there are.
Speaker 5 (25:26):
There is a certain backdrop to the relationship, with your
political backdrop which we have to bear in mind.
Speaker 2 (25:33):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (25:33):
There are also.
Speaker 5 (25:37):
Certain you know, outstanding issues which unless they are addressed,
will not the result in reconstruction of trust. Problem that
that we have.
Speaker 2 (25:54):
Issues for example, his holiness that Dalai Lama or the
issue of it or what they consider is their territory
and we insist, you know, our national for the istion
one hundred percent ours Ladak is one hundred percent ours Tibet.
They are in control of Tibet which was an autonomous
region or you know they came into tibetan nineteen fifty
(26:16):
to fifty one.
Speaker 5 (26:17):
Well, issues are many, you referred to some of them
you earlier mentioned h Chinese desired to be a sort
of pre eminent power in Asia. While they don't say
it publicly, clearly their preference is for unipolar Issia. This
(26:40):
is something which is not acceptable to us.
Speaker 4 (26:42):
You know, where you would like to.
Speaker 5 (26:45):
Have multipolar Asia, We like to have multipolar one word.
So there is no in terms of strategic objectives, there
is a major divergence. We also have no problems about
how they look at our relations to the USA, Ah,
(27:05):
how they are projecting our current differences with the USA.
Speaker 4 (27:11):
You would have noticed that.
Speaker 5 (27:14):
Coming from Chinese side there on Wangi's call on Prime
Minister referred to India and China agreeing to oppose, which
was obviously a reference to USA that is not reflected
in our statement. I don't think, uh, we will be
(27:36):
so crass as to discuss our relations with the USA,
which remains a very important strategic partner for us in
those terms, so they would like to project something which
we are not will not be comfortable with the and
other issues we can discuss boundary question, we can discuss,
(27:59):
you know, live nature of asymmetry in our economic engagement
with China.
Speaker 3 (28:08):
One hundred billion dollars trade SUPPLUS is what they have.
Speaker 2 (28:11):
But you know when we when they seek more access
to our markets, are we likely to get more access
to theirs?
Speaker 3 (28:18):
Or does this this continue? And why haven't we been
able to address this?
Speaker 2 (28:23):
That of that of that hundred billion dollars, is everything
essential or is a lot of it non essentials that
we continue to take from China?
Speaker 4 (28:33):
You know where we have.
Speaker 5 (28:38):
Got into a situation where trade deficity is unsustainable. It's unhealthy,
and it's unsafe. Unsustainable because you know, according to Chinese
data last year it costs one hundred two billion dollars
are exports to China actually are declining instead of increasing,
(29:01):
just about eighteen billion dollars, so last year that cannot
go on indefinitely. It's unsafe because you know kind of
dependencies we have developed on China in critical areas like
active pharmaceutical ingredients, bulk of sourcings from China or no
(29:24):
you look at we have emerged as a hub for
for manufacturing Apple iPhones, for instance, but most of components
and subcomponents are coming from China, and Chinese.
Speaker 4 (29:42):
Are not comfortable with that situation, where in fact, emerging.
Speaker 5 (29:47):
They sort of forced Fox Gone to withdraw Chinese nationals
working in their facilities in India.
Speaker 3 (29:58):
So that was the difference of the Mens eight.
Speaker 4 (30:01):
Not exactly, so, I mean it's it's no.
Speaker 5 (30:05):
You have a situation where they have just deployed very
successfully their stranglehold on supply chain of rare earth magnets
not only VISA WE India, but also a USA European countries.
(30:26):
One of the reasons, possibly the most important reason why
President Trump had to sort of backtrack on question of
tariffs was the leverage Chinese had required. No, when you
are faced with this situation where Chinese are quite prepared.
Speaker 4 (30:47):
To weaponize.
Speaker 5 (30:50):
You know these dependencies, clearly we would like that to
be addressed, and nally did so, it's not interest to
continue with this kind of unhealthy dependence on imports from China.
Speaker 3 (31:07):
What's the way out, Well.
Speaker 4 (31:10):
We are trying to do that.
Speaker 5 (31:11):
You know. Part of the answer lies in creating an
a domestic manufacturing capacities.
Speaker 4 (31:18):
It is happening in some areas.
Speaker 5 (31:20):
I believe some plant is coming up where API will
be produced to be quite strong in API. Earlier before
we seated ground to China.
Speaker 3 (31:31):
So why were we seeding ground to China?
Speaker 2 (31:33):
In more way than one, I'm told even in I
believe copper, we seeded ground to China.
Speaker 5 (31:38):
See what happened that the people bought this argument that
you're importing efficiency from China, that it's the most efficient
place for manufacturing, for sourcing commodities, components, subcomponents, disregarding the
fact that UH, resilience, security, safety of supply chain is
(32:06):
equally important because a refer to it, even in.
Speaker 4 (32:10):
This understanding was registered.
Speaker 5 (32:16):
Dawned on us more forcefully after COVID because we saw
that how difficult it is to source even medical supplies
from China.
Speaker 2 (32:25):
Then even pp kits we could not get, and then
we started manufacturing and exporting.
Speaker 5 (32:31):
So it's not that we cannot do it, but they
it's going to be a challenging proposition. Just to give
you an example, you know, we have very ambitious plans
for renewable energy. We are doing well.
Speaker 4 (32:47):
You know, we are setting up a whole lot of
capacity in solar power in particular or so wind energy.
Speaker 5 (32:55):
Uh. But you know, good part of our solar panels
modules they're still imported from China because China is controlling
something like ninety percent of supply chain of solar.
Speaker 4 (33:10):
Panels, and that's happening in different.
Speaker 5 (33:18):
Market segments. Electric vehicles sixty percent controlled by China. Cobalt,
which is another critical mineral, eighty percent controlled by China.
Speaker 4 (33:27):
So you know, so this is this is going to
be not an easy.
Speaker 5 (33:32):
Proposition because we'd like to have a green energy transition
for which we need to source from China. But in parallel,
we have to create our own capacities so that we
reduce our dependency on China. Okay, one would have thought
America would have learned some very important lessons post COVID
twenty twenty, and America would also want to and since
(33:55):
China was attempting and pardon my usage of the word
twisting America's stay and they could not impose additional tariffs
on China, including giving them this ninety day leven now
on Russian energy is because of those rare earth minerals.
So they would have wanted to move ahead with a
strategic partner that India is. How do you read Donald
(34:16):
Trump's behavior?
Speaker 2 (34:18):
Even though the first time when in his presidency, Quad
was upgraded to prime ministerial level interaction, India and US
did extremely well. And while they have been you know,
since the Cargio War of nineteen nineteen nine, the next
step of strategiing partnership during one more Hun Singh and
George Bush, then Prime Minister Modi and Obama, and then Biden,
(34:42):
and then Bush and Bush, Biden, Obama and again with the.
Speaker 3 (34:48):
Trump Why is it suddenly going downhill?
Speaker 5 (34:52):
Well, if you compare China policy your first Trump administration
with the China Polico second Trump admission, there is a
mark shift. In the first Trump administration, USA in fact
moved away from earlier policy of engagement with China. Instead
of that, they started calling China as a strategic rival
(35:16):
and you know it in some way called out China.
It was under the President Trump at that time. As
you mentioned, they also raised cod to summit level during
President Trump's you know upgrade it this time while Guard
(35:36):
meetings have taken place, two meetings at the level of
ministers taking place, one on the day that Trump, so
that the flagged their interest in God. But we are witnessing,
you know, a couple of developments which are disturbing. On
(35:58):
one side, we're aware of a level degree of turbulence
in India China India US strategic relationship which was on
upward trajectory for more than two decades under different you know, governments,
administrations on both sides. I think there are question marks
(36:20):
about it because we're getting these negative signals from Washington.
Speaker 4 (36:25):
D c Uh.
Speaker 5 (36:27):
We're also not sure to what extent the President Trump
attaches importance to India as a factor in US chinnel relations.
Speaker 4 (36:40):
This is one.
Speaker 5 (36:41):
Secondly, you know there's lack of clarity on what kind
of policy Trump is following visa v.
Speaker 4 (36:50):
China.
Speaker 5 (36:51):
You know, their strategic clarity is lacking. He seemed to
be more interested in some short term tomic gains, and
now he seemed to be more interested in his own
visit to China.
Speaker 4 (37:06):
Feeling one gets that USA and China they are.
Speaker 5 (37:14):
Engaged in a dialogue to see if they can work
out what Trump calls a beautiful deal. So that does
that beautiful deal for you mean that they're looking at
a G two. No, I will not call it G
two De Sally, We don't know what will be contours
of the deal.
Speaker 4 (37:32):
I don't think we can have G two any long longer.
But what has moved beyond G two?
Speaker 2 (37:39):
If I may, wouldn't America be shooting itself in the
foot Because ultimately China would continue to leverage America like
it did in the past four decades plus and then
become the supreme power, pushing USA down. And is America
still facilitating that?
Speaker 4 (37:58):
I think you have made a very important point. China has.
Speaker 5 (38:05):
Certain strategic objectives which have been articulated publicly, officially formally
by presentation Ping, including in his work report to twentieth
Congress of Commons Party of China in October twenty twenty two,
where he talked about you know how middle of the century,
you know, China's emergence as leading power in terms of
(38:32):
composite national interest strength, the fact that China would like
to emerge as the leading power in the world, begin
with the Nasia Pacific or what we call Into Pacific
and possibly lobally eventually with that's going to.
Speaker 4 (38:54):
Happen, But those ambitions are there now.
Speaker 5 (39:01):
USA has to decide whether it wish is to maintain
its primacy or would like to see ground to China.
As for India is concerned, our policy has been moving
towards a multipolar Asia, multipolar world, and I think I
don't think that policy had changed.
Speaker 2 (39:21):
We're in a very difficult situation, aren't we We want
a multi polar world, and we want to ensure that
we also rise in this world, and which is only natural.
At the same time, neither China nor America want India
to rise. Both China and America would want India to
be if I may remains, be subservient to them. You know,
(39:44):
isn't that exactly what Donald Trump is seeking? That India
should just attach itself to US economy and just he dictates,
and we say yes, sir, and that clearly I don't
see that happening.
Speaker 3 (39:56):
Do you see that happening?
Speaker 4 (39:57):
Well, when it comes to.
Speaker 5 (40:02):
US policy towards India, they have been until recently by
a large supportive of rise of India until Trump too.
Speaker 4 (40:13):
Yeah.
Speaker 5 (40:14):
Now, President Trump has his own way of dealing with
the world, and they he has treated both allies and partners,
and India comes in the second category. We're not a
lie somewhat shabbily in fact, people say that he is
(40:39):
being far more considerate enemy China and Russia, countries which
USA was until recently or perhaps even now engaged in
competition with. So it's a changed world we are looking at,
(41:00):
and very uncertain world. But my own feeling is that
there we should not be rushing to conclusions. President Trump
is also known to be to be somewhat fickle in
his policy position. So let's see that would trade with
(41:21):
chickens out in their use. Relations developed. Some damage has
been done to relationship, no doubt about it. But let's
see all things developed, because we have too.
Speaker 3 (41:32):
Many damaged relationships, don't we. I would think with China
post Galvan, it's damaged.
Speaker 2 (41:41):
I would think with America, even if you become friends again,
uh that comprehensive strategic partners and two powerful democracies moving forward,
I wouldn't. I don't think we would be buying military
hardware or critical military hardware from them because you would
remember some more than anybody else. You are right in
the middle of action that time post Pokrun, when they
(42:02):
put sanctions on us. Our entire fighter fleet for the
Navy and helicopter fleet was grounded because we didn't have
critical spares seeking sea harriers r G four or four
engines lacking our LCA could not take off.
Speaker 3 (42:15):
That problem remains even today.
Speaker 4 (42:17):
You know got in a way you answered your own question.
Speaker 5 (42:22):
If you go back to Ookrun two and the kind
of pressure which was brought to bear on India and
remember at that time we were in a more vulnerable position.
On were much smaller. We were subjected to very severe
sanctions un Security Council resolution. But within a matter a
(42:49):
few months, actually India US relations started, Yes, and they
had there was a reassessment until spent in USA and
they are both sides work to develop the relationship. I'm
not saying that the same thing will necessarily happen, but
(43:13):
they when we look at the you know, these relationships,
these key relationships.
Speaker 4 (43:21):
Uh, there is need for.
Speaker 5 (43:24):
Two things which are very important. One, there must be
strategic clarity. They should not be confusion like some people
arguing that no, no, we need to move closer to China, uh,
so that we can deal with USA in real world
things don't happen like of course Chinese just read that.
(43:47):
Look at their social media. Even what was appearing yesterday
after Wangi's visit. Their media essentially messages that we can't
trust India. You know, they are trying to come closer
to us because the problems they're facing with the USA.
(44:09):
We can't be too optimistic about this relationship. There are
parallel concerns on Indian side about China. So what I'm
saying that there should be clarity that they've been a
challenge for US, it will remain. China is our primary
strategic challenge. So if you think we can invoke China
(44:32):
to compensate for certain strategic deficit and our relations with USA,
clearly that's not going to happen, you know.
Speaker 2 (44:40):
But ideally, you know, our civilizational thinking is we'd like
to be friends with China and we'd like to be
friends with America.
Speaker 5 (44:48):
No, So I'll come to second point, need for strategic patients.
Strategic patients when you deal with their countries like China
or even USA, at this point time, you need to
be patient.
Speaker 4 (45:03):
You don't need to sort of.
Speaker 5 (45:07):
Keep reacting sometimes too forcefully or no, trying to to
say in their India Chinnel relations, uh, trying to restore
normalcy when facts the ground, facts of Chinese policy towards
(45:30):
in there, their behavior doesn't quite support that question.
Speaker 2 (45:34):
So if they don't give us more access to their markets,
why do we give them because we need their productions?
That why are you're giving them more access to our markets?
You know, this direct flight resuming India China? Does that
benefit us? Does that benefit them more?
Speaker 4 (45:49):
In your view?
Speaker 5 (45:50):
You know, I think it benefits both sides. I think
it's important to have connectivity. China is the second.
Speaker 4 (45:57):
Largest economy in the world.
Speaker 5 (45:59):
UH. It's the leading trading partner with more than one
twenty countries. Let's remember that it's the largest manufacturing nation
in the world, accounting for nearly one third of global
manufacturing value.
Speaker 4 (46:14):
Edition.
Speaker 5 (46:15):
It's a very critical part of global value chain. So
we need to deal with China, there's no doubt about it.
But when we engage with China, we need to also
keep in mind do limitations and a few risks. I'm
(46:36):
talking about economic domain here. Risks are we talked about,
you know, how dependencies can be weaponized and have been
weaponized by China, among others.
Speaker 4 (46:50):
Limitations will be you know, if we expect.
Speaker 5 (46:55):
That the Chinese investment will build up where manufacturing capabilities
in India or develop India as a as a major manufacturing.
Speaker 4 (47:09):
The China plus going to happen, that's not going to happen.
Speaker 2 (47:12):
UH.
Speaker 4 (47:13):
So we should be clear.
Speaker 5 (47:14):
Yes, I mean to the extent we can work with
China to develop ound capabilities, and we need to know
we need to source our material from China.
Speaker 3 (47:26):
UH.
Speaker 5 (47:26):
In certain areas they are such a huge part of
supply chain. There is no alternative, uh but going to China.
But we have to bear in mind these limitations and
also security concerns that they you know, in today's world, ah,
(47:48):
vulnerabilities have gone up. You have your critical infrastructure. Future
conflicts will not be fought just in body areas. They
will be my domain operation communications, everything will come in.
Why were we giving China access to our communication once
upon a time being a part that you know, did
(48:11):
we think that it's going to help improve I was
told they were trying to sell us some radars for
our post. Also, I mean, you know, I think India
before many other countries. In fact, they have decided not
to give entry to China. In rolling out of Chinese entities,
rolling out of five D telephony companies.
Speaker 4 (48:31):
Like Qabi and Tea, we were aird with the curve.
Speaker 5 (48:36):
Likewise, we were aird to a curve in banning Chinese
apps because you know these apps security concerns in the
USA is still debating on TikTok, but we banned India
banned TikTok. So it's not that we have not taken steps.
This comment has taken some forceful steps. But looking ahead
(49:03):
we must seek better relations with China. We must seek,
as Prime Minister said, you know, stable, predictable, constructive our
relationship with China. But we should do so without they're
harboring any uh, you know, excessive expectations. We should be
(49:25):
realistic and our approach. We should see problems, pitfalls and
possibilities in India channel relations, problems with falls and possibilities
in India channel relations and move accordingly. And it cannot
be it cannot be one side taking initiative. I think
(49:48):
China needs to to respond to our concerns.
Speaker 2 (49:53):
But if it doesn't so for example, you know, even
on border talks, there is some talk about you know,
China talking about deep delineation of the border.
Speaker 3 (50:03):
Is that middle sector? Is that Ladak? Is that northeast?
Do you see anything moving forward?
Speaker 2 (50:10):
Advanced border security, border management delimitation negotiations.
Speaker 3 (50:14):
How do you take them forward? And new CBMs?
Speaker 2 (50:16):
So you negotiated those CVMs from nineteen ninety six through
the BDCA, and they just threw them all out of
the window when they came in twenty twenty.
Speaker 4 (50:27):
You know what has been what does that great?
Speaker 5 (50:31):
The meeting between NSA and BANGI in their respective capacities
as special representatives of India and China.
Speaker 4 (50:39):
The boundary question.
Speaker 5 (50:41):
There are some key understandings, including one tasking WMCC expert
group under that to explore early.
Speaker 3 (50:53):
Harvest what does early harvest actually mean?
Speaker 5 (50:57):
Now? But this say needs to be to be sort
of explained a little bit because what was proposed earlier
and I had proposed that we can have early harvest
by having a separate understanding on Sikim sector.
Speaker 4 (51:18):
We pointed out that.
Speaker 5 (51:21):
In the Agreement on Pultural Parameters and Guiding Principles we
had signed of a boundary settlement in two thousand and five.
We have agreed on a package settlement which will cover
all sectors of the boundary. Will not be inclined to
have peace peel. Besides, you know Sikim, we don't have
(51:43):
any serious problems in terms we agree on the basic
watershed boundary. There may be some differences on the ground.
So we don't see much point in in ENOS undermining
two thousand and five agreement by moving our from Manor
Provisions agreement and going for piecemeal settlement for SICKM sector.
Speaker 4 (52:10):
Now, I don't know.
Speaker 5 (52:13):
What is the scope of early harvest this time, but
I have seen that the readout coming from the Chinese side.
Speaker 4 (52:24):
Refers to.
Speaker 5 (52:27):
Demarcation in pockets which are rife for settlement. Now that
is really puzzling. I happen to be the negotiated for
two thousand and five agreement. We have agreed on a
set of principles and parameters. A sequence sequence was that
(52:50):
first we have this agreement, then we'll agree on framework
for boundary settlement. Only after that will go on delineation
on ground and delineation on map and demarcation ground. Now
they're talking about demarcation without which is without framework without delineation.
So demarcation was supposed to be the last element. We
(53:14):
have to be careful because two five agreement provides a
good solid basis. In fact, I was happy to note
that both sides have retreated their commitment to this agreement yesterday,
but they we should be a little careful. I don't
(53:37):
want to pre judge your early harvest. I can only
say what was discussed earlier and why we didn't accept
it earlier. There was also some discussion on whether early
our west could include the sick middle sector. Chinese had
not agreed to that.
Speaker 4 (53:55):
I don't know. Frankly, I don't know at this point
of time, so this is one uh second to know.
Speaker 5 (54:01):
Likewise, on a de escalation, I think we already discussed that.
That also is a complex that.
Speaker 2 (54:08):
As we have framework in the sense of principles, they'll
have to be further back because they can move on
to discuss that actually to work it out. So I
also wanted to ask you briefly about Sundong Chu in
nineteen eighty six eighty seven.
Speaker 3 (54:25):
How was that ultimately worked out?
Speaker 2 (54:27):
I mean there, I believe when Jel Sundarji had put
in tanks and armored personal carriers in Sundroong Chu and
it took nine years to finally settle that.
Speaker 5 (54:37):
Well, you know, Sundurung Chu for your audience, you know
this is close to Tawang. It's a valley which is
uh you know, south of Taglar Ridge. Taglar Ridge is
(54:58):
then international boundary there and there we had a seagional
post uh in sumdurum Chu valley and they June sixth
when Indian personnel went back there because we used to
withdraw during winters, they found that Chinese were sitting there
and they were asked to vacate, which they didn't and
(55:21):
they started constructing a helipad there. They started reinforcing their presence.
It was after that that, you know, Indian army decided
to have a strong deployment, so they brought in troops.
They were located on the ridge line overlooking Sumdrum Chu Valley,
(55:44):
and that became what Chinese called closed close confrontation because
Indian Chinese troops were deployed in very close proximity each
other and tensions built up along the borders. In fact,
the tensions were brought down by middle of eighty seven,
(56:04):
but this situation of deployment and close proximity continued until
nineteen ninety five when finally we could agree on disengagement.
Speaker 3 (56:14):
Took nine years nine to.
Speaker 4 (56:16):
Work it out. Now that time, if you have to,
you know, learn certain lessons from that.
Speaker 5 (56:25):
One lesson is that our response was immediate and forceful,
and we refused to Chinese kept pushing us to withdraw.
We refused to withdraw, so we sort of showed the
staying power and in a way, that became the backdrop
(56:46):
to Raji Gandhi's visit to China in December eight because
that's how the so that crisis in fact created.
Speaker 4 (56:55):
An opportunity, an opportunity, so that that happened.
Speaker 2 (57:00):
Uh.
Speaker 5 (57:01):
Other thing which is important, which has relevance today, that
was discussed in an emparliament repeatedly, and I.
Speaker 4 (57:10):
Think there is need for greater transparency in what we do,
what is being.
Speaker 3 (57:19):
You know, you you should point that out. Strength is
something that China does respect.
Speaker 2 (57:23):
So if you show strength, military deployments, sustained diplomacy and
patience as you pointed out, uh, that perhaps gets you
your solutions.
Speaker 5 (57:33):
Uh.
Speaker 3 (57:33):
You know, we shall continue this conversation forward. And there's
so much that I want to talk to you about.
Speaker 2 (57:38):
But for joining me here on this Chuck Review podcast, Ambassador,
thank you for inviting me.
Speaker 1 (57:45):
This is En Today Podcasts
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