We’re not Abhimanyu… We’re Arjun.”
Chakravyuh explores the frontline of modern warfare with Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria, former Chief of Air Staff. From Balakot to Operation Sindoor, this no-holds-barred conversation reveals:
🔺How Air Power became India’s weapon of choice
🔺Why precision air strikes replaced ground invasions
🔺Inside India’s 9th and 10th May night aerial blitz that shattered 11 Pakistani air bases
🔺The truth about China-Pakistan collusion and PL-15 missiles
🔺What’s next for India’s stealth fighters, unmanned aircraft, and the AMCA project
🔺How India’s military redefined escalation and deterrence
“This isn’t 1999. This is a new doctrine. Terror = War.
🎧 Don’t miss this explosive episode of Chakravyuh with Gaurav Sawant — your frontline pass to India’s defence and strategy.
🔔 Subscribe now for unmatched insights on national security, geopolitics, and military power.
Produced by Garvit Srivastava
Sound mixed by Rohan Bharti
Chakravyuh explores the frontline of modern warfare with Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria, former Chief of Air Staff. From Balakot to Operation Sindoor, this no-holds-barred conversation reveals:
🔺How Air Power became India’s weapon of choice
🔺Why precision air strikes replaced ground invasions
🔺Inside India’s 9th and 10th May night aerial blitz that shattered 11 Pakistani air bases
🔺The truth about China-Pakistan collusion and PL-15 missiles
🔺What’s next for India’s stealth fighters, unmanned aircraft, and the AMCA project
🔺How India’s military redefined escalation and deterrence
“This isn’t 1999. This is a new doctrine. Terror = War.
🎧 Don’t miss this explosive episode of Chakravyuh with Gaurav Sawant — your frontline pass to India’s defence and strategy.
🔔 Subscribe now for unmatched insights on national security, geopolitics, and military power.
Produced by Garvit Srivastava
Sound mixed by Rohan Bharti
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:08):
Hello and welcome to an India Today's special podcast, Chuck Review.
Speaker 1 (00:12):
I'm God of seventh.
Speaker 2 (00:14):
The Indian Air Force is now caught in the Chuck
Review of politics. Of course, airpar being a weapon of
choice is a subject of discussion today, especially at a
time when airpar was used extensively in Operations Sindur by India,
by Israel as part of its Operation Rising Line, and
(00:36):
by the United States of America as part of Operation
Midnight Hammer to Target four.
Speaker 1 (00:42):
Though Natans and.
Speaker 2 (00:44):
Ishfahan, the fact remains is airpar now the weapon of
choice to send across not just tactical but strategic messaging.
Joining me on the Chuck Review podcast is a Chief
Marshall arcs Padoria, former Chief of Air Staff, Sir, Welcome
on Chuck Review podcast.
Speaker 1 (01:05):
Thank you.
Speaker 2 (01:06):
You have over four three hundred hours of flying on
forty three different types of aircraft fighter jets, transport and helicopters.
Speaker 1 (01:16):
And that's spectacular.
Speaker 2 (01:18):
Four three hundred plus hours of flying on forty three aircraft.
What do you make of air power being employed by
India as a weapon of choice, first Ballacote and now
Operations Sindhur.
Speaker 3 (01:31):
You know, airpower for such operations is absolutely the weapon
of choice for obvious reasons, because both Ballacotte and Sindhu
started with ability to hit terror targets. And when you
want to hit deep inside, mind you, if you're going
to hit closer to lesi, there are other options which
were also excised. But when you want to hit deep inside,
(01:53):
starting Balloquote, airpower was the only answer and it was
done so effectively. Operations two most important targets which were
very deep those were really targets that nobody could think
that they would be attacked when they were attacked. Clearly,
airpar is the weaponar choice for something closer by lot
(02:16):
ammunition would work, and that option was also exercised.
Speaker 2 (02:20):
So are we to think the future of warfe you know,
so if you look at operations Hindu Operation Rising Lion
and Midnight Hammer stand up weapons, UH fighter jets. Of course,
for Midnight Hammer, America Sentenence fighter jets Rising Line. Israel
also Sentenence fighter jets because they'd been able to achieve,
(02:41):
you know, suppression of enemy air defenses completely and the
fighter jets flew into enemy territory.
Speaker 1 (02:46):
Is that going to be the future.
Speaker 2 (02:48):
Either stand up weapons or air power and not employing
ground troops.
Speaker 3 (02:52):
No, let's look at it that way. That air power,
the stand up weapons b it air to ground. No
huge range weapons are to air. These kind of capabilities
would be center stage in any any future conflict, in
any such combat scenarios. Conflict scenarios would be center state absolutely,
(03:12):
you know, primarily the weapons of tries. But we should
not see it in isolation that Okay, this does it
means that you can there's no importance of the ground
forces or the naval forces. They're all now integrated and
as an integrated force, there are elements of you know,
super specialization in each of the services, and that itself
has its own you know, combinations that are brought to
(03:36):
bear in any such conflict. U airpower is also in
some sense, of course, in Navy it's extended. It's over
aircraft carriers, carrier fair amount of air power. Similarly, Army
now going into more drone et cetera, alighting amminition in
some of that that is also extending into airpar assets.
(03:58):
So we should see it as as as a combine nation.
But clearly stand up weapons, precision weapons and air power
would be center stage in any future conflict that has
to be clearly understood, and it's something that is being
built into our the way we are going to fight wars.
Speaker 2 (04:14):
When Israeli A force went into Iran, there was suppression
of enemy air defenses and very effective suppression of enemy
air defenses. Their radars were taken down, their missiles were
taken down, and then the fighter jets went in.
Speaker 1 (04:29):
Should we have.
Speaker 2 (04:30):
Done the same when we struck you know, in twenty
nineteen Balacote, or in twenty twenty five murit ke Bahawalpur,
the nine terrorist training camps and launch pads. I'm asking
you this in context of you know, India's naval attache
in Indonesia as seven are recently when he.
Speaker 3 (04:50):
Spoke of political.
Speaker 2 (04:51):
Constraints, not you know, giving them either clearance or the words.
Speaker 1 (04:58):
To that effect, and which were the reason for losses
of aircraft.
Speaker 3 (05:02):
No, this must be clearly understood. Firstly, as far as
political leadership direction is concerned. If you're talking of obs Indor,
the operational freedom was given straight away and it was
well before obs indur to the services. So so I
think this was well covered in the news, and so
there's clear operational freedom. But you must understand when you
(05:25):
hit terrorist targets. Okay, at that in that strike you
do not target, you do not plan to hit military targets.
And the comparison that you were making with Iran and
what is Rael died there. If your question is whether
we should have taken out some of the ad assets
before we hit the terrorist targets in our answer is
(05:48):
no because we no no, yes, because the target our
plan was to hit terrorist targets alone. Okay uh, it's
very clearly. So your operational mission planning et sector needs
to cater for this. So this is a constraint or
a restaurant that the survice exercises that, yes, I will
(06:10):
hit only terrists target without taking out this it's not
a war situation. You have decided to hit the terrorist target.
Therefore you make a combination how you will go about it,
and in that in a normal war conflict situation you
do all this suppression of enemy air defense and thereafter
take here you don't do because your clear aim is
(06:30):
to hit the terrist targets alone.
Speaker 1 (06:32):
So Israel is a war with Iran.
Speaker 2 (06:34):
That is why Israel was able to take out their
enemy air defenses.
Speaker 1 (06:38):
Suppression That is.
Speaker 3 (06:40):
A classic way of conducting your operations. But here the
situation is different and it will always be so when
you're hitting terrorist target. Therefore, this has to be understood
in this manner.
Speaker 1 (06:50):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (06:51):
Thereafter, when this was escalated, when Pakistan started hitting our
sending runs and started hitting our Mili targets and civilian
targets and targeting and targeting aircraft thereafter, what we did
was like we would have done for operation. Initially, we
took out some radars, but we did it a very
calibrated way.
Speaker 1 (07:10):
On the first day with just some radars, you could
have taken much more.
Speaker 3 (07:14):
But when they next night again attacked some more with
the lottering munitions and tried to hit our bases, et cetera,
some more command centers and radars were taken out, which
were of uh, you know, greater importance and strategically more important.
And on the ninth night and tenth morning before that
when they started hitting our bases, and that is when
when those we hit those eleven targets, was a proper
(07:36):
operation done before that, it was very very calibrated response
from our side.
Speaker 1 (07:40):
So this was not like a build up to war.
Speaker 3 (07:43):
But we still suppressed their air defense adequately, and on
ninth tenths we took out And if you were saying that,
you know Parkson was very capable their air defenses. We
could not sort out on the first day, on the
on the seventh, what happened on ninth and they were nowhere.
We were able to supper and we were able to
achieve all targets without any losses on our side and
(08:05):
all the targets for it.
Speaker 2 (08:06):
So when CDs General Anil Chahan was speaking overseas, he
too seemed to indicate that there were some tactical issues.
Initially those lessons were learned and then as you mentioned
ninth and tenth we gave Pakistan Mary Hill that point taken.
So what are these tactical things that the Air force
(08:29):
sorted out in your appreciation?
Speaker 3 (08:31):
No, I wouldn't like to go into it because I
don't know exactly what the situation is, what happened, the
rational behind what CITIOUS mentioned, and it is best to
for them to sort of cover it subsequently as and
when they want to cover or for the Air Force
to cover. But in general terms, I must explain some
things that even on seventh when we hit terrorist targets, right,
(08:56):
we must understand the rules of engagement. So don't do
a classic suppression of air defense hitting the radar so
some military target before we hit terrace. But when we're
hitting terrace or immediately after that or in the process that,
should you get fired upon, you you thereafter, as per
rules of engagement, you are at liberty to fireback in
(09:18):
air battle. This happens very very fast. It's it's you know,
it's it's moving in seconds. But it must be understood.
So those are the kind of ruts of engagement which
come into play the moment we have hit terrorist targets
and come back. If any military action gets taken by
their side, we are absolutely free to respond.
Speaker 1 (09:33):
So we must understand the rules. As Pakistan follow rules
of no, I'll cover to the no.
Speaker 3 (09:40):
They don't obviously, if they were so rational, we won't
have these situations. No, you know, they will not support
this terrorist organization so blatantly, and when we hit terrist target,
they won't start responding militarily so and they won't be
attending the funerals of the terrorist lane. So they're clearly
and uh, being a nuclear country, the way they start,
(10:04):
you know, talking about use of nuclear weapons absolutely irrational. Okay,
so that's why we land up in this situation on
the issue of tactical mistake that you mentioned, the context
that that we were in. All I can see is
that this is a fast moving situation. You know, Pakistan
(10:25):
had put their complete defenses on alert. They knew our
prime minister had very clearly said, we will not leave
the terrace. Wherever they are, we'll go after them and
whoever is supporting them, and whoever is you know, UH
has ordered these pel garments. So very clearly they were
expecting their their complete defenses were up.
Speaker 1 (10:47):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (10:48):
So while their complete defenses are up, when the first
mission gets undertaken, it is with some constraints in distant Obviously,
you want to eat only the trailt target, so you
excise a lot of UH you know, constrained.
Speaker 1 (11:02):
In your planning and in your execution. A lot of
this gets factored in.
Speaker 3 (11:07):
You asked me what could have gone wrong or what
could have led to this kind of thing, and because
of which Silius said said something all I can think
of is that when new weapons come into the play.
For example, Peel fifteen of China was absolutely new. While
we had had information of that, the information was the
(11:27):
initial version that they gave was one fifty kilometer range
or so, but clearly they had the latest version which
probably got supplied before operations Indur, which was two kilometers class.
So please don't take as if I have some internal
knowledge and what happened. But these are the things that
get factored. And just imagine a difference between one fifty
(11:49):
and two under plus two and fifty kilometers clubs. Second
issues like if there's a surface to air missiles, you know,
the latest one that they've taken from China, where are
they located?
Speaker 1 (11:59):
So I know where you do such missions.
Speaker 3 (12:01):
In a fast moving scenario where deployments are taking place,
you one of your targets is to pick up everything
where what is located and therefore plot it and keep
your assets you know, airbone assets out of it or
take action whenever you get fired.
Speaker 1 (12:18):
Upon what's the biggest list, But you don't know.
Speaker 2 (12:22):
So there could be a surface to your missile which
has moved to a place where you have got into
its domain.
Speaker 1 (12:27):
So these are the kind of things that affect initially
the moment.
Speaker 3 (12:31):
It gets known the battle, you know, footprint becomes very
clear once you fire a first day thereafter you take
other actions to see that you care for all that
this is how it progresses. So I'm just generally guessing
what could have gone and how things would have gone.
Speaker 2 (12:48):
But when we look at future of combat now and
future combat next time we are hitting even if you're
hitting terror bases, and ideally, now that it's clear there's
no difference between half a side and then half is
a semonir, are we to understand that there will be
no distinction in future?
Speaker 1 (13:08):
What is your appreciation?
Speaker 3 (13:10):
Now there is a new normal as as Prime Minister
has defined that an act of terror will be an
act of war. This is absolutely you see previously he
said zero tolerance to terror, so you do something, we
will respond. Balacotte happened this, you know, they did Pelgram,
(13:30):
We did this operation that was zero tolerance. Now it
is equated with an act of war. And now if
you ask me if a terrorist incident was to take
place which is of serious consequence and we want to
and it has been identified as having emanated from Pakistan
and we want to respond. Uh, when we respond this
(13:52):
time to hit on the terrorist targets, we are at
liberty to start taking out any military target which comes
in the way or which is at that time aid
in a bit relevant to that strike.
Speaker 1 (14:06):
Whether we do it is.
Speaker 3 (14:06):
Another reason, another another discussion, it's another A lot of
factors would go into it.
Speaker 1 (14:12):
But that is the implication of the act of war. Uh.
Other issue is it has straight.
Speaker 3 (14:19):
Away put Pakistani army I say that they are in
league with terrorists. So agencies which support terrorists can come
under the crosshair.
Speaker 1 (14:29):
So okay. So so that is the difference.
Speaker 2 (14:31):
The implication is that Pakistan army you said, is irrational.
It's not an army that that is professional. And it's
an army that attacked India when India attacked terrorists. India
was responding to that Pehelgam terror attack and Pakistan army
attacked on military installations. So there is no difference between
(14:52):
their army and their terrorists. And when you hit back,
you will make sure when Indian Air Force or when
India hits back, there is no distinction between Partis Tanami
and Pakistan terrorists.
Speaker 1 (15:01):
Is that amply clear? Has been made clear to Pakistan.
Speaker 3 (15:05):
Yeah, it's been made clear that they've been basically exposed.
Their nexus with terrorism has been exposed very clearly, and
we've been saying this all along, you know, for all
the previous acts we've been putting those years, we've been
putting all the proofs UH and the world would look
(15:26):
at it and to analyze Dosi diplomacy. Now now, no,
they can make the dozier and keep sending this is
what India. India attacked us and did and the world
can keep looking at their doziers now.
Speaker 1 (15:38):
But we will do what we have to do. If
they do act like Pelga, this will be the response
and it will be more.
Speaker 2 (15:45):
What is your assessment now that we're talking about it,
and before I come to airpower, the bigger question of airpower?
What is your assessment of Pakistani training, tactics, weapons, UH
and systems? Three days of operations in there? What is
your assessment? Eighty percent we are told of their equipment
is Chinese. General Shukla was on Chuck review from Ami
(16:06):
Commanda Art track. His appreciation is ninety percent of all
Pakistani equipment is Chinese.
Speaker 1 (16:12):
So what is your assessment? So PL fifteen's apparently seem
to have done well.
Speaker 2 (16:17):
Our impression was one hundred and fifty kilometers, but they
had two hundred kilometer plus range.
Speaker 3 (16:21):
Ones Yeah, answered in two three ways Firstly, if you
see the overall Pakistani independence forces, eighteen ninety percent is
going towards Chinese.
Speaker 1 (16:31):
If you see Pakistan Air Force, there.
Speaker 3 (16:33):
Is a lot of American equipment, particularly American some Western
equipment still there, a lot of F sixteen and a
lot of which have been upgraded and weapons related to that.
MDM was their strong air to air weapon previously, remember Bala.
Now they have gone in for because they were not
getting anything better from West. They've gone in for Chinese aircraft.
(16:56):
So j A tens JF Seventeen's how how PL fifteen
came in then such a hurry? How the best of
the PL fifteen is made available to them, which I
don't think China is or their policy wise they were
wanting to export to anybody. So that China Park collusion
is in the open. We always knew it. It's not
(17:17):
that it's come as a surprise. We always had thought
of factoring this. But but it's not restricted just to
PL fifteen's.
Speaker 2 (17:25):
Apparently satellite and real fifteens all PERIL fifteenhens work, but
the higher range does give it a certain unique capability.
But many PEERL fifteens, because they have fired at danges
and because our our pilots have taken their necessary actions
and and uh.
Speaker 1 (17:42):
Evaded it.
Speaker 3 (17:43):
Those have flown and after the kind of ting energy goes,
they've been found on ground. They've been many you're aware
which have been discovered. So there are many Pel fifteen
Swish didn't to find the target at or obviously if
Pakistan always has prided itself with their air force being
absolute top classes, yeah, yeah, no, there's no no where
(18:04):
to penetrate it. There's no way to. They're their best
option available. So they prided on their defense capability and
they are centered around their air defense, not so much
on that tack side. All that has been sorted out
on ninth and tenth Okay, the missions that we flew
(18:24):
on ninth night and tenth morning was a classic mission
the way you operate in a full fledged conflict.
Speaker 1 (18:32):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (18:33):
Their air defense was hit, The targets that we wanted
were hit, all successful, all precisions okay, and no losses
on our side. Their air force was nowhere insight in
terms of effectively able to defend.
Speaker 1 (18:48):
Why was the air force there on the ninth and
the tenth what's your appreciation?
Speaker 3 (18:51):
Yeah, because the way we had structured our entire s
four hundred plus MRSM combination and along with our ad aircraft,
they were unable to get anywhere close. And mind you,
the fact that none of our airfields or any target
of military importance was successfully engaged with them is because
(19:12):
of this. They have air to ground you know, one
hundred kilometers plus weapons that versions the many of the schools,
and they fired those air to ground precision weapons, they
fired ballistic missiles. They were all tackled by our air
defense system. So one, they were never allowed to get
close enough to fire a huge number of weapons. Whatever
(19:35):
they fired were tackled. Okay, this is important to understand.
So while our air defense tackled their entire offensive, they
were unable to resist any of the attacks that we
did on tenth morning.
Speaker 1 (19:50):
So that is the result where we are today.
Speaker 2 (19:52):
So they lost their nerve after they lost to sub
airborn early warning command in control systems one on ground
and one in the air.
Speaker 1 (20:00):
Am I right.
Speaker 3 (20:01):
My understanding is in the air was not a SAB.
It may be an Ellent aircraft, okay, but but on
the ground was SAB. So I would say one one
that way. But there are various analysis on this and
and one one thirty and there are one thirty was
lost in yeah, and three on three high tech aircraft
(20:22):
in the air. That means sixteen day seventeen class or
jetting class and four on the ground. So about seven
fighters and three more these assets, uh, you know, multi rollized.
So so these are these are very high losses, so
we don't talk about it. These are very high losses.
Speaker 1 (20:42):
These are high losses from Pakistan aphost.
Speaker 3 (20:44):
But having said all this, we must remember never to underestimate. Then, no, absolutely,
you know, they have a unique capability of getting the latest. Okay,
they've been working good after Balacote and today they have
taken the best of Chinese as far as missile is concerned.
(21:05):
They have taken the best of surface missiles from from China.
They've taken a huge lot of radar jamming equipment networks.
Speaker 1 (21:15):
Okay, so did they work? Look?
Speaker 3 (21:18):
P fifteen's may have worked, but what about the other
fifteen also some may have worked, some majority haven't. But
that's because of the ranges that we forced them to find.
Speaker 2 (21:28):
H Q nine's and h Q sixteen's, I mean, you
were able to take them out wherever it passule, Volari
and Malirkin.
Speaker 3 (21:38):
Wherever it mattered, we took them out. Where it didn't matter,
we didn't. We just stayed out. We are not taken
out all. You know, in a full conflict situation, we
were not taken out much more. So why didn't you
take out more?
Speaker 1 (21:49):
No, it was not required.
Speaker 3 (21:50):
So we were calibrating our response all along. It was
not a war situation. It was after hit on terrorists.
We were responding in proportion. It responds to them.
Speaker 1 (22:01):
So when I want to understand this, I mean historically
and civilizationally.
Speaker 2 (22:05):
Also, if I could take you back to Jadra Wad
in the Mahabharat when Abhimanyu was killed in chuk Review
and Jadra was on the first entrance of the chuk Review,
Arjun said, I will kill Jaira by by sundown, or
I will kill myself Dodan. You know the way he
(22:28):
treated uh Panchali or Dropadi when he said jianghato, so
Bim said, my jang, which is against.
Speaker 1 (22:36):
Rules of law.
Speaker 2 (22:38):
And why do we tie ourselves in in all these shirts?
Why are we civilizationally like this? I mean, why do
we even care that we will not take out his
enemy defenses? Take out his enemy defenses he's a terrorist country.
Speaker 1 (22:51):
Kill him. It doesn't work like that to kill himself.
Speaker 3 (22:59):
Yeah, it doesn't work like that when you're responding to
terrorist it if it was that you were declaring to
go to war, it would work like that.
Speaker 1 (23:09):
But does Pakistan declare war? Pakistan does what it wants
to do. It kills up people, It targets our military installations.
Speaker 3 (23:16):
If Pakistan had done more than this, they would have.
See we've responded proportionately, but every time in a multiple
of theirs. So if they were sending drone and luring munition,
we sent much more. We attacked their rada's close to
the border. We're responding. We're responding. Were because this is
a situation when we want to hit terrorists. We said
we are. You know, our de escalation was built in
(23:37):
and we declared it. We said, we don't want to
hit your military we have with terrorists. Now, when they
took a military response, we responded. Now, clearly I look
at the larger picture, how it.
Speaker 1 (23:48):
Was our hit? I mean, how how extensive has Pakistan
been hit?
Speaker 2 (23:52):
As you know, if if you were the Pakistan Army chief,
I would not wish that to any of my friends.
But if you were, how would you assess his losses
of eleven air bases, multiple radar stations.
Speaker 3 (24:04):
It is absolutely in this situation, this is a limited
conflict situation. Okay, it's a huge loss and there that
is why they went running to us, and they wanted
a face saving way to exit. Okay, and that's why
all this drama, theatron that took place from their side.
Speaker 1 (24:22):
Okay. So so it's a loss, absolutely more than just
loss of face. Absolutely loss. We have all the pictures
we have you know, no pictures, so he said, only
crows and trees work.
Speaker 3 (24:36):
Yeah, yeah, So but we knew what we had done.
And you see now when your precision strike happens, you
see a similar thing, small role on top inside, everything destroyed.
That's how precision strikes happened.
Speaker 1 (24:47):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (24:48):
So so that ninth and tenth, what the way he
has been hit and the kind of targets that were
it and with the precision and with their entire defense
you know, left standing there's.
Speaker 1 (25:02):
For that duration. Absolutely, but they could not prevent any
of this. You jammed them or you destroyed everything.
Speaker 3 (25:11):
It would be a combination of everything, combination of jamming,
combination of taking out where it is relevant and a
combination of precision and stand up.
Speaker 2 (25:20):
And these were not just the Chinese systems. I believe
Mali controlment has American radar. Of course, of course some
of the radars were taken out the previous night. They
were taken out the previous night.
Speaker 3 (25:30):
Yeah, and taken out they were you know, command and
control centers that were taken out. Yeah, And it's not easy.
These are all you know, concrete and reinforced seal.
Speaker 1 (25:44):
So it's it's so that control is a nuclear command
in control system.
Speaker 3 (25:48):
It's a common control system there. I have seen reports
that it has strategic elements within the same It could
be same and otherwise we'll leave it at that. So
it's one of the most important command in controls and
that has been taken out.
Speaker 1 (26:01):
Yes, how in your appreciation, how long will it take
him to rebuild it? It really depends.
Speaker 3 (26:07):
But if they put all their you know efforts behind
it still it would take it at least a year
and a half two years, just going by the requirements
of the works itself, and to come down to come
up to the same status what has been destroyed with
these kind of sir.
Speaker 2 (26:25):
Godha, you know, every time whatever I've read about nineteen
sixty five war and seventy one war. Has always been
in war. Our favorite target. Now India was not at war,
and yet you took out Godha.
Speaker 3 (26:37):
Yeah, that was again. It is straight away messaging. We
will reach anywhere that we want. And Sir Godha is
one of the most defended targets. It's deep inside, so
many of the layered defenses as such come into operation.
In spite of that, we got it, Sorgoda what we wanted.
So so it was beautifully planned, you know, right across
(27:01):
various geogrophil depths and the kind of targets chosen. It
was very strong messaging and also very strong uh you
know impact that this is where you stop, and he stopped.
Of course, if you had continued, the repercussions would have
been you'd tell me something. There are many who say that.
Speaker 1 (27:23):
Just because he sought a cease fire, India agreed immediately.
Speaker 2 (27:27):
There are many analysts who say that we should have
hit them for a couple of more days when he
was already down on his knees.
Speaker 1 (27:34):
You know again the Pria Chohan syndrome. And I want
to go back to history.
Speaker 2 (27:38):
Mohammed Gory had been defeated either Mahma Gory should have
been killed, there wouldn't have been the second battle, and
India's history may have been.
Speaker 1 (27:46):
Different even this time when he was down tescimate him.
Speaker 3 (27:50):
We shouldn't get confused of comparing war situations with a
situation of hitting terrorist basis.
Speaker 2 (27:57):
This wasn't by This wasn't the war you were hitting.
It wasn't it was hitting his air bases. It still
wasn't full fledged war. He has taken some military action.
We are still responding. We didn't move our you know,
ground forces. It is not full fledged war. This must
be understood.
Speaker 1 (28:15):
And what was starting? Uh you know what did the
government say? So? So objectives were very clear and you
go by those and overall.
Speaker 3 (28:24):
If you see, everything was achieved wonderfully well, exceptionally well
what not?
Speaker 1 (28:32):
On no objecty was to hit the terrorist targets, those
military those are.
Speaker 3 (28:40):
For for decades. We had had the details and we
never you know, venture to hit. That is true, that
has been hit.
Speaker 2 (28:47):
Could could anybody believe do you think we could have hit?
You know, when it was war, it was always a
question man.
Speaker 3 (28:53):
When will we hit? Okay, But the fact is that
we did hit, even in Pakistan I'm telling you they
would not have imagined that we will. That is, they
could have thought of it, yes, possible target, they would
not have imagined. And that's why they were they were
caught residing. There're still that so many of the terrorists
(29:15):
were still there. That's why that you know, very high
level of funerals and what you saw and the army
joining in at the at the leadership level, it is
is amazing.
Speaker 1 (29:25):
And look at the way we expose them to the world.
Look at the way.
Speaker 3 (29:30):
Pakistan army, the Pakistan you know this, how they support
the terrorism as even exposed to the world.
Speaker 1 (29:39):
I mean they're a country without honor.
Speaker 2 (29:41):
I mean their army chief will still imagine their armies
supping with the devil openly, you know, attending funerals of
terrorists and then having lunch at White House country.
Speaker 1 (29:53):
And the world in a way is dealing with them.
Speaker 3 (29:55):
That lunch at White House will obviously have someone stated
aims behind. I'm sure you know what happened the next
day when American forces were attacking around So so everything
has has some reason and logic.
Speaker 1 (30:08):
Is that but what we did, what we wanted, what
objects are fully achieved.
Speaker 3 (30:16):
And I would say it was achieved better than probably
was initially thought or planned, because when we stopped it,
it would stopped with the with a big hit, with
the with the big wrap on the knuckles, that this
is what you get.
Speaker 1 (30:30):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (30:31):
Also we expose their the sense of that they can't
be defeated. Their their air defense is fantastic, and their
overall what they've done with Chinese help and all, uh,
you know, it's impenetrable.
Speaker 1 (30:44):
So ninth and tenth we proved it.
Speaker 3 (30:46):
Who's going around running to get quickly more aircraft, more
these things? Immediately they're running forstell aircraft. They are running
back to China for this, so very clearly you can
see the panic in their actions. Okay, we are making
our own ragements, We are making our own plans.
Speaker 1 (31:03):
For sure.
Speaker 3 (31:04):
We need to do a lot of thinking for the
future because this changes the you know, situation in our region,
and we need to be prepared. But we are doing
about it in a common control and in a manner
which is more indigenous, more we'll do it ourselves kind
of attitude. They're going around already begging for money and
(31:26):
for weapons.
Speaker 1 (31:27):
And yet bragging. I mean, you know you and I
understand Pakistan lost.
Speaker 2 (31:32):
Anybody who reads about matters military understands Pakistan lost for
the simple reason nine of their terror camps, including Muritken
Bahawalpura hit And I have been covering counter terror operations,
you know since the Cargil War, and I know hitting
Muritken Bahawalpur was unheard of. Nobody had the guts to
(31:53):
order that hit. And the fact that Muritken Bahapur has
been hit have been hit is huge. And then hitting
eleven air bases huge And yet Asseimuni, instead of being
in disgrace, promotes himself to Field Marshal and has lunch
at White House. And you know, I think Balakut was
also huge. I was there in Srinagar at that time
(32:14):
when I was interacting very extensively with all of you. Also,
what I understand was the fact that you could hit
them in Hyberpa was massive. But then the Pakistani narrative
was keval. My only crows and were killed and trees
were damaged. How can they get away? Why do we
let them get away with absolute lives? I mean, I
(32:35):
know they're a shameless country and there are shameless people
with no honor, but why do we let them get
away with it.
Speaker 1 (32:41):
I don't think we let them get away.
Speaker 3 (32:44):
The world, of course, was letting them get away with
a lot of narratives and false support for their own
reasons at times known at times out of sheer incompetence.
But even that after ob Sinzour has changed. Now the
world sees them in a different light. You just what
happens in the future. Okay, they have been exposed thoroughly,
(33:08):
And don't go by this conflicting noises at times which
happened here and there, which is supporting almost their narrative,
because that is you know, it's not important.
Speaker 2 (33:17):
Are they better at information warfare than the Indian system?
Speaker 3 (33:22):
They would be anybody who gets defeated like this or
normally plays on the on the information war much more,
much more.
Speaker 2 (33:29):
No, but in China and Pakistan, I mean information warfare,
Why are they ahead of India, even though I mean
I thought what what happened in Galwan was good work
by India to stall them. India, you know, being in
a position to put fifty thousand troops there, quickly, moving
men material all over ls absolutely astounding operations, brilliant operations,
(33:52):
and yet the narrative is controlled by them.
Speaker 1 (33:54):
See narrative.
Speaker 3 (33:56):
I've heard this many times on Othood that you know
they handle the narrative better when you have pictures of
the strike and targets destroyed, satellite pictures before. After where
is the issue of narratives to decide who did better?
So ninth and tenth just explains everything before that. On seventh,
(34:18):
all the pictures of every single target struck, and of
course muric can Balporto. You know, the videos coming out
of Pakistan were more explicit than we had from the satellites.
So the damage is there to see, the results are
there to see. So all the damage on the aircraft
(34:38):
very clearly, the hangar, you can see the aircraft inside
the aircraft, on the tarmac, all other shelters that would attack,
so very clearly, narrative has no place to decide on
who won when you have such clear proof. However, the
kind of information war or the kind of narratives that
(35:00):
they push after even having lost, is huge.
Speaker 1 (35:04):
That effort is huge.
Speaker 3 (35:05):
Their entire ice pere machinery and the entire media control
in Pakistan works primarily on this, and they want to,
you know, play it to their own public.
Speaker 2 (35:16):
You know the fact that seven Pakistani fighter jets and
early warning system and that Saab Grippin ae W and
C aircraft was lost should have been told officially by
Government of India after battle damage assessment was done.
Speaker 3 (35:29):
Yeah, I think air Force could have done that toll.
But you know Odur hasn't finished so at times, you know,
when operation is on, always there are you know, the
services exercise restraint on what information they want to give
out own and what they've hit. I'm sure they would
(35:50):
have access to even much more imagery and and and
analysis then it's in the public domain.
Speaker 2 (35:56):
Butkistan they hit them in Hyber Paktum, which in somewhere
in Peshawar in Baluchistan, which we are not saying.
Speaker 3 (36:04):
Which we are not saying. Yes, so even I don't
know the details with that. I I've seen that report. Yeah,
so so obviously this air force would have much more
information which they might not want to share. Now would
they decide to share it any time or share later?
It depends on them, depends on circumstances.
Speaker 1 (36:20):
So let's leave it did that. There's another thing, but
what is in the open domain.
Speaker 3 (36:24):
Let me tell you, is there any doubt even an
iotopped out that what has been achieved and how well
it has been conducted, so there is enough in the
open domain.
Speaker 1 (36:33):
I think I am.
Speaker 2 (36:34):
Thrilled to bits when I I've been anchoring. You were
there as my guest on the show. I've been anchoring
throughout when those nine terror camps were targeted. And for
someone who's covered Pakistan state sponsored radical Islamist terror for decades,
you know, I covered Operation Parakhram, the Parliament attack, and
in the midst of all of that, I covered Kaluchuk
(36:56):
and Kaluchuk for the benefit of some of our viewers,
where the armies were deployed.
Speaker 1 (37:02):
Uh due as part of Operation Parakham.
Speaker 2 (37:04):
In two thousand and two, Pakistani terrorists wearing military uniforms
entered a military garrison.
Speaker 1 (37:09):
In Jamu, in Kaluchak close to Jamu and they killed.
Speaker 2 (37:13):
Army families, they killed army soldiers, they killed little army children.
And I've covered that, and after that, India did not
attack Pakistan. I covered twenty six eleven Mumbai terror attacks
and I saw one hundred and sixty six people being
massacred in Mumbai war five days and those bodies which
were being brought into hospital and the works, and India
(37:33):
did not hit back. So after that, when you see
Bahawalpur and Muriitke being hit, and after that when you
see eleven military stations in Pakistan being hit and air
bas is, I am.
Speaker 1 (37:43):
Thrilled to bits that finally action is being taken. I
wanted more.
Speaker 2 (37:47):
But you know, when I was covering the Kargo War,
we'd interviewed with Krambatra and that famous line of his
yea dil mage more there's dil mange.
Speaker 1 (37:55):
Yeah, this is dil mangem. Yeah, absolutely, But why didn't
you do it? Why didn't they air force hit?
Speaker 2 (38:00):
No?
Speaker 3 (38:00):
Now, now, no, firstly you see this time is changed.
This is this shows what this goverment has done. Now
we will not accept. So now we will not prepare
those years. We will get them. Okay, So this is
this is for example, if it happen, why did we
not hit them more?
Speaker 1 (38:18):
We've hit them.
Speaker 3 (38:20):
Very very high in terms of proportionate response to whatever
they did militarily. They did not achieve any of the targets,
believe me, not a single target. Whatever weapons they deployed
hit and they were going very very strongly for Rs
four hundreds and our air bas is to create some
kind of damage and some military targets, and of course
(38:42):
they tried foolishly on the civilian targets and some of
our religious places too, but they could not succeed. So
so so whether we could have done more, if they
had not stopped, you would have done more, and our
navy was already poised. You know, next night would have
been different. So it is the level and the strong
(39:03):
significance of tenth Morning strike is what hit them hard
and they got to their senses.
Speaker 1 (39:10):
Was there a lot of pressure.
Speaker 2 (39:11):
What I'm trying to understand and in the light of
what Israel and America did to Iran, is that why
America was very keen that the air bases remain intact,
because America wanted to use those Pakistani air bases, especially
Nurkhan and Jacobabad which we destroyed, because Americans wanted to
use either Pakistani airspace or air bases to target Iran
(39:34):
From this side.
Speaker 3 (39:36):
I don't know about that, but for sure, since he
was there just before the Iran strike and that time
we didn't know. Although there was this thinking that they
might come in against Iran, I think for sure they
were told to. You know, Pakistani Amiti was told to
(39:57):
stay off any or any thought of being the leaders
in the Islamic world with nuclear capability, and and the
next day they attacked I was I'm sure it was
a very clear message to him that you just lay
off and stay on the side. And they always claim
(40:17):
to be, you know, the leaders in the Islamic world
and being the only nuclear power.
Speaker 1 (40:22):
And look what happened when.
Speaker 3 (40:24):
Some Iranian general made some statements so they could be
officially denied it.
Speaker 1 (40:28):
No, no, no, we are not.
Speaker 3 (40:30):
We haven't said this that we will if you run
gets stuck by a nuclear attack, we will come in
and all that. See how fast they were. So they've
been exposed even to the Islamic world. Okay, so I
think overall it will still even that will go against
them in the long run.
Speaker 1 (40:47):
When you look at I would think that that would
be the that was the dressing down.
Speaker 2 (40:52):
So you are you your impression is that Asa Muni
was given a dressing down in in the United States
of American White House or of wanting to stay off
or a warning to stay off in what's going to
happen to keep their eyes closed, and you see the reaction.
Speaker 3 (41:09):
Would you have imagined this reaction when Iran is getting
attacked from Pakistan. I think.
Speaker 1 (41:16):
Pakistani air bases in future also, uh, may not be,
may not be. I think that that is old school thought.
I I don't think so.
Speaker 3 (41:25):
I don't think so, because the aircraft carrier they have
many they have many options, so so I wouldn't think so.
Speaker 2 (41:34):
Whether that, but they required I mean, they had the
aircraft carrier battle groups even when Afghanistan was operations on
Enduring Freedom, and at the same time they required all these.
Speaker 3 (41:43):
Jacoba, Afghanistan was a little Afghanistan was a little different
in the in the depth of what they were doing
and in the context of what they were doing. I
think their planned against Iran would always have been for
a short and quick one. It wouldn't have been, you know,
(42:03):
based on the Pakistani support, but it could be one
of the factors.
Speaker 1 (42:08):
It's the future.
Speaker 2 (42:09):
Warfare, if we were to talk about future warfare and
the way you're looking at it.
Speaker 1 (42:13):
Globally, America.
Speaker 2 (42:17):
Bombed for though and nobody else in the world had
the kind of weapons that are required the GBU fifty
sevens on the B two bombers to target something which
is ninety meters deep. So that's why America was required.
But you've seen what happened at Ishfahan and what happened
at Nathan's and Busher and several other places. What is
(42:38):
your impression future warfare is that the way to take
out any country's nuclear assets. Many say that we also
targeted the Pakistani nuclear assets, which government of Fundias officially
denied at all times, but we.
Speaker 3 (42:53):
Didn't target their nuclear as its that you can be
sure whether this is the best way to target nuclear
setup in case you want to. It is not a
full fledget. They had not become a nuclear part. You
must understand Iran is not a nucleip and if there
are if if there is some target like this, I
think these are the kind of weapons and this is
(43:16):
the kind of uh you know, plan required to be
able to take out these kind of targets. Anything else
would not work so efficiently. You have to have dedicated
weapons and weapons that can penetrate this kind of uh
you know, concreated ninetimeter depth is a huge penetration capability.
So so I do feel that if this is a
(43:37):
kind of target, this kind of capability is required.
Speaker 2 (43:39):
So there there were some reports that seem to indicate
that while India does not have the GVU fifty seven.
We're looking at modifying or we're modifying the ugly five
for both youuro conventional uh deep penetration and then exploding
and also you know, destroying surface targets.
Speaker 1 (44:01):
Or do we also need the GVU fifty seven kind
of bombs.
Speaker 3 (44:04):
Even if I knew the answer, I won't answer it.
But I only want to say that you should differentiate
between classic ballistic missiles capability and conventional capability, and you
need to have.
Speaker 1 (44:18):
Options in both. You need to have both.
Speaker 3 (44:20):
You should so so whatever we are target and what
kind of weapons that you need to develop for the future.
So there are apart from very high precision, very long
range ability to penetrate, ability to target you know, underground bunkers.
These are all issues that we need to sort out
for our future weapons.
Speaker 2 (44:42):
And airpark remains very important because Iran does not have
airpower effective airpower, but it has a very effective missile
power now in that gap that we also have right
now we need If I remember correctly, we had once
spoken of forty two squadns is our wishless, thirty seven
(45:03):
squad and thirty seven and a half is our sanctioned strength.
We are down to thirty one, God forbid, we shouldn't
go down lower. But our missiles a stopcap arrangement, long
range missilesia strikes.
Speaker 3 (45:15):
It's always a combination that is best suited. It's always
a combination. And if you depend only on missiles, which
Iran primarily was dependent on its missiles as offensive capability,
its air force was largely had huge maintenance issues and
primarily on surface to air missiles at their air defense
and their ladar network as their air defense capabilities. So
(45:37):
they were primarily working on that, and you saw what happened. Okay,
these kind of assets. So there has to be a
comprehensive way of looking at how best to sort out
your air defense.
Speaker 1 (45:47):
It has to be very.
Speaker 3 (45:49):
Highly networked and you have to have all kinds of
capabilities and ability to protect it. And that comes with
the combination. It cannot if you just depend on missiles
and surface missiles to sort out your offensive and defensive
it won't.
Speaker 1 (46:08):
You won't succeed.
Speaker 2 (46:09):
So you need your fighter jets, and you need your
eye in the sky. You need yes, you need those
combat assets, and you need orbiting satellite.
Speaker 3 (46:19):
Absolutely, you need real time intelligence. Your i SR has
to be very strong. We need to go into a
huge capability build up in cyber and space.
Speaker 1 (46:29):
We need to secure our networks.
Speaker 3 (46:30):
We need to go towards quantum technology for secure networks,
for ability to encrypt. We need to really step up
our game in terms of uh, how we are going
to develop our own stealth fighters. How are unmanned stealth
fighters are going to come up? So our unmanned fighters
(46:50):
and with the ability to and unmanned stealth aircraft is
the future which we need to develop quickly. So so
a combination of these for the future we need to
really work.
Speaker 2 (47:02):
But if we don't have our own fighter jet engines,
even our cavery I think is at seventy five kilo
newton power and we require one hundred and ten, isn't it?
Speaker 1 (47:12):
What do we do?
Speaker 3 (47:12):
How do we go?
Speaker 1 (47:14):
No?
Speaker 3 (47:15):
I myself think that the effort in caverry should have
continued at a much higher pace, and we in the
last eight ten years we've we slowed down.
Speaker 1 (47:23):
I don't know why, but it is because you must
remember about twenty years plus.
Speaker 3 (47:32):
Have gone into cavery development and every development gives you
products and lessons. And today the engine that is going
on tour our first, you know, unmanned stealth. If you
talk about is the cavery, is the covert try engine correage,
so there's always already a product out of it. What
is important now when you talk of stealth fighter aircraft,
(47:55):
we don't have engines, so there's another program in the
works in terms of doing development and getting that you
know one and twenty ten class one hundred and fifteen
ten plus at.
Speaker 1 (48:05):
Least, so that that should happen.
Speaker 3 (48:08):
It's very important, and that technology is also important for
the future unman's stealth also the current and man's stealth
would not give us everything. It has limitation in terms
of you know, wherever is the first design? We need
to go towards supersonic stealth and have an aircraft of
fifth generation stealth equivalent in none men category two. Okay,
(48:29):
so this is the future.
Speaker 1 (48:30):
Are you looking at a time frame? We are already behind.
Speaker 3 (48:34):
I think we already behind, and that's why I'm happy
that the government has said private sector needs to step
in the in the fifth generation aircraft. Similarly, a complete
hole of nation approach for all our fighter production and
all our unmanned aircraft production, including engines.
Speaker 1 (48:52):
It will give us results.
Speaker 3 (48:53):
So We really have to put all our industrial might
behind it and indigenously and that is important. Along with this,
what is important is sensors and weapons. Weapons we have
started to succeed hugely. Bromos is one example, there are others,
but sensors we need to do even more work. And
our air to air needs to really step up. US
(49:16):
three we should jump to that. We need to have
a have a We need to review our plan two
fifty ko. Yeah, we need to review our plans. Are
fighters also now Mark one is not good enough. We
need to go for Mark two straight maybe the second
order of Mark one. We should look towards changing to
Mark two. So we need to take steps for the
future and and depend on our indigenous industry to do it.
(49:38):
I think that's what we should should do in the interim.
Speaker 2 (49:41):
You know, when your squad and strength is going down,
are we thinking of more Suqui thirty m k is
upgraded Suki thirty mks because there you have license production
with Bramos supersonic cruise missiles. Does that help fill in
the gap or that's not a stop gap arrangement. You'd
rather have additional you know, one hundred and fourteen fighter
(50:04):
jets whatever that they may be.
Speaker 3 (50:06):
See order for twelve. SUKOI thirty is already through. I
think a trail is already at it the complete ssukoit three.
It is being upgraded correct, So Soko we have two
fifty plus it will become to sixty five with this
twelve order I think roughly may not be exact. What
(50:27):
we need to do is if we start ordering even
two thirties, first you must remember what interineer technology it
is and by the time it produces, time frame is same.
By then Mark two will be out garage. So we
need to expedite our new generation aircraft and tech. Mark
twos need to be expedited and the time frames first,
(50:50):
stealth you know that needs to change. Amcar needs to
come much faster.
Speaker 1 (50:56):
What can be done to bring AMCA fast? And is
all of that happens? Yeah?
Speaker 3 (51:00):
I think with this announcement now, with the complete private
sector involvement, I think things will change. And once you
have the complete industry might coming in. Things will happen faster,
so the efficiencies will improve the cost you know, cutting
would take place. I think overall we are heading towards it.
We should get it right. And while we blame DPSUS
(51:23):
for going slow or not producing on time or reliability issues.
Now it is the test of private sector that they
need to come up to. You know, they've always said
that we need to be involved. The government has said yes, come,
so it is time for them to deliver. It is
time for them to step in for or programs like this.
I wish it happens for Mark two. Also, I would
(51:46):
say Mark to private sector entry is a good step
for them before they come to MCA. But let's see
how things move.
Speaker 1 (51:54):
In the armed forces, you always wargame what could happen next?
Speaker 2 (51:58):
And do you force Pakistan wanting to avenge this defeat
in operations in there launching another terror attack or then
being better prepared for our response. Now it's air bases
will have better air defense systems. Have we shown our
cards without that massive decisive victory, they will one hundred
(52:22):
percent want to do this one hundred percent. That is
their psych and that's how they work. After Balacote, when
we showed our cards.
Speaker 3 (52:29):
That we will hit wherever you are, we don't mind
going deep, they were much much better prepared and they
put everything and some of their acquisitions that did especially
from China. It was so fast and so this thing
because it's a military, military state there and they do
what they want. You know, people don't have food to it,
(52:49):
but they will buy all sorts of weapons.
Speaker 1 (52:52):
But that's how they are.
Speaker 3 (52:53):
This is what they would want to do for sure,
And of course all these gets factored in when we
do our own planning.
Speaker 2 (53:00):
You also foresee conflict with China. I don't foresee a
conventional conflict. I don't see any indicators towards that. But
if anything, situation seems to be only improving. But I
do see that China's collusion with Pakistan is very much
there and is very much more serious than many think
(53:22):
or many thought it would be. Okay, So I think
that's what needs to be factored and this is the
game plan that we need to be aware of. It
has both good and bad impact.
Speaker 3 (53:36):
The bad side is that the Pakistan gets something which
is latest and we need to factor it and even
against Pakistan. Otherwise, normally in our issues, we are concentrating
on developing a cability with respect to China, so we
know what equipment they're fielding. The good part is that
we've already seen some of their equipment and should it
(53:56):
come to a shooting match with China, would naturally be
more prepared, more adapt at it.
Speaker 1 (54:04):
Is it true?
Speaker 2 (54:05):
There were some reports that seem to indicate that Chinese
satellites were giving real time intelligence to the Pakistanis on
all our movement, including our fighter jets, some military movement,
and the Chinese avas were also guiding the Pakistanis.
Speaker 1 (54:18):
I've read these reports.
Speaker 3 (54:20):
I couldn't be sure, but for sure the satellite picture
and intelligence from China has been shared with Pakistan. Whether
it was being done in real time, I don't know, okay,
especially the avas because avax interaction with the combat fleets,
it takes much more. It can't be just done overnight, okay,
(54:40):
So if any such thing is there, they would have
provided that or planned for it much earlier. Satellite imagery intelligence.
You can be sure that they would have shared so.
Speaker 2 (54:51):
Many many more questions that I have for you, especially
you know in Tibet, our relationship is improving. But if
we are able to take out multiple air bases in Pakistan,
uh quickly and simultaneously, we can do the same.
Speaker 1 (55:06):
Should the balloon go up even in Tibet, Yeah, why not?
Speaker 3 (55:11):
You know the kind of defenses that they have in
places similar to what they've given to Pakistan, and some
of their missile systems are better, some network networks are better.
Of course they have better ground weapons to in their
in their arsenal. But given all all the factors that
there are, and and given that some advantages that we
(55:32):
have compared to them, uh in Tibet, should something happened,
we will, we will be up to the up to it.
Speaker 1 (55:41):
We will not lose a conflict in Tibet.
Speaker 2 (55:44):
And that is clear that Pakistan has now realized that
postur it cannot afford to mess around with Indian armed forces.
Speaker 1 (55:51):
Is that your impression? Yes, yes, very much so.
Speaker 3 (55:55):
It should have gone very clearly into their head and
should they make a mistake again, the consequences will be
much much harder. So very clearly I think will habits
significant effect as we go forward.
Speaker 2 (56:11):
Sir for joining me here on this India Today special
broadcast on Chuck Review.
Speaker 1 (56:17):
Many thanks.
Speaker 2 (56:18):
This truly is a Chuck Review, and I for one
thing that we're not a m you we are Arjune.
We know how to come out on the other side
and on tops many thanks for joining me. Thank you,
so I hope you like this podcast, my conversation with
a Chief Marshall Badoria and for many such conversations on
matters military, strategic and international affairs.
Speaker 1 (56:41):
Do like and subscribe to the India Today podcasts. Many thanks.
This is India Today Podcasts
This is India Today podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:08):
Hello and welcome to an India Today's special podcast, Chuck Review.
Speaker 1 (00:12):
I'm God of seventh.
Speaker 2 (00:14):
The Indian Air Force is now caught in the Chuck
Review of politics. Of course, airpar being a weapon of
choice is a subject of discussion today, especially at a
time when airpar was used extensively in Operations Sindur by India,
by Israel as part of its Operation Rising Line, and
(00:36):
by the United States of America as part of Operation
Midnight Hammer to Target four.
Speaker 1 (00:42):
Though Natans and.
Speaker 2 (00:44):
Ishfahan, the fact remains is airpar now the weapon of
choice to send across not just tactical but strategic messaging.
Joining me on the Chuck Review podcast is a Chief
Marshall arcs Padoria, former Chief of Air Staff, Sir, Welcome
on Chuck Review podcast.
Speaker 1 (01:05):
Thank you.
Speaker 2 (01:06):
You have over four three hundred hours of flying on
forty three different types of aircraft fighter jets, transport and helicopters.
Speaker 1 (01:16):
And that's spectacular.
Speaker 2 (01:18):
Four three hundred plus hours of flying on forty three aircraft.
What do you make of air power being employed by
India as a weapon of choice, first Ballacote and now
Operations Sindhur.
Speaker 3 (01:31):
You know, airpower for such operations is absolutely the weapon
of choice for obvious reasons, because both Ballacotte and Sindhu
started with ability to hit terror targets. And when you
want to hit deep inside, mind you, if you're going
to hit closer to lesi, there are other options which
were also excised. But when you want to hit deep inside,
(01:53):
starting Balloquote, airpower was the only answer and it was
done so effectively. Operations two most important targets which were
very deep those were really targets that nobody could think
that they would be attacked when they were attacked. Clearly,
airpar is the weaponar choice for something closer by lot
(02:16):
ammunition would work, and that option was also exercised.
Speaker 2 (02:20):
So are we to think the future of warfe you know,
so if you look at operations Hindu Operation Rising Lion
and Midnight Hammer stand up weapons, UH fighter jets. Of course,
for Midnight Hammer, America Sentenence fighter jets Rising Line. Israel
also Sentenence fighter jets because they'd been able to achieve,
(02:41):
you know, suppression of enemy air defenses completely and the
fighter jets flew into enemy territory.
Speaker 1 (02:46):
Is that going to be the future.
Speaker 2 (02:48):
Either stand up weapons or air power and not employing
ground troops.
Speaker 3 (02:52):
No, let's look at it that way. That air power,
the stand up weapons b it air to ground. No
huge range weapons are to air. These kind of capabilities
would be center stage in any any future conflict, in
any such combat scenarios. Conflict scenarios would be center state absolutely,
(03:12):
you know, primarily the weapons of tries. But we should
not see it in isolation that Okay, this does it
means that you can there's no importance of the ground
forces or the naval forces. They're all now integrated and
as an integrated force, there are elements of you know,
super specialization in each of the services, and that itself
has its own you know, combinations that are brought to
(03:36):
bear in any such conflict. U airpower is also in
some sense, of course, in Navy it's extended. It's over
aircraft carriers, carrier fair amount of air power. Similarly, Army
now going into more drone et cetera, alighting amminition in
some of that that is also extending into airpar assets.
(03:58):
So we should see it as as as a combine nation.
But clearly stand up weapons, precision weapons and air power
would be center stage in any future conflict that has
to be clearly understood, and it's something that is being
built into our the way we are going to fight wars.
Speaker 2 (04:14):
When Israeli A force went into Iran, there was suppression
of enemy air defenses and very effective suppression of enemy
air defenses. Their radars were taken down, their missiles were
taken down, and then the fighter jets went in.
Speaker 1 (04:29):
Should we have.
Speaker 2 (04:30):
Done the same when we struck you know, in twenty
nineteen Balacote, or in twenty twenty five murit ke Bahawalpur,
the nine terrorist training camps and launch pads. I'm asking
you this in context of you know, India's naval attache
in Indonesia as seven are recently when he.
Speaker 3 (04:50):
Spoke of political.
Speaker 2 (04:51):
Constraints, not you know, giving them either clearance or the words.
Speaker 1 (04:58):
To that effect, and which were the reason for losses
of aircraft.
Speaker 3 (05:02):
No, this must be clearly understood. Firstly, as far as
political leadership direction is concerned. If you're talking of obs Indor,
the operational freedom was given straight away and it was
well before obs indur to the services. So so I
think this was well covered in the news, and so
there's clear operational freedom. But you must understand when you
(05:25):
hit terrorist targets. Okay, at that in that strike you
do not target, you do not plan to hit military targets.
And the comparison that you were making with Iran and
what is Rael died there. If your question is whether
we should have taken out some of the ad assets
before we hit the terrorist targets in our answer is
(05:48):
no because we no no, yes, because the target our
plan was to hit terrorist targets alone. Okay uh, it's
very clearly. So your operational mission planning et sector needs
to cater for this. So this is a constraint or
a restaurant that the survice exercises that, yes, I will
(06:10):
hit only terrists target without taking out this it's not
a war situation. You have decided to hit the terrorist target.
Therefore you make a combination how you will go about it,
and in that in a normal war conflict situation you
do all this suppression of enemy air defense and thereafter
take here you don't do because your clear aim is
(06:30):
to hit the terrist targets alone.
Speaker 1 (06:32):
So Israel is a war with Iran.
Speaker 2 (06:34):
That is why Israel was able to take out their
enemy air defenses.
Speaker 1 (06:38):
Suppression That is.
Speaker 3 (06:40):
A classic way of conducting your operations. But here the
situation is different and it will always be so when
you're hitting terrorist target. Therefore, this has to be understood
in this manner.
Speaker 1 (06:50):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (06:51):
Thereafter, when this was escalated, when Pakistan started hitting our
sending runs and started hitting our Mili targets and civilian
targets and targeting and targeting aircraft thereafter, what we did
was like we would have done for operation. Initially, we
took out some radars, but we did it a very
calibrated way.
Speaker 1 (07:10):
On the first day with just some radars, you could
have taken much more.
Speaker 3 (07:14):
But when they next night again attacked some more with
the lottering munitions and tried to hit our bases, et cetera,
some more command centers and radars were taken out, which
were of uh, you know, greater importance and strategically more important.
And on the ninth night and tenth morning before that
when they started hitting our bases, and that is when
when those we hit those eleven targets, was a proper
(07:36):
operation done before that, it was very very calibrated response
from our side.
Speaker 1 (07:40):
So this was not like a build up to war.
Speaker 3 (07:43):
But we still suppressed their air defense adequately, and on
ninth tenths we took out And if you were saying that,
you know Parkson was very capable their air defenses. We
could not sort out on the first day, on the
on the seventh, what happened on ninth and they were nowhere.
We were able to supper and we were able to
achieve all targets without any losses on our side and
(08:05):
all the targets for it.
Speaker 2 (08:06):
So when CDs General Anil Chahan was speaking overseas, he
too seemed to indicate that there were some tactical issues.
Initially those lessons were learned and then as you mentioned
ninth and tenth we gave Pakistan Mary Hill that point taken.
So what are these tactical things that the Air force
(08:29):
sorted out in your appreciation?
Speaker 3 (08:31):
No, I wouldn't like to go into it because I
don't know exactly what the situation is, what happened, the
rational behind what CITIOUS mentioned, and it is best to
for them to sort of cover it subsequently as and
when they want to cover or for the Air Force
to cover. But in general terms, I must explain some
things that even on seventh when we hit terrorist targets, right,
(08:56):
we must understand the rules of engagement. So don't do
a classic suppression of air defense hitting the radar so
some military target before we hit terrace. But when we're
hitting terrace or immediately after that or in the process that,
should you get fired upon, you you thereafter, as per
rules of engagement, you are at liberty to fireback in
(09:18):
air battle. This happens very very fast. It's it's you know,
it's it's moving in seconds. But it must be understood.
So those are the kind of ruts of engagement which
come into play the moment we have hit terrorist targets
and come back. If any military action gets taken by
their side, we are absolutely free to respond.
Speaker 1 (09:33):
So we must understand the rules. As Pakistan follow rules
of no, I'll cover to the no.
Speaker 3 (09:40):
They don't obviously, if they were so rational, we won't
have these situations. No, you know, they will not support
this terrorist organization so blatantly, and when we hit terrist target,
they won't start responding militarily so and they won't be
attending the funerals of the terrorist lane. So they're clearly
and uh, being a nuclear country, the way they start,
(10:04):
you know, talking about use of nuclear weapons absolutely irrational. Okay,
so that's why we land up in this situation on
the issue of tactical mistake that you mentioned, the context
that that we were in. All I can see is
that this is a fast moving situation. You know, Pakistan
(10:25):
had put their complete defenses on alert. They knew our
prime minister had very clearly said, we will not leave
the terrace. Wherever they are, we'll go after them and
whoever is supporting them, and whoever is you know, UH
has ordered these pel garments. So very clearly they were
expecting their their complete defenses were up.
Speaker 1 (10:47):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (10:48):
So while their complete defenses are up, when the first
mission gets undertaken, it is with some constraints in distant Obviously,
you want to eat only the trailt target, so you
excise a lot of UH you know, constrained.
Speaker 1 (11:02):
In your planning and in your execution. A lot of
this gets factored in.
Speaker 3 (11:07):
You asked me what could have gone wrong or what
could have led to this kind of thing, and because
of which Silius said said something all I can think
of is that when new weapons come into the play.
For example, Peel fifteen of China was absolutely new. While
we had had information of that, the information was the
(11:27):
initial version that they gave was one fifty kilometer range
or so, but clearly they had the latest version which
probably got supplied before operations Indur, which was two kilometers class.
So please don't take as if I have some internal
knowledge and what happened. But these are the things that
get factored. And just imagine a difference between one fifty
(11:49):
and two under plus two and fifty kilometers clubs. Second
issues like if there's a surface to air missiles, you know,
the latest one that they've taken from China, where are
they located?
Speaker 1 (11:59):
So I know where you do such missions.
Speaker 3 (12:01):
In a fast moving scenario where deployments are taking place,
you one of your targets is to pick up everything
where what is located and therefore plot it and keep
your assets you know, airbone assets out of it or
take action whenever you get fired.
Speaker 1 (12:18):
Upon what's the biggest list, But you don't know.
Speaker 2 (12:22):
So there could be a surface to your missile which
has moved to a place where you have got into
its domain.
Speaker 1 (12:27):
So these are the kind of things that affect initially
the moment.
Speaker 3 (12:31):
It gets known the battle, you know, footprint becomes very
clear once you fire a first day thereafter you take
other actions to see that you care for all that
this is how it progresses. So I'm just generally guessing
what could have gone and how things would have gone.
Speaker 2 (12:48):
But when we look at future of combat now and
future combat next time we are hitting even if you're
hitting terror bases, and ideally, now that it's clear there's
no difference between half a side and then half is
a semonir, are we to understand that there will be
no distinction in future?
Speaker 1 (13:08):
What is your appreciation?
Speaker 3 (13:10):
Now there is a new normal as as Prime Minister
has defined that an act of terror will be an
act of war. This is absolutely you see previously he
said zero tolerance to terror, so you do something, we
will respond. Balacotte happened this, you know, they did Pelgram,
(13:30):
We did this operation that was zero tolerance. Now it
is equated with an act of war. And now if
you ask me if a terrorist incident was to take
place which is of serious consequence and we want to
and it has been identified as having emanated from Pakistan
and we want to respond. Uh, when we respond this
(13:52):
time to hit on the terrorist targets, we are at
liberty to start taking out any military target which comes
in the way or which is at that time aid
in a bit relevant to that strike.
Speaker 1 (14:06):
Whether we do it is.
Speaker 3 (14:06):
Another reason, another another discussion, it's another A lot of
factors would go into it.
Speaker 1 (14:12):
But that is the implication of the act of war. Uh.
Other issue is it has straight.
Speaker 3 (14:19):
Away put Pakistani army I say that they are in
league with terrorists. So agencies which support terrorists can come
under the crosshair.
Speaker 1 (14:29):
So okay. So so that is the difference.
Speaker 2 (14:31):
The implication is that Pakistan army you said, is irrational.
It's not an army that that is professional. And it's
an army that attacked India when India attacked terrorists. India
was responding to that Pehelgam terror attack and Pakistan army
attacked on military installations. So there is no difference between
(14:52):
their army and their terrorists. And when you hit back,
you will make sure when Indian Air Force or when
India hits back, there is no distinction between Partis Tanami
and Pakistan terrorists.
Speaker 1 (15:01):
Is that amply clear? Has been made clear to Pakistan.
Speaker 3 (15:05):
Yeah, it's been made clear that they've been basically exposed.
Their nexus with terrorism has been exposed very clearly, and
we've been saying this all along, you know, for all
the previous acts we've been putting those years, we've been
putting all the proofs UH and the world would look
(15:26):
at it and to analyze Dosi diplomacy. Now now, no,
they can make the dozier and keep sending this is
what India. India attacked us and did and the world
can keep looking at their doziers now.
Speaker 1 (15:38):
But we will do what we have to do. If
they do act like Pelga, this will be the response
and it will be more.
Speaker 2 (15:45):
What is your assessment now that we're talking about it,
and before I come to airpower, the bigger question of airpower?
What is your assessment of Pakistani training, tactics, weapons, UH
and systems? Three days of operations in there? What is
your assessment? Eighty percent we are told of their equipment
is Chinese. General Shukla was on Chuck review from Ami
(16:06):
Commanda Art track. His appreciation is ninety percent of all
Pakistani equipment is Chinese.
Speaker 1 (16:12):
So what is your assessment? So PL fifteen's apparently seem
to have done well.
Speaker 2 (16:17):
Our impression was one hundred and fifty kilometers, but they
had two hundred kilometer plus range.
Speaker 3 (16:21):
Ones Yeah, answered in two three ways Firstly, if you
see the overall Pakistani independence forces, eighteen ninety percent is
going towards Chinese.
Speaker 1 (16:31):
If you see Pakistan Air Force, there.
Speaker 3 (16:33):
Is a lot of American equipment, particularly American some Western
equipment still there, a lot of F sixteen and a
lot of which have been upgraded and weapons related to that.
MDM was their strong air to air weapon previously, remember Bala.
Now they have gone in for because they were not
getting anything better from West. They've gone in for Chinese aircraft.
(16:56):
So j A tens JF Seventeen's how how PL fifteen
came in then such a hurry? How the best of
the PL fifteen is made available to them, which I
don't think China is or their policy wise they were
wanting to export to anybody. So that China Park collusion
is in the open. We always knew it. It's not
(17:17):
that it's come as a surprise. We always had thought
of factoring this. But but it's not restricted just to
PL fifteen's.
Speaker 2 (17:25):
Apparently satellite and real fifteens all PERIL fifteenhens work, but
the higher range does give it a certain unique capability.
But many PEERL fifteens, because they have fired at danges
and because our our pilots have taken their necessary actions
and and uh.
Speaker 1 (17:42):
Evaded it.
Speaker 3 (17:43):
Those have flown and after the kind of ting energy goes,
they've been found on ground. They've been many you're aware
which have been discovered. So there are many Pel fifteen
Swish didn't to find the target at or obviously if
Pakistan always has prided itself with their air force being
absolute top classes, yeah, yeah, no, there's no no where
(18:04):
to penetrate it. There's no way to. They're their best
option available. So they prided on their defense capability and
they are centered around their air defense, not so much
on that tack side. All that has been sorted out
on ninth and tenth Okay, the missions that we flew
(18:24):
on ninth night and tenth morning was a classic mission
the way you operate in a full fledged conflict.
Speaker 1 (18:32):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (18:33):
Their air defense was hit, The targets that we wanted
were hit, all successful, all precisions okay, and no losses
on our side. Their air force was nowhere insight in
terms of effectively able to defend.
Speaker 1 (18:48):
Why was the air force there on the ninth and
the tenth what's your appreciation?
Speaker 3 (18:51):
Yeah, because the way we had structured our entire s
four hundred plus MRSM combination and along with our ad aircraft,
they were unable to get anywhere close. And mind you,
the fact that none of our airfields or any target
of military importance was successfully engaged with them is because
(19:12):
of this. They have air to ground you know, one
hundred kilometers plus weapons that versions the many of the schools,
and they fired those air to ground precision weapons, they
fired ballistic missiles. They were all tackled by our air
defense system. So one, they were never allowed to get
close enough to fire a huge number of weapons. Whatever
(19:35):
they fired were tackled. Okay, this is important to understand.
So while our air defense tackled their entire offensive, they
were unable to resist any of the attacks that we
did on tenth morning.
Speaker 1 (19:50):
So that is the result where we are today.
Speaker 2 (19:52):
So they lost their nerve after they lost to sub
airborn early warning command in control systems one on ground
and one in the air.
Speaker 1 (20:00):
Am I right.
Speaker 3 (20:01):
My understanding is in the air was not a SAB.
It may be an Ellent aircraft, okay, but but on
the ground was SAB. So I would say one one
that way. But there are various analysis on this and
and one one thirty and there are one thirty was
lost in yeah, and three on three high tech aircraft
(20:22):
in the air. That means sixteen day seventeen class or
jetting class and four on the ground. So about seven
fighters and three more these assets, uh, you know, multi rollized.
So so these are these are very high losses, so
we don't talk about it. These are very high losses.
Speaker 1 (20:42):
These are high losses from Pakistan aphost.
Speaker 3 (20:44):
But having said all this, we must remember never to underestimate. Then, no, absolutely,
you know, they have a unique capability of getting the latest. Okay,
they've been working good after Balacote and today they have
taken the best of Chinese as far as missile is concerned.
(21:05):
They have taken the best of surface missiles from from China.
They've taken a huge lot of radar jamming equipment networks.
Speaker 1 (21:15):
Okay, so did they work? Look?
Speaker 3 (21:18):
P fifteen's may have worked, but what about the other
fifteen also some may have worked, some majority haven't. But
that's because of the ranges that we forced them to find.
Speaker 2 (21:28):
H Q nine's and h Q sixteen's, I mean, you
were able to take them out wherever it passule, Volari
and Malirkin.
Speaker 3 (21:38):
Wherever it mattered, we took them out. Where it didn't matter,
we didn't. We just stayed out. We are not taken
out all. You know, in a full conflict situation, we
were not taken out much more. So why didn't you
take out more?
Speaker 1 (21:49):
No, it was not required.
Speaker 3 (21:50):
So we were calibrating our response all along. It was
not a war situation. It was after hit on terrorists.
We were responding in proportion. It responds to them.
Speaker 1 (22:01):
So when I want to understand this, I mean historically
and civilizationally.
Speaker 2 (22:05):
Also, if I could take you back to Jadra Wad
in the Mahabharat when Abhimanyu was killed in chuk Review
and Jadra was on the first entrance of the chuk Review,
Arjun said, I will kill Jaira by by sundown, or
I will kill myself Dodan. You know the way he
(22:28):
treated uh Panchali or Dropadi when he said jianghato, so
Bim said, my jang, which is against.
Speaker 1 (22:36):
Rules of law.
Speaker 2 (22:38):
And why do we tie ourselves in in all these shirts?
Why are we civilizationally like this? I mean, why do
we even care that we will not take out his
enemy defenses? Take out his enemy defenses he's a terrorist country.
Speaker 1 (22:51):
Kill him. It doesn't work like that to kill himself.
Speaker 3 (22:59):
Yeah, it doesn't work like that when you're responding to
terrorist it if it was that you were declaring to
go to war, it would work like that.
Speaker 1 (23:09):
But does Pakistan declare war? Pakistan does what it wants
to do. It kills up people, It targets our military installations.
Speaker 3 (23:16):
If Pakistan had done more than this, they would have.
See we've responded proportionately, but every time in a multiple
of theirs. So if they were sending drone and luring munition,
we sent much more. We attacked their rada's close to
the border. We're responding. We're responding. Were because this is
a situation when we want to hit terrorists. We said
we are. You know, our de escalation was built in
(23:37):
and we declared it. We said, we don't want to
hit your military we have with terrorists. Now, when they
took a military response, we responded. Now, clearly I look
at the larger picture, how it.
Speaker 1 (23:48):
Was our hit? I mean, how how extensive has Pakistan
been hit?
Speaker 2 (23:52):
As you know, if if you were the Pakistan Army chief,
I would not wish that to any of my friends.
But if you were, how would you assess his losses
of eleven air bases, multiple radar stations.
Speaker 3 (24:04):
It is absolutely in this situation, this is a limited
conflict situation. Okay, it's a huge loss and there that
is why they went running to us, and they wanted
a face saving way to exit. Okay, and that's why
all this drama, theatron that took place from their side.
Speaker 1 (24:22):
Okay. So so it's a loss, absolutely more than just
loss of face. Absolutely loss. We have all the pictures
we have you know, no pictures, so he said, only
crows and trees work.
Speaker 3 (24:36):
Yeah, yeah, So but we knew what we had done.
And you see now when your precision strike happens, you
see a similar thing, small role on top inside, everything destroyed.
That's how precision strikes happened.
Speaker 1 (24:47):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (24:48):
So so that ninth and tenth, what the way he
has been hit and the kind of targets that were
it and with the precision and with their entire defense
you know, left standing there's.
Speaker 1 (25:02):
For that duration. Absolutely, but they could not prevent any
of this. You jammed them or you destroyed everything.
Speaker 3 (25:11):
It would be a combination of everything, combination of jamming,
combination of taking out where it is relevant and a
combination of precision and stand up.
Speaker 2 (25:20):
And these were not just the Chinese systems. I believe
Mali controlment has American radar. Of course, of course some
of the radars were taken out the previous night. They
were taken out the previous night.
Speaker 3 (25:30):
Yeah, and taken out they were you know, command and
control centers that were taken out. Yeah, And it's not easy.
These are all you know, concrete and reinforced seal.
Speaker 1 (25:44):
So it's it's so that control is a nuclear command
in control system.
Speaker 3 (25:48):
It's a common control system there. I have seen reports
that it has strategic elements within the same It could
be same and otherwise we'll leave it at that. So
it's one of the most important command in controls and
that has been taken out.
Speaker 1 (26:01):
Yes, how in your appreciation, how long will it take
him to rebuild it? It really depends.
Speaker 3 (26:07):
But if they put all their you know efforts behind
it still it would take it at least a year
and a half two years, just going by the requirements
of the works itself, and to come down to come
up to the same status what has been destroyed with
these kind of sir.
Speaker 2 (26:25):
Godha, you know, every time whatever I've read about nineteen
sixty five war and seventy one war. Has always been
in war. Our favorite target. Now India was not at war,
and yet you took out Godha.
Speaker 3 (26:37):
Yeah, that was again. It is straight away messaging. We
will reach anywhere that we want. And Sir Godha is
one of the most defended targets. It's deep inside, so
many of the layered defenses as such come into operation.
In spite of that, we got it, Sorgoda what we wanted.
So so it was beautifully planned, you know, right across
(27:01):
various geogrophil depths and the kind of targets chosen. It
was very strong messaging and also very strong uh you
know impact that this is where you stop, and he stopped.
Of course, if you had continued, the repercussions would have
been you'd tell me something. There are many who say that.
Speaker 1 (27:23):
Just because he sought a cease fire, India agreed immediately.
Speaker 2 (27:27):
There are many analysts who say that we should have
hit them for a couple of more days when he
was already down on his knees.
Speaker 1 (27:34):
You know again the Pria Chohan syndrome. And I want
to go back to history.
Speaker 2 (27:38):
Mohammed Gory had been defeated either Mahma Gory should have
been killed, there wouldn't have been the second battle, and
India's history may have been.
Speaker 1 (27:46):
Different even this time when he was down tescimate him.
Speaker 3 (27:50):
We shouldn't get confused of comparing war situations with a
situation of hitting terrorist basis.
Speaker 2 (27:57):
This wasn't by This wasn't the war you were hitting.
It wasn't it was hitting his air bases. It still
wasn't full fledged war. He has taken some military action.
We are still responding. We didn't move our you know,
ground forces. It is not full fledged war. This must
be understood.
Speaker 1 (28:15):
And what was starting? Uh you know what did the
government say? So? So objectives were very clear and you
go by those and overall.
Speaker 3 (28:24):
If you see, everything was achieved wonderfully well, exceptionally well
what not?
Speaker 1 (28:32):
On no objecty was to hit the terrorist targets, those
military those are.
Speaker 3 (28:40):
For for decades. We had had the details and we
never you know, venture to hit. That is true, that
has been hit.
Speaker 2 (28:47):
Could could anybody believe do you think we could have hit?
You know, when it was war, it was always a
question man.
Speaker 3 (28:53):
When will we hit? Okay, But the fact is that
we did hit, even in Pakistan I'm telling you they
would not have imagined that we will. That is, they
could have thought of it, yes, possible target, they would
not have imagined. And that's why they were they were
caught residing. There're still that so many of the terrorists
(29:15):
were still there. That's why that you know, very high
level of funerals and what you saw and the army
joining in at the at the leadership level, it is
is amazing.
Speaker 1 (29:25):
And look at the way we expose them to the world.
Look at the way.
Speaker 3 (29:30):
Pakistan army, the Pakistan you know this, how they support
the terrorism as even exposed to the world.
Speaker 1 (29:39):
I mean they're a country without honor.
Speaker 2 (29:41):
I mean their army chief will still imagine their armies
supping with the devil openly, you know, attending funerals of
terrorists and then having lunch at White House country.
Speaker 1 (29:53):
And the world in a way is dealing with them.
Speaker 3 (29:55):
That lunch at White House will obviously have someone stated
aims behind. I'm sure you know what happened the next
day when American forces were attacking around So so everything
has has some reason and logic.
Speaker 1 (30:08):
Is that but what we did, what we wanted, what
objects are fully achieved.
Speaker 3 (30:16):
And I would say it was achieved better than probably
was initially thought or planned, because when we stopped it,
it would stopped with the with a big hit, with
the with the big wrap on the knuckles, that this
is what you get.
Speaker 1 (30:30):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (30:31):
Also we expose their the sense of that they can't
be defeated. Their their air defense is fantastic, and their
overall what they've done with Chinese help and all, uh,
you know, it's impenetrable.
Speaker 1 (30:44):
So ninth and tenth we proved it.
Speaker 3 (30:46):
Who's going around running to get quickly more aircraft, more
these things? Immediately they're running forstell aircraft. They are running
back to China for this, so very clearly you can
see the panic in their actions. Okay, we are making
our own ragements, We are making our own plans.
Speaker 1 (31:03):
For sure.
Speaker 3 (31:04):
We need to do a lot of thinking for the
future because this changes the you know, situation in our region,
and we need to be prepared. But we are doing
about it in a common control and in a manner
which is more indigenous, more we'll do it ourselves kind
of attitude. They're going around already begging for money and
(31:26):
for weapons.
Speaker 1 (31:27):
And yet bragging. I mean, you know you and I
understand Pakistan lost.
Speaker 2 (31:32):
Anybody who reads about matters military understands Pakistan lost for
the simple reason nine of their terror camps, including Muritken
Bahawalpura hit And I have been covering counter terror operations,
you know since the Cargil War, and I know hitting
Muritken Bahawalpur was unheard of. Nobody had the guts to
(31:53):
order that hit. And the fact that Muritken Bahapur has
been hit have been hit is huge. And then hitting
eleven air bases huge And yet Asseimuni, instead of being
in disgrace, promotes himself to Field Marshal and has lunch
at White House. And you know, I think Balakut was
also huge. I was there in Srinagar at that time
(32:14):
when I was interacting very extensively with all of you. Also,
what I understand was the fact that you could hit
them in Hyberpa was massive. But then the Pakistani narrative
was keval. My only crows and were killed and trees
were damaged. How can they get away? Why do we
let them get away with absolute lives? I mean, I
(32:35):
know they're a shameless country and there are shameless people
with no honor, but why do we let them get
away with it.
Speaker 1 (32:41):
I don't think we let them get away.
Speaker 3 (32:44):
The world, of course, was letting them get away with
a lot of narratives and false support for their own
reasons at times known at times out of sheer incompetence.
But even that after ob Sinzour has changed. Now the
world sees them in a different light. You just what
happens in the future. Okay, they have been exposed thoroughly,
(33:08):
And don't go by this conflicting noises at times which
happened here and there, which is supporting almost their narrative,
because that is you know, it's not important.
Speaker 2 (33:17):
Are they better at information warfare than the Indian system?
Speaker 3 (33:22):
They would be anybody who gets defeated like this or
normally plays on the on the information war much more,
much more.
Speaker 2 (33:29):
No, but in China and Pakistan, I mean information warfare,
Why are they ahead of India, even though I mean
I thought what what happened in Galwan was good work
by India to stall them. India, you know, being in
a position to put fifty thousand troops there, quickly, moving
men material all over ls absolutely astounding operations, brilliant operations,
(33:52):
and yet the narrative is controlled by them.
Speaker 1 (33:54):
See narrative.
Speaker 3 (33:56):
I've heard this many times on Othood that you know
they handle the narrative better when you have pictures of
the strike and targets destroyed, satellite pictures before. After where
is the issue of narratives to decide who did better?
So ninth and tenth just explains everything before that. On seventh,
(34:18):
all the pictures of every single target struck, and of
course muric can Balporto. You know, the videos coming out
of Pakistan were more explicit than we had from the satellites.
So the damage is there to see, the results are
there to see. So all the damage on the aircraft
(34:38):
very clearly, the hangar, you can see the aircraft inside
the aircraft, on the tarmac, all other shelters that would attack,
so very clearly, narrative has no place to decide on
who won when you have such clear proof. However, the
kind of information war or the kind of narratives that
(35:00):
they push after even having lost, is huge.
Speaker 1 (35:04):
That effort is huge.
Speaker 3 (35:05):
Their entire ice pere machinery and the entire media control
in Pakistan works primarily on this, and they want to,
you know, play it to their own public.
Speaker 2 (35:16):
You know the fact that seven Pakistani fighter jets and
early warning system and that Saab Grippin ae W and
C aircraft was lost should have been told officially by
Government of India after battle damage assessment was done.
Speaker 3 (35:29):
Yeah, I think air Force could have done that toll.
But you know Odur hasn't finished so at times, you know,
when operation is on, always there are you know, the
services exercise restraint on what information they want to give
out own and what they've hit. I'm sure they would
(35:50):
have access to even much more imagery and and and
analysis then it's in the public domain.
Speaker 2 (35:56):
Butkistan they hit them in Hyber Paktum, which in somewhere
in Peshawar in Baluchistan, which we are not saying.
Speaker 3 (36:04):
Which we are not saying. Yes, so even I don't
know the details with that. I I've seen that report. Yeah,
so so obviously this air force would have much more
information which they might not want to share. Now would
they decide to share it any time or share later?
It depends on them, depends on circumstances.
Speaker 1 (36:20):
So let's leave it did that. There's another thing, but
what is in the open domain.
Speaker 3 (36:24):
Let me tell you, is there any doubt even an
iotopped out that what has been achieved and how well
it has been conducted, so there is enough in the
open domain.
Speaker 1 (36:33):
I think I am.
Speaker 2 (36:34):
Thrilled to bits when I I've been anchoring. You were
there as my guest on the show. I've been anchoring
throughout when those nine terror camps were targeted. And for
someone who's covered Pakistan state sponsored radical Islamist terror for decades,
you know, I covered Operation Parakhram, the Parliament attack, and
in the midst of all of that, I covered Kaluchuk
(36:56):
and Kaluchuk for the benefit of some of our viewers,
where the armies were deployed.
Speaker 1 (37:02):
Uh due as part of Operation Parakham.
Speaker 2 (37:04):
In two thousand and two, Pakistani terrorists wearing military uniforms
entered a military garrison.
Speaker 1 (37:09):
In Jamu, in Kaluchak close to Jamu and they killed.
Speaker 2 (37:13):
Army families, they killed army soldiers, they killed little army children.
And I've covered that, and after that, India did not
attack Pakistan. I covered twenty six eleven Mumbai terror attacks
and I saw one hundred and sixty six people being
massacred in Mumbai war five days and those bodies which
were being brought into hospital and the works, and India
(37:33):
did not hit back. So after that, when you see
Bahawalpur and Muriitke being hit, and after that when you
see eleven military stations in Pakistan being hit and air
bas is, I am.
Speaker 1 (37:43):
Thrilled to bits that finally action is being taken. I
wanted more.
Speaker 2 (37:47):
But you know, when I was covering the Kargo War,
we'd interviewed with Krambatra and that famous line of his
yea dil mage more there's dil mange.
Speaker 1 (37:55):
Yeah, this is dil mangem. Yeah, absolutely, But why didn't
you do it? Why didn't they air force hit?
Speaker 2 (38:00):
No?
Speaker 3 (38:00):
Now, now, no, firstly you see this time is changed.
This is this shows what this goverment has done. Now
we will not accept. So now we will not prepare
those years. We will get them. Okay, So this is
this is for example, if it happen, why did we
not hit them more?
Speaker 1 (38:18):
We've hit them.
Speaker 3 (38:20):
Very very high in terms of proportionate response to whatever
they did militarily. They did not achieve any of the targets,
believe me, not a single target. Whatever weapons they deployed
hit and they were going very very strongly for Rs
four hundreds and our air bas is to create some
kind of damage and some military targets, and of course
(38:42):
they tried foolishly on the civilian targets and some of
our religious places too, but they could not succeed. So
so so whether we could have done more, if they
had not stopped, you would have done more, and our
navy was already poised. You know, next night would have
been different. So it is the level and the strong
(39:03):
significance of tenth Morning strike is what hit them hard
and they got to their senses.
Speaker 1 (39:10):
Was there a lot of pressure.
Speaker 2 (39:11):
What I'm trying to understand and in the light of
what Israel and America did to Iran, is that why
America was very keen that the air bases remain intact,
because America wanted to use those Pakistani air bases, especially
Nurkhan and Jacobabad which we destroyed, because Americans wanted to
use either Pakistani airspace or air bases to target Iran
(39:34):
From this side.
Speaker 3 (39:36):
I don't know about that, but for sure, since he
was there just before the Iran strike and that time
we didn't know. Although there was this thinking that they
might come in against Iran, I think for sure they
were told to. You know, Pakistani Amiti was told to
(39:57):
stay off any or any thought of being the leaders
in the Islamic world with nuclear capability, and and the
next day they attacked I was I'm sure it was
a very clear message to him that you just lay
off and stay on the side. And they always claim
(40:17):
to be, you know, the leaders in the Islamic world
and being the only nuclear power.
Speaker 1 (40:22):
And look what happened when.
Speaker 3 (40:24):
Some Iranian general made some statements so they could be
officially denied it.
Speaker 1 (40:28):
No, no, no, we are not.
Speaker 3 (40:30):
We haven't said this that we will if you run
gets stuck by a nuclear attack, we will come in
and all that. See how fast they were. So they've
been exposed even to the Islamic world. Okay, so I
think overall it will still even that will go against
them in the long run.
Speaker 1 (40:47):
When you look at I would think that that would
be the that was the dressing down.
Speaker 2 (40:52):
So you are you your impression is that Asa Muni
was given a dressing down in in the United States
of American White House or of wanting to stay off
or a warning to stay off in what's going to
happen to keep their eyes closed, and you see the reaction.
Speaker 3 (41:09):
Would you have imagined this reaction when Iran is getting
attacked from Pakistan. I think.
Speaker 1 (41:16):
Pakistani air bases in future also, uh, may not be,
may not be. I think that that is old school thought.
I I don't think so.
Speaker 3 (41:25):
I don't think so, because the aircraft carrier they have
many they have many options, so so I wouldn't think so.
Speaker 2 (41:34):
Whether that, but they required I mean, they had the
aircraft carrier battle groups even when Afghanistan was operations on
Enduring Freedom, and at the same time they required all these.
Speaker 3 (41:43):
Jacoba, Afghanistan was a little Afghanistan was a little different
in the in the depth of what they were doing
and in the context of what they were doing. I
think their planned against Iran would always have been for
a short and quick one. It wouldn't have been, you know,
(42:03):
based on the Pakistani support, but it could be one
of the factors.
Speaker 1 (42:08):
It's the future.
Speaker 2 (42:09):
Warfare, if we were to talk about future warfare and
the way you're looking at it.
Speaker 1 (42:13):
Globally, America.
Speaker 2 (42:17):
Bombed for though and nobody else in the world had
the kind of weapons that are required the GBU fifty
sevens on the B two bombers to target something which
is ninety meters deep. So that's why America was required.
But you've seen what happened at Ishfahan and what happened
at Nathan's and Busher and several other places. What is
(42:38):
your impression future warfare is that the way to take
out any country's nuclear assets. Many say that we also
targeted the Pakistani nuclear assets, which government of Fundias officially
denied at all times, but we.
Speaker 3 (42:53):
Didn't target their nuclear as its that you can be
sure whether this is the best way to target nuclear
setup in case you want to. It is not a
full fledget. They had not become a nuclear part. You
must understand Iran is not a nucleip and if there
are if if there is some target like this, I
think these are the kind of weapons and this is
(43:16):
the kind of uh you know, plan required to be
able to take out these kind of targets. Anything else
would not work so efficiently. You have to have dedicated
weapons and weapons that can penetrate this kind of uh
you know, concreated ninetimeter depth is a huge penetration capability.
So so I do feel that if this is a
(43:37):
kind of target, this kind of capability is required.
Speaker 2 (43:39):
So there there were some reports that seem to indicate
that while India does not have the GVU fifty seven.
We're looking at modifying or we're modifying the ugly five
for both youuro conventional uh deep penetration and then exploding
and also you know, destroying surface targets.
Speaker 1 (44:01):
Or do we also need the GVU fifty seven kind
of bombs.
Speaker 3 (44:04):
Even if I knew the answer, I won't answer it.
But I only want to say that you should differentiate
between classic ballistic missiles capability and conventional capability, and you
need to have.
Speaker 1 (44:18):
Options in both. You need to have both.
Speaker 3 (44:20):
You should so so whatever we are target and what
kind of weapons that you need to develop for the future.
So there are apart from very high precision, very long
range ability to penetrate, ability to target you know, underground bunkers.
These are all issues that we need to sort out
for our future weapons.
Speaker 2 (44:42):
And airpark remains very important because Iran does not have
airpower effective airpower, but it has a very effective missile
power now in that gap that we also have right
now we need If I remember correctly, we had once
spoken of forty two squadns is our wishless, thirty seven
(45:03):
squad and thirty seven and a half is our sanctioned strength.
We are down to thirty one, God forbid, we shouldn't
go down lower. But our missiles a stopcap arrangement, long
range missilesia strikes.
Speaker 3 (45:15):
It's always a combination that is best suited. It's always
a combination. And if you depend only on missiles, which
Iran primarily was dependent on its missiles as offensive capability,
its air force was largely had huge maintenance issues and
primarily on surface to air missiles at their air defense
and their ladar network as their air defense capabilities. So
(45:37):
they were primarily working on that, and you saw what happened. Okay,
these kind of assets. So there has to be a
comprehensive way of looking at how best to sort out
your air defense.
Speaker 1 (45:47):
It has to be very.
Speaker 3 (45:49):
Highly networked and you have to have all kinds of
capabilities and ability to protect it. And that comes with
the combination. It cannot if you just depend on missiles
and surface missiles to sort out your offensive and defensive
it won't.
Speaker 1 (46:08):
You won't succeed.
Speaker 2 (46:09):
So you need your fighter jets, and you need your
eye in the sky. You need yes, you need those
combat assets, and you need orbiting satellite.
Speaker 3 (46:19):
Absolutely, you need real time intelligence. Your i SR has
to be very strong. We need to go into a
huge capability build up in cyber and space.
Speaker 1 (46:29):
We need to secure our networks.
Speaker 3 (46:30):
We need to go towards quantum technology for secure networks,
for ability to encrypt. We need to really step up
our game in terms of uh, how we are going
to develop our own stealth fighters. How are unmanned stealth
fighters are going to come up? So our unmanned fighters
(46:50):
and with the ability to and unmanned stealth aircraft is
the future which we need to develop quickly. So so
a combination of these for the future we need to
really work.
Speaker 2 (47:02):
But if we don't have our own fighter jet engines,
even our cavery I think is at seventy five kilo
newton power and we require one hundred and ten, isn't it?
Speaker 1 (47:12):
What do we do?
Speaker 3 (47:12):
How do we go?
Speaker 1 (47:14):
No?
Speaker 3 (47:15):
I myself think that the effort in caverry should have
continued at a much higher pace, and we in the
last eight ten years we've we slowed down.
Speaker 1 (47:23):
I don't know why, but it is because you must
remember about twenty years plus.
Speaker 3 (47:32):
Have gone into cavery development and every development gives you
products and lessons. And today the engine that is going
on tour our first, you know, unmanned stealth. If you
talk about is the cavery, is the covert try engine correage,
so there's always already a product out of it. What
is important now when you talk of stealth fighter aircraft,
(47:55):
we don't have engines, so there's another program in the
works in terms of doing development and getting that you
know one and twenty ten class one hundred and fifteen
ten plus at.
Speaker 1 (48:05):
Least, so that that should happen.
Speaker 3 (48:08):
It's very important, and that technology is also important for
the future unman's stealth also the current and man's stealth
would not give us everything. It has limitation in terms
of you know, wherever is the first design? We need
to go towards supersonic stealth and have an aircraft of
fifth generation stealth equivalent in none men category two. Okay,
(48:29):
so this is the future.
Speaker 1 (48:30):
Are you looking at a time frame? We are already behind.
Speaker 3 (48:34):
I think we already behind, and that's why I'm happy
that the government has said private sector needs to step
in the in the fifth generation aircraft. Similarly, a complete
hole of nation approach for all our fighter production and
all our unmanned aircraft production, including engines.
Speaker 1 (48:52):
It will give us results.
Speaker 3 (48:53):
So We really have to put all our industrial might
behind it and indigenously and that is important. Along with this,
what is important is sensors and weapons. Weapons we have
started to succeed hugely. Bromos is one example, there are others,
but sensors we need to do even more work. And
our air to air needs to really step up. US
(49:16):
three we should jump to that. We need to have
a have a We need to review our plan two
fifty ko. Yeah, we need to review our plans. Are
fighters also now Mark one is not good enough. We
need to go for Mark two straight maybe the second
order of Mark one. We should look towards changing to
Mark two. So we need to take steps for the
future and and depend on our indigenous industry to do it.
(49:38):
I think that's what we should should do in the interim.
Speaker 2 (49:41):
You know, when your squad and strength is going down,
are we thinking of more Suqui thirty m k is
upgraded Suki thirty mks because there you have license production
with Bramos supersonic cruise missiles. Does that help fill in
the gap or that's not a stop gap arrangement. You'd
rather have additional you know, one hundred and fourteen fighter
(50:04):
jets whatever that they may be.
Speaker 3 (50:06):
See order for twelve. SUKOI thirty is already through. I
think a trail is already at it the complete ssukoit three.
It is being upgraded correct, So Soko we have two
fifty plus it will become to sixty five with this
twelve order I think roughly may not be exact. What
(50:27):
we need to do is if we start ordering even
two thirties, first you must remember what interineer technology it
is and by the time it produces, time frame is same.
By then Mark two will be out garage. So we
need to expedite our new generation aircraft and tech. Mark
twos need to be expedited and the time frames first,
(50:50):
stealth you know that needs to change. Amcar needs to
come much faster.
Speaker 1 (50:56):
What can be done to bring AMCA fast? And is
all of that happens? Yeah?
Speaker 3 (51:00):
I think with this announcement now, with the complete private
sector involvement, I think things will change. And once you
have the complete industry might coming in. Things will happen faster,
so the efficiencies will improve the cost you know, cutting
would take place. I think overall we are heading towards it.
We should get it right. And while we blame DPSUS
(51:23):
for going slow or not producing on time or reliability issues.
Now it is the test of private sector that they
need to come up to. You know, they've always said
that we need to be involved. The government has said yes, come,
so it is time for them to deliver. It is
time for them to step in for or programs like this.
I wish it happens for Mark two. Also, I would
(51:46):
say Mark to private sector entry is a good step
for them before they come to MCA. But let's see
how things move.
Speaker 1 (51:54):
In the armed forces, you always wargame what could happen next?
Speaker 2 (51:58):
And do you force Pakistan wanting to avenge this defeat
in operations in there launching another terror attack or then
being better prepared for our response. Now it's air bases
will have better air defense systems. Have we shown our
cards without that massive decisive victory, they will one hundred
(52:22):
percent want to do this one hundred percent. That is
their psych and that's how they work. After Balacote, when
we showed our cards.
Speaker 3 (52:29):
That we will hit wherever you are, we don't mind
going deep, they were much much better prepared and they
put everything and some of their acquisitions that did especially
from China. It was so fast and so this thing
because it's a military, military state there and they do
what they want. You know, people don't have food to it,
(52:49):
but they will buy all sorts of weapons.
Speaker 1 (52:52):
But that's how they are.
Speaker 3 (52:53):
This is what they would want to do for sure,
And of course all these gets factored in when we
do our own planning.
Speaker 2 (53:00):
You also foresee conflict with China. I don't foresee a
conventional conflict. I don't see any indicators towards that. But
if anything, situation seems to be only improving. But I
do see that China's collusion with Pakistan is very much
there and is very much more serious than many think
(53:22):
or many thought it would be. Okay, So I think
that's what needs to be factored and this is the
game plan that we need to be aware of. It
has both good and bad impact.
Speaker 3 (53:36):
The bad side is that the Pakistan gets something which
is latest and we need to factor it and even
against Pakistan. Otherwise, normally in our issues, we are concentrating
on developing a cability with respect to China, so we
know what equipment they're fielding. The good part is that
we've already seen some of their equipment and should it
(53:56):
come to a shooting match with China, would naturally be
more prepared, more adapt at it.
Speaker 1 (54:04):
Is it true?
Speaker 2 (54:05):
There were some reports that seem to indicate that Chinese
satellites were giving real time intelligence to the Pakistanis on
all our movement, including our fighter jets, some military movement,
and the Chinese avas were also guiding the Pakistanis.
Speaker 1 (54:18):
I've read these reports.
Speaker 3 (54:20):
I couldn't be sure, but for sure the satellite picture
and intelligence from China has been shared with Pakistan. Whether
it was being done in real time, I don't know, okay,
especially the avas because avax interaction with the combat fleets,
it takes much more. It can't be just done overnight, okay,
(54:40):
So if any such thing is there, they would have
provided that or planned for it much earlier. Satellite imagery intelligence.
You can be sure that they would have shared so.
Speaker 2 (54:51):
Many many more questions that I have for you, especially
you know in Tibet, our relationship is improving. But if
we are able to take out multiple air bases in Pakistan,
uh quickly and simultaneously, we can do the same.
Speaker 1 (55:06):
Should the balloon go up even in Tibet, Yeah, why not?
Speaker 3 (55:11):
You know the kind of defenses that they have in
places similar to what they've given to Pakistan, and some
of their missile systems are better, some network networks are better.
Of course they have better ground weapons to in their
in their arsenal. But given all all the factors that
there are, and and given that some advantages that we
(55:32):
have compared to them, uh in Tibet, should something happened,
we will, we will be up to the up to it.
Speaker 1 (55:41):
We will not lose a conflict in Tibet.
Speaker 2 (55:44):
And that is clear that Pakistan has now realized that
postur it cannot afford to mess around with Indian armed forces.
Speaker 1 (55:51):
Is that your impression? Yes, yes, very much so.
Speaker 3 (55:55):
It should have gone very clearly into their head and
should they make a mistake again, the consequences will be
much much harder. So very clearly I think will habits
significant effect as we go forward.
Speaker 2 (56:11):
Sir for joining me here on this India Today special
broadcast on Chuck Review.
Speaker 1 (56:17):
Many thanks.
Speaker 2 (56:18):
This truly is a Chuck Review, and I for one
thing that we're not a m you we are Arjune.
We know how to come out on the other side
and on tops many thanks for joining me. Thank you,
so I hope you like this podcast, my conversation with
a Chief Marshall Badoria and for many such conversations on
matters military, strategic and international affairs.
Speaker 1 (56:41):
Do like and subscribe to the India Today podcasts. Many thanks.
This is India Today Podcasts
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