July 25, 2025 • 35 mins
Embark on a historical journey as Abner Doubleday, a Union officer in the Civil War, recounts his experiences from the frontlines. Beginning with the bombardment opened on Ft. Sumter in 1861, Doubledays memoirs unravel the tale of two pivotal campaigns - Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Delve into the strategic errors at Chancellorsville that led to a Union defeat and explore the leadership crisis that plagued the camp. After Chancellorsville, Doubleday covers the unexpected clash of the armies at Gettysburg. When he takes command following the death of his superior, he leads his outnumbered division with courage and resilience. Despite being replaced due to a mistaken report of his divisions defeat, Doubledays narrative doesnt falter. Instead, he critiques the missed opportunities post-battle that could have ended the war. This book is not just a memoir, but Doubledays resolute response to the injustices he faced.
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Part two, Chapter two of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. This LibriVox
recording is in the public domain and is read by
Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by
Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter two Hooker's plans. Longstreet occupies
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the gaps in the Blue Ridge Alarm in Richmond, Hooker
superseded by Meade. A shower of telegrams came to Hooker
notifying him of these untoured events and demanding protection, but
he simply moved one step toward the enemy. On the
fifteenth he had three corps, the first, sixth and eleventh
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grouped around Centerville, with the third corps at Manassas, and
the second, fifth and twelfth Corps in reserve at Fairfax
Court House. The left flank of the army was guarded
by Pleasanton's cavalry posted at Warrenton. Hooker was not to
be drawn away from the defense at Washington by any
clamorous appeal for his services elsewhere, his plan being to
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move parallel to Lee's line of advance and strike his
communications with Richmond at the first favorable opportunity. He obtained
some reinforcements at this time Stannard's second Vermont Brigade being
assigned to my division of the First Corps, and Style's
Cavalry Division, about six thousand strong, being directed to report
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to General Pleasanton for duty. As Harrisburg laid directly in
the track of the invading army, Governor Curtin made strenuous
efforts to collect a force there. He called upon all
able bodied citizens to enroll themselves, and complained that Philadelphia
failed to respond. New York acted promptly, and on the
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fifteenth two brigades arrived in Philadelphia on their way to
the front. On the same day, Longstreet, having been relieved
by Hill, left Culpeper with his corps, and marched directly
across the country east of the Blue Ridge to occupy
Ashby's and Snicker's gaps. Stuart's cavalry were to guard his
right flank, but did not leave until the next day.
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The object of Longstreet's movement was to tempt Hooker to
abandon his strong position in front of Washington and march
against the gaps, in which case it was hoped some
opportunity might occur by which the rebels could either crush
the army of the Potomac in the open country, or
possibly outmaneuver it so as to intervene between it and Washington,
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but Hooker remained stationary. Rhodes's division of Yule's Corps reached
Williamsport and remained there during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
to support Jenkins and receive and transmit to the rear
the cattle horses, Negroes, and provisions taken by him. The
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commotion created by the approach of the invader was not
all one sided. General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe,
received orders to advance on Richmond, which was weakly defended
at this time, as through their manifold offenses in the
way of starving our prisoners, etc. The rebel president and
his cabinet were afraid of reprisals. There was great dismay
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at the weakness of the garrison there, and bitter denunciations
of Lee for leaving so small a force behind. The Union.
Troops for this counter invasion were landed at Yorktown and
sent on to the White House. General Getty, in command
of one column of about seven thousand men, moved on
the thirteenth as far as Hanover Junction, to destroy the
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bridge over the North and South Anna and as much
of the railroad as possible, in order to make a
break in Lee's communications. At the same time, General Keys,
with another column of about five thousand men, moved from
the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahamany
and thus leave a clear road for Getty's column to
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advance on the city. The Davis government, however, called out
the militia and concentrated enough men for defense by weakening
the garrisons in South Carolina and elsewhere. But there is
no doubt the fright at one time was so serious
that it was in contemplation to recall Lee's forces, especially
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on the fifteenth of June, when it was learned that
General Keyes's column was at New Kent court House, within
fifteen miles of the city. On the sixteenth, Stuart's cavalry
left the Rappahannock, with the exception of the fifteenth Virginia,
which remained with Hill and bivouacked at Salem with Fitzlee's
brigade at Piedmont. Their orders were to keep along the
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eastern base of the Blue Ridge and guard the front
of Longstreet's corps in the gaps. Our own cavalry were
concentrated at Warrenton and Catlet's. On the seventeenth, Fitzlee's brigade
was sent forward from Piedmont to aldi Via middle Burg
to anticipate our troops in holding the gap. There it
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being considered important to occupy the bull Run range of
mountains as a screen for Lee's further operations. Fitz Lee's
brigade was supported by that of Robertson, which was moved
to Rectortown, where it was also available as a reserve
to W. H. F. Lee's brigade, which had gone forward
to occupy Thoroughfare Gap. No opposition was anticipated in the
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latter place. Pleasanton, having moved to Centerville with his main body,
Stuart made his headquarters at Middelburg. On the seventeenth, fitz
Lee halted near Dover to close up his command and
sent his pickets on to Aldi Gap. Pleasanton, who was
scouting in the vicinity, had no orders to go through
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the pass, but felt prompted to do so by one
of those presentiments which rarely deceive. He pushed on therefore
with Gregg's division, until about two thirty p m. When
he came upon the rebel pickets who fell back on
the main body. The latter had made a march of
forty miles to reach the gap, and Fitzlee chose a
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strong position on a hill directly west of Aldi in
which to fight a defensive battle. His line covered the
road to Snicker's Gap, but could be turned by the
road to Middelburg and Ashby's Gap. A sanguinary contest ensued, which,
including the pursuit, lasted until nine p m. The rebel
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front was strengthened by a ditch and a line of haystacks.
After fighting for three hours, the battle was finally decided
by a gallant charge of the first main Cavalry, who,
after our line had been broken and driven back, were
led by Kilpatrick in person against a regiment of mounted
infantry on the Ashby's Gap road, capturing four guns. The
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Harris like cavalry had been in disfavor for having failed
in an attack at Brandy's Station, but on the present
acause they redeemed themselves, made several brilliant charges and greatly
contributed to the success of the day. The rebels claimed
to have taken one hundred thirty four prisoners and some
flags in this affair, and state that they only fell
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back to Middelburg in obedience to Stuart's orders, ascertaining that
Colonel Duffy was advancing on that place with his division,
Stuart thought by concentrating his entire force there he could
overwhelm him. This may account for the retreat, but it
is very certain that the loss of the pass at
Aldi was a serious blow to the rebel cause. This,
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supplemented by Colonel Duffy's operations, which will be described hereafter,
gave Hooker possession of Loudun County and through the invading
column far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded
in posting forces in the gaps of the bull Run
Range of mountains and in occupying the wooded country between
Thoroughfare Gap and Leesburg, they would not only have hidden
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all their own movements from view, but would have had
command of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to within thirty
miles of Washington, so that they could have operated on
either side of the river. While Gregg's division was thus engaged,
Colonel Duffy started under orders with his regiment from Centerville
for Middleburg by way of Thoroughfare Gap, the enemy W. H. F.
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Lee's brigade were already there, but he forced them out
and kept on to Middleburg, which was reached about nine
thirty a m. He found Stuart's rearguard or escort there
and drove them out. Stuart fell back to Rector's cross
Roads and sent word to all his forces to concentrate
against Duffy. Duffy barricaded the streets of the town and
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prepared to hold it until reinforcements could reach him from Aldy,
not being aware that there was any impediment in that direction.
At seven p m. The different rebel brigades advanced on
him from the direction of Aldi Union and Upperville. By
sheltering his men behind stone walls and barricades, he repelled
several assaults, but at last was surrounded by overwhelming forces
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and compelled to retreat by the road upon which he
had advanced in the morning. He fell back until he
crossed Little River, picketed the stream, and halted there to
get some rest. This gave time to the enemy to
surround him, and by half past one the next morning,
all the roads in the neighborhood were full of cavalry.
An entire brigade being formed on that which led to Aldi.
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He tried to force his way through the latter, but
was received with heavy volleys on both flanks and with
loud calls to surrender. He directed Captain Bliss and Captain Bixby,
who were in advance, to charge through everything in front
of them, and the way was cleared for the main body,
which at last gained the junction of the Aldi Road
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with that which leads to White Plains. He then retreated
on the latter, with his men all intermixed with those
of the enemy and fighting every step of the way.
He finally disengaged his force from this melee and made
his way through Hopewell Gap back to Centerville, leaving two
thirds of his command in this affair. At Middelburg, Stuart
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states that he was unable with his entire force to
drive the first Rhode Island Regiment from a position it
had chosen, and speaks with admiration of the gallantry it displayed.
On the eighteenth Stewart took posts outside of that town
with Robertson and W. H. F Lees brigade. Fitz Lee's
brigade was on his left at Union and Jones's brigade
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was ordered up as a reserve. Pleasant to move forward
with all his available force and occupied Middelburg and Philamont
on the road to Snicker's Gap, releasing some of Duffy's
men who had been captured the day before. Gregg's division
encountered the enemy a short distance beyond Middelburg and drove
them five miles in the direction of Ashby's Gap. There
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was no regular line formation, but the Indian mode of
fighting was adopted on both sides by taking advantage of
every stone, fence, bush, or hollow to shelter the men.
Before the action was over, Kilpatrick's command came up and
took a prominent part. Beauford's division, which had advanced beyond
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Philamont on the Snicker's Gap road, also became warmly engaged.
They turned the left flank of the rebels and pressed
on successfully, but the squadron left to guard the bridge
over Goose Creek was overpowered by numbers and the bridge
was burned. Part of Pleasanton's force made a reconnaissance toward
Warrenton and engaged Hampton's brigade there. On the nineteenth. Pleasanton
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held the positions he had gained and sent back for
an infantry support. As there were indications that the whole
of Stuart's cavalry would be thrown on Gregg's division at Upperville,
Pleasanton went forward with his entire force and a brigade
of infantry to support it. After a series of brilliant engagements,
he drove Stuart steadily back into Ashby's Gap, where he
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took refuge behind Longstreet's corps, a portion of which came up.
Pleasanton then returned to Upperville and the next day to Aldi.
The object of these movements to gain possession of Louding
County having been attained, Hooker was wary and did not
propose to be lured away from his strong position to
take part in cavalry battles at a distance without a
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definite object. He still found it difficult to realize that
Lee would still further lengthen out his long line from
Richmond and endanger his communications by invading Pennsylvania, and he
therefore waited for further developments. Lee, however, impelled by public
opinion behind him which made it hardly safe to break,
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still went forward and directed Yule to cross the Potomac
with his main body and Longstreet to fall back behind
the Shenandoah, to act in conjunction with Hill, who had
relieved Euele at Winchester on the seventeenth, against any attempt
to strike the rear of his long column. Like Achilles,
he felt that he was only vulnerable in his heel.
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Several small skirmishes occurred about this time between detachments of
General schenkst Command, which picketed the north bank of the Potomac,
and bands of rebel partisans. The former were surprised and
captured in two or three instances. In one of these expeditions,
a locomotive and twenty three cars were disabled on the
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Baltimore and Ohio railroad in Bodin, Too, who occupied Cumberland
on the seventeenth, in order to favor the general plan
of invasion, tore up some miles of the track west
of that town with a view to prevent an any
reinforcements coming from that direction. It would have been much
better for the interests of the Southern Confederacy if Lee,
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instead of making a downright invasion, had been content to
remain in the valley and threaten Hooker with two corps
while he used the third to procure unlimited supplies in Pennsylvania,
and to sever all connection between the East and West
by breaking up the railroads and cutting the telegraph wires.
Such a result, however, would hardly have been sufficient to
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meet the expectations of the Southern people, who were bent
upon nothing else than the entire subjugation of the North
and the occupation of our principal cities. Pleasanton's operations having
cleared the way, Hooker moved forward promptly on the eighteenth
to occupy the gaps. The twelfth Corps were sent to Leesburg,
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the fifth to Aldi, and the second to Thoroughfare Gap.
The other corps formed a second line in reserve. This
covered Washington and gave Hooker an excellent base of operations.
In answer to his demand for reinforcements, Crawford's Division of
Pennsylvania Reserves and Amber Crombie's Division were sent to him.
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As the latter was just going out of service, it
was of no use. Hooker contended that his army constituted
the proper defense of Washington, and that it was not
necessary to keep a large force inactive there who could
be of much more service at the front. The authorities
were timid, however, did not see the force of this reasoning,
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and therefore refused to place Shanks in Heinzelmann's commands. Under
his orders, the enemy made a feeble attempt about this
time to occupy Harper's ferry, but were promptly shelled out
by our batteries on Maryland Heights. Lee, having failed on
account of the discomfiture of his cavalry in crossing the
Potomac at Edward's Ferry, was force first either to remain
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where he was or go forward. Impelled by public opinion,
he kept on his way up the Cumberland Valley. Hooker,
being very desirous of keeping the invasion west of the
Blue Ridge, asked Heinzelmann to co operate with him by
sending the two thousand men, which seemed to be of
no service at Poolsville, to the passes of South Mountain,
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which is an extension of the same range. But Heinzmann
said those passes were outside of his jurisdiction and the
men were needed in Poolsville. Hooker replied, somewhat angrily that
he would try and do without the men. The two
generals had quarreled and there was not the best feeling
between them. All of yulescorps were across the river on
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the twenty second, and Jenkins's cavalry pushed on to Chambersburg.
He was ordered to remain there until reinforced, but failed
to do so. As Union troops were approaching from the
direction of Carlisle. Long Street and Hill were left behind
to prevent Hooker from striking the rear of this long column.
Hooker still remained quiescent, engaged in trying to obtain fifteen
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thousand men as reinforcements. He was but partially successful. For
as soon as the New York regiments reached Baltimore, Lockwood's
brigade of Maryland troops about three thousand, was ordered to
join the Army of the Potomac and was assigned to
the twelfth Corps. The Army of the Potomac at this
time was posted as follows, the twelfth Corps at Leesburg,
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supported by the eleventh on Goose Creek between Leesburg and Aldi.
The Fifth Corps near Aldi and the Second at the
next pass below, both supported by the Third Corps at
Gum Springs. The First Corps was behind the eleventh and
twelfth Corps near Guildford on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad.
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Our cavalry which had left Aldi, covered the approaches to
Leesburg on the twenty third. They had a sharp engagement
at Dover on the road from Aldi to Leesburg with
part of Stuart's force, who beat up their quarters, but
they drove off their assailants without much difficulty. Lee now
with a prudent regard to a possible defeat, requested the
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authorities at Richmond to have a reserve army under Beauregard
assemble at Culpeper, a request which was looked upon by
Davis as one quite impossible to carry out, owing to
the scarcity of troops and the necessity of reinforcing Johnston
in the west and Beauregard in the south. Two of
Ewell's divisions, those of Rhodes in Johnson, reached the frightened
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town of Chambersburg on the twenty third. The other, under Early,
took the road to York via Gettysburg and halted it
that day at Waynesboro. By this time, twenty regiments of
militia were on their way from New York to Baltimore
and Harrisburg. Longstreet crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and Hill
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at Shepherdstown on the twenty fourth. Their columns united at
Hagerstown the next day. Thus supported, Yule's main body resumed
its march to Carlisle, which it occupied on the twenty seventh,
gathering large supplies there and along the road by means
of foraging parties sent out to depredate on the farmers.
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As soon as they reached the town, Jenkins Brigade left
for Harrisburg. Hooker, having now satisfied himself that the capital
was safe from a coup de main and that the
main body of the rebels were still marching up the
Cumberland Valley, determined to move in a parallel line on
the east side of South Mountain, where he could occupy
the gaps at once in case the army turned east
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towards Washington and Baltimore. To carry out this design, his
army began to cross the Potomac at Edward's Ferry on
the twenty fifth, and at night Reynolds's Corps was in
front and Sickles Corps in rear. Of Middletown. In readiness
to hold either Crampton's or Turner's gap, Howard's Corps was
thrown forward to Boonsborough. On the twenty sixth, Slocum's Corps
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was sent to Harper's Ferry to act in conjunction with
the garrison there, supposed to be ten thousand strong against
the enemy's line of communication with Richmond. The second, fifth,
and sixth Corps were advanced to Frederick, Maryland as his
support to the first, third, and eleventh Corps. Gregg's cavalry
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division remained behind to cover the crossing, which was all
completed the next day, after which they too marched to Frederick.
On the twenty fifth, Early leaving his division at Greenwood,
went to Chambersburg to consult Ewele, who gave him definite
orders to occupy York, break up the Central Railroad, burned
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the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and afterward rejoined
the main body at Carlisle. It seemed strange that Lee
should suppose that the Union Army would continue inactive all
this time south of Washington, where it was only confronted
by Stuart's cavalry, and it is remarkable to find him
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so totally in the dark. With regard to Hooker's movements,
it has been extensively assumed by rebel riders that this
ignorance was caused by the injudicious raid made by Stuart,
who thought it would be a great benefit to the
Confederate cause if he could ride entirely around the Union
lines and rejoin Lee's advance at York. He had made
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several of these circuits during his military career and had
gained important advantages from them in way of breaking up communications,
capturing dispatches, et cetera. It is thought that he hoped,
by threatening Hooker's rear, to detain him and delay his
crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to
capture Harrisburg and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion
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was undoubtedly a mistake. When he rejoined the main body,
his men were exhausted, his horses broken down, and the
Battle of Gettysburg was nearly over. As cavalry are the
eyes of an army, it has been said that Stuart's
absence prevented Lee from ascertaining the movements and position of
Hooker's army. Stuart has been loudly blamed by the rebel
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chroniclers for leaving the main body, but this is unjust.
Lee not only knew of the movement, but approved it,
for he directed Stuart to pass between Hooker and Washington
and move with part of his force to Carlisle and
the other part to Gettysburg. Besides, Stuart left Robertson's and
Jones's brigade behind with orders to follow up the rear
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of the Union army until it crossed, and then to
rejoin the main body. In the meantime, they were to
hold the gaps in the Blue Ridge for fear Hooker
might send a force to occupy them. These two brigades
within Bowden's Brigade AID and White's Battalion made quite a
large cavalry force. Imboden, however, was also detached to break
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up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to prevent forces from
the west from taking Lee in rear, all of which
goes to show how sensitive the Confederate commander was in
regard to any danger threatening his communications with Richmond. At
one a m. On the twenty fifth, Stuart started on
his expedition and advanced to Haymarket, where he unexpectedly came
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upon Hancock's corps, which had left Thoroughfare Gap and was
on its way to Gum Springs. He opened fire against them,
but was soon driven off. He then returned to Buckland
and Gainesville, for to keep on in presence of our
troops would have frustrated the object of his expedition by
indicating its purpose. This was the day in which Longstreet
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and Hill united their columns at Hagerstown. Some Union spies,
who counted the rebel forces as they passed through the town,
made their number to be ninety one thousand infantry, two
hundred eighty guns, and eleven hundred cavalry. This statement, though
much exaggerated, gained great credits at the time and added
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to the excitement among the loyal people throughout the Northern States,
while the Copperhead element were proportionately active and jubilant. On
the twenty sixth, General French assumed command of the garrison
at Harper's Ferry, then posted at Maryland Heights. On the
same day, the Richmond government were much alarmed by the
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unexpected appearance of Colonel Spears eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry within eleven
miles of the city. Spear had made quite a successful
and very destructive raid on the railroads and other lines
of communication. He made, too, a very important capture by
bringing in General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded
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at the Battle of brandy Station, and who was a
son of General Robert E. Lee. The Davis government had
determined to hang one of our captains who was a
prisoner in Libby, and the fact that a son of
General Robert E Lee was in our power prevented them
from carrying out their intention, for fear he might be
hanged by way of retaliation. Early's division of Yule's Corps
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stopped at Gettysburg on its way to York. The other
two divisions kept on toward Carlisle. These movements at once
caused Governor Curtain of Pennsylvania to call out sixty thousand
men for the defense of the state. They were styled
the Emergency Militia, as there was little else than shotguns
for them. These hasty gatherings did not promise to be
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very effective. The governor still complained of a lack of zeal.
In Philadelphia, the people there said, isn't this awful? But
very few volunteered. They soon awoke from their apathy, however,
and took prompt measures to defend the city. On the
twenty seventh, the commands of Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg
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and Ewell's two divisions occupied Carlisle, while Jenkins pushed on
to Kingston, within thirteen miles of Harrisburg. At the same time,
Early was engaged in wreaking destruction upon the Northern Central Railroad,
and by night he entered York. About the only opposition
he encountered came from a militia regiment at Gettysburg, but
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this was soon driven away. There was wild commotion throughout
the north, and people began to feel that the boast
of the Georgia's Senator Tombs that he would call the
roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill
Monument might soon be realized. The enemy seemed very near,
and the army of the Potomac far away. On the
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same day, Stuart succeeded with great difficulty in crossing the
Potomac in the vicinity of Drainsville. He found our troops
were now all north of this river, so that one
object of his expedition to detain them on the south
side had failed. On the twenty eighth, he resumed his march,
and as he passed close to Washington and Baltimore, he
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created considerable excitement in those cities. At Rockville, he came
upon a large train full of supplies on its way
to Frederick, Maryland, and captured it with its slender escort,
after which he kept on in a northerly direction through
Brookville and Cooksville, traveling all night. On this day, the
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Adjuntant General at Richmond telegraphed for troops to be sent
there at once from the Carolinas and elsewhere, for he
estimated the Union forces at the White House at thirty
thousand men and considered the capital to be in great danger.
Neither Davis nor his cabinet had the slightest desire to
have any success as Lee might obtain in the North,
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supplemented by their own execution at the South, a result
they felt was not wholly improbable in the excited state
of public feeling at that time, if the city should
be taken, Lee, ignorant that Hooker was following him up,
continued his aggressive advance. Early took prompt measures to seize
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the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. If successful, he
intended to cross over and amuse himself by destroying all
direct connection between Philadelphia and the West by railroad and telegraph.
This done, he proposed to march along the north side
of the river, capture Harrisburg, and rejoin Yule at Carlisle.
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As Gordon's brigade approached the bridge, after driving away some militia,
they founded in flames. The Union commander at Columbia, Colonel Frick,
having given orders for its destruction, early, gained some compensation
for his failure in this respect by levying a contribution
on York of one hundred thousand dollars in cash, two
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hundred barrels of thirty thousand bushels of corn, one thousand
pairs of shoes, et cetera. The Union army still remained
in Frederick, with the left wing three Corps under Reynolds
thrown out toward the enemy, the eleventh Corps under Howard
at Boonsborough, the First Corps under my command at Middletown,
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supported by the third Corps under Bernie, two or three
miles in rear, with Buford's division of Cavalry holding the
passes of South Mountain, the remainder of the cavalry being
at Frederick. Hooker thought it useless to keep a garrison
of ten thousand men in a passive attitude at Harper's Ferry.
I think he was quite right, for the war would
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not be decided by the possession of military points or
even of cities, for hostilities would never cease until one
army or the other was destroyed. He therefore appealed to
Washington for permission to add this force to that of Slocombe,
in order that the two might act directly against Lee's
communications by following up the rear while preserving their own
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line of retreat. Slocomb had been already ordered there for
this purpose, but Halleck would not consent that the garrison
of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn under any circumstances, and
positively refused Hooker's request. Hooker, then, considering himself thwarted in
all his plans by the authorities at Washington, offered his resignation.
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It was promptly accepted, and Major General George G. Meade,
then the commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to
the command of the Army of the Potomac. He was
a general of fine intellect, of great personal bravery, and
had had a good deal of experience in the war
in handling troops, but had never achieved any brilliant success
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or met with any serious reverse. Upon ascertaining that the
enemy were at York and Carlisle, Hooker had determined to
throw out his different corps in a fan shape toward
the Susquehenna and advance in that direction, with three corps
on the left to defend that flank in case Longstreet
and Hill should turn east instead of keeping on toward
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the north. At the same time, it was his intention
to have Slocombe follow up Lee's advance by keeping in
his rear, to capture his trains and couriers, and to
cut off his retreat should he be defeated. General Meade's
first order was for all the troops to concentrate in Frederick,
where he proposed to have a grand review. But at
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the urgent remonstrance of General Butterfield, who had been Hooker's
chief of staff and who stated that this delay would
give Lee time to cross the Susquehenna and capture Harrisburg
and Philadelphia, Hooker's orders were allowed to stand. With some exceptions.
Mead appears to have approved all movements against Lee's line
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of retreat, for he ordered slocom to rejoin the main
army and had the Hardihood to break up the post
at Harper's Ferry, in spite of the fact that Hooker
had just been relieved from command for requesting permission to
do this. The bulk of the garrison, under Major General
French was directed to take post as a reserve at
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Frederick when our forces moved forward. The general idea of
our advance was to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia
if he went north, or between him and Baltimore and
Washington in case he turned back. The orders at night
were for Beauford's Division of Cavalry to take post on
the left flank in the direction of Fairfield, Gregg's Division
(32:43):
on the right flank at Westminster, and Kilpatrick's Division in
advance of the center at Littlestown. The different corps to
be posted between New Windsor and Emmitsburg. Yule's corps, as stated,
were at Carlisle and York. Lee and Longstreets at Chambersburg
and Hillscoreps at Fayetteville. Lee was startled to learn from
(33:06):
a countryman who came in on the twenty eighth that
Hooker was at Frederick and not south of the Potomac
as he had supposed. He saw at once that his
communications with Richmond, about which he was so solicitous, were
greatly endangered, For the Union Army could be formed to
interpose between him and Williamsport and still keep a safe
(33:29):
line of retreat open to Washington. This might not be
so great a misfortune to the enemy as regards food
and forage, for he could probably live on the country
for some time by making predatory excursions in different directions,
But when it came to obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition,
the matter would become very serious. An army only carries
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a limited amount of this into the field, and must
rely upon frequent convoys to keep up the supply, which
is constantly decreased from the partial engagements and skirmishes so
prevalent in a hostile country. The wisdom of Hooker's policy
in desiring to assail the rebel communications is demonstrated by
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the fact that Lee immediately turned back the head of
the serpent faced about as soon as its tail was
trodden upon. He came to the conclusion to prevent an
attack against his rear by threatening Baltimore with his whole force.
This would necessarily cause the Union army to march further
east to confront him and thus prevent it from operating
(34:35):
in heavy force in the Cumberland Valley. Accordingly, on the
night of the twenty eighth, Lee sent expresses to all
his core commanders to concentrate at Gettysburg. If he had
known that Meade was about to withdraw all the troops
acting against his line of retreat, he would probably have
gone on and taken Harrisburg. As the new commander of
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the Union Army was a favorite of General Halleck, no
notice was taken of his disregard of instructions in detaching
the garrison of Harper's Ferry. General Couch, who had commanded
the Department of the Susquehanna, was also placed under his orders,
a favor which had been denied to Hooker. The troubles
of the latter were never quite over, for on his
(35:19):
appearing in Washington to explain his actions, he was immediately
put under arrest for visiting the capital without his Hallock's permission,
a piece of petty persecution which might have been spared
under the circumstances. It was, however, a short and easy
method of settling all complaints that were inconvenient to answer.
(35:42):
End of Chapter
Part two, Chapter two of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. This LibriVox
recording is in the public domain and is read by
Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by
Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter two Hooker's plans. Longstreet occupies
(00:23):
the gaps in the Blue Ridge Alarm in Richmond, Hooker
superseded by Meade. A shower of telegrams came to Hooker
notifying him of these untoured events and demanding protection, but
he simply moved one step toward the enemy. On the
fifteenth he had three corps, the first, sixth and eleventh
(00:45):
grouped around Centerville, with the third corps at Manassas, and
the second, fifth and twelfth Corps in reserve at Fairfax
Court House. The left flank of the army was guarded
by Pleasanton's cavalry posted at Warrenton. Hooker was not to
be drawn away from the defense at Washington by any
clamorous appeal for his services elsewhere, his plan being to
(01:08):
move parallel to Lee's line of advance and strike his
communications with Richmond at the first favorable opportunity. He obtained
some reinforcements at this time Stannard's second Vermont Brigade being
assigned to my division of the First Corps, and Style's
Cavalry Division, about six thousand strong, being directed to report
(01:29):
to General Pleasanton for duty. As Harrisburg laid directly in
the track of the invading army, Governor Curtin made strenuous
efforts to collect a force there. He called upon all
able bodied citizens to enroll themselves, and complained that Philadelphia
failed to respond. New York acted promptly, and on the
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fifteenth two brigades arrived in Philadelphia on their way to
the front. On the same day, Longstreet, having been relieved
by Hill, left Culpeper with his corps, and marched directly
across the country east of the Blue Ridge to occupy
Ashby's and Snicker's gaps. Stuart's cavalry were to guard his
right flank, but did not leave until the next day.
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The object of Longstreet's movement was to tempt Hooker to
abandon his strong position in front of Washington and march
against the gaps, in which case it was hoped some
opportunity might occur by which the rebels could either crush
the army of the Potomac in the open country, or
possibly outmaneuver it so as to intervene between it and Washington,
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but Hooker remained stationary. Rhodes's division of Yule's Corps reached
Williamsport and remained there during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
to support Jenkins and receive and transmit to the rear
the cattle horses, Negroes, and provisions taken by him. The
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commotion created by the approach of the invader was not
all one sided. General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe,
received orders to advance on Richmond, which was weakly defended
at this time, as through their manifold offenses in the
way of starving our prisoners, etc. The rebel president and
his cabinet were afraid of reprisals. There was great dismay
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at the weakness of the garrison there, and bitter denunciations
of Lee for leaving so small a force behind. The Union.
Troops for this counter invasion were landed at Yorktown and
sent on to the White House. General Getty, in command
of one column of about seven thousand men, moved on
the thirteenth as far as Hanover Junction, to destroy the
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bridge over the North and South Anna and as much
of the railroad as possible, in order to make a
break in Lee's communications. At the same time, General Keys,
with another column of about five thousand men, moved from
the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahamany
and thus leave a clear road for Getty's column to
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advance on the city. The Davis government, however, called out
the militia and concentrated enough men for defense by weakening
the garrisons in South Carolina and elsewhere. But there is
no doubt the fright at one time was so serious
that it was in contemplation to recall Lee's forces, especially
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on the fifteenth of June, when it was learned that
General Keyes's column was at New Kent court House, within
fifteen miles of the city. On the sixteenth, Stuart's cavalry
left the Rappahannock, with the exception of the fifteenth Virginia,
which remained with Hill and bivouacked at Salem with Fitzlee's
brigade at Piedmont. Their orders were to keep along the
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eastern base of the Blue Ridge and guard the front
of Longstreet's corps in the gaps. Our own cavalry were
concentrated at Warrenton and Catlet's. On the seventeenth, Fitzlee's brigade
was sent forward from Piedmont to aldi Via middle Burg
to anticipate our troops in holding the gap. There it
(05:04):
being considered important to occupy the bull Run range of
mountains as a screen for Lee's further operations. Fitz Lee's
brigade was supported by that of Robertson, which was moved
to Rectortown, where it was also available as a reserve
to W. H. F. Lee's brigade, which had gone forward
to occupy Thoroughfare Gap. No opposition was anticipated in the
(05:27):
latter place. Pleasanton, having moved to Centerville with his main body,
Stuart made his headquarters at Middelburg. On the seventeenth, fitz
Lee halted near Dover to close up his command and
sent his pickets on to Aldi Gap. Pleasanton, who was
scouting in the vicinity, had no orders to go through
(05:48):
the pass, but felt prompted to do so by one
of those presentiments which rarely deceive. He pushed on therefore
with Gregg's division, until about two thirty p m. When
he came upon the rebel pickets who fell back on
the main body. The latter had made a march of
forty miles to reach the gap, and Fitzlee chose a
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strong position on a hill directly west of Aldi in
which to fight a defensive battle. His line covered the
road to Snicker's Gap, but could be turned by the
road to Middelburg and Ashby's Gap. A sanguinary contest ensued, which,
including the pursuit, lasted until nine p m. The rebel
(06:30):
front was strengthened by a ditch and a line of haystacks.
After fighting for three hours, the battle was finally decided
by a gallant charge of the first main Cavalry, who,
after our line had been broken and driven back, were
led by Kilpatrick in person against a regiment of mounted
infantry on the Ashby's Gap road, capturing four guns. The
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Harris like cavalry had been in disfavor for having failed
in an attack at Brandy's Station, but on the present
acause they redeemed themselves, made several brilliant charges and greatly
contributed to the success of the day. The rebels claimed
to have taken one hundred thirty four prisoners and some
flags in this affair, and state that they only fell
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back to Middelburg in obedience to Stuart's orders, ascertaining that
Colonel Duffy was advancing on that place with his division,
Stuart thought by concentrating his entire force there he could
overwhelm him. This may account for the retreat, but it
is very certain that the loss of the pass at
Aldi was a serious blow to the rebel cause. This,
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supplemented by Colonel Duffy's operations, which will be described hereafter,
gave Hooker possession of Loudun County and through the invading
column far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded
in posting forces in the gaps of the bull Run
Range of mountains and in occupying the wooded country between
Thoroughfare Gap and Leesburg, they would not only have hidden
(08:02):
all their own movements from view, but would have had
command of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to within thirty
miles of Washington, so that they could have operated on
either side of the river. While Gregg's division was thus engaged,
Colonel Duffy started under orders with his regiment from Centerville
for Middleburg by way of Thoroughfare Gap, the enemy W. H. F.
(08:26):
Lee's brigade were already there, but he forced them out
and kept on to Middleburg, which was reached about nine
thirty a m. He found Stuart's rearguard or escort there
and drove them out. Stuart fell back to Rector's cross
Roads and sent word to all his forces to concentrate
against Duffy. Duffy barricaded the streets of the town and
(08:49):
prepared to hold it until reinforcements could reach him from Aldy,
not being aware that there was any impediment in that direction.
At seven p m. The different rebel brigades advanced on
him from the direction of Aldi Union and Upperville. By
sheltering his men behind stone walls and barricades, he repelled
several assaults, but at last was surrounded by overwhelming forces
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and compelled to retreat by the road upon which he
had advanced in the morning. He fell back until he
crossed Little River, picketed the stream, and halted there to
get some rest. This gave time to the enemy to
surround him, and by half past one the next morning,
all the roads in the neighborhood were full of cavalry.
An entire brigade being formed on that which led to Aldi.
(09:38):
He tried to force his way through the latter, but
was received with heavy volleys on both flanks and with
loud calls to surrender. He directed Captain Bliss and Captain Bixby,
who were in advance, to charge through everything in front
of them, and the way was cleared for the main body,
which at last gained the junction of the Aldi Road
(09:58):
with that which leads to White Plains. He then retreated
on the latter, with his men all intermixed with those
of the enemy and fighting every step of the way.
He finally disengaged his force from this melee and made
his way through Hopewell Gap back to Centerville, leaving two
thirds of his command in this affair. At Middelburg, Stuart
(10:21):
states that he was unable with his entire force to
drive the first Rhode Island Regiment from a position it
had chosen, and speaks with admiration of the gallantry it displayed.
On the eighteenth Stewart took posts outside of that town
with Robertson and W. H. F Lees brigade. Fitz Lee's
brigade was on his left at Union and Jones's brigade
(10:44):
was ordered up as a reserve. Pleasant to move forward
with all his available force and occupied Middelburg and Philamont
on the road to Snicker's Gap, releasing some of Duffy's
men who had been captured the day before. Gregg's division
encountered the enemy a short distance beyond Middelburg and drove
them five miles in the direction of Ashby's Gap. There
(11:07):
was no regular line formation, but the Indian mode of
fighting was adopted on both sides by taking advantage of
every stone, fence, bush, or hollow to shelter the men.
Before the action was over, Kilpatrick's command came up and
took a prominent part. Beauford's division, which had advanced beyond
(11:28):
Philamont on the Snicker's Gap road, also became warmly engaged.
They turned the left flank of the rebels and pressed
on successfully, but the squadron left to guard the bridge
over Goose Creek was overpowered by numbers and the bridge
was burned. Part of Pleasanton's force made a reconnaissance toward
Warrenton and engaged Hampton's brigade there. On the nineteenth. Pleasanton
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held the positions he had gained and sent back for
an infantry support. As there were indications that the whole
of Stuart's cavalry would be thrown on Gregg's division at Upperville,
Pleasanton went forward with his entire force and a brigade
of infantry to support it. After a series of brilliant engagements,
he drove Stuart steadily back into Ashby's Gap, where he
(12:16):
took refuge behind Longstreet's corps, a portion of which came up.
Pleasanton then returned to Upperville and the next day to Aldi.
The object of these movements to gain possession of Louding
County having been attained, Hooker was wary and did not
propose to be lured away from his strong position to
take part in cavalry battles at a distance without a
(12:38):
definite object. He still found it difficult to realize that
Lee would still further lengthen out his long line from
Richmond and endanger his communications by invading Pennsylvania, and he
therefore waited for further developments. Lee, however, impelled by public
opinion behind him which made it hardly safe to break,
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still went forward and directed Yule to cross the Potomac
with his main body and Longstreet to fall back behind
the Shenandoah, to act in conjunction with Hill, who had
relieved Euele at Winchester on the seventeenth, against any attempt
to strike the rear of his long column. Like Achilles,
he felt that he was only vulnerable in his heel.
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Several small skirmishes occurred about this time between detachments of
General schenkst Command, which picketed the north bank of the Potomac,
and bands of rebel partisans. The former were surprised and
captured in two or three instances. In one of these expeditions,
a locomotive and twenty three cars were disabled on the
(13:45):
Baltimore and Ohio railroad in Bodin, Too, who occupied Cumberland
on the seventeenth, in order to favor the general plan
of invasion, tore up some miles of the track west
of that town with a view to prevent an any
reinforcements coming from that direction. It would have been much
better for the interests of the Southern Confederacy if Lee,
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instead of making a downright invasion, had been content to
remain in the valley and threaten Hooker with two corps
while he used the third to procure unlimited supplies in Pennsylvania,
and to sever all connection between the East and West
by breaking up the railroads and cutting the telegraph wires.
Such a result, however, would hardly have been sufficient to
(14:32):
meet the expectations of the Southern people, who were bent
upon nothing else than the entire subjugation of the North
and the occupation of our principal cities. Pleasanton's operations having
cleared the way, Hooker moved forward promptly on the eighteenth
to occupy the gaps. The twelfth Corps were sent to Leesburg,
(14:53):
the fifth to Aldi, and the second to Thoroughfare Gap.
The other corps formed a second line in reserve. This
covered Washington and gave Hooker an excellent base of operations.
In answer to his demand for reinforcements, Crawford's Division of
Pennsylvania Reserves and Amber Crombie's Division were sent to him.
(15:15):
As the latter was just going out of service, it
was of no use. Hooker contended that his army constituted
the proper defense of Washington, and that it was not
necessary to keep a large force inactive there who could
be of much more service at the front. The authorities
were timid, however, did not see the force of this reasoning,
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and therefore refused to place Shanks in Heinzelmann's commands. Under
his orders, the enemy made a feeble attempt about this
time to occupy Harper's ferry, but were promptly shelled out
by our batteries on Maryland Heights. Lee, having failed on
account of the discomfiture of his cavalry in crossing the
Potomac at Edward's Ferry, was force first either to remain
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where he was or go forward. Impelled by public opinion,
he kept on his way up the Cumberland Valley. Hooker,
being very desirous of keeping the invasion west of the
Blue Ridge, asked Heinzelmann to co operate with him by
sending the two thousand men, which seemed to be of
no service at Poolsville, to the passes of South Mountain,
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which is an extension of the same range. But Heinzmann
said those passes were outside of his jurisdiction and the
men were needed in Poolsville. Hooker replied, somewhat angrily that
he would try and do without the men. The two
generals had quarreled and there was not the best feeling
between them. All of yulescorps were across the river on
(16:46):
the twenty second, and Jenkins's cavalry pushed on to Chambersburg.
He was ordered to remain there until reinforced, but failed
to do so. As Union troops were approaching from the
direction of Carlisle. Long Street and Hill were left behind
to prevent Hooker from striking the rear of this long column.
Hooker still remained quiescent, engaged in trying to obtain fifteen
(17:11):
thousand men as reinforcements. He was but partially successful. For
as soon as the New York regiments reached Baltimore, Lockwood's
brigade of Maryland troops about three thousand, was ordered to
join the Army of the Potomac and was assigned to
the twelfth Corps. The Army of the Potomac at this
time was posted as follows, the twelfth Corps at Leesburg,
(17:35):
supported by the eleventh on Goose Creek between Leesburg and Aldi.
The Fifth Corps near Aldi and the Second at the
next pass below, both supported by the Third Corps at
Gum Springs. The First Corps was behind the eleventh and
twelfth Corps near Guildford on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad.
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Our cavalry which had left Aldi, covered the approaches to
Leesburg on the twenty third. They had a sharp engagement
at Dover on the road from Aldi to Leesburg with
part of Stuart's force, who beat up their quarters, but
they drove off their assailants without much difficulty. Lee now
with a prudent regard to a possible defeat, requested the
(18:17):
authorities at Richmond to have a reserve army under Beauregard
assemble at Culpeper, a request which was looked upon by
Davis as one quite impossible to carry out, owing to
the scarcity of troops and the necessity of reinforcing Johnston
in the west and Beauregard in the south. Two of
Ewell's divisions, those of Rhodes in Johnson, reached the frightened
(18:41):
town of Chambersburg on the twenty third. The other, under Early,
took the road to York via Gettysburg and halted it
that day at Waynesboro. By this time, twenty regiments of
militia were on their way from New York to Baltimore
and Harrisburg. Longstreet crossed the Potomac at Williamsport and Hill
(19:01):
at Shepherdstown on the twenty fourth. Their columns united at
Hagerstown the next day. Thus supported, Yule's main body resumed
its march to Carlisle, which it occupied on the twenty seventh,
gathering large supplies there and along the road by means
of foraging parties sent out to depredate on the farmers.
(19:23):
As soon as they reached the town, Jenkins Brigade left
for Harrisburg. Hooker, having now satisfied himself that the capital
was safe from a coup de main and that the
main body of the rebels were still marching up the
Cumberland Valley, determined to move in a parallel line on
the east side of South Mountain, where he could occupy
the gaps at once in case the army turned east
(19:46):
towards Washington and Baltimore. To carry out this design, his
army began to cross the Potomac at Edward's Ferry on
the twenty fifth, and at night Reynolds's Corps was in
front and Sickles Corps in rear. Of Middletown. In readiness
to hold either Crampton's or Turner's gap, Howard's Corps was
thrown forward to Boonsborough. On the twenty sixth, Slocum's Corps
(20:11):
was sent to Harper's Ferry to act in conjunction with
the garrison there, supposed to be ten thousand strong against
the enemy's line of communication with Richmond. The second, fifth,
and sixth Corps were advanced to Frederick, Maryland as his
support to the first, third, and eleventh Corps. Gregg's cavalry
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division remained behind to cover the crossing, which was all
completed the next day, after which they too marched to Frederick.
On the twenty fifth, Early leaving his division at Greenwood,
went to Chambersburg to consult Ewele, who gave him definite
orders to occupy York, break up the Central Railroad, burned
(20:52):
the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and afterward rejoined
the main body at Carlisle. It seemed strange that Lee
should suppose that the Union Army would continue inactive all
this time south of Washington, where it was only confronted
by Stuart's cavalry, and it is remarkable to find him
(21:13):
so totally in the dark. With regard to Hooker's movements,
it has been extensively assumed by rebel riders that this
ignorance was caused by the injudicious raid made by Stuart,
who thought it would be a great benefit to the
Confederate cause if he could ride entirely around the Union
lines and rejoin Lee's advance at York. He had made
(21:34):
several of these circuits during his military career and had
gained important advantages from them in way of breaking up communications,
capturing dispatches, et cetera. It is thought that he hoped,
by threatening Hooker's rear, to detain him and delay his
crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to
capture Harrisburg and perhaps Philadelphia. His raid on this occasion
(21:58):
was undoubtedly a mistake. When he rejoined the main body,
his men were exhausted, his horses broken down, and the
Battle of Gettysburg was nearly over. As cavalry are the
eyes of an army, it has been said that Stuart's
absence prevented Lee from ascertaining the movements and position of
Hooker's army. Stuart has been loudly blamed by the rebel
(22:21):
chroniclers for leaving the main body, but this is unjust.
Lee not only knew of the movement, but approved it,
for he directed Stuart to pass between Hooker and Washington
and move with part of his force to Carlisle and
the other part to Gettysburg. Besides, Stuart left Robertson's and
Jones's brigade behind with orders to follow up the rear
(22:44):
of the Union army until it crossed, and then to
rejoin the main body. In the meantime, they were to
hold the gaps in the Blue Ridge for fear Hooker
might send a force to occupy them. These two brigades
within Bowden's Brigade AID and White's Battalion made quite a
large cavalry force. Imboden, however, was also detached to break
(23:07):
up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to prevent forces from
the west from taking Lee in rear, all of which
goes to show how sensitive the Confederate commander was in
regard to any danger threatening his communications with Richmond. At
one a m. On the twenty fifth, Stuart started on
his expedition and advanced to Haymarket, where he unexpectedly came
(23:28):
upon Hancock's corps, which had left Thoroughfare Gap and was
on its way to Gum Springs. He opened fire against them,
but was soon driven off. He then returned to Buckland
and Gainesville, for to keep on in presence of our
troops would have frustrated the object of his expedition by
indicating its purpose. This was the day in which Longstreet
(23:50):
and Hill united their columns at Hagerstown. Some Union spies,
who counted the rebel forces as they passed through the town,
made their number to be ninety one thousand infantry, two
hundred eighty guns, and eleven hundred cavalry. This statement, though
much exaggerated, gained great credits at the time and added
(24:11):
to the excitement among the loyal people throughout the Northern States,
while the Copperhead element were proportionately active and jubilant. On
the twenty sixth, General French assumed command of the garrison
at Harper's Ferry, then posted at Maryland Heights. On the
same day, the Richmond government were much alarmed by the
(24:32):
unexpected appearance of Colonel Spears eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry within eleven
miles of the city. Spear had made quite a successful
and very destructive raid on the railroads and other lines
of communication. He made, too, a very important capture by
bringing in General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded
(24:52):
at the Battle of brandy Station, and who was a
son of General Robert E. Lee. The Davis government had
determined to hang one of our captains who was a
prisoner in Libby, and the fact that a son of
General Robert E Lee was in our power prevented them
from carrying out their intention, for fear he might be
hanged by way of retaliation. Early's division of Yule's Corps
(25:16):
stopped at Gettysburg on its way to York. The other
two divisions kept on toward Carlisle. These movements at once
caused Governor Curtain of Pennsylvania to call out sixty thousand
men for the defense of the state. They were styled
the Emergency Militia, as there was little else than shotguns
for them. These hasty gatherings did not promise to be
(25:39):
very effective. The governor still complained of a lack of zeal.
In Philadelphia, the people there said, isn't this awful? But
very few volunteered. They soon awoke from their apathy, however,
and took prompt measures to defend the city. On the
twenty seventh, the commands of Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg
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and Ewell's two divisions occupied Carlisle, while Jenkins pushed on
to Kingston, within thirteen miles of Harrisburg. At the same time,
Early was engaged in wreaking destruction upon the Northern Central Railroad,
and by night he entered York. About the only opposition
he encountered came from a militia regiment at Gettysburg, but
(26:23):
this was soon driven away. There was wild commotion throughout
the north, and people began to feel that the boast
of the Georgia's Senator Tombs that he would call the
roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill
Monument might soon be realized. The enemy seemed very near,
and the army of the Potomac far away. On the
(26:45):
same day, Stuart succeeded with great difficulty in crossing the
Potomac in the vicinity of Drainsville. He found our troops
were now all north of this river, so that one
object of his expedition to detain them on the south
side had failed. On the twenty eighth, he resumed his march,
and as he passed close to Washington and Baltimore, he
(27:07):
created considerable excitement in those cities. At Rockville, he came
upon a large train full of supplies on its way
to Frederick, Maryland, and captured it with its slender escort,
after which he kept on in a northerly direction through
Brookville and Cooksville, traveling all night. On this day, the
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Adjuntant General at Richmond telegraphed for troops to be sent
there at once from the Carolinas and elsewhere, for he
estimated the Union forces at the White House at thirty
thousand men and considered the capital to be in great danger.
Neither Davis nor his cabinet had the slightest desire to
have any success as Lee might obtain in the North,
(27:51):
supplemented by their own execution at the South, a result
they felt was not wholly improbable in the excited state
of public feeling at that time, if the city should
be taken, Lee, ignorant that Hooker was following him up,
continued his aggressive advance. Early took prompt measures to seize
(28:12):
the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. If successful, he
intended to cross over and amuse himself by destroying all
direct connection between Philadelphia and the West by railroad and telegraph.
This done, he proposed to march along the north side
of the river, capture Harrisburg, and rejoin Yule at Carlisle.
(28:36):
As Gordon's brigade approached the bridge, after driving away some militia,
they founded in flames. The Union commander at Columbia, Colonel Frick,
having given orders for its destruction, early, gained some compensation
for his failure in this respect by levying a contribution
on York of one hundred thousand dollars in cash, two
(28:59):
hundred barrels of thirty thousand bushels of corn, one thousand
pairs of shoes, et cetera. The Union army still remained
in Frederick, with the left wing three Corps under Reynolds
thrown out toward the enemy, the eleventh Corps under Howard
at Boonsborough, the First Corps under my command at Middletown,
(29:23):
supported by the third Corps under Bernie, two or three
miles in rear, with Buford's division of Cavalry holding the
passes of South Mountain, the remainder of the cavalry being
at Frederick. Hooker thought it useless to keep a garrison
of ten thousand men in a passive attitude at Harper's Ferry.
I think he was quite right, for the war would
(29:45):
not be decided by the possession of military points or
even of cities, for hostilities would never cease until one
army or the other was destroyed. He therefore appealed to
Washington for permission to add this force to that of Slocombe,
in order that the two might act directly against Lee's
communications by following up the rear while preserving their own
(30:09):
line of retreat. Slocomb had been already ordered there for
this purpose, but Halleck would not consent that the garrison
of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn under any circumstances, and
positively refused Hooker's request. Hooker, then, considering himself thwarted in
all his plans by the authorities at Washington, offered his resignation.
(30:31):
It was promptly accepted, and Major General George G. Meade,
then the commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to
the command of the Army of the Potomac. He was
a general of fine intellect, of great personal bravery, and
had had a good deal of experience in the war
in handling troops, but had never achieved any brilliant success
(30:52):
or met with any serious reverse. Upon ascertaining that the
enemy were at York and Carlisle, Hooker had determined to
throw out his different corps in a fan shape toward
the Susquehenna and advance in that direction, with three corps
on the left to defend that flank in case Longstreet
and Hill should turn east instead of keeping on toward
(31:15):
the north. At the same time, it was his intention
to have Slocombe follow up Lee's advance by keeping in
his rear, to capture his trains and couriers, and to
cut off his retreat should he be defeated. General Meade's
first order was for all the troops to concentrate in Frederick,
where he proposed to have a grand review. But at
(31:37):
the urgent remonstrance of General Butterfield, who had been Hooker's
chief of staff and who stated that this delay would
give Lee time to cross the Susquehenna and capture Harrisburg
and Philadelphia, Hooker's orders were allowed to stand. With some exceptions.
Mead appears to have approved all movements against Lee's line
(31:58):
of retreat, for he ordered slocom to rejoin the main
army and had the Hardihood to break up the post
at Harper's Ferry, in spite of the fact that Hooker
had just been relieved from command for requesting permission to
do this. The bulk of the garrison, under Major General
French was directed to take post as a reserve at
(32:20):
Frederick when our forces moved forward. The general idea of
our advance was to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia
if he went north, or between him and Baltimore and
Washington in case he turned back. The orders at night
were for Beauford's Division of Cavalry to take post on
the left flank in the direction of Fairfield, Gregg's Division
(32:43):
on the right flank at Westminster, and Kilpatrick's Division in
advance of the center at Littlestown. The different corps to
be posted between New Windsor and Emmitsburg. Yule's corps, as stated,
were at Carlisle and York. Lee and Longstreets at Chambersburg
and Hillscoreps at Fayetteville. Lee was startled to learn from
(33:06):
a countryman who came in on the twenty eighth that
Hooker was at Frederick and not south of the Potomac
as he had supposed. He saw at once that his
communications with Richmond, about which he was so solicitous, were
greatly endangered, For the Union Army could be formed to
interpose between him and Williamsport and still keep a safe
(33:29):
line of retreat open to Washington. This might not be
so great a misfortune to the enemy as regards food
and forage, for he could probably live on the country
for some time by making predatory excursions in different directions,
But when it came to obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition,
the matter would become very serious. An army only carries
(33:51):
a limited amount of this into the field, and must
rely upon frequent convoys to keep up the supply, which
is constantly decreased from the partial engagements and skirmishes so
prevalent in a hostile country. The wisdom of Hooker's policy
in desiring to assail the rebel communications is demonstrated by
(34:13):
the fact that Lee immediately turned back the head of
the serpent faced about as soon as its tail was
trodden upon. He came to the conclusion to prevent an
attack against his rear by threatening Baltimore with his whole force.
This would necessarily cause the Union army to march further
east to confront him and thus prevent it from operating
(34:35):
in heavy force in the Cumberland Valley. Accordingly, on the
night of the twenty eighth, Lee sent expresses to all
his core commanders to concentrate at Gettysburg. If he had
known that Meade was about to withdraw all the troops
acting against his line of retreat, he would probably have
gone on and taken Harrisburg. As the new commander of
(34:57):
the Union Army was a favorite of General Halleck, no
notice was taken of his disregard of instructions in detaching
the garrison of Harper's Ferry. General Couch, who had commanded
the Department of the Susquehanna, was also placed under his orders,
a favor which had been denied to Hooker. The troubles
of the latter were never quite over, for on his
(35:19):
appearing in Washington to explain his actions, he was immediately
put under arrest for visiting the capital without his Hallock's permission,
a piece of petty persecution which might have been spared
under the circumstances. It was, however, a short and easy
method of settling all complaints that were inconvenient to answer.
(35:42):
End of Chapter
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