July 25, 2025 • 32 mins
Embark on a historical journey as Abner Doubleday, a Union officer in the Civil War, recounts his experiences from the frontlines. Beginning with the bombardment opened on Ft. Sumter in 1861, Doubledays memoirs unravel the tale of two pivotal campaigns - Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Delve into the strategic errors at Chancellorsville that led to a Union defeat and explore the leadership crisis that plagued the camp. After Chancellorsville, Doubleday covers the unexpected clash of the armies at Gettysburg. When he takes command following the death of his superior, he leads his outnumbered division with courage and resilience. Despite being replaced due to a mistaken report of his divisions defeat, Doubledays narrative doesnt falter. Instead, he critiques the missed opportunities post-battle that could have ended the war. This book is not just a memoir, but Doubledays resolute response to the injustices he faced.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Part two, Chapter four of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. This LibriVox
recording is in the public domain and is read by
Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by
Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter four, Part B The first
(00:21):
day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Wednesday, July first, eighteen
sixty three. After Hall's battery was driven back, no other
artillery occupied the ground for some time. Then General Wadsworth
borrowed Caliph's regular battery from the cavalry and posted it
in rear of the position Hall it occupied. When the
(00:44):
remainder of the division came up. Captain Reynolds Battery, l
of the First New York Artillery, has already stated, was
sent to assist Caliph in keeping down the fire of
two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west, But
when Yule's artillery also opened and the crossfire became too severe,
Caliph was withdrawn and Reynolds was severely wounded. The rebel
(01:07):
battery soon after ceased firing for the time being, and
at Wadsworth's request, Colonel Wainwright, chief of Artillery to the
First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds Battery under Lieutenant
Wilbur on Seminary Ridge south of the railroad cut, Stuart's
battery b fourth United States, being on a line north
(01:29):
of the cut. Cooper's battery was directed to meet Ewle's
attack from the north, and Stephen's fifth main battery was
retained behind the seminary in reserve. Barlow's division on the
right and Shimmel Fenix on the left formed somewhat hastily
against Yule, whose line of battle faced south. Barlow rested
(01:50):
his right on a wooded knoll constituting part of the
western bank of Rock Creek. As there was an open
country to the east. He considered that flanks secure, for
no enemy was in sight then, and if they came
from that direction there would be time to make fresh dispositions.
After the formation, there was an interval of a quarter
(02:11):
of a mile between their left and the first Corps,
which might have been avoided by placing the two divisions
further apart. This was a serious thing to me, for
the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy
from penetrating there lengthened and weakened my line and used
up my reserves. It seems to me that the Eleventh
(02:33):
Corps was too far out. It would have been better,
in my opinion, if the left had been echeloned in
rear of the right of the First Corps, and its
right had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone
foundations at the Almshouse. The enemy then could not have
turned the right without compromising the safety of the turning
(02:53):
column and endangering his communications, a movement he would hardly
like to make, is especially as he did not know
what troops might be coming up. Still, they had a
preponderating force, and as their whole army was concentrating on Gettysburg,
it was not possible to keep them back for any
great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps
(03:15):
were heavily reinforced. The position of our forces and those
of the enemy will be best understood by a reference
to the map on page one twenty five. About two
p m. After the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General
Howard Rode over, inspected and approved it. He also examined
(03:35):
my position and gave orders in case I was forced
to retreat to fall back to Cemetery Hill. I think
this was the first and only order I received from him.
During the day, Roe's division of five brigades was formed
across Seminary Ridge facing south, with Iverson on the right,
supported by Daniel and O'Neill in the center, and Doles
(03:58):
on the left. Ramsour being in reserve. Iversen was sent
to attack the first Corps on Seminary Ridge, and O'Neill
and Doles went forward about two forty five p m
to keep back the eleventh Corps. When the two latter
became fairly engaged in front, about three thirty p m.
Early came up with his whole division and struck the
(04:19):
Union right. This decided the battle in favor of the enemy.
Barlow had advanced with van Gils's brigade, had driven back
Yule's skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkinson's battery,
was preparing to hold the Carlisle Road. He was not
aware that Early was approaching and saw Doles's advance with pleasure,
(04:40):
for he felt confident he could swing his right around
and envelop Doles, left a maneuver which could hardly fail
to be successful. Shimmelfenek now threw forward van Emberg's brigade
to intervene between O'Neill and Doles and to strike the
right flank of the latter, but Doles avoided the blow
by a rapid chain front. This necessarily exposed his left
(05:03):
to Barlow, who could not take advantage of it as
he was unexpectedly a sail by Early's division on his
own right, which was enveloped and in great danger. His
men fought gallantly, and Gordon, who attacked them, says, made
stern resistance until the rebels were within fifty paces of them.
As Barlow was shot down and their right flank enveloped,
(05:27):
they were forced to retreat to the town. This isolated
von Emberg's brigade and Doll's claims to have captured the
greater portion of it. The retrograde movement of the eleventh
Corps necessarily exposed the right flank of the First to
attacks from O'Neill and Ramseur. Howard sent forward Custer's brigade
(05:48):
of Steinber's Division to cover the retreat of the eleventh Corps,
but its force was too small to be effective. Its
flanks were soon turned by Hayes and Hoax brigades of
Early's devs vision, and it was forced back with the
rest We will now go back to the First Corps
and describe what took place there while these events were transpiring.
(06:11):
When the wide interval between the First and Eleventh Corps
was brought to my notice by Colonel banquhead of my staff,
I detached Baxter's brigade of Robinson's Division to fill it.
This brigade moved promptly and took post on Cutler's right,
But before it could form across the intervening space, O'Neill's
brigade assailed its right flank and subsequently its left, and
(06:34):
Baxter was forced to change front alternately to meet these attacks.
He repulsed O'Neill, but found his left flank again exposed
to an attack from Iversen, who was advancing in that direction.
He now went forward and took shelter behind a stone
fence on the Mummusburg Road, which protected his right flank,
while an angle in the fence which turned in a
(06:55):
southwesterly direction, covered his front. As is men lay down
behind the fence, Iverson's brigade came very close up, not
knowing our troops were there. Baxter's men sprang to their
feet and delivered a most deadly volley at very short range,
which left five hundred of Iverson's men dead and wounded,
(07:16):
and so demoralized them that all gave themselves up as prisoners.
One regiment, however, after stopping our firing by putting up
a white flag, slipped away and escaped. This destructive effort
was not caused by Baxter alone, for he was aided
by Cutler's brigade, which was thrown forward on Iverson's right
(07:36):
flank by the fire of our batteries and the distant
fire from Stones's brigade. So long as the latter held
his position, his line with that of Cutler and Robinson's
division constituted a demi bastion and curtain, and every force
that entered the angle suffered severely. Rhodes, in his report
(07:56):
speaks of it as a murderous enflade in reverse fire,
to which, in addition to the direct fire it encountered,
Daniel's brigade had been subject to from the time it
commenced its final advance. A note here General Robinson states
that these changes affront were made by his orders and
(08:17):
under his personal supervision. End of the note. While Iverson
was making his attack, Rhoades sent one of his reserve brigades,
the one just referred to that of Daniel against Stone.
This joined Davis's brigade of Hillscoreps, and the two charged
on Stone's three little regiments. Stone threw forward one of these,
(08:39):
the one forty ninth Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel Dwight, to
the railroad cut, where they were partially sheltered. Colonel Dana's regiment,
the one hundred forty third Pennsylvania, was posted on the
road in rear of Dwight and to the right. When
I saw this movement, I thought it a very bold one,
but its results were satisfactory. Two volleys and a bayonet
(09:01):
charged by Dwight drove Daniel back for the time being.
In this attack, Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and the
command of his brigade devolved upon Colonel Wister of the
one hundred fiftieth Pennsylvania. A note here Dwight was a
hard fighter and not averse to plain speaking. Once, when
(09:21):
Secretary of War Stanton had determined to grant no more
passes to go down to the army, Dwight applied for
permission for an old man to visit his dying son.
The request was refused, whereupon Dwight said, my name is
Dwight Walton Dwight, Lieutenant colonel of the one hundred forty
ninth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. You can dismiss me from
(09:45):
the service as soon as you like, but I am
going to tell you what I think of you. And
he expressed himself in terms far from complimentary, whereupon Stanton
rescinded the order and gave him the pass end of
the note. This attack should have been simultaneous with one
from the nearest troops of Hills Corps, but the latter
(10:07):
were lying down in a sheltered position, and Daniel urged
them in vain to go forward, not being able to
force his way in front. On account of Dwight's position
in the railroad cut, Daniel brought artillery to unfilate it
and threw the thirty second North Carolina across it. The
cut being no longer tenable, Dwight retreated to the road
(10:28):
and formed on Dana's left. Daniel had been originally ordered
to protect Iverson's right, but Iverson swung his right around
without notifying Daniel, and thus dislocated the line. Ramsoor now
came forward to aid Iverson, and I sent Paul's brigade
of Robinson's Division, which was preceded by Robinson in person,
(10:50):
to assist Baxter and if possible, to fill the interval
between the first and eleventh Corps, for I feared the
enemy would penetrate there and turn my right flank. When
Paul's brigade arrived, Baxter was out of ammunition, but proceeded
to refill his cartridge boxes from those of the dead
and wounded. General Howard has stated that the interval referred
(11:12):
to was filled by Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries of the
eleventh Corps, but a glance at the official map will
show that before Paul's advance, these batteries were several hundred
yards distant from the First Corps. Another attack was now
made from the north and west by both Daniels and
Davis's brigades. Colonel Wister faced his own regiment under Lieutenant
(11:36):
Colonel Hutcoper to the west and the other two regiments
to the north. The enemy was again repulsed by two
volleys and a gallant bayonet charge led by Hutecouoper, who
lost an arm in the fight. Colonel Wister, having been
shot through the face. The command devolved upon Colonel Dana,
another veteran of the Mexican War. There had been a
(11:59):
great lack of coordination in these assaults, for they were
independent movements, each repulsed in its turn. The last attack, however,
against Worcester, extended by Brockenborough's and Pettigrew's brigades to Morrow's
front in the woods, but Morrow held on firmly to
his position. I now sent my last reserve, the one
(12:19):
hundred fifty first Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel MacFarlane, to take
posts between Stones and Biddle's brigades. So far I had
done all that was possible to defend my front, but
circumstances were becoming desperate. My line was very thin and weak,
and my last reserve had been thrown in as we
(12:39):
had positive information that the entire rebel army was coming on.
It was evident enough that we could not contend any
longer unless some other corps came to our assistance. I
had previously sent an aid, Lieutenant Slagel, to ask General
Howard to reinforce me from Steinber's division, but he declined
to do so. I now sent my adjutant, General Halstead,
(13:03):
to reiterate the request or to obtain for me in
order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to
remain where I was in the face of the constantly
increasing forces which were approaching from the west. Howard insisted
that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the distance.
The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his error.
(13:26):
He still, however, refused to order me to retire, but
sent Halstead off to find Buford's cavalry and order it
to report to me. The First Corps had suffered severely
in these encounters, but by this additional delay and the
overwhelming odds against us, it was almost totally sacrificed. General
(13:47):
Wadsworth reported half of his men were killed or wounded,
and Rally's division suffered in the same proportion. Hardly a
field officer remained unhurt. After five color bearers of the
twenty fourth mess Michigan Volunteers had fallen, Colonel Morrow took
the flag in his own hands, but was immediately prostrated.
(14:07):
A private then seized it, and, although mortally wounded, still
held it firmly in his grasp. Similar instances occurred all
along the line. General Robinson had two horses shot under him.
He reported the loss of sixteen hundred sixty seven out
of twenty five hundred. Buford was in a distant part
(14:28):
of the field, with Devon's brigade covering the retreat of
the eleventh Corps, and already had all he could attend to.
He expressed himself in unequivocal terms at the idea that
he could keep back Hill's entire corps with Gamble's cavalry
brigade alone. As Howard seemed to have little or no
confidence in his troops on Cemetery Hill, he was perhaps
(14:51):
justified in retaining them in line there for the moral
effect they would produce. About the time the eleventh Corps
gave way on the right, the Confederate horses made their
final advance in double lines, backed by strong reserves, and
it was impossible for the few men left in the
first Corps to keep them back, especially as Pender's large
division overlapped our left for a quarter of a mile.
(15:14):
Robinson's right was turned and General Paul was shot through
both eyes in the effort to stem the tide. They
could not contend against Ramseur in front and O'Neill on
the flank at the same time. Under these circumstances, it
became a pretty serious question how to extricate the First
Corps and save its artillery before it was entirely surrounded
(15:35):
and captured. Biddle, Morl and Dana were all forced back
from the ridge they had defended so long, which bordered
Willoughby's Run. Each brigade was flanked, and Stone's men under
Dana were assailed in front and on both flanks. Yet
even then Daniel speaks of the severe fighting which took
place before he could win the position. What was left
(15:58):
of the First Corps after all this slaughter rallied on
Seminary Ridge. Many of the men entered a semicircular rail
entrenchment which I had caused to be thrown up early
in the day, and held that for a time by
lying down and firing over the pile of rails. The
enemy were now closing in on us from the south
west and north, and still no orders came to retreat.
(16:21):
Beauford arrived about this time, and, perceiving that Parn's brigade
in swinging around to envelop our, left exposed its right flank.
I directed him to charge. He reconnoitered the position they held,
but did not carry out the order. I do not
know why it was said afterward he found the fences
to be an impediment, but he rendered essential service by
(16:44):
dismounting his men and throwing them into a grove south
of the Fairfield Road, where they opened a severe fire
which checked the rebel advance and prevented them from cutting
us off from our direct line of retreat to Cemetery Hill.
The first lawn on line that came on us from
the west was swept away by our artillery, which fired
(17:05):
with very destructive effect, taking the rebel line on ESharp.
Although the Confederates advanced in such force, our men still
made strong resistance around the seminary, and, by the aid
of our artillery, which was most effective, beat back and
almost destroyed the first line of Scale's brigade, wounding both
(17:25):
Scales and Pender. The former states that he arrived within
seventy five feet of the guns, and adds here the
fire was most severe. Every field officer but one was
killed or wounded. The brigade halted in some confusion to
return the fire. My adjutant Generals bared In, Halstead and
(17:46):
my aides Lee Martin, Slagel, Jones and Lambdon had hot
work carrying orders at this time. It is a marvel
that any of them survived the storm of bullets that
swept the field. Robinson was forced back toward the seminary,
but halted notwithstanding the pressure upon him, and formed line
(18:07):
to save Stuart's battery north of the railroad cut, which
had remained too long and was in danger of being captured.
Cutler's brigade, in the meantime, had formed behind the railroad
grading to face the men who were pursuing the eleventh Corps.
This show of force had a happy effect, for it
caused the enemy in that direction to halt and throw
(18:27):
out a skirmish line, and the delay enabled the artillery
soon after to pass through the interval between Cutler on
the north and Beauford's cavalry on the south. As the
enemy were closing in upon us and crashes of musketry
came from my right and left, I had little hope
of saving my guns, but I threw my headquarters guard,
(18:49):
under Captain Glen of the one forty ninth Pennsylvania, into
the seminary and kept the right of Scale's brigade back
twenty minutes longer, while their left was held by Baxter's
brige gate of Robinson's Division, enabling the few remaining troops,
ambulances and artillery to retreat in comparative safety. It became necessary, however,
(19:10):
to abandon one gun of Captain Reynolds's battery, as several
of the horses were shot and there was no time
to disengage them from the peace. Three broken and damaged
Caissan bodies were also left behind. The danger at this
time came principally from Hoax and Hays brigades, which were
making their way into the town on the eastern side,
(19:32):
threatening to cut us off from Cemetery Hill. The troops
in front of the seminary were stayed by the firm
attitude of Buford's cavalry and made abandon their line, apparently
with a view to form square. I waited until the
artillery had gone, and then rode back to the town
with my staff. As we passed through the streets, pale
(19:53):
and frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food,
and implored us not to abandon them. Colonel Livingstone of
my staff, who had been sent on a message, came
back to the seminary, not knowing that we had left.
He says the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously,
evidently under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for
(20:16):
them there. They were also forming against cavalry on the way.
I must have met an aid that Howard says he
sent to me with orders to retreat, but I do
not remember receiving any message of the kind. I observed
that Howard, in his account of the battle, claims to
have handled the first and eleventh Corps from eleven a
(20:36):
m until four p m. But at eleven a m.
His corps was away back on the road and did
not arrive until about one p m. The map previously
given on page one twenty five demonstrates that we were
a mere advance guard of the army, and shows the
impossibility of our defending Gettysburg for any length of time.
(20:57):
The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed.
There were but few left, but they showed the true
spirit of soldiers. They walked leisurely from the seminary to
the town and did not run. I remember seeing Hall's
battery and the sixth Wisconsin Regiment halt from time to
time to face the enemy and fire down the streets.
(21:20):
Both Doles and Ramsay claimed to have had sharp encounters there.
Many of the eleventh Corps and part of Robinson's Division,
which had been far out, were captured in the attempt
to reach Steinweer's division on Cemetery Hill, which was the
rallying point. When I arrived there, I found General Howard
surrounded by his staff awaiting us at the main gate
(21:42):
of the cemetery. He made arrangements to hold the road
which led up from the town and which diverged to
Baltimore and Teeneytown by directing me to post the first
Corps on the left in the cemetery while he assembled
the eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after, he rode
over to asked me in case his own men Steinweer's
(22:03):
division deserted their guns to be in readiness to defend them.
General Schertz, about this time was busily engaging in rallying
his men and did all that was possible to encourage
them to form line again. I understood they were told
that Siegel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction
thought justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that
(22:27):
the discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in
a measure injured their morale and esprit de corps, for
they were rallied with great difficulty. Around three thirty p m.
General Hancock arrived with orders from General Meade to supersede Howard.
Congress had passed a law authorizing the President to put
(22:48):
any general over any other superior to rank, if, in
his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and
General Meade now assumed this power in the name of
the President. Owing to the false dispatch Howard had sent
early in the day, Meade must have been under the
impression that the first corps had fled without fighting. More
(23:08):
than half of them, however, lay dead and wounded on
the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped. Hancock,
being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit to
his authority, and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff,
who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in
(23:29):
a subsequent account of the battle that he merely regarded
General Hancock as a staff officer acting for General Meade.
He says, General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank
and cordial manner and used these words, General Meade has
sent me to represent him on the field. I replied,
(23:49):
all right, Hancock, this is no time for talking. You
take the left of the pike and I will arrange
these troops to the right. I noticed that he sent
Wadsworth's division without concern me to the right of the
eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill, but as it was just
the thing to do, I made no objection. He adds
(24:10):
that Hancock did not really relieve him until seven p m. Hancock, however,
denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as
a staff officer. He says he assumed absolute command at
three thirty p m. I know he rode over to
me and told me he was in command of the
field and directed me to send a regiment to the right,
(24:32):
and I sent Wadsworth's division there as my regiments were
reduced to the size of companies. Hancock was much pleased
with the ridge we were on as a defensive position,
and considered it admirably adapted for a battlefield. Its gentle
slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders to
shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on either flank,
(24:57):
where far reaching batteries could be posted. Advantages. It covered
the principal roads to Washington and Baltimore, and its convex shape,
enabling troops to reinforce with celerity any point of the
line from the center or by moving along the court
of this arc, was probably the cause of our final success.
(25:17):
The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of battle,
was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support
any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly,
nor could the different corps co operate promptly with each other.
It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate his
(25:38):
army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of
Congress for selecting the position. He doubtless did see its
advantages and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took
measures to hold it as a battleground for the army,
while Howard merely used the cemetery as a rallying point
for his defeated troops. Hankock Jock occupied all the prominent
(26:01):
points and disposed the little cavalry and infantry he had
in such a way as to impress the enemy with
the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying
Coulp's Hill on the right with Wadsworth's brigade and posting
the cavalry on the left to take up a good
deal of space, he made a show of strength not
(26:22):
warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ywell had received
some stunning blows during the day and were disposed to
be cautious. They therefore did not press forward and take
the heights, as they could easily have done at this time,
but not so readily after an hour's delay, for then
Sickle's Corps from Emmittsburg and Slocum's Corps from two taverns
(26:44):
began to approach the position. The two rebel divisions of
Anderson and Johnson, however, arrived about dusk, which would have
still given the enemy a great numerical superiority. General Lee
reached the field before before Hancock came, and watched the
retreat of the First and eleventh Corps and Hancock's movements
(27:05):
and dispositions through his field glass. He was not deceived
by this show of force, and sent a recommendation, not
an order, to Eule, to follow us up. But Eule,
in the exercise of his discretion as a Corps commander,
did not do so. He had lost three thousand men,
and both he and Hill were under orders not to
(27:27):
bring on a general engagement. In fact, they had had
all the fighting they desired for the time being. Colonel
Campbell Brown of Yule's staff states that the latter was
preparing to move forward against the Height when a false
report induced him to send Gordon's brigade to reinforce Smith's
brigade on his extreme left to meet a supposed Union
(27:49):
advance in that direction. The absence of these two brigades
decided him to wait for the arrival of Johnson's division
before taking further action. When the latter came up, Slocum
and Sickles were on the ground, and the opportunity for
a successful attack had passed. In sending Hancock forward with
(28:10):
such ample powers, Meade virtually appointed him commander in chief
for the time being, for he was authorized to say
where we would fight and when and how in the
present instance. In accordance with his recommendation, orders were immediately
sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery Ridge.
(28:30):
Two thirds of the third Corps and all of the
twelfth came up, and by six o'clock the position became
tolerably secure. Stannard's second Vermont Brigade also arrived, and, as
they formed part of my command, reported to me for
duty a very welcome reinforcement to my shattered division. Sickles
(28:50):
had taken the responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing
that we were hard pressed. His command prolonged the line
of the first Corps to the left. Slocum's Corps. The
twelfth was posted as a reserve, also on the left.
Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to slocumbe
and rode back to Taneytown to confer with Mead and
(29:13):
explain his reasons for choosing the battlefield. Longstreet's corpse soon
arrived and joined Yule and Hill, so that the whole
rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning,
with the exception of Pickett's Division. At the close of
the day, General John Newton rode up and took charge
of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and
(29:35):
I resumed the command of my division. Several incidents occurred
during the severe struggle of the first day which are
worthy of record. Colonel Wheelock of the ninety seventh New
York was cut off during the retreat of Robinson's division
and took refuge in a house. A rebel lieutenant entered
and called upon him to surrender his sword. This he
(29:57):
declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several of
his men, formed them in line, took out his watch,
and said to the colonel, you are an old, gray
headed man, and I dislike to kill you, but if
you don't give up that sword in five minutes, I
shall order these men to blow your brains out. When
(30:18):
the time was up, the colonel still refused to surrender.
A sudden tumult at the door, caused by some prisoners
attempting to escape, called the lieutenant off for a moment.
When he returned, the colonel had given his sword to
a girl in the house who had asked him for it,
and she secreted it between two mattresses. He was then
(30:38):
marched to the rear, but, being negligently guarded, escaped the
same night and returned to his regiment. Another occurrence recalls
Browning's celebrated poem of an incident at Ratisbon. An officer
of the sixth Wisconsin approached Lieutenant Colonel Dawes, the commander
of the regiment after the sharp fight in the railroad.
(31:01):
The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect attitude of
the man, that he came to report for orders of
some kind, but the compressed lips told a different story.
With a great effort, the officer said, tell them at home,
I died like a man and a soldier. He threw
open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound, and dropped dead
(31:23):
at the colonel's feet. Another incident was related to me
at the time, but owing to our hurried movements and
the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never had an
opportunity to verify it. It was said that during the
retreat of the artillery, one piece of Stuart's battery did
not limber up as soon as the others. A rebel
(31:44):
officer rushed forward, placed his hand upon it, and, presenting
a pistol at the back of the driver, directed him
not to drive off with the piece. The latter did so, however,
received the ball in his body, caught up with the battery,
and then fell dead. We lay on our arms that
night among the tombs at the cemetery, so suggestive of
(32:05):
the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame. But
the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these,
and were too much exhausted to think of anything but
much needed rest. End of chapter
Part two, Chapter four of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. This LibriVox
recording is in the public domain and is read by
Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by
Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter four, Part B The first
(00:21):
day of the Battle of Gettysburg, Wednesday, July first, eighteen
sixty three. After Hall's battery was driven back, no other
artillery occupied the ground for some time. Then General Wadsworth
borrowed Caliph's regular battery from the cavalry and posted it
in rear of the position Hall it occupied. When the
(00:44):
remainder of the division came up. Captain Reynolds Battery, l
of the First New York Artillery, has already stated, was
sent to assist Caliph in keeping down the fire of
two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west, But
when Yule's artillery also opened and the crossfire became too severe,
Caliph was withdrawn and Reynolds was severely wounded. The rebel
(01:07):
battery soon after ceased firing for the time being, and
at Wadsworth's request, Colonel Wainwright, chief of Artillery to the
First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds Battery under Lieutenant
Wilbur on Seminary Ridge south of the railroad cut, Stuart's
battery b fourth United States, being on a line north
(01:29):
of the cut. Cooper's battery was directed to meet Ewle's
attack from the north, and Stephen's fifth main battery was
retained behind the seminary in reserve. Barlow's division on the
right and Shimmel Fenix on the left formed somewhat hastily
against Yule, whose line of battle faced south. Barlow rested
(01:50):
his right on a wooded knoll constituting part of the
western bank of Rock Creek. As there was an open
country to the east. He considered that flanks secure, for
no enemy was in sight then, and if they came
from that direction there would be time to make fresh dispositions.
After the formation, there was an interval of a quarter
(02:11):
of a mile between their left and the first Corps,
which might have been avoided by placing the two divisions
further apart. This was a serious thing to me, for
the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy
from penetrating there lengthened and weakened my line and used
up my reserves. It seems to me that the Eleventh
(02:33):
Corps was too far out. It would have been better,
in my opinion, if the left had been echeloned in
rear of the right of the First Corps, and its
right had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone
foundations at the Almshouse. The enemy then could not have
turned the right without compromising the safety of the turning
(02:53):
column and endangering his communications, a movement he would hardly
like to make, is especially as he did not know
what troops might be coming up. Still, they had a
preponderating force, and as their whole army was concentrating on Gettysburg,
it was not possible to keep them back for any
great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps
(03:15):
were heavily reinforced. The position of our forces and those
of the enemy will be best understood by a reference
to the map on page one twenty five. About two
p m. After the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General
Howard Rode over, inspected and approved it. He also examined
(03:35):
my position and gave orders in case I was forced
to retreat to fall back to Cemetery Hill. I think
this was the first and only order I received from him.
During the day, Roe's division of five brigades was formed
across Seminary Ridge facing south, with Iverson on the right,
supported by Daniel and O'Neill in the center, and Doles
(03:58):
on the left. Ramsour being in reserve. Iversen was sent
to attack the first Corps on Seminary Ridge, and O'Neill
and Doles went forward about two forty five p m
to keep back the eleventh Corps. When the two latter
became fairly engaged in front, about three thirty p m.
Early came up with his whole division and struck the
(04:19):
Union right. This decided the battle in favor of the enemy.
Barlow had advanced with van Gils's brigade, had driven back
Yule's skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkinson's battery,
was preparing to hold the Carlisle Road. He was not
aware that Early was approaching and saw Doles's advance with pleasure,
(04:40):
for he felt confident he could swing his right around
and envelop Doles, left a maneuver which could hardly fail
to be successful. Shimmelfenek now threw forward van Emberg's brigade
to intervene between O'Neill and Doles and to strike the
right flank of the latter, but Doles avoided the blow
by a rapid chain front. This necessarily exposed his left
(05:03):
to Barlow, who could not take advantage of it as
he was unexpectedly a sail by Early's division on his
own right, which was enveloped and in great danger. His
men fought gallantly, and Gordon, who attacked them, says, made
stern resistance until the rebels were within fifty paces of them.
As Barlow was shot down and their right flank enveloped,
(05:27):
they were forced to retreat to the town. This isolated
von Emberg's brigade and Doll's claims to have captured the
greater portion of it. The retrograde movement of the eleventh
Corps necessarily exposed the right flank of the First to
attacks from O'Neill and Ramseur. Howard sent forward Custer's brigade
(05:48):
of Steinber's Division to cover the retreat of the eleventh Corps,
but its force was too small to be effective. Its
flanks were soon turned by Hayes and Hoax brigades of
Early's devs vision, and it was forced back with the
rest We will now go back to the First Corps
and describe what took place there while these events were transpiring.
(06:11):
When the wide interval between the First and Eleventh Corps
was brought to my notice by Colonel banquhead of my staff,
I detached Baxter's brigade of Robinson's Division to fill it.
This brigade moved promptly and took post on Cutler's right,
But before it could form across the intervening space, O'Neill's
brigade assailed its right flank and subsequently its left, and
(06:34):
Baxter was forced to change front alternately to meet these attacks.
He repulsed O'Neill, but found his left flank again exposed
to an attack from Iversen, who was advancing in that direction.
He now went forward and took shelter behind a stone
fence on the Mummusburg Road, which protected his right flank,
while an angle in the fence which turned in a
(06:55):
southwesterly direction, covered his front. As is men lay down
behind the fence, Iverson's brigade came very close up, not
knowing our troops were there. Baxter's men sprang to their
feet and delivered a most deadly volley at very short range,
which left five hundred of Iverson's men dead and wounded,
(07:16):
and so demoralized them that all gave themselves up as prisoners.
One regiment, however, after stopping our firing by putting up
a white flag, slipped away and escaped. This destructive effort
was not caused by Baxter alone, for he was aided
by Cutler's brigade, which was thrown forward on Iverson's right
(07:36):
flank by the fire of our batteries and the distant
fire from Stones's brigade. So long as the latter held
his position, his line with that of Cutler and Robinson's
division constituted a demi bastion and curtain, and every force
that entered the angle suffered severely. Rhodes, in his report
(07:56):
speaks of it as a murderous enflade in reverse fire,
to which, in addition to the direct fire it encountered,
Daniel's brigade had been subject to from the time it
commenced its final advance. A note here General Robinson states
that these changes affront were made by his orders and
(08:17):
under his personal supervision. End of the note. While Iverson
was making his attack, Rhoades sent one of his reserve brigades,
the one just referred to that of Daniel against Stone.
This joined Davis's brigade of Hillscoreps, and the two charged
on Stone's three little regiments. Stone threw forward one of these,
(08:39):
the one forty ninth Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel Dwight, to
the railroad cut, where they were partially sheltered. Colonel Dana's regiment,
the one hundred forty third Pennsylvania, was posted on the
road in rear of Dwight and to the right. When
I saw this movement, I thought it a very bold one,
but its results were satisfactory. Two volleys and a bayonet
(09:01):
charged by Dwight drove Daniel back for the time being.
In this attack, Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and the
command of his brigade devolved upon Colonel Wister of the
one hundred fiftieth Pennsylvania. A note here Dwight was a
hard fighter and not averse to plain speaking. Once, when
(09:21):
Secretary of War Stanton had determined to grant no more
passes to go down to the army, Dwight applied for
permission for an old man to visit his dying son.
The request was refused, whereupon Dwight said, my name is
Dwight Walton Dwight, Lieutenant colonel of the one hundred forty
ninth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. You can dismiss me from
(09:45):
the service as soon as you like, but I am
going to tell you what I think of you. And
he expressed himself in terms far from complimentary, whereupon Stanton
rescinded the order and gave him the pass end of
the note. This attack should have been simultaneous with one
from the nearest troops of Hills Corps, but the latter
(10:07):
were lying down in a sheltered position, and Daniel urged
them in vain to go forward, not being able to
force his way in front. On account of Dwight's position
in the railroad cut, Daniel brought artillery to unfilate it
and threw the thirty second North Carolina across it. The
cut being no longer tenable, Dwight retreated to the road
(10:28):
and formed on Dana's left. Daniel had been originally ordered
to protect Iverson's right, but Iverson swung his right around
without notifying Daniel, and thus dislocated the line. Ramsoor now
came forward to aid Iverson, and I sent Paul's brigade
of Robinson's Division, which was preceded by Robinson in person,
(10:50):
to assist Baxter and if possible, to fill the interval
between the first and eleventh Corps, for I feared the
enemy would penetrate there and turn my right flank. When
Paul's brigade arrived, Baxter was out of ammunition, but proceeded
to refill his cartridge boxes from those of the dead
and wounded. General Howard has stated that the interval referred
(11:12):
to was filled by Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries of the
eleventh Corps, but a glance at the official map will
show that before Paul's advance, these batteries were several hundred
yards distant from the First Corps. Another attack was now
made from the north and west by both Daniels and
Davis's brigades. Colonel Wister faced his own regiment under Lieutenant
(11:36):
Colonel Hutcoper to the west and the other two regiments
to the north. The enemy was again repulsed by two
volleys and a gallant bayonet charge led by Hutecouoper, who
lost an arm in the fight. Colonel Wister, having been
shot through the face. The command devolved upon Colonel Dana,
another veteran of the Mexican War. There had been a
(11:59):
great lack of coordination in these assaults, for they were
independent movements, each repulsed in its turn. The last attack, however,
against Worcester, extended by Brockenborough's and Pettigrew's brigades to Morrow's
front in the woods, but Morrow held on firmly to
his position. I now sent my last reserve, the one
(12:19):
hundred fifty first Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant Colonel MacFarlane, to take
posts between Stones and Biddle's brigades. So far I had
done all that was possible to defend my front, but
circumstances were becoming desperate. My line was very thin and weak,
and my last reserve had been thrown in as we
(12:39):
had positive information that the entire rebel army was coming on.
It was evident enough that we could not contend any
longer unless some other corps came to our assistance. I
had previously sent an aid, Lieutenant Slagel, to ask General
Howard to reinforce me from Steinber's division, but he declined
to do so. I now sent my adjutant, General Halstead,
(13:03):
to reiterate the request or to obtain for me in
order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to
remain where I was in the face of the constantly
increasing forces which were approaching from the west. Howard insisted
that Halstead mistook rail fences for troops in the distance.
The lorgnettes of his staff finally convinced him of his error.
(13:26):
He still, however, refused to order me to retire, but
sent Halstead off to find Buford's cavalry and order it
to report to me. The First Corps had suffered severely
in these encounters, but by this additional delay and the
overwhelming odds against us, it was almost totally sacrificed. General
(13:47):
Wadsworth reported half of his men were killed or wounded,
and Rally's division suffered in the same proportion. Hardly a
field officer remained unhurt. After five color bearers of the
twenty fourth mess Michigan Volunteers had fallen, Colonel Morrow took
the flag in his own hands, but was immediately prostrated.
(14:07):
A private then seized it, and, although mortally wounded, still
held it firmly in his grasp. Similar instances occurred all
along the line. General Robinson had two horses shot under him.
He reported the loss of sixteen hundred sixty seven out
of twenty five hundred. Buford was in a distant part
(14:28):
of the field, with Devon's brigade covering the retreat of
the eleventh Corps, and already had all he could attend to.
He expressed himself in unequivocal terms at the idea that
he could keep back Hill's entire corps with Gamble's cavalry
brigade alone. As Howard seemed to have little or no
confidence in his troops on Cemetery Hill, he was perhaps
(14:51):
justified in retaining them in line there for the moral
effect they would produce. About the time the eleventh Corps
gave way on the right, the Confederate horses made their
final advance in double lines, backed by strong reserves, and
it was impossible for the few men left in the
first Corps to keep them back, especially as Pender's large
division overlapped our left for a quarter of a mile.
(15:14):
Robinson's right was turned and General Paul was shot through
both eyes in the effort to stem the tide. They
could not contend against Ramseur in front and O'Neill on
the flank at the same time. Under these circumstances, it
became a pretty serious question how to extricate the First
Corps and save its artillery before it was entirely surrounded
(15:35):
and captured. Biddle, Morl and Dana were all forced back
from the ridge they had defended so long, which bordered
Willoughby's Run. Each brigade was flanked, and Stone's men under
Dana were assailed in front and on both flanks. Yet
even then Daniel speaks of the severe fighting which took
place before he could win the position. What was left
(15:58):
of the First Corps after all this slaughter rallied on
Seminary Ridge. Many of the men entered a semicircular rail
entrenchment which I had caused to be thrown up early
in the day, and held that for a time by
lying down and firing over the pile of rails. The
enemy were now closing in on us from the south
west and north, and still no orders came to retreat.
(16:21):
Beauford arrived about this time, and, perceiving that Parn's brigade
in swinging around to envelop our, left exposed its right flank.
I directed him to charge. He reconnoitered the position they held,
but did not carry out the order. I do not
know why it was said afterward he found the fences
to be an impediment, but he rendered essential service by
(16:44):
dismounting his men and throwing them into a grove south
of the Fairfield Road, where they opened a severe fire
which checked the rebel advance and prevented them from cutting
us off from our direct line of retreat to Cemetery Hill.
The first lawn on line that came on us from
the west was swept away by our artillery, which fired
(17:05):
with very destructive effect, taking the rebel line on ESharp.
Although the Confederates advanced in such force, our men still
made strong resistance around the seminary, and, by the aid
of our artillery, which was most effective, beat back and
almost destroyed the first line of Scale's brigade, wounding both
(17:25):
Scales and Pender. The former states that he arrived within
seventy five feet of the guns, and adds here the
fire was most severe. Every field officer but one was
killed or wounded. The brigade halted in some confusion to
return the fire. My adjutant Generals bared In, Halstead and
(17:46):
my aides Lee Martin, Slagel, Jones and Lambdon had hot
work carrying orders at this time. It is a marvel
that any of them survived the storm of bullets that
swept the field. Robinson was forced back toward the seminary,
but halted notwithstanding the pressure upon him, and formed line
(18:07):
to save Stuart's battery north of the railroad cut, which
had remained too long and was in danger of being captured.
Cutler's brigade, in the meantime, had formed behind the railroad
grading to face the men who were pursuing the eleventh Corps.
This show of force had a happy effect, for it
caused the enemy in that direction to halt and throw
(18:27):
out a skirmish line, and the delay enabled the artillery
soon after to pass through the interval between Cutler on
the north and Beauford's cavalry on the south. As the
enemy were closing in upon us and crashes of musketry
came from my right and left, I had little hope
of saving my guns, but I threw my headquarters guard,
(18:49):
under Captain Glen of the one forty ninth Pennsylvania, into
the seminary and kept the right of Scale's brigade back
twenty minutes longer, while their left was held by Baxter's
brige gate of Robinson's Division, enabling the few remaining troops,
ambulances and artillery to retreat in comparative safety. It became necessary, however,
(19:10):
to abandon one gun of Captain Reynolds's battery, as several
of the horses were shot and there was no time
to disengage them from the peace. Three broken and damaged
Caissan bodies were also left behind. The danger at this
time came principally from Hoax and Hays brigades, which were
making their way into the town on the eastern side,
(19:32):
threatening to cut us off from Cemetery Hill. The troops
in front of the seminary were stayed by the firm
attitude of Buford's cavalry and made abandon their line, apparently
with a view to form square. I waited until the
artillery had gone, and then rode back to the town
with my staff. As we passed through the streets, pale
(19:53):
and frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food,
and implored us not to abandon them. Colonel Livingstone of
my staff, who had been sent on a message, came
back to the seminary, not knowing that we had left.
He says the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously,
evidently under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for
(20:16):
them there. They were also forming against cavalry on the way.
I must have met an aid that Howard says he
sent to me with orders to retreat, but I do
not remember receiving any message of the kind. I observed
that Howard, in his account of the battle, claims to
have handled the first and eleventh Corps from eleven a
(20:36):
m until four p m. But at eleven a m.
His corps was away back on the road and did
not arrive until about one p m. The map previously
given on page one twenty five demonstrates that we were
a mere advance guard of the army, and shows the
impossibility of our defending Gettysburg for any length of time.
(20:57):
The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed.
There were but few left, but they showed the true
spirit of soldiers. They walked leisurely from the seminary to
the town and did not run. I remember seeing Hall's
battery and the sixth Wisconsin Regiment halt from time to
time to face the enemy and fire down the streets.
(21:20):
Both Doles and Ramsay claimed to have had sharp encounters there.
Many of the eleventh Corps and part of Robinson's Division,
which had been far out, were captured in the attempt
to reach Steinweer's division on Cemetery Hill, which was the
rallying point. When I arrived there, I found General Howard
surrounded by his staff awaiting us at the main gate
(21:42):
of the cemetery. He made arrangements to hold the road
which led up from the town and which diverged to
Baltimore and Teeneytown by directing me to post the first
Corps on the left in the cemetery while he assembled
the eleventh Corps on the right. Soon after, he rode
over to asked me in case his own men Steinweer's
(22:03):
division deserted their guns to be in readiness to defend them.
General Schertz, about this time was busily engaging in rallying
his men and did all that was possible to encourage
them to form line again. I understood they were told
that Siegel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction
thought justifiable under the circumstances. It seemed to me that
(22:27):
the discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in
a measure injured their morale and esprit de corps, for
they were rallied with great difficulty. Around three thirty p m.
General Hancock arrived with orders from General Meade to supersede Howard.
Congress had passed a law authorizing the President to put
(22:48):
any general over any other superior to rank, if, in
his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and
General Meade now assumed this power in the name of
the President. Owing to the false dispatch Howard had sent
early in the day, Meade must have been under the
impression that the first corps had fled without fighting. More
(23:08):
than half of them, however, lay dead and wounded on
the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped. Hancock,
being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit to
his authority, and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff,
who was present, refused to do so. Howard stated in
(23:29):
a subsequent account of the battle that he merely regarded
General Hancock as a staff officer acting for General Meade.
He says, General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank
and cordial manner and used these words, General Meade has
sent me to represent him on the field. I replied,
(23:49):
all right, Hancock, this is no time for talking. You
take the left of the pike and I will arrange
these troops to the right. I noticed that he sent
Wadsworth's division without concern me to the right of the
eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill, but as it was just
the thing to do, I made no objection. He adds
(24:10):
that Hancock did not really relieve him until seven p m. Hancock, however,
denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as
a staff officer. He says he assumed absolute command at
three thirty p m. I know he rode over to
me and told me he was in command of the
field and directed me to send a regiment to the right,
(24:32):
and I sent Wadsworth's division there as my regiments were
reduced to the size of companies. Hancock was much pleased
with the ridge we were on as a defensive position,
and considered it admirably adapted for a battlefield. Its gentle
slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders to
shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on either flank,
(24:57):
where far reaching batteries could be posted. Advantages. It covered
the principal roads to Washington and Baltimore, and its convex shape,
enabling troops to reinforce with celerity any point of the
line from the center or by moving along the court
of this arc, was probably the cause of our final success.
(25:17):
The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of battle,
was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support
any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly,
nor could the different corps co operate promptly with each other.
It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate his
(25:38):
army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of
Congress for selecting the position. He doubtless did see its
advantages and recommended it to Hancock. The latter immediately took
measures to hold it as a battleground for the army,
while Howard merely used the cemetery as a rallying point
for his defeated troops. Hankock Jock occupied all the prominent
(26:01):
points and disposed the little cavalry and infantry he had
in such a way as to impress the enemy with
the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up. By occupying
Coulp's Hill on the right with Wadsworth's brigade and posting
the cavalry on the left to take up a good
deal of space, he made a show of strength not
(26:22):
warranted by the facts. Both Hill and Ywell had received
some stunning blows during the day and were disposed to
be cautious. They therefore did not press forward and take
the heights, as they could easily have done at this time,
but not so readily after an hour's delay, for then
Sickle's Corps from Emmittsburg and Slocum's Corps from two taverns
(26:44):
began to approach the position. The two rebel divisions of
Anderson and Johnson, however, arrived about dusk, which would have
still given the enemy a great numerical superiority. General Lee
reached the field before before Hancock came, and watched the
retreat of the First and eleventh Corps and Hancock's movements
(27:05):
and dispositions through his field glass. He was not deceived
by this show of force, and sent a recommendation, not
an order, to Eule, to follow us up. But Eule,
in the exercise of his discretion as a Corps commander,
did not do so. He had lost three thousand men,
and both he and Hill were under orders not to
(27:27):
bring on a general engagement. In fact, they had had
all the fighting they desired for the time being. Colonel
Campbell Brown of Yule's staff states that the latter was
preparing to move forward against the Height when a false
report induced him to send Gordon's brigade to reinforce Smith's
brigade on his extreme left to meet a supposed Union
(27:49):
advance in that direction. The absence of these two brigades
decided him to wait for the arrival of Johnson's division
before taking further action. When the latter came up, Slocum
and Sickles were on the ground, and the opportunity for
a successful attack had passed. In sending Hancock forward with
(28:10):
such ample powers, Meade virtually appointed him commander in chief
for the time being, for he was authorized to say
where we would fight and when and how in the
present instance. In accordance with his recommendation, orders were immediately
sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery Ridge.
(28:30):
Two thirds of the third Corps and all of the
twelfth came up, and by six o'clock the position became
tolerably secure. Stannard's second Vermont Brigade also arrived, and, as
they formed part of my command, reported to me for
duty a very welcome reinforcement to my shattered division. Sickles
(28:50):
had taken the responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing
that we were hard pressed. His command prolonged the line
of the first Corps to the left. Slocum's Corps. The
twelfth was posted as a reserve, also on the left.
Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to slocumbe
and rode back to Taneytown to confer with Mead and
(29:13):
explain his reasons for choosing the battlefield. Longstreet's corpse soon
arrived and joined Yule and Hill, so that the whole
rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning,
with the exception of Pickett's Division. At the close of
the day, General John Newton rode up and took charge
of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and
(29:35):
I resumed the command of my division. Several incidents occurred
during the severe struggle of the first day which are
worthy of record. Colonel Wheelock of the ninety seventh New
York was cut off during the retreat of Robinson's division
and took refuge in a house. A rebel lieutenant entered
and called upon him to surrender his sword. This he
(29:57):
declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several of
his men, formed them in line, took out his watch,
and said to the colonel, you are an old, gray
headed man, and I dislike to kill you, but if
you don't give up that sword in five minutes, I
shall order these men to blow your brains out. When
(30:18):
the time was up, the colonel still refused to surrender.
A sudden tumult at the door, caused by some prisoners
attempting to escape, called the lieutenant off for a moment.
When he returned, the colonel had given his sword to
a girl in the house who had asked him for it,
and she secreted it between two mattresses. He was then
(30:38):
marched to the rear, but, being negligently guarded, escaped the
same night and returned to his regiment. Another occurrence recalls
Browning's celebrated poem of an incident at Ratisbon. An officer
of the sixth Wisconsin approached Lieutenant Colonel Dawes, the commander
of the regiment after the sharp fight in the railroad.
(31:01):
The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect attitude of
the man, that he came to report for orders of
some kind, but the compressed lips told a different story.
With a great effort, the officer said, tell them at home,
I died like a man and a soldier. He threw
open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound, and dropped dead
(31:23):
at the colonel's feet. Another incident was related to me
at the time, but owing to our hurried movements and
the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never had an
opportunity to verify it. It was said that during the
retreat of the artillery, one piece of Stuart's battery did
not limber up as soon as the others. A rebel
(31:44):
officer rushed forward, placed his hand upon it, and, presenting
a pistol at the back of the driver, directed him
not to drive off with the piece. The latter did so, however,
received the ball in his body, caught up with the battery,
and then fell dead. We lay on our arms that
night among the tombs at the cemetery, so suggestive of
(32:05):
the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame. But
the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these,
and were too much exhausted to think of anything but
much needed rest. End of chapter
Popular Podcasts
Las Culturistas with Matt Rogers and Bowen Yang
Ding dong! Join your culture consultants, Matt Rogers and Bowen Yang, on an unforgettable journey into the beating heart of CULTURE. Alongside sizzling special guests, they GET INTO the hottest pop-culture moments of the day and the formative cultural experiences that turned them into Culturistas. Produced by the Big Money Players Network and iHeartRadio.
Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.