July 25, 2025 • 26 mins
Embark on a historical journey as Abner Doubleday, a Union officer in the Civil War, recounts his experiences from the frontlines. Beginning with the bombardment opened on Ft. Sumter in 1861, Doubledays memoirs unravel the tale of two pivotal campaigns - Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Delve into the strategic errors at Chancellorsville that led to a Union defeat and explore the leadership crisis that plagued the camp. After Chancellorsville, Doubleday covers the unexpected clash of the armies at Gettysburg. When he takes command following the death of his superior, he leads his outnumbered division with courage and resilience. Despite being replaced due to a mistaken report of his divisions defeat, Doubledays narrative doesnt falter. Instead, he critiques the missed opportunities post-battle that could have ended the war. This book is not just a memoir, but Doubledays resolute response to the injustices he faced.
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
Part two, Chapter five, Section one bo Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.
This LibriVox recording is in the public domain and is
read by Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg by Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter five, Section one,
(00:23):
Battle of Gettysburg the second day. The ridge upon which
the Union forces were now assembling has already been partially
described in two places. It sunk away into intervening valleys,
one between Coulps Hill and Cemetery Hill. The other lay
for several hundred yards north of Little Roundtop, as the
(00:47):
lesser of the two eminences on the left was called
to distinguish it from the higher peak called Roundtop. At
one A. M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw
him soon after daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and
hollow eyed. Anxiety and want of sleep were evidently telling
upon him. At dawn he commenced forming his line by
(01:10):
concentrating his forces on the right, with a view to
descend into the plain and attack Lee's left and the
twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part
in the movement. It seems to me that this would
have been a very hazardous enterprise, and I am not
surprised that both Slocum and Warren reported against it. The
fifth and sixth Corps would necessarily be very much fatigued
(01:33):
after making a forced march. To put them in at
once and direct them to drive a superior force of
Lee's veterans out of a town where every house would
have been loopholed and every street barricaded would hardly have
been judicious. If we had succeeded in doing so, it
would simply have reversed the Battle of Gettysburg, for the
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Confederate Army would have fought behind Seminary Ridge and we
would have been exposed in the plane below. Nor do
I think it would have been wise strategy to turn
their left and drive them between us and Washington, for
it would have enabled them to threaten the capital, strengthen
and shorten their line of retreat, and endanger our communications.
(02:15):
At the same time. It is an open secret that
Mead at that time disapproved of the battleground. Hancock had
selected Warren and Slocum, having reported an attack against Lee's
left as unadvisable. Mead began to post troops on our
left with a view to attack the enemy's right. This,
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in my opinion, would have been much more sensible. Lee, however,
solved the problem for him, and fortunately for us, forced
him to remain on the defensive by ordering an assault
against each extremity of the Union line. There has been
much discussion and a good deal of crimination and recrimination
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among the rebel generals engaged aged as to which of
them lost the Battle of Gettysburg. I have already alluded
to the fact that universal experience demonstrates that columns converging
on a central force almost invariably fail in their object
and are beaten. In detail, Gettysburg seems to me a
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striking exemplification of this. Repeated columns of assault launched by
Lee against our lines came up in succession and were
defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive
in time to sustain the attack. He realized the old
fable the peasant could not break the bundle of fagots,
but he could break one at a time until all
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were gone. Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage,
for it took him three times as long as it
did us to communicate with different parts of his line
and concentrate troops. His couriers who carried orders, and the
reinforcements he sent moved on this circumference, and our on
the cord of the Ark. The two armies were about
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a mile apart. The Confederates Long Street and Hill occupied
Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery Ridge upon which
our forces were posted. Yule's corps on the rebel left
held the town Hill, the center, and Long Street. The
right lee could easily have maneuvered Mead out of his
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strong position on the heights, and should have done so.
When he determined to attack. He should have commenced at daybreak,
for all his force was up except Pickett's division, while
two corps of the Union Army, the fifth and sixth,
were still far away, and two brigades of the third
Corps were also absent. The latter were marching on the
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Emmitsburg Road, and as that was controlled by the enemy,
Sickles felt anxious for the safety of his men and
trains and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort
them in This was not done. However, the trains were
warned off the road and the two brigades were fortunately
not molested. There has been a great deal of bitter
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discussion between Longstreet, fitz Lee, Early Wilcox, and others as
to whether Lee did or did not order an attack
to take place at nine a m. And as to
whether Longstreet was dilatory and to blame for not making it.
When a battle is lost, there is always an inquest
and a natural desire on the part of each general
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to lay the blame on somebody else's shoulders. Longstreet waited
until noon for Law's brigade to come up, and afterward
there was a good deal of marching and countermarching to
avoid being seen by our troops. There was undoubtedly too
much delay. The fact is Longstreet saw we had a
strong position, and was not well pleased at the duty
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assigned him, for he thought it more than probable his
attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to take up
a position where Meade would be forced to attack him,
and was not in very good humor to find his
advice disregarded. The rebel commander, however, finding the Army of
the Potomac in front of him, having unbounded confidence in
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his troops and elated by the success of the first
day's fight. Believed he could gain a great victory then
and there and in the war, and determined to attempt it.
He was sick of these endless delays and constant sacrifices,
and hoped one strong sword thrust would slay his opponent
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and enable the South to crown herself queen of the
North American continent. By nine a m our skirmish line
in front of the Peach Orchard was actively engaged with
that of the enemy were making a reconnaissance toward the
Emmitsburg Road. No serious affair, however, occurred for some hours. Meade,
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as stated, was forming his lines on the right of
the position. He afterward occupied the fifth Corps, which came
up about one p m. Was posted as a reserve
south of the twelfth Corps with a view to the
attack which has already been referred to. About three p m.
The sixth Corps began to arrive from its long and
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toilsome march of thirty four miles, and its tired troops
were placed on the Tineytown Road in the rear of
Round Top to reinforce the other corps in case our
troops made an attack on the left lee however, did
not wait for Mead to advance against him, but boldly
directed that each flank of the Union Army should be
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assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations against our
center were to be kept up to prevent either wing
from being reinforced. It was another attempt to converge columns
with an interval of several miles between them upon a
central force, and like almost all such enterprises, failed from
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want of proper cooperation in the different fractions of his line.
Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and
although Eywell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on our extreme right,
it was due to an unfortunate order given by General Meade,
by which the force in that part of the field
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was withdrawn just as Yule advanced against it. But we
are anticipating our narrative. Hood, who commanded the division on
the right of Longstreet's corps, complains that he was not
allowed to go past round Top and flank us on
the south, as he might have done, but was required
by his orders to break in at the Peach Orchard
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and drive Sickles line along the Emmitsburg Road towards Cemetery Hill,
but it seems to me as he started late in
the afternoon. If he had made the detour which would
have been necessary in order to attack us on the south,
he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and
Sykes might have interposed to cut him off from the
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main body. Before describing Longstreet's attack, we will give the
final disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary
to fight a defensive battle. The ridge was nearly in
the shape of a horseshoe. The twelfth Corps was on
the extreme right. Nixt came one division of the First
Corps on Culp's Hill, then the eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill,
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with two divisions of the First Corps at the base,
next the Second Corps, then the Third and the fifth
Corps on the extreme left, the sixth Corps being posted
in rear of Round Top as a general reserve to
the army. Siggles, however, denies that any position was ever
marked out for him. He was expected to prolong Hancock's
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line to the left, but did not do so for
the following reasons, First because the ground was low, and
second on account of the commanding position of the Emmitsburg Round,
which ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front
of the line assigned him, and which afforded the enemy
an excellent position for their artillery. Third, because the ground
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between the valley he was expected to occupy and the
Emmitsburg Road constituted a minor ridge, very much broken and
full of rocks and trees, which afforded excellent cover for
an enemy operating in his immediate front. He had previously
held an interview with General Meade and asked that an
experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in
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locating a suitable position for his core. At his request,
General Hunt, the chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose.
They rode out to the ridge, and Sickles directed that
his troops should be posted along that road, with his
center at the Peach Orchard, which was about a mile
from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top, his right
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wing under Humphreys, extending along the road road, while his
left wing under Bernie, made a right angle at the
Peach Orchard with the other part of the line and
bent around so as to cover the front of Little
Round Top at the base. The disadvantages of this position
are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force to
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hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides
which constitute the right angle. The diagram shows that the
force A will have both its lines A one and
A two unfilated by batteries at B one B two,
and must yield the ground. However, may be such that
the enemy cannot plant his guns at B one or
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B two, But under any circumstances, it is a weak formation,
and the enemy easily penetrate the angle. When that is
the case, and it was so in the present instance,
each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and
the position is no longer tenable. If one side of
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the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot
be ofilated, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes permissible.
Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of
General Meade, who however, censured the movement afterward. As soon
as Sickles took position, General Buford's division of Cavalry was
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sent to the rear at Westminster to guard the trains there,
and Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the
rebel left Syke's Corps. The fifth came up from the
right about five p m. Soon after Longstreet's attack on
Sickles was fairly under way and formed along the outer
base of Little Roundtop, with Crawford's Pennsylvania reserves at their
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right and front. There had been a council of war
or conference of corps commanders, called it Mead's headquarters, and
it was universally agreed to remain and hold the position
as the third Corps in Anie to the guns of
Clark's battery was suddenly assailed by a terrible concentrated artillery fire.
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General Sickles rode back to his command, and General Meade
went with him. The latter objected to Sickles's line, but
thought it was then too late to change it. The
severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of
the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to
a furious attack against Ward's brigade on the left. This
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attack soon extended to the Peach Orchard. The fight became
very hot against Bernie's division from the left to the center,
but the troops on the right of the center Humphrey's division,
were not at first actively engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Bernie
with one of his brigades, and subsequently with a regiment.
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The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks and
ravines was so complicated that it is hard to follow
and difficult to describe the movements of the contestants. Some
idea of it can probably be gained by an examination
of the following diagram. It will be seen that a
long line of rebel batteries bears upon a, and that
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one of them was brought up to enflay the side
ab The angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the
north and Kershaw on the west, was broken in. In
consequence of this, several batteries on the line E F
were sacrificed, and Waffer's brigade soon came forward and took
the position de the Confederate line, being very long an
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overlapping Ward's brigade on the left, the latter was forced
back and the exalting rebels advanced to seize Little Roundtop.
They attacked the force there with great fury, assailing it
in front and rear, but they were ultimately repulsed and
finally took up the line g L. Two divisions of
the Fifth Corps and one of the second corps were
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sent in one after the other to Dry I, backed
the strong rebel force posted from D to G, but
each one had a bitter contest in front and was
flanked by the rebel line at d E, so that
ultimately all were obliged to retreat, although each performed prodigies
of valor. Indeed, Brook's brigade charged almost up to the
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enemy's line of batteries HI. The rebels gained the position
ig confronting our main line and close to it, but
a fine charge made by Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania
Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of the
six Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the
rebels gave up the contest for the night. As regards
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this part of the field, the attack against Humphrey's division,
which followed the breaking in of the angle at A
will be described further on. The general result was that
Sickle's entire line, together with the reinforcements sent in at
different times to stain it, were all forced back to
the ridge, which was our main line of battle, with
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the exception of Crawford's division, which maintained a somewhat advanced position.
The details of this contest are full of incident and
too important to be wholly omitted. About three thirty p m.
The rebels commenced the movement against our left by sending
a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two lines
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around to attack Sickle's left, held by General J. Hobart
Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches
to Little Round Top. Ward's line passing in front of
the mountain, and his flank resting on a rocky depression
in the ground called the Devil's Den. The right extended
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to the minor spur or wooded ridge beyond the wheatfield.
The engagement was furious. Commencing on the rebel right, it
extended to the left until it reached the peach orchard,
where it became especially violent. This central point of Sickles's
line was held by eleven regiments of Berney's and Humphrey's divisions.
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Bernie's two brigades commanded by Graham and de trobiand held
on bravely for the men who fought with Kearney and
the Peninsula were not easily driven, but the line was
too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements
became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the
Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sikes, whose
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core was resting from a long and fatiguing march, But
the latter wished his men to get their coffee and
be refreshed before sending them in, And as those who
were fighting almost always exaggerate the necessity for immediate reinforcements,
Sikes thought Sickles could hold on a while longer, and
did not respond to the call for three quarters of
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an hour. It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's
main line of battle was on the Emmitsburg Pike and
that the flank rested on the Peach Orchard. For he
ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division perpendicular to that road,
whereas Sickles occupied an advanced line and Sikes the main
line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought turning the
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Peach Orchard was turning the Union. Left with this idea,
he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg Road and
push our troops towards Cemetery Hill. Chrishaw after the minor
ridge was taken reported to Longstreet that he could not
carry out these orders without exposing his right flank to
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an attack from Sikes's corps. Ward fought bravely against Benning's
and Anderson's brigades on the left, driving back two attacks
of the latter, but his line was long and weak,
and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly
two brigades. Being concealed from view. From the nature of
the ground, they could concentrate against any point with impune.
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He attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den
by detaching the ninety ninth Pennsylvania from his right, and
although de Trobian had no troops to spare, he was
directed by General Burney to send the fortieth New York
under Colonel Egan to reinforce that flank. Eagan arrived too
late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward
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had been already driven back, but not too late to
make a gallant charge upon the rebel advance. The fighting
soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced
on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement.
First General Warren, who was on Mead's staff as chief Engineer,
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had ridden about this time to the signal station on
Little round Top to get a better view of the field.
He saw the long line of the enemy approaching and
about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt
succor arrived, Little round Top would fall into their hands.
Once in their possession, they would flank our whole line
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and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge,
so that this eminence was in reality the key of
the battlefield and must be held at all hazards. He
saw Barnes Division, which Sykes had ordered forward form for
a charge and about to go to the relief of
de trobiand who held the center of Berney's line, and
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who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment, he rode
down the slope over to Barnes, took the responsibility of
detaching Vincent's brigade, and hurried it back to take post
on Little Roundtop. He then sent a staff officer to
inform General Meade of what he had done and to
represent the immense importance of holding this commanding point. The
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victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire
of a battery on Little Round Top and to another
farther to the right, but it kept on on, went
around Ward's brigade, and rushed eagerly up the ravine between
the two roundtops to seize Little Roundtop, which seemed to
be defenseless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the crest of
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a small spur which juts out from the hill, and
not having time to load, advanced with the bayonet in
time to save the height. The contest soon became furious,
and the rocks were alive with musketry. General Vincent sent
word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in
overwhelming numbers, and Hazlit's regular battery, supported by the one
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hundred fortieth New York under Colonel O'Rourke of Weed's Brigade,
was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with
great labor to the crest of Little Roundtop, and the
one hundred fortieth were posted on the slope on Vincent's right.
They came upon the field just as the rebels, after
failing to penetrate the center, had driven back the right
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in Advanceing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rourke a brilliant
young officer who had just graduated at the head of
his class at west Point, was killed and his men
thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and
repulsed the assault. In doing so, he exposed himself very
much and was soon killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Wead,
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who was on the crest with the battery, was mortally
wounded in the same way, and as Hazlet leaned over
to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also,
and he dropped dead on the body of his chief.
Colonel Rice of the forty fourth New York now took
command in place of Vincent. The enemy, having been foiled
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at the center and right, stole around through the woods
and turned the left of the line, but Chamberlain's regiment,
the twentieth Main, was folded back by him around the
rear of the mountain to resist the attack. The rebels
came out like wolves with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's
men over the crest, but they rallied and drove their
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assailants back in their turn. This was twice repeated, and
then a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of
the fifth Corps dashed over the hill. The twentieth may
made a grand final charge and drove the rebels from
the valley between the round tops, capturing a large number
of prisoners, not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had
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lost the third of his command and was entirely out
of ammunition. Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels,
fifteen officers and five hundred men prisoners, and a thousand
stand of arms hill, and his official report says Hood's
right was held as in avise. We will now return
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to the peach orchard. In answer to a shot from
Clark's battery, a long line of guns opened from the
eleven batteries opposite Graham's infant. The tree were partially sheltered
from this iron hail, but the three batteries with him
in the beginning, which were soon reinforced by four more
from the reserve artillery under Major mcgilvery, were very much
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cut up, and at last it became necessary to sacrifice
one of them, that of Bigelow, to enable the others
to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham
still held the Peach Orchard. Although he was assailed on
two fronts by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's
brigade on the west, a battery was brought forward to
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enflade Sickles line on the Emmitsburg Road, and under cover
of its fire, Barksdale carried the position, but was mortally
wounded in doing so. Sickles lost a leg about this
time five thirty p m. And Graham, who was also
badly wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The command of
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the Third Corps now devolved upon General Burney. Note here
Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died
like a brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had
known him as an officer of volunteers in the Mexican War.
As a member of Congress, he was very influential in
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bringing on the rebellion. End of the note. The batteries
under Major mc gilvery, which lined the cross road below
the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much shattered.
Kershaw captured them at one time, but was driven off
temporarily by a gallant charge of the one forty first
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Pennsylvania of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were
then brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered by Major
mc gilvy to sacrifice his battery to give the others
time to form a new line. He fought with fixed
prolong until the enemy were within six feet of him,
and then retired with the loss of three officers and
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twenty eight men. Philip's battery, which had joined his, had
a similar experience. Mc laws bears testimony to the admirable
manner with which this artillery was served. He says one
shell killed and wounded thirty men out of a company
of thirty seven. The capture of the peach Orchard necessarily
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brought the enemy directly on Humphrey's left flank and de
Trobriand's right. The disaster then became irremediable because every force
thrown in after this period had to contend with a
direct fire in front and an unfilating fire from the right.
End of Section one of Chapter five
Part two, Chapter five, Section one bo Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.
This LibriVox recording is in the public domain and is
read by Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg by Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter five, Section one,
(00:23):
Battle of Gettysburg the second day. The ridge upon which
the Union forces were now assembling has already been partially
described in two places. It sunk away into intervening valleys,
one between Coulps Hill and Cemetery Hill. The other lay
for several hundred yards north of Little Roundtop, as the
(00:47):
lesser of the two eminences on the left was called
to distinguish it from the higher peak called Roundtop. At
one A. M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw
him soon after daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and
hollow eyed. Anxiety and want of sleep were evidently telling
upon him. At dawn he commenced forming his line by
(01:10):
concentrating his forces on the right, with a view to
descend into the plain and attack Lee's left and the
twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part
in the movement. It seems to me that this would
have been a very hazardous enterprise, and I am not
surprised that both Slocum and Warren reported against it. The
fifth and sixth Corps would necessarily be very much fatigued
(01:33):
after making a forced march. To put them in at
once and direct them to drive a superior force of
Lee's veterans out of a town where every house would
have been loopholed and every street barricaded would hardly have
been judicious. If we had succeeded in doing so, it
would simply have reversed the Battle of Gettysburg, for the
(01:55):
Confederate Army would have fought behind Seminary Ridge and we
would have been exposed in the plane below. Nor do
I think it would have been wise strategy to turn
their left and drive them between us and Washington, for
it would have enabled them to threaten the capital, strengthen
and shorten their line of retreat, and endanger our communications.
(02:15):
At the same time. It is an open secret that
Mead at that time disapproved of the battleground. Hancock had
selected Warren and Slocum, having reported an attack against Lee's
left as unadvisable. Mead began to post troops on our
left with a view to attack the enemy's right. This,
(02:36):
in my opinion, would have been much more sensible. Lee, however,
solved the problem for him, and fortunately for us, forced
him to remain on the defensive by ordering an assault
against each extremity of the Union line. There has been
much discussion and a good deal of crimination and recrimination
(02:58):
among the rebel generals engaged aged as to which of
them lost the Battle of Gettysburg. I have already alluded
to the fact that universal experience demonstrates that columns converging
on a central force almost invariably fail in their object
and are beaten. In detail, Gettysburg seems to me a
(03:18):
striking exemplification of this. Repeated columns of assault launched by
Lee against our lines came up in succession and were
defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive
in time to sustain the attack. He realized the old
fable the peasant could not break the bundle of fagots,
but he could break one at a time until all
(03:40):
were gone. Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage,
for it took him three times as long as it
did us to communicate with different parts of his line
and concentrate troops. His couriers who carried orders, and the
reinforcements he sent moved on this circumference, and our on
the cord of the Ark. The two armies were about
(04:04):
a mile apart. The Confederates Long Street and Hill occupied
Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery Ridge upon which
our forces were posted. Yule's corps on the rebel left
held the town Hill, the center, and Long Street. The
right lee could easily have maneuvered Mead out of his
(04:26):
strong position on the heights, and should have done so.
When he determined to attack. He should have commenced at daybreak,
for all his force was up except Pickett's division, while
two corps of the Union Army, the fifth and sixth,
were still far away, and two brigades of the third
Corps were also absent. The latter were marching on the
(04:48):
Emmitsburg Road, and as that was controlled by the enemy,
Sickles felt anxious for the safety of his men and
trains and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort
them in This was not done. However, the trains were
warned off the road and the two brigades were fortunately
not molested. There has been a great deal of bitter
(05:10):
discussion between Longstreet, fitz Lee, Early Wilcox, and others as
to whether Lee did or did not order an attack
to take place at nine a m. And as to
whether Longstreet was dilatory and to blame for not making it.
When a battle is lost, there is always an inquest
and a natural desire on the part of each general
(05:32):
to lay the blame on somebody else's shoulders. Longstreet waited
until noon for Law's brigade to come up, and afterward
there was a good deal of marching and countermarching to
avoid being seen by our troops. There was undoubtedly too
much delay. The fact is Longstreet saw we had a
strong position, and was not well pleased at the duty
(05:54):
assigned him, for he thought it more than probable his
attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to take up
a position where Meade would be forced to attack him,
and was not in very good humor to find his
advice disregarded. The rebel commander, however, finding the Army of
the Potomac in front of him, having unbounded confidence in
(06:16):
his troops and elated by the success of the first
day's fight. Believed he could gain a great victory then
and there and in the war, and determined to attempt it.
He was sick of these endless delays and constant sacrifices,
and hoped one strong sword thrust would slay his opponent
(06:36):
and enable the South to crown herself queen of the
North American continent. By nine a m our skirmish line
in front of the Peach Orchard was actively engaged with
that of the enemy were making a reconnaissance toward the
Emmitsburg Road. No serious affair, however, occurred for some hours. Meade,
(06:57):
as stated, was forming his lines on the right of
the position. He afterward occupied the fifth Corps, which came
up about one p m. Was posted as a reserve
south of the twelfth Corps with a view to the
attack which has already been referred to. About three p m.
The sixth Corps began to arrive from its long and
(07:17):
toilsome march of thirty four miles, and its tired troops
were placed on the Tineytown Road in the rear of
Round Top to reinforce the other corps in case our
troops made an attack on the left lee however, did
not wait for Mead to advance against him, but boldly
directed that each flank of the Union Army should be
(07:38):
assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations against our
center were to be kept up to prevent either wing
from being reinforced. It was another attempt to converge columns
with an interval of several miles between them upon a
central force, and like almost all such enterprises, failed from
(07:58):
want of proper cooperation in the different fractions of his line.
Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and
although Eywell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on our extreme right,
it was due to an unfortunate order given by General Meade,
by which the force in that part of the field
(08:19):
was withdrawn just as Yule advanced against it. But we
are anticipating our narrative. Hood, who commanded the division on
the right of Longstreet's corps, complains that he was not
allowed to go past round Top and flank us on
the south, as he might have done, but was required
by his orders to break in at the Peach Orchard
(08:41):
and drive Sickles line along the Emmitsburg Road towards Cemetery Hill,
but it seems to me as he started late in
the afternoon. If he had made the detour which would
have been necessary in order to attack us on the south,
he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and
Sykes might have interposed to cut him off from the
(09:01):
main body. Before describing Longstreet's attack, we will give the
final disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary
to fight a defensive battle. The ridge was nearly in
the shape of a horseshoe. The twelfth Corps was on
the extreme right. Nixt came one division of the First
Corps on Culp's Hill, then the eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill,
(09:25):
with two divisions of the First Corps at the base,
next the Second Corps, then the Third and the fifth
Corps on the extreme left, the sixth Corps being posted
in rear of Round Top as a general reserve to
the army. Siggles, however, denies that any position was ever
marked out for him. He was expected to prolong Hancock's
(09:48):
line to the left, but did not do so for
the following reasons, First because the ground was low, and
second on account of the commanding position of the Emmitsburg Round,
which ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front
of the line assigned him, and which afforded the enemy
an excellent position for their artillery. Third, because the ground
(10:11):
between the valley he was expected to occupy and the
Emmitsburg Road constituted a minor ridge, very much broken and
full of rocks and trees, which afforded excellent cover for
an enemy operating in his immediate front. He had previously
held an interview with General Meade and asked that an
experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in
(10:34):
locating a suitable position for his core. At his request,
General Hunt, the chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose.
They rode out to the ridge, and Sickles directed that
his troops should be posted along that road, with his
center at the Peach Orchard, which was about a mile
from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top, his right
(10:57):
wing under Humphreys, extending along the road road, while his
left wing under Bernie, made a right angle at the
Peach Orchard with the other part of the line and
bent around so as to cover the front of Little
Round Top at the base. The disadvantages of this position
are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force to
(11:18):
hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides
which constitute the right angle. The diagram shows that the
force A will have both its lines A one and
A two unfilated by batteries at B one B two,
and must yield the ground. However, may be such that
the enemy cannot plant his guns at B one or
(11:39):
B two, But under any circumstances, it is a weak formation,
and the enemy easily penetrate the angle. When that is
the case, and it was so in the present instance,
each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and
the position is no longer tenable. If one side of
(12:00):
the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot
be ofilated, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes permissible.
Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of
General Meade, who however, censured the movement afterward. As soon
as Sickles took position, General Buford's division of Cavalry was
(12:21):
sent to the rear at Westminster to guard the trains there,
and Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the
rebel left Syke's Corps. The fifth came up from the
right about five p m. Soon after Longstreet's attack on
Sickles was fairly under way and formed along the outer
base of Little Roundtop, with Crawford's Pennsylvania reserves at their
(12:45):
right and front. There had been a council of war
or conference of corps commanders, called it Mead's headquarters, and
it was universally agreed to remain and hold the position
as the third Corps in Anie to the guns of
Clark's battery was suddenly assailed by a terrible concentrated artillery fire.
(13:06):
General Sickles rode back to his command, and General Meade
went with him. The latter objected to Sickles's line, but
thought it was then too late to change it. The
severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of
the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to
a furious attack against Ward's brigade on the left. This
(13:27):
attack soon extended to the Peach Orchard. The fight became
very hot against Bernie's division from the left to the center,
but the troops on the right of the center Humphrey's division,
were not at first actively engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Bernie
with one of his brigades, and subsequently with a regiment.
(13:48):
The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks and
ravines was so complicated that it is hard to follow
and difficult to describe the movements of the contestants. Some
idea of it can probably be gained by an examination
of the following diagram. It will be seen that a
long line of rebel batteries bears upon a, and that
(14:10):
one of them was brought up to enflay the side
ab The angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the
north and Kershaw on the west, was broken in. In
consequence of this, several batteries on the line E F
were sacrificed, and Waffer's brigade soon came forward and took
the position de the Confederate line, being very long an
(14:35):
overlapping Ward's brigade on the left, the latter was forced
back and the exalting rebels advanced to seize Little Roundtop.
They attacked the force there with great fury, assailing it
in front and rear, but they were ultimately repulsed and
finally took up the line g L. Two divisions of
the Fifth Corps and one of the second corps were
(14:57):
sent in one after the other to Dry I, backed
the strong rebel force posted from D to G, but
each one had a bitter contest in front and was
flanked by the rebel line at d E, so that
ultimately all were obliged to retreat, although each performed prodigies
of valor. Indeed, Brook's brigade charged almost up to the
(15:20):
enemy's line of batteries HI. The rebels gained the position
ig confronting our main line and close to it, but
a fine charge made by Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania
Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of the
six Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the
rebels gave up the contest for the night. As regards
(15:43):
this part of the field, the attack against Humphrey's division,
which followed the breaking in of the angle at A
will be described further on. The general result was that
Sickle's entire line, together with the reinforcements sent in at
different times to stain it, were all forced back to
the ridge, which was our main line of battle, with
(16:05):
the exception of Crawford's division, which maintained a somewhat advanced position.
The details of this contest are full of incident and
too important to be wholly omitted. About three thirty p m.
The rebels commenced the movement against our left by sending
a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two lines
(16:27):
around to attack Sickle's left, held by General J. Hobart
Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches
to Little Round Top. Ward's line passing in front of
the mountain, and his flank resting on a rocky depression
in the ground called the Devil's Den. The right extended
(16:47):
to the minor spur or wooded ridge beyond the wheatfield.
The engagement was furious. Commencing on the rebel right, it
extended to the left until it reached the peach orchard,
where it became especially violent. This central point of Sickles's
line was held by eleven regiments of Berney's and Humphrey's divisions.
(17:08):
Bernie's two brigades commanded by Graham and de trobiand held
on bravely for the men who fought with Kearney and
the Peninsula were not easily driven, but the line was
too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements
became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the
Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sikes, whose
(17:32):
core was resting from a long and fatiguing march, But
the latter wished his men to get their coffee and
be refreshed before sending them in, And as those who
were fighting almost always exaggerate the necessity for immediate reinforcements,
Sikes thought Sickles could hold on a while longer, and
did not respond to the call for three quarters of
(17:53):
an hour. It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's
main line of battle was on the Emmitsburg Pike and
that the flank rested on the Peach Orchard. For he
ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division perpendicular to that road,
whereas Sickles occupied an advanced line and Sikes the main
line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought turning the
(18:17):
Peach Orchard was turning the Union. Left with this idea,
he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg Road and
push our troops towards Cemetery Hill. Chrishaw after the minor
ridge was taken reported to Longstreet that he could not
carry out these orders without exposing his right flank to
(18:37):
an attack from Sikes's corps. Ward fought bravely against Benning's
and Anderson's brigades on the left, driving back two attacks
of the latter, but his line was long and weak,
and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly
two brigades. Being concealed from view. From the nature of
the ground, they could concentrate against any point with impune.
(19:01):
He attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den
by detaching the ninety ninth Pennsylvania from his right, and
although de Trobian had no troops to spare, he was
directed by General Burney to send the fortieth New York
under Colonel Egan to reinforce that flank. Eagan arrived too
late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward
(19:24):
had been already driven back, but not too late to
make a gallant charge upon the rebel advance. The fighting
soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced
on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement.
First General Warren, who was on Mead's staff as chief Engineer,
(19:44):
had ridden about this time to the signal station on
Little round Top to get a better view of the field.
He saw the long line of the enemy approaching and
about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt
succor arrived, Little round Top would fall into their hands.
Once in their possession, they would flank our whole line
(20:06):
and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge,
so that this eminence was in reality the key of
the battlefield and must be held at all hazards. He
saw Barnes Division, which Sykes had ordered forward form for
a charge and about to go to the relief of
de trobiand who held the center of Berney's line, and
(20:27):
who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment, he rode
down the slope over to Barnes, took the responsibility of
detaching Vincent's brigade, and hurried it back to take post
on Little Roundtop. He then sent a staff officer to
inform General Meade of what he had done and to
represent the immense importance of holding this commanding point. The
(20:51):
victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire
of a battery on Little Round Top and to another
farther to the right, but it kept on on, went
around Ward's brigade, and rushed eagerly up the ravine between
the two roundtops to seize Little Roundtop, which seemed to
be defenseless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the crest of
(21:12):
a small spur which juts out from the hill, and
not having time to load, advanced with the bayonet in
time to save the height. The contest soon became furious,
and the rocks were alive with musketry. General Vincent sent
word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in
overwhelming numbers, and Hazlit's regular battery, supported by the one
(21:36):
hundred fortieth New York under Colonel O'Rourke of Weed's Brigade,
was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with
great labor to the crest of Little Roundtop, and the
one hundred fortieth were posted on the slope on Vincent's right.
They came upon the field just as the rebels, after
failing to penetrate the center, had driven back the right
(21:59):
in Advanceing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rourke a brilliant
young officer who had just graduated at the head of
his class at west Point, was killed and his men
thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and
repulsed the assault. In doing so, he exposed himself very
much and was soon killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Wead,
(22:23):
who was on the crest with the battery, was mortally
wounded in the same way, and as Hazlet leaned over
to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also,
and he dropped dead on the body of his chief.
Colonel Rice of the forty fourth New York now took
command in place of Vincent. The enemy, having been foiled
(22:44):
at the center and right, stole around through the woods
and turned the left of the line, but Chamberlain's regiment,
the twentieth Main, was folded back by him around the
rear of the mountain to resist the attack. The rebels
came out like wolves with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's
men over the crest, but they rallied and drove their
(23:07):
assailants back in their turn. This was twice repeated, and
then a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of
the fifth Corps dashed over the hill. The twentieth may
made a grand final charge and drove the rebels from
the valley between the round tops, capturing a large number
of prisoners, not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had
(23:29):
lost the third of his command and was entirely out
of ammunition. Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels,
fifteen officers and five hundred men prisoners, and a thousand
stand of arms hill, and his official report says Hood's
right was held as in avise. We will now return
(23:50):
to the peach orchard. In answer to a shot from
Clark's battery, a long line of guns opened from the
eleven batteries opposite Graham's infant. The tree were partially sheltered
from this iron hail, but the three batteries with him
in the beginning, which were soon reinforced by four more
from the reserve artillery under Major mcgilvery, were very much
(24:12):
cut up, and at last it became necessary to sacrifice
one of them, that of Bigelow, to enable the others
to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham
still held the Peach Orchard. Although he was assailed on
two fronts by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's
brigade on the west, a battery was brought forward to
(24:35):
enflade Sickles line on the Emmitsburg Road, and under cover
of its fire, Barksdale carried the position, but was mortally
wounded in doing so. Sickles lost a leg about this
time five thirty p m. And Graham, who was also
badly wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The command of
(24:55):
the Third Corps now devolved upon General Burney. Note here
Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died
like a brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had
known him as an officer of volunteers in the Mexican War.
As a member of Congress, he was very influential in
(25:15):
bringing on the rebellion. End of the note. The batteries
under Major mc gilvery, which lined the cross road below
the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much shattered.
Kershaw captured them at one time, but was driven off
temporarily by a gallant charge of the one forty first
(25:36):
Pennsylvania of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were
then brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered by Major
mc gilvy to sacrifice his battery to give the others
time to form a new line. He fought with fixed
prolong until the enemy were within six feet of him,
and then retired with the loss of three officers and
(25:58):
twenty eight men. Philip's battery, which had joined his, had
a similar experience. Mc laws bears testimony to the admirable
manner with which this artillery was served. He says one
shell killed and wounded thirty men out of a company
of thirty seven. The capture of the peach Orchard necessarily
(26:19):
brought the enemy directly on Humphrey's left flank and de
Trobriand's right. The disaster then became irremediable because every force
thrown in after this period had to contend with a
direct fire in front and an unfilating fire from the right.
End of Section one of Chapter five
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