July 25, 2025 • 30 mins
Embark on a historical journey as Abner Doubleday, a Union officer in the Civil War, recounts his experiences from the frontlines. Beginning with the bombardment opened on Ft. Sumter in 1861, Doubledays memoirs unravel the tale of two pivotal campaigns - Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Delve into the strategic errors at Chancellorsville that led to a Union defeat and explore the leadership crisis that plagued the camp. After Chancellorsville, Doubleday covers the unexpected clash of the armies at Gettysburg. When he takes command following the death of his superior, he leads his outnumbered division with courage and resilience. Despite being replaced due to a mistaken report of his divisions defeat, Doubledays narrative doesnt falter. Instead, he critiques the missed opportunities post-battle that could have ended the war. This book is not just a memoir, but Doubledays resolute response to the injustices he faced.
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
Part two, Chapter five, Section two, both Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.
This LibriVox recording is in the public domain and is
read by Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina, Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg by Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter five, Section two
(00:22):
Battle of Gettysburg. The second day, while the peach orchard
was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity which
had a general relation to the defense of Sickles Line.
A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to the
crossroad and about five hundred yards south of it, and
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then turns abruptly to the south at the corner of
a wheatfield, passing through a rocky wooded country to empty
in plumb run. De Trobrienne held the north bank of
this stream with a very insufficient force a front of
two regiments and DX. His contest with SEM's brigade in
front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into
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the peach orchard on his right, was at very close
range and very destructive. At the same time, as Ward's
left was turned and driven back, the enemy came in
on the left and rear of de Trobriande and occupied
the wheat field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, composed
of Schweitzer's and Tilden's brigades, soon came to his assistance.
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The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining several lines,
kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who came
up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged
to give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had
a most determined fight and would not yield the ground.
When relieved by Zook's force, they fell back across the
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wheat field. There Bernie used them as the basis of
a new line, brought up two fresh regiments, charged through
the field and drove them the enemy back to the
stone fence which bounded it. Caldwell's division of Hancock's Corps
now came on to renew the contest. Caldwell formed his
men with the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front
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and those of Zuck and Brooke in rear. In the advance,
Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line, being unfilated
in both directions, was soon so cut up that the
rear line came forward in its place. Zuck was killed,
but Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and
driving Sam's back through the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then
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came up a second time to aide Brook, but it
was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond,
and as the Peach Orchard by this time was in
possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was really a disadvantage,
for both his flanks were turned. Sam's brigade, together with
parts of Bennings and Anderson's brigades, rallied behind a stone wall,
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again came forward and succeeded in retaking the knoll and
the batteries they had lost. Caldwell, under cover of our artillery,
extricated his division with heavy loss, for both Zooks and
Kelly's brigades were completely surrounded. Then Ayres, who had been
at the turning point of so many battles, went in
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with his fine division of regulars commanded by Day and
burbank officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He
struck the enemy in flank, who were pursuing Caldwell, and
who would have renewed the attack on Little Round Top,
doubled them up and drove them back to the position
Caldwell had left. But his line, from the nature of things,
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was untenable, for a whole brigade with ample supports had
formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained but
to face about and fight his way home again. This
was accomplished with a tremendous loss of fifty percent of
his command and killed and wounded. His return was aided
by the artillery on Little Roundtop and by the advance
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of part of the sixth Corps. When the troops were
all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a
time and withdrew by peace. A note here. General Ayres,
whose service in the war commenced with the first bull
Run and ended at Appomatics, may almost be called an
impersonation of the Army of the Potomac, as he took
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part in nearly all its battles and minor engagements. End
of the note. The enemy Wofford's, Creshaw's, and Anderson's brigades
now swarmed in front of our main line, between the
Wheatfield and Little Roundtop. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded
a division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,
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was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which
at one time I had the honor to commit, and
were veterans of the Peninsula and were among the most
dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to
defend the soil of their native state and headed a
charge made by mccanless's brigade. With the colors of one
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of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward
with an impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter
behind a stone fence on the hither side of the
wheat field, but McCanless stormed the position, drove them beyond
the field, and then, as it was getting dark, both
sides rested on their arms. The other brigade of Crawford's division,
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that of Fisher, had previously been sent to reinforce Vincent
and his desperate struggle on the slope of Little Roundtop.
The enemy retired before it so that it was not engaged,
and it then took possession of the main round top
on the left of Little Roundtop and fortified it. As
Crawford charged two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevin
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and Eustace, formed under Wheaton on the right and below
little round Top. The sight of the firm front presented
by these fresh troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward
to reconnoiter, and he gave up all attempts at making
any farther advance. The enemy at night took post at
the western base of the ridge and held a fortified
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line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which
rocky Cavern they took shelter. It remains now to describe
the effect of the loss of the Peach Orchard and
the wounding of Sickles and Graham, which took place soon
after upon the fate of Humphrey's division, posted on the
right along the Emmitsburg Road. When Sickles lost his leg,
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Berney assumed command of the corps and ordered Humphries to
move his left wing back to form a new oblique
line to the ridge in connection with Bernie's division. Humphreys,
up to the loss of the Peach Orchard had not
been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely demonstrated along
his front, But now he was obliged while executing the
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difficult maneuver of a change of front to rear to
contend with Barksdale's brigade of Mclaw's Division on his left
at the Peach Orchard and omphilating batteries there also, while
his entire front was called upon to repel a most
determined assault from Anderson's Division, which hitherto had not been engaged,
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and which now pressed with great force on his right,
which still clung to the road. Four regiments were thrown
in by Hancock to support that part of the line,
but the attack was so sudden and violent that they
only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys
received orders to give up his advanced position and fall
back to the ridge itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock,
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who had been placed in command of the first, second,
and third Corps, was indefatigable in his vigilance and personal supervision,
patching the line wherever the enemy was likely to break through.
His activity and foresight probably preserved the Ridge from capture.
Toward the last meade, brought forward Lockwood's Maryland Brigade from
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the right and sent them in to cover Sickle's retreat.
Humphreys was followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry,
and Wright, about the best fighting material in the rebel army.
Perry was driven back by the fire of our main line,
and as his brigade was between the other two, his
retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported on
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the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as
soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to
do so, and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them,
did not move forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox
and Right, which would have been ruinous to us if
followed up, was fruitless of hers own dults. Both were
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repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached the
crest with his Georgians and turned to Gunn, whose cannoneers
had been shot upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps.
Webb gave him two staggering volleys from behind a fence
and went forward with his two regiments. He charged, regained
the lost peace and turned it upon them. Wright, finding
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himself entirely isolated in this advanced position, went back again
to the main line. And Wilcox did the same. On
this occasion. Wright did what Lee failed to accomplish the
next day, at such a heavy expense of life, for
he pierced our center and held it for a short time,
and had the movement been properly supported and energetically followed up,
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it might have been fatal to our army, and would
most certainly have resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was
but another illustration of the difficulty of successful converging columns
against a central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike
at the hour appointed. Each came forward separately and was
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beaten for lack of support. Right attained the crest and
Wilcox was almost on a line with him. The latter
was closely followed up and nearly surrounded. The troops rushed
in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily
in extricating himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to
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have captured temporarily twenty guns, and write eight. As they
approached the ridge, a Union battery limbered up and galloped off.
The last gun was delayed, and the cannonear with a
long line of muskets pointing at him. Within a few
feet deliberately drove off the field. The Georgians manifested their
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admiration for his bravery by crying out, don't shoot, and
not a musket was fired at him. I regret that
I have not been able to ascertain the man's name.
A note here, as it is well to verify these incidents,
I desire to state that this is a reminiscence of
doctor J. Roby Wood of New York, a Georgian, a
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relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with right.
Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered in the morning.
General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as chief
of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round
Top to Culpse Hill to make himself familiar with the line.
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As he passed by headquarters, he noticed some new troops,
the second Vermont Brigade under General Stannard, which formed part
of my command. They were a fine looking body of men,
and were drawn up in close column by division, ready
to go to any part of the field at a
moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged, he
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passed over to the right on his return late in
the day, he saw Sickle's whole line driven in and
found Wright's rebel brigade established on the crest, barring his
way back. He rode rapidly over to Meade's headquarters and
found the general walking up and down the room, apparently
quite unconscious of the movements which might have been discerned
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by riding to the top of the hill, and which
should have been reported to him by some one of
his staff. Tidball said, General, I am very sorry to
see that the enemy have pierced our center. Mead expressed
surprise at the information and said, why where is Sedgewick.
Tidball replied, I do not know, but if you need troops,
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I saw a fine body of Vermonters a short distance
from here, belonging to the first corps who are available.
Mead then directed him to take an order to Newton
and put the men in at once. The order was
communicated to me, and I went with my division at
double quick to the point indicated There. We pursued Wright's
force as retired, and retook, at Hancock's instigation, four guns
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taken by Right earlier in the action. When these were
brought in, I sent out two regiments who followed the
enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more guns.
I have been thus particular in narrating this incident, as
Stannard's Vermont Brigade contributed greatly to the victory of the
next day, and it is worthy of record to state
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how they came to be located in that part of
the field. It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken
up this advanced position, Hood's division would have turned our left,
have forced us from the shelter of the ridge, and
probably have intervened between us and Washington. The movement, disastrous
in some respects, was propitious as regards its general results,
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for the enemy had wasted all their strength and valor
in gaining the Emmitsburg Road, which after all, was of
no particular benefit to them. They were still outside our
main line. They pierced the latter. It is true, but
the gallant men, who, at such heavy expense of life
and limb stood triumphantly on that crest, were obliged to
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retire because the divisions who should have supported them remained inactive.
I must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance
these supports encountered on the first day from the men
of my command exerted a benumbing influence. On the second day,
it is said that Hood, being wounded, Longstreet led the
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last advance against Little Round Top in person, but when
he saw Sedgewick's corps coming into line, he gave up
the idea of capturing the heights as impracticable. This eminence
should have been the first point held and fortify by
us early in the day, as it was the key
of the field, but no special orders were given concerning it,
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and nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from
falling into the hands of the enemy. Meade was considerably
startled by the fact that the enemy had pierced our center.
He at once sent for Pleasanton and gave him orders
to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the
retreat of the army. Indeed, in an article on the
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secret history of Gettysburg published in the Southern Historical Papers
by Colonel Palfrey of the Confederate Army, he states that
the movement to the rear actually commenced, and that Eules
Picketts heard and reported that artillery was passing in that direction.
After a short time, the noise of the Wheels ceased.
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He also says that in a conversation he had with
Colonel Ulrich Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a
leg and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told
that while the Battle of Gettysburg was going on, he
Dahlgren captured a Confederate scout with a dispatch from Jefferson
Davis to General Lee, in which the former wrote of
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the exposed condition of Richmond, owing to the presence of
a large Union force at city point. Dahlgren said a
retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this dispatch,
he looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness
of the enemy, and perhaps thinking it would not do
to supplement the probable capture of Richmond by a retreat
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of the Army of the Potomac countermanded the order. Sedgwick,
who was high in the confidence of General Meade, told
one of his division commanders that the army would probably
fall back on Westminster. General Pleasanton testifies that he was
engaged by order of General Meade until eleven p m.
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In occupying prominent points with his cavalry to cover the
retreat of the army. Nevertheless, it has been indignantly denied
that such a movement was contemplated, although it was General
Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union Army should
be assailed at the same time, while the immediate forces
made demonstrations. Again, since the center, Yuell did not move
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to attack the right of our line at Culps Hill
until Longstreet's assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes
it to the fact that Yule had broken his line
of battle by detaching two brigades up the York Road.
There was always some reason why columns never converge in time.
Johnson's division, which was on the extreme left of the
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rebel army and had not been engaged, made their way
sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the
right at Culps Hill held by Wadsworth's division of the
First Corps, and that part of the line still farther
to the right, where Geary's division of the twelfth Corps
was posted. In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps
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at the close of the conflict with long Street, General
Meade made the sad mistake of ordering the twelfth Corps
to abandon its position on the right and report to
General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum, sensible
that this would be assue. Sidle Movement, reported that the
enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to
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keep Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade
finally allowed him to retain Green's brigade and no more.
And thus it happened that Eule's troops, finding the works
on the extreme right of our line defenseless, had nothing
to do but walk in and occupy them. If Mead
was determined to detach this large force, there seems no
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good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades should not have
been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.
Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock
Creek about half an hour before sunset. It suffered so
severely from our artillery that one brigade, that of Jones,
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fell back in disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however,
advanced against Wadsworth and Green on his right, but as
these generals had their fronts well fortified, the attack was
easily repulsed. Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed,
took possession of Geary's works about nine p m. And
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thus endangered our communications. Gregg's division of cavalry, which was
posted east of Slocum's position, saw this movement of Johnson.
Gregg opened fire on the column with his artillery and
sent out his men dismounted to skirmish on the flank
of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to meet him,
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and the contest continued until after dark. Green in the
meantime swung his right around on the edge of a
ravine perpendicular to the main line and fortified it to
avoid being flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer,
having graduated second in his class at West Point, and
knew exactly what ought to be done and how to
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do it. He held on strongly, and as it was
dark and the enemy did not know exi exactly where
they were or where our troops were posted, they waited
until daylight before taking any further action. Yet they were
now but a short distance from General Meade's headquarters and
within easy reach of our reserve artillery. A night attack
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on the rear of our army, in conjunction with an
advance from the opposite side on Hancock's front would have
thrown us into great confusion and must have succeeded. During
the night, Yule sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson. Geary,
after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report
to Sykes, and if he had done so, his troops
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would have been of no use as the battle was
over in that part of the field. There was a
mystery about his movements, which needs to be cleared up
to supplement this attack on the extreme right and prevent
reinforcements from being sent there. Early's division was directed to
carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous
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artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's
Hill to prepare the way for the assault, but our
batteries on Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks,
replied and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's
infantry moved forth, Hayes Brigade on the right, Hoake's Brigade
on the left under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve.
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It was supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank,
while Rhodes and Penders divisions would come forward in time
to prevent any attack against his right. The enemy first
struck Van Gils's brigade, which was posted behind a stone
fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to
its left, at the base of the hill was Ames Brigade,
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both enclosing Rickets and Wydrich's and Stephen's batteries, which had
been a good deal cut up on the first day,
were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright,
chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders
not to attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight
the guns to the last. The enemy advanced up the ravine,
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which was specially commanded by Stephen's battery. Wydrich, Ricketts, and
Stevens played upon their approaching line energetically. The rebel left
and center fell back, but the right managed to obtain
shelter from houses and undulating ground, and came on impetuously,
charging over Van Gils's brigade and driving it up the
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hill through the batteries. In doing so, Hayes says, the
darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible slaughter.
Wydrich's battery was captured, and two of Rickett's guns were spiked.
The enemy, in making this movement exposed their left flank
to Stephen's battery, which poured a terrible fire of double
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canister into their ranks. The thirty third Massachusetts also opened
a most effective oblique fire. Were penetrated, but would not surrender.
Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the gun
he serves, and these brave men fought hand to hand
with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They shouted death
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on the soil of our native state rather than lose
our guns. Hancock all this time should have been kept
busy on his own front, repelling an attack from Rhodes Impender.
But as they did not come forward, and as he
felt that there was great danger that Howard would lose
Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent
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Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carrol was joined by the
one six Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schertz's division. For
a few minutes, Hayes says, there was an ominous silence,
and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They
came over the hill and went in with a cheer.
The enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated
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as no one came to theirsistance. When they fell back,
our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said
that out of seventeen hundred fifty men of the organization
known as the Louisiana Tigers, only one hundred fifty returned.
Hayes attributes his defeat to the fact that Gordon was
not up in time to support him. The failure to
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carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our extreme right.
As it could only be reached by a long circuit,
it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there
without unduly weakening other parts of his line. That Rhodes's
division did not reach Cemetery Hill in time to cooperate
with Early's attack was not owing to any lack of
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zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer.
He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank,
then changed front and advanced double the distance Early had
to traverse, and by the time he had done so,
Early had made the attack and had been repulsed. The
day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but
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victorious on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee
to continue his efforts. He could not bear to retreat
after his heavy losses, and acknowledged that he was beaten.
He resolved to reinforce Johnson's division, now in rear of
our right, and fling Pickett's troops, the elite of his
army who had not been engaged against our center. He
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hoped a simultaneous attack made by Picket in front and
Johnson in rear would yet win those heights and scatter
the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been
resting the tired men and horses of his cavalry division
at Abbotsford after the conflict at Hanover, went on the
afternoon of the second to circle around and attack the
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left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown.
This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of
Stuart's cavalry from its long march. They reached that part
of the field about four p m. After a fierce
combat in which Farnsworth's and Custer's brigade and EST's squadron
were principally engaged against Hampton's brigade, supported by the main
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body darkness put an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then
turned back and bivouacked at two taverns for the night.
Gregg's division of Cavalry left Hannover at noon and took
post opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's corps
on the right. There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division
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moving to the attack, and, after throwing some shells into
their ranks, deployed his own skirmish line and advanced against
the one they threw out to meet him. At ten
p m. He withdrew and took post on the Baltimore
Pike where it crosses Cress Run near Rock Creek. By
so doing he guarded the right and rear of the
army from any demonstration by Stuart's cavalry. At night, accounts
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of war was held in which it was unanimously voted
to stay and fight it out. Mead was displeased with
the result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he
said angrily have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg
is no place to fight a battle. In the fact
that a portion of the enemy actually prolonged our line
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on the right, and that our center had been pierced
during the day made him feel far from confident. He
thought it better to retreat with what he had than
run the risk of losing all. Note. Since the above
was written, the discussion has been renewed in the public
prints as to whether General Meade did or did not
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intend to leave the field. So far as the drawing
up of an order of retreat is concerned, it is
undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it is
the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency.
It is easy to criticize and say what should have
been done after a battle has been fought, after the
position of troops is all laid down on the maps
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and the plans of every commander examined in official reports.
But amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat, where
there has been a great loss of men in material,
it is not always so easy to decide. On the
night of the second the state of affairs was disheartening.
In the combats of the preceding days, the first, third,
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and eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated, the Fifth Corps
and a great part of the Second were shattered, and
only the sixth Corps and twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh.
It was possible, therefore, that the enemy might gain some
great success the next day, which would stimulate them to
extra exertions and diminish the spirit of our men in
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the same proportion. In such a case, it was not
improbable that the army might be destroyed as an organization,
and there is a vast difference between a destroyed army
and a defeat army. By retiring, while it was yet
in his power to do so, General Meade felt that
he would assure the safety of our principal cities, for
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the enemy were too exhausted to pursue, and, being out
of ammunition and far from their base of supplies, were
not in a condition to do much further damage or
act very energetically, whereas our troops could soon be largely
reinforced from the draft which had just been established, and
being in the center of their resources, could be supplied
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with all that was necessary for renewed effort. There is
no question in my mind that at the council referred to,
General Meade did desire to retreat and express fears that
his communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at Gettysburg.
It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and
General Newton objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this
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is an error. They merely recommended some additional precautions to
prevent the enemy from turning our left at round Top
and thus intervening between US and Washington. Hancock, in giving
his vote, said the Army of the Potomac had retreated
too often, and he was in favor of remaining now
to fight it out. End of chapter
Part two, Chapter five, Section two, both Chancellorsville and Gettysburg.
This LibriVox recording is in the public domain and is
read by Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina, Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg by Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter five, Section two
(00:22):
Battle of Gettysburg. The second day, while the peach orchard
was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity which
had a general relation to the defense of Sickles Line.
A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to the
crossroad and about five hundred yards south of it, and
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then turns abruptly to the south at the corner of
a wheatfield, passing through a rocky wooded country to empty
in plumb run. De Trobrienne held the north bank of
this stream with a very insufficient force a front of
two regiments and DX. His contest with SEM's brigade in
front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into
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the peach orchard on his right, was at very close
range and very destructive. At the same time, as Ward's
left was turned and driven back, the enemy came in
on the left and rear of de Trobriande and occupied
the wheat field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, composed
of Schweitzer's and Tilden's brigades, soon came to his assistance.
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The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining several lines,
kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who came
up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged
to give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had
a most determined fight and would not yield the ground.
When relieved by Zook's force, they fell back across the
(01:51):
wheat field. There Bernie used them as the basis of
a new line, brought up two fresh regiments, charged through
the field and drove them the enemy back to the
stone fence which bounded it. Caldwell's division of Hancock's Corps
now came on to renew the contest. Caldwell formed his
men with the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front
(02:13):
and those of Zuck and Brooke in rear. In the advance,
Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line, being unfilated
in both directions, was soon so cut up that the
rear line came forward in its place. Zuck was killed,
but Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and
driving Sam's back through the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then
(02:38):
came up a second time to aide Brook, but it
was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond,
and as the Peach Orchard by this time was in
possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was really a disadvantage,
for both his flanks were turned. Sam's brigade, together with
parts of Bennings and Anderson's brigades, rallied behind a stone wall,
(03:02):
again came forward and succeeded in retaking the knoll and
the batteries they had lost. Caldwell, under cover of our artillery,
extricated his division with heavy loss, for both Zooks and
Kelly's brigades were completely surrounded. Then Ayres, who had been
at the turning point of so many battles, went in
(03:23):
with his fine division of regulars commanded by Day and
burbank officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He
struck the enemy in flank, who were pursuing Caldwell, and
who would have renewed the attack on Little Round Top,
doubled them up and drove them back to the position
Caldwell had left. But his line, from the nature of things,
(03:46):
was untenable, for a whole brigade with ample supports had
formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained but
to face about and fight his way home again. This
was accomplished with a tremendous loss of fifty percent of
his command and killed and wounded. His return was aided
by the artillery on Little Roundtop and by the advance
(04:07):
of part of the sixth Corps. When the troops were
all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a
time and withdrew by peace. A note here. General Ayres,
whose service in the war commenced with the first bull
Run and ended at Appomatics, may almost be called an
impersonation of the Army of the Potomac, as he took
(04:30):
part in nearly all its battles and minor engagements. End
of the note. The enemy Wofford's, Creshaw's, and Anderson's brigades
now swarmed in front of our main line, between the
Wheatfield and Little Roundtop. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded
a division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,
(04:53):
was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which
at one time I had the honor to commit, and
were veterans of the Peninsula and were among the most
dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to
defend the soil of their native state and headed a
charge made by mccanless's brigade. With the colors of one
(05:14):
of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward
with an impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter
behind a stone fence on the hither side of the
wheat field, but McCanless stormed the position, drove them beyond
the field, and then, as it was getting dark, both
sides rested on their arms. The other brigade of Crawford's division,
(05:37):
that of Fisher, had previously been sent to reinforce Vincent
and his desperate struggle on the slope of Little Roundtop.
The enemy retired before it so that it was not engaged,
and it then took possession of the main round top
on the left of Little Roundtop and fortified it. As
Crawford charged two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevin
(06:01):
and Eustace, formed under Wheaton on the right and below
little round Top. The sight of the firm front presented
by these fresh troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward
to reconnoiter, and he gave up all attempts at making
any farther advance. The enemy at night took post at
the western base of the ridge and held a fortified
(06:23):
line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which
rocky Cavern they took shelter. It remains now to describe
the effect of the loss of the Peach Orchard and
the wounding of Sickles and Graham, which took place soon
after upon the fate of Humphrey's division, posted on the
right along the Emmitsburg Road. When Sickles lost his leg,
(06:46):
Berney assumed command of the corps and ordered Humphries to
move his left wing back to form a new oblique
line to the ridge in connection with Bernie's division. Humphreys,
up to the loss of the Peach Orchard had not
been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely demonstrated along
his front, But now he was obliged while executing the
(07:08):
difficult maneuver of a change of front to rear to
contend with Barksdale's brigade of Mclaw's Division on his left
at the Peach Orchard and omphilating batteries there also, while
his entire front was called upon to repel a most
determined assault from Anderson's Division, which hitherto had not been engaged,
(07:29):
and which now pressed with great force on his right,
which still clung to the road. Four regiments were thrown
in by Hancock to support that part of the line,
but the attack was so sudden and violent that they
only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys
received orders to give up his advanced position and fall
back to the ridge itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock,
(07:54):
who had been placed in command of the first, second,
and third Corps, was indefatigable in his vigilance and personal supervision,
patching the line wherever the enemy was likely to break through.
His activity and foresight probably preserved the Ridge from capture.
Toward the last meade, brought forward Lockwood's Maryland Brigade from
(08:16):
the right and sent them in to cover Sickle's retreat.
Humphreys was followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry,
and Wright, about the best fighting material in the rebel army.
Perry was driven back by the fire of our main line,
and as his brigade was between the other two, his
retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported on
(08:37):
the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as
soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to
do so, and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them,
did not move forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox
and Right, which would have been ruinous to us if
followed up, was fruitless of hers own dults. Both were
(09:01):
repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached the
crest with his Georgians and turned to Gunn, whose cannoneers
had been shot upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps.
Webb gave him two staggering volleys from behind a fence
and went forward with his two regiments. He charged, regained
the lost peace and turned it upon them. Wright, finding
(09:25):
himself entirely isolated in this advanced position, went back again
to the main line. And Wilcox did the same. On
this occasion. Wright did what Lee failed to accomplish the
next day, at such a heavy expense of life, for
he pierced our center and held it for a short time,
and had the movement been properly supported and energetically followed up,
(09:49):
it might have been fatal to our army, and would
most certainly have resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was
but another illustration of the difficulty of successful converging columns
against a central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike
at the hour appointed. Each came forward separately and was
(10:10):
beaten for lack of support. Right attained the crest and
Wilcox was almost on a line with him. The latter
was closely followed up and nearly surrounded. The troops rushed
in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily
in extricating himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to
(10:30):
have captured temporarily twenty guns, and write eight. As they
approached the ridge, a Union battery limbered up and galloped off.
The last gun was delayed, and the cannonear with a
long line of muskets pointing at him. Within a few
feet deliberately drove off the field. The Georgians manifested their
(10:51):
admiration for his bravery by crying out, don't shoot, and
not a musket was fired at him. I regret that
I have not been able to ascertain the man's name.
A note here, as it is well to verify these incidents,
I desire to state that this is a reminiscence of
doctor J. Roby Wood of New York, a Georgian, a
(11:14):
relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with right.
Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered in the morning.
General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as chief
of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round
Top to Culpse Hill to make himself familiar with the line.
(11:35):
As he passed by headquarters, he noticed some new troops,
the second Vermont Brigade under General Stannard, which formed part
of my command. They were a fine looking body of men,
and were drawn up in close column by division, ready
to go to any part of the field at a
moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged, he
(11:56):
passed over to the right on his return late in
the day, he saw Sickle's whole line driven in and
found Wright's rebel brigade established on the crest, barring his
way back. He rode rapidly over to Meade's headquarters and
found the general walking up and down the room, apparently
quite unconscious of the movements which might have been discerned
(12:17):
by riding to the top of the hill, and which
should have been reported to him by some one of
his staff. Tidball said, General, I am very sorry to
see that the enemy have pierced our center. Mead expressed
surprise at the information and said, why where is Sedgewick.
Tidball replied, I do not know, but if you need troops,
(12:39):
I saw a fine body of Vermonters a short distance
from here, belonging to the first corps who are available.
Mead then directed him to take an order to Newton
and put the men in at once. The order was
communicated to me, and I went with my division at
double quick to the point indicated There. We pursued Wright's
force as retired, and retook, at Hancock's instigation, four guns
(13:04):
taken by Right earlier in the action. When these were
brought in, I sent out two regiments who followed the
enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more guns.
I have been thus particular in narrating this incident, as
Stannard's Vermont Brigade contributed greatly to the victory of the
next day, and it is worthy of record to state
(13:25):
how they came to be located in that part of
the field. It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken
up this advanced position, Hood's division would have turned our left,
have forced us from the shelter of the ridge, and
probably have intervened between us and Washington. The movement, disastrous
in some respects, was propitious as regards its general results,
(13:49):
for the enemy had wasted all their strength and valor
in gaining the Emmitsburg Road, which after all, was of
no particular benefit to them. They were still outside our
main line. They pierced the latter. It is true, but
the gallant men, who, at such heavy expense of life
and limb stood triumphantly on that crest, were obliged to
(14:10):
retire because the divisions who should have supported them remained inactive.
I must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance
these supports encountered on the first day from the men
of my command exerted a benumbing influence. On the second day,
it is said that Hood, being wounded, Longstreet led the
(14:32):
last advance against Little Round Top in person, but when
he saw Sedgewick's corps coming into line, he gave up
the idea of capturing the heights as impracticable. This eminence
should have been the first point held and fortify by
us early in the day, as it was the key
of the field, but no special orders were given concerning it,
(14:54):
and nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from
falling into the hands of the enemy. Meade was considerably
startled by the fact that the enemy had pierced our center.
He at once sent for Pleasanton and gave him orders
to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the
retreat of the army. Indeed, in an article on the
(15:15):
secret history of Gettysburg published in the Southern Historical Papers
by Colonel Palfrey of the Confederate Army, he states that
the movement to the rear actually commenced, and that Eules
Picketts heard and reported that artillery was passing in that direction.
After a short time, the noise of the Wheels ceased.
(15:36):
He also says that in a conversation he had with
Colonel Ulrich Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a
leg and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told
that while the Battle of Gettysburg was going on, he
Dahlgren captured a Confederate scout with a dispatch from Jefferson
Davis to General Lee, in which the former wrote of
(15:57):
the exposed condition of Richmond, owing to the presence of
a large Union force at city point. Dahlgren said a
retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this dispatch,
he looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness
of the enemy, and perhaps thinking it would not do
to supplement the probable capture of Richmond by a retreat
(16:18):
of the Army of the Potomac countermanded the order. Sedgwick,
who was high in the confidence of General Meade, told
one of his division commanders that the army would probably
fall back on Westminster. General Pleasanton testifies that he was
engaged by order of General Meade until eleven p m.
(16:38):
In occupying prominent points with his cavalry to cover the
retreat of the army. Nevertheless, it has been indignantly denied
that such a movement was contemplated, although it was General
Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union Army should
be assailed at the same time, while the immediate forces
made demonstrations. Again, since the center, Yuell did not move
(17:02):
to attack the right of our line at Culps Hill
until Longstreet's assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes
it to the fact that Yule had broken his line
of battle by detaching two brigades up the York Road.
There was always some reason why columns never converge in time.
Johnson's division, which was on the extreme left of the
(17:23):
rebel army and had not been engaged, made their way
sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the
right at Culps Hill held by Wadsworth's division of the
First Corps, and that part of the line still farther
to the right, where Geary's division of the twelfth Corps
was posted. In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps
(17:44):
at the close of the conflict with long Street, General
Meade made the sad mistake of ordering the twelfth Corps
to abandon its position on the right and report to
General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum, sensible
that this would be assue. Sidle Movement, reported that the
enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to
(18:05):
keep Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade
finally allowed him to retain Green's brigade and no more.
And thus it happened that Eule's troops, finding the works
on the extreme right of our line defenseless, had nothing
to do but walk in and occupy them. If Mead
was determined to detach this large force, there seems no
(18:27):
good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades should not have
been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.
Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock
Creek about half an hour before sunset. It suffered so
severely from our artillery that one brigade, that of Jones,
(18:48):
fell back in disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however,
advanced against Wadsworth and Green on his right, but as
these generals had their fronts well fortified, the attack was
easily repulsed. Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed,
took possession of Geary's works about nine p m. And
(19:10):
thus endangered our communications. Gregg's division of cavalry, which was
posted east of Slocum's position, saw this movement of Johnson.
Gregg opened fire on the column with his artillery and
sent out his men dismounted to skirmish on the flank
of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to meet him,
(19:32):
and the contest continued until after dark. Green in the
meantime swung his right around on the edge of a
ravine perpendicular to the main line and fortified it to
avoid being flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer,
having graduated second in his class at West Point, and
knew exactly what ought to be done and how to
(19:54):
do it. He held on strongly, and as it was
dark and the enemy did not know exi exactly where
they were or where our troops were posted, they waited
until daylight before taking any further action. Yet they were
now but a short distance from General Meade's headquarters and
within easy reach of our reserve artillery. A night attack
(20:16):
on the rear of our army, in conjunction with an
advance from the opposite side on Hancock's front would have
thrown us into great confusion and must have succeeded. During
the night, Yule sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson. Geary,
after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report
to Sykes, and if he had done so, his troops
(20:39):
would have been of no use as the battle was
over in that part of the field. There was a
mystery about his movements, which needs to be cleared up
to supplement this attack on the extreme right and prevent
reinforcements from being sent there. Early's division was directed to
carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous
(21:02):
artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's
Hill to prepare the way for the assault, but our
batteries on Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks,
replied and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's
infantry moved forth, Hayes Brigade on the right, Hoake's Brigade
on the left under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve.
(21:27):
It was supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank,
while Rhodes and Penders divisions would come forward in time
to prevent any attack against his right. The enemy first
struck Van Gils's brigade, which was posted behind a stone
fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to
its left, at the base of the hill was Ames Brigade,
(21:50):
both enclosing Rickets and Wydrich's and Stephen's batteries, which had
been a good deal cut up on the first day,
were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright,
chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders
not to attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight
the guns to the last. The enemy advanced up the ravine,
(22:11):
which was specially commanded by Stephen's battery. Wydrich, Ricketts, and
Stevens played upon their approaching line energetically. The rebel left
and center fell back, but the right managed to obtain
shelter from houses and undulating ground, and came on impetuously,
charging over Van Gils's brigade and driving it up the
(22:31):
hill through the batteries. In doing so, Hayes says, the
darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible slaughter.
Wydrich's battery was captured, and two of Rickett's guns were spiked.
The enemy, in making this movement exposed their left flank
to Stephen's battery, which poured a terrible fire of double
(22:52):
canister into their ranks. The thirty third Massachusetts also opened
a most effective oblique fire. Were penetrated, but would not surrender.
Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the gun
he serves, and these brave men fought hand to hand
with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They shouted death
(23:15):
on the soil of our native state rather than lose
our guns. Hancock all this time should have been kept
busy on his own front, repelling an attack from Rhodes Impender.
But as they did not come forward, and as he
felt that there was great danger that Howard would lose
Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent
(23:35):
Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carrol was joined by the
one six Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schertz's division. For
a few minutes, Hayes says, there was an ominous silence,
and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They
came over the hill and went in with a cheer.
The enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated
(23:58):
as no one came to theirsistance. When they fell back,
our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said
that out of seventeen hundred fifty men of the organization
known as the Louisiana Tigers, only one hundred fifty returned.
Hayes attributes his defeat to the fact that Gordon was
not up in time to support him. The failure to
(24:21):
carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our extreme right.
As it could only be reached by a long circuit,
it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there
without unduly weakening other parts of his line. That Rhodes's
division did not reach Cemetery Hill in time to cooperate
with Early's attack was not owing to any lack of
(24:42):
zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer.
He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank,
then changed front and advanced double the distance Early had
to traverse, and by the time he had done so,
Early had made the attack and had been repulsed. The
day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but
(25:05):
victorious on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee
to continue his efforts. He could not bear to retreat
after his heavy losses, and acknowledged that he was beaten.
He resolved to reinforce Johnson's division, now in rear of
our right, and fling Pickett's troops, the elite of his
army who had not been engaged against our center. He
(25:28):
hoped a simultaneous attack made by Picket in front and
Johnson in rear would yet win those heights and scatter
the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been
resting the tired men and horses of his cavalry division
at Abbotsford after the conflict at Hanover, went on the
afternoon of the second to circle around and attack the
(25:50):
left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown.
This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of
Stuart's cavalry from its long march. They reached that part
of the field about four p m. After a fierce
combat in which Farnsworth's and Custer's brigade and EST's squadron
were principally engaged against Hampton's brigade, supported by the main
(26:13):
body darkness put an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then
turned back and bivouacked at two taverns for the night.
Gregg's division of Cavalry left Hannover at noon and took
post opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's corps
on the right. There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division
(26:34):
moving to the attack, and, after throwing some shells into
their ranks, deployed his own skirmish line and advanced against
the one they threw out to meet him. At ten
p m. He withdrew and took post on the Baltimore
Pike where it crosses Cress Run near Rock Creek. By
so doing he guarded the right and rear of the
army from any demonstration by Stuart's cavalry. At night, accounts
(27:00):
of war was held in which it was unanimously voted
to stay and fight it out. Mead was displeased with
the result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he
said angrily have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg
is no place to fight a battle. In the fact
that a portion of the enemy actually prolonged our line
(27:21):
on the right, and that our center had been pierced
during the day made him feel far from confident. He
thought it better to retreat with what he had than
run the risk of losing all. Note. Since the above
was written, the discussion has been renewed in the public
prints as to whether General Meade did or did not
(27:41):
intend to leave the field. So far as the drawing
up of an order of retreat is concerned, it is
undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it is
the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency.
It is easy to criticize and say what should have
been done after a battle has been fought, after the
position of troops is all laid down on the maps
(28:03):
and the plans of every commander examined in official reports.
But amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat, where
there has been a great loss of men in material,
it is not always so easy to decide. On the
night of the second the state of affairs was disheartening.
In the combats of the preceding days, the first, third,
(28:25):
and eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated, the Fifth Corps
and a great part of the Second were shattered, and
only the sixth Corps and twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh.
It was possible, therefore, that the enemy might gain some
great success the next day, which would stimulate them to
extra exertions and diminish the spirit of our men in
(28:47):
the same proportion. In such a case, it was not
improbable that the army might be destroyed as an organization,
and there is a vast difference between a destroyed army
and a defeat army. By retiring, while it was yet
in his power to do so, General Meade felt that
he would assure the safety of our principal cities, for
(29:09):
the enemy were too exhausted to pursue, and, being out
of ammunition and far from their base of supplies, were
not in a condition to do much further damage or
act very energetically, whereas our troops could soon be largely
reinforced from the draft which had just been established, and
being in the center of their resources, could be supplied
(29:31):
with all that was necessary for renewed effort. There is
no question in my mind that at the council referred to,
General Meade did desire to retreat and express fears that
his communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at Gettysburg.
It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and
General Newton objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this
(29:55):
is an error. They merely recommended some additional precautions to
prevent the enemy from turning our left at round Top
and thus intervening between US and Washington. Hancock, in giving
his vote, said the Army of the Potomac had retreated
too often, and he was in favor of remaining now
to fight it out. End of chapter
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