July 25, 2025 • 14 mins
Embark on a historical journey as Abner Doubleday, a Union officer in the Civil War, recounts his experiences from the frontlines. Beginning with the bombardment opened on Ft. Sumter in 1861, Doubledays memoirs unravel the tale of two pivotal campaigns - Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Delve into the strategic errors at Chancellorsville that led to a Union defeat and explore the leadership crisis that plagued the camp. After Chancellorsville, Doubleday covers the unexpected clash of the armies at Gettysburg. When he takes command following the death of his superior, he leads his outnumbered division with courage and resilience. Despite being replaced due to a mistaken report of his divisions defeat, Doubledays narrative doesnt falter. Instead, he critiques the missed opportunities post-battle that could have ended the war. This book is not just a memoir, but Doubledays resolute response to the injustices he faced.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
Part two, Chapter seven of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. This LibriVox
recording is in the public domain and is read by
Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by
Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter seven, the final chapter General
(00:23):
Retreat of the Enemy, Criticisms of Distinguished Confederate Officers. Lee
was greatly dispirited at Pickett's failure, but worked with untiring
energy to repair the disaster. There was an interval of
full a mile between Hill and Longstreet, and the plane
was swarming with fugitives making their way back in disorder.
(00:44):
He hastened to get ready to resist the counter charge,
which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind
which the fugitives could rally. He also made great personal
exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in.
He did not, for a moment imagine that Mead would
fail to take advantage of this golden opportunity to crush
(01:05):
the Army of Virginia and end the war. The most
distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they were in
at this time, and expressed their surprise that they were
not followed up. The fact is Mead had no idea
of leaving the ridge. I conversed the next morning with
a Corps commander who had just left him. He said,
(01:26):
Mead says he thinks he can hold out for part
of another day here if they attack him. This language
satisfied me that Mead would not go forward if he
could avoid it, and would not impede in any way.
The rebel retreat across the Potomac Lee. Began to make
preparations at once and started his trains on the morning
of the fourth. By night. Roads Division, which followed them,
(01:50):
was in bivouac two miles west of Fairfield. It was
a difficult task to retreat burdened with four thousand prisoners
and a train fifteen miles lola in the presence of
a victorious enemy, but it was successfully accomplished. As regards
his main body, the roads too were bad and much
cut up by the rain. While standing on Little round Top,
(02:15):
Mead was annoyed at the fire of a rebel battery
posted on an eminence beyond the wheatfield, about one thousand
yards distant. He inquired what troops those were stationed along
the stone fence which bounded the hither side of the wheatfield.
Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps,
he directed that they be sent forward to clear the
(02:36):
woods in front of the rebel skirmishers, who were very annoying,
and to drive away the battery, but not to get
into a fight that could bring on a general engagement.
As Crawford unmasked from the stone fence, the battery opened
fire on his right. He sent Colonel Enst Regiment deployed
as skirmishers against the guns, which retired as and approached.
(03:00):
Mc canless, who went forward with his brigade moved too
far to the right and Crawford ordered him to change
front and advanced toward round top. He did so and
struck a rebel brigade in flank, which was behind a
temporary breastwork of rails, sods, et cetera. When this brigade
saw a Union force apparently approaching from their own lines
(03:21):
to attack them in flank, they retreated in confusion after
a short resistance, and this disorder extended during the retreat
to a reserve brigade posted on the low ground in
their rear. Their flight did not cease until they reached
Horner's Woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched themselves.
(03:42):
These brigades belonged to Hood's Division, then under law. Longstreet says,
when this pickets charge failed, I expected that, of course
the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and
tried to crush us. I sent my staff officers to
the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried
(04:04):
to our line of batteries as the only support that
I could give them. I knew if the army was
to be saved, these batteries must check the enemy. For
unaccountable reasons, the enemy did not pursue his advantage. Longstreet
always spoke of his own men as invincible and stated
that on the second they did the best three hours
(04:26):
fighting that ever was done. But Crawford's attack seemed to
show that they too were shaken by the defeat of
Pickett's grand charge. A note here Crawford was also one
of those who took a prominent part in the defense
of Fort Sumter at the beginning of the war. We
each commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion. End of
(04:47):
the note in regard to the great benefit we would
have derived from a pursuit, it may not be out
of place to give the opinion of a few more
prominent Confederate officers. Alexander, chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in
a communication to the Southern Historical papers quote, I have
(05:09):
always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity
they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt defensive.
They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe. I
suppose the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more
than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered
from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all
(05:34):
over it. And they could concentrate their whole force at
any point, and in a very short time without our knowledge.
Our line was an enveloping semicircle over four miles in development,
and communication from flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult,
the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's
(05:55):
view and fire. The roads all running at right angles
to our line, and some of them at least broad turnpikes,
where the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is
it necessary now to add any statement as to the
superiority of the Federal force or the exhausted and shattered
condition of the Confederates for space of at least a
(06:18):
mile in their very center, to show that a great
opportunity was thrown away. I think General Lee himself was
quite apprehensive the enemy would repulst, and that it was
that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns
where he could observe all the indications. General Trimble, who
(06:38):
commanded a division of Hillscrps which supported Pickett in his advance, says,
by all the rules of warfare, the Federal troops should
as I expected, they would have marched against our shattered
columns and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat.
Colonel Simms, who commanded SEMs Georgia Brigade in the fight,
(07:00):
Crawford just referred to rites. To the latter, there was
such confusion in our army so far as my observation extended,
and I think we would have made but feeble resistance
if you had pressed on on the evening of the third.
General Meade, however, overcome by the great responsibilities of his position,
(07:21):
still clung to the ridge, and, fearful of a possible disaster,
would not take the risk of making an advance. And yet,
if he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army, then
and there he would have saved two years of war,
with its immense loss of life and countless evils. He
might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's Corps, which had
(07:42):
not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if
it was repulsed, the blows it gave would leave the
enemy little inclination to again assail the heights. At six
thirty p m. The firing ceased on the part of
the enemy, and although they retained their position the next day,
the Battle of Gettysburg was virtually at an end. The
(08:05):
town was still full of our wounded, and many of
our surgeons, with rare courage, remained there to take charge
of them, for it required some nerve to run the
risk of being sent to Libby prison when the fight
was over, a catastrophe which has often happened to our
medical officers. Among the rest, the chief surgeons of the
first Corps, doctor Theodore Hurd and doctor Thomas h. Bosch,
(08:30):
refused to leave their patients, and, in consequence of the
hasty retreat of the enemy, were fortunately not carried off.
After the battle, Mead had not the slightest desire to
recommence the struggle. It is a military maxim that to
a flying enemy must be given a wall of steel
or a bridge of gold. In the present instance, it
(08:53):
was unmistakably the bridge of gold that was presented. It
was hard to convince him that Lee was actually gone,
and at first he thought it might be a device
to draw the Union army from its strong position on
the heights. Our cavalry was sent out on the fourth
to ascertain where the enemy were and what they were doing.
(09:14):
General Burney threw forward a reconnoitering party and opened fire
with a battery on a column making their way toward Fairfield,
but he was checked at once and directed on no
account to bring on a battle. On the fifth, as
it was certain the enemy were retreating, Sedgwick received orders
to follow up the rear of the rebel column. He
(09:36):
marched eight miles to Fairfield, pass there Early, who was
in command of the rear guard, was endeavoring to save
the trains, which were heaped up in great confusion. Sedgwick,
after a distant cannonade, reported the position too strong to
be forced. It was a plain two miles wide, surrounded
(09:56):
by hills, and it would not have been difficult to
take it. But Sedgwick knew Mead favored the Bridge of
Gold policy and was not disposed to thwart the wishes
of his chief. In my opinion, Sedgwick should have made
an energetic attack, and Meade should have supported it with
his whole army, for our cavalry were making great havoc
in the enemy's train in rear, and if Lee, instead
(10:20):
of turning on Kilpatrick, had been forced to form line
against Meade, the cavalry which was between him and his
convoys of ammunition, in all probability, might have captured the
latter and ended the war. Stuart, it is true, was
following up Kilpatrick, but he took an indirect route and
was nearly a day behind. I do not see why
(10:42):
the force, which was now promptly detached from the garrisons
of Washington and Baltimore and sent to Harper's Ferry, could
not have formed on the Virginia side of the Potomac,
opposite William's Port, and with the co operation of General
Meade have cut off the ammunition of which Lee stood
so much in the needed as the river had risen, and
(11:03):
an expedition set out by General French from Frederick had
destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, everything seemed to favor
such a plan the moment it was ascertained that Lee
was cut off from Richmond and short of ammunition, the
whole North would have turned out and made a second
Saratoga of it. As it was, he had but few
(11:24):
rounds for his cannon, and our artillery could have opened
a destructive fire on him from a distance without exposing
our infantry. It was worth the effort, and there was
little or no danger in attempting it. Meade had Sedgwick's
fresh Corps and was reinforced by a division of eleven
thousand men under General W. F. Smith Baldy Smith French's
(11:47):
division of four thousand at Frederick, and troops from Washington
and Baltimore were also available to assist in striking the
final blow. The Twelfth Corps was also available, as Slocum
volunteered join in the pursuit. Mead, however, delayed moving at
all until Lee had reached Hagerstown, and then took a
route that was almost twice as long as that adopted
(12:10):
by the enemy. Lee marched day and night to avoid pursuit,
and when the river rose and his bridge was gone
so that he was unable to cross, he gained six
days in which to choose a position, fortify it, and
renew his supply of ammunition before Mead made his appearance.
In consequence of repeated orders from President Lincoln to attack
(12:33):
the enemy, Mead went forward and confronted Lee on the twelfth.
He spent that day and the next in making reconnaissances,
and resolved to attack on the fourteenth, but Lee left
during the night, and by eight a m. The entire
army of the enemy were once more on Virginia soil.
The Union loss in this campaign is estimated by the
(12:56):
Count of Paris, who is an impartial observer, at two thousand,
eight hundred thirty four killed, thirteen thousand, seven hundred wounded,
and six thousand, six hundred forty three missing, total twenty
three thousand, one hundred eighty six. The rebel loss he
puts at two thousand, six hundred sixty five killed, twelve thousand,
(13:19):
five hundred ninety nine wounded, seven thousand, four hundred sixty
four missing total twenty two thousand, seven hundred twenty eight.
Among the killed in the battle on the rebel side
were Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnet, Pender, and SEMs and Pettigrew.
During the retreat, among the wounded were Generals G. T. Anderson, Hampton, Jenkins, J. M. Jones,
(13:46):
Kemper and Scales. Archer was captured on the first day.
Among the killed on the Union side were Major General
Reynolds and brigadier Generals Vincent, Weade and Zuk. Among the
wounded were major Generals Sickle losing a leg, Hancock, Doubleday, Gibbon, Barlowe,
(14:07):
Warren and Butterfield, and Brigadier Generals Graham, Stannard, Paul losing
both eyes, Barnes, Brooke and Webb. This is the end
of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by Abner Doubleday. Thank you for listening.
Part two, Chapter seven of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. This LibriVox
recording is in the public domain and is read by
Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by
Abner Doubleday, Part two, Chapter seven, the final chapter General
(00:23):
Retreat of the Enemy, Criticisms of Distinguished Confederate Officers. Lee
was greatly dispirited at Pickett's failure, but worked with untiring
energy to repair the disaster. There was an interval of
full a mile between Hill and Longstreet, and the plane
was swarming with fugitives making their way back in disorder.
(00:44):
He hastened to get ready to resist the counter charge,
which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind
which the fugitives could rally. He also made great personal
exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in.
He did not, for a moment imagine that Mead would
fail to take advantage of this golden opportunity to crush
(01:05):
the Army of Virginia and end the war. The most
distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they were in
at this time, and expressed their surprise that they were
not followed up. The fact is Mead had no idea
of leaving the ridge. I conversed the next morning with
a Corps commander who had just left him. He said,
(01:26):
Mead says he thinks he can hold out for part
of another day here if they attack him. This language
satisfied me that Mead would not go forward if he
could avoid it, and would not impede in any way.
The rebel retreat across the Potomac Lee. Began to make
preparations at once and started his trains on the morning
of the fourth. By night. Roads Division, which followed them,
(01:50):
was in bivouac two miles west of Fairfield. It was
a difficult task to retreat burdened with four thousand prisoners
and a train fifteen miles lola in the presence of
a victorious enemy, but it was successfully accomplished. As regards
his main body, the roads too were bad and much
cut up by the rain. While standing on Little round Top,
(02:15):
Mead was annoyed at the fire of a rebel battery
posted on an eminence beyond the wheatfield, about one thousand
yards distant. He inquired what troops those were stationed along
the stone fence which bounded the hither side of the wheatfield.
Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps,
he directed that they be sent forward to clear the
(02:36):
woods in front of the rebel skirmishers, who were very annoying,
and to drive away the battery, but not to get
into a fight that could bring on a general engagement.
As Crawford unmasked from the stone fence, the battery opened
fire on his right. He sent Colonel Enst Regiment deployed
as skirmishers against the guns, which retired as and approached.
(03:00):
Mc canless, who went forward with his brigade moved too
far to the right and Crawford ordered him to change
front and advanced toward round top. He did so and
struck a rebel brigade in flank, which was behind a
temporary breastwork of rails, sods, et cetera. When this brigade
saw a Union force apparently approaching from their own lines
(03:21):
to attack them in flank, they retreated in confusion after
a short resistance, and this disorder extended during the retreat
to a reserve brigade posted on the low ground in
their rear. Their flight did not cease until they reached
Horner's Woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched themselves.
(03:42):
These brigades belonged to Hood's Division, then under law. Longstreet says,
when this pickets charge failed, I expected that, of course
the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and
tried to crush us. I sent my staff officers to
the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried
(04:04):
to our line of batteries as the only support that
I could give them. I knew if the army was
to be saved, these batteries must check the enemy. For
unaccountable reasons, the enemy did not pursue his advantage. Longstreet
always spoke of his own men as invincible and stated
that on the second they did the best three hours
(04:26):
fighting that ever was done. But Crawford's attack seemed to
show that they too were shaken by the defeat of
Pickett's grand charge. A note here Crawford was also one
of those who took a prominent part in the defense
of Fort Sumter at the beginning of the war. We
each commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion. End of
(04:47):
the note in regard to the great benefit we would
have derived from a pursuit, it may not be out
of place to give the opinion of a few more
prominent Confederate officers. Alexander, chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in
a communication to the Southern Historical papers quote, I have
(05:09):
always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity
they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt defensive.
They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe. I
suppose the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more
than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered
from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all
(05:34):
over it. And they could concentrate their whole force at
any point, and in a very short time without our knowledge.
Our line was an enveloping semicircle over four miles in development,
and communication from flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult,
the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's
(05:55):
view and fire. The roads all running at right angles
to our line, and some of them at least broad turnpikes,
where the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is
it necessary now to add any statement as to the
superiority of the Federal force or the exhausted and shattered
condition of the Confederates for space of at least a
(06:18):
mile in their very center, to show that a great
opportunity was thrown away. I think General Lee himself was
quite apprehensive the enemy would repulst, and that it was
that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns
where he could observe all the indications. General Trimble, who
(06:38):
commanded a division of Hillscrps which supported Pickett in his advance, says,
by all the rules of warfare, the Federal troops should
as I expected, they would have marched against our shattered
columns and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat.
Colonel Simms, who commanded SEMs Georgia Brigade in the fight,
(07:00):
Crawford just referred to rites. To the latter, there was
such confusion in our army so far as my observation extended,
and I think we would have made but feeble resistance
if you had pressed on on the evening of the third.
General Meade, however, overcome by the great responsibilities of his position,
(07:21):
still clung to the ridge, and, fearful of a possible disaster,
would not take the risk of making an advance. And yet,
if he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army, then
and there he would have saved two years of war,
with its immense loss of life and countless evils. He
might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's Corps, which had
(07:42):
not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if
it was repulsed, the blows it gave would leave the
enemy little inclination to again assail the heights. At six
thirty p m. The firing ceased on the part of
the enemy, and although they retained their position the next day,
the Battle of Gettysburg was virtually at an end. The
(08:05):
town was still full of our wounded, and many of
our surgeons, with rare courage, remained there to take charge
of them, for it required some nerve to run the
risk of being sent to Libby prison when the fight
was over, a catastrophe which has often happened to our
medical officers. Among the rest, the chief surgeons of the
first Corps, doctor Theodore Hurd and doctor Thomas h. Bosch,
(08:30):
refused to leave their patients, and, in consequence of the
hasty retreat of the enemy, were fortunately not carried off.
After the battle, Mead had not the slightest desire to
recommence the struggle. It is a military maxim that to
a flying enemy must be given a wall of steel
or a bridge of gold. In the present instance, it
(08:53):
was unmistakably the bridge of gold that was presented. It
was hard to convince him that Lee was actually gone,
and at first he thought it might be a device
to draw the Union army from its strong position on
the heights. Our cavalry was sent out on the fourth
to ascertain where the enemy were and what they were doing.
(09:14):
General Burney threw forward a reconnoitering party and opened fire
with a battery on a column making their way toward Fairfield,
but he was checked at once and directed on no
account to bring on a battle. On the fifth, as
it was certain the enemy were retreating, Sedgwick received orders
to follow up the rear of the rebel column. He
(09:36):
marched eight miles to Fairfield, pass there Early, who was
in command of the rear guard, was endeavoring to save
the trains, which were heaped up in great confusion. Sedgwick,
after a distant cannonade, reported the position too strong to
be forced. It was a plain two miles wide, surrounded
(09:56):
by hills, and it would not have been difficult to
take it. But Sedgwick knew Mead favored the Bridge of
Gold policy and was not disposed to thwart the wishes
of his chief. In my opinion, Sedgwick should have made
an energetic attack, and Meade should have supported it with
his whole army, for our cavalry were making great havoc
in the enemy's train in rear, and if Lee, instead
(10:20):
of turning on Kilpatrick, had been forced to form line
against Meade, the cavalry which was between him and his
convoys of ammunition, in all probability, might have captured the
latter and ended the war. Stuart, it is true, was
following up Kilpatrick, but he took an indirect route and
was nearly a day behind. I do not see why
(10:42):
the force, which was now promptly detached from the garrisons
of Washington and Baltimore and sent to Harper's Ferry, could
not have formed on the Virginia side of the Potomac,
opposite William's Port, and with the co operation of General
Meade have cut off the ammunition of which Lee stood
so much in the needed as the river had risen, and
(11:03):
an expedition set out by General French from Frederick had
destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, everything seemed to favor
such a plan the moment it was ascertained that Lee
was cut off from Richmond and short of ammunition, the
whole North would have turned out and made a second
Saratoga of it. As it was, he had but few
(11:24):
rounds for his cannon, and our artillery could have opened
a destructive fire on him from a distance without exposing
our infantry. It was worth the effort, and there was
little or no danger in attempting it. Meade had Sedgwick's
fresh Corps and was reinforced by a division of eleven
thousand men under General W. F. Smith Baldy Smith French's
(11:47):
division of four thousand at Frederick, and troops from Washington
and Baltimore were also available to assist in striking the
final blow. The Twelfth Corps was also available, as Slocum
volunteered join in the pursuit. Mead, however, delayed moving at
all until Lee had reached Hagerstown, and then took a
route that was almost twice as long as that adopted
(12:10):
by the enemy. Lee marched day and night to avoid pursuit,
and when the river rose and his bridge was gone
so that he was unable to cross, he gained six
days in which to choose a position, fortify it, and
renew his supply of ammunition before Mead made his appearance.
In consequence of repeated orders from President Lincoln to attack
(12:33):
the enemy, Mead went forward and confronted Lee on the twelfth.
He spent that day and the next in making reconnaissances,
and resolved to attack on the fourteenth, but Lee left
during the night, and by eight a m. The entire
army of the enemy were once more on Virginia soil.
The Union loss in this campaign is estimated by the
(12:56):
Count of Paris, who is an impartial observer, at two thousand,
eight hundred thirty four killed, thirteen thousand, seven hundred wounded,
and six thousand, six hundred forty three missing, total twenty
three thousand, one hundred eighty six. The rebel loss he
puts at two thousand, six hundred sixty five killed, twelve thousand,
(13:19):
five hundred ninety nine wounded, seven thousand, four hundred sixty
four missing total twenty two thousand, seven hundred twenty eight.
Among the killed in the battle on the rebel side
were Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnet, Pender, and SEMs and Pettigrew.
During the retreat, among the wounded were Generals G. T. Anderson, Hampton, Jenkins, J. M. Jones,
(13:46):
Kemper and Scales. Archer was captured on the first day.
Among the killed on the Union side were Major General
Reynolds and brigadier Generals Vincent, Weade and Zuk. Among the
wounded were major Generals Sickle losing a leg, Hancock, Doubleday, Gibbon, Barlowe,
(14:07):
Warren and Butterfield, and Brigadier Generals Graham, Stannard, Paul losing
both eyes, Barnes, Brooke and Webb. This is the end
of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg by Abner Doubleday. Thank you for listening.
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