January 8, 2025 • 15 mins
We explore the structural challenges in the Chinese Economy, including the issue of fictitious wealth.
China Update provides listeners with the most up to date political, economic, and geostrategic analysis on China - so that you are on top of the world's number 2 economy. These podcasts are based on hundreds of articles, think tank reports, government statements and other resources in English and Chinese every week. The views and analysis are all my own and I produce the podcasts.
My Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/chinaupdate
Disclaimer: China Update is not a financial advisory channel. While I take great care in researching everything discussed in these podcasts, nothing I say should be taken as investment advice. Please speak to a professional before making any investment decisions. #China
China Update provides listeners with the most up to date political, economic, and geostrategic analysis on China - so that you are on top of the world's number 2 economy. These podcasts are based on hundreds of articles, think tank reports, government statements and other resources in English and Chinese every week. The views and analysis are all my own and I produce the podcasts.
My Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/chinaupdate
Disclaimer: China Update is not a financial advisory channel. While I take great care in researching everything discussed in these podcasts, nothing I say should be taken as investment advice. Please speak to a professional before making any investment decisions. #China
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Happy Wednesday, everybody. Welcome to another episode of China Update,
where I provide you with the most up to date political, economic,
and geostrategic analysis on the world's number two economy. My
name is Tony. Let's jump in now. Before we move
on to the main story, we note a tragic development.
A powerful seven point one magnitude earthquake struck Tibet near
Mount Everest on Tuesday morning local time, killing at least
(00:22):
one hundred and twenty six people and injuring almost two hundred.
Over three thousand buildings were destroyed, leaving thousands homeless as
temperatures plunged to negative sixteen degrees celsius three point two
degrees fahrenheit. Rescue operations continued through the night, with workers
navigating debris and distributing blankets in the hardest hit areas.
The quake, one of China's deadliest in recent years, also
(00:45):
disrupted power and water supplies, with over forty after shocks recorded.
Survivors described extensive destruction to dirt constructed homes or others
recalled the terror of being jolted awake by violent tremors.
Beijing his deployed drones and air force units to aid
recovery the Dealai Lama offered prayers for the victims, while
(01:06):
neighboring the poll which felt the tremors reported no major casualties. Okay,
now let's move to the main story for today. This week,
US based the Wired China, founded by veteran journalist David Barbosa,
who won two Pulitzer Prizes, both for China related stories,
published an excellent interview with Barry Norton. Norton, the Solquon Lock,
(01:28):
Chair of Chinese International Affairs at UC San Diego, is
one of the world's leading experts on China's economy and
its transformation over the last half century. In the interview,
Norton discusses the state of the economy generally and the
implications of Hujipink's vision for it. Specifically, he paints a
very pessimistic picture, potentially the end of China as we
(01:48):
have known it. The interview is long and well worth
reading in full of added a link to the interview
in the description below for today's video, and wanted to
move away from the regular format and examine some of
this interview and a few of Norton's more salient answers,
So we will quote selected excerpts lightly edited from the
piece directly question, There's been plenty of criticism of Beijing's
(02:10):
economic policy in recent years, an alarm about whether China
is entering a period of so called Japanification where it
experiences years of sluggish growth. How do you think we
should characterize the Chujumping economy right now? Answer? I think
we can characterize as approaches this billions for tech but
not one cent for bail ouce. This captures two elements
(02:31):
of what Chu jinping wants. The first is high tech
and secure development, or what she would call high quality growth,
and the other is that he's very adverse to bailing
out failing businesses or failing local governments, even when they
could potentially be put back on their feet with a
bit of a financing helping hand. Chijumping doesn't really care
(02:52):
about what Chinese people want to buy or want to make,
because that would just be ordinary GDP. He's asserting that
there's something more fundamental than that high quality GDP, which
is determined at the end of the day by Chi
Jimping himself. That's a very strong, deeply rooted tendency of his,
and it's really very similar to the impulses that drives
(03:14):
a planned economy. Chi Jimpin is making a gamble that
all these technologies the state is pouring capital into will
at some point come together and produce a sudden surge
of productivity. And he might be right. We can't say
for sure that he's not, but thus far he's very
much not. Question do you see it as realistic that
(03:34):
China will become self reliant in chips in the way
that she might also want? Answer no, not in a
reasonable foreseeable time frame five to ten years. But China
is making major investments in each link of the entire
semiconductor industrial chain, and they're making progress. Of course, in
a decade the semiconductor industry will have moved on. I
(03:55):
don't think anybody could say that this has been a
successful industrial policy so far, and it's been very costly.
Question to turn to the second half of your formulation,
no bailouts. How has that manifested itself in the last
two or three years? Answer? Of course, anti corruption is
a lynchpin of shooting things, consolidation of power. He wants
(04:17):
a more disciplined society. That's a big part of his
fundamental worldview, and so when it comes to look at
how to resolve an economic situation like the housing bust
or the crisis and local government finance, he's very adverse
to the idea of your going to reward anyone who
failed to manage their local jurisdiction effectively or who made
reckless investments. He just does not want to bail out
(04:38):
any of these people, because it would create a bad precedent.
This also means that none of the things that we're
seen to prop up demand and keep institutional structures intact
have yet involved a substantial resolution of large amounts of debt.
He keeps refinancing, kicking the can down the road, injecting
some funds into the system to keep everybody from falling,
(04:59):
but without resolving any of the problems. That's really a
problem because at a certain point you have to clean
up the mess. You mentioned earlier. Whether China was becoming
Japan like this is one respect in which it certainly is.
Japan spent almost a decade trying to painlessly restructure a
financial system that it suffered a huge reduction in the
(05:21):
value of its assets. It was the fundamental problem that
lay behind the so called Lost Decade in Japan and
now China seems to be repeating some parts of that question.
Any attempt to fully restore the financial system to health
is going to imply recognizing and apportioning losses. Though right answer,
I like the way you put it. It's a question
(05:42):
in financial slang of deciding who gets a haircut and
how much, and China hasn't done that. The only thing
they've done is to try to say no haircuts. Are
people who prepaid for their housing units, we should try
to guarantee delivery for them. That's a politically good idea,
but it's also a polite, easy policy. What is much
harder as deciding who gets forced into bankruptcy, who gets
(06:05):
bailed out, and who pays what costs in that process.
The best practice is to force some of the early
worst case bad actors into bankruptcy, but then, in order
to restore confidence, provide financial support to the better firms.
China had the chance to do this with collapsed real
estate developer Evergrand, but it never did put it decisively
(06:27):
into bankruptcy and instead just let it bleed to death.
Question do you see unemployment being a structural problem for China?
Is the shoot imping economy going to provide enough jobs
for the Chinese people to do in the future. Answer.
China seems to be rushing so fast into so many
of these new technologies without really worrying about what their
(06:48):
impact on employment will be that it seems at the
minimum to be reckless. There's two different neighbour markets too.
There's the market for newly minted college graduates, who compose
a whole spectrum of skilled levels but which certainly include
very highly skilled and very bright capable young people. And
there's a whole other labor market of mostly migrant workers.
(07:10):
Both these markets are in crisis. The data that China
releases are basically all about the first one, the urban,
relatively high skilled market, but the migrant market also seems
to be in some kind of crisis. Millions of migrants
have probably returned home and don't have very much to do.
I think these twin labor market problems are serious and
(07:31):
long term, and it's hard to see what they're doing
to deal with them. Question why doesn't China introduce a
more progressive tax system to redistribute wealth somewhat and also
improve the welfare system. Answer that's a great question, and
to be honest, I don't know. They have backed themselves
into a corner. Their primary constituency is really a couple
(07:55):
of hundred million urban people. They care a lot about
what those people think, and not so much about rural
people and migrants. They seem to be committed to protecting
the full value of the pensions and healthcare benefits for
all the urban residents and not subjecting them to additional taxation.
As a quick aside, if this statement is an accurate characterization,
(08:15):
it is deeply and bitterly ironic for a nominally communist party.
We continue with the quote, here's this government that in
many ways is not at all responsive to public opinion,
but on four or five crucial economic issues that impact
state workers, government employees, and urban full time employees of
other kinds, they are very, very cautious. Here ends the
(08:41):
direct quote. Now, before we examine his concluding statements, I
wanted to take a brief detour and examine an observation
from Peaking University professor of financed Michael Pettis, who we
quote often on China Update, who discussed this Morton piece
in a long post yesterday. But as quickly, if you're
getting some value from today's episode, of China Update. Don't
forget to thee like button. If you want to be
(09:01):
on top of major development in China as they happen,
maybe consider subscribing. And for those who want to go
the extra mile and help me keep China Update financially sustainable,
Patreon and Buymere Coffee links are in the description below.
Thank you so much everybody for the ongoing support. Now
we move to the Petus observation from yesterday. It's a
long quote, but it is worth giving him the space
(09:22):
to unpack his points. This is what he said in
response to this interview this week. Quote. Norton says that
Japan spent almost a decade trying to painlessly restructure a
financial system, that it suffered a huge reduction in the
value of its assets, and now China seems to be
repeating some parts of that. Norton is right and on
an issue that is widely misunderstood. The huge surge in
(09:44):
China's debt burden has been an enormous problem, but not
because the debt itself is the problem. It is just
the symptom of the problem in itself. Debt is simply
a set of transfers, an explicit transfer. Today followed by
an explicit or implicit transfer tomorrow. In China's case, most
of the accumulated debt had been used to fund investment,
(10:04):
but if this investment had been productive, then by definition,
the increase in debt would have been more than matched
over the medium term by an increase in GDP. The
fact that China's debt burden has surged in the past
fifteen years is pretty conclusive evidence that the investment in
the aggregate has not been productive. That's the problem. The
cost of creating these investment assets was much greater than
(10:27):
the value these assets generated for the economy. In an
economy governed by hard budget constraints, the losses would have
been expensed and so would not have added to overall GDP.
In China's case, however, the growing tendency of the economy
to shift to areas that did not operate under hard
budget constraints meant that those losses could be capitalized rather
(10:48):
than expensed, in which case they boosted GDP growth and
created fictitious wealth. As long as the associated debt servicing
costs could be ruled over, the economy could continue capitalizing
these losses and adding fictitiously to GDP, But because no
one has infinite debt capacity, eventually those fictitious losses have
(11:09):
to be recognized. What is much more difficult, the losses
also have to be implicitly or explicitly allocated within the economy.
This creates three separate problems. Ferst the GDP that was
created by capitalizing rather than expensing losses must be reversed. Secondly,
the creation of fictitious wealth at first boosts economic activity
through a wealth effect, but as it is written down,
(11:31):
it dampan's economic activity even more vigorously through a negative
wealth effect. We saw this with real estate in China.
As prices soared to well above any economically justified value.
Chinese households celebrated the amazing increase in their wealth by
consuming more than they otherwise would have. The reverse has
been true since twenty twenty one. The third problem may
(11:54):
be the most important and least understood. This is the
problem that corporate finance specialists refer to as financial distress costs,
or the adverse economic impact of the uncertainty associated with
the allocation of losses. The losses are ultimately shared out
between all stakeholders, but the way in which they are
shared out is very uneven and often very politicized. As
(12:15):
a result, stakeholders must alter their behavior in ways that
protect them and limit their exposure to the allocation of
these losses. The way they alter their behavior, businesses cut
back on investment, workers become more militant or more sluggish,
the rich engage in capital flight, policymakers shorten their time horizons, etc.
Always causes growth to decline more than it otherwise would have.
(12:39):
It is because of these financial distress costs that financial crises,
which assigns the losses more quickly through balance sheet collapses,
tend to be less painful economically in the long run,
even if they are more painful socially and politically in
the short run. This, as I see it, was Japan's
main problem by the US in late nineteen eighties. It
(13:01):
had enormous amounts of capitalized losses on collective balance sheets,
and these were resolved and allocated very slowly over a
period during which Japan's share of global GDP dropped from
seventeen percent to six percent. This, as I see it,
was Japan's main problem by the late nineteen eighties. It
had enormous amounts of capitalized losses on collective balance sheets,
(13:25):
and these were resolved and allocated very slowly over a
period during which Japan's share of global GDP dropped from
seventeen percent to six percent end quotes. Now, let's return
to Norton's interview, push, when you look back over your career,
do feel depressed about the way things have played out? Answer?
(13:48):
Of course, I feel sad that one of the things
I devoted my career to was trying to explain to
Americans why what was happening in China was important and
positive and more potentially been a official than a lot
of people realized. I was very disappointed at two things.
One was the very gradual change in Chinese policy after
(14:09):
about two thousand and six. It's a fundamental challenge to
our understanding not just of China, but of the world. China,
the country that benefited the most from globalization, chose to
turn against it and to say, oh, that was okay,
but we can do much better. That was ultimately very
destabilizing for the entire world. The second thing is that
(14:31):
China then abandoned the peaceful rise policy that it had
in the first part of the century and adopted a
set of policies to play a greater role on the
global stage while essentially eroding the basis of the American
system and pre positioning themselves to be in some kind
of alternative leadership position. So I feel quite surprised and sad,
(14:56):
but it is what it is. Here ends the direct
quote of the interview and to Day's episode of China Update.
Thank you very much everybody for watching. Please let me
know in the comments below what you thought of some
of the observations made in the interview as well as
Pitts's edition. Thank you everybody for watching to Day's episode
of China Update. Have a good Wednesday and I will
(15:18):
see you all tomorrow.
Happy Wednesday, everybody. Welcome to another episode of China Update,
where I provide you with the most up to date political, economic,
and geostrategic analysis on the world's number two economy. My
name is Tony. Let's jump in now. Before we move
on to the main story, we note a tragic development.
A powerful seven point one magnitude earthquake struck Tibet near
Mount Everest on Tuesday morning local time, killing at least
(00:22):
one hundred and twenty six people and injuring almost two hundred.
Over three thousand buildings were destroyed, leaving thousands homeless as
temperatures plunged to negative sixteen degrees celsius three point two
degrees fahrenheit. Rescue operations continued through the night, with workers
navigating debris and distributing blankets in the hardest hit areas.
The quake, one of China's deadliest in recent years, also
(00:45):
disrupted power and water supplies, with over forty after shocks recorded.
Survivors described extensive destruction to dirt constructed homes or others
recalled the terror of being jolted awake by violent tremors.
Beijing his deployed drones and air force units to aid
recovery the Dealai Lama offered prayers for the victims, while
(01:06):
neighboring the poll which felt the tremors reported no major casualties. Okay,
now let's move to the main story for today. This week,
US based the Wired China, founded by veteran journalist David Barbosa,
who won two Pulitzer Prizes, both for China related stories,
published an excellent interview with Barry Norton. Norton, the Solquon Lock,
(01:28):
Chair of Chinese International Affairs at UC San Diego, is
one of the world's leading experts on China's economy and
its transformation over the last half century. In the interview,
Norton discusses the state of the economy generally and the
implications of Hujipink's vision for it. Specifically, he paints a
very pessimistic picture, potentially the end of China as we
(01:48):
have known it. The interview is long and well worth
reading in full of added a link to the interview
in the description below for today's video, and wanted to
move away from the regular format and examine some of
this interview and a few of Norton's more salient answers,
So we will quote selected excerpts lightly edited from the
piece directly question, There's been plenty of criticism of Beijing's
(02:10):
economic policy in recent years, an alarm about whether China
is entering a period of so called Japanification where it
experiences years of sluggish growth. How do you think we
should characterize the Chujumping economy right now? Answer? I think
we can characterize as approaches this billions for tech but
not one cent for bail ouce. This captures two elements
(02:31):
of what Chu jinping wants. The first is high tech
and secure development, or what she would call high quality growth,
and the other is that he's very adverse to bailing
out failing businesses or failing local governments, even when they
could potentially be put back on their feet with a
bit of a financing helping hand. Chijumping doesn't really care
(02:52):
about what Chinese people want to buy or want to make,
because that would just be ordinary GDP. He's asserting that
there's something more fundamental than that high quality GDP, which
is determined at the end of the day by Chi
Jimping himself. That's a very strong, deeply rooted tendency of his,
and it's really very similar to the impulses that drives
(03:14):
a planned economy. Chi Jimpin is making a gamble that
all these technologies the state is pouring capital into will
at some point come together and produce a sudden surge
of productivity. And he might be right. We can't say
for sure that he's not, but thus far he's very
much not. Question do you see it as realistic that
(03:34):
China will become self reliant in chips in the way
that she might also want? Answer no, not in a
reasonable foreseeable time frame five to ten years. But China
is making major investments in each link of the entire
semiconductor industrial chain, and they're making progress. Of course, in
a decade the semiconductor industry will have moved on. I
(03:55):
don't think anybody could say that this has been a
successful industrial policy so far, and it's been very costly.
Question to turn to the second half of your formulation,
no bailouts. How has that manifested itself in the last
two or three years? Answer? Of course, anti corruption is
a lynchpin of shooting things, consolidation of power. He wants
(04:17):
a more disciplined society. That's a big part of his
fundamental worldview, and so when it comes to look at
how to resolve an economic situation like the housing bust
or the crisis and local government finance, he's very adverse
to the idea of your going to reward anyone who
failed to manage their local jurisdiction effectively or who made
reckless investments. He just does not want to bail out
(04:38):
any of these people, because it would create a bad precedent.
This also means that none of the things that we're
seen to prop up demand and keep institutional structures intact
have yet involved a substantial resolution of large amounts of debt.
He keeps refinancing, kicking the can down the road, injecting
some funds into the system to keep everybody from falling,
(04:59):
but without resolving any of the problems. That's really a
problem because at a certain point you have to clean
up the mess. You mentioned earlier. Whether China was becoming
Japan like this is one respect in which it certainly is.
Japan spent almost a decade trying to painlessly restructure a
financial system that it suffered a huge reduction in the
(05:21):
value of its assets. It was the fundamental problem that
lay behind the so called Lost Decade in Japan and
now China seems to be repeating some parts of that question.
Any attempt to fully restore the financial system to health
is going to imply recognizing and apportioning losses. Though right answer,
I like the way you put it. It's a question
(05:42):
in financial slang of deciding who gets a haircut and
how much, and China hasn't done that. The only thing
they've done is to try to say no haircuts. Are
people who prepaid for their housing units, we should try
to guarantee delivery for them. That's a politically good idea,
but it's also a polite, easy policy. What is much
harder as deciding who gets forced into bankruptcy, who gets
(06:05):
bailed out, and who pays what costs in that process.
The best practice is to force some of the early
worst case bad actors into bankruptcy, but then, in order
to restore confidence, provide financial support to the better firms.
China had the chance to do this with collapsed real
estate developer Evergrand, but it never did put it decisively
(06:27):
into bankruptcy and instead just let it bleed to death.
Question do you see unemployment being a structural problem for China?
Is the shoot imping economy going to provide enough jobs
for the Chinese people to do in the future. Answer.
China seems to be rushing so fast into so many
of these new technologies without really worrying about what their
(06:48):
impact on employment will be that it seems at the
minimum to be reckless. There's two different neighbour markets too.
There's the market for newly minted college graduates, who compose
a whole spectrum of skilled levels but which certainly include
very highly skilled and very bright capable young people. And
there's a whole other labor market of mostly migrant workers.
(07:10):
Both these markets are in crisis. The data that China
releases are basically all about the first one, the urban,
relatively high skilled market, but the migrant market also seems
to be in some kind of crisis. Millions of migrants
have probably returned home and don't have very much to do.
I think these twin labor market problems are serious and
(07:31):
long term, and it's hard to see what they're doing
to deal with them. Question why doesn't China introduce a
more progressive tax system to redistribute wealth somewhat and also
improve the welfare system. Answer that's a great question, and
to be honest, I don't know. They have backed themselves
into a corner. Their primary constituency is really a couple
(07:55):
of hundred million urban people. They care a lot about
what those people think, and not so much about rural
people and migrants. They seem to be committed to protecting
the full value of the pensions and healthcare benefits for
all the urban residents and not subjecting them to additional taxation.
As a quick aside, if this statement is an accurate characterization,
(08:15):
it is deeply and bitterly ironic for a nominally communist party.
We continue with the quote, here's this government that in
many ways is not at all responsive to public opinion,
but on four or five crucial economic issues that impact
state workers, government employees, and urban full time employees of
other kinds, they are very, very cautious. Here ends the
(08:41):
direct quote. Now, before we examine his concluding statements, I
wanted to take a brief detour and examine an observation
from Peaking University professor of financed Michael Pettis, who we
quote often on China Update, who discussed this Morton piece
in a long post yesterday. But as quickly, if you're
getting some value from today's episode, of China Update. Don't
forget to thee like button. If you want to be
(09:01):
on top of major development in China as they happen,
maybe consider subscribing. And for those who want to go
the extra mile and help me keep China Update financially sustainable,
Patreon and Buymere Coffee links are in the description below.
Thank you so much everybody for the ongoing support. Now
we move to the Petus observation from yesterday. It's a
long quote, but it is worth giving him the space
(09:22):
to unpack his points. This is what he said in
response to this interview this week. Quote. Norton says that
Japan spent almost a decade trying to painlessly restructure a
financial system, that it suffered a huge reduction in the
value of its assets, and now China seems to be
repeating some parts of that. Norton is right and on
an issue that is widely misunderstood. The huge surge in
(09:44):
China's debt burden has been an enormous problem, but not
because the debt itself is the problem. It is just
the symptom of the problem in itself. Debt is simply
a set of transfers, an explicit transfer. Today followed by
an explicit or implicit transfer tomorrow. In China's case, most
of the accumulated debt had been used to fund investment,
(10:04):
but if this investment had been productive, then by definition,
the increase in debt would have been more than matched
over the medium term by an increase in GDP. The
fact that China's debt burden has surged in the past
fifteen years is pretty conclusive evidence that the investment in
the aggregate has not been productive. That's the problem. The
cost of creating these investment assets was much greater than
(10:27):
the value these assets generated for the economy. In an
economy governed by hard budget constraints, the losses would have
been expensed and so would not have added to overall GDP.
In China's case, however, the growing tendency of the economy
to shift to areas that did not operate under hard
budget constraints meant that those losses could be capitalized rather
(10:48):
than expensed, in which case they boosted GDP growth and
created fictitious wealth. As long as the associated debt servicing
costs could be ruled over, the economy could continue capitalizing
these losses and adding fictitiously to GDP, But because no
one has infinite debt capacity, eventually those fictitious losses have
(11:09):
to be recognized. What is much more difficult, the losses
also have to be implicitly or explicitly allocated within the economy.
This creates three separate problems. Ferst the GDP that was
created by capitalizing rather than expensing losses must be reversed. Secondly,
the creation of fictitious wealth at first boosts economic activity
through a wealth effect, but as it is written down,
(11:31):
it dampan's economic activity even more vigorously through a negative
wealth effect. We saw this with real estate in China.
As prices soared to well above any economically justified value.
Chinese households celebrated the amazing increase in their wealth by
consuming more than they otherwise would have. The reverse has
been true since twenty twenty one. The third problem may
(11:54):
be the most important and least understood. This is the
problem that corporate finance specialists refer to as financial distress costs,
or the adverse economic impact of the uncertainty associated with
the allocation of losses. The losses are ultimately shared out
between all stakeholders, but the way in which they are
shared out is very uneven and often very politicized. As
(12:15):
a result, stakeholders must alter their behavior in ways that
protect them and limit their exposure to the allocation of
these losses. The way they alter their behavior, businesses cut
back on investment, workers become more militant or more sluggish,
the rich engage in capital flight, policymakers shorten their time horizons, etc.
Always causes growth to decline more than it otherwise would have.
(12:39):
It is because of these financial distress costs that financial crises,
which assigns the losses more quickly through balance sheet collapses,
tend to be less painful economically in the long run,
even if they are more painful socially and politically in
the short run. This, as I see it, was Japan's
main problem by the US in late nineteen eighties. It
(13:01):
had enormous amounts of capitalized losses on collective balance sheets,
and these were resolved and allocated very slowly over a
period during which Japan's share of global GDP dropped from
seventeen percent to six percent. This, as I see it,
was Japan's main problem by the late nineteen eighties. It
had enormous amounts of capitalized losses on collective balance sheets,
(13:25):
and these were resolved and allocated very slowly over a
period during which Japan's share of global GDP dropped from
seventeen percent to six percent end quotes. Now, let's return
to Norton's interview, push, when you look back over your career,
do feel depressed about the way things have played out? Answer?
(13:48):
Of course, I feel sad that one of the things
I devoted my career to was trying to explain to
Americans why what was happening in China was important and
positive and more potentially been a official than a lot
of people realized. I was very disappointed at two things.
One was the very gradual change in Chinese policy after
(14:09):
about two thousand and six. It's a fundamental challenge to
our understanding not just of China, but of the world. China,
the country that benefited the most from globalization, chose to
turn against it and to say, oh, that was okay,
but we can do much better. That was ultimately very
destabilizing for the entire world. The second thing is that
(14:31):
China then abandoned the peaceful rise policy that it had
in the first part of the century and adopted a
set of policies to play a greater role on the
global stage while essentially eroding the basis of the American
system and pre positioning themselves to be in some kind
of alternative leadership position. So I feel quite surprised and sad,
(14:56):
but it is what it is. Here ends the direct
quote of the interview and to Day's episode of China Update.
Thank you very much everybody for watching. Please let me
know in the comments below what you thought of some
of the observations made in the interview as well as
Pitts's edition. Thank you everybody for watching to Day's episode
of China Update. Have a good Wednesday and I will
(15:18):
see you all tomorrow.
Popular Podcasts
New Heights with Jason & Travis Kelce
Football’s funniest family duo — Jason Kelce of the Philadelphia Eagles and Travis Kelce of the Kansas City Chiefs — team up to provide next-level access to life in the league as it unfolds. The two brothers and Super Bowl champions drop weekly insights about the weekly slate of games and share their INSIDE perspectives on trending NFL news and sports headlines. They also endlessly rag on each other as brothers do, chat the latest in pop culture and welcome some very popular and well-known friends to chat with them. Check out new episodes every Wednesday. Follow New Heights on the Wondery App, YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts. You can listen to new episodes early and ad-free, and get exclusive content on Wondery+. Join Wondery+ in the Wondery App, Apple Podcasts or Spotify. And join our new membership for a unique fan experience by going to the New Heights YouTube channel now!
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!