Henry Kissinger and International Law

On November 29, 2023, Henry Kissinger died at the age of 100. The former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor had a long and distinguished career as a scholar and statesman, and his legacy is both prolific and controversial. While many have celebrated his success in resolutely pursuing US global interests, others have criticized Kissinger for his alleged disregard of such values as human rights. This panel discussion explores the complex and multifaceted nature of Kissinger’s legacy, focusing on his interaction with international law and his role in shaping US foreign policy.

Featuring:

• Prof. Jeremi Suri, Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs; Professor of Public Affairs and History, University of Texas
• Prof. Thomas Schwartz, Distinguished Professor of History, Professor of Political Science and European Studies, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Vanderbilt University
• Prof. John Yoo, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley; Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution

Episode Transcript

(00:02):
Welcome to fedsock Forums, a podcastof the Federal Society's Practice Groups. I'm
May kas Merrick, vice President andDirector of Practice Groups at the Federal Society.
For exclusive access to live recordings offedsock Forum programs, become a Federal
Society member today at fedsoc dot org. Well, hello, everyone, and
welcome to today's Fedsock Forum. Today, February seventh, twenty twenty four,

(00:23):
we are excited to present Henry Kissingerand International Law. My name is Jack
Peazi and I'm an assistant Director ofPractice Groups of the Federal Society. As
always, please note that all expressionsof opinion are those of the experts on
today's call. Today, we aredelighted to be joined by Professor Thomas Schwartz,
a distinguished Professor of history and aprofessor of political science and European Studies

(00:45):
and a Director of Undergraduate Studies atVanderbilt University. He is also the author
of Henry Kissinger and American Power.We are also joined by Professor Jeremy Surrey,
who is the mac Brown Distinguished Chairfor Leadership and Global Affairs and Professor
of Public Affairs and History at theUniversity of Texas. At Austin. He's
also the author of Henry Kissinger andthe American Century, and he's the host

(01:07):
of the This Is Democracy podcast.Our moderator today is Professor John Yu who
is the Emmanuel S. Heller Professorof Law at the University of California at
Berkeley. He's also a non residentSenior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and
a visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. After our speakers have given their remarks,
we will turn to you the audiencefor any questions you might have.

(01:29):
If you have a question at anypoint, please just type it into the
Q and a function at the bottomof your screen, and we will handle
those as we can towards the endof the program. With that, thank
you all very much for being withus today. Professor you, I'll hand
it over to you. Thanks Jack, and thanks to the Federal Society for
organizing this important forum. And alsoI really want to thank our two guests,

(01:52):
Professor Thomas Schwartz Professor Jeremy Surrey fromVanderbilt and University at Texas. I'm
just going to play a moderator role. Each speaker will have about ten to
fifteen minutes to discuss the issue beforeus about Henry Kissinger, international politics,
international law. Then we'll have sometime set aside for them to respond to

(02:15):
each other, and then about twentyminutes I hope for questions from all of
you using the chat function, whichi'll read off just in the interest of
full disclosure. Tom Schwartz was aprofessor of mine in college, and he
gave me the important advice don't goto graduate school get a law degree.

(02:36):
I I think the law may beworse off for his advice, but it
was certainly better for me. Butmy heart of hearts, I would love
to have done what Tom and Jeremydo for a living. And I just
want to say that because I thinkthis is great that the Federal Society is
inviting non last speakers, people whowe think of as the real experts about
the facts when we then make legalarguments about again. And I hope we

(03:00):
are going to do a lot moreof this in the future. And I
can't think a better topic and betterspeakers than two time diplomatic historians talking about
Kissinger. So we did the cointoss in the beginning, and Jeremy lost,
so he goes first, and Tomhas asked to receive in the second
half, Jeremy, why don't youbegin? Thank you for joining us,

(03:23):
Thank you, Thank you John foryour very kind introduction. Thank you to
the Federalist Society for organizing this.Thank you to all the people who have
given time to be a part ofour discussion. Most of all, I
want to thank my friend Tom Schwartzfor doing this with me. Tom was
not ever formerly my teacher, butI sort of feel like he's one of
the great figures in our field who'salways been a mentor and a friend to

(03:49):
me. I've known him since Iwas in graduate school, and it's really
a pleasure to do anything with Tom. And I'm delighted that both he and
I have tried to make sense ofwhat one can not really make sense of,
which is the brain of Henry Kissinger. It is so tooy, generous,
and even at one hundred it wasstill a machine without parallel And I'm

(04:10):
delighted we have a chance to talkabout this today, particularly the topic of
international law, because I think thisis one of many areas, but certainly
one of the key areas where Kissingeris often misunderstood. The standard thing you'll
hear from polemicists, and from somescholars who maybe haven't approached things with the
depth that Tom and I have.They'll say that he didn't care about international

(04:32):
law, that he was this sortof quintessential Machiavellian figure, who, of
course, the term Makuavellian doesn't evenreflect mcavelly's thinking. Ends justify the means,
et cetera, et cetera, andI think that's way off base.
There are many things, perhaps tocriticize in the way Kissinger conceptualized and implemented
his ideas about international law, butthere's no doubt that he came out of

(04:55):
from the very beginning a tradition seepedin thinking about interest national law. One
of the main points of my book, which is as much an intellectual history
as it is a diplomatic history.Tom's book is wonderful in its detailed analysis
of a lot of Kissinger's policy making. My book is trying to understand where
Kissinger comes from. One of thecentral points of my book is that he

(05:17):
really is the figure in American policymaking who brings late nineteenth century German intellectual
thought into the world of American policy. The most important figures in his intellectual
development where figures like Carl Friedrich,Hans Morgenthau, Oswald Spengler, to some
extent Karl Schmidt, and he thinksof the world. And this is where

(05:40):
there's a tension between his thinking anda Wilsonian American discourse. He has trouble
thinking of the world in ways thatare built around democracy and liberalism. He
thinks much more in terms of Germanthought from the late nineteenth century. How
would I characterize that a world thatis built around hierarchy, a world that

(06:01):
is built around bildung notions of particularideas having precedents over others. Culture and
law are one and the same forKissinger as they were for most nineteenth century
German thinkers. And power is culturallydefined, but it is culture not in
a democratic vector. It is culturein a hierarchical, meritocratic vector, and

(06:26):
one that reflects what he sees aslarge conglomerations of cultural, political, and
military achievement. And this, bythe way, is one of the reasons
I think he was drawn to Chinafrom a very early period. There's no
doubt that Richard Nixon also was drawnto China for his own reasons, but
Kissinger, I think, although notan expert on China. Certainly, early
in his career quite naturally sought Chinaas the Germany of Asia, and I

(06:50):
think in some moments he thought ofPersia and Iran as the Germany of the
Middle East. Right, these longstandingcultures of power, longstanding nodes of achievement,
and an intellectual civilizational accomplishment. Andthat's a very nineteenth century German way
of thinking. From Carl Friedrich,who was one of Kissinger's most important intellectual

(07:14):
teachers at Harvard and thereafter, fromFriedrich he learned, I think, a
conception of international law that was reallybuilt around rules, norms, and federalism.
But federalism not in an American sense. It was to be a world
where there were rules. Unlike HeadleyBull and others who are of a similar
generation, he did not see anarchyin the world Kissinger. He saw oligopoly.

(07:40):
He saw large entities vying for power, and of course the role of
many other smaller entities in that largerecosystem. It was an ecosystem that was
oligopolists, where many of the smalleractors played an important role as coalition builders.
Kissinger is really one of the firstAmericans to make the case that multi
polarity is better than bipolarity for thisreason, right, the standard way of

(08:03):
thinking about the Cold War from GeorgeKennon Ford was a world that was bipolar.
Kissinger always thought of it as multipolar. He always thought of it in
this great power context of the nineteenthcentury. So international law served a set
of needs. This is what hegets from Friedrich. I think rules of
the game, things you do andthings you don't do, norms, and

(08:24):
they fundamentally serve to create order,to preserve order. And I think some
people have taken the Spenglarian influences onKissinger too far, but they're definitely there.
He's definitely a declinist. He's definitelyone who sees that an international system
that's unregulated, that doesn't have somekind of legal authority, is an international
system that will careem to disaster,which is of course his explanation for World

(08:46):
War One, which was a standardexplanation at the time. International rules are
designed to mediate conflict, they're designedto arbitrate conflict, and they're designed to
provide predictability so leaders don't mistakes withinthat context. Within that context, international
law for Kissinger was not democratic andit was not judicial, it was enforced

(09:11):
by the largest actors. Again,this is a very nineteenth century German way
of thinking about this, that thelaw overlaps with the responsibility of the largest
actors in that much of Kissinger's career, I think can be defined as his
efforts to educate Americans what he thoughtwas their role in the world as enforcers
of a certain set of norms,a certain order in the world that of

(09:35):
course would serve American interests, butwould serve the interests of other countries as
well. And I think this isone of the many reasons toward the end
of his life, while he wasso alarmed by the belliger and conflictual framing
of US China relations, because forKissinger, the future of Asia was to
be a regulated, legally managed worldorder in Asia, with the United States

(09:56):
and China were the first among equalsand able to manage relationships in that context.
This is why, like the EuropeanUnion, people forget he was an
advocate of the European Union. He'sinfamously quoted for saying that there was no
one in charge of the European Union, but that was the whole point for
him. It was to be acoalition, a federalist coalition of states that

(10:16):
would manage law and order within thispart of the world and would work very
well for that purpose for him.So international law was to be made enforced
by the largest states, by thestates that were the highest achieving, and
they were to see responsibility that theyhad for smaller states as well as smaller
states were to see responsibilities toward them. The states, for Kissinger in his

(10:41):
model of international law, are thereceptacles of power, but the real sources
of legitimacy, and he writes aboutlegitimacy quite a lot, especially from his
dissertation forward. The sources of legitimacywere cultural. Why was it that the
United States had a role to playin the world. It wasn't simply because
we were a powerful country or richcountry. It was because we were a
center of cultural production. We werea center of achievement. And this is

(11:05):
why Kissinger's international legal theory, theorizing, and thinking can look racist and culturally
condescending to some because it is culturallycondescending because it is built around the notion
that all cultures are not equal.It is built around the notion that all
civilizations are not equal, and it'snot an honor off switch either. It's

(11:28):
a very hierarchical world. And again, someone coming from his intellectual tradition,
that should not be surprising to usat all. Hans Morgenthal thought of the
world they were. In fact,most of the Emigray intellectuals, including Hannah
Aren't if you push them, wouldthink about the world in these terms.
And it meant that military power wasactually not the end all be all for

(11:52):
Kissinger. Diplomacy was the place whereculture and military power came together. And
I think that's the best way tounderstand so many of his diplomatic initiatives,
whether we're talking about China, wewere talking about Detante, but we're talking
about Sheltle diplomas in the Middle East, which of course has taken on a
new relevance recently. Tony Blinking iskind of trying to recreate this. For

(12:13):
Kissinger, Egypt played a particularly importantrole, not simply because it was a
powerful neighbor to Israel, but becauseit was a legitimate center of cultural power.
Kissinger agreed with Sadat that Egypt wasthe rightful cultural center for at least
one main part of the Arab world. And Kissinger had no time for Palestinians

(12:37):
because he saw them as not culturallysignificant. Whether that's right or wrong,
we can debate. But that's howhe saw the world. And I think
the power of his vision was hewas able to effectuate based on a clairvoyant
understanding and mapping of the world inthis way. I just wanted to say
a couple of other things about theapplication then of international They were skeptical of

(13:01):
international institutions. He was skeptical ofthose international institutions because he believed they would
be hijacked by one of his overridingfears, which was populism. And I
wanted to tell one story, onestory, which is that years ago we
were out at dinner. This wasa dinner with the New York Historical Society.
It was when my book had comeout, and at that point he

(13:22):
was happy with the book. Laterhe wasn't'd be clear on that. But
we were sitting at dinner, andthis was two thousand and eight, in
the spring of two thousand and eight, and it just looked like candidate Barack
Obama was going to seal up theDemocratic nomination. And I said to doctor
Kissinger, I said, you know, I've gone to a few rallies.

(13:45):
I was then the University of WisconsinMadison, I was on the faculty there.
I was like, I'm excited,regardless what you think about Obama,
I'm excited that so many young peopleare excited. I'm glad to see.
And he said to me, andI think it was a very honest moment.
He said, you know, whenI see large numbers of people excited
at rallies, I'm not sure that'swhat we want in our politics. I'm

(14:05):
not sure that's the politics we want. That applies to his view of domestic
politics. By the way, Idon't think he was opposed to civil rights,
but he was never a civil rightsmarcher, even though many of his
many Jews of his generation were.But I think it also applies as understanding
of international institutions, because he hadwitnessed the United Nations, in a sense,
get captured yet perhaps overtaken by akind of populism, and he was

(14:26):
fearful that other institutions would fall thatway. International law was to be implemented
by the most capable powers and bythe leaders of the most capable powers.
He was explicitly elitist about this.We don't have to like it, but
we have to recognize it and recognizethe power of that vision. I think
it allowed him to effectuate change,It allowed him to do things. It

(14:48):
was also a world that was federalistin Carl Friedrich's thinking, which is to
say, nested levels of authority.The United States was to have primary influence
in its own area and its ownand its own continent, but then secondary
influence in a transatlantic space, tertiaryinfluence thereon. It was a world of
nested sovereignties. I spend a lotof trying to explain to my students.

(15:11):
I don't think I have to explainto this audience that sovereignty is not an
all or nothing. There are differentdegrees of sovereignty, and for him,
the world was one of different levels, different concentric circles of sovereignty, the
United States perhaps having the largest piece, but having limitations as well as many
levels to its sovereignty. And thenthe final point was that his notion of
international law was not to be subjectedto elections. He was skeptical, and

(15:37):
I've come to agree with him moreand more over time that elections actually produce
the kinds of leadership and serious thinkingthat we would hope to see. I
guess another way of putting that ishe anticipated all the problems of crowdsourcing very
early on. For him, internationallaw was to have its own international standing.
It was to be recognized as adiscipline, as a way of thinking,

(16:00):
and people to be educated into it. There's a platonic element to this.
It wasn't to be static, butit wasn't to be a popularity contest
as well. And this is whytime and again the criticisms of the unpopularity
of some of his policies actually didn'tshatter his confidence. It actually reinforced much

(16:21):
of his thinking on that. Justa final word I've talked for about twelve
thirteen minutes, Just a final wordI wanted to say is I don't think
we have to buy his vision ofinternational law holy or even mostly, but
I think there are a lot ofinsights into it. And the one I
just take away most today when Ilook at places like the Middle East or
I look at Ukraine, are theperils of trying to build international law without

(16:47):
the strong buy in of the mostpowerful actors. Whether we agree normatively as
to whether that should be true ornot, doesn't really matter. I think
the historical record I'm guessing Tom willagree is that whether we want to or
not, great powers have to beat the center of international well. There
have to be laws and rules,and the great powers have to be key
actors. We as a country haveto recognize that and convince ourselves of that.

(17:11):
I think it's atrocious that we're consideringabandoning the Ukrainians. That's just my
view, and I think Kissinger wouldfind that atrocious as well. But we
also have to get the buy infrom other countries, and we have to
do work to build a system notof international intervention in Ukraine, but of
consensus law and the enforcement of thatlaw by the most powerful actors in the

(17:33):
way that's most effected. So Iwill leave it there, Tom, to
you. The mass are wonderful.Thank you, Jeremy. We're going to
turn over to Professor Schwortz. Justa short comment. Jermy's remarks make me
think that if he could have,Kissinger would have claimed co authorship of the
Federal's papers too, because a lotof the first he thought he wrote all

(17:56):
the great ideas in our time,but more importantly a lot of things that
did Jeremy say, really, egoare resound from themes in the Federal's papers,
which a lot of people in theaudience of course read and are very
familiar with. But that was thatwas wonderful, Professor Schwartz, Please,
oh, well after that, Ireally Jeremy has provided a really extraordinary understanding

(18:23):
for Kissinger and international law. ThatI had a problem initially with our even
the subject, because not that Idismissed his ideas international law. It's just
that it's not something that I foundhim very engaged in as a policymaker,
and it was a little hard forme to conceptualize what I wanted to say
about it. In that case.The other thing was that I was thinking,

(18:45):
as this forum was developed, Iwas thinking of all the accusations against
Kissinger, namely for violating international law, for being in effect what Rolling Stone
and what many on the left inthe United States called the war criminal after
death, and anyone who followed thereactions of some after his death recognizes that
he was accused constantly of all sortsof crimes against international law in that period.

(19:10):
And I wanted to in a sensesay a little bit about that as
well. In the course of thisand recognizing I think Jeremy's sense of Kissinger's
intellectual history is one that I share. His book was very fundamental in my
thinking about thinking about Kissinger's background.But here's where I was thinking the book.

(19:32):
My book originated in the concept orthe idea of using Kissinger's biography to
talk in some manner about the historyof American foreign relations, to use biography
as a lens through which to seewhat I called at that time the dilemmas
of American power. In a way, it was the initial spur for the

(19:55):
book series was this notion of teachinghistory through biography, which has its problems
but also is very effective student.I think in general people respond to biography
much better than they do to moreabstract historical works, and I saw Kissinger's
biography particularly is encapsulating the rise ofAmericas to its great power status, and

(20:18):
then the Kissinger's own exercise of poweras both National security advisor than Secretary of
State, and for a period oftime as Secretary of State almost as president
for foreign policy. Kissinger's life,of course, from his birth in Germany,
his immigration after the Nazis came topower, then his return in the
form of an American occupation regime andhis ascendency through what Jeremy called well a

(20:45):
Cold war university Harvard University at thattime is a pretty remarkable story and it
does capture aspects of the American century, the American a period of power in
the twentieth century. But my bookreally in terms of any contribution, intellectually
starts with Kissinger coming to be RichardNixon's National security advisor in nineteen sixty nine.

(21:11):
This was a post that I arguein my book, which Richard Nixon
wanted. He recognized in Henry Kissingeran extraordinary talent in both bureaucratic maneuvering and
power and understanding how to make thebureaucracy work. He wanted to use Kissinger's

(21:32):
National Security advisor to bring foreign policymaking into the White House, to also
ensure that the foreign policy decisions andparticular innovations of the Nixon administration would redound
to his political credit. That hisre election as president was one of his
foremost objectives from the very moment hebecame president, and he saw particularly in

(21:53):
changing American foreign policy. In movingaway from one might have one might argue
was the Kennedy pay any price baronyburden view of American leadership to one which
did retrench American power, but didit in a creative way in which kept
the United States as an important playerin the international system. And in that

(22:18):
sense Kissinger was, although he hadhis own ideas, he also was He
worked with Richard Nixon, and RichardNixon had certain objectives and fundamental to my
book is a take on Henry Kissingerthat is a little different from what others
wrote before me in terms of stressingother historians did stress more Kissinger's ideas,

(22:42):
his role as a theorist, thebackground of his ideas, particularly his embrace
of what's called real politique, theGerman word for approaching foreign policy with an
emphasis on states protecting and furthering theirnational interests, largely devoid of ideology or
moral considerations. My emphasis is onehot Kissinger is a political figure, a

(23:04):
politician, someone who recognized how significantdomestic politics were in carrying out foreign policy,
and he worked to facilitate that bothfor President Nixon and ultimately for President
Ford as well, seeing in foreignpolicy very much an aspect of the domestic
battles in the United States, ofa way to help his political masters his

(23:26):
political those who he worked for.There was a moment I think when Kissinger
himself sort of, I don't haveany I don't have many good stories.
I only met with Kissinger once foran interview. He was not particularly thrilled
with the idea of my book.As he said, when I told him
I was going to write something short, he said, you will leave things

(23:47):
out, and so I knew that. But he was kind in other respects.
And particularly one of the references Ifound that I tell in my book
is when he was discussing the MiddleEast, an area where he played a
particularly crucial role and wanted to beshaping policy, and he was annoyed with

(24:11):
Nixon, and he made a remarkabout that damn constitutional amendment that he wanted
the Republicans to push through to leta foreign board person become president of the
United States. So he had hisown visions. At times he did serve
Nixon in particular ways, and Ithink here goes to what I had thought

(24:32):
about with international law, namely tomany of the accusations against him. Christopher
Hitchins, who was really most responsiblein the work the trial of Henry Kissinger,
argued that there were three fundamental areaswhere Kissinger could be seen as a
war criminal or be brought before internationallaw. One was in the bobbing of
Cambodia, the second was in theoverturning of the Chilean government of Salvadary and

(24:56):
and the third was in the supportgiven to General Suharto and pressing the East
Timor rebellion in nineteen seventy five.In terms of the Vietnam War, Kissinger
did obviously come in I think skepticalof the war, believing though it needed
to be ended in a manner thatsomehow preserved American credibility, which was also

(25:17):
something Richard Nixon believed. Nixon believedthat he could end the war in a
manner that Eisenhower and ended the KoreanWar, preserve a independent South Vietnam.
He wanted to go beyond. Hewanted to demonstrate to the North Vietnamese that
he would go beyond the tactics thatwere used by the Johnson administration, and
so one of those was to bombNorth Vietnamese installations in Cambodia, which he

(25:38):
did with fervor, and which Kissingerthought was also a very important step in
trying to lead to a settlement inVietnam. Kissinger at this time was also
trying to further nixon So called Madmantheory by meeting with the Russian ambassador and
suggesting that Dixon might have lost hismind if he can't end Vietnam War.

(26:00):
Jeremy has written about the nuclear alertthat or Nixon launched in October of sixty
nine. So there were all theseattempts to end the war, frustrated by
the fact Tenoi would not go alongwith it, and in fact, the
expansion of the war and the Cambodianbombing I think is part of that,

(26:21):
to the extent that Cambodia was apart of the Vietnam War, I think
any indictment of Henry Kissdry has torecognize that the war was a product of
many American administrations and leaders, andthat signaling him out for the role on
the bombing of Cambodia is I thinkmisguided and overwhelmingly, I think misses the

(26:42):
degree to which this was part ofa larger conflict that American leaders had launched
with in terms of the containment policyand the prevention of Communist expansion that had
been the theme of American foreign policysince nineteen forty five. On the Chilean
case, I think that I ammore critical, but I think that Chile

(27:03):
represented particularly the sensitivity of Richard Nixonto communism in Latin America, something that
he had seen in the Cuban caseand had been very sensitive too, and
that he was particularly determined to getthe CIA involved in Kissinger again served as
the point man for this. Idon't think he cared a great deal about
Chile at all, but he didfurther covert activities that were designed to prevent

(27:29):
Allende from coming to power, oneof which resulted in the death of General
Renae Schneider in Chile. I thinkin this case, I think we can
be very critical of the administration forattempting this, since I think it was
an overreaction to the Chilean situation,but I don't think it amounts to a
criminal indictment. And even in anEast timor, which I think the United

(27:51):
States really largely lacked the ability toreally control what the Indonesian government would do,
and also was in a position whereSoutheast Asia had been so weakened by
are the stans of the United Stateshave been so weakened by the collapse in
Vietnam. That was very unlikely thatthe United States was going to take a

(28:12):
strong stance against one of its remainingallies in Indonesia, and that was something
I think both for It and Nixonwere agreed on. There are many other
aspects. There are other aspects ofKissinger's misjudgments on the Indo Pakistan War also
because of no session. I thinkwith China there were achievements though, and

(28:33):
I think one cannot underestimate. AndI think one of the things I tried
to do in my biography is triedto come to some sort of a balanced
judgment on Henry Kissinger, and Ithink on the Middle East he played an
extraordinary role in setting up at leastthe beginnings of a peaceful framework in the
Middle East. Obviously, that looksa lot further away now than it did

(28:53):
maybe even a few months ago,and it looked like Saudi Arabia and Israel
were going to make an agreement.But nevertheless, Kissinger shuttle diplomacy during that
period with both Egypt and Syria wasI think a major achievement for American diplomacy
during this period. His day tentwith the Soviet Union. Despite the criticisms

(29:15):
I think later was also necessary givenAmerican public opinion, and I think it
was conducted in a manner that recognizedthe responsibility of both nuclear powers to being
particularly responsible or careful about the dangersof nuclear escalation. And I do think
Henry Kissinger, and I'm going totell a story here from a friend who

(29:37):
recently passed away, Ambassador John Kornbloom, who was here at Vanderbilt. He
worked for Kissinger during this period andremembered presenting Kissinger with a suggestion on the
human rights policy in nineteen seventy five, which Kissinger rejected. Kissinger, in
that sense rejected the idea that humanrights had to obtain a higher priority in

(29:59):
American form and policy. And Cornbeamalways felt that Kissinger in this sense had
become too stubborn, had become blindedand missed the domestic political salience of human
rights at this point, and thiswas one of his mistakes toward the end
of his time in office, andthat he later of course became more sensitive
and was of course much more willingto talk about human rights, even though

(30:23):
in many respects he certainly did notvalue it in the same manner as others
in international politics. In his earlycareer, Kissinger often referenced the Greek goddess
Nemesis, which defeated man by fulfillinghis wishes in a different form or answering
his prayers too completely. I thinkKissinger, who became such a celebrity and

(30:47):
who personalized his own foreign policy,got his prayers answered too completely in the
sense that he came to be seenas responsible, particularly in a moral sense,
for many policies and actions over whichhe had relatively little influencer control.
And I think, to borrow fromJeremy's reference to legitimacy, I think in
a sense Kissinger Kissinger did worry aboutthe legitimacy of the international system. He

(31:12):
was concerned about, for about thepolicies of countries like Iran with their revolutionary
nature, and of course of theSoviet Union early in the Cold War and
later in China, and did hopein some sense to achieve a certain stability
in international affairs that would prevent thepossibility of either nuclear war or very serious

(31:33):
international warfare. But I think inthat sense he was not as he had
that skepticism toward international institutions in internationallaw that Jeremy's reference, and in a
way became targeted as responsible for policiesadopted by the United States government over which

(31:57):
some of which he had influence,but over a period of time that made
his own the reference or the reactionto, for example, his passing to
be as polarized as it was andthe accusations to be as extreme as they
were over his conduct of American foreignpolicy. So I'll stop there, maybe

(32:19):
we can have a discussion. Thankyou, Tom, and that was wonderful.
Both of you remind me how muchbetter it is to be a professor
in the arts and sciences where youcan talk about Nemesis and you don't have
to drop a footnote to explain whothat is if to our viewers though,
I love it. I love itso Jeremy, maybe you could take a
few minutes to comment on anything youheard from Professor Schortz, particularly he went

(32:43):
through, you know, the famousChristopher Hitchins indictment of Kissingerich I don't think
you could. You almost got to, but didn't quite get to. And
then maybe in about seven or eightminutes we'll turn to questions. We have
a lot of them. They're veryI'm looking at them, very educated and
thorough, quite deep questions, soplease send them in. We'll get to
as many as you can. Bythe way, use the Q and A

(33:06):
function, not the webinar chat function. Thank you everybody. Jeremy, So
that was fantastic, Tom. Ialways learned so much from your writing and
from your presentations, and I thinkyou have really brought out better than anyone
else. As you say, Kissingeris politician as someone who really understood I
think in his terms that power ispolitical. I mean, he was a

(33:29):
student of Klauswitz. He had livedthat in World War Two, that you
can't have power, you can't getthings done if you cannot play to the
egos, interests, and concerns ofvarious actors. That applies to the international
space as well as the domestic space. What fascinates me, I have no
disagreement with anything you've said. Whatfascinates me, though, is as a

(33:50):
political actor, how tone deaf hecould sometimes be to the criticisms that he
faced. You know, our mutualcolleague John Gaddis, who we both have
enormous respect for, writes very positivelyabout Kissinger's Heartland speeches in seventy five and
seventy six, when he goes aroundthe country he goes to Minnesota, he
goes to Cleveland, and he triesto convince people, you know, that

(34:15):
there's a moral vision there. AndI think these speeches go over like a
lead balloon, you know, inthe seventy sixth election, as we all
know, his name becomes almost acurse wordy Kissingers as fort us to pretend
he doesn't know him. And soI guess it's just a question, Tom,
And we've actually talked with this before, but I'd love to hear you
reflect on how could someone who wasso politically astute at working in the lions

(34:37):
den of Richard Nixon's white House andsurvive Watergate as almost no one else did,
how could he be so tone deafto other politics around him. Well,
I think he did get more isolatedas he as is, both power
and celebrity increase, so that hedidn't early on he was you know,

(34:58):
he talked a lot with Democrats.He talked a lot. He had a
lot of friends among journalists in theestablishment, in the Washington Post, New
York Times group, and I thinkthat those sorts of relationships benefited him a
great deal in the early period ofhis ascendancy. But as he became more
powerful, I think, and asparticularly the concervative wing of the Republican Party

(35:22):
began to coalesce and be concerned aboutexcessively appeasing the Soviet Union, I think
he became less. Those people werenot in his group, Those were not
the people he was talking to,and I think he became somewhat tone deaf
to them, I mean, theDemocrats and human rights in some ways.

(35:42):
I mean, he was very goodwith people like Fulbright. He had a
harder time with the mcgoverns and others. He could deal with people who were
concerned about American power being overextended,but not with people who are concerned about
whether we were freeing political dissidents orpushing authoritarian regimes to be more liberal.
So I think there might be athere may be an element in there,

(36:07):
a degree to which he became orhe listened to his press clippings more than
he dealt with opposition, even thoughhe always always had a there was always
this thing. Walter Isaacson commented inhis biography that the way to get Kissinger's
attention was to write something critical abouthim, and then he'd call you up
or something. But I think hedid become a bit clue ist. Brent's

(36:28):
Gocroft, who I did have achance to talk with, said that he
thought Kissinger really never really connected witha lot of the more conservative Republicans that
were developing around Ronald Reagan and othersin seventy six, and that now he
made an effort afterwards to sort ofcatch up with that, and he did
his best to try and get intothe Reagan circle, but he never was

(36:52):
trusted by them, and that thatalways kept him, I think, from
having the type of influence he wantedto. He wanted to come back as
Secretary of State. He wanted tocome back and never did. And that
is actually one of the interesting storiesas well about his career. Yeah.
Yeah. The only thing I'd addtom to that excellent explanation is, you
know, I think one of thethings his career warns us about, and

(37:14):
I think you implied this in youranswer, is the hubris and self centeredness
of power, even for someone whoI think is as self conscious about it
as he is. I do thinkjust as you said, I think you
show this so well in your book, and I recommend it to everyone is
there. He does change over timeand the accretion of power, and particularly
during Watergate, I think the absenceof the president I think, I think

(37:37):
it does not necessarily in a legallycorrupting but in a morally corrupting way,
in an intellectually corrupting way. AndI think he I think he loses perspective.
And then I think his hunger forpower thereafter almost does a disservice to
some of his thinking before it.Would you agree with that, Yeah,
I think so. I think whenyou see how much he alienated Congress after

(38:00):
the seventy four elections and really hada hard time dealing with congressional leaders,
even though I had a number ofthem who were his allies and would have
been his allies, I do think, I do think it became harder for
him to accept the type of critiquethey were offering. He thought they had
done a great job, and nowthese people are coming after him on all
the things that they had accomplished.He felt, you know, the relationship

(38:23):
with the Soviet Union, which somany had been so concerned with when they
started were in power, and nowit was more balanced, and suddenly everyone
was criticizing him for it, orthe Salt Agreements, these sorts of things.
So I think he I would agreewith you wholeheartedly that I think there's
a hubrisk here of being able,unable really to adapt to changing political circumstances

(38:45):
in a way. And gerald Fordtried to school him on this, but
gerald Ford was always in awe ofHenry Kissinger, and so I think even
that effort did not work as itmight have, even when he tried gently
in some ways to distance himself.I think other people like Rumsfeld and others
wanted to fire Kissinger and get ridof him and that and Forward always resisted

(39:06):
that. So, having had achance to meet and work with Rumsfeld in
his second tour, I can seethat as an attitude Rumshald had toward a
lot of people. But let meturn to some of these questions. Very
interesting and the first one I thinkthis is when a lot of people are
asking, and maybe I think itties to some of the themes Jeremy race

(39:28):
was Was there something in the wayKissinger's career, his way of thinking before
he became Secretary of State? Didit cause him to miss anything about China
today? Was he overly optimistic aboutChina? Did he how did he?
Did it cause him to miss theturn in relations? Now between China and

(39:49):
the US has gone so frosty.And then I think this person might have
been in college at Harvard and aroundthe Kissinger he said, did he not
learn anything from John Fairbank or Reichshauergrect. I mean that sounds like it's
directed at you. Yeah, thisquestion go ahead, Yeah, it's a
great question. I mean the firstthing that has to be said, right
is that McCarthyism had an effect inthe United States and the American Academy when

(40:14):
Kissinger was there, of limiting accessto knowledge on China. This is an
old argument that was made about explainingAmerican missteps in Vietnam, and I think
it's still true, which is,we went in without the body of knowledge
you thought we would have had forthat region because following the McCarthy ied period,
during the McArthur period, people likeOwen Latimore and many others who had

(40:35):
a lot to offer were pushed out, especially if they had nice things to
say about mat se Don. Andso even though John Fairbank and Reichschera were
around, they were the exceptions tothe rule. Kissinger showed very little interest
as far as I can tell,in China during the nineteen fifties and the
early nineteen sixties. I think hecame to it late, so it's not
that he learned the wrong lessons,that he came to it actually with very

(40:59):
little knowledge of China, and Ithink Nixon knew much more about China.
Nixon had spent much more time asVice president thinking about China. He had
been briefed during the Komorimatsui crises andthings of that sort. Kissinger know he
was around the Council on Foreign Relations, he was around Nelson Rockefeller's group,
but at Harvard, I don't thinkhe was really doing much with regard to

(41:21):
China. And I think that's whyChina fell into this template, this model
for him of a great civilization,the Germany of Asia, a civilization that
had existed for centuries. And healso believed that China recognized that its foremost
adversary by the late sixties and earlyseventies was the Soviet Union, not the

(41:43):
United States. They were involved ina shooting war, and in nineteen sixty
nine there was even talk of thatwar going beyond just a border skirmish.
And he recognized, and I wasgetting briefings on that to a level that
most Americans weren't. So the combinationof his shall we say Schamat view of
China and then the intelligence he wasgetting on the border conflict that really colored

(42:06):
his view. It's extraordinary, though, the leap that he and Nixon make
in reaching out to China. Onthe one hand, you can say it
shows their perspicacity and their courage.On the other hand, it can show
their flagrant reckless behavior. I mean, it's the only time I know,
John where a president goes in seventytwo to a foreign country without a pre

(42:29):
arranged agenda. You know, whenthe president comes to Austin, he has
a pre arranged agenda for every minute. Right they go to China, they
don't even know they're going to getthe meeting with Mao. They take a
lot of risks, and I thinkthat reflects the combination of strategic planning and
strategic hope with detailed ignorance that theythat they bring the t They rolled the

(42:51):
dice and it happened to work outwell, at least in that time.
I add. I think also though, that you can't underestimate the domestic police
importance of China. China reversed thepolls for time. It was a popular
move to embrace China in nineteen seventyone, very very popular, and Nixon

(43:12):
and Kissinger saw this is or Nixonmore maybe than Kissinger, but Kissinger too.
I mean the elaborate coverage of theChina visit, that the polling afterwards
showing that you know, almost everyAmerican knew about Nixon going to China,
the whole idea that only Nixon couldgo to China, all of that was
really quite an important thing, andI think it had a real impact on

(43:35):
Kissinger in terms of his thinking tooabout the significance of China. He tells
a British diplomat in nineteen seventy three, China is our best NATO ally.
I mean he was enthusiastic. Yes, we could say some ignorance there,
but I think in the tactical termsof the Cold War and the politics at
the time, it looked great.Now we have a different perspective on China,

(43:57):
but I think we have to keepin mind what what happened at that
time, or what were the conditionswere. I'm pulling together two questions here
which have a very similar theme.There is not surprising you have a lot
of international lawyers listening in. They'revery curious about what both of you said
about Kissinger's skeptical attitude towards international organizations. I want to ask more about why

(44:20):
was that? And so you havetwo gear one they just these are just
examples, they feel of international organizationsthat Kissinger was very skeptical of. But
they're inviting your broader ideas. Whydid Kissinger have such skepticism? So one
is the World Trade Organization? Youknow, So this person writes, would
Kissinger actually be happy with the waythe Biden and Trump administrations have been so

(44:45):
almost hostile to the WTO and thesort of return of trade sanctions, tariffs,
lack of respect for the wtwo asa body. And then they say,
also Kissinger's attitude, of course personallydriven in some way towards the International
Criminal Court and his personal worry ofbeing indicted and tried by the ICC.

(45:10):
But is it the personal this resistancetowards international organizations? Is it Jeremyson was
justting earlier. It's no, it'sreally part of his broader approach to thinking.
Some of this is I guess howmuch of it was skepticism driven while
he was Secretary State, and howmuch is it driven by what he thinks
after a secretary of state towards Io'sJeremy, why don't you go ahead?

(45:32):
I think you raised the issue first. Sure, sure, and I think
it's both right to the latter partof your question. I think there's a
longstanding skepticism and articulate skepticism, alearned skepticism about international organizations that he has.
He's not opposed to them, buthe sees them playing a minor role
supporting the work of the great powers. Right, they are to support the

(45:54):
world's work of the great powers,they are not to supersede that. And
I think that's where the difference reallycomes in because the claim that some make
through the ICC, and I thinkit's also a well formulated claim, is
that the ICC in some ways,I think Article ninety eight right in some
cases, would give the ICC theability to supersede the criminal trial of the

(46:14):
Slobodom Melosovitch being an example perhaps ofthis. So he was skeptical of that,
He was not skeptical of the existingexistence of international organizations. You mentioned
the WTO. He actually supported Chineseentrance into the WTO, if I remember
correctly. I think he was atthe White House when Clinton announced that supportive
of the Democratic President bringing China intothe wto supportive of the idea that this

(46:37):
would make China, what was ita responsible stakeholder? I think is the
phraseology that was used at the time. Kissinger's skepticism about international organizations was he
didn't believe, number one, thatthey would ever have the power or the
cultural capital that the great powers wouldhave. And second, he believed that

(46:57):
they could be captured and would becaptured often by other actors, that they
would have the problems of regulatory capturein their elements. And he had seen
that in the General Assembly. Hehad witnessed how the General Assembly of the
United Nations had been transformed around somany issues because of the changing composition of
the General Assembly, and so hebelieved that the organization should be subsumed within

(47:23):
this federal structure. And later whenthese organizations, particularly the ICC, went
after him, it was very personal. He felt, I think, not
only that he was being disrespected,he felt he was being constrained from doing
the good work he should still bedoing, and we should recognize it had
an effect. There were parts ofthe world he couldn't travel to. He

(47:45):
had to be careful when he movedin different areas. So no one should
deny that this was personal. Itwould just be improper to say that it
didn't have a true intellectual foundation toit. As well, would add that
he did see a relationship between politicsand economics, that, for example,
on the when the Europeans came downhard on the Middle East, opposing some

(48:07):
of his policies, he was notshy about going after the European Union and
working toward and saying, look,you guys are getting our protection, and
yet you know you're you're you're doingthings economically against us and your opposing us
in policy. So he had hehad a respect for the institutions, and
even in the United Nations. Imean, he deeply disliked the the passage

(48:29):
of the resolution comparing Zionism to racism, but at the same time he didn't
want moynihan to to damage the USrole in the UN. So he was
ambivlent sometimes about how he wanted totreat international organizations. But I'd largely agree
with Jeremy that he saw that youknow, they had they played a role,
but they were not They did nothave the power to really be decisive

(48:52):
in this manner, there are aseries of questions. It's almost like these
questions wish Kissing it was around asan ai and we could just ask him
questions about what to do now.So let me let me I could put
a team maybe this way. Imean, it's kind of like what you
were both saying, because of hiscomplex mind and his importance. But we've

(49:14):
got a lot of foreign policy challengesgoing wrong right now. Maybe each of
you could pick one and explain whatwould Kissinger think we should do. I
mean, obviously there are questions aboutUkraine, Gaza, China. I mean,
unfortunately these days you could go onand on Russia. Uh. Maybe,
But because there's so many questions ofthis nature, I would just say,

(49:34):
maybe each of you could pick oneof these hot spot problems we have
right now, and what would Kissingersay? What woul Kissinger recommend we do?
Maybe you could pick one where Kissingerviews might be the most different from
what we are doing today. Maybethat would be interesting. But Tom,
why don't you start on that one? What is it that? Sorry to
sticky with all the hard one,but you know I am in the world

(49:57):
to Yeah, please have been thinkingabout this a lot in relation to the
Middle East, and particularly what TonyBlinkett has been trying to do by traveling
to different countries. You know,there is I think Kissinger would have been
drawn perhaps to the idea that there'spossibilities for a breakthrough. I mean,
he saw the war in nineteen seventythree as opening up possibilities. He might

(50:22):
have thought that the Hamas Israeli waropened up new possibilities, but I think
he would have also recognized that italso had certain it created certain problems as
well. But I think particularly theidea that there could be some sort of
a trade off or settlement here givingPalestinians greater autonomy or something of resembling a

(50:49):
state in return for Saudi Arabian arecognition of Israel and a role in rebuilding
Saudi Arabian Egypt, say, arole in rebuilding Gaza, or also how
being in the West Bank. SoI think he might have thought that there
might be the possibility of arranging somethinglike that as a way and then using
that as a way of trying toorganize a coalition against the Iranians, who

(51:14):
are playing the key role it seemsto be in trying to disrupt any type
of American vision. He was supportiveof the Abraham accurts and thought that they
were a step forward. You're right, Jeremy's right about his view of the
Palestinians. But I think he mighthave seen, just as he came to
see in seventy three, the importanceof Egypt and later the importance of Syria

(51:37):
as well as in negotiating that hemight have seen the importance if we could
find Palestinians were willing to work withthe Egyptians in Saudis, perhaps in some
sort of a comprehensive settlement. ButI have thought that Blincoln, in replicating
the sort of travels, is atleast trying to do something along those lines.

(52:00):
So again, the great thing thatKissinger head in nineteen seventy three that
Lincoln does not have is that Iranat that time was our ally and was
favorably disposed to Israel. Iran's situationnow, in many respects maybe resembles more
what the Soviet Union was doing atthe time, or at least its concerns

(52:21):
and role in that. So thatwould be my thought that he might have
been advising along those lines, well, though maybe in a surprising direction.
I agree with everything that Tom said. I think at the end of his
life, and I think if hewere still around today, Kissinger would emphasize
his cosmopolitanism. I mean, there'sa big theme of my book that he

(52:43):
is a true cosmopolitan. He ispossible because the United States internationalizes. I
mean, when he's a student atHarvard, he's in a Jewish only dorm.
When he becomes Secretary of State,he's the first Jewish Secretary of State.
He really saw the strength of theUnited States as an assimilationists. It's
maybe an older vision, but avision I still find compelling, of bringing

(53:05):
people from different parts of the worldtogether, and that the United States being
a special country for people from differentparts of the world. Where am I
going with this? I think he'dbe a palled at our immigration policies.
I think Kissinger was a supporter ofallowing talented people to come into the United
States and become citizens, what hehad experienced with his own family coming in

(53:25):
nineteen thirty eight, of opening ourinstitutions to them. He would push back
very hard on the isolationist elements Johnthat I see in both parties right now.
The notion that you would tie thefuture security of Europe, whatever you're
doing in Ukraine to the border,and that you would hold both, hold

(53:45):
both hostage for political reasons. Ithink that would be a step too far
for him. I think he wouldwarn against us, and he would remind
us that the American dream is adream of immigration and a dream of supporting
free peoples around the world. Ifear too many people in our society have
forgotten that. John and I worryabout that. Well, I have to

(54:06):
say, just as moderator, Ido share your views on that too,
but I'm the moderator. I can'tsay anything about that. To quote my
favorite British political sitcom, you mightthink that I could not possibly comment which
is from the House of Cards?Which cards? So this is actually really

(54:29):
interesting question from an economist who saidwho says economists who've studied Kissinger have criticized
him actually for leaving economics out ofthe way he thought about things, or
tended to downplay economics as a toolof staycraft, or would sometimes miss very
important economic dimensions of some of thedecisions. To the point I guess this

(54:52):
person quotes Peter Drucker, a wellknown you know economists, who said,
quote Kissinger's refusal to include economics andhis plans, and it was a blunder
of the first magnitude unquote. Whatdo you think about that? Did Kissinger
have sort of a blind spot withthe economics or did he really think of
it just thought it wasn't this important? Is this something that actually you could

(55:14):
probably make this criticism of American formpolicy sense too, But is this what
do you think of this comment fromthe economics part of the audience? Tom
Well, Okay, I you know, he he did downplay it. I
think he knew more about it thanhe He deliberately in some senses, absented

(55:35):
himself from a lot of the economicpolicy making. One of the most important
steps Nixon did in his first termwas of course, breaking the the bond
between gold and the dollar and endingthe Bretton Wood system, and this created
an enormous disruption with the Allies thatKissinger ended up having to play a role

(55:57):
in trying to ease over, especiallyJohn Cock, who was sort of an
early version of Donald Trump and theway he talked about the Europeans and the
way he discussed these matters. Kissingerdid, as Secretary of State, find
himself involved with more of the economicissues, food the food crisis in nineteen
seventy five, and some of thequestions of the economic the new international economic

(56:22):
order, which he sort of finessedin some ways or moved away from,
but he was not. I thinkit probably is fair to say that this
did not preoccupy him. I thinkhe felt that he could work with others
on that. I think later,as he became an international consultant and in
his private sector work, he becamemuch more caught up with economic issues,

(56:44):
trade issues and the rest. Andeventually I think we may have work that
will document that more fully about hiscareer after he was Secretary of State.
But that would be my take onthat. Yeah, the only thing Jeremy
two minutes before we have to end, all right, a short addition to
Tom's really thoughtful answer, and Iwonder if you'll agree, Tom. I

(57:06):
think he also in part stayed awayfrom economic policy in the Nixon administration because
Nixon was so obsessed with economics inits relationship to his reelection, and so
Kissinger was carving out a space forhimself. It seemed to me as the
strategic specialist, leaving the economics toArthur Burdens, who was Chair of the
Federal Reserve and George Schultz and othersdo agree with that. Tom, absolutely,

(57:28):
no, I think that's right.It's not as if he didn't.
I mean, he dealt with therepercussions from the decisions, he had to
deal with the diplomacy of that.But yes, Well, thank you so
much for this wonderful discussion, andI'm going to turn the session back over
to Jack Kapezi to close. Andagain Tom and Jeremy, thank you very
much. This was really wonderful.This is the is it fairdies the best

(57:52):
time I've ever had on a FederalSociety podcast. That is high compliment,
John, thank you, thank you? Or no, it's hard to say
Jack, please, well, thankyou John. I certainly agree with what
you have to say there and onbehalf of the Federal Society. I just
want to extend a thank you toProfessor Surrey and Professor Schwartz for being so

(58:13):
generous with their time and expertise today, and of course to you as well,
Professor you from moderating. If you'dlike to watch a recording of this
discussion, it will be made availableon YouTube immediately after we're done here today,
and then it will be re uploadedto our website later on. As
always, we do welcome listener feedbackat info at fedashstock dot org. And

(58:36):
with that, thank you all verymuch for being with us today. We
are adjourned. Thank you for listeningto this episode of fedsoc Forums, a
podcast of the Federal Societies Practice Groups. For more information about the Federal Society,
the practice groups, and to becomea Federal Society member, please visit
our website at fedsoc dot ne org.